I see free will as a necessary precondition for any human understanding consistent with a Kantian pure intuition (...) which I'd be grateful if someone could confirm or deny. — Hanover

I shall deny, albeit second-handedly.

“....This pure form of sensibility I shall call pure intuition..... (A20/B35)
“....it will be found that there are two pure forms of sensibility, or, pure intuitions, namely, space and time.... (A22/B36)
.....The sphere of phenomena is the only sphere of their validity, and if we venture out of this, no further use can be made of them....” (A39/B56)

Freedom of the will is a necessary precondition of some human understanding, but not any human understanding consistent with pure intuitions. That which takes the place of pure intuitions operating under speculative empirical conditions, are the so-called hypothetical or categorical imperatives, which legislate in the same manner but under practical moral conditions alone. The former has to do with what is, the latter with what ought to be.

“...Now morality does not require the speculative cognition** of freedom; it is enough that I can think it, that its conception involves no contradiction, that it does not interfere with the mechanism of nature. But even this requirement we could not satisfy, if we had not learnt the twofold sense in which things may be taken; and it is only in this way that the doctrine of morality and the doctrine of nature are confined within their proper limits....” (Bxxix)
(** absolutely requiring the pure intuitions of space and time)

For whatever all that’s worth......

I'm not familiar with this distinction of four perspectives. Is it raised later in the CPR? — darthbarracuda

(Sigh) Ya know, I often frown upon subjectively, and sometimes chastise objectively, those who take some passage and reinvent it. So...here I am, unceremoniously busted for doing exactly that. From this little bit in the B introduction at xxviii.....

“.....For pure speculative reason has this peculiarity about it, that it can and should measure its own capacity according to the different ways for choosing the objects of its thinking, and also completely enumerate the manifold ways of putting problems before itself, so as to catalog the entire preliminary sketch of a whole system of metaphysics; because, regarding the first point, in a priori cognition nothing can be ascribed to the objectsd except what the thinking subject takes out of itself, and regarding the second, pure speculative reason is, in respect of principlese of cognition, a unity entirely separate and subsisting for itself, in which, as in an organized body, every part exists for the sake of all the others as all the others exist for its sake, and no principle can be taken with certainty in one relation unless it has at the same time been investigated in its thoroughgoing relation to the entire use of pure reason....”

.....I unceremoniously took it upon myself to substitute perspective for relation. But there’s enough support for the substitution, elsewhere and throughout the text, I think, to make it at least not inconsistent. Kant is notorious for saying stuff like, understanding views all its conceptions....., or, imagination reaches for its synthesis....., which just makes it seem like these faculties have a sort of capacity to reflect or look at their objects, which is, for all intents and purposes, a perspective these faculties possess, relative to the mode by which objects are presented to them.

So rather than a reification of abstract ideas on my part, which is usually considered an argumentative fallacy, I think the use of perspective as more along the lines of a rhetorical device, which is sort of allowed. Still, CPR can be successfully studied without the notion of perspectives. Whatever suits the student, right?
—————

Space is not an intuition.....
— Mww

Not sure if I agree with this exactly....(...)
......but a representation cannot be both a concept and an intuition for they have a different nature. — darthbarracuda

Point to you. I should have said, “space is not an empirical intuition”, insofar as all intuitions are of appearances and space does not appear in sensations. It is easy to see that space is necessary for the determinations of sensible objects, insofar as objects must be in space in order to be a perception for us. This from the metaphysical exposition of the conception of space. As such, we represent to ourselves a condition which pertains to all objects, as opposed to intuitions respecting the dissimilar matter of them. I suppose Kant means to say that whenever something is represented about an object, the representation of its space must have already been given, from which is deduced that space is then the form of sensibility, or, “....that which effects that the content of phenomena can be arranged under certain relations...”. All this means is, we cognize one end of this undetermined object as “tail” and the other end as “head”, with absolute certainty, because one is intuited as being in a different spatial relation from the other, and all that such that the conception of “dog” doesn't contradict itself. And while this seems like an awful lot of trouble to go through every time, the methodology of the system as a whole, just wouldn’t work without doing exactly that.

On the other hand, from the transcendental exposition of the same conception...Kantian dualism once more....in the case of synthetic a priori cognitions in which there are determinations on objects that are not of sensibility, re: geometric figures, which give to us a representation of the determinable space these figures enclose, it is found that this space is necessarily intuited as well, but not under empirical conditions. Kant says of this, “....What, then, must be our representation of space, in order that such a cognition of it may be possible? It must be originally intuition...” (added in B41, omitted in A).

Apparently, a representation can be both an intuition and a conception, albeit from different perspectives. Space is represented here as an intuition, there as a conception, but always a priori.

There’s a very good examination of the background history of Kantian critical philosophy in the introduction by Guyer/Wood, found here: http://strangebeautiful.com/other-texts/kant-first-critique-cambridge.pdf . Damn thing is 80 pages long, just as a measly intro, but there’s a lot of interesting commentary in it. You might find it useful.

0. There really isn’t a definition qua certain criterion, for cognition as such. There are fly-by’s, like, “thought is cognition by means of conceptions”, or, “(truth is) the accordance of a cognition with its object”. Cognition, in and of itself, is hidden in this passage: “...the unity of the act of arranging diverse representations under one common representation....” (A68/B93), in which it may be surmised cognition is the culmination (the unity) of the act (the logical “function”) of the understanding in synthesizing a series of conceptions under a general representation.

1. Spontaneity. Which makes more sense....that there exists in some faculty of the human mind a repository of all possible conceptions, even for that of which there is as yet no thought, or, a certain faculty of human reason brings up new conceptions pursuant to a circumstance in which no extant conception is sufficient? If the former, there would be no need to conceive anything at all, for the conception of it, no matter what it is, is already present in the mind. But then we would need a mechanism by which the mind, which is itself not part of the cognitive system, picks and chooses the proper conception out of every possible standing iteration resident in the repository, and then gives the conception to understanding, which most certainly is part of the cognitive system. Now, such could be the case, but parsimony suggests the simplicity of just letting understanding be that faculty by which conceptions arise, and that only and always in conjunction with something else already given by the system, re: phenomenon, because in that way, the system remains a unified procedure, operating by and within itself, without the influence of that which is not contained in it.

Again....transcendental philosophy. We aren’t talking about what we know. We talking about how it is possible to know, which presupposes not knowing. It follows that T.P. concerns itself with that instance between the absence of and the acquisition of, knowledge. In other words, the first ever instance of it. People are fond of missing the implication, instead complicating it by insinuating the effect of extant knowledge, when the cognitive system is most effective in, and absolutely necessary for, the absence of it. From the conception of “wheel” to the conceptions of “quark”, it’s all done the same way, the only difference being the time of it.

3. “Our nature is such that intuitions are never not sensuous; they must always appertain to the way in which objects affect us”

How can Kant claim to know this, — darthbarracuda

He doesn’t claim to know it; he claims that according to transcendental philosophy, such is a necessary hypothesis such that the philosophy is internally consistent and logically coherent. There is never an empirical proof for speculative metaphysics. What may be said that he does know, is that if intuitions are in some case not of sensuous origin, the entire treatise is worthless.

4. “Pure general logic contains only a priori principles which can be applied to either empirical or transcendental content.”

By transcendental content, I take Kant to mean space and time? — darthbarracuda

No. Logic has to do with understanding, as phenomena has to do with sensibility. Kantian dualism. The transcendental content of the logic of understanding, are the categories, which provide “.....unity to the different representation in a judgement...”. Space and time, as pure intuitions, are that which makes representations of objects possible, but has nothing to do with either the empirical content of phenomena, nor with judgements respecting the unity of those representations. Space and time, on the other hand, as conceptions, are deduced transcendentally, which merely indicates their objective reality and logical validity are thought absent any empirical influence in the formulation of their respective representations, and, their employment is completely a priori. This does not, however, make them transcendental conceptions, but only indicates the manner of their production.

An a priori principle takes the form of conceptions such as “cause”. While we have no logical need of cognizing a cause for the possibility of objects of sense, we certainly must append the conception of space to them necessarily, as a pure a priori intuition, as a means to justify the invocation of the system in the first place. “....for mere intuition does not in any respect stand in need of the functions of thought...” (A91/B123)

6. The answer to that is in the notes.

I don't understand what you mean by systemic successions, could you clarify this? — darthbarracuda

Systemic successions is just me, keeping the theoretically mandated order of the particular influences of the particular elements involved, between the perception of an object and the experience of it.
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"Give to ourselves" - I take this to not mean things like memory or imagination (which we present to ourselves without an external stimuli), but rather that which does not have its original origin in us? — darthbarracuda

Backwards. Given to us means has its origin external to us; given to ourselves means has its origin internally within us. Thus, “give to ourselves” does mean things like memory, imagination. Technically, every facet of the representational cognitive system we give to ourselves. The world only gives to us the things on which the system is used.
—————

the intuition of space is not identical to the conception of space. — darthbarracuda

Space is not an intuition, because all intuitions have sensuous origins, and we never sense space. Space for us is never a phenomenon. Space is called a pure intuition just to provide a condition under which objects of perception can be said to be located relative to us or to each other. As a conception, it allows the concept of motion to have meaning. Just as time as a concept allows change to have meaning.
————-

How do I imagine space without something in it? — darthbarracuda

By imagining where some object would have to be, if there was one. Don’t forget, in Kantian-ese, you’re imagining a transcendental ideal, not a thing. Just hold out your hand, palm up, and imagine a Mars bar sitting there. Now think away the Mars bar, and imagine the space it was in, which you should be able to do. Now....just for fun....try thinking away the space the bar was in. You can’t, because there wasn’t, and never could be, anything relative to that empty space. There no such thing as an empty thought, you cannot think of that which may take the place of the space you thought away, therefore it is impossible to think it away in the first place. That’s why, along with time, Kant calls them ideals, because they are not themselves conditioned by anything. Instead, they are the conditions. Speculative epistemological metaphysics.

Besides, I don’t see a problem with imagining the empty space between two objects a foot apart. Elementary particle physics aside, of course, which we don’t care about anyway, but people like to try proving Kant wrong by bringing up such nonsense.
————

The book is a critique of reason. Reason is what the show is all about. Transcendental is a perspective, one of four, that reason takes with respect to what it is doing at any given time, the others being empirical, rational and judicial, or, moral. Reason examines....we can examine using reason in these various perspectives....everything from one or more of those perspectives, and some require all of them, re: freedom of the will. The most noteworthy being, of course, the so-called Copernican Revolution....something Kant never said by the way....in which reason is said to look at things from a different point of view. The ultimate transcendental perspective.

Amazing, isn’t it, how human intellect can’t get out of its own way?

How would it even be possible to discern, with apodeictic certainty, whether there are intrinsic patterns in Nature, or, there are occurrences in Nature that appear as intrinsically orderly to an intelligent observer?

Given that order is a relation between two things, what sense does it make to say order is intrinsic to two things, one of which is not an observer sufficiently intelligent enough to estimate it? It follows that it makes no difference whatsoever, and is therefore utterly meaningless, for there to be patterns as an intrinsic condition of the empirical domain, if there is no intelligence to which the pattern is comprehensible.

Ironic, though, that it takes an intelligence to determine that which constitutes a pattern, or an orderly occurrence of some kind, then declare there is no such thing as a pattern or orderly occurrence without him as a witness to it. In effect, he is both the author and the arbiter, over that of which he has absolutely no control.

(Sigh)

0. The whole is not the same as its parts.
1. Immediate merely indicates systemic successions. Everything starts somewhere.
2. Because object herein relates to intuition, they are real, physical existences with the capacity to affect the senses. They are distinguished thereby, from objects of reason, objects of experience, ideas, notions, transcendental objects in general which do not affect the senses.
3. It is enough to say the time of the affect on the senses by objects, is sufficient for how intuitions happen. Intuitions do happen in time, but that doesn’t say how they happen. For that, we really don’t have an explanation, nor do we need one.
4. Intrinsic Kantian dualism. Given to us here means that which we do not give to ourselves. That which is a perception vs that which is merely thought.
5. Keep in mind the perspective. This has all to do with the empirical side of reason, thus objects here are the real physical things in the world. Signs are the matter of objects in accordance with the mode of their affect. One kind of sign of an object is its odor, another sign is its shape.....and so on. Like any sign, it is a preliminary indication of that which is to understood by means of it, but in this case, a preliminary indication of the phenomenon it should become. Thought must relate just says the conceptions synthesized to intuitions must be imagined as necessarily belonging together. In other words, it is inconsistent to synthesize a conception belonging to smell, to a sign given from the sense of sight.
6. Representations are not all present to awareness, but that which is present to awareness, is a representation. Intuition and conceptions are representations, as are ideas, sensations, even perceptions themselves. As unsatisfying as it may be, representations are the means by which reason explains itself.
7. In this system, an object of intuition just indicates any object of perception in general, that is as yet merely an appearance. An undetermined object of intuition, per se is that which follows from the operation of that faculty, which is therefore a phenomenon, a particular determinable representation. Intuition can be said, if anything, to contain the forms of objects, insofar as such forms reside a priori in this faculty. The CofJ gives a more inclusive exposition of this part of the system....changes in subjective conditions, and all that. Aesthetic vs empirical judgements. Productive vs reproduction imagination. Seriously complex methodology, needless to say.
8. It is safe to say manifold content is the matter of the object, because all sensation is with respect to it. Technically, that which in phenomena is arranged according to forms, is the manifold content of them, and they correspond to the sensation from which they are given. The inference being, if the matter of objects were that which is arranged, they would be determined by that arrangement. It follows that if object were to be determined merely from the arrangement of its matter, there would be no need of any synthesis with conceptions in order to experience an object as a certain thing, and the entire transcendental system immediately becomes untenable.
9. Space is an intuition....a pure intuition only....because it is considered to be the necessary condition for the experience of objects. Space is a conception insofar as it must first be thought as both justified for, and logically consistent with, the role it plays in a theoretical system. If space could not be thought, it could never be a conception. If never a conception, never a possibility. If never a possibility, never a necessity. If never a necessity, never a necessary condition. If never a necessary condition, never a logically justified domain in which objects are to be found, because we already know with absolute certainty where they are not. If no logically justified domain in which they are to be found, no logically justified possibility of being known. A contradiction.
10. That space is necessary for objects, and objects are necessary for color, it follows that empty space will be absent any color, which is merely our conception of black, which is contingent on objects in space, not the space they are in. Extension is shape, neither extension nor shape is a property of black. Space doesn’t have shape, insofar as all parts of space are each themselves just space, and the shape of objects is merely the limits of the space it is in. To imply space as black or that black is extended, are a transcendental illusions of mischaracterized reason.

Enough.

Damn!! No wonder you been absent so long.

Beautiful sentiments from the light.

And essentially ignored, in favor of puerile egos represented by the Mutual Admiration Society cheerleader section. The loudest voices with nothing worth saying.

You're a drink of water in the desert, you know. — Wayfarer

Yeah, well, you know how it goes. In keeping with the complementary nature of human reason, I’m as likely to be found just as full of centuries-old cow patties as are you.

the human conscious system, the primary determinant for understanding, does not operate in the same terms as cognitive neural biology measures.
— Mww

But physicalism, by definition, believes that everything in the Universe is resolvable to physical laws. — Wayfarer

To which I say.....big fat whoop!! To be human is to be a two-aspect biological entity, so even if physicalism proves we don’t really think, that brain mechanics is entirely determinable by natural law, it will still seem to us that we think. Any empirical science that denies that, is just stupid. I mean, c’mon, man. Has any experiment been done that wasn’t first thought? That wasn’t predicated on a necessarily antecedent judgement?

I have a long-standing interest in idealist and other non-materialist forms of philosophy — Wayfarer

As do I, for the excruciatingly simple reason that the rational workings between the ears is never susceptible to its own contradiction, which, of course, physicalism attempts to prove.

“....Let us once again assail your ears, That are so fortified against our story...”
(“Hamlet”, 1.1)

“....The true nature of things is evident only at the bottom, that is, on the molecular level, and so life can only be understood in those terms, that is, from the bottom up....”

And yet.....for those thinking, e.g., the moon landing a hoax, not one of them ever substituted the variables in the Hodgkin/Huxley equations, when explaining why he thought so, given his understanding of that which he considers as pertinent evidence.

So, no, not even close; the human conscious system, the primary determinant for understanding, does not operate in the same terms as cognitive neural biology measures.

Doesn’t matter how the brain works, when the ways and means for the transition from the given physical law governing matter, to the abstract logical law governing rational agency, is what we actually want to know.

vague and elastic nature of the concept. — Jack Cummins

That’s certainly half of it, and true enough in itself.

But the concept of mind can be unambiguous if the theory of which it is a constituent is logically consistent and internally complete. Then, of course, with respect to the other half, we have a plethora of theories, so we don’t gain much from a rational perspective, and gain not a damn thing from an empirical perspective.

Same as it ever was......

So, my own framing of the mind and body problem is in to put it back to the area of metaphysics. — Jack Cummins

Right where it belongs.

Whether or not there is an actual problem, the concept of mind, taken in its irreducible sense, is at least part of the question. That alone is sufficient to justify the claim the extent of the mind/body problem is entirely metaphysical.

For the time being.

There are numbers in Nature in the form of recursions — Fine Doubter

Hmmm. How does infinite reflections in paired mirrors prove numbers are contained in Nature?

If counting is a recursive procedure, the procedure itself cannot show numbers are already contained in Nature, for numbers must be presupposed in order for the procedure to even occur.

But....maybe neither of those are what you meant by recursive. In which case, I don’t understand what you do mean.

surely it was always obvious that maths is an ideal / a fiction / an approximation? — Fine Doubter

Yeah....a take-off on the old “is math invented or discovered” dichotomy. There are those that say math is ideal because there are no numbers in Nature, that math is a fiction because there are no mathematical laws in Nature, and that math is an approximation because the possibility exists that other rational agencies have different maths. Not to mention, any mathematical formulation predicated on pi must necessarily be an approximation.

What is sets of sets of sets?

What supports Kant against his usual opponents? Max Black’s comments? Is it Black that says what you wrote...

Some simple ones are 100 or 99 per cent synthetic and the more complex they get the greater the analytical proportion of it. — Fine Doubter

If so, that opposes Kant rather than supports him, insofar as Kant makes no mention of the varying degrees of analytic/synthetic with respect to mathematical judgements. Maybe nowadays, folks have added their own interpretations to Kantian metaphysics, but that shouldn’t detract from what the man himself says.

And Kant was brief about the analytic/synthetic dichotomy, because all he was trying to prove was the possibility of synthetic a priori cognitions. In order to do that, he first had to distinguish the conditions synthetic cognitions must have, from the other kinds of cognitions there are, then determine whether such cognitions were indeed possible a priori.

It turns out he was so brief, because it was so simple and easy to prove. In fact, he chastised Hume....gently of course..... for not having thought of it already.

Anyway.....drop in when you feel like it, bearing in mind there are no proper Kantian scholars here. Or, if there are, they’re being awful damn quiet.

Ok. Good to know.

“....Some few principles preposited by geometricians are, indeed, really analytical, and depend on the principle of contradiction.....

Yet, the analytic is conditioned by the....

“....Analytical judgements are therefore those in which the connection of the predicate with the subject is cogitated through identity....

Hard to reconcile this apparent mischaracterization. But assuming Kan knew what he wanted to say, the reconciliation must be possible. If that weren’t tough enough.....

“....Mathematical judgements are always synthetical.....

Given that geometricians are mathematicians, and all mathematical propositions are synthetic judgements, the “preposited” principles by geometricians must not be mathematical propositions covered by synthetical judgements. That being the case is supported by....

“....and depend on the principle of contradiction. They serve, however, like identical propositions, as links in the chain of method, not as principles—for example, a = a, the whole is equal to itself, or (a+b) —> a.....

Why not change a little teeny-weeny thing, and call it identity propositions? So if the “preposited” principles of geometricians that depend on the principle of contradiction, are really just the first links in a chain of a method, and if that method Is just formal logic, not mathematics, then it follows that it is only logical that the geometrician work with one figure in order to gain something from it, and he would not work with any other kind of figure, for working with trapezoids would necessarily contradict what he wanted to discover about a triangle. Hence, the preposited principle of contradiction relates to what figure he works on, but the real mathematical propositions remain synthetical, which relates to how he works with the figure.

Formal logic consists in conceptions by their similar identities, Kantian analytics consists in conceptions by their similar relations, within a given proposition. If conceptions can be conceived as relating without any additional conceptions supplementing that which is given in the proposition, or, which is the same thing, no additional conceptions are necessary to derive a truth from that proposition, it is analytical. This is a two-aspect system, the conceptions avail themselves to mere analysis for their similarity.

If the conceptions in a proposition cannot be related to each other without the addition of another conception, it is synthetical, and is a three-aspect system. The conceptions in this system avail themselves, not to analysis, but to synthesis, by means of which the additional conceptions are derived.

“....merely the equivocal nature of the expression.”

.....the expression being any considered analytical judgement, and the equivocation residing in the dual nature of, on the one hand, identity, and on the other, contradiction. Therefore, even geometrician’s judgements with respect to their profession alone, is nonetheless synthetic. And “...mathematical judgements are always synthetical...”, survives unscathed.

Dunno if that helps or not......

propose the concept of the 'thing outside of itself'; as an extension to the thing in itself. — Cheshire

implying an error probably exist in the original notion of the thing in itself. — Cheshire

....an extension of a probable error, which would necessarily implicate itself as a probable error.

1 + 1 = 3 + 1 = 4 is the error compounded, iff 1 + 1 = 3 is the error.

Seconded. And agreed.

Does Kant define what is transcendental metaphysics in the CPR? — Corvus

Not that I know of. Defines metaphysics as such, defines transcendental this or that pursuant to context, but doesn’t explicitly combine them. But he does so combine transcendental and philosophy, so one could make the leap if he wanted to badly enough.

And how would he answer? — tim wood

“....I confine myself to the examination of reason alone and its pure thought; and I do not need to seek far for the sum-total of its cognition, because it has its seat in my own mind....”

“...the mere natural disposition of the human mind to metaphysics...”

“...For we have not here to do with the nature of outward objects, which is infinite, but solely with the mind, which judges of the nature of objects, and, again, with the mind only in respect of its cognition a priori....”

“....the form must lie ready a priori for them in the mind....”

As unsatisfactory as that may be, that the mind is the catch-all for that which can’t be explained....but there it is. Besides, if Nature teaches, why would the notion of Copernicus’ transitional thesis even be mentioned as a preliminary inspiration for the entire transcendental philosophy? I submit that we teach ourselves, Nature being nothing but the availability of occasions.

“....Transcendental philosophy is the idea of a science, for which the Critique of Pure Reason must sketch the whole plan architectonically, that is, from principles, with a full guarantee for the validity and stability of all the parts which enter into the building. It is the system of all the principles of pure reason. If this Critique itself does not assume the title of transcendental philosophy, it is only because, to be a complete system, it ought to contain a full analysis of all human knowledge a priori. Our critique must, indeed, lay before us a complete enumeration of all the radical conceptions which constitute the said pure knowledge. But from the complete analysis of these conceptions themselves, as also from a complete investigation of those derived from them, it abstains, partly because it would be deviating from the end in view to occupy itself with this analysis, since this process is not attended with the difficulty and insecurity to be found in the synthesis, to which our critique is entirely devoted, and partly because it would be inconsistent with the unity of our plan to burden this essay with the vindication of the completeness of such an analysis and deduction, with which, after all, we have at present nothing to do. This completeness of the analysis of these radical conceptions, as well as of the deduction from the conceptions a priori which may be given by the analysis, we can, however, easily attain, provided only that we are in possession of all these radical conceptions, which are to serve as principles of the synthesis, and that in respect of this main purpose nothing is wanting....”

Cop-out? Or maybe merely the lazy way of saying....hell, damned if I know where these come from, but trust me, my system needs them so they must be there? Kantian metaphysics suffers these explanatory-gap slings and arrows yet, perhaps even for good reasons.

But still, “all the parts that enter into the building” seems to say the mind isn’t part of the building, but is just where, or is merely a euphemism for where, the building happens to be done.
————

I'm compelled to believe that the challenge for education is to figure out how to make the most esoteric and difficult of scientific pursuits that which children can address. — tim wood

“We don’t need no education.
We don’t need no thought control.
No dark sarcasms in the classroom.
Teacher!! Leave us kids alone!!”

“....it would be more consistent to favour a criticism of this kind, by which alone the labours of reason can be established on a firm basis, than to support the ridiculous despotism of the schools, which raise a loud cry of danger to the public over the destruction of cobwebs, of which the public has never taken any notice, and the loss of which, therefore, it can never feel....”

All that to say this: you know of Ron White, right? Guy that made “you can’t fix stupid” into a whole Las Vegas comedy show. Tours, HBO special, an album, the whole shootin’ match. Anyway....the public being those under the influence of the schools, and the schools being that which is challenged in a particular domain, Kant metaphorically says, “you can’t teach critical thinking”, for thinking of the pure a priori kind, that “...which rises to the level of speculation...”, is a fundamental human attribute, and one must teach himself to do it properly, with the least error.

It seems to me......

But experience is the teacher. — tim wood

Doesn’t this presuppose that which we wish to know? If experience is the teacher, from whence comes the teacher? Or, better yet....from what does the teacher learn?

But what is the ultimate measuring stick? Experience. — tim wood

Hume would clap for Scottish joy, that a modern intellectual finds his empiricist philosophy in good standing. Kant would exhibit typical Prussian indignation, that a modern intellectual neglects the implicit continuity, insofar as that which measures presupposes the ability, yet no account of it is offered.

There’s also a minor categorical error here, for we are talking about different applications of reason, but experience is the ultimate measuring stick of knowledge.

What are we to do with “exist together in independence of and without interference from each other”?

And no mention of the classifications of these kinds of reason. Practical reason can be pure, just as speculative reason can be impure.

Not to say that wasn’t some splendid axe-work. Far better than the general butchering running rampant hereabouts.

I’m not going to spend much time on this, but taken in context, re: “given the two basic kinds....I await...” is a declaration of intention, not an “ask”.

Can’t be reading stuff into what wasn’t there, doncha know.

I took it that your question as to how the one might be grounded in the other — Constance

While I didn’t technically ask a question, I was querying Tim, as to how he thought the one grounded in the other. The quote merely relates to Tim’s assertion, as a preliminary reference.

Hmmmmm, a question: — Constance

Sorry......what?

How could anything be understood absent the faculty of understanding — tim wood

Of course nothing can be, but intuition doesn’t have anything to do with understanding.....

“...the understanding cannot intuit and the sensuous faculty cannot think...”

....but we’re still in the sensing stage, not the conceiving stage. We’ve synthesized matter to form, according to appearance, giving phenomena, but haven’t yet synthesized concepts to phenomena, according to judgement, giving cognition.

Besides, all this intuitive synthesis being completely outside our awareness, it must be a priori, or, it isn’t even happening that way at all. Hence....speculative metaphysics. We are aware of sensuous impressions, we are aware of how those impressions are to be known. All in between, is guesswork, albeit necessarily logically consistent.
—————

if the CPR is intended to establish a ground for scientific thinking, which I think it is and does — tim wood

Nahhhh....scientific thinking had already been established, and it is the ground for the theoretical epistemology of pure reason.

“.....Whether the treatment of that portion of our knowledge which lies within the province of pure reason advances with that undeviating certainty which characterizes the progress of science, we shall be at no loss to determine. If we find those who are engaged in metaphysical pursuits, unable to come to an understanding as to the method which they ought to follow; if we find them, after the most elaborate preparations, invariably brought to a stand before the goal is reached, and compelled to retrace their steps and strike into fresh paths, we may then feel quite sure that they are far from having attained to the certainty of scientific progress and may rather be said to be merely groping about in the dark....”

CPR admits the validity of scientific thinking, that is, logical theory verified by experience, and thereby attempts to ground metaphysical thinking in accordance with the certainty of scientific thinking. It begins by asking, “...how is metaphysics as a science possible...”. (absent in A/ added in B22)

Now, if you’d said, CPR is intended to establish the ground for thinking scientifically......we’d be off to the rodeo.
—————-

if the CPR is intended to establish a ground for scientific thinking (...) it is itself grounded in practical reason. — tim wood

I’ve noticed you speak of this in other places and times. Sooner or later I probably would have asked about it.

Kant must have attributed to reason three fundamental conditions, for there are ....DUH!!!....three critiques, to wit:, theoretical (CPR), judicial (CofJ) and practical (CpR). Everydayman thinks more about his actions than about how he comes up with his actions, which implies practical reason has more importance overall than either of the other two conditional forms of reason. Nevertheless, given the two basic kinds of reason qua reason, pure and practical....

“.....To this question we have given a sufficient answer; for we have shown that, as the former stands in a relation to a different kind of condition from those of the latter, the law of the one does not affect the law of the other and that, consequently, both can exist together in independence of and without interference with each other....”

....I shall await your exposition as to how the one might be grounded in the other.

As there is no such thing as a triangle — tim wood

Just baffles me that people are alive and otherwise well, that reject that truism. Still, check out these rock formations:

https://thedailyplasma.blog/2017/11/03/triangles-in-nature-why/#:~:text=Triangular%20shapes%20are%20everywhere%20in%20Nature.%20They%20show,…%20well%2C%20natural.%20Or%20is%20it%20that%20simple%3F

Kinda hard for the average Smuck On The Street to agree there’s no triangles in Nature, when he can look right at ‘em.
————

there might be triangular shapes all around all the day long, what it takes to recognize them as triangles is an internal intuition with which those experiences conform. — tim wood

I think Kant would say those shapes are sensed, become phenomena, so must be empirical intuitions. The shapes may be recognized as triangles merely from being told the object is shaped in that particular way. In this case, the perceiver has no need to think a priori about lines or the arrangement of them, because the lines are there and they’ve already been arranged. Judgement merely says...yep, the spatial extension perceived conforms to the mental form cognized.

I think the key takeaway with respect to that quote, is that not everything of perception is a thing in itself. The first part of it states “object of this external intuition is itself possible”. But we’ve already agree there are no triangles in Nature, so it must be that “the object of this external intuition” is a sensible object we ourselves put in Nature. And because we created it, in accordance with its form residing in reason, It must appear to us as it is in itself. But it bears remembering we don’t need to cognize this appearance, herein the triangle in itself, because we’ve already cognized a priori exactly how the appearance will manifest and it is already known to us accordingly.

The second part asks, even if that which we construct and objectively illustrate then becomes a phenomenon because it affects our faculties of representation, we cannot say we know it as a thing in itself, which is already proven to be impossible, so it must be known in conjunction, not with its appearance from sensibility, but with its form from intuition, which we already have. Which is exactly what we did when we originally cognized it a priori, before the illustration of it.

The proper conclusion is, then, that there must be a faculty of intuition a priori within us.

Hope that makes sense, cuz it’s the hardest my brain has worked since.....oh, 1984, I think.

does this basically mean that thought is always tied to sensibility, but is nevertheless different from it? — darthbarracuda

Not quite. Thought is different from sensibility, but thought is always and only tied to understanding.

“....For it** is, according to what has been said above, a faculty of thought....”
“....understanding cannot intuit, and the sensuous faculty cannot think...”
(** “it”, in context, is understanding; “what has been said above” doesn’t paraphrase properly. See A69/B94)

Empirical intuition is tied to sensibility. We don’t think about our sensations; we only realize there has been one.

That does not mean that I can have pure a priori thoughts, though — darthbarracuda

Sure you can. Every change has a cause is an impure a priori cognition, insofar as here, something that changes is presupposed. You don’t have to step on the gas to know your car will go faster if you do. You also know it will also go a little faster if you get hit in the back by a little car, as well that it’ll go a lot faster if hit by a big truck.

But every change must have a cause is a pure a priori cognition, for it doesn’t consider any objects, but only the relation between objects in general, and time, which is.....as we all know....a pure intuition. And any proposition containing a pure representation, is pure a priori cognition. All parts of space are themselves space. And so on.

This reflects back to the mention of pure a priori cognitions thought as principles, or the laws derived from them. There is no exception to the principle, “every change must have a cause”, hence it is a pure a priori cognition. “No A can be not-A”, a law; “every existence is necessary”, a law; “existence cannot be a predicate but subject only”, a principle but not a law, for it has to do with the structure of pure reason itself, which is always speculative.
—————

meaning of these words: intuition, object, and representation. — darthbarracuda

Kant doesn’t say exactly what an intuition is, only what they do or how they come about. Empirically, or that which is an “external intuition” because its source is without us rather than within:

“....If, on the other hand, the object conforms to the nature of our faculty of intuition...”
“....sensible intuition, and hence are only conditions of the existence of things as phenomena...”
“....an intuition can take place only in so far as the object is given to us...”

This is quite difficult, because Kant also talks about “internal intuitions”, which do not arise from sensibility, hence are not susceptible to being phenomena, in other words, where an object is not given to us. As such, and because I can intuit myself as a thinking rational agent, but myself can hardly be considered a phenomenon, so it would seem internal intuitions are necessary. Kant is either not very clear about this, or he is far too clear, to the point of confusing his readers.

“...Now if there did not exist within you a faculty of intuition a priori; if this subjective condition were not in respect to its form also the universal condition a priori under which alone the object of this external intuition is itself possible; if the object (that is, the triangle) were something in itself, without relation to you the subject; how could you affirm that that which lies necessarily in your subjective conditions in order to construct a triangle, must also necessarily belong to the triangle in itself?...”

Good luck with that little tidbit. From that bolded, I just let the faculty of intuition be some contingent state of my subjective condition. I don’t really need to know exactly what it is, or its exact origin. If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it sorta thing.

An object in Kant is either a real physical thing, iff it can be represented as a phenomenon, or a predicate belonging to a copula, iff contained in a logical proposition, re: an object of reason, or an object of experience. The real object and the object of experience are not the same, but relate to each other with sufficient logical justification to say the sensed object is to be known as a certain thing. An object of experience, on the other hand, is nothing but what the cognitive system says it is, after applying itself to the real perceived object, re: cloud formations, mirages, or, what the system conceives on its own accord, without the presence of an object, re: hallucinations.

A representation is just what the cognitive system substitutes for the real thing, the most general word for an object at any stage in its de­termination by the subject, or for the subjective act of forming the object at that level. Intuitions and conceptions are representations, judgement is a representation of a representation. Knowledge is not, insofar as the determination of the object by the subject, is already accomplished.

For what it’s worth.....

In what way is a priori knowledge apodictic that makes it impossible for empirical knowledge to provide the same universality and necessity? — darthbarracuda

The way in which pure a priori knowledge is apodeitic is becaiuse it arises from the understanding alone, an internal cognitive faculty, thereby granting sufficient causality for certainty, in that there is no other influence on it. That which arises from itself, cannot be other than it is, which holds the same value as truth, but truth restricted to the very domain from which it is given. Now “not other than it is” may eventually be shown to be false, but at the originating time of it, the certainty is not questionable, and if eventually shown to be false, it cannot be of the same domain from which it originated, for in such case, there is an outside influence. It is clear from this stipulation, the only possible pure a priori knowledge is in the form of principles, or the laws derivable from them, either with respect to the physical domain, which is properly science, “...the science of what is...”, or with respect to the metaphysical domain, which is properly morality, “...the science of what ought to be...”. Again, a furtherance of the intrinsic Kantian epistemological dualism.

Universality and necessity are principles that cannot apply to anything empirical, because they are overturned by, subsumed under, the more powerful Principle of Induction, which makes explicit experience is always contingent: undeniable observational proof that what’s true today may not be true tomorrow, re: determinations of the nature of the observable Universe. What reason seeks, on the other hand, is that which is never contingent, or, which is the same thing, never self-contradictory, itself just conventional speech for seeking the unconditioned, the ideal, the irreducible. The question then becomes....does reason ever reach that state of affairs, and the Kantian speculative metaphysics proves it does not, and it cannot.

Given what reason cannot do, it remains to be determined what reason can do, the controlling condition being the LNC, which immediately suggests the entire human cognitive system is inherently logical. This, in turn, makes it impossible to demonstrate how logic itself comes about, but instead, must simply be granted as being the case. Otherwise, no theoretical sciences of any kind that are predicated on logical propositions can facilitate knowledge, which means we can never claim knowledge of anything at all.

That 7 + 5 = 12 is a synthetic a priori true proposition is certainly plausible to me, but that it is necessarily and universally true that 7 + 5 = 12 is not. — darthbarracuda

Truth here is irrelevant. Synthetical propositions denote nothing but the relation of conceptions to each other, with no judgement as to the truth of the proposition being enabled. Again...dualism, in that synthetical is only to differentiate a kind of relation of conceptions from its complement, the analytical. It is identity, not truth, which makes these relational determinations. Analytical propositions are those in which the conceptions hold similar identities, synthetical propositions are those in which identity does not hold. Identity herein meant to indicate only that the conception in the predicate of a proposition can be found in the subject of that same proposition. In synthetical propositions, then, the conception in the predicate cannot be found in the subject.

From that it follows that while 7 + 5 = 12 is synthetical, in that neither of the numbers to the left, in and of themselves, can give the number on the right.....

“....The conception of twelve is by no means obtained by merely cogitating the union of seven and five; and we may analyse our conception of such a possible sum as long as we will, still we shall never discover in it the notion of twelve. We must go beyond these conceptions, and have recourse to an intuition which corresponds to one of the two—our five fingers, for example, or like Segner in his Arithmetic five points, and so by degrees, add the units contained in the five given in the intuition, to the conception of seven. For I first take the number 7, and, for the conception of 5 calling in the aid of the fingers of my hand as objects of intuition, I add the units, which I before took together to make up the number 5, gradually now by means of the material image my hand, to the number 7, and by this process, I at length see the number 12 arise....”
(Added in B16, not found in A)

.....the fact that the proposition is true only arises from empirical proofs, in which it is found that it is impossible for this particular arithmetic operation to give a different result, and thereby sets the stage for establishing the criteria for any mathematical entailment, and in turn, establishing the possibility and the validity of pure a priori conditions in general. In this way, all logical propositions determined by reason are in logical form only, the content be what it may. From the simplest analytical proposition, A = A, to the most complex abstract synthetical mathematical calculus, the proofs of all logical forms depend on empirical conditions.

For what reason do I have to believe that it may not be different in the future? — darthbarracuda

According to Kantian metaphysics, you don’t. Knowledge destroys belief, so if you know without the possibility of refutation that mathematical propositions are the mark of absolute certainty, because you can prove all of them to yourself, you have no reason whatsoever to doubt them. It behooves one, nonetheless, to keep in mind such certainty is only determinable under the auspices of the very system from which the the ground for it is given. In such case, not only is it impossible to doubt this certainty, but it is just as impossible to think of what form the doubt would have.

The justification of all this, is in the categories, the “...pure conceptions of the understanding...”, from which are given the schema of “quantity”, first in the form of numbers, and thereafter in the form of unity, the manifestations of the permissible connectedness of numbers. Because it is the case, at least in this particular epistemological theory, that the categories are absolutely essential, and given that the schema of the categories are always the same, it becomes impossible to arrive at different conclusions for any one proposition predicated on them, assuming internal logical consistency is met, the primary condition of the system as a whole. Still, justification is not proof, which, as already shown, is entirely dependent on empirical conditions.

Universality and necessity, in fact any terminology of any kind, the categories, even reason itself, if developed by humans, only applies to humans. Mathematical propositions will therefore be true, iff a human is responsible for them. They will be true wherever and whenever there is a human to think them, but not necessarily otherwise. To a rational agent with other than a intuitive/discursive cognitive system, nothing about mathematical truths, or any truths at all, can be said. Does 1 + 1 = 2 to an elephant? Or a resident of a planet we don’t even know about? Not only can we not say, but we don’t even have the means to understand how to ask.

And Nagel thought himself the first to wonder. No reason for it, really, for the answer had already been given, fully 200 years before he even thought about it.

what is the difference between a sensation and an intuition (what more is there to an intuition other than sensation?), — darthbarracuda

Sensation arises from the matter of objects and is the initiation of the process by which the system is going to determine how the object is to be known; intuitions are the forms to which the matter attains, whatever that objects may be. Thus it is, sensation is given from physicality, intuition is given from rationality, and therein is the preliminary theoretical ground for the Kantian transcendental idealist science of combining the empiricism of Hume, et al with the rationalism of Descartes et al. Which, from his earliest critical career, was to be his primary philosophical mandate. “Dogmatic slumbers” and all that.

What more is there to intuition than sensation, depends on one’s understanding of the matter/form duality. If one doesn’t grant such a thing, there is no more, at least in the Kantian sense; if one does grant the duality, what more is there, is already given, from the Kantian sense.

The matter of objects can only affect the human system five ways, for there are, of course, only five modes of perception. But any mode of perception gives a representation, which are themselves only distinguishable by the mode in which they are received into the system. Representation of sound from the auditory apparatus is different from the representation of touch from the tactile apparatus, but to the system, all are merely representative of an object’s particular affect, and something more is absolutely required before any determination is possible as to what the object is.

“....Without the sensuous faculty no object would be given to us, and without the understanding no object would be thought. Thoughts without content are void; intuitions without conceptions, blind. Hence it is as necessary for the mind to make its conceptions sensuous (that is, to join to them the object in intuition), as to make its intuitions intelligible (that is, to bring them under conceptions). Neither of these faculties can exchange its proper function. Understanding cannot intuite, and the sensuous faculty cannot think. In no other way than from the united operation of both, can knowledge arise. But no one ought, on this account, to overlook the difference of the elements contributed by each; we have rather great reason carefully to separate and distinguish them. We therefore distinguish the science of the laws of sensibility, that is, aesthetic, from the science of the laws of the understanding, that is, logic....”
(A51/B75)

And here it is that Kant exhibits his admitted dualist metaphysical nature, and the ground for a completely dualistic methodology for human knowledge in general. No escape from it, and those making the attempt otherwise only “...have recourse to pitiful sophisms or confess their ignorance...”

Kant says that knowledge a priori is that which is absolutely independent of all experience...... — darthbarracuda

From B3:

“....whether there exists a knowledge altogether independent of experience, and even of all sensuous impressions? But the expression, "a priori," is not as yet definite enough adequately to indicate the whole meaning of the question above started. For, in speaking of knowledge which has its sources in experience, we are wont to say, that this or that may be known a priori, because we do not derive this knowledge immediately from experience, but from a general rule, which, however, we have itself borrowed from experience**. (...) By the term "knowledge a priori," therefore, we shall in the sequel understand, not such as is independent of this or that kind of experience, but such as is absolutely so of all experience. (...) Knowledge a priori is either pure or impure**. Pure knowledge a priori is that with which no empirical element is mixed up....”
**impure a priori knowledge, also considered as either intuition, metaphysically, or memory, psychologically.
** in Guyer and Meiklejohn, omitted in Kemp Smith.

Kant is merely distancing the knowledge we’ve already acquired through experience, from knowledge not given from any experience whatsoever. Impure a priori knowledge is like....seen one fireworks display, seen ‘em all kinda thing. Regardless of relative degree, all are still just fireworks displays. Pure a priori knowledge, because it is being herein defined as absent any experience, must then be determined by something other than sensibility. And the only thing remaining after eliminating sensibility, is thought. Therefore, the theoretical ground is laid for deriving the possibility of pure a priori knowledge from understanding alone, which is the faculty of thought.

......is it more like it having the possibility of being experienced which makes it empirical knowledge? — darthbarracuda

Two counter arguments:
First, If possible experience was sufficient for empirical knowledge, how would we tell the difference between what we might know, and what we do know? It is, at the end, contradictory to ascribe certainty on the one hand, and ascribe the same certainty to a mere possibility on the other.

Second, If it is true the only means for empirical knowledge is from experience, then the negation of it must also be true, insofar as without experience there is no empirical knowledge. The proposition is true, therefore the negation is also true.

Best to remember.....the entire treatise is concerned with the question stated above, proving the possibility, validity and the source of the principles which determine the legitimate boundaries of human reason.

“....Thus the person who has learned a system of philosophy—say the Wolfian—although he has a perfect knowledge of all the principles, definitions, and arguments in that philosophy, as well as of the divisions that have been made of the system, possesses really no more than an historical knowledge of the Wolfian system; he knows only what has been told him, his judgements are only those which he has received from his teachers. He has formed his mind on another's; but the imitative faculty is not the productive. His knowledge has not been drawn from reason; and although, objectively considered, it is rational knowledge, subjectively, it is merely historical. He has learned this or that philosophy and is merely a plaster cast of a living man. (...)

All rational cognition is, again, based either on conceptions, or on the construction of conceptions. The former is termed philosophical, the latter mathematical. A cognition may be objectively philosophical and subjectively historical—as is the case with the majority of scholars and those who cannot look beyond the limits of their system, and who remain in a state of pupilage all their lives. (...)

Of all the a priori sciences of reason, therefore, mathematics alone can be learned. Philosophy—unless it be in an historical manner—cannot be learned; we can at most learn to philosophize....”
(A836-7/B864-5)

Questions..... — darthbarracuda

......are given their ground beginning with A50/B74, in which are found definitions, systemic conditions, and constituent relations. A few pages that set the stage for the morass that follows.

It’s only been four days since.......

The thing-in-itself is a real, physical, space/time thing,
— Mww

Any examples of them?
— Corvus

Yeah......every single thing there ever was or ever will be. All things are external to us, so exists in its own right. Exists as itself. Exists in-itself.

.......so if god is a space/time thing external to us, existing in its own right, then god is a thing-in-itself too, as far as we’re concerned. If not a thing, all god is, is an idea, an object of reason, the proverbial transcendental object. As far as we’re concerned.

On the other note, if the expression “god” is present as representation, than the conception from which it is given is necessarily present as understanding. The conception is an internal comprehension of a certain relation, “god” merely the expression of it.

It may be in White, but it is so in NKS, 1929, reading along with Benno Erdmann, circa 1889, found in a translator’s footnote, at A491/B519.

On empirical idealism:

The human cognitive system is inherently logical, therefore, for any this, the negation of it is given immediately in that. Kant grounds the human system as necessarily representational, the external part by means of the a priori architecture of space and time, whereas the negation of it, in the form of transcendental realism, grounds the human system as non-representational, insofar as the object and its appearance are the same thing, hence not conditioned by intuitions of space and time, those conceived as belonging to the objects in themselves.

An empirical idealist, then, is merely the transcendental realist who labors under the illusion of explaining the existence of a thing, conditioned only by two necessarily infinite, content-less conceptions, a contradiction. In short, the one properly institutes space and time as necessary conditions for the reality of objects, while the other improperly institutes space and time as necessary properties in the existence of objects. As paraphrased from A491/B519.
——————

On the presumed dual nature of space and time:

The “objective validity/empirical reality” of space and time are noted. However, transcendental ideality of space and time, insofar as they are both mediate concepts given from understanding but which can only be represented by the category “Quantity”, re: “an infinite given magnitude” and not any real object, and, they are immediate intuitions a priori insofar as they are presupposed in the affect upon a subject that perceives, thereby establishing the rules for the possibility of synthetic a priori cognitions, which in turn, is the possibility of experience itself. As paraphrased from “...SS 3: Transcendental Exposition of the Conception of Space....”, B41.

The “objective validity/empirical reality” regards the use of intuitions as conditions; the transcendental ideality regards the derivation of them from pure reason alone.
—————

In Kant.....

.....the origin of knowledge is not perception; it is understanding. That which is before the synthesis of intuition to conception, is not in our awareness, thus does not ground knowledge, which is always a conscious judgement with respect to the possible logical certainty of those relations. As well, the synthesis of conceptions to each other, involving no intuitions, therefore no perceptions at all, and of which we are perfectly aware as a conscious judgement with apodeitic logical certainty, insofar as those relations are of our own construction, is the source of a priori knowledge.

.....empiricism is nothing but one of only two possible modes of thought, the other being a priori. All empiricism does, is legislate, and thus authorize, one type of cognition. The complementary nature of human cognition demands an empirical aspect, otherwise the a priori aspect, while undeniable for its internal construction, cannot be relieved of its illusory extension on the one hand, and is entirely insufficient for explaining affects on sensibility, on the other.

.....the thing-in-itself can never conform to the mind; that is precisely what it cannot do. If it did, or if it could, the entire Kantian transcendental treatise drops headlong into the metaphysical crapper. It may stand in such relation in other doctrines, but not in this one.

Anyway.....just sayin’.

I didn’t look there, but found it since.

Thanks.

what do you think? — Hello Human

If there is no real difference, one or the other is superfluous or mis-defined. What I think is......all in all, not too bad. — Mww

I guess those terms (consciousness, CSE) are redundant. Also, I have unfortunately misused the term "consciousness" — Hello Human

What I think now......much better.

Kant says "matter's motion or rest merely in relation to the mode of representation or modality, and *thus* to appearance of the outer sense, is called phenomenology." — Gregory

Citation? I ask because you’ve indicated the statement is a quote, but I can’t find it in any of my translations. Not saying it isn’t in somebody’s, somewhere, but just that I’d like to view the context.

Thanks.