I’m good. You stipulated material universe, so.....hard to miss.

So how do things which are clearly and obviously not possible, given a material universe, happen anyway? — Joe0082

Either it is possible, or, it didn’t happen. There are mysteries of which physicists are aware, but that ain’t one of ‘em.

I am obligated only not to be the cause of suffering. It is not my duty to reduce suffering, although I may or may not be inclined towards it.

I live in the West, and I maintain that I am as free in the pursuit of my inclinations as my conditions permit, so.....yes.

So what....I played fast and loose with “same principle”. I still see no evidence that you grasped the intention of the paragraph, but rather, misdirected it where it was never meant to go.

Anyway....old news. Once missed, twice gone.

sensation of the representation.....is backwards.
— Mww

Backwards? How so? — Isaac

Sensation of the representation implies representation comes before the sensation, which is backwards.

Sensation is a physical event; representation of it is a subconscious event which necessarily follows from the physical event, and is called phenomenon. From your point of view, perhaps, that which happens along nerves between the incident and registration in the brain. Subconscious physical information transfer for you, metaphysical subconscious ground of empirical knowledge for me.

With the more general functions you list, it's much more difficult, but it can be done to a degree. — Isaac

To a degree, yes, limited by technology and natural law. Metaphysics is limited only by logic, so as long as the logic holds, what metaphysics does, can be complete. On the other hand, Whatever degree science attains necessarily conforms to states-of affairs, while metaphysics can only conform to possible states of affairs. Six of one, half dozen of the other.
—————

One does not think the pain he is in, one does not report anything whatsoever to himself
— Mww

Exactly. There is no 'your pain' for me to know in that sense - unless we use the term technically (which I reserve the necessary right to do). — Isaac

Cool. You use the term technically, I’ll use it conceptually. We’ll end up in the same place.
————-

Everydayman will the more readily accept that he thinks by means and ends of reason, than he will accept mathematical algorithms and natural law as necessary for how he thinks.
— Mww

So I'm finding... — Isaac

But not admitting to being included? What are you when you close your reference manuals and take off your lab coat? I admit that sometimes I flash on which network path might be energized for whatever I’m doing at the time, but when it comes down to reading the expiration date on that primo, over-priced Italian mozzarella......Campania, not Florence, I’ll have you know......nary a single neurotransmitter nor any differential equation, enters my attention.
—————

I think there is a language game in which pain is a thing, it's a technical game between doctors, or research scientists where pain is necessarily treated as the sum of certain activity in a particular region of the central nervous system. One might, in this game, say "I have a pain in my body" and mean exactly the same thing as "I have an iPhone in my hand". — Isaac

This implies doctors or research scientists play the technical language game in treating pain as a thing. No proper metaphysician, while agreeing with the antecedent (the sum of certain activity), would make the mistake implied by the consequent (the one means the same as the other).

The problem we find here is that some want to take that technical definition to show that 'pain' is inherently private (happens inside a closed physiological system), — Isaac

If doctors treat pain as a thing, in that it is the sum of certain activity in (...) the central nervous system, and the central nervous system is a closed physiological system, and a closed physiological systems implies containment in a single environment......then how is it a problem that some (presumably not doctors), want to call pain inherently private, while rejecting the notion that pain is a thing?

I’m not sure you’re actually claiming doctors treat pain as a thing. I rather think doctors want me to treat pain as a thing, when one asks me to grade it on a scale of one-to-ten. I reallyreallyreally detest such language games as these, and by association, the attempted philosophy that is manufactured in conjunction with them.

Just between you and me, I would never trust a doctor that asks me to scale my pain from 1-10, over a doctor that asks me to describe what my pain feels like and where it feels like it is located.

Moon-object-public; sensation of -representation-not public. — Mww
Fixed it.
— Isaac
I'm going to have to declare victory here. :party: — frank

Victory....over what?

Moon-object-public; sensation of the moon-representation-not public.
— Mww

Fixed it. — Isaac

Neither sensation of the-representation-not public, nor, sensation of the representation-not public, is a fix.

Sensation of the....is empty; sensation of the representation.....is backwards.

Ah, so is it a deed or title that establishes ownership of your sensations? — Banno

Wow. None but the most daring intellectual acuity could excavate that from what I wrote.

YOu seem to be thinking of privacy in terms of ownership — Banno

Yep. Ownership of the car, possession of the sensation. Same principle.

You continue in the belief that there is a meaning for each word, to be found in one's private subconscious. — Banno

Not believe. Logically speculate.
Not in subconscious. In understanding.
Not meaning of each word. Meaning of each representation, expressible by a word.

My objection is not that each person does not have a sensation of the moon; it is that this sensation is private. — Banno

Each person. Ownership/possession. ‘Nuff said.

In so far as it is of the moon, it is public. — Banno

Moon-object-public; sensation of the moon-representation-not public.

In so far as it is private, it is not a sensation of anything. — Banno

It is a sensation of a yet undetermined something.

The Kantian analysis is outdated. — Banno

Yet the paradigm shift in human thought that it was, has not itself been shifted.

but the judge wasn't going to look at the pictures. — Banno

Little bit of that kinda judge in all of us, ne c’est pas?

Sensation itself does not prompt reaction. Reason itself does not prompt conclusions. We infer and react. — simeonz

“....For how is it possible that the faculty of cognition should be awakened into exercise otherwise than by means of objects which affect our senses, and partly of themselves produce representations, partly rouse our powers of understanding into activity, to compare to connect, or to separate these, and so to convert the raw material of our sensuous impressions into a knowledge of objects, which is called experience?...”
(CPR, B1)

We can say sensation does in fact prompt reaction, and reason does in fact prompt conclusions. At least, theoretically. And, of a sort.
————

But sensibility and reason are a variety of persuasion. Are you not persuaded to trust them? — simeonz

Such queries suggest a metaphysical reductionism gone too far. We exist in a epistemological contingency, and rationalize under the auspices of the principle of complementarity, in that every thought has its negation, but despite all that, there is no profit in pretending we have no certainties. So, no, I’m not so much persuaded to trust as I am convinced I have no choice but to trust, and make the best of the circumstances.

I think that it would be mistake to assume that people should treat all of their persuasions the same. — simeonz

I disagree, in principle, in that because they are all persuasions they should be treated as such. It is thus still allowed to attribute different values to each persuasion. It is that one of which we are persuaded, that is not necessarily treated the same as another.

We trust our senses, we trust our reason, and we trust even our instinct in general. We don't use our senses, reason, and general instinct in the same way. We relate them to each other, and they complement each other. The end product, however, is still a persuasion. — simeonz

In the strictest sense, this is true enough. In keeping with what I said above, this is still a reduction too far. It is anathema to pure reason to maintain that mathematical or logical laws are persuasions, at the expensive of knowledge, even while recognizing the tentative nature of it. In conjunction with a specific definition of persuasion, such that varieties in subjective conditions are distinguishable, to limit reason to persuasion is to limit humans to lower-classed intelligences. A rat runs from snakes from instinct alone, but cannot ever reason to the conviction of possible destruction if he doesn’t. We have to account for, not only why we humans can, but also why we do.
———-

an opinion is never merely held. It is held by someone having personal investment in it. Reason is a personal investment. Sensory experience is a personal investment. — simeonz

OK, so all that means is that there are different kinds or qualities attributable to personal investment. This is mere aesthetics, included necessarily in the human condition. We still need to relate the activity of personal investment to the plethora of states of affairs. Just as in any investment, it needs be determined how to arrive at it and thereby quantify its value, which is not itself mere aesthetics, but.....technically speaking....purposivity. Goal-orientation. And the ultimate goal for humans, is truth.

I appreciate your arguments. They’re well-formed and interesting. Don’t take anything I say as some serious effort to refute them, which really can’t be done anyway, just.....point/counterpoint, nothing more.

And the upshot of that is that it is improper to talk of representing our own pains and pleasures. "I have a pain in my hand" is not like "I have an iPhone in my hand"; it is more like "Ouch!" — Banno

Language games? A phone cannot be in your hand, it can only be held by your hand. The cause of pain can be in your hand (arthritis) but can also be held by your hand. Whether contained in or held by, these are both sensations, hence necessarily will be representations to downstream cognitive faculties, because they arise from physical conditions. As sensations, either can illicit a feeling of pain or pleasure, but do not represent pain or pleasure.

Then he asks of our use of "the language which describes my inner experience" (§256), — Banno

#256 begins with.....
“.....Now, what about the language which describes my inner experiences and which only I myself can understand? How do I use words to stand for my sensations?—As we ordinarily do? Then are my words for sensations tied up with my natural expressions of sensation?.....

First, notice Witt goes from experience to sensation. One should be aware of this time-specific differential; a whole bunch of stuff is happening internally between sensation and experience.
Second, I use words to stand for my sensations just like I always do, And words are always tied up with my natural expression......otherwise they wouldn’t be words......but that does not imply the necessity for expression itself.

I can manufacture a word for the expression of a sensation, then never express it. “Ouch”, of course, is a both a word and a general expression of a kind of sensation, but empty of determinable information by a listener. Time becomes important here, for, in the strictest sense, sensations are not named. They are, technically mere phenomena, until understanding thinks a conception belonging to it. That tickle between your shoulder blades....is it a bug or a hair? If a bug...mosquito or ant? That blind taste test....is it Coke or Pepsi?

Continuiing with #256:

“.....In that case my language is not a 'private' one. Someone else might understand it as well as I...”

My car is privately owned. If I give you a ride in it, is it any less privately owned? Accordingly, if I speak to you in a private language, the fact of your hearing does not affect its privacy. Plus, Witt has already stipulated a language “...only I can understand...”, so it is given that there is not someone else that might understand. Hence, even expressed, my language remains a private language. Useless for being understood, highly likely, but still private.

Witt is guilty of a categorical error, insofar as the “private” implication for the internal construction of the language by one subject, is very far from the “not-private” receptivity of the expression of it by another subject.
————-

If one were to treat of a private, subjective world, it seems one may not be able to name items therein. — Banno

Usually, yes, words are perceptions, but that does not account for the fact that every single word ever, is itself a private word at the time of its inception, hence not a perception in itself at all, and only henceforth understood by like-minded beings for what it was originally meant to represent, which is exactly the terminus of what Hume meant by “constant conjunction”. You say a word to me and what it means, and if I never heard that word before, I immediately grant whatever you’ve told me. I don’t bother asking you where you got that word from. From now on, I’ll use that word, under the same conditions, out of mere habit.

The items of a subjective world are representations alone, of which words are a species. There are no words in Nature; they are each and every one a construction of a rational being capable of relating a conception to a expression for it. The objects named by words are not private to a subjective world, but that by which each individual human knows them, most certainly is. And language is nothing but an intelligible assemblage of words, so.....there ya go.

But I will continue to reject any primacy that might be given to supposedly private sensations, such that they form the basis for inter-subjectivity. Such an account is arse-about; we start with what is public, not with what might be private. — Banno

Sensation is defined as an affect on sensibility; sensibility is defined as the capacity for receptivity of impressions. Sensation then reduces to the affect of impressions. Even if all humans are capable of receptivity of impressions, it is not given from that, that the affect is perfectly matched to the impression. To whit: even if it is the case that a multiplicity of humans perceive the moon, it is not given that the moon makes the same impression on each human that perceives it. To claim such a thing as a non-private sensation, is a categorical error, from which follows the reconciliation of the error necessitates that all sensations, as such, are private affectations of general impressions. Therefore, rejection of the primacy of private sensations, is unreasonable, and the ground of inter-subjectivity, is mediately given. (Not a typo, not immediately given. If you’re still with me, that is)
————

Such an account is arse-about; we start with what is public, not with what might be private. — Banno

Trust me....I dig where you’re coming from. These days, in this small world, there are very few new experiences, hardly anything not common to just about everybody else. It is easy to say we start with what is public because it sure seems that way. And nine times out of ten, it is that way. But not always, which makes explicit it is possible to start with what is not public, and account for that must be made. That accountability results in the conclusion that no matter what is started with, the private part has all the power. The public part just is, the private part says what it is.

quod erat demonstrandum

Or, in Grey-Haired Ponytail parlance..... the story (in) twenty-seven 8 x 10 colored glossy pictures with the circles and arrows and a paragraph on the back of each one explaining what each one is.....

Here is where Witt’s #246 plays (......)
— Mww

That is true, when you think about it. But is that how you feel about it? — simeonz

Simply put....there are no feelings intrinsic to a purely empirical statement, in the same way I do not have a feeling about the water I may or may not put to some use. #246 is an empirical statement, for, on the one hand it has to do with the perceptions of someone else and the knowledge possible from them, and on the other, it has to do with the sensations that belong to me alone, from which follows the possibility of my own knowledge. In such case, I don’t feel the former is impossible and the latter nonsense, but rather, I can only justify the truth of it to myself. In language, this manifests as me merely saying I agree with the statement. You hinted at it yourself: truth is in what you think, then to ask of a feeling about the same thing, implies the truth is not in that.

Isn't knowledge ultimately a feeling of conviction that you don't need to fight, but to refine, until it becomes as good as possible under preconceived criteria, a set of virtues conveyed without need for justification. — simeonz

Post-modern convention says that may be the case. I agree, speaking from my well-worn armchair, that knowledge, and here we’re talking empirical knowledge, the kind with which #246 concerns itself, is a relative conviction, but not a feeling of being convinced. That condition reduces to mere persuasion, and we not persuaded to knowledge, but convinced upon arriving at it. But with respect to what you’re asking here, I would deny that empirical knowledge follows from virtue, which makes conveyance sans justification moot. A set of virtues conveyed without need of justification, is called interest. At the same time, I would affirm that knowledge is by definition already as good as possible iff knowledge is taken to mean certainty under the preconceived criteria from which it arises. But not necessarily so, insofar as there may be no preconceived criteria, re: experience, in the event of new knowledge.
————-

I should irrationally believe my convictions until a stronger, more convincing instinct makes itself available from experience. — simeonz

Your comment is commendable, anthropology aside that is, but epistemically I’d take issue with....

.....one doesn’t irrationally believe a conviction, but rather, a persuasion, which reduces to merely holding with an opinion;
.....instinct doesn’t make itself available from experience, but from lack of it, manifest in sheer accident or pure reflex, or congruent circumstances wherein reason is otherwise supervened.

But again, I’m not so good with this post-modern stuff, so.......

If a model of brain function identifies a region as associated with some function, and the association is suitably strong in all cases thus far, then when we look at that component in our alternative model running 'in conjunction with it' we should find it correlates. — Isaac

Yes, that’s standard modus operandi for theoretical science. At the same time, it is the cum hoc ergo propter hoc logical fallacy in theoretical philosophy, which you’re probably more familiar with as the “correlation does not imply causation” principle. In this case, it seems your argument is the stronger, insofar as the brain is ultimately responsible for everything human, including philosophy, from which follows as a matter of course that if a certain brain region repeatedly illuminates from a corresponding human function, the former is deemed sufficiently responsible for the latter, in a general sense.

On the other hand, there is no actual occasion to “look at that component in our alternate model”, because it isn’t there. I think you must.....err, subconsciously....realize this important fact, by switching from “function” in the one model, to “component” in the other. The old speculative model does not distinguish regions of the brain as relating to specific components of reason. Conversely, it is impossible for science to distinguish the functions of reason with respect to components of the brain. That is to say, imagination is not to be found in the region containing this component, understanding in that region, moral constitution thataway, aesthetics over yonder. Cognition....aisle three right; opinion....level ten left.

If it doesn't (correlate) then either there's something wrong with one of the models or they are no longer 'in conjunction'. — Isaac

I think we’re both of the mind that they do correlate, and that’s there nothing intrinsically wrong with either model, even if you consider mine chimerical/superficial and I consider yours useless. Dunno....can two things be correlated but incompatible? Oil and water? GR and QM?

But to be fair in acknowledging my lack of scientific exposure....does the exact same region of my brain respond to my understanding of race riots, as it does to my understanding of internal combustion engines? I would suppose not, which sustains my claim that speculative methodological theories are domain-specific, and one does not mix at all with the other.
—————

I wonder how much of Kant would be scoffed at by firefighters. — Isaac

I’m guessing most of it. He admits “....the present work is not intended for popular use...”. In one respect our models are on the same ground, insofar as they both relate to a certain human condition. Yours concerns the physical mechanics that make the condition real, mine concerns the metaphysical methods which make the condition possible. Nevertheless, Everydayman will the more readily accept that he thinks by means and ends of reason, than he will accept mathematical algorithms and natural law as necessary for how he thinks.
—————

On the one hand they're some immutable private thing embedded in your body (and so inaccessible to others), but on the other they're whatever you currently think they are, which seems easily communicated. — Isaac

The old system easily explains this apparent entrapment in a contradiction for an unwary thinker, in that feelings are not things and they are not thoughts. We don’t think pain or pleasure, we think things by which one or the other of those, and the various schemata subsumed under them, is represented. Here is where Witt’s #246 plays, insofar as it is false for you to claim knowledge of my pain, or sensations in general, and it is nonsense for me to claim knowledge of my pain or sensations in general. The former is false because all you can know is what I report to you, the latter is nonsense because sensation is not thought and thinking is the only possible means for knowledge, “....as it is normally used (and how else are we to use it?)....”. One does not think the pain he is in, one does not report anything whatsoever to himself; either there is an empirical condition as sufficient causality representing the feeling of pain/pleasure, necessarily sensed and subsequently thought by one but only possibly reported as such post hoc to another....or there is not.

I understand we can do this for days on end. We don’t have to, so without something new and different to talk about.....

Guess we’ll never know. Sworn to secrecy and all.

why not just say we simply reason to the prevention of cause?
— Mww

You could, but 'reason' has typically been reserved for conscious processing, and much of the modelling that brain regions have been shown to do is subconscious. It 'acts like' reason. — Isaac

Does this not contradict itself? If reason is reserved for conscious processing, which is granted, and if much of the modeling is unconscious, how can such modeling be said to be acting like reason?

What is the special attention you give to “reason” and “acts like” meant to indicate? What would you use to substitute for those, for which no special attention is necessary?
—————-

this science is itself speculative (....), substituted an older speculative system for a newer one (...),
— Mww

Yes, indeed. A common objection it seems. I remain unconvinced by this idea that since the science is only 'modelling' models it's somehow open season and anything goes. Models can be more or less coherent with each other, more or less useful, more or less parsimonious. — Isaac

Absolutely; permitting open season and anything goes permits all sorts of irrationalities. And models can be coherent with each other, but only within their respective domains and iff the conditions for them are given from the domain in which the model resides. If may indeed be the case that brain mechanics adhere to physical law, and follow mathematical algorithms, but that modeling is utterly irrelevant to a separate system that models itself absent all those terms in its purpose, even while operating in conjunction with it.

We've replaced the older speculative system for the newer one, not on a whim, but because it works better. — Isaac

Who’s we? The teeny-tiny fraction of intellectually specialized humanity that even considers the new system a better explanatory device? So, technically, you’ve replaced nothing, but only attacked a common opponent.....ignorance.....from a different direction, and with a much smaller hence potentially less effective force, using experimental weapons.

And works better than what? Whatever system model that can’t present itself to being measured? So quality is determined by measure? I’m wondering if you see that any experiment intending to demonstrate a result via any kind of measurement, is entirely predicated on the very speculative system the new speculative system is attempting to replace.
—————-

humans can reason to prevention, then proceed to ignore it.
— Mww

I don't believe they can. — Isaac

I suspect there to be many senior firefighters, soldiers, and these days, nurses’ aides,
boldly scoffing at that. A few of ‘em.....the more senior.....rolling on the ground, even. The most insulted, the most senior, would look at you with that, “what....you wouldn’t do your damn job???” expression, and immediately proceed to ignore, if not regret, your very existence.

'Reason' is usually a post hoc construction to rationalise a decision that has been made anyway further back in the subconscious. — Isaac

That’s actually a pretty decent rendering, except the “further back in the subconscious” part, insofar as no decision of reason is ever made in the subconscious domain. Some preliminary conditions for reason are subconscious, but these are not decisions.

I've yet to have understood exactly what it picks out to the exclusion of all else. — creativesoul

I’m not sure about “all else”, but in the interest of a science of thought, the text has psychology, which is normative in that its propositions contain judgements by a thinker concerning the correctness of other people’s thoughts, opposed to metaphysics which is criteriological, in that it makes no propositions but retains the power of judgement respecting his own thoughts only.

This all evolves from the Greek understanding that the science of feeling is very different than the science of thought. The former were attributes of the psyche, the latter of the mind; the former was, by Greek standards, what we would call empirical because it has to do with directing towards ends in the form of behavior, and the latter has to do with determination of ends in the form of constructing opinions or knowledge. The latter was considered a theoretical science of thought called logic, the former the practical science called ethics.

Both these are called normative, insofar as “they paid great attention to the task of defining criteria by which they judge their own success” in the field in which they operate. But the judgement of success of one’s own thoughts is never given, if it be granted that thought is sometimes self-refuting, which implies normative in its strictest sense, cannot apply. In other words, success does not belong to a thinker’s faculty of judgement, for if there is a judgement, judgement is immediately successful because of it. Judgement cannot be unsuccessful.

On the other hand, judgement by a thinker respecting his own thoughts, has absolutely necessary fundamental conditions, whatever their name may be, so the appellation “criteriological”, is apt.

Close enough? I skipped some of the finer points, for expediency, so I trust you to correct me if I missed something important.

I don't see the advantage in throwing out good quality research in favour of your introspection. — Isaac

“...Furthermore, it provides a mathematical specification of ‘what’ the brain is doing; it is suppressing free-energy. If this uses gradient descent, one can derive differential equations that prescribe recognition dynamics that specify ‘how’ the brain might operate....”
(Your link, conclusion)

.....that’s the advantage. The brain does what it does, and it makes no difference to me how it does it. And don’t throw out anything just because of my introspections. Do it for your own, if the occassions arise. It’s called learning, doncha know. Also called mysticism, which ain’t so good. Or good in a strange way, maybe. Dunno, don’t care.
——————

“....one can understand the hierarchical deployment of cortical areas and the nature of message passing among cortical levels in terms of minimising prediction error under hierarchical dynamic models of the world....”

One can understand. Hmmmm. Does that mean one has to calculate? Or might he....you know....introspect?
——————

What ta hell is a hidden state anyway?
— Mww

(reference) — Isaac

“...Causal states link levels, whereas hidden states link dynamics over time and endow the model with memory. (....) In short; a hierarchical form allows models to construct their own priors. This feature is central to many inference procedures....”

....including human reason, in which the construction of priors, is just plain, good ol’ experience. FYI, I can present the same system....without the use of differential equations....which says basically the exact same thing. All that’s happened here, is neuroscience has taken the human subject into the personally inaccessible and generally useless. But that’s ok, really, for, as Kant says....

“...This can never become popular and, indeed, has no occasion to be so; for finespun arguments in favour of useful truths make just as little impression on the public mind as the equally subtle objections brought against these truths. On the other hand, since both inevitably force themselves on every man who rises to the height of speculation....”

.....and by your own admission, this science is itself speculative, so all that’s happened is we’ve substituted an older speculative system for a newer one, which is nonetheless speculative for it.
—————-

An exercise for Occam’s Razor:

“.....For example, we cannot avoid pain unless we remove the noxious stimulus....
(Sound familiar?)

.....In short, we sample the world to ensure our predictions become a self-fulfilling prophecy and surprises are avoided. In this view, perception is enslaved by action to provide veridical predictions (more formally, to make the free- energy a tight bound on surprise) that guides active sampling of the sensorium....”

Or...for all intents and purposes, why not just say we simply reason to the prevention of cause? What the science doesn’t allow for, insofar as differential equations, because they are equalities that “perscribe recognition dynamics” thereby permitting no self-negation, is the fact humans can reason to prevention, then proceed to ignore it. Of course, the proper scientist is well aware of this, so makes allowances for it with “hidden states”, which I take to indicate what the author terms “observation noise” and such-like random stuff.

One thing I noticed: the paper recognizes the human cognitive system as representational; there are eleven instances of that conception therein. Always a good first step, methinks.

Interesting paper nonetheless. Thanks for the exposure.

We have mathematical rules (...) to describe many events (...). However, do you think that we have "understood" nature itself? — The0warrior

Nature itself, no. Since Hume, understanding events as parts of a whole, does not necessarily grant understanding of the whole. Technically, knowledge, but one follows from the other so.....

do you think we have a way to finally "understand" it? — The0warrior

Non-sensical query. What would it look like if it turns out we never did?

Do you agree with the following sentence: "the end of science is theology"? — The0warrior

No. The end of science implies, on the one hand, complete empirical knowledge, and on the other, the impossibility of complete empirical knowledge. Neither necessarily implies theology, which has its ground in rational knowledge alone.

Interesting topic.

I really love it and believe everyone should be a philosopher-sovereign — DeGregePorcus

If everybody should be a philosophy-sovereign......how could it be taught? That which is taught is philosophizing by one to the receptivity of another; that which makes one sovereign belongs to him alone and therefore never is passed to him, but originates in him.

So just to begin, what about Anaximenes and Thales would you teach to kids? — DeGregePorcus

Whatever they are capable of understanding. Whatever that is won’t make them philosopher-sovereign, but only give historical background. Such instruction could still serve as ground for it.

For what it’s worth.....

we only create our own new beetles — Isaac

Create our own new....

What better inkling of “private” could there be? “Create our own new” is merely speechifying synonyms for inventive, individual, personal, and time-successive, all necessary ingredients in the recipe for “private”.
————

your model yesterday (....) Replaced by a filtered and re-arranged version moderated by... yep, your social environment. — Isaac

Nahhh....nothing so dramatic. Nothing but time, replaced because whatever instantiated the model is no longer present, and that from which successive models are created merely represent successive qualities, or degrees, of the original, predicated on successions in time. Otherwise, I couldn’t recognize being in more or less pain today than yesterday if there were no witnesses, which is quite absurd. While it may be the case how I model my pain to my mother is very different than the pain I model for my doctor, there is a certainty belonging to me alone that underpins them both equally, and from that I construct models different from each other.
————-

No-one just 'knows' what pain is. — Isaac

Correct, but irrelevant. Nature saw fit not to require humans to run the gamut of reason, in order to realize injury; survivability is directly proportional to how long one thinks about the danger he’s in. Pain speaks to dangerous effect; reason speaks to the quantity and quality of the cause of it. The one is immediate and not a cognition, the latter is mediate and is always a cognition. Pain can never eliminate its own cause, but reason can eliminate causes such that pain will never be an effect, possible empirical occassions being presupposed.
————-

the hidden states themselves within any inference system, — Isaac

In a discourse concerned solely with humans, which intersubjectivity must be, there is no inference system that is not an a priori human logical construction. How can an inference system have hidden states? What can be inferred from that which is not present as the conditions for it?

Perhaps you’re intending that hidden states refer to the conscious subject who actively infers, but that is a classic categorical error, insofar as the assertion states explicitly “within any inference system”. The inferring subject represents the use of the system intrinsic to his nature as a rational being, but he is not within the system, which grants the states may be hidden from the subject, but not the system the subject employs. If follows that hidden states may be said to drop out in conversations given the necessary predication for its possibility, but inference systems as such, do not speak. They merely present that which is spoken about.

What ta hell is a hidden state anyway? Wait wait, don’t tell me. Hidden states are what machines see but common human thinkers don’t notice, right? So...a common thinking human sees the hidden states a machine shows him, and what.....says to himself...well lookie thaya, I’ll be damned!!! Next time ol’ Perceval next door’s dog dumps on my lawn, those hidden states will show me just how much I hate that farging dog. OH...wait....I’ve already got a pretty good idea about that, so screw a buncha stupid machines. At the same time, probably muttering something unintelligible about their operators.

(Termination of teeth-grinding)

grant definitions/senses of key terms. — creativesoul

“criteriological” pg 118.

New one on me. Got a nice ring to it, much cooler than “normative”.

basic presuppositions (....) are constitutive of the processes of thought — Janus

I certainly agree with that, so....good enough. Thanks.

I fell the two work together — EnsambleMark

This is closer to the matter.

Despite popular literature, Kant didn’t so much unite the two, as to show, beginning with himself, how they couldn’t have been separate in the first place. Kant didn’t add anything to the human cognitive system that wasn’t already there; he only informed as to its better use.

Now THAT’S a comeback worth a decent chuckle right there. I appreciate it.

True enough. Some logical arguments conclude sound inferences, some do not.

If epiphenomenalism is true, then epiphenomenalism is an epiphenomenon. — Olivier5

Yep. Circularity. Never provable, but refutable, by merely invoking different majors or minors.

Start here, you get epiphenomenalism; start there, you don’t.

Common courtesy mandates a response, so......Thanks.

And therefore... — Olivier5

Circular. Not contradictory. With respect to illusion.

1.) The mental model of the brain.....

that determines brain workings.....
which determines mental models to be illusory....

....must therefore be illusory.

1A.) An illusory mental model of the brain....

that determines brain workings....
which determines mental models to be illusory....

....remains consistently illusory.

This is the “killer blow” so far missed. It is human reason itself, the ground of everything human, that is intrinsically circular, therefore susceptible to an illusory conclusions. It is the nature of the rational beast, inevitable and irreconcilable, possible only to guard against, but never to eliminate.

Science as a doctrine sets the ground for trying, but it is always a human that does science, so.....just more potential circularity.

Mental models for brain workings that determine that mental models are impossible......is contradictory.
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With respect to epiphenomenalism, science may eventually falsify the premise, empirically, but it is currently viable as an explanatory thesis, metaphysically, merely because we don’t possess knowledge sufficient to negate it, and while it violates the principle of cause and effect physically, it stands as non-contradictory from a purely logical domain.

Rhetorically speaking.....

Interested in reading group, or another thread? — creativesoul

I’m non-committal, but I might eavesdrop from behind the fake rubber tree.

I don't disagree with what you say there. I agree that it is accordance with ordinary parlance to say that causation is presupposed in all our searches for explanation. — Janus

Ordinary parlance, yes.

I also see that basic presupposition as a kind of foundational belief — Janus

Presuppositions, yes.

we don't consciously presuppose or believe in causation, it is rather constitutive of our whole process of thought. — Janus

I’m sure you wouldn’t contradict yourself as obviously as this last seems to contradict the first, so I’ll just assume I’m not getting what you’re saying.

I guess I’d first have to ask what you mean convention, consensus, to be the primary reasons for.
— Mww

Why do we assume the presuppositions that, often unconsciously, underlie our understanding of the world. — T Clark

Ahhhhh....Ok, gotcha. Reasons for assuming presuppositions. All those are sufficient reasons for assuming presuppositions, experience being my personal favorite, probably. At least the most obvious. Only nit worth picking is, intuitions are not representative of “spontaneity” as I used it.

I guess I’d first have to ask what you mean convention, consensus, to be the primary reasons for. Spontaneity and those are very far apart, so just wondering what they might have in common.

if by that I mean in line with RGC. — creativesoul

Yeah.....(chuckles to self).....I’m trying really hard to stay in the proper lane.

what is the absolute presupposition they express? You say it is causality; but what could it mean to presuppose causality — Janus

I emphasize “metaphysically speaking”, for none of the following has any affect on Everydayman, who doesn’t know, and cares even less, about any of it. Speculative epistemology is intellectual entertainment, not a solution to existential difficulties.

Metaphysically speaking, humans presupposes causes, which we question and answer for ourselves in propositions; we absolutely presuppose causality, which we never talk about because without causality, there wouldn’t even be any cause questions to ask. We reason to instances of cause; we grant causality, which is the point of departure for reason to come up with causes.

Much like...when we go to the store for a thing, we presuppose the thing to be there, because of experience (milk, eggs, butter) or it’s just the kind of store that has that thing (granite, lawnmowers, Chinese silk), but before all that we always absolutely presuppose the reality of the thing, because if we’ve presupposed it being in the store, we must have absolutely granted that the thing exists.

Furthermore, after granting its existence, we still presuppose the possibility of the particular thing being in the store we’re going to (because it is impossible to know it’s actually there), then it must be the case that we’ve already absolutely granted the general notion of possibility itself, because without it, whether the thing was in the store or not would never have become a question, a concern or a satisfaction/disappointment, for us. This is the possibility in relation to space, because we’ve already granted the possibility of the thing in relation to time, from the mere fact it exists.
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Once the concept of causality is formed, then the idea that it either obtains or does not obtain logically follows. — Janus

This is part of RGC’s thesis, in that once the concept of causality is formed, whether or not it either obtains or does not obtain, is a nonsense implication. Once it forms, it has obtained, hence the logic of it is irrelevant. Which is not quite the right way to express it, but the point remains. The reason for this is given in Kant, but not so much in Collingwood, so I’ll refrain from it.

Don’t mean to speak for you, but perhaps your sentence would have been better stated as...once the concept of a cause is formed, whether it obtains or does not obtain, logically follows (that is to say, whether or not the necessarily conjoined effect follows from it).
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then the term "absolute presupposition" understood as being beyond truth aptitude, seems itself simply wrong, because causality is being proposed, even if not explicitly. — Janus

Agreed, it is confusing, and seemingly self-refuting. Collingwood covers this confusion by stipulating that absolute presuppositions are not “propounded”, which we take to mean not proposed. Thus, if the conception of causality is not proposed, it is immediately removing from susceptibility to truth aptitude, and, rather, it is tacitly understood a priori, antecedent to our conscious construction of empirical propositions.

Remember....all our conceptions arise from something. It is easy to see conceptions of objects arise from sensibility, but it is not so easy to see from whence abstract concepts arise. It is irrefutable that we have them, re: time, beauty, justice, etc., but they cannot arise from sensibility, so....wherefrom?

I’ll leave you with....(gulp)......spontaneity.

I don't agree the three examples of absolute presuppositions Tim Wood quotes there have no truth value — Janus

Tim didn’t quote absolute presuppositions; they were explicitly stated by the author as metaphysical propositions, and as such, can have truth value. You are justified in asserting truth values are possible for them as propositions, but cancel yourself by calling them absolute presuppositions.

On pg 52, the author says these proposition express an AP, albeit under three different configurations, which is very different than saying they are AP’s, in and of themselves. It is in the underlaying conception expressed, taken for granted, by the proposition, to which a truth value assignment is tantamount to “nonsense”, because that which the proposition takes for granted, assumed as immediately given, is nothing but a single, solitary, unconditioned conception, re: causality.

For all intends and purposes, pursuant to the reference literature, AP’s are just single words, which is sustained by the author asserting that AP’s are not propositions. Linguistics attributes truth value to propositions alone, which includes beliefs, but single words are not propositions not are they beliefs, hence, as such, can not have the truth value of a proposition, re: is “yes” true or false? Metaphysics can ask if AP’s are logically valid, and if answered that they are, then to ask if they are true or false, is utterly irrelevant. Or.....in the author’s vocabulary......nonsense.
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I would consider it a great success if I could get you to see that AP’s are not beliefs, I shall smooth potentially ruffled feathers beforehand, by reminding you that while your ordinary language use is all fine and dandy, the reference material for this thread is predicated on critical thinking, for which, one must admit, ordinary language use lacks sufficient authority.
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Once more, into the breach........

as I said before, the logic is inexorable. — Janus

DANGER, WILL ROBINSON. DANGER!!!!

“...Now it may be taken as a safe and useful warning, that general logic, considered as an organon, must always be a logic of illusion, for, as it teaches us nothing whatever respecting the content of our cognitions, but merely the formal conditions of their accordance with the understanding, which do not relate to and are quite indifferent in respect of objects, any attempt to employ it as an instrument (organon) in order to extend and enlarge the range of our knowledge must end in mere prating; anyone being able to maintain or oppose, with some appearance of truth, any single assertion whatever. Such instruction is quite unbecoming the dignity of philosophy....”

Nothing wrong using the logical form supposition/belief; presupposition/belief; absolute presupposition/absolute belief. They’re just words thrown together. But try to substitute reasonable arguments against the words, and you find that the relationship the words imply were, shall we say, unbecoming.

Now for the success. Maybe. Logical consistency maintains that if suppositions are beliefs, which could be true, then presuppositions should be pre-beliefs, which is a logical illusion, for we have no idea what is contained in a pre-belief. And then we have what should be.....absolute pre-beliefs. You can easily get from supposition to belief and do so rationally, but you cannot get so easily from presupposition to pre-belief. And it is quite irrational indeed, to attempt to get to absolute pre-belief from absolute presupposition. Parsimony suggests the better illusory reconciliation to be, therefore, that suppositions can be beliefs, but presuppositions and absolute presuppositions, cannot.

TA-DAAAA!!!! (Mic drop, exit stage left)

One man’s pedantry is another man’s precision.

We don’t think in terms the scientists use to tell us how we think. You’re asking a stonemason how he would plumb a bidet when all he knows how to use is a trowel and mud.

Thankfully, you know that as well as I do.

Cool. Thanks.

I would say that, according to ordinary parlance, there is little difference between the two terms....... — Janus

Little difference in ordinary parlance, yes. But what difference there is, speaks volumes: the first says “the fact of believing....” and the second says “something believed....”. The first makes explicit an object that is a rational cognition, the second is a rational cognition in which an object is implied. The first presupposes believing, the second presupposes something. The first, iff it is a fact, stands as an absolute presupposition, the second can only be a relative presupposition because some question can be answered by it, what the something may actually be.

But even aside from that, the definitions are so close, virtually using the same words, they practically define the same conception. Except the conceptions are not the same.
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.......although a presupposition might be considered more basic. — Janus

Agreed; my sole raison d’etre for getting involved in the first place, to demonstrate how that is actually the case.