I take Kant's to be a construction, Collingwood's to be a finding. — tim wood

Pretty much, yeah. Kant bottom up construction, Collingwood top down analysis.
————-

The short historical perspective which Kant inherited from Voltaire was at this point his undoing — tim wood

As far as physics is concerned, and the notion that his presuppositions were sufficient for future physics, this is true. But Kant didn’t base his philosophy on physics, but on mathematics, which far antecedes both Voltaire and Greek physical science. He does this to demonstrate why physics as a science didn’t advance as far and as surely as mathematics, because the Greeks didn’t apply the same apodeitically certain a priori principles of mathematics to physical science. Enter Copernicus, whom Kant supposed, did.

Good stuff, Maynard.

Beliefs are more fundamental than knowledge — Pantagruel

More fundamental only as in less rigorous. Ehhh....not going to get into the speculative subtleties explicit therein. Too long, too deep and not relevant to the topic.

In what sense is a "presupposition" not a kind of belief? — Pantagruel

In ordinary linguistics, they may be, from which arises the relative presupposition, according to Collingwood. In metaphysics, on the other hand, where I stake my epistemological tentpoles, presuppositions are taken as necessary conditions, re: absolute presuppositions, and beliefs, at best, are merely contingent judgements. Only here does it become apparent that the negation of a judgement does not falsify the presupposition that supported it. “Elvis is not dead”, a possible belief, has no affect on the presupposition of Elvis, the condition necessary for the belief. We don’t need to analyze the proposition to grant the necessity of the presupposition contained in it, even while analyzing the truth of the proposition itself.

Also according to Collingwood.....beware customary jargon from “desultory and casual thinking of our unscientific consciousness”.

There is no reason to believe that absolute presuppositions are not presupposed. — Pantagruel

Hey.....no fair confusing me, dammit!!! I had to go back through all my comments to see if I indicated absolute presuppositions were not presupposed, and I couldn’t find where I gave that indication. I’m arguing contrary to your claim that presuppositions are beliefs, which I emphatically reject on purely metaphysical grounds. So, no, there is no reason to think absolute presuppositions are not presupposed. In fact, it is no other way possible for them to be logically viable, then to be presupposed.

If they are presuppositions, then they are "pre-supposed". — Pantagruel

Yes, but these are relative presuppositions, and according to Collingwood, may serve as answers to previous question, re: Prop 5. Answers must be subjected to rational predication, which permits them propositional form, which in turn allows them to be supposed antecedent to the question they are intended to answer.

They are "fundamental hypotheses" about the nature of reality, not expressible in propositional form directly but consonant with some set of relative propositions, which are taken for granted and acted upon as if they were real, in consequence of which is engendered all manner of actual behaviours, including scientific theorization. — Pantagruel

And these are the absolute presuppositions. Although, while certainly fundamental, I’d hesitate to call them hypotheses, which implies the very propositional form denied to them.

Why should we construe belief so narrowly? — Pantagruel

Because metaphysics is the science of thought, and any science is grounded by basic principles, axioms or conditions.

The best answer is the reduction to the the capacity to distinguish belief from knowledge. And if certainty is one of two fundamental human interests, the other being some moral disposition, it is all the more metaphysically pertinent to disseminate the conditions for its possibility scientifically, as opposed to the contingency of mere belief.

Beliefs apply to things like cultural norms and habitual practices and for the vast majority of people take the form of presuppositions. — Pantagruel

These are at best in the purview of psychology, which, according to Collingwood, is “anti-metaphysics”, probably because those applications are in the public domain. Besides, “Beliefs apply to.....”, while correct from the view of practical reason, still makes no allowance for that which justifies both the content and the applicability of belief in general, which only arises from pure reason. One must, after all, think a belief before applying it.

Absolute presuppositions are not considered, weighed, and chosen — tim wood

Agreed, and sustained in Prop. 5, “absolute presuppositions are not propositions”, and if not a proposition, cannot be considered in propositional form, which weighing and choosing would seem to require.

But if be said thatbsomeone holds a presupposition is that not equivalent to saying that they believe it? — Janus

If we allow a supposition to be a belief, which is not contradictory, then from mere language we see a pre-supposition makes explicit that which has yet to meet the criteria of belief. If belief is the consequence of some cognition relative to a thing in conjunction with a judgement made upon it with respect to the subjective validity of the cognition, it follows that presupposition does not lend itself to any of those cognitive faculties relating thought to an object, but, if anything, given their validity, are necessarily antecedent to them. Hence, in Collingwood, the notion of “logical priority”.
(In Kant, “logical priority” is the transcendental condition making the categories possible, which Collingwood modernizes to “absolute presuppositions”, in his attempt to modernize post-Kantian metaphysics in general, in order to accommodate advances in the hard sciences)

So the question, at least from one point of view, attempts to misuse our cognitive faculties, which leads to self-contradictions. Throw in “absolute” as a quality of presupposition, and it makes that idea not even contained in cognitive faculties, from which arises the ground of the contradiction, re: the absolute is the unconditioned, for which no object is possible in human experience. In addition, with respect to Collingwood, to further qualify absolute presuppositions as, A.) that of “to any question it is never an answer” (Def. 6), and B.) “never verifiable” (pg 32), in that absolute presuppositions are in and of themselves not contained in, are indeed never even subjected to, the faculty of cognition at all. And that which is never cognized can never be a belief.

Problem is, of course, neither Kant nor Collingwood venture an altogether satisfactory origin of the categories in the former, nor absolute presuppositions in the latter. They each arrive at his own version of some irreducible metaphysical necessity, and each recognize they’ve tacitly boxed themselves in.

Same as it ever was......

If suppositions or presuppositions are beliefs, which in accordance with ordinary parlance they indeed are, then absolute presuppositions are absolute beliefs. The logic is inexorable. — Janus

Not going to gang up on you, so I’ll just say I’m surprised you’d consider presuppositions are beliefs, or, as you say later, are truth-apt. Both of those would seem to make presuppositions congruent with empirical judgements and absolute presuppositions congruent with a priori judgements. Dunno how to justify that, at least from a metaphysical domain.You know...what with logical priority and all.

But you did stipulate “ordinary parlance”, so.....there is that.

Found it, thanks.

Agreed, as far as I give ontology any consideration at all.

“..... and the proud name of an ontology which professes to present synthetical cognitions a priori of things in general in a systematic doctrine, must give place to the modest title of analytic of the pure understanding....”
(CPR, A247)

“....the metaphysician’s business is not to propound them, but to propound the proposition that this or that of them is presupposed...”

These “absolute presuppositions” hold congruent with the categories, insofar as any ontological or epistemic proposition is grounded by them a priori, without exception.

1.) is necessity; 2.) is reality; 3.) is causality; 4.) is possibility.

Thanks, . That’s what I wanted, from Collingwood himself, not a reference which gives me examples of what they do but does not tell me what they are.

Here's the thing i would guard against: — Banno

No need, really. Having gained their victory, such theoreticians find precious little profit in venturing into that which for them, would be naught but a wasteland.

Still, probably best beware the odd quixotic nonetheless, for whom the proper theoretician is not responsible.

very unambiguous example in the Essay on Metaphysics. — Pantagruel

Would you cite that for me, please? Or something similar? I just want to know what is being used as an unambiguous example of an absolute presupposition.

I’m wondering if I know it by another name, is all.

Thanks.

True enough. But it doesn’t follow from the general capacity for feeling pain, that individual instances of it are necessarily mutually inclusive.

Dunno if it relates, but you said “metaphysically” and “anyone?”, so....pain is a subjective condition common to humans in general; pain, as the subject’s “appraisal of his subjective condition”, is never shared.

Just as is, or is not, pleasure.

cooking breakfast. — Banno

HA!!! We just finished dinner, which on this fine Saturday night, consists of.....breakfast.

Isn’t relevancy a judgement? Or do you just wish to disregard the part where the authors all but reduced the experiments to “episodic memory”?

I wanted to ask you.....the “bottom of page 84” is a footnote, so what was that article supposed to tell me?

Why those quotes? They don't say anything relevant. — Banno

Oh, I dunno. If one chooses between yours consisting of 4:36 minutes of anecdotal hogwash, and mine consisting of peer-reviewed publications, I guess you’d be right.

Of particular note, at 1:08, “...my brain automatically tries to recreate the sensory experience of other people as if I am them and they are me...”, which SERIOUSLY begs the question.....what difference does it make to say, “as if......”?

Gimme a break.

Fair point. Cannot something be accurately described in more than one way? — creativesoul

I trust you’re not considering something so mundane as.....describing a horse in French is just as accurate a description of horses as describing a horse in Japanese.

It seems your question merely adds to “all the ways the object is”, without addressing “the way the object is”. Just between you and me ‘n’ the fence post, from dialectical precedent doncha know, we both surmise the key here is “none of these constitute the object as it is”, which implies your accurately describing in different ways doesn’t have anything to do with such constituency.

If the original quote contained the fair point, and the main of the fair point was constituency given by “none are the way the object is”, why does it appear that your question is tending to undermine it?

Now I know, from my own experience that I cannot feel other's pain. — Janus

Agreed, but not just from experience. I know I will never feel another’s pain merely from sheer logistics, in that the source of pain in another in not resident in me. And if it should be the case that some common event is the source of pain in both of us, it is my brain that registers my physiological malevolence, and his pain is entirely his own. It’s actually quite absurd to suppose otherwise, for then it must be explained why I never feel my brother’s hypoglycemia, and, what’s worse, it gives the impression that human nature arbitrarily/circumstantially invites pain such nature aesthetically makes every effort to avoid, in contradiction with itself.

A quick perusal of “mirror-touch synesthesia for dummies”.......you know, Wikipedia.....shows such theoretical hysterics has barely anything practical to do with generally natural conditions. For good measure, upon deeper investigation, is found a fancy-assed exposition of plain, run-of-the-mill, our ol’ buddy.......mere experience. Or, to be more metaphysically accurate, intuition:

“....We have recently demonstrated that neurons in medial temporal lobe are reactivated during spontaneous recall of episodic memory. The action observation/execution matching neurons in the medial temporal lobe may match the sight of actions of others with the memory of those same actions performed by the observer. Thus during action-execution, a memory of the executed action is formed, and during action-observation this memory trace is reactivated. This interpretation is in line with the hypothesis of multiple mirroring mechanisms in the primate brain, a hypothesis that can easily account for the presence of mirroring cells in many cortical areas.....”
(Mukamel, et.al., 2010, in https://www.cell.com/current-biology/fulltext/S0960-9822(10)00233-2)
————-

Food for thought, and only addressed to you because I’m too lazy to open another post, regarding psychologically-inclined science that does absolutely nothing for Everydayman.....

“....We recorded extracellular activity from 1177 cells in human medial frontal and temporal cortices while patients executed or observed hand grasping actions and facial emotional expressions....”
(Ibid

“....Many original articles, reviews and textbooks affirm that we have 100 billion neurons and 10 times more glial cells (Kandel et al., 2000; Ullian et al., 2001; Doetsch, 2003; Nishiyama et al., 2005; Noctor et al., 2007; Allen and Barres, 2009)....”
(Herculano-Houze, et.al., 2009, in https://sites.oxy.edu/clint/evolution/articles/humanbraininnumbers.pdf

.......compared to science that does, say, wherein a telescope irrevocably renders ten thousand years of human thought regarding the cosmos obsolete, it is found that the ratio of ~1 in ~100,00,000 neurons in the human brain sufficient to render the claim we do not feel another’s pain.....

questionable — Banno

we must know something of the territory in order to determine that some maps are more accurate than others. — Janus

Agreed.

The question is how do we know anything of the territory if not through maps (models or representations or whatever you want to call them)? — Janus

There’s no map of my house, but I know the territory pretty well. Could we say experience is the same as models, representations or whatever you want to call them? Hope so, because otherwise it’d be pretty hard to explain how Lewis and Clark came back with a map, but they didn’t leave with one.

As far as the playing of the game is concerned, there are two players if I am playing both colors. The quality of the game isn’t the least affected no matter who’s moving the pieces, as long as the movements conform to the rules.

Popper appreciates you respecting his metaphysical dispositions. If it’s any consolation.....Einstein didn’t.

the schema of conceptions are entirely the product of imagination, which is sufficient reason for justifying that I can name any perception of mine, any damn thing I want.
— Mww

Right, so as I said above it is not possible to create a private language (one constructed entirely in private terms) but it is possible to have private names for things that can be pointed to. We seem to be in agreement. — Janus

Close, but not entirely. If I combine a few imagined, private, names in an organized composition, wouldn’t I have created an imagined, private language? Note there is yet no incursion of meaning, intentionality, or explanation. There is only composition from extended representations relating to each other, which sufficiently defines the conception of language in the first place (contra Witt), as yet having nothing to do with the use of it.

“....When we say: “every word in language signifies something” we have so far said nothing whatsoever; unless we have explained exactly what distinction we wish to make...”
(Wittgenstein, P.I.,1,13, in Anscombe, 1958)

Can maps be more or less adequate to the territory? — Janus

I guess, sure, but “more or less” is pretty open-ended and “adequate” doesn’t say much.

What’s the catch?

Ontological anti-realism is just some level of skepticism about ontology in general. — frank

Ok. I grant ontology in general, so I guess I don’t have some level of skepticism about it. I’m certainly skeptical that my knowledge of things is complete or true. Which is a metaphysical condition, I would say.

if you decided to create one, you would not be able to understand any of its non-ostensive terms except by translating them into your native, public language — Janus

True enough, which mandates that if I create a private language, its terms must directly correspond to their respective antecedents. Which they will, or the creation of that which represents a range of my subjective activities is impossible.

You, of all people, may understand the schema of conceptions are entirely the product of imagination, which is sufficient reason for justifying that I can name any perception of mine, any damn thing I want.

I'm not surprised. — Banno

Excellent. I haven’t exceeded my intentions.

Soft ontologist I can live with, but you can’t get “anti-realist” from my “empirical realist, certainly”.

For me to require “some sort of internal reality”, presupposes some sort of speculative metaphysics, because that’s the only means to it.

And I’ll have you know my fins are no more floppy than anybody else’s, thank you very much.

How does your view about private language flow into your ontology? I'm guessing you're a realist. — frank

The easy part, and.....good guess. An empirical realist, certainly, insofar as to deny spacetime reality independent of me, yet necessarily causal in itself, is both contradictory and dangerous. At the same time, there seems to be some sort of internal reality that is very different. And from that seeming.......let the games begin.

Somewhat less easy, is the doctrine of ontology.....taken to reference the science of the nature of being. Ehhhhh.......whatever is, is whatever it is, the nature of its being given immediately to me upon my knowledge of it, which follows seemingly from my own internal reality. In general, epistemology holds the more fundamental metaphysical domain, than ontology. Doesn’t matter what the ontology of a thing is, if a valid methodology for knowledge doesn’t precede. Plus....I prefer to keep my -ologies and -isms as plain and simple and few as possible.

So.....because I know from experience what “language” entails, and I know I can assemble the representations of my conceptions into an organized composition, which is exactly what experience informs me is “language”, I am authorized to think “talking to myself” is a legitimate rational exercise, which is logically the same as having a language contained in, and used by, me alone. Hence, an ontology of private language in the logical sense, is given.

This is, of course, thoroughly refuted by merely changing the prioritization inherent in concept of language itself, from its altogether necessary internal construction by a subject, to its altogether contingent external employment by some other subject, which is exactly what post-Enlightenment analytic philosophers did.
————-

In context.....

So would you argue that the set of things we declare to be real is largely produced intersubjectively and has the stamp of culture on it? — frank

No - I would not use that word; nor the notion of reality that seems implicit. — Banno

I think Mww will say whether he thinks reality is a social construct. — frank

OK. You do see that the question you asked Mww is different to the question you asked me..? — Banno

......it appears Frank equates “the set of things we declare to be real” spoken to Banno, with “reality” asked of me. I’m OK with that part, at least as it pertains herein. It then appears Frank equates “produced intersubjectively and has the stamp of culture” spoken to Banno, with “a social construct” asked of me. I’m OK with that, too, in context herein.

I disagree with Banno in that he claims it is a different question. On the other hand, I agree with Banno, in that I wouldn’t use the term “intersubjectivity”, and I would thereby reject the implication the term carries, with respect to reality, specifically, insofar as I disagree with the notion that reality is a social construct.

The really cool part is, those “Kantian oddities” Banno tosses about in such cavalier fashion, offer the perfect logical exposition for the ambiguity and general logical vagaries contained in the term “intersubjectivity”, justifying its epistemological exclusion. Which, ironically enough, does nothing to exclude it from psychological doctrines, where ambiguity and logical vagaries prosper.

If you were feral, I don't think your natural capacity to speak would be activated. — frank

I dunno....a feral cat does the same basic stuff as a regular cat. A feral human, if there could be such a thing, might just be what we’d call uncivilized. Still have the same innate capacities, I would guess. Again....the reality of it would be inconceivable, even if the logic is not.

Point is, your private language would be built off work done by others — frank

Agreed, hence my (edited) unloaded consciousness stipulation.

You sure you want to throw in your lot with a bloke with an eccentric notion of equality, Mww? — Banno

I was agreeing with the gist of his comment as it relates to mine. No more, no less. I didn’t see anything in it having to do with equality.

I accept you agree with Wittgenstein. I agree private language is entirely impractical for intelligible communication, which is language’s only purpose, but do not agree it is impossible to create. I gave two examples of it.

I don't know how to make an untranslatable language. — frank

Yeah, but.....translatable by who? I don’t need my private language translated, and for somebody else to translate means it isn’t private.

I think I could make an untranslatable language if I had my current consciousness unloaded. But for that, I’d have to be 100% feral, meaning, from birth. But if I was 100% feral I wouldn’t survive long enough to load that version of my consciousness with conceptions words represent, which makes language creation moot. If I was in a vegetative state I might have an unloaded consciousness, or at least a useless one, but what use does a vegetable have for language.

Bottom line is....we’re human so anything we do must be something a human can do. If we’re going to have a language we have to develop one the way humans do. It would, as you say, have to relate to things innate to humans. Trying to figure out a non-human way, post hoc, is doomed to failure from sheer inconceivability.

Could you help me understand this? Isn't it drawing on common sense? — frank

I’m not a fan of analytic philosophy in general, and language philosophy in particular, so I’m not going to give an unbiased critique. See Antony Nickels; he knows this stuff inside out, but that doesn’t guarantee another’s understanding of it.

Does "private" mean untranslatable even in principle? — frank

It does to Wittgenstein. To me, private merely indicates contained in and used by the subject which thinks it. Post-moderns shy away form “subjective”, so they invoke “private” to substitute for it. Nevertheless, why would a private language need to be translatable? Why call it private if it’s not intended to represent a single mind, or consciousness, or user.

Yep. Thumbs up. Still just my opinion though.

What's the PLA's take-away? It's not actually an argument. — frank

Funny, though, the academic/peer-reviewed argument is that the PLA is nothing but argument, because there are no principles on which it could be grounded as a legitimate dialectical thesis, as had always been the wont of pure philosophy. I mean....from Locke to Fodor it’s been said that words are nothing but a map of subjective representation to meaning, and language merely stands for the possibility of a common map, all with no discourse on method.

Personally, I don’t see why there couldn’t be a comprehensible private language, contra Wittgenstein. Because it’s private, it must have been built by me, so it would only have to be comprehensible to me. And if it is absolutely impossible for me to misunderstand myself, and none of the ingredients of a possible private language contradict any of the others, it must be possible.....

It certainly doesn't preclude language use that simply isn't shared with others. — frank

.....just like that.

Oh. Ok. I forgot about that. Exceptions to the rule?

Sure we talk to ourselves, but can we without a language given from experience? Or, as you say, interaction? I don’t see why not. If I’m totally locked-in, say from birth, it wouldn’t be possible to relate my internal speech a posteriori anyway, so the chances of confusing myself are exactly zero. But it’s impossible to conceive these conditions anyway, so......

Pretty much as I see it, yep. Although I think Banno will reject the claim he creates false dichotomies, in that he is on the record as categorically rejecting half of it, that is, private language. I bet he says refusing to grant the validity of a true dichotomy is hardly the same as creating a false one.

It is easily neglected that private language is not self-contradictory; one can readily structure a publicly incomprehensible composition of invented words, however impractical it may be. I gave two examples, and I’d be surprised if there weren’t others.

distinguish between what is potentially comprehensible to others, and what is actually comprehensible to others. — Metaphysician Undercover

Which brings up the notion of intentionality, re: Brentano, 1874. The measure by which the potential transfers to the actual. We usually do wish to be understood when we communicate, which is determined primarily by how much we care about the composition of our expressions.

If you are human; you are, even in a philosophical way, blind to yourself — Antony Nickles

“....(except for psychology’s insights).....”

Ants at a picnic.

The language of their thoughts isn't native to them originally. They learned it through interaction. — frank

No one’s is; everyone does. Perhaps what is native in thought, is images.

But think about someone who's locked-in (they're conscious, but can't signal out in any way). — frank

Locked-in. Like....deaf-mute? Incapacitated somehow? Dunno. If he can’t get a signal out, he isn’t going to communicate anything, which makes words and language irrelevant anyway, as far as he’s concerned.

There’s always exceptions to the rule.

We work together to build the use of a word. — Banno

Yep. That still presupposes the word, and, implies experience.
———-

implying that all our words are subjectively invented.
— Banno

Originally, they were. All of them. No words in Nature.
— Mww

SO... your claim is that originally there were words used only by one person... a private language? — Banno

Could be, if the inventor of the word was the only user of it, in an organized, structured composition. Turns out, that’s not the case, as the historical record verifies, but that is beside the point.

Plus....here we go again with the goalposts; I never said words used by only one person. I said words subjectively invented, which implies one person, but does not imply use, that being merely a possible consequent. While it may not make sense to invent a word then not use it, that doesn’t mean the use is necessary because of invention. The use is necessary for something else, which, again, presupposes the invention.
————-

What do you think they did with these words? — Banno

They created that organized, structured composition I just mentioned.

What function could they have had — Banno

Like I said a couple days ago: represent subjective activities.

the individual grunted in a particular way each time they saw a particularly delicious fruit? — Banno

Sure, why not. A grunt for pleasure, a grunt for danger, a grunt for the fun of grunting. All representing subjective activities, subsequently communicated. You did say individual, after all.

they grunted, and others understood this as indicative of ripe fruit. — Banno

BINGO!!!! One grunts, the others respond according to what they understand the grunt to mean. Now we gots ourselves the basics of grunt-language, and it isn’t private. All started by a lonely grunt over lovely fruit, which was. Hmmmm.....image a pair of these hairy dudes, eating the fruit of the one bush. Would they emit the exact same grunt?

A grunt ain’t nothing but a word that don’t need no spellin’.

Anyway....enough of this. I’m right in what I’m saying, you’re right in what you’re saying. It’s just that mine comes before yours. If you’d just grant the chronology, it’d be a done deal.

Nor does there seem to be any difficulty outside of philosophy tutorials in moving from perception-of-shoe to shoe. — Banno

There shouldn’t be, even within philosophy, which doesn’t give a shit about what is known. Your handy-dandy little formula is mere memory; you musta already known what a shoe is in order to say “perception-of-shoe”. To be perfectly consistent, you are left with “perception-of-x to x”, which makes explicit you can never learn anything at all, if left to your own cognitive devices; for you, x can never be anything but x. And if every human ever, uses that formula.......where in the HELL did “shoe” even come from in the first place?????

Consider this, mon ami: your rational methodology bears striking resemblance to Hume and his “constant conjunction” theory, published a half century earlier than the epistemological philosophy I’ve been advocating, and chastised for as being outdated. Thing is.....humans haven’t significantly evolved since (+/-) the Neolithic era, insofar as the brain works pretty much the same way now as it did when we figured out how to get real food out of scruffy-assed seeds. I trust your intellectual capacity to draw the proper conclusions from such obvious implications.

So yes....things moved on. Things other than an irrefutable, thus entirely sufficient, scientific explanation for human experience. Without that, we are free to hypothesize as we wish. With proper regard to logic, of course. I hope you’ll agree that one is a fool to argue good logic just as much as one is a fool to argue good science.
——————-

the meaning is not private, but constructed and shared in that very use
— Banno

This suggests we always understand each other.
— Mww

I don't see how. There will obviously be misconstruel during the construction process. — Banno

I intended “we always understand each other” to indicate that if use alone was sufficient for both construction of meaning and sharing of it, I would only need your constructions given from your sharing in order to understand your meaning. Nevertheless, by saying there will always be misconstrueals merely admits an inconsistency in the your assertion that meaning is not private. You said it yourself: there will be misconstrueals in the construction process, but without mention of the sharing. Perhaps you were just trying to convey that we share our constructions and we construct what we share, which is true enough, but we certainly do not do both at the same time nor in the same way. It follows that if one of the two is private, then the meaning derived from it will be just as private. It can only be that if both construction and sharing are not private then meaning will not be private.
—————-

implying that all our words are subjectively invented. — Banno

Originally, they were. All of them. No words in Nature.
—————

the suggestion is that we treat of the way we use words.....

Yep, usually. Mutually intelligible language.

.......rather than a secret meaning we must guess. — Banno

Yep, as in codes. Not mutually intelligible language.

What’s common to both?

Your first paragraph contains an existential inconsistency.