But experience is the teacher. — tim wood

Doesn’t this presuppose that which we wish to know? If experience is the teacher, from whence comes the teacher? Or, better yet....from what does the teacher learn?

But what is the ultimate measuring stick? Experience. — tim wood

Hume would clap for Scottish joy, that a modern intellectual finds his empiricist philosophy in good standing. Kant would exhibit typical Prussian indignation, that a modern intellectual neglects the implicit continuity, insofar as that which measures presupposes the ability, yet no account of it is offered.

There’s also a minor categorical error here, for we are talking about different applications of reason, but experience is the ultimate measuring stick of knowledge.

What are we to do with “exist together in independence of and without interference from each other”?

And no mention of the classifications of these kinds of reason. Practical reason can be pure, just as speculative reason can be impure.

Not to say that wasn’t some splendid axe-work. Far better than the general butchering running rampant hereabouts.

I’m not going to spend much time on this, but taken in context, re: “given the two basic kinds....I await...” is a declaration of intention, not an “ask”.

Can’t be reading stuff into what wasn’t there, doncha know.

I took it that your question as to how the one might be grounded in the other — Constance

While I didn’t technically ask a question, I was querying Tim, as to how he thought the one grounded in the other. The quote merely relates to Tim’s assertion, as a preliminary reference.

Hmmmmm, a question: — Constance

Sorry......what?

How could anything be understood absent the faculty of understanding — tim wood

Of course nothing can be, but intuition doesn’t have anything to do with understanding.....

“...the understanding cannot intuit and the sensuous faculty cannot think...”

....but we’re still in the sensing stage, not the conceiving stage. We’ve synthesized matter to form, according to appearance, giving phenomena, but haven’t yet synthesized concepts to phenomena, according to judgement, giving cognition.

Besides, all this intuitive synthesis being completely outside our awareness, it must be a priori, or, it isn’t even happening that way at all. Hence....speculative metaphysics. We are aware of sensuous impressions, we are aware of how those impressions are to be known. All in between, is guesswork, albeit necessarily logically consistent.
—————

if the CPR is intended to establish a ground for scientific thinking, which I think it is and does — tim wood

Nahhhh....scientific thinking had already been established, and it is the ground for the theoretical epistemology of pure reason.

“.....Whether the treatment of that portion of our knowledge which lies within the province of pure reason advances with that undeviating certainty which characterizes the progress of science, we shall be at no loss to determine. If we find those who are engaged in metaphysical pursuits, unable to come to an understanding as to the method which they ought to follow; if we find them, after the most elaborate preparations, invariably brought to a stand before the goal is reached, and compelled to retrace their steps and strike into fresh paths, we may then feel quite sure that they are far from having attained to the certainty of scientific progress and may rather be said to be merely groping about in the dark....”

CPR admits the validity of scientific thinking, that is, logical theory verified by experience, and thereby attempts to ground metaphysical thinking in accordance with the certainty of scientific thinking. It begins by asking, “...how is metaphysics as a science possible...”. (absent in A/ added in B22)

Now, if you’d said, CPR is intended to establish the ground for thinking scientifically......we’d be off to the rodeo.
—————-

if the CPR is intended to establish a ground for scientific thinking (...) it is itself grounded in practical reason. — tim wood

I’ve noticed you speak of this in other places and times. Sooner or later I probably would have asked about it.

Kant must have attributed to reason three fundamental conditions, for there are ....DUH!!!....three critiques, to wit:, theoretical (CPR), judicial (CofJ) and practical (CpR). Everydayman thinks more about his actions than about how he comes up with his actions, which implies practical reason has more importance overall than either of the other two conditional forms of reason. Nevertheless, given the two basic kinds of reason qua reason, pure and practical....

“.....To this question we have given a sufficient answer; for we have shown that, as the former stands in a relation to a different kind of condition from those of the latter, the law of the one does not affect the law of the other and that, consequently, both can exist together in independence of and without interference with each other....”

....I shall await your exposition as to how the one might be grounded in the other.

As there is no such thing as a triangle — tim wood

Just baffles me that people are alive and otherwise well, that reject that truism. Still, check out these rock formations:

https://thedailyplasma.blog/2017/11/03/triangles-in-nature-why/#:~:text=Triangular%20shapes%20are%20everywhere%20in%20Nature.%20They%20show,…%20well%2C%20natural.%20Or%20is%20it%20that%20simple%3F

Kinda hard for the average Smuck On The Street to agree there’s no triangles in Nature, when he can look right at ‘em.
————

there might be triangular shapes all around all the day long, what it takes to recognize them as triangles is an internal intuition with which those experiences conform. — tim wood

I think Kant would say those shapes are sensed, become phenomena, so must be empirical intuitions. The shapes may be recognized as triangles merely from being told the object is shaped in that particular way. In this case, the perceiver has no need to think a priori about lines or the arrangement of them, because the lines are there and they’ve already been arranged. Judgement merely says...yep, the spatial extension perceived conforms to the mental form cognized.

I think the key takeaway with respect to that quote, is that not everything of perception is a thing in itself. The first part of it states “object of this external intuition is itself possible”. But we’ve already agree there are no triangles in Nature, so it must be that “the object of this external intuition” is a sensible object we ourselves put in Nature. And because we created it, in accordance with its form residing in reason, It must appear to us as it is in itself. But it bears remembering we don’t need to cognize this appearance, herein the triangle in itself, because we’ve already cognized a priori exactly how the appearance will manifest and it is already known to us accordingly.

The second part asks, even if that which we construct and objectively illustrate then becomes a phenomenon because it affects our faculties of representation, we cannot say we know it as a thing in itself, which is already proven to be impossible, so it must be known in conjunction, not with its appearance from sensibility, but with its form from intuition, which we already have. Which is exactly what we did when we originally cognized it a priori, before the illustration of it.

The proper conclusion is, then, that there must be a faculty of intuition a priori within us.

Hope that makes sense, cuz it’s the hardest my brain has worked since.....oh, 1984, I think.

does this basically mean that thought is always tied to sensibility, but is nevertheless different from it? — darthbarracuda

Not quite. Thought is different from sensibility, but thought is always and only tied to understanding.

“....For it** is, according to what has been said above, a faculty of thought....”
“....understanding cannot intuit, and the sensuous faculty cannot think...”
(** “it”, in context, is understanding; “what has been said above” doesn’t paraphrase properly. See A69/B94)

Empirical intuition is tied to sensibility. We don’t think about our sensations; we only realize there has been one.

That does not mean that I can have pure a priori thoughts, though — darthbarracuda

Sure you can. Every change has a cause is an impure a priori cognition, insofar as here, something that changes is presupposed. You don’t have to step on the gas to know your car will go faster if you do. You also know it will also go a little faster if you get hit in the back by a little car, as well that it’ll go a lot faster if hit by a big truck.

But every change must have a cause is a pure a priori cognition, for it doesn’t consider any objects, but only the relation between objects in general, and time, which is.....as we all know....a pure intuition. And any proposition containing a pure representation, is pure a priori cognition. All parts of space are themselves space. And so on.

This reflects back to the mention of pure a priori cognitions thought as principles, or the laws derived from them. There is no exception to the principle, “every change must have a cause”, hence it is a pure a priori cognition. “No A can be not-A”, a law; “every existence is necessary”, a law; “existence cannot be a predicate but subject only”, a principle but not a law, for it has to do with the structure of pure reason itself, which is always speculative.
—————

meaning of these words: intuition, object, and representation. — darthbarracuda

Kant doesn’t say exactly what an intuition is, only what they do or how they come about. Empirically, or that which is an “external intuition” because its source is without us rather than within:

“....If, on the other hand, the object conforms to the nature of our faculty of intuition...”
“....sensible intuition, and hence are only conditions of the existence of things as phenomena...”
“....an intuition can take place only in so far as the object is given to us...”

This is quite difficult, because Kant also talks about “internal intuitions”, which do not arise from sensibility, hence are not susceptible to being phenomena, in other words, where an object is not given to us. As such, and because I can intuit myself as a thinking rational agent, but myself can hardly be considered a phenomenon, so it would seem internal intuitions are necessary. Kant is either not very clear about this, or he is far too clear, to the point of confusing his readers.

“...Now if there did not exist within you a faculty of intuition a priori; if this subjective condition were not in respect to its form also the universal condition a priori under which alone the object of this external intuition is itself possible; if the object (that is, the triangle) were something in itself, without relation to you the subject; how could you affirm that that which lies necessarily in your subjective conditions in order to construct a triangle, must also necessarily belong to the triangle in itself?...”

Good luck with that little tidbit. From that bolded, I just let the faculty of intuition be some contingent state of my subjective condition. I don’t really need to know exactly what it is, or its exact origin. If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it sorta thing.

An object in Kant is either a real physical thing, iff it can be represented as a phenomenon, or a predicate belonging to a copula, iff contained in a logical proposition, re: an object of reason, or an object of experience. The real object and the object of experience are not the same, but relate to each other with sufficient logical justification to say the sensed object is to be known as a certain thing. An object of experience, on the other hand, is nothing but what the cognitive system says it is, after applying itself to the real perceived object, re: cloud formations, mirages, or, what the system conceives on its own accord, without the presence of an object, re: hallucinations.

A representation is just what the cognitive system substitutes for the real thing, the most general word for an object at any stage in its de­termination by the subject, or for the subjective act of forming the object at that level. Intuitions and conceptions are representations, judgement is a representation of a representation. Knowledge is not, insofar as the determination of the object by the subject, is already accomplished.

For what it’s worth.....

In what way is a priori knowledge apodictic that makes it impossible for empirical knowledge to provide the same universality and necessity? — darthbarracuda

The way in which pure a priori knowledge is apodeitic is becaiuse it arises from the understanding alone, an internal cognitive faculty, thereby granting sufficient causality for certainty, in that there is no other influence on it. That which arises from itself, cannot be other than it is, which holds the same value as truth, but truth restricted to the very domain from which it is given. Now “not other than it is” may eventually be shown to be false, but at the originating time of it, the certainty is not questionable, and if eventually shown to be false, it cannot be of the same domain from which it originated, for in such case, there is an outside influence. It is clear from this stipulation, the only possible pure a priori knowledge is in the form of principles, or the laws derivable from them, either with respect to the physical domain, which is properly science, “...the science of what is...”, or with respect to the metaphysical domain, which is properly morality, “...the science of what ought to be...”. Again, a furtherance of the intrinsic Kantian epistemological dualism.

Universality and necessity are principles that cannot apply to anything empirical, because they are overturned by, subsumed under, the more powerful Principle of Induction, which makes explicit experience is always contingent: undeniable observational proof that what’s true today may not be true tomorrow, re: determinations of the nature of the observable Universe. What reason seeks, on the other hand, is that which is never contingent, or, which is the same thing, never self-contradictory, itself just conventional speech for seeking the unconditioned, the ideal, the irreducible. The question then becomes....does reason ever reach that state of affairs, and the Kantian speculative metaphysics proves it does not, and it cannot.

Given what reason cannot do, it remains to be determined what reason can do, the controlling condition being the LNC, which immediately suggests the entire human cognitive system is inherently logical. This, in turn, makes it impossible to demonstrate how logic itself comes about, but instead, must simply be granted as being the case. Otherwise, no theoretical sciences of any kind that are predicated on logical propositions can facilitate knowledge, which means we can never claim knowledge of anything at all.

That 7 + 5 = 12 is a synthetic a priori true proposition is certainly plausible to me, but that it is necessarily and universally true that 7 + 5 = 12 is not. — darthbarracuda

Truth here is irrelevant. Synthetical propositions denote nothing but the relation of conceptions to each other, with no judgement as to the truth of the proposition being enabled. Again...dualism, in that synthetical is only to differentiate a kind of relation of conceptions from its complement, the analytical. It is identity, not truth, which makes these relational determinations. Analytical propositions are those in which the conceptions hold similar identities, synthetical propositions are those in which identity does not hold. Identity herein meant to indicate only that the conception in the predicate of a proposition can be found in the subject of that same proposition. In synthetical propositions, then, the conception in the predicate cannot be found in the subject.

From that it follows that while 7 + 5 = 12 is synthetical, in that neither of the numbers to the left, in and of themselves, can give the number on the right.....

“....The conception of twelve is by no means obtained by merely cogitating the union of seven and five; and we may analyse our conception of such a possible sum as long as we will, still we shall never discover in it the notion of twelve. We must go beyond these conceptions, and have recourse to an intuition which corresponds to one of the two—our five fingers, for example, or like Segner in his Arithmetic five points, and so by degrees, add the units contained in the five given in the intuition, to the conception of seven. For I first take the number 7, and, for the conception of 5 calling in the aid of the fingers of my hand as objects of intuition, I add the units, which I before took together to make up the number 5, gradually now by means of the material image my hand, to the number 7, and by this process, I at length see the number 12 arise....”
(Added in B16, not found in A)

.....the fact that the proposition is true only arises from empirical proofs, in which it is found that it is impossible for this particular arithmetic operation to give a different result, and thereby sets the stage for establishing the criteria for any mathematical entailment, and in turn, establishing the possibility and the validity of pure a priori conditions in general. In this way, all logical propositions determined by reason are in logical form only, the content be what it may. From the simplest analytical proposition, A = A, to the most complex abstract synthetical mathematical calculus, the proofs of all logical forms depend on empirical conditions.

For what reason do I have to believe that it may not be different in the future? — darthbarracuda

According to Kantian metaphysics, you don’t. Knowledge destroys belief, so if you know without the possibility of refutation that mathematical propositions are the mark of absolute certainty, because you can prove all of them to yourself, you have no reason whatsoever to doubt them. It behooves one, nonetheless, to keep in mind such certainty is only determinable under the auspices of the very system from which the the ground for it is given. In such case, not only is it impossible to doubt this certainty, but it is just as impossible to think of what form the doubt would have.

The justification of all this, is in the categories, the “...pure conceptions of the understanding...”, from which are given the schema of “quantity”, first in the form of numbers, and thereafter in the form of unity, the manifestations of the permissible connectedness of numbers. Because it is the case, at least in this particular epistemological theory, that the categories are absolutely essential, and given that the schema of the categories are always the same, it becomes impossible to arrive at different conclusions for any one proposition predicated on them, assuming internal logical consistency is met, the primary condition of the system as a whole. Still, justification is not proof, which, as already shown, is entirely dependent on empirical conditions.

Universality and necessity, in fact any terminology of any kind, the categories, even reason itself, if developed by humans, only applies to humans. Mathematical propositions will therefore be true, iff a human is responsible for them. They will be true wherever and whenever there is a human to think them, but not necessarily otherwise. To a rational agent with other than a intuitive/discursive cognitive system, nothing about mathematical truths, or any truths at all, can be said. Does 1 + 1 = 2 to an elephant? Or a resident of a planet we don’t even know about? Not only can we not say, but we don’t even have the means to understand how to ask.

And Nagel thought himself the first to wonder. No reason for it, really, for the answer had already been given, fully 200 years before he even thought about it.

what is the difference between a sensation and an intuition (what more is there to an intuition other than sensation?), — darthbarracuda

Sensation arises from the matter of objects and is the initiation of the process by which the system is going to determine how the object is to be known; intuitions are the forms to which the matter attains, whatever that objects may be. Thus it is, sensation is given from physicality, intuition is given from rationality, and therein is the preliminary theoretical ground for the Kantian transcendental idealist science of combining the empiricism of Hume, et al with the rationalism of Descartes et al. Which, from his earliest critical career, was to be his primary philosophical mandate. “Dogmatic slumbers” and all that.

What more is there to intuition than sensation, depends on one’s understanding of the matter/form duality. If one doesn’t grant such a thing, there is no more, at least in the Kantian sense; if one does grant the duality, what more is there, is already given, from the Kantian sense.

The matter of objects can only affect the human system five ways, for there are, of course, only five modes of perception. But any mode of perception gives a representation, which are themselves only distinguishable by the mode in which they are received into the system. Representation of sound from the auditory apparatus is different from the representation of touch from the tactile apparatus, but to the system, all are merely representative of an object’s particular affect, and something more is absolutely required before any determination is possible as to what the object is.

“....Without the sensuous faculty no object would be given to us, and without the understanding no object would be thought. Thoughts without content are void; intuitions without conceptions, blind. Hence it is as necessary for the mind to make its conceptions sensuous (that is, to join to them the object in intuition), as to make its intuitions intelligible (that is, to bring them under conceptions). Neither of these faculties can exchange its proper function. Understanding cannot intuite, and the sensuous faculty cannot think. In no other way than from the united operation of both, can knowledge arise. But no one ought, on this account, to overlook the difference of the elements contributed by each; we have rather great reason carefully to separate and distinguish them. We therefore distinguish the science of the laws of sensibility, that is, aesthetic, from the science of the laws of the understanding, that is, logic....”
(A51/B75)

And here it is that Kant exhibits his admitted dualist metaphysical nature, and the ground for a completely dualistic methodology for human knowledge in general. No escape from it, and those making the attempt otherwise only “...have recourse to pitiful sophisms or confess their ignorance...”

Kant says that knowledge a priori is that which is absolutely independent of all experience...... — darthbarracuda

From B3:

“....whether there exists a knowledge altogether independent of experience, and even of all sensuous impressions? But the expression, "a priori," is not as yet definite enough adequately to indicate the whole meaning of the question above started. For, in speaking of knowledge which has its sources in experience, we are wont to say, that this or that may be known a priori, because we do not derive this knowledge immediately from experience, but from a general rule, which, however, we have itself borrowed from experience**. (...) By the term "knowledge a priori," therefore, we shall in the sequel understand, not such as is independent of this or that kind of experience, but such as is absolutely so of all experience. (...) Knowledge a priori is either pure or impure**. Pure knowledge a priori is that with which no empirical element is mixed up....”
**impure a priori knowledge, also considered as either intuition, metaphysically, or memory, psychologically.
** in Guyer and Meiklejohn, omitted in Kemp Smith.

Kant is merely distancing the knowledge we’ve already acquired through experience, from knowledge not given from any experience whatsoever. Impure a priori knowledge is like....seen one fireworks display, seen ‘em all kinda thing. Regardless of relative degree, all are still just fireworks displays. Pure a priori knowledge, because it is being herein defined as absent any experience, must then be determined by something other than sensibility. And the only thing remaining after eliminating sensibility, is thought. Therefore, the theoretical ground is laid for deriving the possibility of pure a priori knowledge from understanding alone, which is the faculty of thought.

......is it more like it having the possibility of being experienced which makes it empirical knowledge? — darthbarracuda

Two counter arguments:
First, If possible experience was sufficient for empirical knowledge, how would we tell the difference between what we might know, and what we do know? It is, at the end, contradictory to ascribe certainty on the one hand, and ascribe the same certainty to a mere possibility on the other.

Second, If it is true the only means for empirical knowledge is from experience, then the negation of it must also be true, insofar as without experience there is no empirical knowledge. The proposition is true, therefore the negation is also true.

Best to remember.....the entire treatise is concerned with the question stated above, proving the possibility, validity and the source of the principles which determine the legitimate boundaries of human reason.

“....Thus the person who has learned a system of philosophy—say the Wolfian—although he has a perfect knowledge of all the principles, definitions, and arguments in that philosophy, as well as of the divisions that have been made of the system, possesses really no more than an historical knowledge of the Wolfian system; he knows only what has been told him, his judgements are only those which he has received from his teachers. He has formed his mind on another's; but the imitative faculty is not the productive. His knowledge has not been drawn from reason; and although, objectively considered, it is rational knowledge, subjectively, it is merely historical. He has learned this or that philosophy and is merely a plaster cast of a living man. (...)

All rational cognition is, again, based either on conceptions, or on the construction of conceptions. The former is termed philosophical, the latter mathematical. A cognition may be objectively philosophical and subjectively historical—as is the case with the majority of scholars and those who cannot look beyond the limits of their system, and who remain in a state of pupilage all their lives. (...)

Of all the a priori sciences of reason, therefore, mathematics alone can be learned. Philosophy—unless it be in an historical manner—cannot be learned; we can at most learn to philosophize....”
(A836-7/B864-5)

Questions..... — darthbarracuda

......are given their ground beginning with A50/B74, in which are found definitions, systemic conditions, and constituent relations. A few pages that set the stage for the morass that follows.

It’s only been four days since.......

The thing-in-itself is a real, physical, space/time thing,
— Mww

Any examples of them?
— Corvus

Yeah......every single thing there ever was or ever will be. All things are external to us, so exists in its own right. Exists as itself. Exists in-itself.

.......so if god is a space/time thing external to us, existing in its own right, then god is a thing-in-itself too, as far as we’re concerned. If not a thing, all god is, is an idea, an object of reason, the proverbial transcendental object. As far as we’re concerned.

On the other note, if the expression “god” is present as representation, than the conception from which it is given is necessarily present as understanding. The conception is an internal comprehension of a certain relation, “god” merely the expression of it.

It may be in White, but it is so in NKS, 1929, reading along with Benno Erdmann, circa 1889, found in a translator’s footnote, at A491/B519.

On empirical idealism:

The human cognitive system is inherently logical, therefore, for any this, the negation of it is given immediately in that. Kant grounds the human system as necessarily representational, the external part by means of the a priori architecture of space and time, whereas the negation of it, in the form of transcendental realism, grounds the human system as non-representational, insofar as the object and its appearance are the same thing, hence not conditioned by intuitions of space and time, those conceived as belonging to the objects in themselves.

An empirical idealist, then, is merely the transcendental realist who labors under the illusion of explaining the existence of a thing, conditioned only by two necessarily infinite, content-less conceptions, a contradiction. In short, the one properly institutes space and time as necessary conditions for the reality of objects, while the other improperly institutes space and time as necessary properties in the existence of objects. As paraphrased from A491/B519.
——————

On the presumed dual nature of space and time:

The “objective validity/empirical reality” of space and time are noted. However, transcendental ideality of space and time, insofar as they are both mediate concepts given from understanding but which can only be represented by the category “Quantity”, re: “an infinite given magnitude” and not any real object, and, they are immediate intuitions a priori insofar as they are presupposed in the affect upon a subject that perceives, thereby establishing the rules for the possibility of synthetic a priori cognitions, which in turn, is the possibility of experience itself. As paraphrased from “...SS 3: Transcendental Exposition of the Conception of Space....”, B41.

The “objective validity/empirical reality” regards the use of intuitions as conditions; the transcendental ideality regards the derivation of them from pure reason alone.
—————

In Kant.....

.....the origin of knowledge is not perception; it is understanding. That which is before the synthesis of intuition to conception, is not in our awareness, thus does not ground knowledge, which is always a conscious judgement with respect to the possible logical certainty of those relations. As well, the synthesis of conceptions to each other, involving no intuitions, therefore no perceptions at all, and of which we are perfectly aware as a conscious judgement with apodeitic logical certainty, insofar as those relations are of our own construction, is the source of a priori knowledge.

.....empiricism is nothing but one of only two possible modes of thought, the other being a priori. All empiricism does, is legislate, and thus authorize, one type of cognition. The complementary nature of human cognition demands an empirical aspect, otherwise the a priori aspect, while undeniable for its internal construction, cannot be relieved of its illusory extension on the one hand, and is entirely insufficient for explaining affects on sensibility, on the other.

.....the thing-in-itself can never conform to the mind; that is precisely what it cannot do. If it did, or if it could, the entire Kantian transcendental treatise drops headlong into the metaphysical crapper. It may stand in such relation in other doctrines, but not in this one.

Anyway.....just sayin’.

I didn’t look there, but found it since.

Thanks.

what do you think? — Hello Human

If there is no real difference, one or the other is superfluous or mis-defined. What I think is......all in all, not too bad. — Mww

I guess those terms (consciousness, CSE) are redundant. Also, I have unfortunately misused the term "consciousness" — Hello Human

What I think now......much better.

Kant says "matter's motion or rest merely in relation to the mode of representation or modality, and *thus* to appearance of the outer sense, is called phenomenology." — Gregory

Citation? I ask because you’ve indicated the statement is a quote, but I can’t find it in any of my translations. Not saying it isn’t in somebody’s, somewhere, but just that I’d like to view the context.

Thanks.

Good, well-thought, post. I note 1.) the transition from analytic/continental, to, analytic/synthetic, and 2.) the correctness of the pragmatist parenthesis.

Philosophically, Pierce blew himself up advocating objective idealism. Yea? Nay?

I mean...c’mon, man!!

“...A physical law is absolute. What it requires is an exact relation. (...) On the other hand, no exact conformity is required by the mental law...”
(Pierce, “The Architecture of Theories”, in The Monist, vol1, pg161, 1891., https://archive.org/details/monistquart01hegeuoft/page/n10/mode/1up?view=theater)

What....never heard of universality and absolute necessity?!?!?!
(Kidding. Piece was an intellectual giant, to be sure. Smarter than Kant if only because he was about a hundred years newer, with about a hundred years worth of.....you know, like..... progress, to work with.)

not universally true........ — Janus

Of course not.....just a prejudicial lament on my part. Pass the cheese, if you’d be so kind.

sapere aude has its own elder-Kant thematic rendering, but "aegis of tutelage" doesn’t Google. Cool soundbite, though. Like something just itching to be said.

Anyway....don’t take my flippancy seriously; it’s only the little George Carlin in me.

Dunno about that, but I was told this one has special provenance, what with the ex libris Cambridge University bookplate.....which might simply indicate it was stolen......and antiquarian bookseller’s condition report.

BRAVO!!!! No substitute for the book, I must say.

Norman Kemp Smith was the standard translation from 1929, until the Guyer/Wood came along. Typically, one accuses the other of mis-translating a notoriously difficult language in the first place, and a extremely difficult text in the second.

I was just telling somebody the other day about my excellent quality 1929 first edition NKS.

If this correct the same rules apply to such abstract concepts as spirituality, inner motivation, soul, or universal ethics. Kantian ethics. — Art Stoic Spirit

If the principles determine the applicability of certain faculties there must be rules for determining the conditions which meet the criteria of the application. So there are different rules. It’s like....the laws of thermodynamics don’t suffice in the domain covered by the laws of motion. We find that the categories set the rules for the applicability of the principle of, say, cause and effect, to empirical conditions. But spirituality, e.g., doesn’t have a cause as do empirical objects, so the categories do not suffice as rules for that cause/effect principle with respect to that abstract conception.

But we sometimes wish to know if there exists any possible object that belongs to abstract concepts. If we can construct the object, without contradicting extant conditions, it then falls under the purview of the categories, and if we cannot construct such an object that is ruled by the categories, because it does contradict extant conditions, it is impossible to prove an object that belongs to that conception actually exists, and thereby proves the reality of It. Which leaves us with logical validity of the conception, but without empirical existence of its object.

Good one downloadable from Gutenburg. Searchable, jumpable and C&P enabled.

Guyer/Wood, C&P enabled, non-searchable, scroll only, but with good translator intro: http://strangebeautiful.com/other-texts/kant-first-critique-cambridge.pdf

Have fun.

pragmatists may have a point. — Janus

Maybe.

Stephen King has a catchphrase, born in the Dark Tower series.....”they have forgotten the face of their fathers”, a literary commentary on honor.

Pragmatists, and analytical philosophers in general, have forgotten their fathers, a philosophical commentary on teachings.

Progress, I suppose.

The thing-in-itself is a real, physical, space/time thing,
— Mww

Any examples of them? — Corvus

Yeah......every single thing there ever was or ever will be. All things are external to us, so exists in its own right. Exists as itself. Exists in-itself.

I used to understand The "Thing-in-Itself" was impossible for us to know or perceive with out sensical perception. — Corvus

True enough, but that doesn’t take anything away from the existence of it as such. It should be obvious the thing that affects the senses is not the thing of experience. Transitions into it, but is not it. The thing of perception is a real physical object out there, the thing of experience is a mental copy of it, a representation, in here. It is impossible that the totality of the thing of perception registers on the system, for such would necessarily be a simple thing, and there are no simple things in Nature**. In fact, even if it does register in concreto, it is quite clear the thing does not so register in summa, and if it doesn’t, it is impossible to know those parts, which leaves us with just logical inference.

So, from the human perspective.....the only one we care about....that which is represented in us, a function of sensibility, and subsequently cognized, a function of understanding, constitutes the reality of the thing for us; that part of the thing not represented hence not cognizable, constitutes merely the possible reality of the thing. Then, carrying the logic to its end, that which is not represented at all, is neither perceived nor cognized in our-selves, is the thing in it-self. All of it being out there, none of it being in here. And if all of it is out there and none in here, what of it is there for us to know?
(** transcendental refutation of Leibnitzian monadology)
————-

How can we even talking about things that we don't perceive or know? — Corvus

That which we don’t perceive or know we can still talk about logically. That which is impossible to perceive or know, should not be talked about at all, which means we should have no business with it. But we do sometimes indulge in that business, because reason left alone has no innate self-control, that being acquired from experience alone.

Are we good?

the "problem" here would be the desire to understand why we bother thinking, wouldn't it? — Janus

Damned if I know. “I don’t think we reason....” is itself a thought, albeit with negative predication, so if we only think if there’s a problem, and “I don’t think” is thinking....there must have been a problem that needed solving. So I went out on the skinniest of limbs and inquired as to what it might be.

While it is true that in order to solve a problem one must think, the negation of that truth, re: absent a problem equates to absence of need for thinking, is patently false. And I fail to see how pragmatism is gonna fix the apparent absurdity in dismissing a fundamental human condition.

Furthermore....he said with an abundance of serious countenance.....just because we’re so accustomed to not being aware of something, is not sufficient reason for claiming there is no something there.

But I was told the problem is more who than what, and desire to understand is a what therefore hardly a who, so.....we’ve gained not a thing.

Glad you noticed.

Kant's investigations in the Transcendental Logic lead him to conclude that the understanding and reason can only legitimately be applied to things as they appear phenomenally to us in experience. — Art Stoic Spirit

No, I don’t think that’s quite right.. The categories are stated as legitimately applied to objects, or possible objects, hence, objects of experience.

Kant went to great length to prove the possibility of a priori cognitions, the objects of which do not arise naturally from phenomena, re: mathematics and geometry. From that, it is the case pure reason and pure understanding, have no legitimacy in experience.

It is the principles those faculties employ, that determine the legitimacy of their application.

But....prove me wrong; I welcome it.

Ok, thanks.

Would logical I belong to the category of Thing-in-Self? — Corvus

Absolutely not, in Kantian metaphysics, at least. The thing-in-itself is a real, physical, space/time thing, says so right there in the name. The logical “I” can never be found in space, so......

And no....noumena are not things-in-themselves. Never were. Overlook those instances where Kant seems to contradict himself.....think: contextual oversight....at least with respect to that text where he says with authority, how he wants noumena to be conceived in conjunction with the understanding, from which all conceptions arise.

Can’t argue with your logic.

“...Our foregoing method of reasoning will easily convince us, that there can be no demonstrative arguments to prove, that those instances of which we have had no experience, resemble those of which we have had experience. Thus not only our reason fails us in the discovery of the ultimate connexion of causes and effects, but even after experience has informed us of their constant conjunction, it is impossible for us to satisfy ourselves by our reason, why we should extend that experience beyond those particular instances, which have fallen under our observation.....”
(Hume, T.H.N., 1.,3., 6., 1., 1739)

And there you have it, from he who has been credited with saying it first. Or, maybe credited with saying it best.

Too bad he was wrong about reason failing us. But still, considering his time.....

One is existential and the other is logical which must not be predicated. — Corvus

Bingo. Which is all Descartes meant to say: “therefore I am” is an analytic judgement given from, and thus is a predicate for, “I think”, but “I am”, in and of itself, is always and only unconditioned. And of course, the unconditioned has no predication.

“I am” is very far from “I” am that which exists as thinking subject.

If you think before you speak, how could you do so if not rehearsing what you will say — Janus

By composing what you will say. Can’t rehearse what hasn’t been composed.

I question the possibility of abstractive thought absent language. — Janus

Assuming abstractive thought to mean the understanding of conceptions that have no immediate correlation to concrete things, we must first grant that understanding is an activity in general, without a necessary regard for concrete things. The absence of concrete things is nothing more than the absence of perceptions, hence absence of intuitions, or, phenomena.

There’s a famous artist from the Pacific Northwest named Dale Chuhuli. He has a display at Seattle Center, full of utterly amazing....and VERY expensive.....stuff. Complex. Wonderful, even. He names them, but the casual observer, just looking, may cognize the beauty within, without ever assigning a name to the object. Now, granting that beauty is a judgement predicated on feelings, thus are not cognitions, the conditions which satisfy the feeling, must be themselves cognitions. Hence, abstractive thinking, re: understanding concepts belonging to a feeling of beauty, and not to a concrete object in the form of a glass sculpture. All without the necessity for language.

I would certainly need language to tell you about it, but that’s not the same as thinking about it.

Our cat sitting on the floor presents no problems to solve, creates no doubts that plague us, — Ciceronianus the White

True enough. Still, I wonder.....

I don't think we reason, or engage in scientific inquiry, or even think unless we encounter a problem — Ciceronianus the White

.....what may have been the problem needing to be solved, which inspired you to think we do not think unless there is one?

I don't think we reason (...) unless we encounter a problem (...). — Ciceronianus the White

Then what would inform us there isn’t? What would encountering a problem be compared to?

There is no empirical evidence that the train would have hit me if I would have stayed on the railroad, — Art Stoic Spirit

True. But there is a ton of empirical evidence that justifies the claim no two physical objects can occupy the same space at the same time.

Wouldn’t you rather trust the standing evidence from experience, over the mere possibility of falsifying it?

In Kant, is "Ich denke" not a presupposed condition for all intuition and judgment? — Corvus

Technically, in Kant, “I think” accompanies representations in intuition, but “I am” accompanies judgements. The former is the synthetical unity of self-consciousness, while the latter is the transcendental unity of apperception, so-called. The former is itself an intuition, representing the determinable in me, the latter is merely a thought, representing the determining in me.

In effect, “I” represents the form of, or is the presupposed condition for, both intuitions and judgements. “I” represents the totality in consciousness, or, the transcendental ego, by which it is possible, “that all my representations are united, or can be united, in one consciousness, otherwise I must have as many and varied a self as there are representations....”

Bring your own salt; most folks require it by the truckload.

But then I cannot deny the fact the "I" in the garden was not the same "I" in the chair now, because from my memory it was vividly and unmistakably identical "I". — Corvus

...(fact): the I in the garden then was not the same I in the chair now;
...cannot deny (the fact): the I in the garden is not the same I in the chair;
...from memory they are identical.

These seem to contradict each other.

One way to look: Memory is wrong. The “I” in the shed then was thinking subject then; the “I” in the chair now is thinking subject now, but the thinking “I” then is thought object now. “I” as subject is that which is conscious of itself, and no object is ever conscious of itself. Therefore, the “I” as object not the same “I” as subject.

Another way: The thinking “I” cannot think a thinking “I”. The thinking “I” cannot think itself. A subject cannot think a subject; a subject can only think an object.

I’m of the mind there is only one self. I can’t even begin to imagine what it would be like with more than one me, tromping all around in there. I mean......who would be the boss?

are you just elucidating what was said? — Banno

Yes. Just that.

the explanation for one's actions is post hoc. — Banno

Yes, but I was talking about causality, not explanation.

expecting actions to be the expression of explicit deliberation. — Banno

Only the intentional acts.

This is far from simple.... — Banno

Simple = boring. Wouldn’t you rather be challenged than bored?

dismissed the rest of my thoughts as "empirical anthropology," rather than engaging with them. — T Clark

Sorry. There just wasn’t a trigger in your comments sufficient to inspire me to engage with them. I did explain myself, which I considered to be enough, so.....

I'm also a sucker for old books. — darthbarracuda

Not to brag....although I usually do......I have an excellent condition first edition, 1929 KempSmith CPR, with a perfectly preserved ex libris Cambridge University stamp on the fly leaf. Our neighbor down the road is an antique book dealer, who found it in a London hole-in-the-wall bookstore.

Obviously, and thankfully, very few people ever used it. Or if they did, they were properly respectful of it.

Anyway....just in passing.