I think that what we scientifically know, is a rough estimation of what is really there in-itself. — Bob Ross

I suppose, depending on how logically consistent one wishes to be, but generally I agree with that, which should relieve me of scientific anti-realism. What we scientifically know, then, just indicates a particular method; that which is known about being what it may.

Without taking an anti-realist position, I don't see how you can explain the observable phenomena of 'time dilation', for example, by appeal to "phenomenal", a priori, time. — Bob Ross

All time dilation shows is the relation between sets of conditions with respect to each other. Nothing particularly amazing about it, insofar as time dilation only manifests to that which is outside both relative sets of conditions, so if a guy is contained in one or the other of those, there is no time dilation for him at all, but he intuits relations in time for himself a priori nonetheless.

But regarding your concern, maybe it is that appeal to phenomenal intuitions of time isn’t really necessary to explain the scientific experimental result. Or to explain even the mathematical justification before the scientific experimental result. Maybe it is sufficient to presuppose the intuition within the domain of empirical science, and only appeal to it within the domain of metaphysics, the interest of which being the possibility of knowledge itself.

I don't think that space and time are proper substances…. — Bob Ross

Cool. That’s what I understood by your space and time in a “cosmic” sense.

I think physics demonstrates quite sufficiently that space and time are valid 'entities' in our calculations….. — Bob Ross

True enough, insofar as physics is nothing more than human intelligence at work in the specific domain where the physicist investigates the conditions by which things relate to himself or to each other. If the fundamental relation between things is the where and/or the when of one with respect to the other, space and time are necessary conditions……or in your terms I suppose, valid entities…..in calculating that relation.

……and not in the sense that they are merely our modes of intuition. — Bob Ross

I would argue that they are in that very sense, insofar as the physicist still has to intuit the things** to which his calculations are applicable. He knows a priori one thing is in a different space and a different time than another thing, which would be the most certain when the other thing is himself; his calculations merely determine how much space and time are between one and the other. He also knows a priori one thing can be of two times in one space but never two spaces at one time. None of such a priori intuition is possible without the conceptions to which any and all things must relate, from which follows necessarily that space and time, as those conceptions are represented, and that by which the physicist intuits the relation of things as determinable, must reside in the physicist himself.
(**the theoretical physicist, when concerned only with possible things, still must treat them as if their reality is given, iff he subjects them to the same natural law as he subjects the real things of his experience)

Anyway….for whatever that’s worth.

the task of decomposing thoughts on the axis of time is very troublesome, and I would be interested to know if there was ever a philosopher to undertake this task. — Lionino

“…. The schema of substance is the permanence of the real in time…..
……The schema of possibility is the determination of the representation of a thing at any time….
……The schema of reality is existence in a determined time….
……The schema of necessity is the existence of an object in all time….

……It is clear, from all this, that the schema of the category of quantity contains and represents the generation (synthesis) of time itself, in the successive apprehension of an object….
……the schema of quality the synthesis of sensation with the representation of time, or the filling up of time….
……the schema of relation the relation of perceptions to each other in all time (that is, according to a rule of the determination of time)….
……and finally, the schema of modality and its categories, time itself, as the correlative of the determination of an object—whether it does belong to time, and how.

The schemata, therefore, are nothing but à priori determinations of time according to rules, and these, in regard to all possible objects, following the arrangement of the categories, relate to the series in time, the content in time, the order in time, and finally, to the complex or totality in time.…”
(CPR A143-145/B182-185)

Maybe not exactly what you asked for, but does show there was/is a philosopher tasking himself with decomposing that which is thought about, to its necessary relation to time.

I accept that the space and time which are our forms of experience are a priori, but not that space and time do not exist beyond that in reality. — Bob Ross

That’s fine. Until the Enlightenment space and time were considered by the majority of thinkers as constituents of reality, and never as a priori conditions for experience.

If you don’t accept that space and time don’t exist in reality, wouldn’t you want to offer at least an idea on how it might be that they do? Is it even possible to grant to space and time coexistent intuitional a priori and cosmic a posteriori conceptual schemes?

I do consider the concept of space and time, in a phenomenal sense, to be primitive. — Bob Ross

Primitive, yes, but….in a phenomenal sense? What is meant by a phenomenal sense?

Space and time are merely irreducible forms of sensuous intuition, so I’m wondering in what manner could they have a phenomenal sense, when they are not themselves phenomena but merely represent that by which phenomena are given their extension and temporal form in compliance with a sensation.

Would you include the so-called 'primary intuitions' of time and space? — Wayfarer

I would, yes. While they may be pure primitive intuitions with respect to their use, they are pure primitive conceptions as regards their origin.

I think Bob is trying to ascertain the word-resistant concepts we all accept prior to language. — AmadeusD

I’m ok with that; word-resistant just means the concept is difficult to represent for the use of expression, and prior to language just means the concepts have no relation to communication.

But they can’t be word-impregnable, for in such case we couldn’t theorize on their place in a system, assuming there are such things as simple pure conceptions, and there is a system in which they serve a purpose.

That we all accept….mmmm, not so sure about that. Pretty hard to convince Everydayman he uses pure simple primitive unanalyzable conceptions for anything, even harder that he knows what they might be.
————-

I don't even think our faculty of self-reflective reason can define certain concepts — Bob Ross

I must say reason doesn’t define, and I’m hesitant regarding reason being “self-reflective”, mostly cuz I don’t know what that means, but that’s very different story.

I agree that faculty which does define, understanding, lacks the capacity to define primitive concepts, but must represent them post hoc with words in order to describe their place in a speculative system. Within the natural use of that system, the primitive concepts are just kindasorta there nonetheless**, which makes them hard to swallow for he who needs everything to accord with his senses sans mediation.
(**they’re not, but a different story once again)
—————

I can envision a concept which, in principle, could be a priori but isn't simple; because our representative faculties could be acquainted with it. — Bob Ross

Many conceptions can be envisioned conforming to that criteria, but I don’t see a concept that isn’t simple as primitive, and I don’t see a concept with which our representational faculties are acquainted as pure.

I don’t want to take your thread where you had no intention of it going; it is yours to direct in its progression. I merely agree there are pure, primitive, simple conceptions.

I believe you are giving more of an ontological account of why it is absolutely simple — Bob Ross

I dunno. Can the pure and absolutely simple have an ontological accounting? If the primitive and unanalyzable concept is so, insofar as it has no object belonging to it, from whence could an ontological account arise?

I am curious as to how many people hold a similar view — Bob Ross

Are there pure and unanalyzable concepts? Put me in the affirmative/similar view column, re: the categories of transcendental philosophy.

“Pure and absolutely simple” insofar as they ground every real object, hence every empirical cognition, but have no object of their own.

Speculative metaphysics to be sure, but is that sufficient to disqualify the view?

Interesting dialogue.

I picture ol’ Rene, nodding in knowing agreement with his notion of “…. discourse on the method of rightly conducting the reason…”.

Well, you’re just too smart for me.

I'm not insulting you. Are you perceiving it like an insult? — flannel jesus

I judge it to be an insult to proper philosophy.

…."do you still beat your wife?" It's nothing like that. — flannel jesus

It’s exactly like that, insofar as if I say yes, I believe a query has been made, than my knowledge of it appears predetermined and I’ve contradicted myself, and if I say no I don’t believe the query has been made leaves open the catastrophic descension into that pitiful sophism, you can’t know what you don’t believe.

Are we done here?

I said I know a thing. Why would you ask if I believe the very same thing I said I know?

The only way to answer you question is if I’d said I believe a statement had been presented, which I could than have answered in the affirmative.

“Do you still beat your wife”-type entrapment is “…beneath the dignity of philosophy…”

Oh. Well, damn. So if you have the power to tell me what I must have believed, does that mean you know what it is that I must have believed? What do you believe in order to know what to tell me I must believe? Please don’t tell me you must believe the same things I must; that just ain’t gonna fly.

If you just mean it only makes sense to you that in order for me to know something I must first believe something but you’re not sure what it is I have to believe, or it really doesn’t matter what it is I have to believe, then you have no warrant whatsoever to claim I need to believe anything.

I suppose it’s only fitting, given those conditions, that because I know my mother raised me I have no choice but to believe I had a mother that I know raised me.

I believe I’m not imagining….. Why not just, you know…not imagine? If I believe I’m not imagining, what tells me I am or I am not? That I believe I’m not imagining does not in itself negate the possibility that I am. Quite the Keystone Cops drill you got goin’ on there, bud. Thankfully, Mother Nature saw fit to make human cognition rather more efficient than that.

Or….I believe She did, I mean.

I can’t think of an example of knowledge of a statement requiring belief of a statement, no.

Obviously I experienced, hence now possess the knowledge, that to me a query has been presented. What can you tell me about what I had to believe in order for me to know about that experience?

do you have any illustrative examples? — flannel jesus

Examples that I disagree with the claim that knowledge requires belief? How would I illustrate, given something I know, that there necessarily exists in conjunction with and antecedent to it, something I believe?

My claim was that knowledge is existentially dependent on belief(knowledge requires belief). — creativesoul

I understand your claim, but disagree that knowledge requires belief.

Your rejection is based upon a conception of experience that cannot include language acquisition. Your responses thus far have been full of strawmen and red herring. — creativesoul

So lemme get this straight. We’re talking belief/knowledge, you bring in experience/language….yet I’m the one committing strawman/red herring dialectical inconsistencies?

It must be that your position is more complex and penetrating than I realized.

So be it.

Who's made those claims anyway? — creativesoul

Somebody was talking to. You should know; you commented right after, a day ago.

Do you think someone has made the argument that all belief is necessary for bike riding? — creativesoul

Nope. I know the thread topic major premise has the form, “Knowledge is only belief”. I know from reading the discourse, that someone said all knowledge requires belief, both of which I for sure, and apparently, reject.
————-

Bike riding - as we know it - is existentially dependent on the belief of the original bike makers. "Belief is not necessary for bike riding" is proven false. — creativesoul

Categorical error: one subject’s beliefs are irrelevant with respect to another subject’s skill acquisition. Whatever the dude believed about the possibility of a bike disappears upon its successful manufacture.
—————-

The bike emerged onto the world stage through the belief of the original bike makers. — creativesoul

True enough, but irrelevant. Post hoc ergo propter hoc informal fallacy, when attached to my knowledge of bike riding.

Impossible to ride a bike that you do not believe is there. — creativesoul

Whatever bike I consider riding must be right there in front of me. Otherwise all I’m doing is considering the possibility of what a bike ride would be like. I grant it is impossible to ride a bike that isn’t right in front of me, but in such case there is no need to believe it isn’t there if I already know there’s nothing there to ride.

Any sympathy forthcoming here? Maybe a slight tip of the pointy hat?

All of this reads like an argument reductio ad absurdum. Is it? — ucarr

Maybe, but more like an appeal to extremes, I would think. I mean…beyond imagination? How can we go beyond imagination except by using it?

Ok, fine. Absurdum it is.

We're over-reaching when we imagine a fleshy mass of connected hemispheres has a scope of imagination beyond what protein-based matter has the capacity to conceive. — ucarr

Yet, for all intents and purposes, that is exactly what appears to be the case. If we are what the brain does, and we have a rather unlimited imagination, we can only be that way iff the brain has a matching unlimited capacity for what it does, such that we can then do what we do because of it.

If abstract thought is connected to the brain, then the limitations inherent in the material_physical dimensions of the brain: cells, synapses, electric current, gravity etc. exert controlling limits on what the content of abstract thought can be. — ucarr

If the human can think whatever he wants, where is the controlling limits by the brain on the content of his thought? All that’s left is to say the brain’s limits prescribe the kind of thinker a human is, the content of his thoughts be what they may.

But I feel ya. The brain informs of all our knowledge, but doesn’t give us even an inkling of the knowledge of how it informs of the knowledge we have. It’s like the brain keeps to itself its own inner workings, while at the same time permitting the ability for us to know anything else, all else being given.

To exalt the mind's perception of reality beyond limitations of the brain amounts to driving the express lane to fallacy without knowing it. — ucarr

Because we don’t know enough of how the brain works, by what warrant can we say we’ve over-reached the brain’s capacity for knowing things? I think we do know when we’re approaching fallacies, in that Nature will tells us regarding real things (never step in front of a fast-mover), and logic will inform us regarding other-then-real things (A /= B).

Hey. Once again, for no particular reason while agreeing in a rhetorical fashion…..

I question whether all knowledge does require belief. — Janus

If such were the case, it reduces to belief being a necessary condition for knowledge. If it is true the only source for knowledge is experience, and there is no possibility of experiencing that which one merely believes, wouldn’t it follow that one cannot condition the other?

Pretty dumb, methinks, to merely believe I know how to ride a bike while I’m actually doing it, and conversely, even dumber to claim to know I can ride a bike by merely believing I’ve been on one and in control of it.

Maybe I believe I can’t know how to ride a bike cuz I’m a hopeless klutz who believes he shouldn’t use a hammer given the historical precedent of experiencing serious bodily injury. But then, out of sheer well-being necessity, I find myself riding a bike in order to escape the neighbor’s mutt. If knowledge requires belief, and the belief is negative the knowledge must also be negative thereby how to ride a bike should not have been known to me, and under sufficiently strong negative belief that I can’t know how, I shouldn’t have even bothered to try. Yet given that riding a bike….which I’m now doing….presupposes at least the awareness of the mechanics and principles by which bike riding is accomplished, re: I’m peddling upright in a progressive series of times, it is the case what I believe about bike riding (I can’t know how) has nothing whatsoever to do with my coming to know how to do it (YEA!! Look it me, here I am bike riding).

So did I switch beliefs and come to believe I can know how to ride a bike? Like that little engine that could? Seems kinds silly to me, to take the time to believe something at the same time I’m discovering it for myself in conjunction with the extant experience that bikes are inherently ride-able. Even if IthinkIcanIthinkIcanIthinkIcan is running through my brain, am I navigating positively because of that alone, or am I concentrating on the objects of certain mechanics and principles necessary for transportation via bicycle? Do I really need to believe in the authority of those principles in order to use them, especially considering the fact I’m only interested in their objects I use and not the principles themselves I merely think as given?

Wonder why Nike, instead taglining with “Just do it”, didn’t instead go with “Believe you can know how to do it then just do it”?

….a philosopher arrives at some logically valid statements…. — ucarr

….neuroscience discovers through long-term testing…. — ucarr

How would the scientist test the philosopher’s logically valid statements, the subject and predicate of which are merely abstract conceptions? At bottom would be Aristotle’s laws of thought, in which it is clear A = A would be impossible to test with deductive certainty.

I grant that science can test some philosophic statements, but I wanted to account for it, by stating that philosophers need no consult for that investigation which in no way involves natural law, which would include statements the validity of which are only logical.
———-

….it can work through unlimited higher orders of categorical thinking… — ucarr

….after reaching higher order X of categorical thinking…. — ucarr

Here the philosopher, specifically the metaphysician, would reject even his own the notion of unlimited higher orders of critical thinking, which makes the neuroscientist’s claims of brain data loss inherent in it, mistaken hence irrelevant. On the other hand, the philosopher may well acknowledge data transfer loss even for the levels of critical thinking he grants to human intelligence; he would simply label “forgetfulness” what the neuroscientist labels “plasticity”.

Interesting gedankenexperiment though.

no science is ever done purely a priori, and no philosophy is ever done purely a posteriori;
— Mww

Do you think it's also true when we switch the position of the two disciplines in the above statement? — ucarr

If the differences between the two hold, one cannot be switched with the other. So, first, it would have to be shown how they are not, in order to show how the purities by which each is conditioned, are removed. Still, it is the requisite of metaphysics that it is purely a priori, eliminating it from being even partially a posteriori, as the switch in positions would ask.
————

I suppose I'm saying science and philosophy are two sub-divisions, or specializations operating under one over-arching category. — ucarr

I might agree with that, iff the one over-arching category, is reason. Science and philosophy are both done by humans, and reason is the singular human condition, so….
———-

If a philosopher is not first a scientist, then they need to always maintain a direct line to someone who is. — ucarr

The philosopher doesn’t need a scientific consult if he is theorizing in, or merely speculating on, that which cannot at all be legislated by natural law. Or, in the interest of fairness, why would he?
————

I think the relationship between scientific truth and philosophical truth is bi-conditional. — ucarr

I don’t understand what bi-conditional means. Nevertheless, I’m not sure there is a relationship between truths predicated on an observable natural order, and truths predicated on speculative conceptual order.
————

philosophy differs from science merely in the determination and application of rules.
— Mww

I think this difference, when the two disciplines dialog constructively, for my reasons above, shrinks to a near vanishing point. — ucarr

If it is the case these two dialogue constructively only by means of reason, then the difference may well vanish with respect to the determination of rules, but would remain for the application of them, insofar as rules determined as governing empirical conditions cannot apply to abstract conceptions. Bearing in mind, of course, cause/effect is a principle, not a rule, and as such applies to both.

Anyway….worthy subject, but I can’t think of much else to say about it.

What is the difference between philosophy and science:

The short list, and assuming the human condition alone….
…..no science is ever done purely a priori, and no philosophy is ever done purely a posteriori;
…..philosophical truths are proven logically and are necessarily so, scientific truths are proven empirically and are contingently so;
…..no science is done that isn’t first a philosophical construct, from which follows….
…..a scientist is always a philosopher, but a philosopher is not always, nor needs be, a scientist;
…..all together, philosophy differs from science merely in the determination and application of rules.

…..is a judgement of truth the same as truth? I don't think that is how the two are commonly conceived. — Janus

Perhaps not commonly conceived, but common is so boring, innit? At the end of the day, each comes by and thereby possesses his own anyway, so….

A judgement of truth just indicates the condition of the object of the judgement. To judge a thing as the case, then to think or be led to think the negation of it, leads to self-contradiction, and conversely, to judge a thing as not the case, while equally a lawful truth, still leads to self-contradiction upon thinking or being led to think its affirmation.

I think there is a valid distinction between knowledge and belief, although I also think that much of what is generally considered to be knowledge might be more accurately classed as belief. — Janus

As do I, but if there is a distinction, putting belief and knowledge in the same class kinda invalidates it.

But I get what you’re saying, I think, in that it is often the case one validly disputes another’s knowledge claim, while he can never dispute another’s mere belief with equal validity. By the same token, I can never dispute with myself the persuasion of belief with the conviction of knowledge, at any one time with respect to the judgement of one thing.

Still, regarding the question in general, this….

What distinguishes a 'fact' from a belief is that THAT PERSON ONLY (…) has decided…. — Chet Hawkins

….would be the focal point of the issue, insofar as whether opinion, belief or knowledge, any relative judgement of truth is a purely subjective effort. And even if that is the case, brain states aside, still leaves the method by which it happens.

At any rate, I agree there is a valid distinction.

So be it.

Take all the exception you like; you compound perception with experience, my presently considered pet peeve.

Ya know….it’s too bad the major reference material stipulates “perceptual experience”, so almost everyone just figures that’s the way it is. It used to be, back in the Good ol’ Days, that perception was one thing, experience was another, just as you’re describing the confusion of the road with the destination. But that road has to be built, which requires machinery of a certain type, and that’s what’s been neglected here for 37 pages.

Progress, donchaknow. Science can’t inform what kind of machinery is needed, so speculating on the construction has become passé, and we end up with no road at all. Not even a bumpy, potholed, wagon track, yet perception is conjoined with experience as if there was a gawdamn 6-lane freeway.

OK. Thanks.

And I guess if x is in a coma….. — Metaphyzik

Anthropomorphic tautologies with respect to x aside….on the off-chance you weren’t actually going there….the coma thing won’t work, if we’re keeping with the original cogito simpliciter you started with, in that Descartes counts thinking as such “because we are aware of it”.

But the simple cogito? (…) If there were no other way to exist other than to think…. — Metaphyzik

If it is I that thinks and given that there is thinking, then isn’t it necessary for “I” to be? Under these conditions, there is no way for “I” to be other than to think. Descartes used the term “exist” here and there, for which he should be forgiven, considerIng the general mandate of his thesis.

“…. This is the best way to discover what sort of thing the mind is, and how it differs from the body. How does it do that? I am supposing that everything other than myself is unreal, while wondering what sort of thing I am. I can see clearly that I don’t have any of the properties that bodies have—I don’t have a spatial size or shape, and I don’t move—because those properties all fall on the supposed-to-be-unreal side of the line, whereas we’ve just seen that I can’t suppose that I am unreal. So I find that the only property I can ascribe to myself is thought. So my knowledge of my thought is more basic and more certain than my knowledge of any corporeal thing.

….I take the word ‘thought’ to cover everything that we are aware of as happening within us, and it counts as ‘thought’ because we are aware of it. (…)

….I’m not going to explain many of the other terms (in addition to ‘thought’) that I have already used or will use later on, because they strike me as being sufficiently self-explanatory. I have often noticed that philosophers make the mistake of trying to explain things that were already very simple and self-evident, by producing logical definitions that make things worse! When I said that the proposition I am thinking, therefore I exist is ‘the first and most certain thing to occur to anyone who philosophizes in an orderly way’, I wasn’t meaning to deny that one must first know what thought, existence and certainty are, and know that it’s impossible for something to think while it doesn’t exist, and the like. But these are utterly simple notions, which don’t on their own give us knowledge of anything that exists; so I didn’t think they needed to be listed…”
(Principia Philosophiae, 1, 8-10, 1644, in Bennet, 2017)

Ok. Thanks.

“….depends on the philosophical framework and the specific definition of these terms used in the discussion….”

Can’t disagree with that, at least.

As ChatGPT states: — Luke

Just curious. What did you ask of it, to get that statement?

psychology is becoming one of the most popular subjects for study. — Jack Cummins

Probably because on the one hand there’s no math in it and on the other, it’s socially more inviting than sports analytics.

In any case, what do you think about the argument overall? — Malcolm Lett

Overall, not too bad, except for the false attributions of Kantian metaphysics. It would have been better to go your own way and leave him out of it.

Which is merely a friendly way of saying my opinions would have been happier….

My question arises because neuroscience has changed the thinking of mind completely. — Jack Cummins

Perhaps, of a scant few, but Everydayman couldn’t care less if he tried, unless neuroscience lowers his grocery bill.

So, in the light of cognitive science and neuroscience, how, and what do you see as the overriding and outstanding issues of the philosophy of mind in the twentieth first century? — Jack Cummins

Yikes. Talk about a loaded question…….

If the conditions are limited to cognitive science and neuroscience, wouldn’t it be science of mind? Which leads to a contradiction, insofar as the science of mind would need to empirically decide the absence or impossibility of that which is necessarily presupposed, but never intended for empirical status, susceptible to, thus legislated by, methodological naturalism, re: scientific rigor.

If philosophy of mind, and because philosophy proper has no use of empirical experimentation, the light of neuroscience would seem to be pretty dim with respect to purely abstract conceptions, in spite of the gross reifications by which they arise.

So…overriding/outstanding issue? Neglect of lane.