Are not all consistent and coherent theories logically grounded? — Janus

I had in mind that empirical science theories are grounded in observation. For some of those there is precedent where syllogistic logical coherence has been set aside, or at least fought over, as in the uproar ca 1920-25, even if mathematical logical coherence holds.

Kant didn’t force anything, is what I think. There is a truth buried in there but doesn’t have anything to do with force. Or Nietsche.

….if someting is affirmed to be true, then we have to be able to make sense of it not being true. — Astrophel

If a thing is affirmed to be true, the sense of its falsity must already be given. If we know it is this, we must already know why it is not that.

How is this not covered end to end in Aristotle?
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Kant didn't understand that what is transcendental is what is right before one's perceptions IN the empirical phenomenon. — Astrophel

There’s a ton of references to just that. He did understand it, in his own way. Just because someone understands it differently only indicates they approach from a different direction, and doesn’t negate the antecedent.

….we fill the world with purpose that is not in the phenomena…. — Gregory

Yep. Purpose relates to how the subject feels about a thing, regulated by aesthetic judgement. Phenomena relate to what a subject knows about a thing, regulated by discursive judgement.

He divorced the shadows from the forms such that we cannot know what a form even is. Agree? — Gregory

Ehhhh….he doesn’t give us much to work with here. Forms “….exist a priori in the mind…”. Supposedly, any instance of a form, form of this, form of that, is meant to be that which exists a priori in the mind as the possibility for whatever this or that is.

Kant says we can know nothing at all about noumena, but….why? Therein lay the solution to the nonsense.

From my books on Kant, they all seem to agree in saying that Kant's main point for writing CPR was to draw a boundary on the power of human reason….. — Corvus

Not quite right, in that reason alone does not account for PURE reason, right there is the title of the book.
“…This attempt to introduce a complete revolution in the procedure of metaphysics (…) constitutes the aim of the Critique of Pure Reason….”

The boundary on the power of pure reason merely follows necessarily from the revolution in its procedure.

…..i.e. reason can only operate within the limits of our senses. — Corvus

Close, but still not accounting for Pure reason.
“…. Reason must approach nature with the view, indeed, of receiving information from it, not, however, in the character of a pupil, who listens to all that his master chooses to tell him**, but in that of a judge, who compels the witnesses to reply to those questions which he himself thinks fit to propose***….”

**operating within the limits;
***operating no matter the limits.

The revolution in metaphysical procedure extended reason into that which has nothing to do with the senses, but establishes the possibility and validity of pure a priori conditions, which had always either been unacknowledged, or when acknowledged then outright denied. You know….“consign it to the flames” kinda nonsense.

The main point in CPR ended up being, pure reason can only operate, with justice, within the limits of, not experience, which just is practical reason, but possible experience, and that is its proper boundary, transcendental philosophy, then, being that which sets the boundaries as to that of which the justice consists. That is, that which is otherwise is illusion. Junk knowledge.

Except for the quotes, a personal interpretation of the original view, whatever it’s worth. Still, if reason were limited to the senses, it’d be pretty hard to not only justify, but to even come up with, some modern scientific theories.

Kant didn't understand metaphysics at all. — Astrophel

Pitiful, ain’t it? Just as ol’ Henry didn’t understand production efficiency. Landry didn’t understand football. Gandhi didn’t understand civil rights. Wright didn’t understand buildings. Just what we of the vulgar understanding didn’t realize we always needed, huh? Another fool coming along, disrupting the status quo, knocking us from our collective intellectual comfort zone.
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That introduces the further complication of the 'ding an sich' (thing in itself) and the vexed question of whether that is the same as, or different to, the noumenal. — Wayfarer

You know what it’s like? It’s like….dog food and house paint both come from a can, therefore dog food is the same as house paint. As my ol buddy Forrest would say….that’s all I’m gonna say about that.

Logically grounded theories in the metaphysical discipline necessarily justify, or validate if you’d rather, whatever is the case given by the course of the argument.

It never was that “metaphysics sets out the background against which the world is ordered”, but sets the background by which the subject orders himself, such that the science by which the world is ordered, by and for him, becomes possible.

Ok. Thanks.

We look at the world and see an object that has been given a name by the Community within which we live. — RussellA

Superficially true, but insufficient to explain empirical discovery by a solitary subject.

Hume's principle of constant conjunction….. — RussellA

….has more to do with the relation of cause and effect than to perception and cognition. It is the case that the relation of perception to cognition is under certain conditions entirely a priori, the validity of which Hume vehemently….and quite mistakenly…..denied.

…..one can have the thought of an object independently of any name it may or may not have been given. — RussellA

Yes, but because of constant conjunction alone? I rather think not, insofar as Hume’s carries the implication of necessary antecedent impression, whereas pure thought of things is exclusive of it. Constant conjunction refers this object to this impression as a matter of habit, but the mere impression of an object is not enough to name it.

for example what I understand by the word "tree" is unique to me, as no one else has had the same life experiences. — RussellA

But you just said the name is given by a relevant community, and if “tree” is that name for an object looked upon in the world by yours…..how can it be unique to you? If it is unique to you, it contradicts the proposition it is named by a community.

Life experiences are not identical but they can still be congruent, or similar enough to eliminate self-contradiction.
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HA!!! Like me and my foot, did the fork experience take your ego down a peg or two? One could say it was just a life experience, but the truth is, it perfectly exemplifies how to be a dumbass. Well….for me anyway.

How can a thought be named ? — RussellA

It isn’t, which was the point: thought of a cup is to name the thought, whereas the thought “cup” references that which is thought about.

The thought is just the system doing its job, in T.I., the synthesis of representations, and is an image. The name, then, in the form of a word, belongs to the image as its representation, and is its conception, and the different particular instances of that general conception are its schemata.

I would not be so presumptuous as to call W wrong. I have no problem whatsoever, on the other hand, in dismissing OLP, insofar as it is the case no word is ever presented that isn’t first thought. It is never the case we think with language, or by means of it. The only reason for language in the first place, is to objectively express, to communicate, the cognitive system’s functionality, but is not a necessary condition for it. Want proof? Read a book, to yourself of course, then reflect on what it was you were actually doing.
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Is it the case that we have the thought of a cup and then name it….. — RussellA

Close. We think, and name that which is thought about, the object of thought, cup. Or we could just be recalling a priori what was already resident in us as that represented named thing. Some call that residence consciousness, others call it memory, some call it intuition. Doesn’t matter; it’s just meant to represent that which has already been done, which just is, or given from, experience. The initial experience is not a priori, but the recalling of it by mere thought, is. How else to know a thing in a different time than its immediate perception?
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The limits of my language is the limit of my world……that I can tell you about. When I was bulletproof, many MANY years ago, by sheer accident I put a chainsaw into my left foot. Now there’s a part of my world I will never be able to tell you about. No matter what I say, your experience will never relate to it unless you’ve done the same thing, and then, our experiences will only match in content and not the least in effect, and proof positive there is that in my world beyond, and therefore not accountable by, my language.

Why OLP? So we relieve ourselves of the hard part of inquiring where words come from. It’s so much easier to examine the games we play with language, then to examine how the games we play are even possible. Funny, innit? That every single word ever, and by association every single combination of them into a whole other than the words themselves, being at the time of its instantiation a mere invention, is for that very reason entirely private? Gell-Mann’s language wasn’t private, but Joyce’s, from whence it came, certainly was.

People are funny. They think that because they are taught the name of a thing, the thing always came with the name they were taught to know it by, they’re comfortable believing the name belongs to the thing as its identity. And maybe that’s true for them, but it wasn’t always. And simply from that fact, speculative cognitive metaphysics is justified.

you must have had the thought of a cup. — RussellA

Might be closer to the case to say, there had to have been the thought “cup”, simply from the fact “you must have had” is already given by the thought itself.

And even that isn’t as close to the case as, there must have been a judgement that the conception represents “cup”.

It may do well to note, in addition, as long as we’re “making a case for transcendental idealism”, that since it is merely the thought “cup”, there is already the experience of that particular object by the same subject to which the thought belongs, for otherwise the subject would’ve not had the authority to represent it by name.

By fabrication, I just mean it in the sense of something being simulated and not real. — Bob Ross

That’s fine. Intuitions are made up, fabricated. Kant calls it something else, but works out to be close enough.

….why would you say that (….) there exists real things that impact our sensibility (and are not just made up)? — Bob Ross

Sensibility is a big place involving the entirety of the non-cognitive human intellect; best break it up into proper parts.

Because without real things that impact us there is no accounting for sensations. Sensation is just a message that there is an object present and affecting the senses, but can offer nothing as to what the object is. As for making it up….there is nothing in the physiology of perception that permits making stuff up. That is to say, under the assumption making it up implies contingency, all the human sensory devices function according to mode-specific natural laws, which do not lend themselves to being contingent. In other words, for that range of wavelengths there will be that impact on the eyes; for that chemical composition there will be either that impact on the nose or that impact on the tongue, or both, and so on.

T.I. exhausts precious little effort on the impacts on sensibility; it just is that which is given on the one hand, and that of which we are not conscious on the other. What is done with the given at the point of becoming conscious of it….that’s where the fun is.
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…..in order for the mind to be represented for experience….. — Bob Ross

I can’t unpack this. The mind is represented conceptually, but no mere conception is an experience. To represent the mind for experience requires the intuition of it as phenomenon, which requires the mind to be a real object conditioned by space and time, which contradicts the conception. You’ve got me over the proverbial barrel here, I must say.

I understand you’ve qualified this entire thread with your interpretation of the original view of transcendental idealism, which is fine, you’re perfectly entitled. Perhaps for my benefit you could re-phrase the “in order for….” to elaborate on how it relates to that original view.

….proves that there must be real things outside of me in space (…) but this doesn't prove that the sensations or intuitions themselves must be non-fabricated. — Bob Ross

All of which was the point. If you already know there is a proof of a claim (things do exist outside the mind), I don’t understand why you would then ask how could he possibly claim that things do or do not exist outside of minds.

And what's any of that got to do with fabrication? How are you assigning this condition, what do you mean by it?

I have long wondered what it actually means to be a Kantian….. — Tom Storm

“…. We shall thus spare ourselves much severe and fruitless labour, by not expecting from reason what is beyond its power, or rather by subjecting it to discipline, and teaching it to moderate its vehement desires for the extension of the sphere of cognition….”
(Think carefully about what you don’t know)

“…. To maintain a simply negative position in relation to propositions which rest on an insecure foundation, well befits the moderation of a true philosopher; but to uphold the objections urged against an opponent as proofs of the opposite statement is a proceeding just as unwarrantable and arrogant as it is to attack the position of a philosopher who advances affirmative propositions regarding such a subject….”
(Speak even more carefully about what you don’t know)

Kant specifically denies knowledge of the things-in-themselves: so how could he possibly claim that things do or do not exist outside of minds? — Bob Ross

Kant does in fact claim things do exist outside minds, and that necessarily so. In fact, there are two arguments in affirmation of it, concluding from either subjective a priori** or objective a posteriori*** major premises.

So, what……you think the warrant for those claims was unjustified, or, you think he had no warrant at all?

**the gigantic footnote to Bxxxix
***Bxx: “…. and that things in themselves, while possessing a real existence….”

So who is the real idealist? — Gregory

Everyone. At least, of a certain kind.

I don’t see how that would entail a close mirroring of the things-in-themselves. — Bob Ross

Here’s the overlooked part of the whole ding an sich dichotomy: the thing of perception, or appearance, is the thing of the thing-in-itself, the only difference being time, or, occassion. Or, using your word, happenstance. Some ol’ thing is out there, just minding it’s own damn business, been doing its thing for a million years, suddenly gets itself perceived by a human operating under the auspices of Transcendental Idealism. POOF!!! The thing that used to be all by itself out there suddenly gets itself transformed into a mere representation by a being sufficiently equipped for doing it, and it’s off to the rodeo.

So, yes, all we have to work with is the representation, but we’re trying to mirror with it, the thing out there that was formerly just another extant, albeit undetermined, object in a universe full of ‘em.
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I have a different interpretation of this passage. — J

Been paying attention, haven’t you. For you, a pro; for me a con, in that I took some liberties with the author’s intent. Bob advocated negative knowledge, which require judgement, and from the preface to what we’re talking about here….

“…. Negative judgements—those which are so not merely as regards their logical form, but in respect of their content—are not commonly held in especial respect. They are, on the contrary, regarded as jealous enemies of our insatiable desire for knowledge; and it almost requires an apology to induce us to tolerate, much less to prize and to respect them….”

….I offered Bob a way out such he wouldn’t be exposed to the obligation for apologizing, to himself only of course, for something his reason should have guarded him against, which he actually did, of a sort, by admitting to the point.

I trust you, so here we go:

Regarding the content of a knowledge judgement….knowledge of things-in-themselves is impossible;
Regarding the “task of negative judgement”: reject false knowledge, re: reject as false that knowledge of things-in-themselves is impossible;
Regarding “where yet no error is possible”: given from pure speculative reason, it is necessarily the case knowledge of things-in-themselves is impossible, insofar as all knowledge is of mere representation;
Regarding substitution of such negative judgements that are…..

“true…..” (knowledge of things-in-themselves is not impossible iff negative knowledge of things-in-themselves is possible);
“but empty…” (negative knowledge is nothing more than negation of knowledge itself);

Regarding “…..and just for this reason….”: knowledge of things-in-themselves already having been shown as necessarily impossible reduces negative knowledge of things-in-themselves to the negation of that which never was;
And we finally arrive at: that which “…is inane, senseless and quite absurd”.

TA!! DAAAAA!!!
(Mic drop, kill the TED lights, Chaplin-esque waddle exit stage right)

so would 'immanent' be simply possible [human] knowledge of things? — Bob Ross

Ehhhh….I dunno. Immanent/transcendent relates mostly to understanding. Understanding is the faculty of thought, so immanent/transcendent relate to the manner of thinking of things. Thought with immanent quality will be about things of possible experience, transcendent thought will be about things not possible to experience.

It doesn't follow that the p-zombie is "inconceivable" merely that it is implausible, and even incoherent in the sense that we can find not any cogent explanation for how it could be possible. — Janus

Whew!! Thanks for the addendum, the add-on. I was having trouble with the post, but…..hey, no worries…..I’m all better now.

Instead, I know that what I am given is not a thing-in-itself, but the thing-in-itself could turn out to be a mirror (by happenstance) of what I am given — Bob Ross

It is the function of understanding/judgement, to as closely mirror the thing as it is in itself with the thing as it is represented in us. So….not by happenstance, but by logic, Nature herself being the arbiter.

What do you mean by "immanent", and how it is contrasted to "transcendental"? — Bob Ross

Immanent isn’t contrasted to transcendental.

What I mean by immanent is that which concerns understanding in its considerations of possible experience. Transcendent, on the other hand, concerns understanding in its considerations of that which is beyond all possible experience. And transcendental does not concern understanding at all, but has pure reason for its origin.

Transcendental, in its broadest sense, merely stands for the possibility and application of a priori cognitions and the necessary, dedicated, conditions for them.

Ok. Thanks for that.

I rather position transcendent in opposition to immanent rather than transcendental, that’s all.

Whatever the things are in-themselves is entirely impossible to know. — Bob Ross

While this is in accord with Kantian T.I., there is nothing implied therein having to do with negative knowledge. “Impossible to know”, or, knowledge not possible to obtain, with respect to thing-in-themselves, merely highlights human sensory limitation and says nothing whatsoever about the cognitive aspect of the overall human intellectual system. It is absurd to expect a system to make a determination on something that was never given to it.

Another way to put it, is that I have only negative knowledge of X by negation and never positive knowledge. — Bob Ross

Under the assumption X is some empirical condition, and negative knowledge regarding X is obtained according to judgements such as, “I know X’s are not this or that”, such judgements are “….inane and senseless; that is, they are in reality purposeless and, for this reason, often very ridiculous…”(A709/B737). You cannot say anything about, nor legitimately claim any kind or degree of knowledge for, that for which nothing is given with which to form a judgement.

So…..upon sufficient reflection, you might find that rather than having negative knowledge of X, there is only positive knowledge of yourself, re: you know there is something you cannot know, from which follows, that forcing the former at the expense of the latter is what the A/B quote is meant to indicate.

Anyway….just sayin’. One interpretation of “the original view” in relation to another. Although, given the high pagination of the quote and your admission of “starting” to embrace the source, you must be forgiven for not being familiar with the intent of it, and how it tends to correct this one point of your personal interpretation.

Cool.

All I’m saying is for the guy that thinks up….conceives……a thing, then for him to be presented with an argument implying he didn’t think it, might cause him to seriously reject the argument.

Invoking square circles in juxtaposition to the topic here, is a categorical error, in that both squares and circles are established knowledge regarding classes of objects in general, such that the combining of them leads to a contradiction. For that which is not established knowledge, on the other hand, the contradiction may still arise, but not necessarily, depending on the conceptions being combined. In the case of p-zombies, the conception itself combines other conceptions, if not actually deemed knowledge, at least do not contradict each other, from which follows the conception itself is not invalid as the conception of square circles would necessarily be. Which is to say….it cannot be said the guy didn’t really conceive it, or, which is the same thing, there is no strong argument for the inconceivability of the very thing the guy conceived. I mean….the guy can bend a listener’s ear for days about that thing, so for him to be told he didn’t conceive it, or what he conceived wasn’t really what he thought it to be, says more about the listener than the guy.

Maybe a compromise. Maybe the strong argument should be against the rationality of the conception of p-zombies, rather than the conceivability thereof. It must be the case there is no argument strong enough to negate the conceivability of them, insofar as they reside in the domain of discourse, where the inconceivable is never found.

Let’s give it a rest, shall we?

Strong argument against the conceivability of p-zombies?

How can there be one, when successful arguments affirming such conception have been given?

Strong argument against the empirical reality of one, and recognizing it as such…..that may be inconceivable..

….how would logic be able to correct itself….. — Corvus

Judgement corrects itself.

….they are all the contents of thought. — Corvus

Correct. Logic being the rules by which the relations of contents obtains.

Of course logic is the form of a thinking system, but it needs the contents. — Corvus

The thinking system needs content; logic, not being a thinking system, does not.

Without the content, how could you have demonstrated the logic? — Corvus

I don’t demonstrate the logic; I demonstrate my understanding of the content of my thoughts, according to the a priori rules logic provides.

If you empty your thoughts, then there will be no logic. — Corvus

We’re not talking about the emptiness of thought; we’re talking about the emptiness of logic. It is impossible to have emptiness of thought, insofar as to think of nothing is a contradiction, but it is a metaphysical condition of logic that it be empty of determinable content.

All logic must have the contents to operate. — Corvus

Actually, logic doesn’t operate. It merely regulates how human discursive understanding operates, and content actually belongs to that faculty in the form of its representations, which are conceptions.

Without it (re: content), it is a pseudo logic or a shell with nothing in it. — Corvus

No determinable object, but for that, not nothing. Logic is really only that by which our judgement is orderly, and adheres to the means for correcting itself.

Gotta keep in mind….thought is not by means of logic, even if thought is intrinsically logical. All thought is by means of synthesis of representations, logic is merely that which underpins the correctness of the representations understanding adjoins to each other, such underpinning more commonly called just….you know….rules.
(If you’re cognizing a circle, one of the rules of understanding is there won’t be angles cognized along with it)

Which gets us to your world of reason. There is a metaphysical precept, for what it’s worth, that understanding is the faculty of rules, but reason is the faculty of laws. Thus it is the world of reason is that by which cognitions are legislated according to, not rules, but principles. The reason for this distinction is obvious, iff one readily admits to the possibility of misunderstanding, but finds error in his reason inadmissible.
(Upon the cognition of a circle, one of the laws of reason concerning geometric figures in general, having nothing to do with the constructing of the cognition of a circle itself, is it must have enclosed a space)

That seems different from my understanding of General and Transcendental logic in Kant. — Corvus

That’s fine. Yours is further along in the book, whereas mine merely states the initial conditions.

My thoughts on Logic is that, contents is the precondition of thoughts, and thoughts is the precondition of Logic.  Therefore, without content, Logic is impossible.  Contentless logic is pseudo logic, or logic in just a shell with no meaning. — Corvus

Now, I think that’s sorta backwards.
1.) The possibility of thought must be the condition antecedent that which is thought about. Account must be made for the fact that the faculty of understanding generates its own objects merely from the thought of them, re: conceptual spontaneity, thereby immediately eliminating the possibility that content is the precondition of thought.
2.) Under the assumption the human cognitive system as a whole is a logical system, logic is then the precondition of thought. How would it be possible to think logically without logic being the form of the thinking system? Like…..how could you have a square concrete pad, if not for the construction of the very form required to receive the fluid concrete that subsequently solidifies into a square?
3.) Your A = B, B = C, therefore A = C doesn’t work iff logic….plain ol’ logic, all by itself, a critical method in itself….has never been that which has to do directly with objects, but only sets the rules under which objects are thought.

As for meaning, logic in itself, as a function of understanding, has to do with establishment of non-contradictory judgements alone. As with the concrete pad, empirical meaning can never arise without the a priori elimination of contradictions.
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…the world of reason…. — Corvus

Out of curiosity, what does that mean to you?

Also, you were going to tell me which type of logic has its content already contained in it.

Logic is possible to be studied, but wouldn't be useful for the practical uses in the real world. — Corvus

No one was disagreeing with that. It is the content in logical propositions by which we know anything at all. Nevertheless, it is by the form the content takes, that certainty is even possible for the human intellect. The content of the conceptions in the subject of any proposition must relate to the conceptions in the predicate of that same proposition, for it to have any knowledge contained in it.

…your view on logic is too narrow. — Corvus

As it must be, I suggest; there is a need for the irreducible ground, by which to judge the rest. The use of logic, on the other hand, the application of the method….the filling in of the content, as you say…..is as wide or narrow as the conceptions represented by however filling the content is, warrants.

Regarding Kantian general and transcendental logic, these are merely differences in the source of the representations contained in our cognitions. The former is with respect to the relations of a priori cognitions themselves to each other, regardless of the source of the representations contained therein, while the latter regards only those relations which have only to do with what makes a priori cognition possible. So while they technically are different types of logic, they still abide by the same rules of logic, which reduces to the congruency of relations of representations even in different types of cognition.

Logic is possible to be studied, but wouldn't be useful for the practical uses in the real world. — Corvus

Exactly right. Logic, the critical method, is useless for knowing, but categorically necessary for making things known.

….what you meant by logic is "contentless"? — Corvus

Simply put, I mean, logic is a method for examining critical thought in general, in the form of…..for that critical thought which is constructed logically, or, which is the same thing, in accordance with a strict logical form, self-contradiction is impossible, and thereby the truth of the construct is given.

Even without knowing what meant by it, I can still agree that logic is contentless, under the presupposition that logic, as such, is only a methodological form in itself.

That there is logic is one thing; that things are logical is quite something else.

My point was there are different types of logic, some contentless, some content given, or filled. They don't work all the same. — Corvus

While there may indeed be different types of logic, I would still ask, which type of logic has its content already given?

If you fill in the contents, doesn’t that imply there isn’t any? That being the case, isn’t that exactly the same as logic being contentless?

Logic…..just that, plain ol’ logic….has been called the science of correct thought. When employed as a countable noun, in which there are assorted forms of logic, all that’s implied is a formal system providing an empirical proof from a corresponding set of antecedent a priori conditions.

Maybe you’re trying to say even, e.g., the formal law A = A contains the content of A and necessary equality, but even so, in order for that logic to be useful as a system of proof, one must still fill in that content for which A alone represents the form of the law.

By the same token, how would it be persuasive that mere “if-then” syllogistic logical form has content exhibited by “if” or “then” all by themselves, when they are merely the necessary conditionals? The systemic proof arises from the “if (this content), “then” (that content), the parentheticals being filled in by the user.

I’ll second the notion that logic….as such, all by itself….is contentless.

…..three note-worthy points:

1. There is a world (independent of 'me');
2. There is an 'I' (or 'me') which is in that world; and
3.There is a distinction between my experience of and the world itself.

Firstly, all three of these are transcendent claims assumed as true….. — Bob Ross

Even if I grant all three points are assumed as true, what makes them transcendent claims?

After all the observable physical determinism, the speculative metaphysical reductionism, all the chatter and nonsense, the otherwise unexceptional human brain ends up being a conniving mass of wetware.
(Sigh)

Honestly, I'm surprised no one has proffered up: "if it tells you how to do everything you want and satisfies inquiry then it is telling you the truth." You could simply object to the supposition that it really lies to you. — Count Timothy von Icarus

That the book will lie to me is not a supposition of mine, insofar as I’m categorically informed of the inevitability of it beforehand.

The book telling me to my satisfaction how to do stuff and satisfying my inquiries, and by which I’m being lied to, does nothing but cause me to question my own judgement with respect to how I consider myself satisfied on the one hand, and on how knowing how to do something will sufficiently relate to my experience when I actually do it, on the other. Combine those two, and I should find no measure of truth at all in the book, and questionable measure in some respects in myself.
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This book will answer any questions you ask of it to your satisfaction — Count Timothy von Icarus

Magical indeed. It’s possible I won’t even know what questions to ask until immediately before I ask them, which requires a mere book to infinitely anticipate. Which would cause me to wonder if I’m asking a book, or something else entirely. Even supposing that me asking a book is a euphemism for just looking in the book for whatever question I have, presupposes the book….or whatever it is…..contains every single question possible to be asked of it.

I wouldn’t worry about the spell; I’d have already backed slowly away, from the mysterious old woman and her lying book, forever giving mystery and magic a very wide berth.

Not sure exactly what you mean here. — Count Timothy von Icarus

The Universe is a self-contained system without external influence, which serves as the criteria for a conception, in this case, autonomy. Upon stipulation that the Universe is the totality of all possibilities for the intelligence that performed such stipulation, it becomes superfluous to grant autonomy to the Universe, but only validates the conception relative to certain subsystems within it.

The human is a self-contained system in itself, but at the same time, contained within a greater system and is thereby subject to influence by it. If it is the case that the only influence the Universe as a system can have as causality, is the effects of the objects in it relative to each other, which is always and only a physical manifestation, it is contradictory to then assert the Universe influences through its cause/effect, that which the lesser self-contained system exerts on itself, insofar as such exertion is NOT relative to any other object contained in the greater system.

So sets the conditions by which a lesser self-contained system can at the same time be free of influence from the greater system, which justifies the validity of the preconceived conception of autonomy. Nevertheless, while autonomy is a necessary condition for self-determination intrinsic to any self-contained subsystem capable of it, it is not itself sufficient causality. But a self-contained subsystem must have its own causal ground, else the authority for such system to be self-determining becomes internally inconsistent.

That’s what I mean…..

Think of me as one of those two ol’ Muppets in the balcony, nodding knowingly to the other, says, “BRILLIANT!!!”

But alas, there’s an unstated determinant condition for both systems, that which gives ground for both of them to work, each within their own domain. Coming oh so close with the systemic Universe, but not so noticed for the human subsystem within the Universe, tends to unbalance the overall thesis.

Under the assumption you’re not a fan of guessing games, I submit..…..autonomy.

I am not concern with the thing that does the looking…… — Daniel

If I’m looking in a mirror, regardless of what I perceive in the seeing, there is a phenomenal representation given to my intellectual system. This is the way the human system works: the senses relay physical information in the form of sensation, the cognitive part of the system operates in conjunction with it, and by which the representations of things perceived become my experiences.

So it is that in the case of me looking into a mirror and seeing myself, the phenomenal representation is just another set of physical information. The senses do not have the ability to discern identity, from which follows the phenomenal representation of the physical information contains no indication that I am seeing myself. As far as this goes, there is merely an appearance of some thing, presented to my senses, as is the case with every single perception of mine, without exception.

So how does it arise that the perception from the mirror is my body? From the information my senses provide, re: movement, the color of the shirt, the haircut, a veritable plethora of representations corresponding exactly with what I already know.

But no matter what, that which is not a representation from the mirror, is that to which the manifold of representations that are from the mirror, are given. The senses can never enable a representation of that which operates on, and because of, them. There can be no representation of the self given from the perception in the mirror.

I cannot see my self in a mirror. I cannot see my self, ever. And the myself I do see, is nothing but my personal empirical object, which is just my body.
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But forget all that; you’re asking me to imagine. Fine. To imagine is to make the senses irrelevant, insofar as I can imagine looking at myself in the mirror while skydiving, in which case there is no phenomenal representation of my body, because I’m not actually perceiving it. Nevertheless, imagination does present its own representations, otherwise I wouldn’t have the mere mental image of looking in a mirror while not actually looking.

Ok, so the imagined image of me looking in the mirror corresponds precisely to the image given from the actual looking, which makes explicit the representations from imagination have at least some of their origins in experience. If I didn’t already know what a mirror is, how could I imagine looking into it? Which implies a sort of mental storage facility, which we common folk call memory, philosophers call intuition, and metaphysicians call consciousness.

Long story short…..guess what representation cannot be found in memory/intuition/consciousness, but serves as its representation? And if, even just for the sake of argument and in keeping with pure logical law, consciousness is the sum total of every representation belonging to an individual subject, and, it is thereby impossible for self to be contained in that which it represents as containing all representations, there arises an impasse, in attempting to represent the self as such.

There is a expression representing that which encompasses consciousness as the totality of representations, called “ego”. Ego, then, is a complexity, and in turn is conceptually represented by the simple, called “I”. All three of these together entail the conception of self, whereas any one of them alone does not. Hence the incomprehensibility of attempts to conceptualize a self without the apprehension of that conjunction, and upon that apprehension, the self is given, but not as a representation.

There is no thing that does the looking. There is only a systematic process by which there is that which is its object.

Not sure if that was what you had in mind, though... — Janus

Close enough. When I see “way of thinking”, I interpret “way” as “method”.