I'm not. This follows from what i take to be your (rather extremely) misguided conception of cognition in relation to phenomenal experience. It seems quite clear to me your monist conception is arbitrary and counter to what's presented to you. The line of yours I quoted should make it sufficient clear that your objection here is not apt, at all, in any way, to my objection/s. — AmadeusD
an underlying organisational structure — AmadeusD
but given we already know 90% of our cognition has absolutely no noticeable effect on our phenomenal experience, this is just not plausible. — AmadeusD
Experience is irrelevant to the explanations and organisations of cognition. There is nothing in cognitive science that would lead us to predict conscious experience from the underlying structure of, lets call it awareness, which is in turn strictly tied to (theoretically) the underlying physical relational structure of information processing in the brain. — AmadeusD
This is the entire f-ing point my dude. We dont. And this is a known fact. We have no idea about most of our cognition. Because "as above.." — AmadeusD
No. — AmadeusD
I have no idea what you thought this was addressing? — AmadeusD
But no. — AmadeusD
You think a reductionist account is incoherent? — AmadeusD
I guess its just agree to disagree then since I don't find your justifications compelling. — Apustimelogist
If property dualism were true, we could formulate and test psychophysical laws the same way we test physical laws, and come to the same levels of causal, relational and phenomenal certainty about them — AmadeusD
here is though. I think i'll just leave you to discover the discussions on your own, at this stage. Chalmers himself deals with these issues in the work we're referring to. — AmadeusD
It seems you simply have no idea about hte arguments in this area. — AmadeusD
Chinese Room*. Chalmers deals with it head-on aimed at Searle. — AmadeusD
This, again, has literally nothing to do with the discussion we're having. — AmadeusD
You didn't understand what I was saying — Apustimelogist
Not one of these is not something you are not directly aquainted with by experience. Perception? Obviously experience. Attention? Obviously attending to experiences. Imagination? Bring up mental images, talk about narratives. Intelligence? Do an intelligence test, you have the experience of doing it and coming up with the answers. Memory? You experience your recollection of a fact or event. Judgement? You experience yourself looking at something and experiencing it and then making the judgement or reporting it and how you feel. Problem Solving? you experience yourself thinking and engaging with a problem. Language? You experience yourself reading or bringing up words. — Apustimelogist
I was talking about dualism being incoherent, i.e. conscious experiemce arising out of and separate to something elae. — Apustimelogist
You do not understand what you're talking about given the above. You're conflating the activitiy in the brain with the (abstract) experience which is not of that action. We are blatantly speaking past each other and you are, unfortunately, flat-the-heck-out-wrong. — AmadeusD
Which makes it all the more clear that you're confusing not only the concepts you're discussing, but yourself in the process. — AmadeusD
Everything in this response further entrenches the clear fact you are confusing cognition and experience — AmadeusD
I am unsure why you're bothering with length replies at this stage. — AmadeusD
The charge that I'm invoking some mysterious unobservable is risible, in that context. — AmadeusD
There is nothing in cognitive science that would lead us to predict conscious experience from the underlying structure of, lets call it awareness, which is in turn strictly tied to (theoretically) the underlying physical relational structure of information processing in the brain. — Apustimelogist
….unfolding on the same experiential space with the same category of underlying explanation very broadly in terms of brain dynamics. — Apustimelogist
methodological dualism — Mww
…..and yet, there is currently no plausible explanation for experiential space in terms of sufficiently reduced brain dynamics. — Mww
I don't think such things are a threat to people's humanity. — Apustimelogist
…..and yet, methodological dualism is still not granted as necessarily the case with respect to human intelligence. — Mww
IT is required to speak about what we currently know as to a relationship between the brain an experience. — AmadeusD
Oh, I metaphysics too. Quite a lot. — Manuel
…..it could be that one system is "closer to truth" than another one. But we have no possible way of finding out which one is correct. — Manuel
….the fantastic advance of the sciences….. — Manuel
one can spend one's whole career studying the neuron of a squid, without knowing much more about biology. — Manuel
There are plenty of good reasons, supported by science, to believe indirect realism over direct realism, as I discussed at length here. — Michael
But I don't understand how we got to this point. You were saying something about us wanting to help each other if we're in pain, and somehow conclude from this that indirect realism is false? Your reasoning is confusing. — Michael
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