If I understand Hegel correctly, then he claims that the philosopher's task is to understand history. — 64bithuman
To understand history it to understand the development of
geist - spirit or mind. This is not simply a matter of an individual studying the past as a subject matter separate from or other than the individual, but to know it from within as part of this development, to know it from the standpoint of the "universal individual".
From a thread a few years ago on the
Phenomenology
The quoted material is #27 and #28 from the Preface. The quotes are followed by my attempt to explicate the text. There are earlier posts in the thread that also address your questions.
27:
Knowing, as it is at first, or, as immediate spirit, is devoid of spirit, is sensuous consciousness. In order to become genuine knowing, or, in order to beget the element of science which is its pure concept, immediate spirit must laboriously travel down a long path.
Immediate spirit is devoid of spirit because it is consciousness of something other, that is, it is not self-consciousness. The path from consciousness of what is other to self-consciousness is the development of genuine knowing.
28:
However, the task of leading the individual from his culturally immature standpoint up to and into science had to be taken in its universal sense, and the universal individual, the world spirit, had to be examined in the development of its cultural education.
The universal individual, the world spirit, is not any particular individual:
... the particular individual is an incomplete spirit, a concrete shape whose entire existence falls into one determinateness and in which the other features are only present as intermingled traits.
The universal individual is one formed by the development of Western culture. Although genuine knowing involves both subject and object and is in that sense subjective, it is not a matter of whatever any particular individual declares or thinks or believes. It is universal subjectivity. But it is not simply a matter of consensus, that is, what is true is not so because most or all at any given time take it to be true.
In any spirit that stands higher than another, the lower concrete existence has descended to the status of an insignificant moment; what was formerly at stake is now only a trace; its shape has been
covered over and has become a simple shading of itself. The individual whose substance is spirit standing at the higher level runs through these past forms in the way that a person who takes up a higher science goes through those preparatory studies which he has long ago internalized in order to make their content current before him; he calls them to mind without having his interest linger upon them.
Each stage of development is secondary to the completion of the movement of spirit. By way of analogy, one's first steps are of momentous importance but cease to be important as one learns to walk and run. Hegel is not minimizing the importance of what those before him have accomplished. Their accomplishments, however, have become internalized, part of one's cultural education. However great the accomplishments of Plato or Kant or Newton or anyone else, they are only moments in the development of knowledge and the world spirit. Although we may never accomplish what they did we are able to see further than they by standing on their shoulders.
In that way, each individual spirit also runs through the culturally formative stages of the universal
spirit, but it runs through them as shapes which spirit has already laid aside, as stages on a path that has been worked out and leveled out in the same way that we see fragments of knowing, which in earlier ages occupied men of mature minds, now sink to the level of exercises, and even to that of games for children. In this pedagogical progression, we recognize the history of the cultural formation of the world sketched in silhouette. This past existence has already become an acquired possession of the universal spirit; it constitutes the substance of the individual, or, his inorganic nature. – In this respect, the cultural formation of the individual regarded from his own point of view consists in his acquiring all of this which is available, in his living off that inorganic nature and in his taking possession of it for himself.
Our inorganic nature is our spiritual nature. We are as we are not because of some timeless and invariant human nature or individual particularity. It is as it is because our spiritual nature is cultural and historical. The " cultural formation of the individual regarded from his own point of view" appears to be a matter of what he or she acquires on his own, but:
... this is nothing but the universal spirit itself, or, substance giving itself its self-consciousness, or, its coming-to-be and its reflective turn into itself.
It is not the individual person but the instantiation or indwelling of spirit manifest in the individual.