Plato distinguishes between the visible and the intelligible, what can be seen with the eyes and what is seen by the intellect (nous) itself by itself. It has nothing to do with 'IQ' assessment.

Not in Parmenides, but in the dialogue — Wayfarer

Yes, I understood that. The name of the dialogue is not The Parmenides, although it is referred to as the Parmenides. The dialogue is about the Forms, but this does not answer the question.

He aims to show that the twentieth-century view that Aristotle started out as a Platonist and ended up as an anti-Platonist is seriously flawed.' — Wayfarer

That may be, but it is not the interpretation of Aristotle I was referring to. This interpretation does not regard Aristotle as either a Platonist or anti-Platonist.

the basic intuition of the rational intellect as 'that which perceives the forms' — Wayfarer

I don't know if that detracts from the general point. — Wayfarer

What is the general point?

the basic intuition of the rational intellect as 'that which perceives the forms' — Wayfarer

What you call the basic intuition is an image on the cave wall. Do you perceive the Forms? Socrates admits he did not.

It is identified with the immortal aspect of the human (in e.g. the Phaedo). — Wayfarer

The Phaedo talks about the immortal soul but whether or not the soul is immortal remains in question. Socrates tells them that it is better to believe it is, but, as the arguments make clear, if one's concern is with the truth, belief, however beneficial it may be, is not a satisfactory alternative.

To explore these questions, it's necessary first to study the Parmenidies, don't you think? — Wayfarer

I don't see why. What do you find in Parmenides that addresses these questions?

Isn't it the case that in the later tradition of Aristotelian philosophy ... — Wayfarer

There are a few problems with this. First, I think it necessary to distinguish between Aristotle and the Aristotelian tradition. It is questionable whether that tradition understood him. Second, the problem of interpreting Plato is only compounded by having in interpret Aristotle. Third, hyle is Aristotle's concept. It is not found in Plato and Plato's Forms are eidos not morphe. Tying these problems together is whether Aristotle should be understood as rejecting or supporting Plato. The tradition assumes the former, but recent scholarship points to their affinity.

Socrates begins:

"Next, then," I said, "make an image of our nature in its education and want of education, likening it to a condition of the following kind ... (514a)

What follows is an image of images regarding the human condition according to its education. Since we have been in this condition since birth we are not even aware that we are in bonds and can only see what is right in front of us. We do not attempt to escape because we do not know we are not free. The images whose shadows we see are:

... statues of men and other animals wrought from stone, wood, and every kind of material ... (514e-515a)

It should be noted that these images are not images of Forms, but of humans and other animals.

It is said that it is "by nature" (515c) that one is freed from the wall, but it is by force that someone drags him out of the cave into the light of the sun. (515e) By nature I take him to mean the nature of that prisoner. It is not said who it is that drags him out.

Who is able to drag us into the light remains in question. There is a type of wisdom in the cave (516c), but those who hold such honors are not the same as one who is capable of bringing you out of the cave. Such a person would not be regarded as wise but foolish and not to be trusted.

Who the puppet-masters are, also remains in question. The puppets are images. Do the makers have knowledge of the originals, or do they mistake the images they make for the originals?

"Well, then, my dear Glaucon, " I said, "this image as a whole must be connected with what was said before. Liken the domain revealed through sight to the prison home, and the light of the fire in it to the sun's power; and, in applying the going up and the seeing of what's above to the soul's journey up to the intelligible place ... (517a-b).

There is a problem with this analogy. The prisoner who escapes the cave does not see the Forms. She remains in the visible realm, culminating in the sight of heaven, the stars and moon at night, and the sun (516a) before returning to the cave. The domain revealed through sight includes what is seen outside the cave. Outside the cave one first sees reflections in water:

... the phantoms of the human beings and the other things in water; and, later, the things themselves.

What are here called the things themselves are the things of our ordinary experience. But according to the hypothesis of Forms (511b), these are not the things themselves, but images of the Forms. In that case, the shadows are not simply images of images, but images (shadows) of images (puppets) of images (humans and other things) of Forms (which are called the things themselves).

The fire in the cave is the image of the sun, and the sun is the image of the Good. Where are we in this three-fold division? Both the fire and the sun correspond to the visible realm. By which light do we see?

To put it differently, how does this three-fold division, cave, light of sun, Forms, correspond to the two-fold division of visible and intelligible? Are the Forms themselves more than images or are they shadows in the mind cast by Plato the image maker? Does the image of escape from the cave to a light above the light of the sun bind us more firmly to the cave?

I do not share what I take to be your revelatory expectations for philosophy.

The real question is — Constance

A real question. Your real question. Not the real question.

I will not say that your effort understand the author is for naught at all, but that in the end, you will have understood mostly yourself and your own advanced understanding. — Constance

This has not been my experience. It remains my understanding, but the more closely and attentively I read and the more I am helped by other more advanced readers, the more I learn and the more my understanding is altered.

In philosophy, I never try to understand the intentions of another. — Constance

The problem of the author's intention should not close you off to listening to the author. Listening cannot take place when the reader assumes that the author cannot be understood, when the reader assumes that the real questions are the ones she asks, that there are foundations that must be built on rather than toppled.

That sounds too abstract — Constance

Quite the opposite. It is a matter of practice, of allowing a text to open up, of learning to read a text on its own terms.

The reduction removes cultural heritage. — Constance

The practice itself is cultural heritage.

And matters like how cultures carry meanings, and how these meanings are constructed differently, fall away. — Constance

Or perhaps it is being captivated by a picture of liberation. The dream of being free of presuppositions

But what is that-which-is-not-reduced? — Constance

The activities of life. The experiences of life. Being alive.

his analysis of time in the Concept of Anxiety is eye opening — Constance

Based on what you said about the inability to understand an author, perhaps you have misunderstood his intent. Or do you think authors write without intent? But it looks like you think you understand him better than he understood himself.

The metaphysics of presence takes something to be its own presupposition, with no need to rely on anything but its own presence to affirm that it is. — Constance

What does the metaphysics of presence have to do with seeing the duck-rabbit? What is a duck-rabbit's own presence?

seeing a duck, and taking up what is before one AS a duck is contextual, contingent, deferential, a thing of parts. — Constance

Right. Seeing is not simply passive reception. What does this have to do with the metaphysics of presence?

Kierkegaard's intent, of course, is as plain as mine when I read him. But when I read him, it is my "intent" that receives and understands and interprets. — Constance

My intent is to understand the author, to resist imposing the understanding I bring to the text when trying to understand the text. It is never a completed task but one that can begin.

But are they so closed they can only mean one thing? — Constance

Words have definition, but the boundaries, depending on the word, may be more or less elastic. The term 'geist' it can be translated as spirit or mind or ghost, but when Hegel uses the term we are bound to misunderstand him if we intend Casper the friendly ghost.

the phenomenological reduction — Constance

The practice itself is part of your cultural heritage.

Not is meaning yielded out of language games. — Constance

Language games need to be viewed within a form of life. A form of life included but is not reducible to language.

Metaethics is the foundational issue in ethics. — Constance

The later Wittgenstein eschewed theory. Ethics does not require a theoretical foundation. That is exactly the kind of philosophical assumption he wants to overcome.

I am not sure how you get from the duck-rabbit to the metaphysics of presence in a single paragraph.

I don't see the difference between cultural conditioned and context. — Constance

Culture is more general, context more specific. Within the same culture there are different contexts. How I see the man in a trenchcoat watching children at the playground might be influenced by reports that there is a pedophile in the area.

Such things are not fixed, but contingent. — Constance

The baby reaction seems to be hardwired.

The "badness" of a twisted arm is "presented" to us — Constance

The badness is not presented to us. That seems to be an odd way of talking as if removed from the immediacy of what is happening. A twisted arm hurts. Pain is bad.

Is your question about what Kierkegaard means or about the terms? Whatever it is he might mean it may not be what someone else might mean.
— Fooloso4

Is this an important part of it? — Constance

You made the connection between philosophy and language. What the words might mean to someone
and what he means when he uses the words are not only an important part of it but an essential part.

Take it as a matter of the openness of ideas — Constance

Are ideas to be so open that they can mean anything and everything?

I am taken by Husserl's epoche and the French theological thinking that sees an apophatic, theological turn in this. Michel Henry, for example. There is a lot of Kierkegaard in this — Constance

Does this mean that it is not, as you suggested, a matter of suspending one's cultural heritage?

Kant's transcendental conditions? Where he went wrong is here: — Constance

The transcendental conditions of the Tractatus are not about where you think Kant went wrong.

The latter Witt is not as interesting. — Constance

Should we take this to mean you do not find it as interesting?

I think the private/public discussion not to be close enough to the core question. — Constance

Perhaps the assumption of a core question is symptomatic of the problem. The later Wittgenstein does not attempt to ground things theoretically or absolutely. I think it worth considering whether the notion of epistemological 'hinges' in On Certainty finds its correlate in ethical 'hinges'. For example, murder is wrong. So too, the metaphor of the river and the appeal to relativity theory or the absence of an absolute, fixed ground. In other words, the recognition that ethical standards change over time.

There is a difference between learning philosophy and learning what you need to do to do well in the class. Are you using primary texts, books written by notable philosophers, or secondary texts, books written about what is written by Plato or Descartes for example? Does the class focus on presenting and defending your own views or stating the views of the philosophers or interpreting the texts?

As a general rule I suggest not highlighting the first time you read through the material because it is often the case that you will not see what is important until you have finished the reading. Philosophers often discuss something only to then say why they disagree.

Being confused can be a good sign. It show you understand enough to see that there is something problematic being discussed.

Try to be flexible in your thinking. Do not make the mistake of agreeing or disagreeing too quickly. It may be that what you are agreeing or disagreeing with is your own misunderstand of what is being said.

What is your gods demanded human sacrifice? Or persecution of heretics? Or denied access to birth control?

Has anyone asked if you can justify religion without morality?

An amateur can become interested if it becomes clear what is at issue, why, for example, the question can't simply be settled by a definition.

But being a professional philosopher or someone trained in philosophy does not mean that such questions will be of interest.

Every professional philosopher was at one time an amateur philosopher. It may be that such questions led someone to pursue philosophy, but it might also be that if not for other more compelling issues someone might conclude that philosophy was not worth pursuing.

I don't want to quibble about what the understanding "does" but it seems clear that to "see" a rabbit requires a rabbit concept. — Constance

Wittgenstein' concern is with the fact that it happens, not why it happens. He does not attempt to explain. He is well aware of the pitfalls.

an underpinning of a language culture that talks about rabbits, — Constance

Wittgenstein often made use of imaginary tribes. Suppose there is a tribe that has never seen a duck or a rabbit, but has seen images of what we call a duck and a rabbit. When they look at an image that combines the two their experience would be the same as ours, seeing first the one image and then the other.

To understand is more than what the optical part reveals, of course. I thought this was your thinking. — Constance

That is another aspect of it. A tribe that knew nothing of Christianity or Christian iconography would not look at a cross and see what Christians do. What we see is to some extent culturally conditioned. In some cases it is more a matter of context.

How we see the look on someone's face: is it a matter of understanding the expression? Babies react differently to smiles and sad faces, smiling in return or becoming upset. Adults may react to the look on someone's face as a smile or a smirk or a sneer. Is the response a matter of understanding? Does how we take it or understanding follow from how we respond or determine how we respond?

Did you say the arborist's contextualization need not be linguistic? This is a scientist whose classificatory speciality is taxonomically complex. — Constance

Yes, but arborist does more than classify. The arborist might see the tree and picture how it should be pruned. How the tree is to be pruned is not a matter of linguistic analysis, although such an analysis can be given.

The difference for me has to do with one thing language does that simply ready to hand cannot do: philosophy — Constance

Is there more to philosophy than what is said?

What does it mean for spirit to posit soul and body, as Kierkegaard put it? — Constance

Is your question about what Kierkegaard means or about the terms? Whatever it is he might mean it may not be what someone else might mean.

To suspend one's cultural heritage in a qualitative leap of affirmation of one's existential condition? — Constance

For some this is meaningful, although perhaps in different ways. For others, a culturally embedded desire for some kind of transcendence.

to overcome the human condition altogether, if you will. — Constance

What might this mean? To be more or less than human? To rebel against being human? To attempt to escape being human by leaping away? Therapy or denial? Perhaps the leap is to nowhere. Are such challenging questions part of or antithetical to philosophy?

I don't think he ever dropped the religious, mysticality of ethics and aesthetics — Constance

There is a difference between maintaining an attitude of something mystical and his rejection of Kant's transcendental conditions.

I always read him to be saying that metavalue (Tractatus) cannot be affirmed. — Constance

Affirmed in what sense? See what he says about the world of the happy man.

Added the language games concept, but maintained a healthy distance from putting ethics in theoretical play. — Constance

Yes, I agree. It is not a matter of theory. As I said:

the meaning of ethics is related to what we do, to how we live, to what is meaningful. — Fooloso4

This is not something I have looked at closely, but I think there is a connection between the rejection of a private language and a rejection of the solipsism of the Tractatus. Ethics for the latter Wittgenstein is not about the solipsistic world of the happy or unhappy man. Ethics is not private. It is about what we do and how we live.

Seen and understood? Are these not synonyms? — Constance

When you look at the picture of the duck-rabbit what do you see? The picture does not change but what you see does. This is not a matter of understanding.

It is contextualized beneath the surface event. — Constance

Right, but that contextualization need not be linguistic. The furniture builder and the arborist may see the tree differently. The contextualization is here not a matter of what is said but of what is done.

Certainly, but Wittgenstein notoriously refused to talk about ethics — Constance

And yet, a great deal is now being said about Wittgenstein and ethics.

The early Wittgenstein was explicit in his identification of ethics and aesthetics. In his Lecture on Ethics he refers to his own experience of absolute value. Here again, he connects ethics to what is experienced. For the later Wittgenstein ethics as well as logic are no longer regarded as transcendental but part of a form of life. How one looks at things and what is seen when one changes the way they are looked at remains central. Just as the meaning of words is related to their use, the meaning of ethics is related to what we do, to how we live, to what is meaningful.

I see. The one who administers the poison is just in so far as he is doing his job. On the model of the Republic, one man one job. Minding his own business.

... for all of the understanding's ability is bound up with the way a thing is taken up. — Constance

How a thing is seen and how it is understood, although related, is not the same.

In other words, because language is an essential part of an object's construction — Constance

A mechanic might look at a bunch of parts and see how they are connected. She constructs the object both visually and in practice without the use of language.

This pain in my knee is not language, even though language is what brings this pain to "light". — Constance

Wittgenstein talks a great deal about pain. Toothache is his favorite example. Language does not bring the pain to light. It is an expression of pain. That someone is in pain may be obvious without uttering a word.

Could you elaborate on this last part of "seeing as"? — Shawn

Seeing as is also called seeing an aspect. The best known example is the duck-rabbit. He does not think we first interpret it and then see it one way or the other, we simply see it as a duck or a rabbit.
Further, we can see it first one way and then the other.

Perception is not simple passive reception. There is a connection between perception and conception.

What is at issue is not some visual peculiarity, but the way we look at things and seeing connections. To see connections is not to make connections.

This is a topic that has gained a lot of interest.

Or, what might be the same thing, one hard-working Athenian saluting the virtue of another. — Valentinus

You lost me here.

... tipping his waiter on the way out. — Valentinus

His libation of hemlock? The master as servant to the servant? (Phaedo 63a)

When Wittgenstein talks about "philosophy" he is often talking about what was being done by his contemporaries and the problems their thinking gets they into. In Culture and Value that he ought to be no more than a mirror, in which his reader should see all the deformities of his own thinking, so that, helped in this way, he can put it right (p.18e).

When one has "put it right" where does she go from there? Wittgenstein presents another notion of philosophy:

Work on philosophy -- like work in architecture in many respects -- is really more work on oneself. On one's own conception. On how one sees things. (And what one expects of them.) (CV, 24)

Such activity is not simply destructive, it is constructive and self-reflective.

As we see in the later Wittgenstein as opposed to the earlier, thinking straddles the saying and seeing distinction. Here he came to see the importance of conceptual seeing, "seeing as".

In this way too, philosophy can be regarded as therapeutic, but the goal is no longer to stop doing philosophy.

Socrates' myths, some of which are "in accordance with things said" and some of which he makes up and some of which he makes up and claims to be in accordance with things said, always point back to to life. He tells these tales not to inform his listeners of a life beyond life, a life not he nor them nor us knows anything about, but rather as part of living the examined life.

Socrates condemns:

the biggest lies about the biggest things (Republic 377e)

He is referring to Hesiod's myth about Cronus and Uranus. He continues:

Even if they were true ... the best way would be to bury them in silence, and if there were some necessity for relating them, that only a very small audience should be admitted under pledge of secrecy ... to the end that as few as possible should have heard these tales.

The problem is, how do we know if they are true? The muses tell Hesiod that they speak lies like the truth. (Theogony 27) Socrates says:

When anyone images badly in his speech the true nature of gods and heroes, like a painter whose portraits bear no resemblance to his models. (377e)

What do they know of the true nature of gods? Where are the models to be found? The muses? The poets? Or are they to make them themselves?

But the truth is not Socrates' foremost concern. If the story of Cronus is true, it is something that only a few should known. The truth should be hidden and in place of the "biggest lies", they should be told noble lies.

Socrates states what is at issue:

Shall we, then, thus lightly suffer our children to listen to any chance stories fashioned by any chance teachers and so to take into their minds opinions for the most part contrary to those that we shall think it desirable for them to hold when they are grown up? (377b)

"Chance stories by chance teachers", in other words, "according to things said".

And the stories on the accepted list we will induce nurses and mothers to tell to the children and so shape their souls by these stories ... (377c)

Myths shape the soul. The obverse of Socrates' avoidance of the politics of the city is his active engagement with the politics of the soul. It is not just those who are chronologically children who benefit from the myths.The souls of children of all ages might still be shaped by stories of the gods and rewards and punishment.

Are those who are not past that point (or nowhere near it) justified to value wisdom over socioeconomic success? — baker

I am not sure what you are getting at. If someone is poor and values wisdom over socioeconomic success, depending on how this affects others, I am not sure I see a problem with what they value. I see these as two different things though. The former is roughly a matter of who you are and the latter what you have. Whether or not one interferes with the other depends on what one assumes the pursuit of wisdom is about.

If you are saying we should not disregard the importance of socioeconomic needs out of some lofty notion of wisdom then I agree.

A better version!

You must know the Jewish story of the long spoons. — Olivier5

I had to look it up. A summary from Wiki:

In each location, the inhabitants are given access to food, but the utensils are too unwieldy to serve oneself with. In hell, the people cannot cooperate, and consequently starve. In heaven, the diners feed one another across the table and are sated.

Legend and the evangelists added a lot, but I doubt they voluntarily suppressed anything. — Olivier5

The Church Fathers, based on their own authority, decided what was canonical and what was heretical. Prior to this "inspiration", speculation, and stories grew unchecked by anything except personal conviction or the shared convictions of different groups.

too far from the original (monotheist) Jesus IMO. — Olivier5

I think Jesus would have been appalled to learn that he had been deified, a man made into a god. But paganism has been a part of Christianity almost from the beginning, something inherited, embraced and fought against.

Some interpreted the Kingdom of Heaven or Kingdom of God as an internal transformation rather than the geo-political transformation envisioned in some messianic views.
— Fooloso4

This view was strenuously deleted by the early Christian Fathers as a species of heresy. — Valentinus

The work of your namesake being a prime victim.

That others such as Paul piggy-backed on him only shows how vibrantly the message was resonating. — Olivier5

We do not know what his message was in distinction from the messages that emerged in his name and was in some cases suppressed.

And this may be one of his deepest intuitions: the solution is perhaps not one big kaboom, with angels blowing celestial trumpets. Maybe it's already here, in every one's own longing for justice and love. — Olivier5

The central theme of this belief is that we all contain a divine spark that can be discovered. It is at hand. But in either case, it supports my point. Where there are varying teachings said to be his we do not know the source.

arguably accepted by Plato — Wayfarer

Yes, it can and has been argued. The fact that it was a ubiquitous belief might be a good reason for why it appears in some of the dialogues, but it is a bad reason for assuming he therefore accepted it. It is "in accordance with things said". Things said are the basis for Socratic inquiry. Of course, such inquiry must fail to arrive at a definitive answer. Death may be nothing. That it is something must be without sufficient evidence. None of us recollect being dead.

I don’t see, O Morosophos, how it follows that his soul would no longer be Socrates’ after this “change and migration” of it. — Leghorn

In the Phaedo he says that the soul of a man might be that of an ass in the next life, or an ant, or other animal. (82a-b) This of course raises problems for the myth of recollection. I've been reminded that I'm an ass, but do not recollect being that kind of animal in a previous life. It would be remarkable if an ass had knowledge of the Forms!

Indeed, they align well with the House of Hillel, and against the House of Shammai. — Olivier5

And yet despite the opposition both houses are firmly within Judaism.

But didn't we agree that Judaism at the time was plural? Jesus was certainly, along with the Essenes, opposed to the Sadducee leadership in the Temple. — Olivier5

It is this pluralism that makes the claim that he broke with Judaism questionable. Since the Essenes and Sadducees were both Jewish sects, if Jesus was with the Essenes in opposing the Sadducee leadership in the Temple, this is not an indication that Jesus was opposed to or advocated something contrary to Judaism.

He was radical alright. — Olivier5

Perhaps. I don't know enough about the different views within Judaism to say whether his views aligned with other Jews who might also have been seen as radical, as opposed to being unique in his radicalism.

He did change the world, in the end. — Olivier5

I think that is an open question. If not for Paul we might not have even heard about Jesus. Paul was a Pharisee and believed in resurrection. If Jesus was in agreement with the Essenes he would have denied the resurrection of the body.

Jesus expected the end of days, quite clearly — Olivier5

Some interpreted the Kingdom of Heaven or Kingdom of God as an internal transformation rather than the geo-political transformation envisioned in some messianic views.

Tzeentchquietism.
— Fooloso4

Drop the strawmanning already. — Tzeentch

I don't know what you mean. If you mean your name was combined with quietism that was not intentional. The @ function did not leave a space. If you mean that you think quietism is a strawman then you only have to read your own posts to see why I addressed it.

Yes, Torah is the Law.

In keeping with the topic, we should consider the different Jewish groups at the time of Jesus. In addition to differences between sects there were also differences with regard to such things as militantism and @Tzeentchquietism. Passages in the NT that support quitism are not evidence of a break with Judaism.

Just where Jesus fit in all this is not clear. It may be that rather than an affiliation with one or another of these groups he did what many others did then and continue to do today, accepting those beliefs and practices that seem most true to them. Many of the things he was said to have taught can be found in the diverse beliefs of the time. With knowledge of this diversity the idea that Jesus broke with or taught things contrary to Judaism becomes far less tenable.

He says many things, not all of which point to literalism. I mean, there's a certain ambiguity in Jesus, as recorded. — Olivier5

Yes, I agree. Previously I said:

it is questionable that what is left are the teachings of Jesus rather than of those who were inspired by and may or may not have understood him. Those who may or may not have addressed their own concerns rather than his. — Fooloso4

The Torah is an official doctrine, though. — Olivier5

https://www.myjewishlearning.com/article/doctrine-dogma/

Until the Talmud sort of updated the whole thing. — Olivier5

According to the Talmud, the oral Torah existed alongside the written Torah. Of course this is historically problematic since both are claimed to originate with Moses. In any case, the Torah appears to be a patchwork rather than a doctrine.

Given what Socrates says about the body in the Phaedo and his seeming indifferent to how he is to be buried (115c), what are we to make of his bathing before he dies? (116a) Is the care for the body more important than he lets on? Is his care for the body part of rather than separate from his care for himself? His concern is with "my departure from here to There". But "in accordance with things said", it would not be Socrates' departure, but "a sort of change and migration of the soul from the place here to another place.” A soul that would no longer be Socrates'.

It should not go without notice that the man who administers the poison is recognized by Socrates as:

one who has knowledge of these things. (117a)

The only one recognized as having any knowledge of death is someone who knows about putting him to death.

Or according to the spirit of the Law, rather affording so much importance to its letter. — Olivier5

He says:

For truly I tell you, until heaven and earth disappear, not the smallest letter, not the least stroke of a pen, will by any means disappear from the Law until everything is accomplished. (Matthew 5:18)

It is Paul who makes the distinction between the letter and spirit of the Law.

So the people Jesus was talking to were not all fundamentalist followers of the Law of Moses to the letter. — Olivier5

Given the quote above, it seems as if Jesus himself might have been just such a fundamentalist.

As any rabbi of the time, he had his own interpretation of the Torah. — Olivier5

Hence the old joke about two rabbis and three opinions.

Things changed a lot during this time, even within Judaism. — Olivier5

An important point. Judaism never had the "official doctrines" that are found in Christianity after the establishment of the Church. In fact, the first Christians were guided by inspiration, the indwelling of spirit. This was problematic for the development of a universal Church with a single teaching.

The contradiction between 'an eye for an eye' and 'to turn the other cheek' is to me a fundamental one, because the two present entirely different approaches to responding to injustice. — Tzeentch

The former is legal and applies to all who are under the Law, the latter is a matter of personal choice. An eye for an eye does not teach that one should or must respond by taking an eye for an eye.

From the Sermon on the Mount:

Do not think that I have come to abolish the Law or the Prophets; I have not come to abolish them but to fulfill them. For truly I tell you, until heaven and earth disappear, not the smallest letter, not the least stroke of a pen, will by any means disappear from the Law until everything is accomplished. Therefore anyone who sets aside one of the least of these commands and teaches others accordingly will be called least in the kingdom of heaven, but whoever practices and teaches these commands will be called great in the kingdom of heaven. For I tell you that unless your righteousness surpasses that of the Pharisees and the teachers of the law, you will certainly not enter the kingdom of heaven.

Jesus is not rejecting the Law. He exhorts his followers to righteousness beyond the Law. This can be clearly seen in what follows regarding murder, adultery, divorce, oaths, and an eye for an eye.

About eyes he also says under adultery:

But I tell you that anyone who looks at a woman lustfully has already committed adultery with her in his heart. If your right eye causes you to stumble, gouge it out and throw it away.

I've pointed out a contradiction between Q and the Torah that I think is a fundamental one to the moral systems they prescribe. — Tzeentch

In the Sermon on the Mount Jesus makes clear his strict allegiance o the Law. @Valentinus comment about a Jew wrestling with another Jew is central to understanding this allegiance in practice as seen in Talmud and Midrash, interpretation and commentary on the Law. Even the style of Jesus' comment fits the form. It is dialectical.

Socrates, on the other hand, though begrudgingly, accepted his fate without appeal to a god for salvation. — Leghorn

Before drinking the hemlock he ironically requests to pour a libation! (117b)

There is the problem of sourgraping, presenting socioeconomic success as less relevant than it is. — baker

There is, but there is a difference between presenting socioeconomic success as less relevant than it is and first hand experience that it is not all that there is. There is a point at which more is not better, despite how it may appear.

a Jew wrestling with other Jews — Valentinus

To elaborate:

The story of Jacob wrestling with God is emblematic for Judaism:

Then the man said, “Your name will no longer be Jacob, but Israel, because you have struggled with God and with humans and have overcome.” (Genesis 32:28)

There are various aspects of Judaism with which one wrestles or struggles, including struggling to understand what is required of you. Jesus speaks from within this tradition and not in opposition to it. When he says things that appear to be in opposition or contradictory it may be that it is this opposition that we must struggle with if we are to understand.

From the link you provided:

The practice is based around asking oneself three questions about a person in one's life:

What did I receive from this person?
What did I return to this person?
What troubles, worries, unhappiness did I cause this person?

This is not a list of questions

one _should_ ask oneself in order to "examine one's life". — baker

although it can be a part of the examined life, I think Socrates would have many questions to ask in return, including why the examined life should be focused on "this person". One the one hand, he might ask about people in general or the community or city, and, on the other, about oneself - how I live, what I think, what I value.