You seem to be confusing the mathematical propositions with their application. It is because the mathematical propositions 1+1=2, 100+100=200, 12x12=144 an so on are true that we can calculate a bank balance correctly. — Fooloso4

I don't learn to calculate because 1+1=2 is true, no more than I learn to move a bishop because it's true that bishops move diagonally. I act in accord with how others act when they calculate or move bishops. It has nothing to do with truth or falsity. Sure, in some language-games I can say that it's true that 1+1=2 or that it's true that bishops move diagonally, or that it's true that a given statement, which at times doesn't have a truth value (Moorean propositions), can at other times have a truth value. When we learn to calculate we simply learn a skill, like learning any language, i.e., we apply the grammatical rules that others use, and we learn to use them in ways that accord with particular language-games.

There is a certainty to mathematical propositions, but that certainty is a way of acting, not a certainty based on truth or falsity. What are the truths that language sits on? There are no prior linguistic truths, no more than there is something prior to the rule that bishops move diagonally. In a sense it's just an arbitrary grammatical move that we choose to use as part of the language-game of mathematics. It's a useful tool like any of our concepts.

You're right, there is a sense where they are incontestable, but that's not because they are true, it's because we choose to act with these propositions in ways that are incontestable - not because there is some intrinsic sense of truth. They have a bedrock function that's completely devoid of truth. They are arational beliefs, so they function apart from ratiocination in their bedrock role.

The mathematical propositions you're referring to are not bedrock. Their use in terms of your bank account have nothing to do with what I'm am talking about, and definitely nothing to do with what W. is trying to communicate in OC.

Not all hinges should be regarded as the same. The hinge proposition that 12x12=144 is true. How could such propositions not be true? — Fooloso4

Because the basic propositions of mathematics function like rules, grammatical rules, it's not a matter of them being true or false, generally speaking, no more than a rule of chess is true or false in it's background setting. Can they function as truths, yes, in certain settings/contexts language-games they can. You're failing to see the dual function of these bedrock statements.

Take care and get well.

I'm just going to do a general post because I just don't have the energy to respond to all of you.

Much of the problem probably stems from the different ways we view beliefs. My contention is that beliefs can function quite apart from language (Wittgenstein's showing), i.e., we can observe beliefs in non-linguistic actions (even in animals). And, epistemological language-games (knowing, justification and truth), in terms of hinge's or bedrock beliefs, come later as language develops.

If we think of very primitive language-games (for e.g. W.'s example at the beginning of the PI), I think it follows, again, necessarily, that epistemology, and all the concepts involved (even truth), will not, and cannot obtain, until the conceptual framework develops. So, bedrock or hinge beliefs at their core, i.e., because of how they come about as part of the framework or backdrop of reality, have a status that excludes them from all epistemological talk (including truth - OC 204, 205, 206).

All epistemological talk (as arguments against my position), even truth, is always after the fact, we tend to bring it into the conversation as though its always been there. Even in young children, who learn what it means to know only later in their language talk, have these primitive beliefs long before they develop the concepts involved in epistemology.

Now some of you might argue that it doesn't matter that the concepts of justification and truth come later, that doesn't, in itself, negate the truth of these bedrock beliefs. If this, however, was true, then it would seem to follow that it wouldn't negate our use of justification either, or it wouldn't negate Moore's use of the concept know within the the context Moore is using the word.

One of the key features W. points out about Moorean propositions is that when seen against their negation (e.g. "I don't know this is a hand.") it's not clear what their sense is (OC 4). After all if we're not sure of the very backdrop of reality, then how can you be sure of the very words used to talk about such things (W.). It also seems clear to me that truth (as an epistemological function) has the same problem, viz., if Moore had said, as he held up his hand, "It's true that I have a hand," it would have the identical problem that Moore's use of know has, especially since knowing entails truth. Again, consider the negation, "It's not true that I have hands," this proposition also lacks sense in the same way.

One last point, W. pointed out through examples that Moore's use of "I know..." can have a sense in other settings or language-games, but this use is different from the use as a hinge, which is the use Moore is being criticized for. The same is true when speaking of bedrock or hinge beliefs when it comes to truth, in a bedrock setting, they are neither true nor false. However, in other settings or language-game, they can be true or false. I think to fail to acknowledge this is to fail to understand W. point about hinges, or as I like to refer to them, bedrock beliefs.

Sorry, I haven't been feeling well, so it's difficult to post.

Do I have to "kindly wait?" :wink:

Well, then we just disagree.

First, I want to say that my view, although much the same as Danièle Moyal-Sharrock, was arrived at quite independent of her. I gave the link because @jamalrob wanted to know what other philosophers thought that hinge's were neither true nor false.

You seem to think that hinge propositions are neither true nor false...

How can you validly make a deduction from a proposition that is neither true nor false? — Banno

It's not that hinge's can't be used in deductive logic (@Cuthbert @Banno), it's that hinge's, in the language-game of being a hinge (think of Moore's propositions), isn't a proposition in the normal sense. However, there are language-games, deductive and inductive logic, where the hinge, can be used as a normal proposition. So, hinge's are not stuck in one particular role, no more than our use of game is stuck in one role, say, only chess games or board games.

Hinge's, however, in there most basic form have quite a different role, especially if you look at them as non-propositional or non-linguistic, they have no connection with language (logic is a language obviously) in this role. However, they do have an important function as Wittgenstein points out in OC.

So, yes, @Banno I do believe that hinge's, basic beliefs, bedrock beliefs, foundational beliefs, have the role of not being true or false. So, it's not that I seem to think this, it can be correctly applied to my thinking. In fact, if you remember there was another thread where I said that 2+2=4 was a hinge, i.e., that it's not true or false. I hadn't paid particular attention to certain mathematical propositions, so I began to doubt whether I was correct about this, but after considering my position again, I'm returning to that belief, with the caveat that, it depends on the language-game the proposition (mathematical or not) is being used in.

So, just as we shouldn't confuse language-games in terms of presenting the same use, i.e., as having the same meaning or function, we shouldn't confuse the language-games of hinge's. Again, in some language-games they do function as normal propositions, but generally I would say, they do not. In cases where they do not, then they are by definition, not true or false, as per basic belief status.

I already explained it above.

To understand what hinge-propositions are, one needs to understand what beliefs are; and if you don't agree or understand this, then you won't fully grasp the nature of hinge-propositions.

Beliefs fall into two categories of actions, those that are non-linguistic, and those that are linguistic. Those that are non-linguistic, as the name implies, are acts that are quite separate from language. For example, the act of opening a door, shows that you believe that there is a door, a hand, a body, and all the surrounding things enabling you to perform the act within the world. Specifically, we're referring to contingent states-of-affairs that make up the world (this idea has it's roots in the Tractatus). These kinds of beliefs are not limited to humans, but can also be seen in animals, i.e., in their actions too.

The second category of belief is the one most of us are familiar with, viz., beliefs that are a function of language (statements/propositions). These are necessarily dependent on the first category of non-linguistic beliefs, without which, there would be no linguistic acts of believing. So, linguistic beliefs are born out of non-linguistic beliefs, and all the contingent surroundings that enable such beliefs. Non-linguistic acts (beliefs) are necessarily prior to linguistic acts and all that amounts to language.

Hinge-propositions, which Wittgenstein identified in OC, are not propositions in the strict sense, although in certain language-games they can function as propositions. I identify them, as do other philosophers, as basic beliefs, or foundational beliefs. However, one must be careful not to think of them in terms of the traditional ideas of foundationalism (for e.g. Plantinga's epistemology).

Once we see these non-linguistic basic beliefs (hinge-beliefs) in this way it follows that they are outside any talk of epistemology. This means that any reference to these beliefs in terms of knowledge, true or false, is meaningless. The problem of course, is that as soon as you start talking of these beliefs, you bring them into the linguistic arena and change their nature in some respects. You change their nature because now they have different functions depending on the language-game. Also, there is no precise way of defining these basic beliefs within language because they have so many different functions. It's like trying to define the essence of a game (as per Wittgenstein). There are just a group of family resemblances tying together the many uses that define hinge-propositions or basic beliefs.

What has intrigued me about hinge-propositions is that they usher in, I believe, a new kind of foundational epistemology. One that answers many questions about the nature of epistemology, and solves, for example, the infinite regress problem, and the problems of how to refer to such foundational beliefs. My epistemology now revolves around the ideas presented here, and gives epistemology a more solid footing.

Another similar paper in line with my own thinking of this subject, at least generally.

https://www.academia.edu/61206520/Wittgensteins_Hinge_Certainty

Pay close attention to how she talks about hinge-propositions and truth.

I find that I agree with much of her interpretation.

Can you point me in the direction of the relevant philosophers and their work? — jamalrob

There is much being written on this subject, but here is some of what I'm talking about. Sorry I didn't get back to you sooner.

https://uhra.herts.ac.uk/bitstream/handle/2299/17388/Moyal_Sharrock_Animal_in_Epistemology_pre_imp_PdF.pdf?sequence=3

Okay, well, I've said my peace, that's all I can do. Have a good one.

On this we agree. But their special standing isn't due to anything intrinsic to the propositions themselves, but rather due to the role they play: hinge propositions form the bedrock upon which our entire process of knowing, evaluating, and justifying is built. But I (and jamalrob) are suggesting it is their inability to be justified, not an inability to true, which distinguishes them from ordinary propositions (and their inability to be justified is directly due to this peculiar role- or "special standing" as you say).

And there isn't anything contradictory about propositions or truths that cannot be justified, whereas the idea of a proposition which cannot be true is contradictory, or at least highly problematic (given the ordinary usage of the word "proposition"). — Seppo

Oh no, we've gone backwards. Truth is included with knowing and justification, because, again, knowing entails truth, and what is it that you're justifying, other than the truth of the statement. So, no knowledge, justification, or truth in terms of these Moorean statements.

Moorean beliefs are prior to epistemic (knowing, justification, and truth) talk. Just as the rules of chess provide the context whereby we can talk of the fact that bishops move diagonally. In other word, we can say, based on the rules, that it's true that bishops move diagonally. The rule provides the background that allows truth to get a foothold.

Or on these propositions ability to be justified. Knowledge entails not only truth, but justification, and it is our ability to justify hinge propositions that is lacking... due to the fact that hinge propositions are the background against which our process of justification takes place, and so justifying these propositions would become circular. — Seppo

Yes, except, it's not a matter of them being circular, it's a matter of the statements being meaningful. Damn Seppo, it seems you have understood my point. I don't feel like I'm banging my head against a wall afterall.

I hate to be the one to hand-wring over definitions, but I don't think I understand what you mean when you use the word "proposition" (and that is, perhaps, at the root of our disagreement here): can you tell me how you define this term? — Seppo

No, you're quite right to point this out. Wittgenstein's wording, viz., hinge-propositions, bedrock proposition, etc., is pointing out something special about these statements. They aren't normal propositions, or normal statements, they have a special standing in our language-games. This is why the normal definition of a proposition doesn't work when applied to these kinds of statements. This is why we should look at their function in our language. I happen to think, and so do other philosophers, that these statements form a kind of arational belief system that allows our language-games to take root. Without them there would be no talk of knowing, justification, or truth. They form the bedrock from which we form our linguistic acts.

Keep in mind that Wittgenstein never sorted this out, and it's difficult to say how much of what's written in these notes would have remained after he edited it.

But it's obvious. From your not knowing that the capital of Vanuatu is Port Vila it doesn't follow that it isn't true that it's the capital. To question a claim to know is not "by extension" to question the truth of what is claimed to be known.

Things are somewhat different in the case of hinges, but you haven't shown relevantly how. How does it follow "almost by necessity"? — jamalrob

The fact that you're saying, "From your not knowing that the capital of Vanuatu is Port Vila it doesn't follow that it isn't true that it's the capital," demonstrates that you're not following my point. Obviously not knowing the truth of a statement, doesn't mean the statement isn't true. It just means that you have no justification, or no epistemic right to claim it's true. Any claim, without some kind of justification, is a claim that can either be true or false, not just true, as some want to say about Moore's propositions.

Knowledge entails truth, by definition, so if knowledge entails truth, then Wittgenstein's attack of Moore's use of know is also an attack on the truth of those same propositions. This is why I believe it necessarily follows that to attack know, as W. does, is to also attack the truth of those same propositions. Otherwise, Wittgenstein's attack on Moore's use of know would be meaningless or vacuous.

By the way, this interpretation, which is an interpretation I primarily arrived at on my own, is confirmed by other philosophers, who have arrived at the same interpretation. This doesn't make the interpretation right or wrong, but does, I think, show that it certainly seems to follow from one's reading of the text.

Oh well, I know, everything I'm saying doesn't follow. From where I'm sitting it follows almost by necessity.

That's funny!

I appreciate your take, but I don't think that is what Wittgenstein is saying in OC. Moreover, I don't think that hinge-propositions are propositions in the normal sense, i.e., they don't have a truth value (generally speaking). In other words, there are uses where we can assign a truth value, but if the proposition is being used as a hinge, bedrock, or basic belief, then not only can we not talk about them in terms of knowing, but we can't talk about them in terms of truths either. They are outside our epistemological language games, which means that any talk of knowing, and by extension any talk of truth or justification, is meaningless (again, generally speaking, there are exceptions). They are arational beliefs. These beliefs function as the building blocks of our language-games of epistemology, and of language generally.

If W. is saying that Moore's use of know is senseless, then by extension truth is included, for what are we talking about, if not the truth of Moore's propositions. To say that Moore knows X, is to say that Moore knows the truth of X. What else would knowing mean in Moore's context, if not, that his propositions are true? So, again, when W. attacks Moore's propositions, he is not only attacking the use of the word know, but all that goes along with it, including truth and justification (repeating for emphasis).

It would be like asking, while coming up with a rule in chess (as the game is invented), "Is it true that bishops move diagonally?" It's just a rule. It's not about true or false. Now later, in a given context, you can speak of the truth of a rule, but note this is only after the rule has been established. The rule that bishops move diagonally is a kind of ground for the game, a bedrock statement. It has nothing to do with truth.

The status of W.'s hinge-propositions depends on it's status in a given language-game, which is why in some language-games it's appropriate to talk of these propositions in epistemological terms.

You would deny, upon seeing said boulder, that one of these is true?

The weight of the boulder is 5000 kg
The weight of the boulder is not 5000 kg

Before you tell me that we don't normally talk like that etc., try this one: there is life on other planets. It could be true as far as we know. If it is, then it's currently true but nobody knows it yet.

We sometimes seek to prove statements to be true. This doesn't make any sense without this concept of truth. Your position implies that a proposition becomes true only when we come to know it, which seems confused. — jamalrob

No, that's not what I'm saying. I'm not denying that there are claims that are either true or false. I'm denying that there are unknown truths, there are facts that are unknown, but to say that X is a truth, but is unknown doesn't make sense. Ya, and we seek to prove statements to be true, but that's not what's being claimed here. We are not saying there is a claim, which can be true or false, and we are seeking to prove it's true. Here, what is implied is that there is a statement X, that is true, but we don't know it's true. How could you say it's true if you don't know it?

It's as if we have these propositions existing in some metaphysical realm that are true, but we don't know their true. We can say that of facts, but not of truths, which are just claims by themselves that can be either true or false.

There are claims that I don't know are true, but others do, but that's still different from what's claimed here.

To understand that the phrase "unknown truth" is nonsense or senseless, all we have to do is think of cases where in our ordinary use we speak like this. Ordinarily, we might say, "It's unknown what the weight of some random giant boulder is," not, there exists some unknown truth X, that is the weight of the boulder. This kind of talk is what Wittgenstein was fighting against, it's a kind of philosophical jargon that seems to say something, when in fact it represents a confusion.

I'm inclined to agree with Luke. In fact, I would go so far as to say change is analytic to time. For there to be time, there would have to be a change of some kind, and that change has to be measurable in some way. This is why it makes no sense to talk of persons outside of time, timelessness is completely static, because there is no measurable change. I don't think we could make any sense of a universe outside of time or change.

Although change is analytic to time, I'm not sure time is analytic to change. Maybe there is an abstract use of change that isn't measurable, but this would seem not to be a real event.

Here's another way of making my point. If there is a proposition X that is an unknown truth, then the proposition, "X is true, but unknown" is true. If this is the case, then the proposition "X is true, but unknown," would be known to be true, leading, again, to a contradiction.

It seems we're ascribing some metaphysical existence to these "unknown truths," such that there is some future proposition X, that is not only true now, but true in the future, albeit unknown now, but known at some future time. It's as if the proposition is necessarily true, not contingently true. For if it were contingently true, then proposition could be false, which would violate the necessity of it being true.

I haven't completely thought the logic of this through, but there still seems to be a problem with this line of thinking.

Maybe hinge-propositions could have some third value, such that in some uses they are neither true or false, but have some other logical status.

I'll try one more time. Statements/propositions have two possible values (true or false), i.e., they either match with the facts or they don't. The claim that your truck has a particular weight, is a claim about a fact or state-of-affairs; and it's the state-of-affairs that is unknown. A statement that is true, is one that would line up with the fact (the correct weight of the truck). There is no statement or claim that's true independent of the facts. There are statements that have the potential of being true, but they also have the potential of being false. I believe that what's happening here is that people are trying to separate statements that are true (not intentionally) from the corresponding fact, and it can't be done. Again, it's a linguistic confusion.

I guess I fail to see what is contradictory about an unknown truth. My truck has a certain weight. I don't know what it is, but it has one. So there is some truth, i.e. "my truck weighs X lbs/kg", I just don't know it. Similar examples aren't difficult to multiply: I don't know what the temperature is right now in Paris, but there is a temperature (and so a truth corresponding to that). I don't remember Wittgenstein's birth date, but there is some truth RE when he was born. So I don't see what is difficult about that. — Seppo

The proposition that, "My truck has an unknown weight," is true, but that proposition is known to be true, viz., you know that you don't know the weight. This is still a confusion, and it's not an example. You still haven't given a truth that you don't know is true.

I don't have time right now to answer the rest of your post. I'll answer later.

I can't make any sense of the idea that there are propositions that are true, but I don't know if their true, it's contradictory. The problem, is the same problem Wittgenstein had with Moore's propositions, viz., that a claim to know (in Moore's cases) involves an objective verification or justification, but what would such a verification look like? Moore's propositions are not the kind of propositions that allow for a justification, which is why I call them beliefs, not propositions in the normal sense. In fact, Wittgenstein refers to them in the same way, "Moore's view really comes down to this: the concept 'know' is analogous to the concepts 'believe', 'surmise,' [etc] (OC 21)." Moreover, what does having knowledge amount to, other than having a true belief based on good reasons or evidence?

If Moore held up his hand, and said, "It's true that I have a hand," it would lack sense for the same reasons that "I know I have a hand," lacks sense. To the latter statement Wittgenstein says to consider it's negation (OC 4), "I don't know that I have hands," this negation tells us something about the queer nature of Moorean propositions. It also tells us something about the proposition "It's true that I have hands," it's just as strange as the Moorean proposition, in fact, it amounts to the same thing. Consider the negation of this proposition, "It's false that I have hands," the exact same problem raises it's ugly head. What in the world would that mean?

Now does it follow that in all cases we can't speak of these kinds of propositions as being knowledge or being true? Of course not, and Wittgenstein gives examples of where we can use the word know when referring to our hands. It also follows that there are cases where we can claim that these kinds of propositions are also true. It depends on the language-game or the context. However, saying a proposition is true, still amounts to having knowledge. Part of the problem is equating what we mean by knowledge and truth, with claims about knowledge and truth.

This is a re-written continuation of the post at the following location: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/644130

This section of the book, again, is written in the final chapter or chapters, to give those interested a more detailed look at the progression in my thinking. Ideally, I would have written this starting at the beginning of the book, but I was afraid of losing readers. So, I'm starting with my conclusion, and working back to the foundation. Hopefully, the writing is clear enough so that someone without much background can follow the thinking. Now, on with the writing.
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Understanding the history of meaning, and some of the mistakes made about what meaning amounts to, is very important to having a good understanding of how the meaning of a word is acquired. This is not an easy topic. One reason it is not easy, has to do with the complicated nature of language, namely, how is it that we are able to communicate with each other about the world around us? We communicate our view of the world conceptually, so understanding how we learn to use concepts will help clear up some of the linguistic confusions that can and do occur. These confusions not only happen in philosophy, but they often happen in our everyday uses of words and sentences.

Another reason it is difficult to understand the nature of meaning, is that language, by its very nature, is not always given to the kind of exactness some of us are looking for, especially in philosophy and science. However, not having the exactness we want does not mean that we cannot come to an understanding about the general logic behind the use of a concept in various contexts. It just means that it takes a lot of work.

The attempt, in these pages, is to couple some of Wittgenstein’s analysis of language, to the analysis of what it means to know. It is not meant to be a sustained treatment of the subject of epistemology via Wittgenstein, but an overview, that hopefully will provide enough depth to give an understanding of what knowing amounts to. So, this is why starting with the Tractatus is helpful, it will provide the starting point for this overview, and some of the mistakes made about meaning.

Wittgenstein’s early work in the Tractatus, is a more traditional philosophical work. It is traditional in the sense of the kind of analysis he is doing. He analyzes the proposition as if to find some essence that will logically connect it to the world. It is an a priori analysis that shows how propositions picture (or mirror) the world of facts through a one-to-one correspondence between the proposition, and the fact it pictures (it is a picture theory of language). It is through this investigation that Wittgenstein hopes to find an exactness of meaning, or an exactness of expression. He accomplishes this by breaking down the proposition into what he believes are its essential parts, namely, elementary propositions, and even smaller parts, called names. So, according to Wittgenstein, “…propositions must bring us to elementary propositions, which consist of names in immediate combination (T. 4.221).” Names, again, being the smallest constituent part of the proposition. And, since Wittgenstein held to the traditional view of language, namely, that the meaning of a word is the object it refers to, or the object it denotes (T. 3.203). He then links the proposition, via a name, with an object, the smallest constituent part of a fact. Facts being broken down into atomic facts, then into objects. There is a direct connection from the name (the smallest component of the proposition) to the object it represents (the smallest component of the fact). In this way we have a direct logical link between the proposition and the world of facts.

The proposition, in Wittgenstein’s view, was a “…model of reality (T. 2.12),” modeling the facts of reality, just as many paintings are models of reality; and, it is this model of reality that either corresponds with the world of facts, or it does not. This brings us back to the traditional view of meaning, that the meaning of a word is the object it depicts in the world of facts.

The main point, in referencing the Tractatus, is to show how meaning was thought of in the traditional sense, and how Wittgenstein’s Tractatus continued this historical line of thinking in a much more precise way. The exacting nature of Wittgenstein’s analysis is probably why Russell mistakenly thought Wittgenstein was trying to construct an ideal language. Because, if Wittgenstein was correct in the way he thought of propositions, then you would have a more precision based analysis of the nature of the proposition, and how propositions relate to, and picture the world of facts.
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I think this is clear enough for anyone to get a general idea of Wittgenstein's early thinking.

My goal is to present an inductive argument, as outline in my thread on "Does Consciousness Survive the Death of the Body." The argument, I believe, demonstrates that we can know that we survive death. So, I want to show my thinking, i.e., how I progress from Wittgenstein to epistemology, and finally to my argument.

Here https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/644130

Did you see my latest change just above.

Maybe @TClark will chime in and give an answer.

I was wondering that myself. Just how much can you switch back and forth?

First, thanks for the input. I have looked at other books that have been written, and some like the one I'm writing, are done in the first person. I guess an argument can be made about writing either way. Third person gives a more objective account though.

Moving the block! — Banno

Ya, but what's involved in the correcting part. Surely just moving a block is not enough, there has to be the correction of not following the rule (some hand signal, grunt, or words). Some form of communication would have to be involved, which brings us back to the linguistic part.

I re-wrote the opening paragraphs of one of the last chapters in the book. Hopefully this flows a bit better than what I wrote in the OP.
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Since language is the tool that allows us to make knowledge claims, it follows that having a basic understanding of how language works is important. Specifically, what is involved when we learn the meanings of our words or concepts? The importance of how the meaning of our concepts is learned is crucial to our understanding how concepts function. And, since much of this analysis is concerned with knowledge claims, it is important to be as accurate as possible about what it means to have knowledge. This leads to the subject of linguistic analysis, and its relation to the subject of epistemology.

In the twentieth century there are two philosophers who stand out in terms of their work in linguistic analysis, namely, Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951), who taught at Cambridge, and J. L. Austin (1911-1960), who taught at Oxford. Our focus will be on Wittgenstein’s contribution, and how it relates to the subject of knowledge, or more specifically the study of epistemology. Two works of Wittgenstein stand out as pivotal to our understanding of epistemology, namely, The Philosophical Investigations (1953), and On Certainty (1969), both published posthumously. The Philosophical Investigations is important because of its sustained treatment of linguistic confusions, and its analysis of how meaning is learned. On Certainty is important because it focuses on the problem of what it means to know, using the methods of analysis from The Philosophical Investigations.

Wittgenstein (1889-1951) was born in Vienna, Austria. He was the youngest of eight children. He came from a very cultured and very rich industrialist family, where the arts, especially music, played a central role. In fact, Johannes Brahms, who was considered a close friend, would come to the Wittgenstein home and play his music; and Brahms was also known to have given some family members piano lessons.

Ludwig was educated at home until the age of 14, when his parents decided to send the young Wittgenstein to Linz to prepare him in mathematics and the physical sciences. It seems that the young Wittgenstein wanted to study with the physicist Boltzmann, however Boltzmann died in 1906. After being educated in Linz for three years, he then went to Berlin to study mechanical engineering at the Technische Hochscule at Charlottenburg. After two years in Berlin, he went to England where he became a research student of engineering at the University of Manchester. During this time, he engaged in aeronautical research, and went from experimenting with kites, to the construction of a jet reaction propeller for aircraft. The design of the propeller was a mathematical endeavor, which led Wittgenstein to develop his own equations in an attempt to solve aeronautical problems; and while considering these equations with others, it led to philosophical questions about the nature of mathematics.

It was suggested to Wittgenstein that he read Bertrand Russell’s and Alfred North Whitehead’s book, called The Principia Mathematica; and as Wittgenstein continued down this philosophical path, he eventually met with Gottlob Frege, who was a German philosopher, mathematician, and logician. Frege apparently saw potential in Wittgenstein and suggested that he meet with Bertrand Russell at Cambridge. Wittgenstein took his advice, and they met in October of 1911. Thus began Wittgenstein’s obsession with linguistic analysis, prompted mostly by Russell’s early talks with Wittgenstein about mathematics, logic, and philosophy.

An important difference between linguistic analysis and the philosophy of language must be distinguished. Linguistic analysis refers to a method or technique used for philosophical inquiry, and is used for solving or clarifying philosophical problems. However, the philosophy of language refers to a specific branch of philosophy. So, linguistic analysis would fall under the heading of, the philosophy of language; and much of what we will be doing as we investigate what it means to know, is a linguistic analysis of the concept.

Before considering the subject of linguistic analysis and its relation to epistemology, we will need some background on how meaning has been traditionally thought of in philosophy. Traditionally, the meaning of a word was thought to be connected with the object it refers to, that is, its referent, or the object it denotes (the object the word points to). Think of how we teach the word cup to a child, we point to the object, and say, cup. This model of learning, is called the ostensive definition model, which is learning a concept by pointing to objects associated with the word. The idea that meaning is directly connected to things or objects can be traced back to Augustine (354 A.D. – 430 A.D.). Thinking of meaning in this context culminates in the twentieth century with Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Tractatus-Logico Philosophicus (originally published in German, in 1921, then translated and published into English, in 1922).

Forms of life are not just acts, but acts combined with language. — Banno

No doubt that Wittgenstein concentrated on those forms of life associated with language, but forms of life go beyond language. Any act that people do together with or without language can be construed as a form of life.

My point is that all actions, even the ones you describe, don't go beyond language, i.e., we can further describe the command "Block!" using more sophisticated language forms. There is nothing that happens when someone gets the block that we can't describe using language. You're right, the command "Block!" in itself, doesn't describe all that happens, but my point is that it can be described. Surely you don't want to limit what happens to just that word. Moreover, what would "going along with or against the rule" amount to apart from language? Even if it's just a primitive way of correcting a particular action. It would have to be a language of some kind.