Actually you wrote "IF" He claimed it. Not "IF" He said it. — ThinkOfOne

Obviously if Jesus claimed that he was God, then he said it, or at least implied it.

The point you seemed to miss is that even "probably said" cannot be reasonably determined from the available evidence. — ThinkOfOne

That's my point. We can't reasonably conclude that Jesus said X, Y, or Z based on the testimonial evidence. It's just too weak. Geez, I don't know how I can make it any clearer.

If someone claimed to be God, he may not be a lunatic, he may just be delusional (you could argue that being delusional is a mental illness), or a good liar. — Sam26

Ya, "IF" he said it, but I have no strong evidence/reasons to conclude that he did say it, other than very weak testimonial evidence.

While we don't know that Jesus necessarily said what was attributed to Him, there's no compelling reason to believe that He necessarily did not. I've always found that argument really weak. The argument seems to be, "If we don't know that He necessarily said it, then there's no point in discussing anything that was attributed to Him". If that's an acceptable argument, then that argument could be used for many a historical figure. — ThinkOfOne

Why are you framing the argument in such absolute terms? I sure didn't frame it that way. Even if there was strong testimonial evidence to support that Jesus said X, Y, or Z, that doesn't support the idea that Jesus said it necessarily. The argument is an inductive argument. Inductive arguments don't give us conclusions that follow necessarily, only deductive arguments do that. So, again, it's not about what Jesus said necessarily. It's about what he probably said, or didn't say. If it was true that that is what I was implying, then I would agree, but it's not what I was implying.

Since you responded as if you believe that Jesus claimed to be God, can you address the following which I posted earlier? — ThinkOfOne

How did you come to that conclusion? I said, we don't know what Jesus actually said, because the testimonial evidence is too weak.

I'll refrain from expressing my attitudes or feelings about Christianity, but I don't always succeed. I came from a Christian background, and considered myself a Christian for about 40 years. Moreover, at that time, I considered myself a Christian apologist, so I'm quite familiar with the arguments for God's existence, and C.S. Lewis's arguments.

The problem with setting the trilemma up as the only choices, is that all of the testimonial evidence, as to what Jesus actually said, is second-hand or hearsay, so it's very weak by definition. We actually don't know what Jesus said, because we don't know how reliable the second-hand testimony is. Of course if you believe that the words of the Bible are inspired by God, then your beliefs about the claims of Jesus, as given by the writers of the NT, will be governed by those beliefs. The trilemma only works if you believe the testimonial evidence is accurate.

If someone claimed to be God, he may not be a lunatic, he may just be delusional (you could argue that being delusional is a mental illness), or a good liar. Of course many Christians would respond that these options are not appropriate given that he performed miracles (supposedly), and rose from the dead (supposedly). The problem, again, is that the testimonial evidence is too weak, and the counter-evidence is enormous, i.e., our experiences run counter to people coming back to life after three days in a grave. You would need an enormous amount of testimonial evidence from a variety of sources, including extra-Biblical sources, to support such a belief, and we just don't have that kind of evidence.

What link?

I don't oppose the mental. I just do not suppose it to be confined to the inside of people's heads. — Banno

I agree, if there wasn't some outward manifestation of the mental, then what would a mental life entail? Even if we exclude language, what's mental would have to seep out in some outward act (linguistic or otherwise). The mental, in order for us to call it mental, has to manifest itself in some way. We could say the same thing for what it means for something to be conscious.

If a bowl is existentially dependent upon language(and they are) and the content of the cat's belief includes the bowl(and it does) then that particular belief is existentially dependent upon language, and there's no way around it. — creativesoul

You seem to be suggesting that you can't create a bowl without a language. I'm sure that pre-linguistic man created bowls of some sort, or maybe you're referring to a particular kind of bowl, say plastic bowls. Even if you're right, it seems like a stretch to the conclude that because a thing (maybe stove is more appropriate), is created by language users, that the cat's belief is dependent upon language. When I use the phrase "dependent upon language," I'm referring to the use of concepts as part of a statement of belief. So, the cat is not dependent upon language in this sense. You're adding another sense of "dependent upon language" that doesn't involve the direct use of concepts, which seems to be an indirect dependence. Am I understanding your point, or not? Mostly I'm talking about concepts, in particular the concept truth. The difference maybe in our focus.

Obviously linguistics played a part in the stove's creation, but the fact that stove exists, is just like any other fact of existence for the cat, and the cat's belief. What if we removed all humans from existence, but there still existed stoves, would there still be an overlap between the cat's belief and language? What if someone created a stove, ceased to exist, then cats came into existence later, would you still say that the cat's belief overlapped language? I don't see any reason to think that the cat's belief has a linguistic component simply because some language user created the stove. The stove is just another fact of reality, like a tree or the moon.

I may or may not be one of those philosophers, but I do think common language is capable of being precise enough. Language can be honed. — creativesoul

Ya, I'm not saying language can't be precise, only that some concepts resist precision. So, we agree.

A non-linguistic belief cannot be existentially dependent upon language. If a bowl is existentially dependent upon language(and they are) and the content of the cat's belief includes the bowl(and it does) then that particular belief is existentially dependent upon language, and there's no way around it. — creativesoul

I agree, that a non-linguistic belief is not dependent on language. However, I would probably word the next statement a bit different. The concept bowl is dependent on language, but the fact that there is a bowl (the object referred to as bowl), this fact can be part of the of the cat's belief. In fact, many states-of-affairs can be part of the cat's belief. So, I'm separating the concept from the facts involved in the cat's belief.

Some language less creatures' belief includes content that is itself existentially dependent upon language. Believing that a mouse is under the stove for example includes the stove. This makes perfect sense given that the overlap between their world and ours includes things that we created via language use; some of which are perfectly capable of being directly perceived by language less creatures and thus could be sensibly said to be part of the content of their belief. — creativesoul

Again, here, including the stove is just including a fact about reality, their belief doesn't include the concept stove. The object that the concept refers to is not dependent on language, just as many facts aren't dependent on language. So, the cat's belief, it seems to me, is not dependent on language, at least our language, but maybe dependent upon some fact that has obtained as a result of our interaction with the world. So, I don't see an overlap, i.e., if I'm interpreting you correctly.

I agree with your assessment of your granddaughter's belief. I think your other thoughts may need more refinement. That's my take, for what its worth.

That's painful :gasp:

I'm through for the night. Maybe I'll be back tomorrow, not sure.

It would be absurd to say Witti spurned logic. — Banno

Who would say the W. spurned logic? I surely never said such a thing.

“The criteria which we accept for ‘fitting’, ‘being able to’, ‘understanding’, are much more complicated than might appear at first sight. That is, the game with these words, their employment in the linguistic intercourse that is carried on by their means, is more involved—the role of these words in our language other—than we are tempted to think. (This role is what we need to understand in order to resolve philosophical paradoxes. And hence definitions usually fail to resolve them; and so, a fortiori does the assertion that a word is ‘indefinable’.)” PI 182.

I'm currently reading a paper entitled, A Wittgensteinian Way with Paradoxes by Rupert Read. I'm interested in whether anything he says applies to what we are discussing.

The liar is like someone saying "but look, I can move the king more than one space!" — Banno

I definitely don't see the liar's paradox as the same as saying, "Look I can move the king more than one space." Although I do use this technique in chess when I'm losing.

Facts are the stuff of science. But they are created -- rather than lying there for us to discover, we invent a lot to make them useful for ourselves. Actuality doesn't change with the facts -- facts are generated by our interaction with actuality, though. — Moliere

Your notion of a fact is a bit different from mine. I talked about facts in my summary of truth a few pages back.

What I meant is that seeing a tree, feeling its bark and leaves, carving your initials into it, climbing it and so on are all perceptual. — Janus

Ya, they're all sensory experiences. You're not saying it's all subjective are you?

What's all perception? Are you referring to what we mean by truth? Sorry, I haven't read everything in the last three pages.

We just are never going to get the kind of precision out of language that some philosophers want. It's like an itch that won't go away.

I'm not sure I understand your point. If you're saying there are other ways of gaining knowledge besides science, I definitely agree.

I definitely agree that truth is linguistic, and thus embedded in our forms of life.

You will take my point: logic remains primary in Wittgenstein. — Banno

No, I will not take your point in the way you seem to be making it. It depends on what Wittgenstein is talking about. You do not see the use of logic in the same way it's used in his early philosophy, where logic is primary. He's much more flexible in his later philosophy, not as dug in, in terms of using logic as a primary tool.

But, one of the points in the PI is that language is not always precise. Sometimes being vague is just what we need. So, he's not always trying to be precise, because ordinary usage doesn't always work that way.

Wittgenstein's logic of use in his later philosophy is much different from his early philosophy. I don't think it's as precisely used. The logic of language in the PI seems to entail something that's not so easy to pin down. Maybe the kind of logic entailed in our ordinary uses hasn't been invented.

You probably have a point, so I'll just substitute another more exact measuring device to make the point, i.e., the point of the post still stands. I don't know enough about measuring with lasers. Interesting though.

All our talk is only ever approximation when it is about the world — Janus

I agree, but I wonder about the above statement. It probably depends on how we're using the concepts approximation and exact, i.e., whether we are talking about a scientific measurement using lasers or a measurement using a ruler. However, even a scientific measurement that's considered exact in one setting, will only be an approximation in another setting.

Sam, do you think our everyday language is insufficient for explaining the Liar and/or all its permutations? — creativesoul

I think the problem lies in the vagaries of language, and trying to fit language into a very precise medium, like mathematical logic. Logic is a guide for our reasoning, but it has it's limits. The two mediums of logic and ordinary language are very different, and it's this difference that may contribute to the problem.

My guess is that Tarski is basing his theory on false premises. For example, the liars paradox.
— Sam26
Odd, since it's clear he explicitly deals with the liar by introducing levels of language. It's certainly not a premise in his argument, obviously. — Banno

My point is simply that he feels he needs to address the liar paradox, viz., that our everyday language is insufficient.

I'm asking because there is a substantive body of work, by the strongest logicians of the last hundred years, that depends on t-sentences. It would be odd if that were irrelevant. Worse if they were wrong. — Banno

They're irrelevant to our social uses of propositions as they correspond to facts. We don't need to understand Tarski to understand the relationship between propositions and the world. It would be odd if we did. I can see the attraction to 'p' is true, IFF p, but, again, I don't see a need for it.

Although, I do feel the need for speed. :gasp:

I haven't spent much time on his works. I've mostly been reading secondary sources, and even there, it's sporadic. My main point, is that it doesn't help to define truth for everyday usage. I don't think it advances much in terms of that.

This, perhaps, is the point Sam26 makes when he says that the T-schema is irrelevant? — Michael

My point was, that it doesn't help us understand the meaning of truth in the object language. The object language is fine without it. It just adds a layer of confusion to the nature or meaning of truth.

Think it's Davidson rather than Tarski. Tarski's work came out of considerations for formal languages right, — fdrake

From what I've read, it's Tarski, in "On the Concept of Truth in Formal Languages" (1935), where he's trying to resolve the liar paradox. Also, in the course of his thinking he uses Godel's incompleteness theorem as a model for his theory. This includes a meta-language to talk about our everyday language, in terms of truth, that's my understanding.

Thanks.

Yes.

I think we generally agree, with some differences. I have to calm my mind down before bed or I'll be thinking about this stuff into the early morning hours. Take care all.

It really gets back to Wittgenstein (unbelievable, I know), how do we learn to use concepts? I'm saying, if you want to understand what truth is, then you look at use in social settings. I don't believe that 'p' is true IFF p helps us to decide meaning as it takes place socially. We could completely disregard it, and it wouldn't change a thing. There would be nothing lacking.

Janus, while that is true, it is also true that "cat" is meaningless beyond what is communally perceived and conceived to be a cat. — creativesoul

Yes, the concept cat is meaningless beyond our social linguistic uses.

The cat can be hunting a mouse and that would be the case, even if there were no one around... ever. — creativesoul

I agree. The use of the concept fact goes beyond the linguistic.

Agreed.

I think if you were to analyze the uses of truth in social settings it would be more in line, generally, with a kind of correspondence. Would you agree?

My guess is that Tarski is basing his theory on false premises. For example, the liars paradox.

Like with Sam26 (I imagine), a theoretical emphasis on pragmatics and a central role for T-sentences in that theory are strange bedfellows. — fdrake

Yes, to say the least.

And yet, they are correct. I mean, you would not disagree that ("p' is true IFF p), would you? — Banno

I would disagree. I don't see that as helping people to understand the concept truth.