The forms of derision which had come to manifest in accordance with that upon which you had sought to act, arose implicitly; all the while standing no less evident than before.

"Think of how excited people will be when you try English! -Or try some proof-reading. The "classic" style was never permissive of plain error, nor obscurity, except when the goal. It
is true of English in 2019 what Richmond Lattimore said of it c. 1951, that we do not have a poetic dialect. And to paraphrase only slightly, that we should aspire to be rapid, plain, and direct in substance, thought, and expression. Or if you don't like a Homeric standard of clarity, perhaps study the rhetorical practices of the character of Kent in King Lear. If you must affect a flowery and ornate style, try to do it better! Because clearly at the moment you are more interested in display than sense."

That of which I had made conveyance at the time, wasn't itself in reproach, nor had come to warrant either supposition unto which you ascribe merit, falsely. I had in earnest hoped to exemplify beauty in the manner of sentiment for which I persisted though not for loss of clarity in expression of the same. My intent had thus been to appropriate a balance amongst each such that beauty and insight, remain commensurate with one another, and coalesce. Your assertion wherein commitment of failure in pursuance of attainment of all thereof for the sake of each as it be conferred on my behalf, was in truth, unfounded and bore no entrenchment in the rational.

"Don't confuse clarity with difficulty."

I hadn't conflated either; I merely yielded allusion to the central form therewith, and the relation amongst each, while in concurrence ensuring recognition of their distinctiveness preserved thusly, as separate notions.

"Sorry, Vessuvius, too much incoherence."

The series of conditions upon which your statement of fault is predicated insofar as I bear it, must offer destitution for that only through which can the latter be vindicated; imparting credence to the contrast between that which is the case, and the subject thereof as a matter of truth, in perception.

"Not derision, just fact. Do you know how to parse a sentence? Try parsing some of yours. And I see you've been doing some after-the-fact editing/proof-reading. Better if done ante.... "

Neither of which has bearing on the veracity of my judgement, nor is to make manifest pertinence in any of its myriad forms (is inconsequential with respect to the heart of such confliction, which has garnered ever more precedence, since.)

As it seems clear in my eye's that you have striven to determine the advent of much fault, in which my prior actions had been the catalyst thereby, in spite of absence of commitment of the aforementioned as granted on my behalf. You regard all of that which I have hitherto sought to convey on the outset in contempt. Either criterion alone, would fulfill that which serves to permit another, to deem such a course as an act of derision; as a whole none other (beyond 'derisive') shall suffice to designate.

It is evident that you had partaken in an act of derision, and to my own detriment all the same; yet you offer no recognition of the reason for which that is the case, nor as to how what you have sought to profess can be granted credence of any form.

Once more you made failure to differentiate instances of truthfulness; that which is the case, from what are to be regarded as matters of normativity as bound by subjective consideration.

If I haven't known how to affect a particular course, how am I to achieve its consequence?

"And I see you've been doing some after-the-fact editing/proof-reading."

I imagine it to be fortunate that while blind to much truth, you are not toward all.

I have come to present a fertile ground on which a great many others may predicate judgement; though you subsist in a state of eagerness for derision as cast unto the former therewith.

The lesser the degree of clarity which one feels' a particular statement, or proposition, to entail, the lesser the difficulty one shall find, in their apprehension of the same statement. It is a relation of equivalence, amongst the subject's perception of what is to be apprehended.

Suppose for sake of argument that one wishes, by which I refer to the subject, to garner some semblance to understanding of the notion termed 'Deontological Ethical Theory'. Therein lies the condition in which the subject has no true endowment of mind, and thus is absent particular aptitude for that which necessitates intellectual depth, and rigor.

We then find a corresponding subject, whose intention is indistinguishable from the previous, yet is constrained by no manner of deficit in intellect, whether that manifest in the potentiality of their faculties, or breadth of understanding, to which the notion in sight has come to pertain; neither is of much pertinence, insofar as the central tenant remain. One can infer from the variance as made evident through each, that all lie at a path of divergence from one another in spite of what had been sought (the assigned properties of that which each had hoped to apprehend) persisting in constancy, unchanged.

Clarity in apprehension influences difficulty in the same; difficulty in apprehension as per the presumption that it be coherent in truth is independent of the subject; the extent of difficulty one encounters in that course determines the perceived clarity with which it manifests.

For the sake of brevity;
Assuming objective coherence, the perceived clarity of any particular statement determines its perceived difficulty in apprehension by the subject, independent of all confounding aspects.

A truth toward which it seems to me, you have remained blind.

Nor do I hope for that consideration either; that much we can affirm on a basis of commonality. Irrespective of which it is clear to me that the vastness in breadth of your contribution remains incomparable to all my own, thus far. Owing to the prior, I stand in gratitude of your acknowledgement, for my sake and yours.

"As brevity is the soul of wit(in which I have shown little aptitude), I will be brief-er."

The depth of clarity in one's understanding of the meaning expressed through a particular statement, or collective thereof, influences the same attribution with respect to the difficulty found in one's course of the apprehension sought; in concurrence with the extent to which one feels' it difficult to apprehend, whereupon the latter reflects often unto how clear it seems in the eye's of the subject as a matter of thought.

Your own iteration of what I had sought to convey at the time of such inception, lies in subsistence, destitute of all manner of fault.

Let's get mundane; you are correct in your assessment, for which I wish to commend you.
Not to grant the implication that the notion of correctness(nor commendation) each are mundane in form. Though in my mind the latter of which ought not to be striven toward for its own sake, much unlike the former.

I have sought to apprehend much of the essence contained therein, though in vain, of each individual; thus far I have nearly attained completion in my reading of the 'Critique Of Pure Reason; the latter's seminal work. I have begun study of the former's, entitled 'Science Of Logic' as well, since, and have yet to venture beyond the first chapter thereof for fear of not garnering apprehension of its content, in full and succumbing to what is otherwise as consequence in compensation of that deficit; misapprehension, which is itself a greater hindrance to one's understanding than none at all.

While I concede to the merit of your final argument, it is the case more often than not(and is thus true) that failure to preserve clarity in understanding of that of which another had spoken, entails difficulty for the recipient; the converse bears truthfulness, also(vice versa). In that sense each notion is interrelated, and as such the extent with which either manifests may be determined by that of the other, through the depth of its own manifestation.

We ourselves and all others bear the liberty to act as we each deem necessary, in particular instances, yet remain bound by an implicit 'contract' which offers dictation as to the manner in which we ought to act by virtue of consensus, lest we infringe upon the liberty of another by lending ourselves to infliction; thus greatly influencing our behavior and relations with those of the rest. What is the extent to which it guides the course of our lives, and to what end must it subsist as principle, if the state to which it pertains and on which it rests, is to be maintained readily in its cohesion?

The veracity of your assertion is reliant upon whether that for which I sought to offer conveyance(which hadn't been the case with respect to the latter; contradiction), had in truth been with contradiction, if not inconstancy in form. One could argue the same of those whom had been most prevalent in their times yet whose work remains lauded even in our era, though not for the sake of clarity in expression, rather the attainment of mere insight had taken precedence.

The course wherein sense is conferred, bears equal weight in my mind, with that which exemplifies, in regard to the same, beauty in form.

It is evident in my eye's that you had spoken(wrote) with a tone of facetiousness, and faint derision. In what respect is either to fulfill the criteria you have set forth? It can facilitate no betterment, and incites only confliction, for what sake had it then been, that toward which you have striven, since it cannot be vindicated by any other means?

We are wholly fucked, man. I have yet to encounter reason to suspect otherwise.

I imagine that only through the prideful, as it be predicated by our state of regress, or rather, drawn in contrast therewith, can be yielded the inclination to persist in either course, in disregard of what each may entail, as consequence. One needn't descend toward the depths of vanity, to ensure that there be no incurrence of loss in the manner of pride, which ought to be.

There was a time in which we bore reflection unto that; forms of pride which be healthful and impart much betterment for those in whom it be preserved. Yet, at present, our heart's and mind's grow ever more impotent, and callous, without even the faintest prospect of abatement of its intensity hitherto known, in sight.

I recognise the truth which belies that transition, should it arise, yet I cannot permit myself to be dissuaded from that toward which I have striven, since, with such ease. One's usage of language, as I regard the course, ought to exemplify much beauty through the form in which it manifests. I see no reason which would vindicate one's intent for mere detraction from that attribute, however bound by subjective consideration the former may be, inasmuch as it be acted upon for its own sake, in the end.

I had thought it the case, by presumption, that of all the domains' in which I could rest no other would endure in passivity, my preference with respect to both manner of speech, and the written form, to an extent equal to that which would be conferred, here. It seems I had been mistaken, to ascribe much other than fault, alone, unto that same belief.

Few it seems, if at all beyond yourself, wish to affirm that sentiment.

The World As It Is Of Itself; A Priori
1: All manner of conception which stands contingent upon the whole of the world, and each aspect arising therein needn't cast reflection unto that of the object for which one harbors the privilege to strive to adjoin one's sight unto the former, as it be absent and thus separate from an act of observance. One could speak of the form with which a particular object, if not series thereof is to manifest; yet one would be unwise to eschew abidance by that of the requisite through which there is yielded true apprehension of what is spoken of, as if each were to be greater in substance, than that which serves merely to represent the object held in sight; in contrast to that which is of the truest form, independent of its appearance in our eyes. One ought not to seek dismissal of either, as each bears much pertinence.

The Relation Amongst Thought And Experience
2: Thought is itself the catalyst for conception. We must have an image, in our minds; an intangible yet clear form if we are to conceive of any object. We are reliant upon associations drawn in the past; the sum of all that is experientially grounded, and sought in life, to confer depth unto thought itself. Often the depth of one's thought is in proportion to the depth of one's experience. The act of speech serves as a medium for expression of such thought; what One has known, and what shall be known in potentiality, is expressed by means of that same medium, though can be granted in written form as well. The associations which one has drawn amongst what is known, and what has been inferred, are each the determinants for what One can conceive, and by consequence of that, what One can express.

The Necessary Association Of Subject And Expression
3: All conceptions stand tantamount to that with which one has hitherto associated, there is thus a correlation between each, wherein the form of one reflects unto the other; the converse holds true, also. This is to be regarded as evident. Language as akin to the sum of all linguistic conceptions in a certain domain, has the greatest entrenchment in experience; how it appears, how it is spoken, is determined solely by what the subject has known prior to its inception in usage, and what the subject believes' proper in form and conduct in the course of all modalities, pertaining to expression of itself, as preceded by the action of the subject.

The Functionality Of Terms In Usage And Their Influence Upon The Structure Of Expression In Full
4: The functionality of all terms, as contained within a particular language, manifest by means of speech, as well as the written form; though are nonetheless determined by their relations to other terms, sequentially. The order in which each appears, often coincides with much influence, exerted unto both the clarity and meaning, expressed through the former. The cumulative whole of any sequence of terms whether spoken, or otherwise, is nonetheless bound by other considerations, in the meaning which it expresses, and is thus inconstant. In the sense that there needn't entail loss in clarity, nor in meaning if either transition to a state distinct from the previous, whilst that of the rest lie in destitution; that is, neither attribute is supervenient with respect to the other; a change in the degree of clarity may not in truth entail a change in the form of meaning, as conveyed through some manner of sentiment.

The Indirectness Of The Nature Of Our Apprehension And Its Consequence
5: None can garner apprehension of the form with which an object is to manifest, beyond the farthest reach in the breadth of sight, nor can one make discernment of that of which it alone is constituted. The means through which one can apprehend what rests within the principal domain of one's faculties of perception, never once shall be permitted to exceed that toward which it remains able to venture forth. Whilst one bears the liberty to conceive of such notions, insofar as each be bound by the aforementioned condition, there must prevail the subject; one whose course may facilitate its advent. Yet it need be a matter of truth that in the absence of either, no sense of understanding is to be conferred, as no manner of judgement can be granted passage. In concurrence with the prior attribution, the world and every aspect therein must persist, destitute of all that which seeks to ensure apprehension of itself, for the sake of the subject only through whom can the latter of which be yielded.

For the sake of brevity;
"What is spoken of, to describe an object of the world, is contingent upon, yet independent of that which it serves to represent; the object as it truly is of itself."
"The faculties which permit our own apprehension, and all aspects contained therein constitute matters of the world themselves, and thus their every form, remains determined by the conditions of the world, and all it comprises."
"The World As it appears in our eye's needn't bear semblance to itself, as it is in truth independent of observance; a course from which it can never deviate, merely affirm."
"As consequence of the prior condition, of which I have spoken since, the world as it is neither must conform to our prejudice as a matter of truth, nor be reflected without fault by the forms of apprehension, and sight, through which it is expressed."
"All of that which we apprehend, as objects of the world, can never lie beyond the boundaries of representation for itself, as granted through the mind of the subject and thus, stands only partial; offering sight of the object, yet all the while lessening the clarity of its image."

I have yet to encounter reason to suspect otherwise.

For you stands' only what is contrary, in both tone and substance; as I see you have never once sought to offer, here, that which is enough. Little else I can say, with equal clarity, and conviction.

"Twas brillig, and the slithy toves
Did gyre and gimble in the wabe;
All mimsy were the borogoves,
And the mome raths outgrabe.

“Beware the Jabberwock, my son!
The jaws that bite, the claws that catch!
Beware the Jubjub bird, and shun
The frumious Bandersnatch!”

He took his vorpal sword in hand:
Long time the manxome foe he sought—
So rested he by the Tumtum tree,
And stood awhile in thought.

And as in uffish thought he stood,
The Jabberwock, with eyes of flame,
Came whiffling through the tulgey wood,
And burbled as it came!

One, two! One, two! And through and through
The vorpal blade went snicker-snack!
He left it dead, and with its head
He went galumphing back.

“And hast thou slain the Jabberwock?
Come to my arms, my beamish boy!
O frabjous day! Callooh! Callay!”
He chortled in his joy.

’Twas brillig, and the slithy toves
Did gyre and gimble in the wabe;
All mimsy were the borogoves,
And the mome raths outgrabe." -Through The Looking Glass; Lewis Carroll; circa 1871

Each is to serve as that of the conception granted by means of the effort expended on behalf of another, from which he remains exempt.

"Jabberwocky"; circa 1871; Lewis Carroll

What manner of 'issue' is it you believe we harbor? Beyond of course what you had spoken of, thereafter.

(Though I imagine the latter of which would serve to preclude a sense of mutuality, with regard to the same.)

Language is formed primarily through associations in the meaning of particular terms, and forms of consideration which have bearing on the sentiment expressed. Yet to inquire as to whether the singular constituents, the terms themselves convey meaning, alone, would preclude much of what is most relevant to the matter itself. Meaning is best discerned, linguistically, through recognition of a particular statement's role, in an instance; a "language-game" as has been termed, since. The reason for which, I believe to owe itself to the ever greater expansion in complexity of the many forms of mere sentiment, that coincide with ever greater depth, in what is expressed, and their relations.

For instance, suppose that one wishes to speak of a fondness for some model of automobile, and convey this sentiment to another in such a manner that it be understood without fault. The other neither can identify the form of such an automobile by association of its assigned name with a specific model, nor deduce it from observance. How can the subject find resolve to the dilemma, if it be bound by each condition? One must describe it, in depth. Therein arises the question of how one ought to describe it. Well, one could say, "it is quite large and bears a distinct insignia atop its front." Yet each modality is pervasive, and indistinct from much else as a great many models' of automobile can rightfully be spoken of as 'large' in proportion as can an equally numerous array be described as distinct in the insignia each is to bear.

What thoughts' have you come to, in relation to this?

Fucking hell, man. This shit sucks, for me. Here.

Alright then, I wish to concede.

It seems to me that our own preferences in regard to manner of speech are nothing short of dissimilar from one another; owing to that in the hope of inciting a fruitful discussion, I shall eschew that toward which I have striven thusly, with respect to the same action for your sake, and mine.

Thought is itself the catalyst for conception. We must have an image, in our minds; something of an intangible yet clear form if we are to conceive of any object. We are reliant upon associations drawn in the past; the sum of all that is experientially grounded, and sought in life, to confer depth unto thought itself. Often the depth of one's thought is in proportion to the depth of one's experience. The act of speech serves as a medium for expression of such thought; what One has known, and what shall be known soon, in potentiality, is expressed by means of that same medium, though can be granted in written form as well. The associations which one has drawn amongst what is known, and what has been inferred, are each the determinants for what One can conceive, and by consequence of that, what One can express.

All conceptions stand tantamount to that with which one has associated, in the past; there is thus a correlation between each, wherein the form of one reflects unto the other; the converse holds true, also. This is to be regarded as evident. Language as akin to all conceptions, has the greatest entrenchment in experience; how it appears, how it is spoken, is determined solely by what the subject has known prior to its inception in usage, and what the subject believes' to be proper in form and conduct in the act through which it is expressed.

The functions of certain terms, as contained within a particular language, manifest through speech, as well as the written form; though are nonetheless determined by their relations to other terms, in a spoken sequence. The order in which each appears, often coincides with much influence, exerted through itself unto both the clarity and meaning, as granted expression by means of such a sequence. The cumulative whole of any spoken sequence of terms is nonetheless bound by other considerations, in the meaning which it expresses, and is thus inconstant, variable even. in the sense that there needn't entail loss in clarity, nor in meaning if either transition to a state distinct from the previous, whilst the other stands destitute; that is, neither attribute is supervenient with respect to the other; a change in the degree of clarity may not in truth entail a change in the form of meaning, as conveyed through some manner of sentiment.

I would hope this to suffice, here.

Yes, for what sake would my preference be otherwise, if it be the case at all?

All conceptions stand predicated by means of that to which each shall lie in pertainment; yet therein has dwelt a certain form by which what One is to speak of, remains bound. That which serves as the centrality for what is to designate a particular sentiment, its most necessary tenant, needn't harbor entrenchment in the determinate, beyond that which is ascribed unto itself, by virtue of the tone for which it is to stand without dispensation, to express that of which it remains representative as imbued by certain externalities. What had been regarded as contentious throughout the course unto which we affix our sight coincided with the advent of much force, by which he was found to have drawn toward each, though in time the intensity with which all thereof had come to manifest, grew absent and thus no longer exerted bearing, as consequence.

The lesser breadth in form which your assertion shall entail, insofar as it be deemed as having mere veracity, ought not to be held in sight, in a manner such that it be seen in the eye's of the many as a basis for true representation of the whole which it had been to describe, with much effectuality as was the intent. One can conceive of an instance in which what is to be designated, through usage of a term, as it be given, precede no ascertainment of that to which it refers, in either respect, inasmuch as there be absence of a conceptual scheme which must yield the former, if its utility is to be granted vindication. The modality which accords with the function of all thereof, can be discerned most readily, only through that of the state of which it is reflective, in contrast to that unto which it imparts much fulfillment, and be spoken of as such, prior to the inception of its central form.

All manner of linguistic expression, in its myriad forms, and constituents, which lend themselves to the formation of a cohesive whole, an unity, ought to be understood through their distinct role in particular instances, and the variegated considerations amongst each rather than as sole terms which remain isolated from that to which all are to pertain. The function in which each term serves as it be contingent upon the rest is the most effectual basis for identifying what all are to designate, and convey. Yet the whole is no less pertinent than the sum of its every aspect, nor of lesser meaning as alone all therein must stand destitute of that attribute, though in full there can be no grander form of expression; seldom is it true that much else be comparable. It is nonetheless vital, that those through whom there be made passage of judgement, bear in mind the requisite for mere differentiation, and strive to preserve the inconstancy, within the series of actions which have no semblance to that of the rest, beyond itself, and are thus dissimilar in regard to the same, by means of recognition of such distinctness, hitherto drawn.

I have yet to determine the means by which there has been made commitment of mere blindness toward much of what is to accord with the condition unto unto which we have sought to ascribe precedence. All manner of imagery; that which is to be regarded as pictorial in form, can subsist in thought, in spite of the absence of certain aspects thereof which insofar as each be present, serve to facilitate linguistic expression.

Imagery of object's, irrespective of content, can be regarded as distinctly representative of instances' in which no such modalities are conferred, and would as consequence fulfill the criterion you have set forth.

Suppose that one has chosen to conceive of a material object; its sight is then retained in the mind of the subject. One can offer recognition of the form of such an object, and differentiate it from what is without true semblance, with respect to itself, whilst inferring certain attributes of each, which reflect unto one another through associations hitherto drawn.

Thus, we have made discernment whereof imagery, inasmuch as it pertain solely to a particular sight, is an instance of non-linguistic expression, and by virtue of that, the same sentiment holds true as a matter of thought.

"Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent."
If there be permitted no means for such expression, none shall speak as consequence.

One can conceive without fault of an instance in which the sole modality of thought, lying in pertainment to the same, harbors entrenchment in mere imagery, and shall exemplify no basis for conflict, amongst that of all manner of predication, for itself. One must descend beyond such a condition, in that of which oneself has conceived, since, insofar as there be sought description of the object held in mind; yet the image of the latter, can persist in spite of its absence.

There can be thought without language, though the converse stands destitute of truth; there can be no language without thought.

It is clear in my own eye's that all conceptions serve merely to represent that unto which our sight is to be affixed, as determined by the particular considerations of the instance in which such usage, wherever it may arise, has come to manifest. The object, if not series thereof, of which one can speak, need only reflect unto that to which it would pertain, and designate. All manner of expression in speech, is bound by the many constraints which inhere within itself, thus restricting the breadth of forms with which it is permitted to coincide, and exemplify. No aspect of language ought to conflict, nor detract from the clarity with which meaning can be conferred. Yet such a principle, presents a certain sense of dimunition, in regard to the degree of variance in forms of expression of which one can speak, in the course throughout which one has hoped to convey mere sentiment. To offer illustration, take heed of that which is to come.

One can present the utterance, "That man ate many green boats." I imagine those through whom there is to be made passage of judgement, would seek to offer recognition with much sincerity in mind, only of the absence of true meaning, as conferred by means of the former(phrase), upon their apprehension of what it shall entail, insofar as it be deemed representative of the course, spoken of. Therein lies the modality of such restriction in depth; the latter attribution would serve to preclude, and by means of the same facilitate dismissal of the prospect in which the prior utterance, that unto which we affix our sight, expresses without incurrance of lesser clarity, what is the case in truth. ('That man may very well have eaten many green boats, yet we discard the prospect of such truth outright for the absurdity in tone which it presupposes and therefrom dispense with the liberty to describe that very instance, should it arise.') In judgement we ascribe prejudice unto that of which we strive to express and thus persist in mere reflection, for the principle under which all else remains contingent. In concurrence with the preceding condition, no basis through which there is granted entailment of representation, in form, corresponds without fault to that of the object of which it alone stands reflective.

For the sake of brevity;
"The map isn't the territory, nor can it ever be otherwise." -
"Loss in clarity needn't entail loss in meaning."-
"All representations must impart a sense of understanding on our behalf, of the distinct forms (and properties) which they seek to designate, if their usage is to be vindicated."-
"All our renditions of phenomena are only partial, with respect to each phenomenon thereof." -