The Revolt of the Masses
by José Ortega y Gasset

The Soul of Man Under Socialism
by Oscar Wilde

:up:
This is fundamental to a philosopher like Collingwood, for example, and his notion of "absolute presuppositions," which are the epistemological cornerstone of his metaphysics.

There are also a ton of hits on TPF if you search "theory-laden".

Not quite sure what you mean by observation is theory laden either. — Corvus

As I said, it is a well-known concept; there is actually a wiki on it. I would start with that.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Theory-ladenness

:up:

\ This basically says that observation is theory laden, so all thought is the product of its history of conceptualization (including observations). Fundamentally (observation is theory laden) it's a pretty basic concept. Collingwood expands upon it considerably.

Whatever the case, they all need observation by humans who record and monitor the process, and simulation and modelling wouldn't replace observation in science. — Corvus

Yes. Bearing in mind that

...the work of observing facts is really done by the senses with assistance from the intellect. What the positivists called ‘observing’ facts is really historical thinking, which is a complex process involving numerous presuppositions
~Essay in Metaphysics

At present, I'm not seeing how:

Our thoughts exemplify what they conceptualize
— Pantagruel

is inconsistent with:

...consciousness formats the boundaries of perceived things as a translation of things-in-themselves.
— ucarr — ucarr

I don't know that I said it was inconsistent, merely that your concept of "boundary administration" isn't gelling with me. Perspective might dictate that we perceive the same thing through different metaphors.

When you score a victory against your opposition, it has meaning and value. The circularity of you being you in isolation has no meaning or value. — ucarr

Which is why Collingwood's conception of logic-metaphysics is not just dialectical, but dialogical. Propositions only have meanings as answers to questions.

We are alive and real only because we can die. Consciousness divorced from death is a childish game. We grow up when we accept the strategic incompleteness of ourselves; it fends off death until the living project extends beyond the individual’s strategies for preserving its incompleteness. — ucarr

Consciousness can be construed as a species-collective property, which at the bare minimum distances (and possibly insulates) it from the individual notion of (ego-)death. Your statement reads as existential. I've been a determined existentialist in the past; I'm coming to see existentialism, however, as more of a very sophisticated kind of psychology.

But don't simulation or modelling at the end of the day need observation to be meaningful? Simulation and modelling unobserved by humans don't exist, therefore meaningless? — Corvus

Absolutely. Models don't exclude the modeler and the modeled, they unite them.

Instead, cogito-spacetime takes the place of cogito ergo sum. With consciousness now inducted into the physico_material realm of physics as the boundary administrator for the cognition of the physics of physico_material reality, this addition resolves the seeming inconsistency between QM and Newton. The seeming inconsistency between QM and Newton, plus Descartes' cogito ergo sum, operate as the wellsprings of the HPoC. — ucarr

I think conceptually this accords with R. G. Collingwood's elaboration of the Ontological Argument:

The distinction between processes that we can discover in the object, and processes which we can discover in our minds when we reflect on our thought about the object, is a distinction that we have no right to make here, because, as we learnt in reflecting upon the idea of nothing, we are here in a realm of thought in which there is no object, and in which therefore whatever necessarily happens in our minds when we think about a given concept is a process necessarily ascribed to the concept itself.
~Collingwood, The Nature of Metaphysical Study

Our thoughts exemplify what they conceptualize. This is why I don't quite gel with your notion of the "boundary administrator" role. I would say we are quantum-mechanical adjudicators of the quantum.

As regards its modus operandi, then, all analysis is metaphysical analysis; and, since analysis is what gives its scientific character to science, science and metaphysics are inextricably united, and stand or fall together.
~R.G. Collingwood, Essay on Metaphysics

Rather more on topic...

"That truth is greatest or truest which expresses most, which includes most successfully within itself a number of diverse and by themselves conflicting points of view."
~R.G. Collingwood, Truth and Contradiction

I'm merely pointing out the limits of our relation to the answers, that some answers require a drastic change in perception in order to know where to look and where to conduct the further research. — Christoffer

Thomas Kuhn's paradigm shift.

Still there can be no science without art:

"For Collingwood, art is the beginning of the process by which we create the self and the world. The distinctions between the self and the world and between the world as discovered and the world as made only occur at the level of intellect. However, for intellect to function, there must first be art."
~Richard Murphy, Collingwood and the Crisis of Western Civilization

If science is a tool then it is susceptible of improper use, like any other tool.

We lack enough comprehension to fully grasp the implications of what we objectively know. And therefor we lack in the instinct which guides us towards further knowledge. — Christoffer

Which is why it is so important not to overestimate the scope of our empirical "knowledge". What is real now might not cover what is real tomorrow.

What usually comes to mind for me about energy is how scale influence the perception of entropy. — Christoffer

I wonder too about time, whether time at micro-scales is even a well-defined property.

A society which thinks, as our own thinks, that it has outlived the need of magic, is either mistaken in that opinion, or else it is a dying society, perishing for lack of interest in its own maintenance.
~R.G. Collingwood, Principles of Art

Collingwood and the Crisis of Western Civilisation: Art, Metaphysics and Dialectic
Richard Murphy

A Harlot High and Low
Honoré de Balzac

Is there a sense in which consciousness overflows its symbolic representations? Empirical knowledge is precisely reflected in exhausted by what is symbolically represented. However consciousness can know some things in a way that seems to transcend empirical encapsulation of this kind. The fact that it can "know" that something can be brought about by conducting itself counterfactually, for example, acting "against" the way things are in order to bring about something different. So does intuitive knowledge transcend empirical encapsulation? Or is it in fact such an encapsulation itself?

Presently, I am focusing on consciousness as a builder by way of being a boundary administrator. The boundary negotiations work towards construction of a representation of reality. — ucarr

Conceptually, this is cogent. But it still begs the question of the exact nature of the representation construct. I view it in light of what I'd call "constructive realism".

Math...among other things. But are we talking about the conscious experience qua representation, or are we talking about some kind of construct - presumably a material-symbolic artefact - that instantiates or incorporates this conscious experience?

Is it strictly mental, or does it also inhabit the empirical realm of practical physics? — ucarr

To me this seems like asking the question, Is the "representation" real? It seems incontrovertibly to be so, the question being posed (by the representing faculty). Our increasing mastery of quantum phenomena being solid evidence.

If you are suggesting that consciousness functions as an organizational principle of reality I'd agree that is evident.

Actually quantum phenomena are being practically harnessed at rapid rate, beginning with transistors and cascading throughout modern electronics. But also of course being increasingly recognized as operating in nature, including organic nature. Most recently, the realization that microtubules in the brain can sustain quantum states supporting Penrose's hypothesis. So I would hazard that more than just the construction of a picture of reality is going on. Constructing reality itself perhaps. However, undoubtedly constructing the picture is a significant part of that project.

I completely agree consciousness crosses the quantum-classical bridge; I just don't know whether it therefore builds that bridge. Certainly quantum phenomena are not a discrete and isolated realm, because they not only do manifest directly at the classical level, but are increasingly being exploited (by consciousness) in advanced technologies.

The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy and Other Essays
by John Dewey

When we look at the world at the scale of QM, we’re looking at pre-cognitive reality without the benefit of the formatting by reality’s boundary administrator, our consciousness. — ucarr

Why should this be the case? On the one hand, you seem to be presenting a metaphysics of consciousness as a natural feature of reality. But then you seem to fall back on a more anthropomorphic interpretation.

Perhaps consciousness does exemplify an "executive" function (oversees boundary negotiations). But another way to phrase it would be that it is a "function of" those operations.

In the Days of the Comet
by H.G. Wells

I think pretty much everybody who is alive is pro-life. The so-called "pro-life" movement is really "anti-abortion". If it is an issue of personal responsibility, then it is and should be a personal choice. If it is an issue of social responsibility, then the world is becoming increasingly overpopulated, in a way which increasingly threatens the health and well-being of many, as well as the biosphere. In which case it is a reasonable choice.

Little Dorrit
by Charles Dickens

So - is there a connection between biosemiosis and this broader understanding of evolution? — T Clark

My take is that biosemiosis is essentially the materialization of understanding. So expanding it becomes a kind of self-understanding that embraces and constitutes reality at the deepest levels, through/as the mechanism of semiotic feeback.

I'm currently reading about biosemiotics. It is the science of signification that stretches across the biological domain, the logical extension of Lorenz's ideas you mentioned. The grandfather of biosemiotics is Jakob von Uexkull. Biosemiotician Barbieri notes that von Uexkull's Umwelt:

had an influence on...Ernst Cassirer and Martin Heidegger...and was instrumental for Konrad Lorenz's development of ethology.

I'm trying to expand the notion of biosemiotics to embrace the entire material domain, not just the biological (a la Terrence Deacon).

We are free to act on our will, but not free to choose our will.... We are our will, who would be the "we" apart from our will that wants to change the will. — ChatteringMonkey

Yes, we have an inherent disposition. In many ways, this is akin to having (being) a perspective. How does this not make sense conceptually? And just because we have a disposition, why should this mean we are not free to change our disposition? Your argument is like saying that a sailboat being driven by a northerly wind is not able to change its course.

Introduction to Biosemiotics: The New Biological Synthesis
by Marcello Barbieri

I think the most compelling idea in the book is there there is a direct continuity between the "cognition" of the earliest animals and the cognition of complex animals such as us. — T Clark

What is your interpretation of "direct continuity"? I feel there is a "direct continuity" between individual consciousnesses, their socio-cultural encodings, and their subsequent re-encodings (as subsequent individual consciousnesses). Like that?

A Journal of the Plague Year
by Daniel Defoe

Civilization and Capitalism 15th-18th Century, Vol. 1: The Structures of Everyday Life
by Fernand Braudel

The C.S. Peirce collection was edifying. From the perspective of a voracious intellect, Peirce consistently demarcates the different spheres of scientific, logical, and metaphysical inquiry:

the scientific man...ardently desires to have his present, provisional beliefs (and all his beliefs are merely provisional) swept away (312)
the conclusions of science make no pretense to being more than probable (326)
Metaphysics [is] an observational science (313)
that which has been inconceivable today has often turned out to be indisputable on the morrow (332)

Peirce also suggests that there is an overarching kind of reason that encompasses the totality of our experiences, something that is neither reducible nor amenable to scientific expression. For me, this is a fundamental truism.

The Expedition of Humphry Clinker
by Tobias Smollett

A Norton Critical Edition I happened across. Includes a critical essay by Sir Walter Scott I'll probably read first.