This is certainly not true. There are more than seven billion human minds that are objects to us and only one you might argue isn't. — T Clark

Maybe, but this would be contingent on how one defines and thereby interprets "mind". So how do you define mind?

As two examples among many:

1) a body of sometimes disparate agencies of awareness and will - interacting at various levels of unconscious (with one's conscience as one example) - that can of themselves hold causal power and thereby affect or else form the causal abilities of consciousness (e.g., feeling an overwhelming unconscious urge to do something that one then does) that can fully unify into a singular awareness and will (such as when one is in the flow and effortlessly acts in manners devoid of any choice making or deliberative thought). In short, mind as a mostly unified bundle of agencies.

2) the strict, causal-power-devoid epiphenomenon of a physical brain's operatons that is thereby necessarily reducible to the purely deterministic, causal operations of a physical brain's components and, hence, of itself holds no causal power to alter any behavior - this such as via the activity of making choices or of thinking - here very much including the non-agency of consciousness ... which is one aspect of a human's total mind). In short, mind as the effete byproduct of a brain.

Just two options among many, but I so far find anything resembling (1) to be non-observable (instead only being inferable, typically unconsciously in day to day life, this via observable data regarding a total person's overt behaviors) - this even though a corporeal being's mind is here yet understood to be contingent on a corporeal, hence physical, body (and at the very least in mammals, on a physical central nervous system). And, since mind here is non directly observable (with MRIs and such, which are observable, being inferential understandings of such agency we term mind), mind in this interpretation cannot be an observable object. (albeit, one can via various inferences often enough predict what minds will do).

Whereas anything resembling (2) can then be easily expressed as an observable object - this since it here basically amounts to the occurrence of a brain - of whose illusory agency in the form of mind is fully, well, illusory.

(Personally, I find that satisfactorily defining mind is far more challenging than defining consciousness - esp. when attempting to remain consistent to the occurrence of consciousness itself. All the same, an interesting topic to explore via commonalities and differences of perspective.)

Thanks.

But how much neurobiology do you know to make such sweeping dismissals? What definition of “consciousness” can you present here such that it could be subject to experimental investigation?

Sure, you know what it feels like to feel like you. But where can you point to the failures of science to say something about that? Give us an example from psychophysics or cognitive neuroscience. — apokrisis

As to definitions:

Science: any conceivable field of knowledge, including that of theoretical fartology any field of study that is necessarily founded upon empirical observation (hence, observations via any of the physiological senses) and that employs the scientific method of a) falsifiable hypothesis regrading empirical observations, b) empirically observable test, and c) empirically observable results. (e.g., M-theory is currently an untestable theory and so is not of itself science)

Consciousness: the first-person point of view which empirically observes (again, hence observes via its physiological senses), as well as introspects (which is a non-empirical activity), while always finding itself as first-person point of view in non-empirical yet experiential states of being such as those of happiness, certainty, and their opposites, among numerous others. (E.g., I know I am psychologically certain when I am simply by so being as a first-person point of view – such that this certainty is in no way something other that I as a first-person point of view apprehend but, again, is simply an aspect of my momentary state of being as a consciousness.)

If you find any disagreement with either definition, it would be important that you then express your differences.

Then, I cannot see myself as a first-person point of view in the mirror - I can instead only see the body through which I as a first-person point of view operate (e.g., neither of the two physiological eyes through which I see is the I which I am as a first-person point of view (i.e., a consciousness). Nor can I touch, smell, taste, hear, or proprioceive (etc.) myself as that which apprehends touch, smell, taste, auditory information, and proprioception (etc.).

In short, I as a consciousness – i.e. as a first person point of view – know myself to be 100% non-empirical - to in no way whatsoever stand out to anyone anywhere, my own self very much included - and to nevertheless yet be.

Science – including psychophysics and cognitive neuroscience – can only address empirical givens by definition.

Ergo, to presume that anyone now or ever can obtain scientific knowledge of what consciousness is is a massive category mistake. It’s right up there with believing one can catch the horizon if one chases it fast enough.

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Of important note: here is being strictly addresses the issue of consciousness – and in no way that of mind (which as a definite given among humans always pertains to a given consciousness; e.g. “my mind” or "his mind") This in no way denying the interplay between consciousness and the unconscious mind. And it in no way addresses metaphysics.

A theory of “consciousness” is just the pursuit of a ghostly spirit stuff. Or can you frame the task in a way that is scientific rather than a search for immaterial being? — apokrisis

Science should be able to explain something as fundamental as consciousness, shouldn't it? — RogueAI

Why should it?

It’s not like this ultimate beetle in the box called “consciousness”, aka lived experience, in any way matters - all the more so were it be immaterial - not ethically and certainty not substantially (neither of the latter - ethics or substance - being in any way scientifically testable anyways).

For instance, pragmatically speaking, we can contemplate mathematical systems and work with empirical knowledge just fine without it.

Plus, socio-politically speaking, all those people the world over that have learned to detest science exactly due to attitudes such as the two just expressed are morons – this for having the nerve to maintain that their lived experience (which, needless to add, is first-person), and those of others they care about, should be in any way valued, this either by other individuals or by cultural institutions. Telling them that they're idiots on this count should get them to finally take science seriously - rather than thumb their noses at global warming and the like.

And why is "consciousness" in quotes? — RogueAI

Because it is one of them illusions? After all, it is neither tangible nor explainable mathematically and, thus, cannot possibly be real.

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Hey, devil’s advocate at work here. :naughty: Because while I know I am, I can’t conclusively prove that individual others are.

(BTW, the advocacy provided is directed primarily at @apokrisis's comments.)

I know it's already been suggested that crows can count, but try explaining the concept of prime to them. — Wayfarer

To try clarify what was suggested, by me at least: If crows can count, then crows (as with apes and other lesser animals) obviously cannot count the way humans do: via use of language and its conceptual constructs. But then crows can't understand a rock as object the same way we do either - e.g., that it consists of minerals, subatomic particles, etc. Still, crows can hold awareness of some rudimentary properties of rocks well enough to intentionally make use of some rocks as tools - not like us, they can't build a skyrocketing pyramid from them, but they can drop them on things in attempts to crack these things open.

In parallel to their, by comparison, minuscule understanding of physical objects in the world, crows might well be able to apprehend rudimentary aspects of definite quantities existing in the world which we humans linguistically refer to by the term "numbers".

This teeny-weeny aptitude of apprehension will quite obviously differ by great magnitudes in comparison to an average human's. But this does not mandate that there is an absolute on/off switch in-between.

That our human psyches are leaps and bounds more awareness-endowed than those of all lesser animals does not of itself then indicate that there was no evolutionary cline in awareness and the intelligence that accompanies it.

As another parallel, that one can't explain calculus to a five-year-old doesn't then imply that the five-year-old has no awareness of specific quantity whatsoever.

Not claiming to know that lesser animals do or don't count. But if they do, this does not then make their aptitudes of understanding on par to our own. Its why we term them "lesser" animals - due to us being the most evolved (here strictly meaning, developed) animal we know of by far.

In the Philebus Plato addresses the question of the relation between language and world.
It raises the problem of what Aristotle called the “indeterminate dyad” . — Fooloso4

Interesting. But I find that a distinction can be made between necessary dyads and unnecessary dyads (however it would be best to lignuistically distinguish them). As an example of this distinction:

Left and right form what I've termed a necessary dyad. It is impossible in all cases and at all times to have one devoid of the other's occurrence (same with up and down and many other dyads).

On the other hand, love and hate give an example of what I've tentatively termed "an unnecessary dyad": yes, they stand in direct opposition to each other as a dichotomy and therefore comprise one set, but: while one cannot ever hate in manners fully devoid of love - namely, of love for that which is valued, typically one's own self - a person can potentially experience love in manners fully devoid of hate for anything (at least transiently). So, unlike left and right, while hate necessitates love in all cases, love will not likewise necessitate hate.

Ultimately, there is neither ‘this or that’ but ‘this and that’. The Whole is not reducible to One. — Fooloso4

Getting back into cosmology :razz: , in cosmological models wherein some the absolute state of being is equated to pure (cosmic) love - maybe such as the Neo-platonic notion of "the One"? - the unnecessary dyad of love-hate terminates in manners where only love remains at the expense of all hate. So that the Whole here can be theoretically reducible to One - this due to not all dyads being a matter of "this and that" (some in fact being "this or that"). [Other possible cases of unnecessary dyads might also be potentially discerned.]

p.s., yes, deep down, I'm sincerely philosophically minded about this issue of opposites. Though I'm not sure that if fits in with the thread's theme.

Thanks for engaging with what I've previously asked!

To go back to Bateson's initial quote, what would a numberless measurement of length, for example, be? - javra

Couldn't this be accomplished by simply referencing objects' extension in relation to one another? — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes, you are quite right. (Realized this after posting, but deemed that editing it would be a bit much ... in any case, my bad here.) I would however better reword the concern I have in this way:

-- Can one have any measurement that is devoid of any discrete givens which we - either thinkingly or unthinkingly - enumerate (i.e., determine the amount of) via numbers?

If not, then it currently seems to me that measurement necessitates number in some way or another.

Notice that in the very quoted sentence number (a definite amount; i.e., a definite quantity) is necessarily specified in order for cogent semantics to obtain (what I've boldfaced). Likewise, while a ratio might not be itself interpreted as a number (debatable) it will yet, I so far find, necessarily consist of a relation between numbers - at the very least between quantities (the plurality of which is itself a quantity) which we hold the potential to enumerate. Else, in measurements that strictly concern relations, such as greater than or lesser than, there will always be an at the very least implicitly addressed number of givens to which the relations applies. I'm for example weak on pure theoretical mathematics, but I so far can't find any exception to this.

I feel like there is support for the supposition that the illusion of discreteness is just a useful survival trick as much as for the idea that innate numeracy denotes the existence of numbers "out there, sans mind." — Count Timothy von Icarus

As to whether lesser animals can count, as philosophy it's right up there with whether lesser animals are in fact conscious - to which might as well be appended the issue of other minds. In short, I'm convinced that they do, but, as with those who'd disagree, can't provide conclusive philosophical evidence of it - at least not in a forum format. So, I won't debate the issue.

Still, the pivotal issue I was addressing is that, as I currently find it, discreteness is contingent on the occurrence of awareness - such that if awareness then discreteness (and as an important meta-example: the occurrence of one awareness or more will each be a discrete given). And, furthermore, that numbers are only then contingent on the occurrence of discreteness. This irrespective of one's metaphysical interpretation(s) regarding the consequent significance in respect to the cosmos we inhabit. (e.g., a materialists' view that an awareness-devoid cosmos is possible or, else, an idealist's view that such is impossible - as two among other metaphysical perspectives)

So I'm here in full agreement that "numbers 'out there, sans minds' [by which I here understand, tersely stated, "a plurality of discrete awareness"]'" can only be a fallacy.

how can one have numbers in the complete absence of discrete amounts of givens - i.e., of quantities? - javra

Imagine a continuum, for example a line, of finite length. Our line has an uncountably infinite number of points but also a finite length. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Right here, in the very semantics of what a line is, is the occurrence of quantity in the form of "points" - such that this quantity minimally consists of more than one point. In addressing "a" continuum one is likewise specifying a quantity - not two or three continuums but one. So the occurrence of quantity is a requite aspect of any continuum - be it real or strictly conceptual.

ake some section of the line, arbitrarily, and compare how many lengths of the section fit within the whole. There are sections of the line that exist such that the line can be broken into n segments of equal length, where n is a natural number. No initial discreteness required, right? All that is required is that the points of the line differ from each other in some way; — Count Timothy von Icarus

Maybe the "discreteness" here addressed by you has a specialized mathematical meaning? But in the ordinary sense I've addressed it it specifies something being separate, distinct, individual. Hence, in the sense I intend the very sections of the line that are compared are thereby discrete (to our awareness of them as such - otherwise no comparison could be made).

BTW, one could then address point-free topology as another example to be provided - but, here too, tmk there will be discerned some form of separateness somewhere (e.g., sets), such that discreteness (and hence quantity) yet obtains.

So, I again find that the (maybe I should specify, cosmic) occurrence of quantity is requisite for the occurrence of numbers (be the latter's occurrence also cosmic or, else, strictly located in individual minds as some would have it).

I've always found the reverse argument more interesting, the claim that numbers are essential for reality, or at least our understanding of it. — Count Timothy von Icarus

This in fact isn't too different from my own personal metaphysical views. Only that I maintain quantity - as in "discrete givens" - to be essential to existence rather than to reality (with "existence" here roughly understood as all which "stands out" in any way) and, thereby, to physical reality (which exists); this, thereby, concurrently necessitating the ontic occurence of numbers in the cosmos (however sentience might represent them symbolically; e.g. as "IV", as "4", or as "four"). But I don't want to digress into my own metaphysical views concerning this.

All the same, of main interest here is the issue of how numbers could be had in the complete absence of quantity.

Anyhow, if some hitherto unformulated version of logicalism is true, and numbers are reducible to logos, it seems to me like this argument is moot (and that the concept of logos spermatikos ends up beating out divine nous as a better explanation of "how things are," IMHO.) — Count Timothy von Icarus

:grin: I could go with that. (but then these touchy terms hold different connotations to different people, for instance, that of "spermatikos" say by compassion to the terms "in-fluence" or even that of "inspiration (aka, to breath in or, more archaically, roughly, to be breathed into psychically)") But yes, a Heraclitean-like, cosmic logos of the type addressed stands in direct logical contradiction to an omnipotent and omniscient creator deity whose "words" make up the world.

I'm not sure what you are saying or asking there. I'll attempt an answer if you care to clarify. — Janus

That's OK. Thanks

That something stands out perceptually is not that it is actually separate from its environment; it is just that we can distinguish it. — Janus

I'm not getting this. Edit: A predator's perceived prey that stands out perceptually isn't separate from the prey's environment?

When we distinguish a single tomato, there is not an "indefinite quantity of something" in the sense that you were using the term 'quantity', that is as number: on the contrary there is an exact number of tomatoes; in this case one. — Janus

"A quantity" is an unspecified amount. "A number" is a specified quantity. Q: "What is the quantity of tomatoes you've purchased from the store?" A: "One." Conceptually, quantities consist of numbers - whether or not the latter are specified. To go back to Bateson's initial quote, what would a numberless measurement of length, for example, be?

As to Bateson's latest quote, interesting as it is to read, it only speculates without evidencing what is speculated.

Just found this on line:

https://www.quantamagazine.org/animals-can-count-and-use-zero-how-far-does-their-number-sense-go-20210809/

it starts:

An understanding of numbers is often viewed as a distinctly human faculty — a hallmark of our intelligence that, along with language, sets us apart from all other animals.

But that couldn’t be further from the truth. Honeybees count landmarks when navigating toward sources of nectar. Lionesses tally the number of roars they hear from an intruding pride before deciding whether to attack or retreat. Some ants keep track of their steps; some spiders keep track of how many prey are caught in their web. One species of frog bases its entire mating ritual on number: If a male calls out — a whining pew followed by a brief pulsing note called a chuck — his rival responds by placing two chucks at the end of his own call. The first frog then responds with three, the other with four, and so on up to around six, when they run out of breath.

Practically every animal that scientists have studied — insects and cephalopods, amphibians and reptiles, birds and mammals — can distinguish between different numbers of objects in a set or sounds in a sequence. They don’t just have a sense of “greater than” or “less than,” but an approximate sense of quantity: that two is distinct from three, that 15 is distinct from 20. This mental representation of set size, called numerosity, seems to be “a general ability,” and an ancient one, said Giorgio Vallortigara, a neuroscientist at the University of Trento in Italy.

And it gets better as you read the article.

But wait, what if all this is not counting but "pattern or rhythm recognition"? I'll skip on this debate.

Instead, you could reply to what I initially asked.

Either via the idealism of Platonic Realism or the materialism of today's mainstream views, how can one have numbers in the complete absence of discrete amounts of givens - i.e., of quantities? (if nothing else, there would yet be a quantity of numbers by the shear presence of the number(s) addressed) — javra

So, we can have exactly three tomatoes, but we cannot have exactly three kilograms or cubic centimeters of tomatoes. — Janus

I of course accept this, but so far fail to see its significance.

Rather than focusing on the absolute exactitude of things in the physical world (which I would grant does not exist, all of it being in flux and such - tomatoes very much included), I'd instead focus on the discreetness of physical givens as discerned by awareness. Something which, as an indefinite amount of something, we commonly term quantity in the English language. Which we then use numbers to more precisely quantify in definite manners.

I don't know the background of the guy you've quoted. Is the guy trying to conceive of what reality is like, or would be like, in the complete absence of all awareness in the cosmos? As one avenue of enquiry into this: under the a materialist's reductionist microscope where everything material (i.e., everything) is reducible to the quantum vacuum, in the absence of awareness discreteness would be hard to specify, if at all present. Sure. But then in a world devoid of all awareness so too would numbers not be present.

The exactitude of numbers has everything to do with awareness's aptitudes - especially here addressing that of humans - the very same awareness which discerns discreteness, and hence quantity, in the physical world (to not mention in is own thoughts, in its own emotions, in it own perceptions, etc.).

Take that meter I previously addressed: its composed of ever moving quantum parts; it, as a physical meter stick, has no absolute exactitude. And yet it is not simply an absolutely precise, abstract, free floating number; it instead is a discrete amount of something, a quantity - which we address in definite terms via use of numbers. Hence, "there is one meter stick there".

At any rate, in reference to what seems to be your disagreement with my stance that you've previously quoted:

Either via the idealism of Platonic Realism or the materialism of today's mainstream views, how can one have numbers in the complete absence of discrete amounts of givens - i.e., of quantities? (if nothing else, there would yet be a quantity of numbers by the shear presence of the number(s) addressed)

Again, in reference to what I initially said, the physical reality we know of entails the presence of quantity and, due to this, of number, (the later at least for us linguistic animals). (As an apropos, ravens and other animals are known to be able to count, obviously this without the use of language, via which numbers are specified).

Between two and three, there is a jump. In the case of quantity, there is no such jump; and because jump is missing in the world of quantity, it is impossible for any quantity to be exact. You can have exactly three tomatoes. You can never have exactly three gallons of water. — Janus

Alright, so you're saying (via your quote) that tomatoes are not quantifiable?

As to the "exactness" of what a gallon consists of, this applies to all measurements in general, doesn't it? As in "exactly 1 yard or meter" doesn't quite exist in every day physical reality - other than good enough approximations - but only occurs as an abstracted concept ... much the same as a (perfect) circle doesn't occur in physical reality. Take the standard meter by which all measuring devices (say, a tape measure) are measured and built, place this very standard on any flat surface: which molecules pertain to the meter and which don't? And then there's smaller constituents of the physical. Its exactness doesn't occur in physicality.

Till shown otherwise, I'm calling BS on the quote's contents. One can't have numbers (such that they mean anything) in the absence of quantity, I still say.

My belief is that our every rational act is suffused with such judgements of sameness and difference, is/is not, equals/unequal. And because it structures our cognition, these are also inherent in reality as experienced by us. — Wayfarer

I'm in agreement. Could try to splurge on the idea a little, but am thinking this would only muddle matters.

However, in relation to what has been so far discussed by me, on one hand there is the issue of whether the law of identity is immutable for all awareness and, thus, for all consequent thought. Then, on the other hand, there is the issue of whether physical reality in fact does conform to this same principle: that what is X at time t cannot in the same respect be non-X at time t - not just epistemically but also onticaly.

Since we're all quite familiar with introductory notions of quantum mechanics, this issue, for instance, can then apply to the wave-particle duality of quantum particles: Is a particle a particle at time t when its so measured to be? Is this so called "measurement" only a best inference - rather than an immediate percept of what is - that can thereby be mistaken (due to mistaken reasoning) in the identity of what is being measured - such that what's measured is neither strictly particle nor wave, but something different? Or is it, in physical reality, both a strict particle and a strict wave simultaneously and in the same respect - contradictory though this is? But the latter can then signify that a chair can ontically be a swimming pool at the same time and in the same way - and so so much for reasoning.

For those of us who don't know how to "shut up and just do the math", how one address the law of identity as an existential given - one that might be applicable to physical reality at large as well as all our awareness - will directly impact one's possible choices in perspective regarding this issue of particle-wave duality just mentioned.

I don't have a ready answer for this issue up my sleeve - just my convictions. And this subject is probably a distraction for the thread's primary theme. All the same, it's interesting stuff to me - ontologically speaking.

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Edit: BTW, thanks for the head's up as to the historic background to the law of identity. I misspoke in that previous post you quoted from: the principle was known of prior to Aristotle.

Is there some other sense in which the logic we imbue these artifacts with is eternal and unchanging? If so, it's something different from what we've been talking about. — Srap Tasmaner

Yes to the first; no to the second.

That said, thanks for the informative reply. What you say of logic makes sense, but then, it also unintentionally equivocates what is at issue – this at least in terms of the dilemma I’ve repeatedly presented.

It hence equivocats between logic proper and that which it necessarily depends upon: the basic laws of thought, of which I exemplified the most fundamental of these: the law of identity.

Logic – here presuming we’re addressing formal logic and not informal logic – is largely axiomatically founded. With most of these axioms being creations which we for whatever reason (a best inference, a shot in the dark, and so forth) thereby fabricate and then build logical systems upon. It is because of this that different systems of (formal) logic can be obtained (consistent, paraconsistent, etc.). In comparison, informal logic is simply the process of solving problems in linear, step-by-step manners of thought – irrespective of how this might come about – and so is for the most part equivalent to rationality and reasoning.

Either type, however, would not be able to be engaged in in any manner whatsoever if not for our utterly fundamental manner of being aware – this in respect to anything, including of empirical givens (e.g., the sky’s color), of introspective givens (e.g., a felt emotion), of proprioceptive givens (a felt pain), and so forth. Fully innate to all aspects of our awareness is something that is so utterly basic, so utterly necessary, that quite a few might be at a loss for why it should be presented as a law that we follow to begin with. Namely: Anything (e.g., an entity, a process, a quality, a property, etc.; else, a set of any of the aforementioned or mixture of these; and so forth) one is aware of at time t can only be at time t the very same given one is aware of – this in comparison to being both itself and something other at the same time and in the same respect. E.g., when one (consciously) strictly focuses on X at time t one does not – cannot - then strictly focus (consciously) on Y at time t (needless to add, this in the same respect).

This is (of if one prefers, appears to be) a property of all awareness – hence, derivatively, of all possible conscious thought (one cannot think without being aware of one’s thought(s)). It is not something that some person decided one day to concoct as an axiom thinking that, upon its being so axiomatized, it might then be put to use as foundation for further reasoning by him/herself and others. It is not something that can be invented by some awareness that, at some initial time of its creation, lacked the very ability addressed.

It is then termed a law – not because some individual or cohort decided to make it a law for others to follow – but because it is deemed to be an immutable governing factor of all possible awareness (and, hence, of all possible thought).

Becoming, if you’d like, meta-aware of this innate aspect of all awareness is a discovery of what is and has always been – but an awareness does not need to be endowed with this meta-awareness in order to be aware and, thus, to be governed by this, so traditionally termed, law of identity.

I know of those who doubt the reality of the LNC. I have yet to learn of any philosopher or non-philosopher who in any way doubts the law of identity as just specified.

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Hopefully I’ve addressed the law of identity more clearly this time around than I did when I was replying to the issue of infants’ lack of recognition of object identity (which, again, is a complex concept which we likely learned as infants via trial and error and which we adults entertain habitually in mostly unthinking manners – but which could not be obtained in the absence of that property of awareness just specified, i.e. in the absence of the law of identity).

If so, then the question should be addressed not in terms of logic but, again, in terms of the basic laws of thought upon which all forms of logic are contingent. To further simplify things, I'll here strictly address the law of identity (as it was just described):

Can – or, better asked, does – this utterly innate law of identity change over time?

If so, on what grounds can we consider any aspect of our current thought process to arrive at any existential truth – such as that of materialism (for example)?

If not, how can materialism account for this utterly immutable governing principle of all awareness?

I’m currently tired, so my bad if I’m reading you wrong. You reply as though I’m pushing you into buying something and you’re not yet prepared to buy it – but I have nothing to sell. I’ve simply presented my fallible perspective. I’ve by now expressed my views repeatedly, and at this point find the prospect of doing so once more to likely not be beneficial for anyone. So I’ll now ask you in turn for your own perspective:

Do you find that the basic laws of thought are fixed for everyone today, yesterday, and tomorrow?

If so, on what coherent materialism-based grounds do you so conclude?

If not, on what coherent grounds do you find that reasoning and logic can serve as means for discerning what is real?

although I do wonder why the problem with angels is that they're not physical and the problem with numbers is nothing at all. — Srap Tasmaner

Yea, one way to tersely address this is that the cogency of scientific knowledge is in many ways contingent on the occurrence of numbers but couldn't care less about the occurrence or non-occurrence of angels. Numbers - more accurately, quantity - is something the occurrence of a physical reality essentially entails (otherwise one would have a quantity-devoid, partless, etc. reality - which is not what the physical presents itself to be). Angels, on the other hand, are not essentially entailed by the physical reality we all share.

And naturalism gets around this, on your view, by countenancing laws of thought as "natural, though immaterial, givens," that is, you get to rely on logical inference and the materialist does not. Is that your position? — Srap Tasmaner

No, it is not. My position - which I think I've repeated one too many times already in this thread - is that the logical inferences of materialists when it comes to their metaphysics result in the conclusion that all logical inferences are relative - such that one might as well declare that "to each their own equally valid logic and reasoning". In contrast, maybe there is some impartial, nonfabricated set of rules, laws, or principles that we all must adhere to when it comes to logic and reasoning if we are to pragmatically survive - immaterial thought these might be - such that 2 + 2 does not equal 5 no matter how much one tries to make it happen.

That makes such a law a fact about the universe (if I understand "ontic occurrence" as you intended). — Srap Tasmaner

Yes, its an accurate interpretation of my view.

(1) What is the real difference between such a law and other natural laws, such as the laws of thermodynamics?

(2) How can we tell whether such a law happens to hold in our universe, or whether it must hold? What would make it necessary, and how could we know? — Srap Tasmaner

As apokrisis illustrates, these questions will be contingent on one's - hopefully self-consistent and explanatory power endowed - metaphysical worldview. (I'm myself still working on expressing the worldview I have in mind. It's a very long ways from being finalized, but it's what the website in my profile points to - this to be transparent and not seem to be posturing. Rather than trying to engage in detailed explanations of my, sometimes unorthodox, metaphysical perspectives in a forum format, I'll just point to that website and leave it at that.)

As to (1), I follow Peirce's view and hold that the former is existentially fixed while the later is in a perpetual process of (very gradual) development - such that the latter depends on the former, but while I take both to be fully natural.

As to (2), as I've previously expressed, the optimal explanatory power that will result from such a worldview would in this case evidence (always fallibly) that the law must and does hold in our the universe (or in the cosmos, if one prefers).

Whatever the correct, reality-conformant answer to these questions might in fact be, however, in relation to this thread, the pivotal issue remains: how can materialism and physicalism uphold their own rational validity when their rational validity is (for reasons so far discussed) undermined by the very metaphysical stance they maintain?

Your version of naturalism countenances immaterial entities so long as -- what exactly? They are not traditionally identified as supernatural? — Srap Tasmaner

Can you better explain what you mean by "immaterial entities" in this context? Would these include things like numbers, natural laws, and teloi (e.g., intentions)? Or do you by the term intend things like angels, deities, and forest fairies? As to the latter, they would again not be consistent with what I take naturalism to be - this due to not being explicable in terms of the physical and what the physical essentially entails. However, as to the former, tmk they are not amenable to scientific investigation - by which I understand the empirical sciences' use of the scientific method - but are nevertheless aspects of reality writ large upon which all at least modern scientific investigation depends. And, personally, I do take the former set to consist of natural, though immaterial, givens - hence to quality as natural aspects of the nature which naturalism demarcates.

Can they reason yet? Hard to say, but they express surprise when there's no object where they expect one, so the predictive machinery is certainly running already, it just doesn't need object identity to get going. — Srap Tasmaner

Object identity is not an identical property to that of what the law of identity stipulates. I'd like to rephrase the latter (for better clarity) in this way: every X that we can be in any way aware of - be it an abstract given, a concrete given, a percept, or anything else - can only be X, this at the same time and in the same respect. This whether or not one is consciously aware of this property of thought (quite arguably as most, if not all, philosophers prior to Aristotle were consciously ignorant of this property - to give just one example). As far as we can fathom, lesser animals, though not consciously aware of this property of thought as a concept, can only think via its occurrence (e.g., unless one considers them to be automatons, a predator thinks, aka reasons - forethought included - in terms of how to best capture prey that is evading and holds the potential to injure the predator, either singularly or by working cooperatively as a team - obviously this without use of language; apes however give the best known examples, including of holding "eureka moments" that occur after strict contemplation in respect to a problem. I know its arguable to philosophers, but I'll uphold this.)

So understood, the law of identity's operation (its praxis, not its theory) is required for an understanding of what an object's identity is, but does not necessitate the latter. The latter is a complex concept and, thus, abstraction regarding what is. So, for those lifeforms that don't recognize the object identity of relevant objects instinctively (unthinkingly, this via genetic inheritance), it only makes sense that the aptitude is learned.

All this, I know, can be debated. But is by no means contradictory to either reason or empirical evidence. Back to the quote above: the "predictive machinery" which is surprised at there not being an object where an object is expected could not function in the absence of the law of identity as praxis. For then there would not be any "X" to be expected in the awareness of the infant.

What's relevant to a law of thought's occurrence is not our conceptual grasp of it as such but that it ontically occurs. It is only in this manner that laws of thought can be discovered - rather then invented - by us.

Might help me make sense of them if you compared your use of the terms "materialism" and "naturalism". (I've never been very comfortable arguing the merits of isms, hence my reliance on whales and infants and play-writing hominids.) — Srap Tasmaner

In brief, to my mind, materialism specifies that everything that is or can be is fully reducible to, and emergent from, insentient material constituents. Naturalism, on the other hand, specifies that all which does and can occur is that which is natural - thereby nature at large - this in contrast to that which is deemed to not be natural (again, for example, angels, deities, forest fairies, etc.). Materialism mandates naturalism of a certain kind, but naturalism is not limited to the possibility of materialism.

something in javra's phrasing really crystallized the choice for me, a heaven of eternal logic versus naturalism — Srap Tasmaner

Ha! But then on what grounds would - needless to add, insentient - global constraints on what is and can be (the Heraclitean logos, so to speak, since it would occur in the so called heavens just as much as in the bowels of the earth and in everything in-between) then be validly defined as unnatural? Else expressed, as "non-naturalistic"?

This "heaven of eternal logic versus naturalism" (if I interpret the expression right) so far seems to me a false choice, since to me the two are not mutually exclusive by necessity. Such Heraclitean logos of sorts, if in fact existent, then being part and parcel of nature - the very same by which naturalism is defined.

If I'm missing out on something - other than the implicit status quo stance of materialism/physicalism - I'd like to be made aware of it.

I’ve noticed that Apokrisis tends to acknowledge only those aspects of Peirce’s philosophy which are pragmatically useful for modelling semiotic relationships whilst often disavowing his broader idealism. — Wayfarer

Yea, I very much noticed that too. :smile:

Thomas Nagel put it, 'Even without God, the idea of a natural sympathy between the deepest truths of nature and the deepest layers of the human mind, which can be exploited to allow gradual development of a truer and truer conception of reality, makes us more at home in the universe than is secularly comfortable'. — Wayfarer

I find this quote quite beautiful. :up:

If you have further thoughts, do post, and I'll try to give better responses later. — Srap Tasmaner

Well, OK. Maybe this is nothing worthy of debate. All the same:

As a fallibilist, I'm as confident as one can be that no one can ever infallibly settle this (or any other) issue - namely, that of it being possible to have a world devoid of ontically fixed laws of thought (or, at the very least, some ontically fixed law(s) to the like). Laws that therefore don't emerge out of constituent stuff, whatever this "stuff" might be - but instead "just are" and thus govern what is.

So - in keeping with the pragmatism that I myself uphold - the previously mentioned issue regarding laws of thought can then only be satisfactorily resolved via (not infallible proof, but) optimal explanatory power. Then:

If no inconsistencies are found in the dilemma I've provided, the claim that materialism (at least as its currently understood by most, and as it was addressed in my first post today) is a sound metaphysics can only end up being a self-refuting logical, or rational, proposal - for it results in a nihilism in relation to logic and reason (and/or rationality) which then negates its own logical, or rational, validity as a metaphysics. In short, materialism does not present a self-consistent explanation for the way things are - and, due to this, lacks cogent explanatory power.

Pragmatically, the following holds: optimal explanatory power evidences the, always fallible, and always to be improved, truth of theories.

By this I then conclude on pragmatic grounds the following: materialism must then be an erroneous stance.

Hence, in sum: ontic reality could only validly be non-materialist (else here expressed, non-physicalist, this again as physicalism is typically understood).

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Note that I'm not one to equate either pragmatism or, more importantly, naturalism to materialism. So I maintain that both the former can be viably held in a non-materialist (else, non-physicalist) world view.

But, as a maybe important caveat to this given for the sake of frankness: Yes, the latter specified world view can also - not validate, but - logically allow for the possibility of the supernal (a view that is contradicted by naturalism). This possibility, however, would clearly remain outside the purview of the empirical sciences ... which as study can only address that which is objectively manifest and so equally apparent to all (this in principle if not also in practice). So, just as it currently is, the possibility of the supernal would remain an empirically unverifiable belief at best (or worst?) consisting of unverifiable personal experiences ... or, otherwise, an impossible to infallibly validate disbelief, this in cases where naturalism is being maintained.

That said, personally, I couldn't give a hoot as to whether or not anything supernal (e.g., angels, deities, forest fairies, etc.) might ontically be, same with the possible occurrence of extraterrestrial aliens. What I deem most important is unbiased reasoning and, maybe more importantly than this, ethical conduct. Well, just saying.

So I'll put my chips on what seems to me a naturalist and pragmatist view, and find some way to fight off the threat of nihilism. — Srap Tasmaner

:grin: :up: Fair enough.

And since you're at work, I won't push too much in this direction. All the same, even if what you say might be true in regard to alternative worlds, it would still remain a reality that we - here, in the world we inhabit - could only fathom any such alternative world only if it were to abide by the law of identity, and then other laws of thought that could be argued derivatives of this one.

At any rate, thanks for the compliment! (Re: it being a good question :razz: )

apokrisis would have me say that even logic is just habitual, patterns of inference that have proved their worth, but he's got a whole metaphysics that makes that the natural move, and I'm not there yet. — Srap Tasmaner

BTW, while I can't speak for apokrisis's metaphysical outlook, Peirce would have it that laws of nature evolve as global habits exactly via globally fixed laws, else expressed, principles - hence, via metaphysically fixed global principles that supersede natural laws and which are not themselves emergent from the latter: Peirce has a trifold system to this effect and - something that apo so far has disallowed in my conversations with him - the principle of Agapism as ultimate cosmic goal. Such that neither of these are emergent habits of the cosmos but, instead, are the immutable global principles via which the habits of effete mind (i.e., of physicality and its natural laws) evolve.

Short answer is that I wouldn't write these with a slash between them. Logic is a system of relations among propositions; reasoning is something people do, and they can do it well ("logically") or poorly ("illogically"). — Srap Tasmaner

I've addressed both of them, with a slash for concision of expression, in that the occurrence of both are dependent on basic laws of thought. (edit: this irrespective of how either term might be interpreted, given both terms' multiple meanings)

So the dilemma I've presented remains: namely, either the soundness of materialism's position which inevitably results in a nihilism of both reasoning and logic (that, I'll add, can then be applied to materialism itself) or, else, the necessity that materialistic metaphysics is, in some way, erroneous.

Here in reference to the OP’s basic contention:

Do you uphold that the basic principles/laws of thought which Aristotle brought to light are emergent properties of ever-reducible matter that, thereby, can then change with changes in the ordering of their underlying constituents of matter?

This would be in line with materialism: that laws of thought are the mutable constructs of purely material constituents. But it would also logically entail that all principles of logic/reasoning are, when ontologically addressed, a relativistic free for all—this relativity existing in relation to the order of underlying material constituents from which these principles of thought emerge—a relativism that, again, is thereby devoid of any impartial, existentially fixed standards (in the form of principles or laws) by which all variants of logic/reasoning manifest. This then being a conclusion that I take to be at the very least an unnerving suggestion; one could express it as inevitably leading into a nihilism or reasoning—i.e., in respect to logic as an authoritative means of discerning what is real or true and what is not.

The alternative doesn’t then necessitate that biology, genotypical evolution, and a concurrent phenotypical evolution of behavior (with the generality of “behavior” including that of (reason-adherent) cognition) are in any way bogus. (I, for one, uphold that lesser animal can and do utilize reasoning to various lesser degrees). Instead, it would only necessitate that the materialist paradigm (including its just aforementioned entailment of relativity in relation to laws of thought) is mistaken as a metaphysical outlook.

Yes, I suppose the issue is to me fully metaphysical regardless of the perspectives one may hold in relation to it. All the same, no worries. I was just passing through.

“Reason” to me is a fairly ambiguous concept, and so then too is the notion of “rationality”. As one minor hint of this: The irrational argument is yet engaged in reasoning, albeit in false or wrong or inaccurate ways, and so it is not arational—for it yet makes use of the laws of thought to obtain its conclusions. On the other hand, to add to this ambiguity, and with a pointer to Janus’s comments, I don’t see rationality as distinct from emotions—finding emotions to hold their sub/unconscious reasoning and, conversely, finding all conscious reasoning to be hewed, if not governed, by emotive dispositions, ranging from overt forms like animosity or compassion to more subtle forms like sereneness, or wonder, or curiosity.

At any rate, due to the just mentioned, I would present what I take to be the OP’s underlying stance differently, this by addressing the issue of truth. (intending to come full circle at the end)

For lack of equivocation, by truth I’m referring to the generalized sum of all individual truths regardless of their type (e.g., abstract or concrete), such that an individual truth is understood to be an instance of conformity to that which is actual, aka that which is real. If this is too abstract in its given terse form, then I’ll here yield to the correspondence theory of truth. Given this:

Is all truth thus understood a fabricated creation or, otherwise, is it a brute aspect of the world that is thereby uncreated?

Of note, when we willfully fabricate what others then accept to be a truth, we as a society term this a deception, aka a lie. So, then, for the theistically minded, are all the mundane truths we accept and live by the fabrication—one can here technically say, the deception—of an omnipotent psyche (thus, an omnipotent deceiver)? On the other hand, for the atheistically minded, is truth an emergent condition fabricated from, i.e. created by, mindless subatomic particles and forces that themselves emerge from a quantum vacuum field as these engage in an emergent process of biological evolution—such that the referent to the term “truth” changes (evolves) with time, never holding any definitive existential property but, instead, only being (often enough, the changing) fabricated stories we tell ourselves about it?

Plenty from both camps will answer “yes, all truths are fabricated/created”, but then the relativism that unfolds either way becomes detrimental to human welfare. The deceptions of the despotically minded become the lived, incarnate truths of the populous—and opposition to these created truths become collectively condemned at the long-term expense of all. As one example, that climate change is a global hoax becomes truth because some autocrats so state (in large part to keep their wallets fat) and because others so choose to believe. And yet, the nonfabricated truth that it is not a hoax yet pulls us into the inevitable.

On the other hand, if one answers that truth is not a created fabrication, then there will be something more to existence than what physicalism proposes, as the OP suggests. And yes, this can be characterized as Platonism or Neoplatonism wherein the Good is the ultimate truth (and vice versa), and can be furthermore shunned on account of this presently unorthodox view.

But if truth where to be metaphysically uncreated, then this will resonate with the basic laws of thought: what is true can only be itself; it will thereby be impossible that two contradictory truths cooccur at the same time and in the same way; and in it will likewise be impossible that a proposition be both true and false at the same time and in the same way, entailing that the proposition can either be one or the other.

These basic, universal laws of thought will then form the foundations of all rationality. Here, then, rationality becomes a metaphysical derivative of the existential occurrence of (uncreated, rather than fabricated) truth. Nevertheless, truth and rationality can well be deemed in such an interpretation to be staple aspects of existence—this in line to a globally pervading logos—aspects toward whose greater comprehension the increased intelligence that occasionally gets selected for by evolutionary mechanisms develops toward.

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I’m still relatively short on time so I’ll likely not participate for long, and I know this post has some gaps in it. But I wanted to chime in a bit all the same, this in my support of the OP. Even if our perspectives might differ somewhat.

There's also this more recent study from 2019: Neural precursors of decisions that matter—an ERP study of deliberate and arbitrary choice. In summation of the abstract:

Our results and drift-diffusion model are congruent with the RP representing accumulation of noisy, random fluctuations that drive arbitrary—but not deliberate—decisions. They further point to different neural mechanisms underlying deliberate and arbitrary decisions, challenging the generalizability of studies that argue for no causal role for consciousness in decision-making to real-life decisions.

My take: no deliberation, no consciously made choice, and a significant Readiness Potential to evidence this; conversely, where there is conscious deliberation, there is no significant RP in the choice made, implying the possibility of free will. (there are interesting editorial notes affixed to the study, but this conclusion seems to me to stand)

I found the study online, but there might be more recent relevant research as well.

Well actually, this perfectly encapsulates the "shutting off" or rather "grappling of being" that humans must deal with. You see, we are not "there" (whatever we are aiming for with Nirvana and meditative practices) so we have to get "there". But why aren't we "there"? I'm sure you can use some tricky language and say, we are "there" we just don't realize it, but it is just inverting the same thing. We "don't realize it". So we aren't there. So yeah, we have the burden of not being there. Other animals are there. — schopenhauer1

No, I certainly don't believe we are there either. I should say, if there is such a "there" to begin with. And I think I see what you mean to convey in a roundabout way. But as to other animals already being there ... say, to add just one slant to things, that this "there" is (among other things) the zenith experience of beauty which in some way equates to the zenith of being in the zone; other animals have no cognizance of the beauty we humans can experience - with the experience of beauty being one possible instance of flow - much less of this experience's potential zenith. So, here, saying that other animals are already "there" would be a romanticized misnomer. There is a massive qualitative difference between a) what lesser animals experience by flow, b) what humans experience during moments of flow, and c) what this "there" of actualized, perfect, literally limitless flow could be.

Don't think this might change your perspective much, but I wanted to offer this alternative interpretation.

We are going to split hairs at this point because in theory, I have no preference for degree or kind. But the degree gets to be exponential once we factor in not just variation in culture, but the virtual worlds I am talking about. — schopenhauer1

I'm myself fully onboard with this notion: an "exponential" difference of degree. So maybe we don't have any major differences on this point after all. Again, my own view is that there is yet an evolutionary continuity despite the reality of this drastic differentiation - such that there is not metaphysical divide between lifeforms - but, as it now seems, that's neither here nor there in relation to the OP.

It is because of these "kinds" of capacities that we have that I think humans aren't necessarily "special" - not in the religious sense you were conveying with some elite status, but rather with existential burdens of self-awareness and self-motivational ways of going about the world. — schopenhauer1

I think this to be obvious, so I'm in agreement. In parallel, with great ability comes the burden of greater responsibility.

It is precisely when our brain "shuts off" that we seek the most value: "Flow states", "meditative states", "good night's sleep", "zoning out". — schopenhauer1

Interesting perspective. I find that being in the zone, or in flow states, is antithetical to zoning out. Yes, the questioning, chattering aspects of mind vanish in both cases, but in the first we are effortlessly (so to speak) accomplishing our goals. Wheres with the second we don't progress anywhere. For me, in an ideal case, all pondering and analyzing is to facilitate a smooth practice of being in the zone and so having "flow". Which, for me at least, is when life become most purposeful, for lack of better terms.

Other animals are already there. We have to constantly "get there" or "get caught up in something" to get there. — schopenhauer1

Here again I'd describe this in terms of degrees. Lesser animals can certainly feel anxiety, trepidation, lack of flow - this in due measure to their intelligence. But they certainly are nowhere near as prone to such unpleasant states of being as we humans are.

Reminds me of train of thought wherein ego is considered a in some fundamental sense a vice, lesser animals have less ego in due measure with their intelligence, and we humans - although having greater egos due to our greater intelligence than all other known lifeforms - endeavor for states of being that are evermore more egoless while yet maintaining the wisdom, or gnosis, that our intelligence gives us opportunity to obtain. To momentarily bring spiritual notions back into the discussion, notions of Nirvana or Brahman come to mind as just such egoless state of being which would be the pinnacle state of awareness to experience ... that is yet different in supposed quality from the reduced egos of lesser lifeforms.

Would this roundabout mindset be something that resonates with you?

Just remembered what I take to be another interesting tidbit. Gorillas might know how to use plants for medicinal purposes, though more research is required to establish that such plant use is intentional and ailment specific. But, if so, such knowledge could to my mind only be described as culturally transmitted. As a highlight from the link:

The most common medical problems that affect mountain gorillas are respiratory infections, diarrhea, and intestinal parasites. The main disease challenges for the local human population are similar. Surveys have shown that traditional healers who live near the park use up to 183 different plants, of which 110 grow wild in Volcanoes National Park and the remaining 73 are cultivated by people in their gardens. Of the 110 medicinal plants found in the park, 55 are known to be consumed by gorillas.
...
Researchers discovered, by using chromatography, that similar plant species contained a number of organic properties known to have positive effects against bacteria and parasites that cause diarrhea and respiratory diseases. These findings led to more questions for researchers: "Do the gorillas treat themselves by seeking specific plants, or does their constant intake of a variety of plant material end up being a preventive measure?" — https://gorillafund.org/uncategorized/do-gorillas-use-plants-as-medicine/

Yes agreed. But do other animals have this cognitively general processing unit? This kind is different not in its specialization but in its GENERALIZATION. It is this I'd like to focus on. This is quite different. We didn't get better at a set of innate things (echo location, egg flipping, great scent, etc.). We don't just have a set way we get the things we need to survive. But it's not just that, it is the fact that we have infinitely iterative ways of surviving. But not only that, it is based on the fact that as deliberative, language-based animals, we can create virtual worlds of internal culture, and personal value that we weigh our actions against, creating yet more exponentially different ways of being. This brain vastly plastic and continually iterative and learning from its learning about learning about learning. — schopenhauer1

We are the most generalist species that we know of by far. And clearly only humans communicate via the use of words. As to other animals having a lesser degree of generalized cognition ability than that which we have, chimpanzees immediately come to my mind. They exhibit an impressive amount of cultural variation in the wild. As one reference:

Abstract

As an increasing number of field studies of chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) have achieved long-term status across Africa, differences in the behavioural repertoires described have become apparent that suggest there is significant cultural variation1,2,3,4,5,6,7. Here we present a systematic synthesis of this information from the seven most long-term studies, which together have accumulated 151 years of chimpanzee observation. This comprehensive analysis reveals patterns of variation that are far more extensive than have previously been documented for any animal species except humans8,9,10,11. We find that 39 different behaviour patterns, including tool usage, grooming and courtship behaviours, are customary or habitual in some communities but are absent in others where ecological explanations have been discounted. Among mammalian and avian species, cultural variation has previously been identified only for single behaviour patterns, such as the local dialects of song-birds12,13. The extensive, multiple variations now documented for chimpanzees are thus without parallel. Moreover, the combined repertoire of these behaviour patterns in each chimpanzee community is itself highly distinctive, a phenomenon characteristic of human cultures14 but previously unrecognised in non-human species. — https://www.nature.com/articles/21415

Boldface mine.

Bonobos, or pygmy chimps, have tmk been studied a lot less in the wild, thought they exhibit a more developed cognition than chimps in captivity, as in learned symbolic communication (interestingly, they're also far more comfortable than chimps in walking upright - and, unlike chimps, they can also smile when feeling pleased). And we know far less about elephants and dolphins which could also hold cultural plasticity and, at least anecdotally, give evidence of advanced communication skills.

False dichotomy. I’m not implying nor would I imply anything like that. — schopenhauer1

I didn’t presume that you were. I did however, however mistakenly, presume that you were exploring the possibility of some type of metaphysical divide between humans and lesser animals - to which what you quoted of my post was supposed to be an analogy … since it does present one such form of a metaphysical divide. This notion of a metaphysical divide (however it might be envisioned) being something never found in what I take to be non-Abrahamic mindsets; for one example, such as in typical polytheistic systems wherein lesser lifeforms can be considered kindred spirits.

At any rate, while I don’t presume you filter the OP’s question via a theistic lens, it so far does seem to ask whether there occurs a metaphysical divide between lifeforms. Am I wrong in this?

When is something in evolution a difference in kind and not just a difference in degree? — schopenhauer1

To first address this question, without getting into the philosophy of biology in which problematics emerge regarding how a species should be demarcated, from a relative distance at least: the most rudimentary difference in kind among lifeforms occurs when speciation occurs. All members of a given species are the same kind of lifeform, and are differentiable from other species, these being different kinds of lifeforms - even if they all belong to the same genus. Whereas differences of degree that are devoid of differences in kind will, tmk, only be deemed to occur within a given species.

So appraised, Homo Sapiens are a unique kind of lifeform. But then so too are all other species of life out there. And all species evolve, sometimes speciating into new kinds, given a sufficient period of time and given that they don’t perish.

At what point do you think that this general processing ability- whereby there is much plasticity in how we behave and thus plasticity in our ways of survival, makes this ability some thing that is a difference in kind not just a degree in evolutionary, biological, and psychological terms? — schopenhauer1

This question is to my mind strictly philosophical rather than being a biological or evolutionary one.

For example, each individual organism is unique in certain respects, but this for most would be insufficient to declare that each individual organism is its own kind of lifeform. Similarly, should we declare the unique mathematical genius of a particular human, for instance, to be an intellect kind that is metaphysically divided from those of all other humans on account of its uniqueness? This rather than it being viewed by a difference in degree?

More generally, how can awareness, as an aspect of life, be deemed to not hold any continuity between different types, here meaning species, of lifeforms? With such an evolutionary continuity then also comes different degrees of magnitude of awareness and different degrees of quality of awareness. The ameba and the human then holding vast differences in their magnitude and quality of awareness despite there being a continuity between the two - such that the differences in their awareness could be deemed a matter of degree on a very extreme spectrum.

Philosophically, I strongly favor there being a continuity among the psyches of different species of life, including that of humans. But I don’t know how to convincingly make this point to somehow inclined to view humans via, for lack of a better analogy, a Biblical-like metaphysics wherein a supposed existential division of being occurs between soul-endowed humans and soul-devoid lesser lifeforms. (To me, either all life is endowed with an evolutionary continuity of soul/anima or else no life is endowed with soul - but I see neither evidence nor logical cohesion for there being a division between lifeforms with a soul and lifeforms devoid of soul.)

I greatly value the perspectives you’ve been sharing.

I should maybe preface my reply with one example of what I envision by a more perfect meritocratic governance. First, in a democratic society wherein all adult individuals are of relatively equal ability, public offices could be awarded via lottery for optimal fairness—as was in large part the case in ancient Athens. That said, in contrast, in a democratic society wherein individuals are not of a relatively equal ability, a “rule by merit” could be in part established in the following manner: for individuals to be able to run for public office they would first need to pass a number of pre-established tests in subject matter competency. Topics could include history, law, ecology, etc., and would be democratically established. If these general subject tests are not passed, one could not then run for public office—with citizens voting only among those individuals that evidence minimum background knowledge regarding the offices they pursue. One can consider this a small piece of a more general idea that intends to oppose what the satirical movie Idiocrocy alludes to (a comedy to which I find a number of unfortunate truths). In this proposed (fraction of a) work-in-progress model, there would be a political elite selected based on merit—to which all citizens would/should have roughly equal opportunity to pertain—whose evident privilege would be that of rulership for the limited terms that are democratically allotted to each public office.

This, again, in attempt to better depict what I envision as a democratic “rule by merit”. But, yes, devil’s in the details.

To push this point home, I’d say that if you do supplement your idea, or ideal, of meritocracy with conditions with respect to how the economy works—and you produce something like an ideal of social democratic meritocracy—then there is nothing much left for the idea of meritocracy to do, because what is crucial here is a vision of real equality of opportunity where merit is valued, and “meritocracy” is left merely emphasizing the -cracy, i.e., rule, which I know is not really the thrust of your concept.

If that’s unconvincing, then merely as a practical move I think it would be wise to abandon the idea, because of the way it functions in the real world. Meritocracy can be achieved only by opposing meritocracy. note — Jamal

A very valid point. I'll keep it in mind better from now on.

The good but difficult points I still have to answer concern the need to reward merit and the need for incentives. But I’ll leave you with this: a meritocracy is by definition an oligarchy of talent, so it is essentially anti-egalitarian. From this perspective, maybe what you are arguing for is not really meritocracy at all? — Jamal

Due to you're insightful critique I'm currently struggling with this question myself.

Thanks again for your views.

Thanks for taking the time to reply in such an in-depth manner. It’s appreciated.

As to discussions regarding capitalism, I’m not intent on engaging in disagreements regarding a) what capitalism is in our entrenched economic model (a system that when devoid of governmental regulations will gleefully make use of forced child labor and other types of either direct or indirect slavery) verses b) what capitalism could be in terms of a more humanitarian system comprised of, I will here stress, a healthy competition in relation to private ownership of means of production for gain (i.e., for profit in far more than a merely monetary sense). Here interpreting the sweat, tears, and/or blood of an individual in their labors to produce X in itself being “a means of production” that is “the private belonging and hence ownership (so to speak)” of the individual in question. I foresee this could easily get relatively deep into debates regarding the validity of certain notions about the human psyche that today's capitalism both depends on and also skews toward a (non-metaphysical) materialism wherein all prosperity is defined via a monetary value, and I unfortunately don’t currently have the luxury of enough time to engage in such debates in any meaningful sense. I’ll instead strictly keep to the issue of meritocracy.

Do correct me if I’m wrong about this but, in reading in-between the lines of your post, I gather that you deem Marxism opposed to compensation based on merit. This being the central motivation for my last post. That mentioned, to address some of your points:

Meritocracy is bad in two senses. One is that it works as a myth, so that the very idea of meritocracy hides the truth (this is like Marx’s attitude to the idea of egalitarianism). But the other sense is more profound: a society stratified by income and status on the basis of skill and work might not be such a good thing after all. — Jamal

As to meritocracy being a myth. Yes, the term “meritocracy”—just as “communism”—can easily become perverted so as to fit Orwellian propaganda. Communist states arguably were never communist—for, though all comrades were supposed to be equal in worth, some comrades were always deemed “more equal” than others and materially profited accordingly (sometimes, such as can be exemplified by Romania’s Nicolae Ceausescu, to exorbitant degrees). In like manner, the myth of meritocracy which you’ve repeatedly mentioned can to my mind only consist of the roundabout notion of “this system we’ve got is the pinnacle of meritocracy in action—despite all appearances to the contrary—so don’t question the status quo and let those in power do their thing”. Otherwise, (a perfected) meritocracy is, and can only be, a target aimed at—from which we can gauge what needs improvement. To call this target a “myth” would be equivalent to calling any ideal that can be held a myth, including that of “health”. Is the ideal of “being healthy” valueless or a myth—here in the sense of being a falsity—on grounds that it is unreachable in absolute form? I take it that most would answer “no”; that all can distinguish better health from worse, and that we all would desire to be relatively healthy if we’re not—thereby making the ideal of health something substantial, even if unobtainable in perfect form.

In this light, I don’t view the concept of meritocracy as a myth but as an ideal worth struggling for—again, this as much as health (or, else, a healthy economy and politics) is an ideal that is worth pursuing. What I then mean by “a meritocratic economy” is not some Orwellian system that claims to so be while simultaneously not so being (requiring its double-think) but an economic system that—while not perfectly—does facilitate a functional meritocracy; one which thereby can become even more meritocratic in time, despite this being very gradual.

Then there was the other theme of stratification resulting from meritocracy being a bad that works against egalitarianism.

This is a moral point of view but also a pragmatic one: social stratification leads to inequalities of not only income but also opportunity, thus it tends to negate the equality of opportunity that meritocracy ideally depends on. — Jamal

One key ingredient to egalitarianism is equal opportunity (imperfect though it might be). But we are, I think, addressing this in realistic terms: An individual cannot be a specialist in all societal fields simultaneously for the entirety of their lives—much less can all people of a society fit this just expressed model. So equal opportunity cannot be equated to the possibility that all people are actualized in all societal roles.

I think it might help if I were to address hunter-gatherer tribes—these typically being the most egalitarian societies we (or at least I) currently know of. Here, the abilities and efforts of some will see them specialized into hunters and others into gatherers as adults, and some can further specialize in other fields, such as medicine. Doubtless, within many of these fields, further specializations can occur. To my knowledge, more often than not, these tribes are informally democratic. Personal gain in the form of trust, respect, and material possessions does occur for individuals. But individuals typically view themselves as parts of a collective. So the wellbeing of an individual is viewed as in large part contingent on the wellbeing of the collective. What we formally have as taxes for the purpose of benefiting the democratic state and all people therein, these tribes simply hold to be the fraternity of giving to those in need or in want from one’s own resources. But one must first acquire goods (in the sense of food, knowledge, artifacts, and other valuables here not equated to moneys) in order to distribute them to others. Much like one ought first put on the oxygen mask in an airplane before assisting others with theirs, the collective tribe must first acquire goods by the abilities and efforts of the individuals within prior to having these individuals give to other members of the tribe. The medicine-man gains the opportunity to heal others of the tribe at expense of loosing opportunity to, for example, be deemed the best hunter of gazelles. But both medicine-man and best hunter of gazelles—while being respectively compensated based on merit for their respective skills and efforts in terms of trust, respect, and material possessions—will teach others of like ability and enterprise to be as good as themselves if not better. Here, equal opportunity implies that all children of the tribe are encouraged to maximally develop their own inherent skills—as contrasted to oppressing the potential of certain children so as to further the potential of others.

OK, I acknowledge this is a very incomplete appraisal. For starters I’m here focusing on male roles of the hunter-gatherer tribe (which as tribe can often enough be matriarchal). But this won’t be a dissertation, only a post intending to better illustrate my view on the matter: The relatively egalitarian societies of hunter-gatherer tribes are stratified in specialty of societal roles, but (at least as I interpret them) this in relatively meritocratic means that allow for a fluidity within tribal relations.

The ideal hear is that—while not all potential will be actualized by all members of the given society as individuals develop from children into adults—no potential will be systematically oppressed by members of the society so as to biasedly grant other members of the society greater gains (this, again, at the expense of those individuals whose potential is actively oppressed). That all peoples' potential be encouraged to develop as much as possible. And in this, I find a pragmatic approach to the ideal of (a perfectly) equal opportunity for all members of society.

If the society were to be honestly meritocratic, then, to my way of seeing, an ever increasing proximity to equal opportunity for all in the sense just described would be enacted, this despite the resulting fluid stratification of roles and their respective compensations.

In other words, even for a society of equal opportunity, where ideal meritocracy might work, I want to ask: why should those who are naturally more able or inclined to produce useful things gain any privilege at all? That they should gain effective positions and the concomitant authority: that I can see; but I can't see why they should gain better, richer lives, or even higher social status, unless perhaps the production of life's necessities is generally precarious and we need incentives (this is why communism is sometimes said to depend on a post-scarcity economy). — Jamal

For the same reason that, for example, the hunter which provides for the tribe has a better, richer life than the fellow tribesman whose leg was bitten off by a lion and who depends on the hunter for sustenance. Here, the two-legged hunter has greater privileges than the handicapped tribesman in terms of providing for the tribe, maybe in term of prospective lovers, and so forth. This, however, does not make the handicapped tribesman's life insignificant. If the latter, for example, is a good story (to not say myth) teller at campfires, or does his best to assist the tribe in the ways he can, then he too gains his own role-specific privilege, which is also based on merit.

As to incentives, don't we all require incentives of some form or another to do anything? The very notions of pleasure and pain come to mind, these being rudimentary incentives to all life. Why would someone invest well over a dozen years of intense study (and go into extreme debt) to become a doctor if their compensation at the end of it all would be indistinguishable from that of a warehouse worker's? I would agree that financial wealth might not be the most ideal of incentives for a doctor to so become, but I deem that there will need to be some benefit to being a doctor, such as prestige, that serves as incentive for all the effort required.

I’ll take a breather at this point. Feel like apologizing for length. Suffice it to say, it is easier to post as written then to spend time editing for brevity. Fingers crossed that a sufficient amount of clarity in what I intended to express is nevertheless there.

"He took that position for specific political reasons and I don’t feel the need to follow him in that, but it does contain the insight that rights are not enough in a world where material reality doesn’t allow for the full flourishing of every individual."
— Jamal

I'm in agreement with this.
— javra


Like I say, maybe we're not so far apart on this after all. — Jamal

I tend to think this might be true as well—even if we might hold different perspectives on certain topics.

Marx would have said that egalitarianism just is the false belief that a capitalist society can be the kind of society I just sketched, hence he rejected egalitarianism along with all talk of rights and justice. — Jamal

Interesting again, thanks.

As background for a, maybe all too naive, question on Marxism:

Speaking from a common folk understanding of capitalism, as I’m so far aware of it, the term can mean different things to different people (I’ve bumped into more than a few that reflexively equate it to democracy, for example; something I sharply disagree with). As for myself, though, I can’t find any other succinct label for a meritocratic economy other than that of “capitalism” – all the technicalities and history to this term aside. What I mean by this is that those who put in more effort into and have better skills at X become economically compensated for engaging in X more than those who do little if anything, lack knowhow, or both when engaging in X. As a theoretical ideal this may seem straightforward enough, but it would require societal movements toward a cessation of nepotism (be it racial, of economic class etc.); equal educational opportunities for all children, regardless of their parents’ background, to allow those who put in the greatest effort and hold the greatest knowhow to flourish … the list can go on.

I’m mentioning this because I so far find that an egalitarian society needs to be meritocratic (economically as well as politically) if it’s not to succumb to vices that undermine its long-term preservation. And this in turn would then result in certain societal hierarchies, fluid though they'd be. An authority (not to be confused with “authoritarianism” or authoritarian interests) in some discipline is then to ideally be trusted, respected, and economically compensated more than a trainee in the same field, for example – this, again, ideally based on due merit – with the further ideal that such an authority in a field works in good faith to best optimize the flourishing of those who are not as experienced in the given field.

Yes, this would, I believe, require a much more elevated moral compass of all citizens/members of an egalitarian society. But my main point to this is that an egalitarian society, to be successful in sustaining itself, can only result in a meritocratic specialization / stratification / hierarchy of roles (in large enough societies, each with its own due degree of economic compensation that in part roughly correlates the individual’s degree of societal responsibility toward other(s)) ... a hierarchy which, again, would be dynamic rather than static in nature.

Feel free to disagree, of course. But I do find this ideal to be a far cry from the capitalism of today, which does not check and balance itself against such things as monopolies (economically) and oligarchies (politically); with these in turn stopping those who hold potential to improve things via innovation from so doing; hence, with these ending meritocracy. To not here evoke today's capitalism essentially being a global pyramid structure which lacks the infinite resources it is modeled on. A different issue, though.

I only know of Marx and Engels indirectly, and have not read their works. So, the naive question:

What do you gather was (more aptly, would have been) Marx’s stance on a meritocratic economy? (The term “meritocracy” wasn’t coined until recently, and even then it was initially used as a pejorative label … this to argue against the very type of healthy competition and fluid stratification I was endorsing above as a needed aspect of any healthy egalitarian society – be it tribal or the prospect of one that is global.)

At the very least, he did hold that labor merited more than what it was getting. But I'd like better insight into the matter: would he have been opposed to people being compensated based on merit?

(BTW: Coming from a communist Stalinist background – I immigrated to the US from Romania as a preadolescent – the backlash against communism as ideology from many of those I’m close to stems, not only from the Stalinist, totalitarian surveillance-state mechanisms and the like, but also form the everyday experience that many who were lazy and inept benefited greatly on account of nepotism while those who worked hard and had much to offer where often not treated very well … especially if the latter were not members of the communist party. I should also add, I’m personally all for community-ism – which is how I rephrase my current understanding of the communist ideal when it comes it being theory on paper. Though, again, I don’t have much of any expertise in firsthand readings.)

He took that position for specific political reasons and I don’t feel the need to follow him in that, but it does contain the insight that rights are not enough in a world where material reality doesn’t allow for the full flourishing of every individual. — Jamal

I'm in agreement with this.

Are there other forms of idealism which are not antirealist? — 180 Proof

As I've mentioned, C.S. Peirce's objective idealism comes to mind. (the Wikipedia page isn't in-depth, but it does evidence the point)

Perhaps many of our fellows here on TPF feel the same? — Moliere

From what I recall reading in the thread, there are a few other forum members that do (that feel the principle choices between realism and idealism offer a false dichotomy).

The thought being that each thought should be treated individually, and feeling that our beliefs cannot fit the cookie cutters? — Moliere

:up: If I'm understanding you right, I for one endorse that. My own impression is that @Banno is a bit peeved that those who lean toward idealism haven't voted for idealism ... but, again, the dichotomy between realism and idealism can well be viewed as false. A kind of entrapment into mislabeling oneself.

The ultimate telos in Buddhism (if there is one) would be karma I think. — Janus

I've always thought of it being Nirvana: the point of the eight-fold path. Karma, from this vantage, would then only be a manifestation of either getting closer to Nirvana or further away from it based on actions of all kinds (mental as well as physical).

Does entanglement inherently involve consciousness or mind? — Janus

Not to my current thinking.

Anyway I'm still stuck in the inability to parse the notion of telos, without incorporating purposefulness. — Janus

I can see why. All teloi we are consciously aware of and motivated by in our day to day lives provide us with purpose, this by definition, I think.

But again, as concerns our discussion of metaphysics, more importantly for me is the issue of whether a metaphysical system can incorporate just such day to day intents into its structure of understanding.

Or are you making the stronger contention that those who did choose should engage in more critical thought? — Moliere

No. We all have our own mindsets and beliefs and critical justifications for these. Mine just don't fit the cookie cutter alternatives presented when one is taken to exclude the others, that's all. I wanted to emphasize that the "trepidation" interpenetration for not choosing "idealism" is a wrong conclusion for at the very least some of the forum members.