In any case all of this is kind of a red herring given the subject of discussion was concerning self-contradictory argumentation. — Janus

OK. Point taken. To then better address the issue you’re pursuing:

While I stand by the belief that the LNC is sound, it of itself is in no way prescriptive. If indeed sound, it is strictly descriptive of what is. So I so far don’t find that one can obtain an ought from the LNC.

That said, I’ll present the outline of an argument for why self-contradicting arguments are bad. First some simplistically expressed premises:

• Premise 1: The objective world is singular (hence, we don’t inhabit a world wherein two or more objective realities co-occur, if this is even possible to contemplate).
• Premise 2: This singular actuality, or reality, of the objective world we all partake of is itself coherently structured so as to comprise a unified whole. (This postulate can become complicated by the possibility of ontic randomness in part occurring in the world. But, even so, this random aspect of the cosmos would nevertheless here be an integral component of the unified whole which will interact with non-random aspects of the world so as to, again, result in a coherently structured, singular, objective reality.)
• Premise 3: The word “truth” references “conformity to that which is actual, i.e. real”.

I get that these premises can be debated and that they might be too simplistic in present format, but in here tentatively granting them all the same, the following then results. Truths will in such world never contradict; this because the singular and universal actuality, or reality, which truths conform to is itself coherently structured, hence consistent, hence noncontradictory. By comparison, an untruth will always be that which does not conform to what is actual and, because of this, two or more disparate untruths will always contradict each other – as well as contradicting that which with is actual.

Here, an expressed contradiction in one's reasoning will signify either that all but one of the contradicting parts do not conform to what is actual or that all the contradictory parts do not so conform. In short, a contradiction will here always entail a lack of conformity with what is actual.

Conversely, an argument that is devoid of self-contradiction then givens no indication of being untrue.

Further granting that what is sought is conformity with what is actual (that we seek what is true), then self-contradictions shall in this case always be bad due to always entailing untruths.

That said, there are other goals that individuals can pursue, some of which will find untruths and the resulting contradictions quite useful so as best fulfill said goals. As one example, we can tell untruths to a murderer so as safeguard a loved one. As a more unpleasant example, we would not be able to understand the psychology to Orwell’s 1984 (complete with the Ministry of Truth’s dictums of “War is Peace”, “Freedom is Slavery”, and “Ignorance is Strength”), nor find the story-line believable, were untruths to not be beneficial in sustaining autocratic power within everyday life.

This is a rough outline of a general perspective I hold. In summation, contradictions always evidence untruths. But whether untruths are good or bad will be fully dependent on the ends which one seeks to fulfill. (That said, none of the contradictions here expressed which result from untruths will themselves be the logical contradiction which the LNC states cannot occur - in so far as hypocrisy and doublethink can occur despite the LNC nevertheless holding.)

In short, I don't agree with Einstein's assessment because if it is true that light really is both a wave and a particle, then the difficulty is not that that is a contradiction, but that due to our lack of some relevant understanding it is merely the case that it might appear to be a contradiction. — Janus

Remember, these are models of the quantum realm, models that have a very high degree of predictive value, but models just the same. In Einstein's quote, he doesn't say that reality is contradictory but that we have contradictory pictures of reality. This makes a world of difference in what is affirmed by him.

I will just point out that a photon being a wave and a particle is not logically equivalent to a photon both being and not being a particle, because it being a wave does not logically rule out its also being a particle. — Janus

TMK, a particle is localized thing with volume, density, and mass. Whereas a wave function is not. So a wave function is not a particle. And hence the term "wave-particle duality". Am I missing out on something?

To corroborate my current understanding:

As Albert Einstein wrote:[1]

It seems as though we must use sometimes the one theory and sometimes the other, while at times we may use either. We are faced with a new kind of difficulty. We have two contradictory pictures of reality; separately neither of them fully explains the phenomena of light, but together they do. — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wave%E2%80%93particle_duality

edit: I get that a photon is considered massless. But wave-particle duality applies to mass endowed particles just as well. It even applies to some small molecules.

To say that something could be simultaneously wave and particle does not constitute a logical contradiction as far as I can tell. We might think there is an incompatibility between the two states, but maybe our understanding or imagination is just not up to the task, If it is a fact that something can be both wave and particle, then it is a fact, pure and simple. — Janus

This, I think, will depend on what significance one imports into the terms "particle" and "wave". If the LNC does hold, however, then one can not have a photon be both a particle (A) and not a particle (~A) at the same time and in the same respect.

For example, it might be that the unobserved photon is neither spatially localized (particle) nor disperse fluctuations (wave) but something else that can account for both observations.

That said, as to our imagination likely not being up to par, as I tried to previously express, I agree.

Indeed. I think reasoning serves a purpose. — Srap Tasmaner

I should add: so do I (multiple possible purposes). But we will likely disagree on the details. It was good debating with you.

:up:

Are you even sure you know what you're claiming? — Srap Tasmaner

We don't seem to share the same wants when it comes to philosophy. I'm interested to ground my beliefs on what is. If I can't currently fully explain all that is, that's OK by me - so long as my beliefs regarding what is are sound. I dislike forsaking truths because they don't fit in with the explanatory model I so far have. What I'm claiming, in short, is that the LNC appears to be sound. The possible implications of this take a very distant second place for me.

What's the model of rationality we should aspire to? Flip-flopping and hypocrisy are fine so long as you don't contradict yourself? We're supposed not to contradict ourselves because it's a bad thing to do. — Srap Tasmaner

This is entirely an issue of ethics (and value-theory): what ought we do. As I think you're by now very aware of, arguments are sometimes engaged in with the outlook of "winning at all costs" - such that snide remarks and innuendos intended to humiliate the "opponent" are given in arguments by those who uphold the just mentioned ought. Whether this is rational or not fully depends on the goal one has in mind: e.g., to win and subjugate at all costs or, as corny as this might sound, to better discover truths and only then their likely relations. If one intends the former, then its rational to belittle and dehumanize the other. If one intends the latter, then it is not. But, again, this is an issue of what one ought do and, hence, one of ethics.

p.s. the same then goes for whether contradicting ourselves in rational discourse is good or bad: it depends on one's overall goal in so engaging in discourse.

OK. That said, it certainly doesn't look like that to me.

I thought you were going to finish that paragraph with A at 0.7 and ~A at 0.7, which should also be impossible but is known to happen, at least when considering the implications of people's beliefs. — Srap Tasmaner

Sure. Its called hypocrisy or doublethink. But no one actively holds two (or more) contradictory beliefs at the same instant. Instead, one flip-flops between them while upholding both as true.

As to doubting: One can choose to doubt anything, including what is is. But doubt, of itself, does not affirm, i.e. posit, anything.

And then what is it the LNC actually applies to? Is it the non-verbal intellections of God? — Srap Tasmaner

While I don't share many another's phobias of the possibility of divinity, the basic answer is no more or no less then laws of nature, such as that of gravity. Which is to say, who the heck can conclusively answer this & by no means necessarily. It could be as much an uncreated "just is" aspect of reality as matter is to the materialist.

es, yes, we all know you can make this sound more precise, — Srap Tasmaner

TMK, it’s the way the LNC has always been worded and understood since the time of Aristotle.

Anyway - as an aside that I find interesting - wanted to point out that, as per Leibniz, the law of non-contradiction can be deemed entailed by the law of identity. As one example, one can word the law of identity this way:

At any given time t, A can only be equivalent to A, this in all conceivable ways. (otherwise, A would not be equivalent to A)

And then the LNC can be worded this way: at any given time t, A cannot be ~A in all conceivable ways. (which is the same as saying: A and ~A cannot both occur at the same time (i.e., simultaneously) and in exactly the same respect).

Hence, if this holds, then to deem the law of non-contradiction inapplicable will then be to then deem the law of identity inapplicable; for, if the LNC is violated, then so too is the law of identity. ... Unless one engages in dialetheism.

BTW, a belief that A which is held with a probability of .90 is not contradicted by a belief that ~A held with a probability of .10. Each proposition entails the other, for they address the same thing. The LNC however does affirm that it is not possible to hold a belief that A with .90 probability while at the same time holding a belief that A with .10 probability.

↪Srap Tasmaner
Whitman is a poet, not an rational arguer, and in any case would you say he does actually contradict himself there? — Janus

In case anyone’s interested, in the name of philosophical accuracy, the law of non-contradiction states that A and ~A cannot both be at the same time and in the same respect. If both A and ~A are at different times or at the same time but in different respects, then the law of non-contradiction is not broken or violated.

Whitman’s contradictions do not (or at the very least cannot be proven to be of the type that would) violate the law of non-contradiction. Just as saying “Yes and no (i.e., not yes)” or “they’re the same but different (i.e., not the same)” doesn’t violate this law, since all such non-technical contradictions implicitly affirm either that A and ~A occur at different times or that A and ~A simultaneously occur in different respects.

Apropos, the law of non-contradiction as intended by Aristotle can well be interpreted as applying to everything, and not just thoughts and propositions and percepts: at the very least, all macroscopic objective objects abide by it. (And, if we wouldn't take this for granted, I imagine we'd be direly grateful for such a world, here including our own body parts.) On the other hand, if it weren’t for this law, or universal principle, then there’d be no biggie to comprehending particle-wave duality in QM. But no one can intuit that X is both a particle and not a particle at the same time and in the same way. Hence the incomprehensibility of much of QM as its currently interpreted.

The collection {things I like} is made up of anything I deem to be a member of it. It's nothing more than those things, it's not those things + the collection of those things. The collection {my body} is similarly made up of those components I deem to be part of it. It's not a thing in addition to that collection. — Isaac

Someone with alien hand syndrome might not deem his hand (or other body part) to be an aspect of himself. For this and other reasons, I still find you explanation of what the "I" references to be uninformative.

The point is that you are conflating the already given with the constructed. — Isaac

Experience, including that which is empirical, is directly present to conscious awareness. That experience can be constructed can only be inferential. Inferred from experiential evidence. But, as is already known, we don't share a common outlook.

We tell ourselves a story about the causes of what just happened based primarily on interocepted states. Sometimes a story involving 'willing' will be most useful. Other times a story involving 'involuntary' will. Both are constructions, when looked at at this level of analysis. — Isaac

Thank you for the explanation. I myself don't find it convincing. While it might work well enough on a philosophy forum, such outlook would likely be quickly deleterious in many a real-life context. And it does not explain many a medical condition, such as that of alien hand syndrome. But again, we hold different outlooks.

As was addressing, that no one can empirically observe the mind's eye so far seems to be well enough substantiated. If anyone believes they've come upon evidence to the contrary, I'll likely take a look. Otherwise, due to time constraints, I'll at this point likely be leaving the debate in others' hands.

Why? I'm not seeing any incoherence. — Isaac

There's a few aspects, but I'll start with this:

'I' refers to me, my body, whatever I deem to be part of that unit. — Isaac

This statement claims that "I" refers to both a body and to a unit of that body, this at the same time and in the same respect - thereby making a whole equivalent to a part of that whole. If you uphold this logical contradiction, it is incoherent. If you don't than your quoted statement is erroneous or, at best, very misleading; in which case, please clarify it.

As I said to you (part of the "word-salad" you decided was beyond you to understand), you are not here dealing with your experiences. The evidence you think you're presenting of the way your mind works is not direct evidence. — Isaac

As to the first sentence, it reads as though making the claim that I have no experiences which I can then address. Which is sheer fallacy. I do have experiences, and it is these that I'm addressing. As to the second sentence, it is equivocating the way my total mind works with the way my conscious experience works. Where it to instead read, "The evidence you think you're presenting of the way your conscious experience unfolds is not direct evidence" it would be nonsensical.

No I take 'willing' to be a post hoc construction of the working memory after the event of imagining the table. — Isaac

OK. Interesting hypothesis. How then do you distinguish behaviors - such as that of imagining a table - that are voluntary (which means consciously willed) from those that are involuntary (which means not consciously willed).

Different how? I imagine a table, that's different to the chair I imagine (one's smaller than the other). The 'I' is different in that sense. I'm referring to me, my body. I'm not a table. — Isaac

Different in this respect:

the things I imagine can readily change as distinct images whereas I remain constant in so far as being that which apprehends information in the form of the things imagined.

Does this in any way make sense to you? — javra

To which you've already replied:

Yes. — Isaac

I asked so as to confirm that this same understanding is there in your proposed expression of, "Things I imagine," but it doesn't appear to be.

So you deem the "I" addressed to be identical to you as body. And yet, the imagined table is only an aspect of your bodily processes, specifically of certain aspects of your CNS - the very same CNS from which this "I" results (at least as its typically understood; such that the I is one of many functioning process of the body - along with a multitude of unconscious processes of mind - but is not the body itself). But then in deeming this "I" identical to you as body there is grave incoherence in terms of what is being referenced in the expression, "Things I imagine".

Given this incoherence, again, in which way then do you deem what you refer to as "I" to be in any way different from the imagined table? (To emphasize: Both are functions of your body, which according to you is equivalent to the you which can imagine tables and the like. But then, again, how would this "I" be in any way different from the table it imagines?)

Clarification would be useful to further discussions.

one could for example will to visually imagine X without being visually aware of the visual properties of the given X so willed — javra

I don't think that's possible, but I'm willing to suspend that disbelief if it helps — Isaac

OK, so when one intends to imagine a table, you take it that one consciously holds awareness of all the table's imagined properties instantaneously to so intending, aka willing. My experiences affirm that when I want to imagine a table and proceed to do so, my unconsciousness fills in a lot of blanks so as to form a coherent image (also called "picture" in common English usage) of the table - such that my willing to imagine precedes the visual representation which I then apprehend as an imagined given, or thing. It's also not hard for me to suppose that one could want to imagine X but be unable to form a mental image of X. Worse things can happen in psychological processes. But, maybe, all this doesn't matter too much to the discussion.

I'll check in latter on, probably sometime tomorrow.

'Things I imagine' — Isaac

Do you by this expression intend that the "I" is different from the things it imagines?

If so, how is this "I" aware of what it willfully imagines?

(In philosophical speculations, one could for example will to visually imagine X without being visually aware of the visual properties of the given X so willed; the two processes - that of willing X and that of having visual awareness of X - are not logically entailed, as far as I can currently discern. But we could debate this if you'd like.)

The question doesn't make sense. I don't 'picture that which I imagine' I just imagine. Imagining something involves a picture, it doesn't make sense to talk about a picture of it, that would entail a picture of a picture. — Isaac

So far your reply doesn't make sense to me. Maybe you could help me make sense of it.

When I engage in the process of imagination I can imagine various things - granted, this as thought I were looking at them (maybe this is a personal quirk though). But, importantly here, the things I imagine can readily change as distinct images whereas I remain constant in so far as being that which apprehends information in the form of the things imagined.

Does this in any way make sense to you? If so, how would you linguistically express the difference between me as as that which is constantly taking in, or processing, imagined information of various types vs. those imagined givens that are disparate relative to each other?

And no, the conversation is not over. — Isaac

OK. I'd like an answer to the following so as to gauge were we currently stand:

Question: Can you visually imagine things? If so, is your ability to picture that which you imagine real or unreal? — javra

If you want to stick your fingers in your ears and say, "La la la, I can't hear you.", then I don't have more to say. If you change your mind this article on visual cortex filling the role of the 'mind's eye' might be worth a look. — wonderer1

I'm quite familiar with such articles - and fully acknowledge their worth. You however appear to not have understood what I expressed.

Hm, because taking text out of context is supposed to be ... ?

As far as this conversation being over, as you wish.

My apologies, but for the most part your reply for me enters into word-salad territory. We appear to disagree on the referents which words address - this if we even agree that the words expressed, such that of "a mind's eye", reference anything at all. You, for example, maybe for this reason have not replied to the questions I've asked.

If you are visually imagining a table, due to your eyes being directed towards and focusing on an illuminated table, and you have the binocular vision typical of humans, you are seeing the table from two different perspectives and your brain is synthesizing what you imagine to be a table seen from a singular perspective but with a depth which is due to the binocular origins of the imagining under consideration. — wonderer1

Firstly, I/we don't visually experience that which we imagine via our physiological eyes (e.g., one can so imagine just fine if not better with both eyes closed).

Secondly, as I previously commented in my last post: because we are here strictly addressing first-person awareness, the processes of one's unconscious mind (its synthesizing of information very much included) are fully irrelevant to the issue of what is factually being consciously experienced (this by first-person awareness).

And that experience isn't evidence because...? — Isaac

Where did I claim it isn't?

I might be hallucinating, be a brain in a vat, etc. but my knowledge of seeing what I am seeing as a percept at the current moment remains utterly unaltered by these and all other possible stipulations. — javra

One does not 'see' percepts though. A percept is the result of seeing, you don't then 'see' it, otherwise what results form that process? Another percept? A percept of a percept? — Isaac

I never stated that we do. Please read more carefully.

I'm struggling to think of an example where I obtain knowledge directly from my senses without any inference. Perhaps you could provide one? — Isaac

I already have: knowledge of the keyboard I am typing on. Such as "I know the keyboard I'm typing on is black" (not because I've inferred it to so be, but because I've seen it to so be)

Its about inferences not being empirical data, or empirical information if one prefers. — javra

What difference would that make, even if I were to agree? — Isaac

Example: To infer X from empirically observed A, B, and C is not to empirically observe X.

The 'mind's eye' is just a made up term at the moment. — Isaac

https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/mind%27s_eye

Its not a made up term.

You're trying to establish it's a real thing (but not material), I'm trying to establish the opposite (not real, but if it were anything it would be in the brain). — Isaac

You're again bringing metaphysics into this. I am here avoiding ontological inferences but am addressing direct experience.

Question: Can you visually imagine things? If so, is your ability to picture that which you imagine real or unreal?

we are discussing whether or not the mind’s eye can be in any way empirically observed. — javra

We're not. You've declared the mind's eye to be the sort of thing that cannot be empirically observed. That's not a discussion it's a lecture. — Isaac

No. It is, again, a falsifiable proposition which - because I both believe it to be true and to be sufficiently justified - I then assert as a (fallible) knowledge claim. As per the initial post to which you responded with illustration of the brain, this proposition remains substantiated till falsified.

When I visually imagine a table, I see the table from one singular perspective (rather than, say, from 12 different perspectives simultaneously). — javra

No, you don't. You see several perspectives, you see aspects of the table that are behind and shaded, aspects that are out of focus, or moving. Part of the process of 'seeing' involves inferring these details. — Isaac

Those aren't different points of views - aka perspectives - but different aspects of what is seen from a singular point of view (i.e., perspective). And, again, they are not conscious inferences. We are not here addressing the unconscious mind but only the conscious mind - this since we are addressing the first-person awareness of an imagined table.

In keeping with common language, this visual perception of an imagined table I then term my seeing an imagined table with my mind’s eye. So I experimentally know in non-inferential manners that my mind’s eye is singular. — javra

What? You say it's singular, so therefore you know it's singular? That doesn't make any sense, and I know it doesn't make any sense because I just said it doesn't — Isaac

You are equivocating an experience with reports of the experience.

I am not seeing the perfectly singular, cognitive perspective which sees a spatially-extended table in its imagination — javra

Of course you aren't. There's no such thing. A 'cognitive perspective' can't 'see' anything — Isaac

I'll reword this if it helps: a cognitive first-person point of view (in contrast to, for one example, a camera's point of view) - to be clear, this where "cognitive" addresses all conscious aspects of an intellect, as in "cognitive science". Are you yet claiming there's no such thing? Or, else, that a cognitive first-person point of view can't see (i.e., visually cognize) anything?

[Edit: given that there are unconscious agencies of one’s mind capable of perceiving that which one consciously doesn’t (e.g., such as is inferred to occur in subliminal processing of stimuli), these unconscious agencies can easily be further inferred to hold unconscious first-person awareness of stimuli. Hence, for clarity, from the perspective of oneself as a conscious awareness, these could either be described as one’s total self’s cognitive but non-first-person instantiations of awareness (if “cognitive” is here meant to address a total mind) or, alternatively, as one’s total self’s non-cognitive first-person instantiations of awareness (if “cognitive” is – as expressed in the above paragraph – here meant to strictly address one’s own conscious faculties of mind). Yes, language can sometimes be unclear in expressing that which one intends to convey by it’s use. Still, hopefully this will better clarify the above paragraph.]

I am claiming that the mind's eye cannot be empirically observed in principle. — javra

Yes, and we're all waiting for an actual argument to back up that claim that isn't self-referential. — Isaac

You have this backwards. The impetus is on you to falsify this (fallible) knowledge claim which, as of yet, remains substantiated both by evidence (no one here has so far seen a mind's eye) and reasoning (such as that provided in my last post regarding constituent parts and the whole which you have so far not addressed).

Can you think of any knowledge you have at all that isn't inferred from evidence? — Isaac

Certainly. That I am right now looking at the keyboard I'm typing on is knowledge that is not (consciously) inferred by me from evidence - but, instead, is knowledge of direct experience. For instance, I might be hallucinating, be a brain in a vat, etc. but my knowledge of seeing what I am seeing as a percept at the current moment remains utterly unaltered by these and all other possible stipulations. And other such examples of non-inferential knowledge could be provided.

Why is being inferred from evidence suddenly being treated with such suspicion? — Isaac

Our empirical precepts are not conscious inferences. Inferences are one aspect of reasoning-based knowledge (deduction, etc.). On the other hand, empirical data - i.e., data obtained via the physiological senses - are one aspect of experience-based knowledge (the experience of one's own confidence being non-empirical in the modern sense of the term). Yes, the two are intimately intertwined. But they are nevertheless utterly different.

It's not about suspicion for inferences. Its about inferences not being empirical data, or empirical information if one prefers.

If you think the images I've shown you are not 'the mind's eye' then you'll have to come up with a better counter argument than "that's not what I was expecting it to look like" — Isaac

This illustrates your utter misconception of my position; simply: one cannot see the minds eye because it has no look whatsoever. See below.

your proposition attempts to rule our physicalist/naturalist interpretations. It doesn't merely rule-in dualism. We're not here arguing if dualism is a possible way to think about consciousness. You're arguing that physicalism isn't. To make that you have to show that this view is incoherent, not that it doesn't match the way you like to think about things. — Isaac

This, again, is completely mistaken. I made no metaphysical claims. We are not discussing metaphysics here. Instead, we are discussing whether or not the mind’s eye can be in any way empirically observed. A mere epistemological claim as to what is the fact of the matter.

Your counter regarding p-zombies to me misses the logical implications by focusing on ontological commitments. Nevertheless, I fully grant that the issue can easily become confusing. So, I’ll offer a different, but much less concise, way of addressing why I’m not seeing the mind’s eye in the illustrations:

When I visually imagine a table, I see the table from one singular perspective (rather than, say, from 12 different perspectives simultaneously). This, to me, is an experiential fact of the matter. To clarify, I know this to be the case experimentally in non-inferential manners; and - as with my visual percept of the keyboard I am now typing on - this experiential knowledge is steadfast. I'm not claiming this knowledge is infallible, but I am claiming that I can be in no way uncertain about this experiential knowledge regardless of inference I might entertain or be informed about - this on account of it being precisely what I experience.

In keeping with common language, this visual perception of an imagined table I then term my seeing an imagined table with my mind’s eye. So I experimentally know in non-inferential manners that my mind’s eye is singular. Whether it’s a singular entity, process, both, or neither is here fully irrelevant to the actuality of the experience (and could only be an inference extrapolated from the experience's occurrence).

In contrast, the illustrations you've presented all depict multiple brain processes that are located in different portions of one brain (over a dozen different locations in each illustration last I looked). We can of course infer that these visualized brain processes depict aspects of the physiological brain which in whole constitute that process of me seeing an imagined table. Nevertheless:

I am not seeing the perfectly singular, cognitive perspective which sees a spatially-extended table in its imagination via its non-physiological sight (by which I simply mean, sight which does not occur via the use of one's physiological sensory organs). Of course the person whose brain is illustrated likely imagined something different, but I'm addressing a table to keep things simple.

Just as strictly observing the empirical constituents of a rock cannot be equivalent to seeing the rock itself, so too with brain and awareness: to empirically observe the brain processes on which first-person awareness is dependent cannot be equivalent to empirically observing first-person awareness itself. The multiple constituents of a whole are not equivalent to the singular whole which is addressed.

In other words, I am not seeing the mind’s eye in the illustrations. At best, all I am seeing is a multiplicity of certain disparate constituent aspects of it.

--------

Again, I'm not claiming that the mind's eye has a certain look that hasn't yet been evidenced. I am claiming that the mind's eye cannot be empirically observed in principle.

My name keeps being brought up. — apokrisis

As the empirically obvious evidence shows, not by me.

You so far haven't made any mention of the charading, posturing, lying accusation I just made against you. Curious to witness it.

To be blunt, I see no sane reason to reply to you at this point.

But I am quite tiered of this interplay. Enjoy. — javra

So this is goodbye. :party: — apokrisis

Oh, yea. There was also this.

You waved goodbye. But I keep getting tagged. — apokrisis

So stamp your feet and splutter away. But I’ve lost interest. — apokrisis

And you keep on telling untruths. Why should I bother again?

:blush: Eh, we'll see how things go with the argument at hand.

Your arguments in no way address the stipulation that we do not empirically witness the mind's eye.

Besides, wasn't it a "goodbye" between us?

Unlike my seeing a moving hand when I look at it, I’m not seeing a mind’s eye in the brain images provided.

What I am seeing are individual slides empirically depicting a certain set of a brain's functions which are inferred to correlate with empirically evident self-reports concerning something that might or might not in fact be. For instance, were philosophical zombies to be real, one would expect exactly such empirically physical processes to occur in the philosophical zombie’s brain despite the philosophical zombie having no such thing as a minds eye. In short, I am not seeing the mind’s eye in the illustration.

A less complex way to address the same conclusion: to affirm that one is seeing the mind’s eye in these illustrations of a brain is in full parallel to affirming one sees in these illustrations what the mind’s eye is focusing on and thereby seeing. Both are brain functions; therefore, both ought to be seen in these illustrations. However, neither are empirically witnessed by us.

In other words, these illustrations of a brain’s functioning so far do not falsify the proposition which was provided. The proposition therefore so far remains substantiated.

The substantiated position is that consciousness is not empirically observable — javra

Substantiated how? — Isaac

Since I don’t want to start this debate from scratch, here’s a different, albeit terse, argument:

A proposition: No one can in any way see that aspect of themselves which visually perceives imagined phenomena via what is commonly termed “the mind’s eye”.

This proposition can be readily proven false by any empirical information to the contrary (which, as empirical information, can thereby be verified by anyone who so pleases).

Till the just given, falsifiable proposition is proven false, it remains substantiated.

:grin: I like that: converging with one's Jungian shadow in manners that benefits one's own intentions - preferably both short- and long-term.

I connect this with the ferryman in Hesse's Siddhartha and 'nothing human is alien to me.' — plaque flag

I find this is a good ideal to live by. But, of course, it's never perfectly actualized by any self. I've often enough thought that an important aspect of this otherwise quite elusive, maybe even mystical, term "wisdom" consists in being able to simultaneously entertain different perspective such that one's thoughts and actions satisfies all these otherwise disparate perspectives with the same breath, so to speak. But yea, a detective, for one example, likely wouldn't be worth squat without this ability or relating and understanding other - including that other with which one is in an antagonistic relation to.

Need to take off for now. But really good chatting with you!

If you like Jung already, you'll probably enjoy it. — plaque flag

Cool. As to my liking for Jung, yea, so so. Some of his concepts are interesting to me - and, maybe even pragmatic in certain contexts for some - but, notwithstanding, not analytical enough for my general tastes. Notions such as that of synchronicity and the universal unconscious come to mind. Well, this when considered from a panpsychistic perspective; or, at least, something close enough to it. As I said, interesting but in no way definitive.

You ever looked into Finnegans Wake ? — plaque flag

No, not yet at least. I tried Joyce's Ulysses but - just as with Virginia Woolf - though I recognize the genius in the work, it so far hasn't spoken to me. Maybe I'll check out Jung's analysis though, sounds quite worthwhile.

The person who doesn't believe in a world that encompasses us both and a language we can discuss it in is (if somehow sincere and actually thinkable) simply insane -- cannot even count as a philosopher. In short, the very concept of philosophy implies/assumes a encompassing-shard world-language, exceeding individual philosophers (else it's just mysticism or something.) — plaque flag

Fair enough! Still, there are some who do maintain that the philosopher, as an individual subject (subjected to the very same world of objects and logic to which everyone else is an equal subject of), is strictly illusion ... a view which, once analyzed, I so far find leaves the universality of this shared world in shambles. This though such philosophers wholeheartedly disagree. What can one say. One tries as a self-purported and always imperfect lover of wisdom to discern what is true from what isn't as best one can.

We'd probably agree that it feels bad to be cruel or petty. So the person aware of 'insane' freedom tends even to be nice. A sense of the infinite puts one in a good mood. I speculate that maybe even the Buddha saw such freedom but didn't bother talking much about 'the dark side of the force.' — plaque flag

Yeah, Nietzsche's golden passages are transcendent and joyous and sweetly wicked. — plaque flag

Couldn't help but given a joyful smile at this. Something about Nietzche's own aphorism of a beast of burden which, upon taking too large of load, transmutes into a predatory carnivore fighting off the monster or "thou shalt" and "thou shalt not" which, upon liberating itself of this monster, again transmutes into a babe newly birthed into the world ... one of his insights that has always stayed with me. As far as I know, it certainly fits the mythos of the Buddha underneath the tree in the wilderness. And it doesn't strike me as the only mythos to which it could apply.

I think many philosophers have tried to establish a safe base of operations, a relatively certain center from which to speculate.

My suggested 'core' (which I think is what Karl-Otto Apel was getting at) is what you seemed to accept also.

"Communication that intends truth assumes (tacitly) a single world that encompasses all participants, and any relatively private subspaces (personal imaginations, maybe qualia) that might be allowed to them, as well as a set of shared semantic-logical norms." — plaque flag — plaque flag

Yes, there most certainly is agreement here. If I were to nitpick, I’ve at least so far found that addressing the totality you've just outlined leaves one with few options to then proceed in formulating conclusions from this - what we both find to be - sound premise. Such as in manners that could stand up to those who find doubt for the given affirmation, in part or in whole. That said, to each their own paths in enquiry just as in life.

In relation to this, although maybe coming out of left field: Though I don’t have tremendous respect for the person who said it, I can jive with the aphorism, “Do what thou wilt shall be the whole of the law.” It’s just that, in the non-solipsistic world we in fact inhabit, I find this implicitly entails that there are consequences to everything we will – sooner or later, in one form or another. Hence, action and consequence; cause and effect. … But this isn’t pivotal to the topic at hand. Still, I do like the aphorism. In a way, it reminds me of the better aspects of Nietzsche.

In other words, I vote for open-mindedness within the limits of telling a coherent story and recognizing and avoiding pseudo-explanations. I think we agree on an awareness of ignorance --on keeping the darkness visible. — plaque flag

In agreement here as well. And very well said.

It occurs to me that any such sketch is aimed at describing the world. Your words are understood to be relevant to me. Communication that intends truth assumes (tacitly) a single world that encompasses all participants, and any relatively private subspaces (personal imaginations, maybe qualia) that might be allowed to them, as well as a set of shared semantic-logical norms. I see all this as a unified phenomenon. — plaque flag

Yes, precisely so.

More on this here:
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/13308/our-minimal-epistemic-commitment-fixing-descartes-cogito/p1 — plaque flag

There’s a lot to the link you’ve shared. Descartes was a man in search of infallible knowledge. I’m one to believe such cannot be had. This ala Cicero et al. – the very folk Descartes wanted to disprove. My fallible reasoning for upholding fallibilism? Our lack of omniscience entails that no one can ever prove that, in the span of all remaining time, no one will ever find valid reason for why some proposition X which is currently held by us as true might, in fact, not be true – thereby mandating that proposition X can only technically remain liable to being wrong, this irrespective of what it might be: including “I am” and “1 + 1 = 2”. But this is not to deny that our fallible knowledge comes in a wide array of different strengths: that “1 + 1 = 2” is not on a par to “it will rain tomorrow” (both of which can well be knowledge claims).

At any rate, this epistemological issue of fallibilism vs. infallibilism aside, there remains this question:

If there are universals among, at the very least, all human beings – to include identical aspects of our cognition as a species, the occurrence of other humans, and the reality of an objective world commonly shared by all – how might these universal truths be discerned or discovered without any investigation into what is in fact actual relative to the individual subject? This such as that which Kant engaged in in his discovering of the categories.

And for this, the individual subject must first be evidenced to in fact be.

Get it straight if you want to claim to have a basic grasp on logic. I’m asking you to define what you might mean by circle. And yes, that is conventionally done in counterfactual fashion. So a circle is not a square for these particular reasons. Anyone with a compass and straightedge can demonstrate the Euclidean proof of the assertion. — apokrisis

You’ve addressed my analogy via a literalist interpretation of its parts. And deem this a rational argument against the analogy. Remarkable.

The substantiated position is that consciousness is not empirically observable and you insist that it be defined in an empirically measurable way to be taken into consideration in the first place - because circles can so be. From your previous comments, this via "counterfactual definitions" - whatever that might mean to you.

Aren’t you weary of your own failure yet? What keeps you going and going? — apokrisis

My failure? As in to convince you? You must take yourself to be the sole arbitrator of the situation. But I am quite tiered of this interplay. Enjoy.

I asked for your measurable definition - the one that would make sense to a scientist wanting to get on with their scientific inquiry. — apokrisis

Yes, apo. You're asking me to define circles so that they have four sides. My very point from the very beginning. Glad we've finally come to an agreement.

Let’s see. You’re laughing because you, in contrast, have certain knowledge of what consciousness is and isn’t in an empirically measurable way. This while at the same time holding that whether the proposition “I am conscious of this text” can hold a truth-value is unanswerable. :up:

As I previously expressed: Good luck with that!