So, I'm wondering how we can conceive of an "ultimate telos" without thinking of it as being purposeful. If it is just an apparent general natural tendency like entropy, I don't see why that could not be incorporated into a physicalist model. — Janus

As to entropy being the ultimate telos of all things, if we're both interpreting him right, that's more Apo's neck of the woods. While not wanting to push my own agenda, I don't look at it as being purposeful. More like that ultimate end of all spatiotemproal being which, as ultimate end, occurs as existentially fixed potential, and which either directly or indirectly teleologically drives all existents, be they animate or inanimate. (Again, though, don't here want to get into the details of my own views out of concern that they might bring about more confusion then clarity when expressed via the soundbites of a forum). Point being, imo, even if the ultimate telos were to be intimately associated with psyches, it still would not need to be envisioned as being purposeful (and definitely not a psyche itself ... just as with Nirvana not being a psyche nor a realm of psyche/"I-ness" while still being the end result of psychological being in Buddhist thought).

... on second thought, don't know if this much helps, but I'll leave it in all the same.

Or perhaps this is just a way of coming down firm on "trepidation" as an explanation for the difference. — Moliere

For amusement I’ll say this again in fuller terms. Speaking for myself at least, since choosing one of the three alternatives implies a rejection of those not chosen, I, for one, would be false to my own beliefs in choosing just one. Consider:

- I am a skeptic in the sense of ancient skepticism to which Marcus Cicero et al. pertained (in modern parlance, I am a diehard fallibilist … which has absolutely nothing to do with (Cartesian) doubts).
- I uphold there being a real external world for which there can be no rational doubt.
- And, when not in a neutral-monism set of mind, I likewise consider myself an idealist, with many affinities to the idealism of C.S. Peirce.

My own not partaking of the poll is not “trepidation”. It’s critical thought. :nerd: :wink:

Something like this is how we think of the evolution of apparently designed biological forms due not to any "transcendent designer" but to natural selection.

That said, there would not seem to be any way to conceptually incorporate the notion of a transcendent designer into a physicalist model, so if that is what you mean then I think we agree. — Janus

:smile: Want to clarify this: "Transcendent designer" entails there being a transcendent psyche ... that designs. Yes, physicalism can't incorporate this. I was however addressing an ultimate telos as unmoved mover of everything that is not a psyche and, hence, not a "designer". So far don't think physicalism can incorporate the latter either ... even if it does not in any way address the presence of a deity. Wouldn't mind someday being proven wrong about physicalism's aversion to teleology, though.

As to the rest, I respect your views.

This is a very human way of understanding human motivation and creativity, but do we have any warrant for projecting that onto the cosmos? — Janus

My own idiosyncratic inclinations aside, the issue as I see it is whether the metaphysical model of the world we endorse (e.g., physicalism) can allow for the existence of final causes within the cosmos. Humans are undeniably within the cosmos. So whether or not final causes can apply to things such as rocks, the question still is can the metaphysical model acknowledge that they apply to, at the very least, humans?

Would an illusory perception be non-existent, though, or rather would it be a perception of something non-existent? — Janus

I was aiming to affirm that we cannot in good faith in any way doubt that perceptions, illusory or not, occur (in the world). I'm hoping that makes better sense. But to answer your question, the second.

They cannot be accommodated within eliminative physicalism perhaps, but I don't see why they cannot be accommodated within physicalism tout court. — Janus

All I know is that the reality of final causes were rejected along with rejection of Aristotelian thinking in the history of ideas (not tout court, but by in large), leading to the metaphysical doctrines of materialism and, later on, physicalism. For my part, I will only affirm that physicalism would drastically change as belief system where it to uphold the reality of final causes operating in the cosmos. As one maybe blatant example, if final causes do occur, this then opens up the realm of possibilities toward an ultimate final cause as unmoved mover (not a psyche as unmoved mover, but an ultimate telos ... in the way you've presented Apo's views, entropy would then be just this ultimate telos of all things in his philosophical views). The physicalism of today does not allow for the possibility of such ultimate telos as unmoved mover (of everything that is).

Are you referring to collapse of the wave function? Otherwise I'm not familiar with the idea. — Janus

I tend to associate it with events such as the delayed-choice quantum eraser, but there is an SEP article on it if you're interested.

Although the OP expresses the central thought of conservatism, conservatism actually offers an alternative that’s a bit more hopeful than a “homeostasis between good and bad that never progresses in either direction,” namely gradual, organic change produced communally.*

Of course, this change would merely avoid the most egregious evils of inequality and oppression, and never result in the banishment of social hierarchy. To the humane, optimistic conservative, hierarchy and inequality don’t have to be bad—they’re natural and we should do our best to live with them. — Jamal

Thanks for that perspective on conservatism.

All the same, if the "humane" form of conservatism you address does intend to progress toward somewhere, isn’t it incrementally progressing toward an more egalitarian society (contra progression toward the authoritarianism of a fascist state, for example)?

Maybe a root issue here is what is meant by “egalitarianism”. Does the term intend something along the lines of an equality of fundamental rights for every citizen (e.g., a CEO gets ticketed just as a janitor will for a parking violation despite the stratification of economic class between the two … to not bring into the conversation more complex issues, such as healthcare) or does it imply the absolute equality of all people in all ways?

I think all can agree that the latter interpretation is an absurdity through and through. Brings to mind Kurt Vonnegut’s short story "Harrison Bergeron":

In the year 2081, the 211th, 212th, and 213th amendments to the Constitution dictate that all Americans are fully equal and not allowed to be smarter, better-looking, or more physically able than anyone else. The Handicapper General's agents enforce the equality laws, forcing citizens to wear "handicaps": masks for those who are too beautiful, earpiece radios for the intelligent that broadcast loud noises meant to disrupt thoughts, and heavy weights for the strong or athletic. — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Harrison_Bergeron#Plot

Not all people can be of an exact equal height, kind of thing.

With this in mind, I so far don't view egalitarian causes being incompatible to hierarchy / stratification. I've so far interpreted the egalitarian ideal struggled for to be one where people of different ranks, abilities, talents, intelligences, etc. are yet valued as people irrespective of their placements on these metrics. This in contrast to certain authoritarian ideals wherein a subset of humans will deem and treat others as less than human, or some such.

You're looking at the issue very moralistically. — frank

To keep things simple (I never mentioned "evil"), you could have mentioned this the first time around instead of replying:

Yes. That's exactly what I was saying. — frank

For what its worth, then, from my vantage: egalitarian interests such as those of democratic governance cannot work in the absence of an honest checks and balances of power. The more these are eroded the more the governance becomes authoritarian - this with or without Orwellian propaganda that affirms otherwise. However, this doesn't imply that democratic governance must "always fail".

It's like saying that, because good interpersonal relationships (friendships, of romance, etc., which tend to be egalitarian intending) are always susceptible to becoming rotten - because one or all parties can do bad things to each other - one then should shun all good interpersonal relationships ... this because they will always fail.

Fair enough. For the record, to state the obvious, the bad (those who endeavor to get away with wrongs) incur plenty of suffering in life as well. More like a choice between which kind of suffering one wants to experience - that which comes from pursuing good or that which comes from pursuing bad - one can add to this "types of pleasures" as well.

I'm not sure what you mean by asking whether our reasons for acting are real.or illusory. — Janus

Here, I didn't mean via particular examples but as a form of determinacy that either can or cannot occur in the world. If final causes can and do occur in the world, then they are real determinacy types. If final causes cannot and thereby do not occur in the world ... then the awkward conclusion that all our teleological reasons (e.g., goals/intents) for our actions are illusory/nonexsitent.

Yes, in terms of particulars, goals can be both real and illusory; same can be said, in short, for any perception of some object: it can be real or illusory (e.g. mirage or hallucination). But few, if any, would doubt that perceptions occur within the world - i.e., would sustain that perceptions per se could be all be illusory and thereby nonexistent.

Thing is final causes, such as our goals/aims/intents, cannot be accommodated for within physicalism, and the empirical sciences cannot empirically observe them (this as physical existents can be observed) ... or at least so I last gathered.

Beside which, even efficient causes (what we today commonly simple express as causes), though easily understood from a distance, become problematic logically in numerous ways when investigate up close. As one easily expressed example, some have proposed backward causation - wherein the effect occurs before the cause - in attempts to explain some aspects of quantum phenomena. This, though, is not scientific reasoning but metaphysical reasoning about what science has discovered - whether its good or bad metaphysical reasoning being another matter all together.

In other words, good never ubiquitously prevails because there is bad in the world. Therefore, we should shun a striving for that which is good; instead favoring either the bad or a magical type of eternally unchanging, self-sustained, homeostasis between good and bad that never progresses in either direction.

Am I missing something significant in this interpretation of the issue?

Heck, to each their own. Hence the myriad conflicts of life.

I wouldn't count causality as metaphysical because I see causality as intimately tied with, indispensable to, the understanding of the physical, and I don't think we have any idea of causes which are not physical. I mean we can think the possibility of non-physical causes, but we have no grasp on what they would "look" like. Same thing with time and space; what could time be without physical existents, can we imagine a non-physical space? What changes if not physical things? As to identity I think that is a logical, not a metaphysical, notion.

So, again I think these notions are all intimately connected with experience of the physical or with logic. — Janus

The questions you ask seem to presuppose physicalism. To answer your questions via counterexamples: Final causes (teloi) are not deemed to be physical causes; e.g. the goal/telos of replying to you caused me to write this post as written (or, Q: “what on earth caused you to do X” A: “I wanted Z”). Are teloi real or illusory? Not a question answerable via the physical - regardless of how one answers. Nor do teloi/intents have a certain “look”. Not that I in any way endorse either, but, since they’re easy pickings, the alternative worlds of heaven and hell are temporal, comprised of befores and afters, devoid of physical existents though they are - so the occurrence of time does not logically entail physical existents. As to nonphysical spatial relations, for one example, a paradigm which is composed of ideas is larger (which can only be a spatial attribute) than a single idea it is composed of - in this case presenting spatial relations between whole and part that are nonphysical. Consciousness constantly changes despite remaining the same consciousness (maintaining the same identity) over time - and it is not tangibly physical. As to the last affirmation, metaphysical study is logical - the bad logic that sometimes results notwithstanding, just just as bad logic can permeate the empirical sciences at times.

Of course all of these examples are debatable, some more than others, but they intend to illustrate that the metaphysical subjects of causation, time and space, change and identity, etc., are not strictly contingent on the physical (nor, for that matter, on a physicalist worldview: physicalism simply affirms everything real to be physical based on underlying metaphysical presumptions … I say this though I understand you don’t label yourself a physicalist).

I doubt this will in any way resolve the matter, and presume it will raise certain eyebrows. But your asking of questions motivated me to answer them.

As I previously said, we differ in our understandings of what metaphysics entails.

Nice quote, btw.

My definition of what qualifies a metaphysical claim would be that it purports to be a universal and absolute truth, independent of human experience and understanding. — Janus

I would agree that it is true that science evolved out of a context of metaphysical dogma, but I don't see any reason to believe that the continuing practice of science relies on any metaphysical beliefs. — Janus

It then seems that we hold different understandings of what constitutes the metaphysical. No biggie.

To me, generally speaking, the metaphysical signifies that which is but is not tangibly physical - the notions of space and time thereby being metaphysical subjects, for another example. At any rate, metaphysics as study is not to me defined by dogma but by the best inferences upon enquiry, and is always fallible. In my understanding, since science assumes the truth of causality, of identity and change, of time and space, etc., with certain understandings of what these signify, science then always relies upon metaphysical beliefs.

We cannot help understanding the world in causal terms, even animals do. — Janus

In a certain way, sure. One could argue that at least some lesser animals can discern things via the use of what we term other metaphysical subjects as well: being and nonbeing, identity and change, space and time. I'd even go so far as to offer that in some rudimentary way even unicellular organisms, such as ameba, discern the world via at least some metaphysical givens - else they could not survive. Still, only we humans can consciously comprehend these as abstracted concepts which we can then ponder and investigate for cogency and explanatory value. It is the latter which I intended by "metaphysical understanding".

As one example, only we can grasp the extrapolated notion of a cosmos/universe of which we are a part of; resulting issues such as whether the cosmos is infinite or finite are not an aspect of lesser animals' cognition.

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BTW, in regard to:

My definition of what qualifies a metaphysical claim would be that it purports to be a universal and absolute truth, independent of human experience and understanding. — Janus

Since idealism claims all things to be either directly or indirectly dependent upon psyche, wouldn't that then make idealism a non-metaphysical construct? :razz: (kidding)

I think metaphysics is a valuable study, for its imaginative and creative interest, I am only rejecting the idea that truth may be found there. — Janus

I find things to be more complicated then this sentence presumes.

The empirical sciences would be nonexistent without the philosophy of science upon which they are founded, which in turn could not obtain without a philosophy of causation, and causation is in turn a metaphysical study. Hence, all modern science is founded upon metaphysical understandings, causation as one such. Hence, by logical derivation, if there can be no metaphysical truths, such as that pertaining to the reality and nature of causation, there could then be no scientific truths (the fallibility to the latter notwithstanding).

Are you indirectly advocating for general Pyrrhonism in regard to all existential truths?

In a sense I get what you might mean: metaphysical speculation can be a curse far more often that a cure. But then, what else but an awareness of metaphysical issues (such as that of causation), and the existential truths we thereby accept, sharply distinguishes the intellect of the human species at large from those of lesser lifeforms? Tool use, medicine, basic math skills, communication, comprehension of symbols, normative behavior in relation to what is given and taken (morality in this sense), all these can be found among lesser animals. But not metaphysical understandings.

Hey, for the record, I, as with most people, uphold the reality of causation. This then being one example of a metaphysical truth I subscribe to.

Yes, that is how I characterise the unknown - by reference to the known. Because there is no other character I could conceivably give it. And hence no particular response it can evoke, except by association with something known. — unenlightened

Yes, but in reference to your initial claim that we fear the loss of knonws (by which I initially understood: this via the presence of the unknown):

There are ample cases where the unknown, once experienced, only adds to that which is already known - rather than doing away with ready held knowns. The empirical future, for one general example, is replete with unknowns. But when knowledge of what tomorrow holds in store is acquired via immediate experience this does not, typically, dispel the empirical knowns already held. The unknown does not necessarily present a loss of knowns, in other words.

The unknown of what death is existentially - for those who don’t hold a belief of certainty regarding it - can conceivably be just such a type of relation between the knowns of today and the unknowns of tomorrow, so to speak. Hence, if death is an unknown, it will not thereby logically entail a “a loss of knowns”.

Only if one considers death to be a known state of nonbeing will death necessitate the loss of knonws.

So if one arrives at a fear of death, it can only be by associating it with something known and feared - a fear of abandonment perhaps. Which is the loss of relationship. Whenever one imagines one's death, one imagines being alive to it, and that is where fear can arise. — unenlightened

I translate this into a fear of suffering upon death and subsequent to it (rather than prior to its occurrence) - which, by the way, is a given in ideologies such as that of reincarnation.

Yet, taking at his word, he doesn’t believe in the possibility of suffering subsequent to death but yet finds death potentially fearful on account of losing awareness of all pleasant experiences acquired throughout life as an ego (by which I here merely mean an “I-ness” that experiences other). Something which I take to be more inline with loss of knows upon death (as I initially interpreted you as saying).

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BTW, as to fear of death as an ultimate unknown: no human is perfectly good; all have willfully done wrongs in life; this is a given. Some then fear the unknown of death in terms of how they will be judged by some form of what they might consider to be universal justice - ranging from notions of karma to notions of God. Of course though, again, this possibility will strictly apply to those who don't consider death to be the known state of nonbeing.

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As an aside, I guess in all this discussion the distinction should be made between “not wanting to die” and “fear of death”. All life lives by avoiding death and thus by either consciously or unconsciously striving against death, i.e. not wanting to die. Whereas the want to die to me borders on suicidal ideology.

All the same, one can well want to live in attempts to live life to the fullest without holding a fear, i.e. anxiety, about someday dying (regardless of how one interprets death: be it an unknown or else the known state of nonbeing).

BTW, , I forgot to link my post to you. (it was intend as a reply to the OP rather than to unenlightened per se)

What I think one can more successfully fear is the loss of the known, which seems to be more or less in line with Vera Mont — unenlightened

Interesting. Thanks for the perspective. Might I in good faith ask why?

For me the known too comes in a wide variety of flavors. Some knowns are quite pleasant while others are the converse. Learning to forget, from where I stand, can be an important aspect of life. Of course, at issue here from my vantage is that not all knowns are of beneficial value. Deep insights, acquaintances with beauty, and the like one one hand; grotesque violence as intense qualitative experience can serve as one example of something best left behind. As to holding on to the past, we typically do so only to better serve our future. Which is to say I find empirical knowledge to always be of instrumental, rather than intrinsic, value. So why fear loss of knowns if it comes via the form of nonbeing?

Maybe I rambled a bit. All the same, in honesty, if the presumption is that death equates to nonbeing, this has never bothered me as a possibility; nonbeing would be an absolute liberation from all ills were it to be real. Still, I don't currently take this scenario of death to be certain; I nowadays find it rather unlikely, personally.

Non comprendo. — unenlightened

Yea, me neither.

I've always thought that fear of death - for those who are so afraid - largely consists of fear of the unknown ... with death being the ultimate unknown. As in: "if death is not an absolute nihility of being, then what awaits given who I've been?"



At any rate, as a slight spin off: why should those who don't fear death on account of their conviction that it in fact is an absolute nihility of being thereby want to not be?

Doesn't jive well with the way humans are.

I am no psychologist, counselor, self-help wizard, or anything to the like. Wanted to however comment:

Although not everyone, many – both hereabouts and in the world at large, myself as no exception – are to large extents self-righteously arrogant, unknowingly ignorant, and ignorantly callous. Which is to in part say that most could hardly give a damn about those in need if they don’t have some material or social capital to gain from it – to not even get into cases where there's a potential loss of either such capital for doing what one can to help. It’s also to say that most people argue not to better discover that which is true but to further fortify their own ego, which in part consists of ready-constructed presumptions about oneself and the world upon which one’s selfhood depends. Such that anyone who significantly differs from oneself is by default deemed wrong and, to varying extents, unfit. This dislike for others emerging irrespective of the other’s moral character and existential innocence.

Neither philosophers nor those who spend time philosophizing are, as cohorts, exempt from this competition of ego.

Life can be rough, this in more than just a few ways. Especially for those who don’t partake of – or who cannot even find any means of relating to – the dog-eat-dog aspects of the world. It's not the whole of humanity, but it is a significant portion of it.

I get some of what you mean by associating the experience of pain with acquisition of new truths. Though not always, there often for me as well is a sting to the ego involved in a new existential discovery. A bursting of a bubble kind of thing, wherein one acknowledges that what one has so far upheld has been wrong all along. This occasional association between pain and truth, however, does not mandate that all new existential discoveries be uncomfortable to oneself. Nor that pain is somehow equivalent to strength. Heck, some intuitions and inspirations that lead one to see things anew with greater clarity can be downright pleasant intellectually, to say the least. And these pleasant occasions can provide a great deal of strength.

All of that briefly touched upon, I think at least part of you is on the right path in learning to think for yourself. This as evidenced by your questioning certain authority figures whose conclusions make little if any sense to you, such as what you’ve done in this thread. There’s something to be said about not following the dictums of authority figures blindly; in understanding that no human is infallible, not even those who are specialists and who most look up to. It's in no way about universal doubt, but about bearing in mind that ego most often prevails – or is at least in part always entwined – this irrespective of philosophical position. Reasoning things out for yourself to the best of your ability is certainly an important part of this. While I’m at this "question authority and think for yourself" motto, engaging in random acts of kindness can be a noble endeavor as well.

As I said, I know of no panacea – and I’m not pretending to. It’s a struggle – for everyone at some time or another. Some treat life as a joke; other’s take it seriously. But everyone suffers during portions of it. One simply has to find the optimal means for oneself to face the storms when they come and battle with them – or, better said, through them. Hopefully findings ways to hold onto integrity – to an ethical heart – in the process.

The answers you seek to your most important existential questions will, imo, likely not come from others, but from within yourself. Even if there is no success, there will still be dignity for yourself you will find in taking on the strife: in the noble battle with whatever obstacles you have to face.

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Any way to make it stop? — Darkneos

Again, not as any type of professional but as a fellow imperfect human being dwelling within an imperfect humanity, I wouldn’t address complete strangers with such questions. Too many sharks in the seas to make such open questions profitable to you – most of the time at least. People at large typically aren’t as compassionate as they profess to be. Still, this isn’t to say that good souls don’t occur in the world.

My own best, though imperfect, answer, is provided in what I've already typed. There is no stopping life's strife; there's only doing one's best to deal with it. And the personal pride that ought to accompany this.

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Hopefully at least some of this post will resonate with you. If not, kindly disregard it. Best of luck to you either way.

p.s. I in all likelihood will not have anything further to add on this matter. Again, I'm no professional on the subject.

I only skinned through the article, short though it was. To be charitable to the guy, his argument could be deemed to boil down to "there's more to us than what we physiologically perceive via our sense organs". For one easy example of this, we are endowed with things such as emotions and goals ... none of which are thus perceivable.

But yea, when it comes to Eastern notions of Maya, I in this case far more respect your instincts than trust his awards.

It doesn't mean not real in BUddhism, it's more complicated than that. — Darkneos

Precisely.

Kudos. Sounds in keeping with C.S. Peirce's point of view. Though something tells me you'd disagree with his pragmaticist conclusions of objective idealism. :smile:

Loosely speaking, the OP is about what is real. I agreed with BC's point that humans are meaning making creatures who invent stories to help manage their environment. (Richard Rorty holds a similar view.) Some of those stories work better in some texts than others. And some of those stories, like the one in the OP, might be borne out of having too much spare time. — Tom Storm

Right. Here's a more pithy question. What then is real rather than invented story?

But this question has the potential to lead one down the rabbit hole of philosophical enquiry. With plenty of potholes along the way.

Ok, I'll cease and desist then. :wink:

I don't think even he really knows what he's talking about — Darkneos

I was addressing not so much the OP's link but the OP's quote.

All the same, in reference to the OP's link, from where I stand, this assessment of yours sums up the situation nicely.

I would include scientism as one of those bedtime stories. — Tom Storm

Curious: would you also include in this list of illusory/delusional bedtime stories the metaphysics of materialism/physicalism?

I ask because the OP’s quote isn’t about scientism - its conclusions are devoid of anything that is empirically demonstrable, which is what science tackles - but instead addresses perspectives directly derived from a materialistic/physicalist platform. Its argument, in a nutshell, is that because there is no significant distinction between life and non-life (due to all life being inferred fully emergent from non-life), and because all that is real is material/physical (which is non-living), then all life is illusory rather than real.

I’ve already addressed some of the reasons for why this argument is lacking in a previous post.

The current point being, the conclusion that “life is an illusion” is not a product of scientism - but a product of the materialism/physicalism on which scientism is typically founded.

As an interesting tidbit in terms of Darwin’s ethics, he is well enough known for his anti-slavery/abolitionist stances. A far cry from what we often interpret by survival of the fittest. For example, here’s an excerpt from his autobiography:

Fitz-Roy’s [the captain of the Beagle, the ship on which Darwin traveled to the famed Galapagos Islands] temper was a most unfortunate one. It was usually worst in the early morning, and with his eagle eye he could generally detect something amiss about the ship, and was then unsparing in his blame. He was very kind to me, but was a man very difficult to live with on the intimate terms which necessarily followed from our messing by ourselves in the same cabin. We had several quarrels; for instance, early in the voyage at Bahia, in Brazil, he defended and praised slavery, which I abominated, and told me that he had just visited a great slave-owner, who had called up many of his slaves and asked them whether they were happy, and whether they wished to be free, and all answered “No.” I then asked him, perhaps with a sneer, whether he thought that the answer of slaves in the presence of their master was worth anything?

To my way of seeing, getting the captain of the ship you are a guest on (in the middle of a vast ocean you could easily fall into) angry by questioning his moral character takes, should I say, a great deal of gall. Kudos to him.

But it might be interpreted metaphorically to signify a quality that living organisms possess. I think a way of conceiving it might be along the lines of the relationship between meaning and the symbolic form in which meaning is encoded. — Wayfarer

I agree.

Another prominent factor I find of interest is that of intentions (teloi). Life is overtly intentional, goal-oriented. Whereas non-life is either fully devoid of intentionality or - if interpreted through certain ancient philosophical perspectives - can potentially be deemed covertly intentional only in so far as it abides by the logos' (universal reasoning's) laws in progressing toward an Aristotelian final cause as prime mover. Although I grant this latter option is very offbeat. Still, either way, I do find that life is fundamentally different from non-life; that there is a "vital impetus" intrinsic to life that is missing in non-life.

At any rate, I deem this a better perspective than declaring life to be illusory. :wink:

It is interesting that none goes for idealism yet. I remember debating in some threads with members who were Platonist. — javi2541997

I myself waver between idealist and neutral monist, but I’d vote for “the alternatives provided in the poll are too unclear to answer” - which, unfortunately, is not an alternative provided in the poll.

If philosophers categorize “non-skeptical realism” then there should also be such a thing as “skeptical realism”. Both of these are to me very muddled concepts in need of further clarification. Assuming this is possible.

Then the categories of “idealism” and “realism” are presented as though they were somehow incompatible when it comes to an external world. C.S. Peirce’s views serve as one clear-cut example to the contrary. Posing idealism against realism is about as philosophically astute as would be posing realism against materialism. Muddled, or at least so I find.

Once we have the leisure to roast domestic rabbits, we start spinning out interesting ideas about gods, illusion, Maya, the Trinity, Karma, and so on. Some of this thinking is not illusory, it's delusional. Our - perhaps - overly intellectual brains seem to need a certain amount of delusional thinking to put up with life. Otherwise, some people find reality terrifying. — BC

We certainly seem to need and cherish our bedtime stories. — Tom Storm

I so far don't understand how any of this is relevant to the OP.

The elephant in the room in this thread is vitalism (not specific variants which oddly enough sought to measure the immeasurable as though life were itself somehow a physical property, but simply as the general idea that life is fundamentally different from non-life). If, as is commonly believed today, vitalism is false such that there is no fundamental difference between life and non-life, and if all that we deem life is emergent in all respects from non-life, then - as per the OP quote - life can be deemed an illusion rather than real. One of those delusional bedtime stories we tell ourselves and our children: that we are alive.

Consequences of materialism 101.

Don’t know about others, but this way of thinking gives me a good laugh. Still, for the typical materialist, it’s nowhere near as worrisome as the prospect of vitalism - wherein the reality of life becomes, for the materialist, something to be scared about.

I want to know how accurate this view is. — Darkneos

From what I’ve read in the OP, life is here considered illusory on account of being emergent (in this case, from non-life). In here granting a materialist’s general perspective, first, on what logical grounds does an emergent property necessitate that it be illusory rather than real? The properties of water are emergent from the properties of two gases - hydrogen and oxygen - when the latter’s atoms are covalently bound together; ergo, the properties of water are illusory? Secondly, from a materialist perspective, what existent would not be in any way emergent from something else - other than, maybe, the quantum vacuum field and/or some free-floating natural laws and the like?

Seems to me that this same argument for life being illusory offered in the OP quote will, by its own reasoning, also conclude in affirming that everything else we commonly appraise as real is likewise illusory - for it is all in some way or other emergent. That a materialist can be fine with entertaining this while in the same breath deploring notions such as Maya is, to me, something of wonder.

when thus understood, "fitness" strictly applies to the Neo-Darwinian synthesis of Darwin and Mendel, ... — javra

You lost me here! :grin:
But it's OK. Not important. — Alkis Piskas

To all the same clarify: Gregor Mendel is the guy who discovered genes by working on pea plants. He knew of Darwin's work but his is work was unknown to Darwin. It wasn't until later than Mendel's discovery of genes was incorporated with Darwin's notion of natural selection. This incorporation of Darwin's work with Mendel's work goes by the name of Neo-Darwinism. Properly speaking, today's biological notion of "fitness" is not a Darwinian concept but a Neo-Darwinian one - one which Darwin himself was ignorant of, since he did not know about genes.

I consider all this an exellent analysis! :up: — Alkis Piskas

Glad it made sense. Cheers. :grin:

His moral and political philosophies contradict the implications adopted by others, for instance eugenics, showing that his haters have wrongly and undeservedly cast him with aspersions from which his reputation has yet to recover. Such a shame. — NOS4A2

Out of curiosity, I once read though most of his "Principles of Ethics". I found it to be utilitarianism 101. A very different spiel than what we now commonly interpret by the notion of "Social Darwinism". So I'm seconding your comments here.

the latter phrasing [re: “survival of the form that survives in successive generations”] can just as well be reduced to “survival of that form which survives”. — javra

I see what you mean. But is just "survives" enough? Every organism survives ...
I believe that Darwin's "reproductive success" is very clear and satisfies his theory. If we have to translate it in to "survival", we could say "the form that survives longer, in terms of generations". As we say figuratively that a person "survives through his children".

it depends on how the phrase "survival of the fittest" gets interpreted. — javra

Yes, it can be interprested in different ways. However, as I mentioned to Vera Mont, there's only one definition as far as Darwin's theory is concerned. Which, BTW, I missed to include in my description of the topic. — Alkis Piskas

To try to clarify what I was saying:

A) When contextualized by the modern field of biological evolution, the term “survive” can in a very rough way be equated to the term “outlive” (as in, "children typically survive their own parents", as you've mentioned) - this rather than holding the meaning of “continuing to live”. Since “survival of the fittest” is applied in the context of biological evolution, this phrase could then be reworded as “the outliving of those forms which are fittest”.

[Hence, to my understanding: When the term is thus evolutionarily applied, an organism that lives its whole life without reproducing does not evolutionarily survive - for there is no form it serves as ancestor to that outlives it.]

B) Next, when “fitness” is biologically defined as “the quantitative representation of a form’s reproductive success” or something to the like (of note: when thus understood, "fitness" strictly applies to the Neo-Darwinian synthesis of Darwin and Mendel, being a semantic unknown to Darwin himself), the term “fitness” too can be roughly equated to “the attribute of outliving (that which one was biologically generated by)”.

[Note that “the continuing to live ("survival" in this sense) of that form which holds greatest reproductive success ("fitness" in its modern evolutionary sense)” is not a very cogent proposition in the context of evolutionary theory. For example, an organism with very short lifespan that successfully reproduces galore will have a relatively great fitness - despite not continuing to live for very long.]

C) Then, when integrating (a) with (b), within this context of Neo-Darwinian biological evolution, one could potentially conclude that the biological phrase “survival of the fittest” can translate via its biological semantics into “the outliving (of ancestors) of that form which most outlives (its ancestors)” or, again via semantics typically applied to the field of modern evolutionary theory, into “the survival of that form which most survives”.

[To emphasize, "fitness" as, in short, reproductive success is a biological notion that was unknown to Darwin and his contemporaries (Spencer, Wallace, etc.). It was first proposed with its modern biological sense [url=https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fitness_(biology)#History]in 1924.[/url] So, while “survival of the fittest” could have made sense in a Darwinian model of evolution (given that "fitness" did not then entail a quantitative representation of a form's reproductive success), in the Neo-Darwinian model of evolution this phrase does run a significant risk of being interpreted as a tautology among biologists in the field.]

That’s my best current impression, at any rate.

I only read The Origin of Species, The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals, and his autobiography - this decades ago with no recollection of the editions I read, nor with much background knowledge of how he incorporated “survival of the fittest” into later editions due to, I believe it was, Wallace’s influence. So I'm no academic on the matter. But I did find this news article which supports the impression that reading him made on me back when I read Darwin: he didn't endorse the notion of selfish individualism being a leading driver of evolution. Here’s a noteworthy, though inadequately referenced, excerpt from the article:

Charles Darwin not only did not coin the phrase “survival of the fittest” (the phrase was invented by Herbert Spencer), but he argued against it. In “On the Origin of Species,” he wrote: “it hardly seems probable that the number of men gifted with such virtues [as bravery and sympathy] ... could be increased through natural selection, that is, by the survival of the fittest.”

Darwin was very clear about the weakness of the survival-of-the-fittest argument and the strength of his “sympathy hypothesis” when he wrote: “Those communities which included the greatest number of the most sympathetic members would flourish best and rear the greatest number of offspring.” What Darwin called “sympathy,” in the words of Paul Ekman, “today would be termed empathy, altruism, or compassion.”

Darwin goes so far in his compassion argument as to tie the success of human evolution (and even “lower animals”) to the evolution of compassion. He writes that as the human race evolved from “small tribes” into large civilizations, concern about the well-being of others extended to include not just strangers but “all sentient beings.”

Wayfarer's recommendation reminded me of this complementary work, The Genial Gene.

Are selfishness and individuality—rather than kindness and cooperation—basic to biological nature? Does a "selfish gene" create universal sexual conflict? In The Genial Gene, Joan Roughgarden forcefully rejects these and other ideas that have come to dominate the study of animal evolution. Building on her brilliant and innovative book Evolution's Rainbow, in which she challenged accepted wisdom about gender identity and sexual orientation, Roughgarden upends the notion of the selfish gene and the theory of sexual selection and develops a compelling and controversial alternative theory called social selection. This scientifically rigorous, model-based challenge to an important tenet of neo-Darwinian theory emphasizes cooperation, elucidates the factors that contribute to evolutionary success in a gene pool or animal social system, and vigorously demonstrates that to identify Darwinism with selfishness and individuality misrepresents the facts of life as we now know them.

Read it some time ago. Found it an enjoyable read, and remember it being well supported by a good amount of scientific research.

To add my two cents, though I now see some of this overlaps with some previous comments:

To paraphrase a former professor of mine as I can best recall, the phrasing can well be deemed tautological; consider that “survival of the form that will leave the most copies of itself in successive generations” can biologically well translate into “survival of the form that survives in successive generations” and, since evolutionary survival is always implicitly understood in terms of generations (rather than in terms of one individual organism’s lifespan), the latter phrasing can just as well be reduced to “survival of that form which survives”.

That tidbit mentioned, to further opine, as to (1) it depends on how the phrase "survival of the fittest" gets interpreted. For instance, if “fitness” is philosophically understood in the more abstract terms of “the attribute of being conformant to some given” and one further infers that this conformity first and foremost addresses something akin to objective reality when it comes to life and its inherent subjectivity, then one can obtain the rather realistic view that those lifeforms which best conform to the requirements of objective reality’s ever-changing parameters will be most likely to survive (i.e., will, as forms, be most likely found to continue occurring in latter generations). Though this understanding of fitness is different from the official understanding of fitness as, in short, reproductive success, the two understanding can very well converge to my mind. Hence, when thus interpreted, for one example, the present human species can be deemed of very low fitness since it is not fitting itself into, i.e. conforming with, the ecological requirements of the biosphere, but instead diverging from these requirements … with global warming and its ever more devastating consequences as one primary outcome of this. Yes, a lot is opined here but, again, it's mentioned with intent to illustrate that the realism to “survival of the fittest” is contingent on how the expression is interpreted.

As to (2), how most interpret “survival of the fittest” is to my mind a simple mirror held up to the principle values which humanity at large currently entertains. We too often value authoritarian dominance over other, this being implicitly deemed synonymous to fitness by many if not most, as contrasted to living in harmony with other. In reality, non-human species that tend to not live in harmony with their surrounding species and environment also tend to not be very fit, apex predators included. If a predator species eats too much of its prey species, then the predator species will collapse and, if its collapse and absence of food is sufficient, it can go extinct. Maybe for obvious reasons, not many, if any, living examples of such species of apex predators (humans here excluded), but from what I recall ecological models illustrate this just mentioned tendency.

And in terms of (3), again imo, given the aforementioned perspectives, the phrasing is morally detrimental in so far as it reinforces the predominant view of “fitness” being equivalent to a kind of individualism wherein the individual person or cohort outcompetes all others in a zero-sum game. The phrasing further seeks to root this mindset into the objective reality of biology at large when, in fact, this mindset, generally speaking, directly contradicts what the natural world of life for the most part consists of. Competition stands out to us against a background of cooperation and harmony; we focus on the first and tend to neglect the second.

So, to sum my own perspective up, there’s a lot more cooperation and harmony in nature than what we are typically interested in acknowledging, such that it is this very cooperation and harmony which leads to the fitness of the species and individuals from which the biosphere is constituted. But cooperation and harmony is most often opposite to what we commonly interpret via the motto of “survival of the fittest”.

I'd say sure, if by "thinking thing" one would include all forms of awareness as thoughts; thereby, for example, granting that lesser lifeforms are also thinking things. (I'm not big on Cartesian implications of the cogito.)

At any rate, good enough for me to agree.

I think, maybe, we might now be in agreement? To use your own terminology:

If others think of the thinker A as ignorant, and if the thinker A thinks of him/herself as ignorant, then thinker A could well be wise instead of ignorant. A Socratic figure of sorts. Nevertheless, all the potential and actual illusions pertaining to what thinker A is will not dispel the existential fact that thinker A is … for thinker A must be in order to entertain the illusions, their own and others’, regarding what thinker A is.

Does this work for you?

As you can see we run into trouble in trying to get a fix on the self - it's in the simplest sense the thinker and I'll leave it at that. — Agent Smith

Ditto, although I favor something more akin to the "awareness-er".

What's left then to be the true self? — Agent Smith

Maybe delving into these metaphysical waters would get us too close for comfort to certain so-called religious beliefs - here mainly thinking of the Hindu notions of Brahman and Moksha. Because of this, I won't insist on the matter.

In me humble opinion combining the two selves makes more sense than opting for either alone even though both [...] are illusions. — Agent Smith

Hence the crux: illusions to whom? To non-existing givens?

However, knowledge (epistemology, not ontology) of the self consists of the self to the self or the self to others; there's no third alternative, — Agent Smith

Yet the same can be said of anything physical: e.g. knowledge of a rock consists of the rock to the self or the rock to others. But this does not then signify that a rock's "real identity" = "rock to one's self" + "rock to others".

As to a third alternative, I'll tepidly propose that personal identity is as subject to indirect realism as would be anything physical, consisting in part of aspects that are independent of particular thoughts or beliefs (of noumenal givens, as Kant might call them) and, in part, of aspects that are a directly construct of particular thoughts or beliefs. For instance, a self requires a first-person point of view, whatever that might ontologically be, that partitions reality into self an other - and this irrespective of particular thoughts or beliefs on the matter. On the other hand, that this first-person point of view is itself endowed with this or that attribute can then well be a full construct of the particular thoughts and beliefs - one's own and other's - in question.

Still, this would mean that the equation you've proposed is not fully accurate.

Hm … do you then hold that human selfhood is Berkeleyan (“to be is to be perceived”) while reality is not? This where reality includes things such as human bodies and brains and facts (including facts of what one has previously intended and chosen)?

To me this seems too much of an ontological mismatch. And I’m personally not one for Berkeleyan immaterialism.

There are 3 selves (identities)
1. Who others think you are (So)
2. Who you think you are (Ss)
3. Who you really are (Sr)

Sr = So + Ss — Agent Smith

Don’t have an answer for the OP, and while I agree that the human self is in many a way interpersonal and multidimensional, the implications of this math feel off.

If the equation is right, then: A guy who is thought to be X by others and who thinks of himself as X then will mandatorily be X.

Won't necessarily apply if X is “a god” or “an extraterrestrial alien” or “a subhuman”. But to be more detailed: If a guy perpetually lies to himself and to others with enough cunning to make his lies convincing, if others thereby think him to be honest, and if he holds a psychosis in which he also thinks himself honest, does this then make this teller of lies an honest person?

As my example tries to illustrate, there seems to be more to the reality of personal identity - or at least some aspects of it - than the mere sum of thoughts (one’s own and others’) regarding it. For instance, personal identity will in part consist of existential facts regarding what one has intended and chosen so far in one’s life; thoughts, one’s own and others’, might either correspond to these facts or they might not - but thoughts per se can’t alter or otherwise recreate these facts.

That said, this is deep waters for me, and I’d rather not swim too far out.