Is it already too late? — Xtrix

Since I’m not big on defeatism: Too late relative to what? Too late for us to live as we’ve so far lived in relation to the climate? But of course it is! (At the very least, we should have taken the Kyoto Protocol a bit more seriously, but its too late for that now.) Is it too late for future generations to not have it as bad as it would be were humanity to go about its business as usual. Nope, not at all. One interesting fact I’ve so far learned in life, no matter how bad things get, things can always get worse.*

This however pivots on how much most of us care about future generations. At the very least the kids we're related to.

Is there ANYONE out there who still doesn't consider this the issue of our times? — Xtrix

Yes. Most of the people I’m surrounded by, for starters. Then there is a fair sum of the same in government. Also in the media …

---------

* Doctor calls up a guy saying, “Your tests are in. I’ve got bad news and worse news. Which do you want to hear first?” Guy replies, “The bad news”. Doc: “The tests are conclusive in you having only 24 hours left to live.” Guy: “What the hell can possibly be worse?” Doc: “I forgot to tell you yesterday.”

… kind of thing.

I get you. And there's something of what was saying regarding ignorance to all this. And I'd rather step on a bug than release fishes into the ocean which hooks or hook holes in their mouths. For one thing, to me fishes are higher up in the, I'll say, sentience (rather than ecological) pyramid of life.

But in terms of why one is frowned upon by some and the other generally isn't, I again think its because stepping on bugs that do no harm to you tends to express the intention of cruelty whereas sport fishing is, after all, a sport, and sports tend to express intentions such as comradely. Now, of course, there's cruelty toward fish in sport fishing, but those that do engage in sport fishing don't do so with willfully cruel intentions toward the fish (as is often ascribed to those who step on bugs for the fun of it, rather than for reasons such as you've ascribed). Reminds me of Cobain lyric taken out of context, "It's OK to eat fish, because fish don't have any feelings."

Iff that is granted, then an interesting hypothetical: sport bug-squashing. It's obviously not an official sport we're indoctrinated into. Whether this would be frowned upon or not I still think would be dependent on what we take the participants' intentions to be in partaking in the sport. If we find they do it for the pleasure of cruelty, then frowned upon (by those who don't value cruelty). If we appraise that they don't, then we may think them ignorant and so on, but we don't hold the same type of aversion to the participants.

No?

The difference is in the intention behind the act. At least, the intention that is assumed to be the cause of each act.

As one alternative example, it's the difference between killing a snail by covering it in salt for the kicks of it and putting salt on escargot because it tastes better that way. The snail gets killed either way, but the intentions are different.

Personally, I can't stomach even so much as watching another put salt on snails for the mirth of it (and, in all honesty, feel like becoming aggressive toward that human; why, because I disdain their sadistic pleasures), but I have no significant qualms in personally eradicating an excess of snails from my backyard by poisoning them, which is second best to using carnivorous snail species for the same purpose.

Same can be said to feeding seagulls alkaseltzer tablets so as to see them blow up ... its a long list.

Edit: don't mean to be harsh on you. (yet, at least :wink: ) Stepping on a bug kills them quickly, unlike burning them alive with a magnifying glass.

Democracy is where people vote directly on issues of concern to them. — Banno

Yes to your overall post. I however take democracy to be pivoted on a checks and balances of political power among citizens. This either via direct democracy (as one example I find remarkable, in later ancient Athens many public offices were elected by lottery, presupposing the requisite that all citizens in the lottery were capable of holding the given office for the allotted time, with all such citizens holding the potential to exert the same degree of political power) or via representative democracy, wherein - at least as the USA was envisioned to be by its founders - checks and balances are meant to occur both between a) representative factions themselves as well as between b) representatives and those they represent. A voting citizenry would then be a necessary consequence of “a checks and balances of political power among citizens”, but democracy seems to me to be defined by the latter and not the former. Voting could for example occur in oligarchies, but to me this does not make them democratic.

Curious if you’d disagree and, if so, on what count.

I think what was getting at is that the yin/yang is rooted in the notion of nondualism:

Taoism's wu wei (Chinese wu, not; wei, doing) is a term with various translations[note 21] and interpretations designed to distinguish it from passivity. The concept of Yin and Yang, often mistakenly conceived of as a symbol of dualism, is actually meant to convey the notion that all apparent opposites are complementary parts of a non-dual whole.[229] — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nondualism#Taoism

(boldface mine)

If states could agree globally on effectively including all costs in the prices than that would already be one step in the right direction. Other such agreement could be made as needed... — ChatteringMonkey

I'm not in disagreement with this "if". And I've heard of other concrete proposals regarding improvements in general, that of a universal property/death tax to level the playing field where nothing is taxed under 1 million USD or equivalent and that of having CEO profits capped off at roughly 200% of the company's mean employer income, as two examples that come to mind. Both these ideas I'm acquainted with sound good to me. But without such laws being global, those that would subscribe to them would suffer due to global competition. And without the general agreement to so globally implement there is no political will for it. So stagnation in the form of business as usual results.

I'm questioning how an agreement could result among the powers that be in the absence of there being a common cause among them which all intend in the name of respective self-interests?

I know this is idealistic (in the common sense of the word), and I have cognizance of just how difficult it would be to bring it about, but I so far don't understand how concrete progress can be made in the absence of a goal that is agreed upon and toward which all/most relevant parties progress.

For starters, currently, not even the earnest goal of mitigating climate change is shared by most worldwide. I hope this is a warped perspective, but I so far see no evidence for it being so.

You know what, I'll bite a little.

Rationality, for better or worse, is the self-proclaimed infallible authority. — TheMadFool

It can't be, since reason evidences itself to be fallible, rather than infallible. See the previously arrived at conclusion that justification for justification cannot be obtained which we both agree upon.

Still, you got references for this proclaimed belief of yours? I ask because, as explained justified above, it strikes me as glaringly incorrect: as it being an erroneous belief regarding reasoning, and not anything which reasoning itself evidences.

Can rationality justify itself? No! It can't! — TheMadFool

Yes, yes. Agreed in full. And the point to this is?

Differently asked, we both appear to fallibilistically know that we infallibly know nothing. All well and good. I do believe this state of affairs regarding the human condition was discovered by schmucks millennia before we came along. Back then they went by the label of "thoughtful enquirers" or some such.

So what bearing can this fallible knowledge - of which we both appear to be quite certain/sure of (i.e., not a shred of doubt involved ... we're not skeptical about it) - possibly have on the experientially verified reality that what is true can be justified (yes, fallibilistically) without inconsistencies ever appearing, whereas what is false can always be found to suffer from inconsistencies?

Don't know about you, but beliefs riddled with inconsistencies are to me a red flag.

Spot on! I agree whole-heartedly but that opens Pandora's box. Now, we can't be sure of anything at all. We were smug about deductive justification - conclusions were certain given true premises - but now, all bets are off. — TheMadFool

Only when one's temperament is driven toward infallibility, much as Descartes' was. This doesn't apply for the fallibilist. But trying for a simple approach to a complex issue:

Is justification justified (J) or is justification unjustfied (~J)? — TheMadFool

Neither. One cannot obtain justification for justification, much in the same way the eye cannot see itself. But this does not demonstrate, nor even insinuate, that justification does not do its job properly; in parallel, the eye still sees.

If you personally disagree and find justification to not be trustworthy, why continue in justifying anything at all, ever?

What's the situation here? — TheMadFool

I take the situation to be in line with what @Pantagruel just said.

What you evidence is that normative reasons cannot be used to justify the use of normative reasons. This is rationally justified by use of normative reasons. Yes.

In my previous post, though, I was trying to detail how the use of normative reasons can nevertheless be itself justified by our motivating reasons. We are motivated to use normative reasons not because it is an infallible means of evidencing truths but because it is the best means we have at our disposal of so doing. There's no viable alternative to so doing that we know of. And, when it comes to motivating reasons, the buck stops with the nature of our will.

The conclusion that

The Bad news: We can't use justifications with ~J. — TheMadFool

is evidently not true, as is evidenced by all the justifications going on. Dare I say, you will need to justify this bare affirmation if you want to establish it as just (correct). But in so doing you'll evidence it false.

Thus, justificationism has no leg to stand on. — TheMadFool

Seems like you’re nearing the threshold of (global/radical) fallibilism. :smile:

Yes to the quote, but, all the same, eppur si muove - as evidenced by the justification you’ve provided in your post.

So as to simplify matters, speaking here only for when we justify beliefs in good faith (rather than to bolster our attempts at successful deception, as one counterexample that occurs often enough in the world): Why do we justify our beliefs, because we want our beliefs to be accordant to what is real - and justification is the best way we can find of so establishing. And why do we want our beliefs to be true rather than false, because this best safeguards our eudemonia, so to speak. We first hold this impetus innately/instinctively before knowing how to speak, and then it becomes fortified by experience.

So there’s one alternative avenue for justifying justification.

The big problem for global governance that I see though, is bureaucracy. If structures get that big, you get a whole new layer of logistic and administrative problems. — ChatteringMonkey

The only thing I can currently think of in regard to this is that for it to stand a chance of working there must first be an ideal that is aimed at; one that most folks are not opposed to. Headaches will occur one way or another. But in the absence of such ideal that serves as a common cause for most, I can't foresee the possibility of good results. And I think this is where @Xtrix's notion of a global awakening comes into play. Still, in seeing how many have had big problems with the wearing of face masks during the current pandemic, it will take considerable effort to bring such global ideal about.

Just saw that Banno beat me to it. I'll post this all the same

Charted below are the survey results from 20 countries, and they illustrate some startling beliefs — not least that 73% of Chinese consider China to be democratic, whereas only 49% of Americans believe the same about the U.S." — ltlee1

If memory serves me right, paraphrasing a comment once made by Darwin to the captain of The Beagle (the captain being vociferous about the benefits of slavery) as was recorded in Darwin's autobiography:

When a slave-master asks his slaves if they are happy, of course most will answer "yes". Even though, one would be tempted to believe, they answer "yes" because it is the only rational thing to do to avoid grave reprisals from the slave-master. And not because they are in fact happy being slaves.

Side note: Darwin was either incredibly courageous or stupid in so saying to the captain of a ship out in the middle of nowhere who staunchly disagree with Darwin's take on slavery. I readily choose to believe the former. At any rate, as it happens, young Darwin didn't accidentally drown on this voyage after so expressing to the captain.

At any rate, my question: Why should the self-reported happiness and the self-reported trust of a people be taken into consideration when appraising the question of "when is a democracy not a democracy". For instance, if such self-reports are to be deemed indicative of the truth regarding what is reported, then this would definitively prove that the majority of USA slaves in pre-Abolition days were exceedingly happy in so being slaves. Which history evidences is patently false.

And BTW, I'm all for the notion that "democracy" is nowadays becoming an Orwellian propaganda term which is in the process of losing nearly all meaning in, at least, the USA. Much like the "communism" (you know, a great big kibbutz-like loving community of comrades where fraternity rules) which never was in Europe, here pointing to a place I know best, except in places where the term had nothing to do with the reality.

Also note that China is again the biggest offender here. They subsidise everything, there isn't even a real difference between private and public sector there, to the point that 'free competition' with them is not a real possibility from the beginning. — ChatteringMonkey

Yes, it's why I think that the solution can only be via some form of global governance, toward which we are already inching our way toward. Brings to mind the - acknowledged toothless - global 15% minimum corporate tax that was recently in the news. If laws are not universally applied, those who don't pollute (as much) will be economically destroyed by those who do. Still, the devil is in the details. For instance, given all the surveillance that we have and the economic oligarchy that is largely in charge, it could just as easily turn into a global totalitarianism. But, paraphrasing what I think by now is an adage, if we prepare ourselves with the worst in mind we may well be pleasantly surprised.

Thanks. I'm relieved it didn't fall on deaf ears as it usually has.

Maybe I need to look into it some more (feel free to share sources that could educate me on this), but I don't think you get around the fact that green energy is just more expensive... — ChatteringMonkey

In case it wasn’t known, the IMF reports that over 6% of the global GDP is spent in providing welfare … oops, the correct term for this when concerning corporations is “subsidies” … to the fossil fuel industry. Without this corporate welfare, fossil fuels would not be as inexpensive as they are relative to renewables. And a laissez faire attitude would be taken to competition among energy producers (quite likely resulting in both greater innovation in the production of and lesser prices for renewables). But the latter is not the type of capitalism we live in.

Also worth considering:

According to the International Energy Agency (IEA) phasing out fossil fuel subsidies would benefit energy markets, climate change mitigation and government budgets.[25] — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Energy_subsidy#IEA_position_on_subsidies

We shouldn't take it seriously, except when reading Nietzsche or having academic conversations. It's like debating about whether the earth is spherical or gravity exists. Can be fun and interesting, but we'll still walk out the door and not the window (to paraphrase Hume I think). — Xtrix

I thought myself to be aiming for tact there. Speaking for myself, just because something was said by Mr. Nietzsche or some other great doesn’t automatically make that something worth being taken seriously, nor, I’ll say it, true - lest one succumbs to authoritarianism. The ubiquitous truth of there being no ubiquitous truth being one such. I’ll add to the examples you’ve given that of the proverbial ostrich who finds the predator disappears as soon as it places its head in the sand, and then gets gobbled up by the predator. Inaccurate predictive capacity, that. My main point being that truth, which is of itself immaterial, matters more than the material stuff that so many claim to be all there is. But, in guessing your thoughts, I agree that I’m likely digressing.

I’ve heard so called truths from people claiming that the planet is cooling, that global warming is caused by more recent occurrences in the sun making humans not culpable, and so on.

So, in regard to truth, global warming, value schemes, and such, a simple argument for human caused global warming:

P1) The greater the concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, the greater the planet’s greenhouse effect and the warmer the planet (T/F)
P2) Carbon dioxide is the most prevalent greenhouse gas next to water vapor (T/F).
P3) The burning of organic matter releases carbon dioxide into the atmosphere (T/F)
P4) Humans require the burning of organic matter to comfortably live (minimally, to cook, to keep warm, and so forth) (T/F)
P5) In the last 200 years, human population has increased nearly eightfold, thereby increasing the burning of organic matter by, minimally, eightfold. (T/F)

Now, in keeping this simple, no mention will be here made of things such as human caused deforestation* and its effects on carbon dioxide. Simply using premises 1-5:

C) In the last 200 years, humans have singlehandedly increased the second most prevalent greenhouse gas by at least eightfold, thereby causing a respective increase in the greenhouse effect, thereby causing an increase in the planet's total heat.

For anyone iffy about human caused global warming: Which of the premises are not sound or how is the conclusion not valid?

-----
* For which quotes such as this can be found:

According to a study published in Scientific Reports if deforestation continue in current rate in the next 20 – 40 years, it can trigger a full or almost full extinction of humanity. — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deforestation#Recent_history_(1970_onwards)

Maybe it won't be that bad, but it certainly won't be good.
-----

As for those who think such claims are alarmist nonsense, the proverbial ostrich comes to mind. Don't know the extent to which I'm preaching to the choir, but I guess I'll find out.

Yes, I'm in agreement that something about public consciousness needs to change.

“The world with which we are concerned is false, i.e., is not fact but fable and approximation on the basis of a meager sum of observations; it is "in flux," as something in a state of becoming, as a falsehood always changing but never getting near the truth: for--there is no "truth" (Nietzsche 1901/1967 Will to Power) — Joshs

Without taking him to be a demigod, I like much of Nietzsche. But this I think is either flat wrong or else points to deeper truths via equivocation, which Nietzsche was fond of (cf. his notion of virtue).

Either there is a ubiquitous reality we will or will not conform to, or there is no ubiquitous reality: no uni-verse, no cosmos, no reality proper.

Only in the latter case can there be no truth toward which we can approach. And this latter option wherein there is no ubiquitous reality of anything needs some explaining if it is to be taken seriously.

I am asking the question what if reality is not linear, a plane. And we exist in a singularity and our perspective is merely psychological. And Time is merely conceptual a form of metric system. Not an actual element of reality. — SteveMinjares

Don’t know if this post will be of help, and it will come out from the left field. But it intends to illustrate that space and time being contingent on mind in general does not logically dispel objective space and time as being illusions.

First off, space too can be deemed interrelated with mind. For example, directionality (up/down; left/right; forward/backward) is observer relative and hence observer dependent, as can also be said of proximity/furtherance. One cannot have an observer sans observer-relative directionality. When two or more observers interact, that directionality which is commonly shared among all observers simultaneously becomes a fourth-person spatial configuration, pertaining to no individual observer, one that remains despite possible deviations from it by individuals. As a concrete example of this, that the sky is objectively above the earth can be appraised to so be due to such a reason. Now, I take this to be hinting at a possible metaphysical interpretation of space in large, rather than expounding on how space in general can be construed to be contingent on observers. Nevertheless, within this pseudo-interpretation, objective space is itself the construct of a multiplicity of interacting observers. In such interpretation of space, objective (fourth-person) space would nevertheless be real to all observers, despite being the product of a multiplicity of observers.

The same can be conceived for time: that which occurs before I act/react and that which occurs as a consequence of my action/reaction would entail a before and after relative to the present moment of the action/reaction I engage in. Two or more observers interacting will then entail a commonly held before and after relative to all, a common time that emerges from all relevant observers; an objective (fourth-person) time that will occur despite possible deviations from it by individual observers. Here, again, objective time could become construed to be observer-dependent and yet utterly real, rather than illusory.

In short, whether or not time is deemed contingent on mind, it can nevertheless yet be objectively real. And, hence, not illusory.

:rofl: OK, got it now. It's been a while since I read that book. Cool.

Darn it, I'm embarrassed. Can't pin the figures. I give up. Now I'm curious. Mine remains Pink Floyd, despite my rather eclectic tastes.

One approach would be to divorce the materialist mindset from the prevailing materialist worldview. Because, materialists are materialistic. Else have no cogent reason not to be. But, yes, this is unfair: “Greed is good!” is nowadays a staple implicit slogan for most JC fanatics as well, to name just one religious group among many. Because, like, that’s what JC was teaching, right? Meanwhile, the Flynn effect appears to have started reversing since the about the mid-1990s. But our politicians are probably unconcerned about this because unintelligent/uneducated populaces are easier to manipulate and thereby control, bringing in more profits to boot. Still, it does bum me out personally, in part because I blame this reversal on why I don’t like today’s music as much.

OK, blowing off a wee bit of steam as diplomatically as I could. Less juvenilely, I don’t believe the end of the human species is near. But I do believe that when you place fire at people’s feet they start moving. Global warming will do this. Our current economic globalization will be followed by political globalization, if for no other reason, to govern cash flows. My leading concern as regards the humanity I’m a part of (regardless of how many billions it will consist of) is whether it will result in a globalized 1984 or a globalized republic aiming toward a non-hyperbolic global democracy. The latter I know will be laughed at by many. And for me this laughter ties into my juvenilely written portion above. Hence my concern.

For me, the leading problem is one of values held and aspired toward by the majority of humans inhabiting this earth: both those in power and those who grant them their power. And aims such as those of love, peace, and understanding cannot be obtained by coercion. (Caveat: I’m by now jaded as hell myself.)

But yea, a global awakening: good stuff that I’m all for.

ps. Haven't done hallucinogens, but I have read "Naked Lunch".

Thus, your notion of form, eidos, whole is linked to identity as persisting presence to self, substance and res extentia. — Joshs

Well, fyi, this is not an accurate representation of my view. And I have quite an aversion to the Cartesian notion of res extensa and related themes. Is an individual paradigm, which we know to be constituted from a great plurality of interrelated ideas, not comparable in its magnitude to that of an individual idea? Only a Cartesian would so assume. For the rest of us, paradigms are of course larger than ideas and, in so being, hold a greater extension within cognitive spaces, and both are aspects of cognition rather than being corporeal. A potential idiosyncrasy of mine that I couldn't resist expressing.

All the same, I was mainly claiming that awareness of wholes is primary to both our cognizance and cognition, and that awareness of parts, or of constituency, is secondary. As one generalized consequence, we infer parts from wholes, rather than vice versa. But I wasn't aiming at a metaphysics for the principle of identity, if there were to be one.

Husserl and Heidegger unravel the concept of self-present identity. — Joshs

Guesstimating here, but the notion of identity being fully relative to relations as opposed to "self-present" (if this indeed touches upon their content) doesn't of itself refute the primacy of wholes over parts in respect to awareness, to not address in respect to aboutness.

Doesn't seem you're interested in a discussion on this subject, and that's fine. Just wanted to clarify my stance.

EDIT: Also, I want to note that I'm open to other approaches with respect to "to be" -- while I'm using a notion of Quine, I'd like other notions put forward and used to analyze or have a better understanding of holes. If you have such a notion aside from quantification I'm all ears. — Moliere

Interesting. Not 100% on this, but what about: that which is is that which stands out as a whole, and thereby stands out as an entirety which is other than its context, else other relating to that which is in relation to it, such as its parts. A hole stands out as an entirety which is other than its ground, and thereby is. There are parts to a hole (e.g. its left or right boundary or quadrant) but it nevertheless is cognized as an entirety and thereby stands out. Fairly confident there will be drawbacks to this approach - which, acknowledgedly, assimilates being with existence - but its an idea.

Edit: Maybe obviously, this approach to a hole's being does not however preclude quantification. The quantity of "one" would abstractly represent that which stands out as an entirety.

But how is it that we are able to experience an object as a singular unit , separated out from a
multiplicity of which we deem it to belong , such that we can proceed to perform these feats of logic? Husserl’s fist published work , the philosophy of arithmetic, offers a fascinating genesis of such seemingly irreducible concepts as that of the discrete , self-persisting object from mix more basic acts , wherein there is as yet no concept of formal object.

For instance, according to Husserl, the basis of any sort of whole of independently apprehended parts(a whole in the pregnant sense) is the collective combination, which is an abstracting act of consciousness uniting parts. — Joshs

This perspective seemingly differs from mine and it intrigues me. First, to be clear, I acknowledge that I have not read Husserl and so cannot offer a firsthand judgment of his philosophy, that I don’t know the extent to which you uphold Husserl’s ideas, and maybe most importantly, that I’m not fully certain as to this quote’s intended meaning.

That acknowledged, I find that wholes, forms (rather than shapes), or eidoi (I so far find no meaningful difference between the three terms), though cognizable to be the summation of parts, are primary to our awareness of what is, rather than being second-order abstractions from some more rudimentary awareness wherein wholes don’t occur. (This without denying that in adults many are indeed abstracted from immediately experienced wholes previously encountered.)

If this doesn’t conflict with what the quote is intended to imply, then I’ve misunderstood. My bad in advance. But to try to make myself clearer:

When we conceptualize the parts which constitute particular wholes, any cognized part, when focused upon, will itself be cognized as a whole, an eidos, onto itself. This though each part may itself be deemed to be constituted of yet smaller parts. Given current physics, this until we arrive at zero-point energy, wherein we again address wholes, eidoi, these either being specific fields or specific quanta, or, alternatively, the quantum vacuum field as itself being a whole, i.e. an eidos.

For me this ties in with the principle/law of identity: any identity we can be aware of is itself an eidos and, as such, is cognized by us to be a whole give that, most always if not always, can be abstracted as being constituted of parts, with each identifiable part then itself, again, being an eidos.

As one concrete example, we infer a whole rock to be constituted of rock fragments (themselves constituted of sand particles, and so on) but we hold no inkling of what these particular rock fragments might actually be until we take a hammer to the rock to break it apart. At which point the particular whole rock ceases to be, now being replaced by a multiplicity of whole rock fragments.

Else, if the development of object permanence is being addressed, I'd likewise argue that infant awareness innately consists of eidoi as primary. The relations which these wholes, eidoi, hold is what is learned via a conflux of experience and innate reasoning as the infant matures.

Alternatively argued, one cannot intentionally act if nothing is identifiable, if there is no identity of which one is in any way aware. Intention (aboutness) presupposes cognizance of identities; again, with each identity being a whole onto itself.

At any rate, if there in fact are disagreements, I’d like to learn more about where these disagreements take place.

I think that this way of thinking about the external world does raise the question of a singular actuality. Subjective aesthetics plays such a critical role of perception, to the where we can query the underlying objective one. — Jack Cummins

This would depend on the metaphysics espoused. In Platonic Realism, for example, the Aesthetic is as much a singular universal Form as is the Good. Hence, while in the eye of the beholder, so to speak, all beholders of it will experience some or all of the same universal attributes of this Form.

Photography is not really looked at in the book, but we can wonder about whether photographs are the most accurate forms of visual art. — Jack Cummins

Interesting phrasing. Accurate in terms of that reality which is common to all, right? I'm myself biased in interpreting art as a conflux of a) ideas expressed x b) quality of expression x c) audience's understanding of both (a) and (b), with the audience including the artist her/himself - such that if either (a), (b), or (c) is null, no art can take place. So interpreted, I can't describe art as accurate, other than, maybe, being an accurate representation of the artist's intentions. But this would address both subjective and intersubjective realities to a far greater extent that the singular objective reality.

One aspect which I wonder about in the experience of reality is the role of mood. That is because I believe that it does affect the whole interpretation of reality. I believe that it affects perception and understanding in various ways. — Jack Cummins

I do agree. To fall back on the terminology I've previously offered, this for ease of expression, we all experience equi-subjective reality via our own momentary intra-subjective reality which is itself always in large part formed by the intersubjective realites we are participants of.

Fair enough. Wanted to clarify that I offered Peirce’s metaphysics as one possibility that I personally envision could facilitate a constructivist notion of equireality, so to laconically speak. This idea I threw out regarding equireality in general was not, however, to my knowledge explicitly stated by Peirce … although I’d love to find references in Peirce’s works that would corroborate this notion. I’ll check back in tomorrow, though.

I think that your categories are useful, but reality is something which expands outside of us, and includes us, with our own interior consciousness. — Jack Cummins

I'm in agreement with your comments on intra- and inter-realities. I am interested to better understand your critique of category three, which, for the time being, could be labeled "equi-subjective reality" or "equireality" for short: that reality/actuality which equally applies to - hence, is equally shared by - all subjective beings regardless of what we think, believe, perceive, etc.

I intentionally left its description open ended. To the physicalist, equireality would not be contingent upon awareness in general; it would remain in the absence of all awareness. From any number of non-physicalist metaphysics - with CS Peirce's notion of physicality as effete mind as one variant - that which is equireal would itself be contingent on sentience in general: such that, for example, it would naturally emerge from a plurality of individual sentiences as that which is equally shared by all. A cumbersome metaphysics, granted, but nevertheless one avenue of approach.

I very much don't intend to turn this discussion into one of metaphysical debate on various monisms.

I am, however, interested to find any logical problems that might be apparent to the third category of equireality, as that - by necessity, singular - actuality which is common to all and which we ordinarily simply term "reality".

Thanks for the input, btw.

I haven’t read most of the thread, and by now there’s a lot to read. Wanted to throw out an interpretation and see the critiques.

Building on this:

In many ways, even though we have shared realities, I do believe that each one of us has a unique reality. — Jack Cummins

“Reality” can hold two meanings, that which is actual, which to me can apply to at least three levels, and that which would strictly be the third level in the following categorization:

1) (Intra-)subjective realities: e.g. mine was a real dream, and not a fictious dream that I lie about to you. Or: we each dwell in our own (intra-subjective) reality, here referencing an individual’s epistemic awareness of what is ontic as itself being an actuality.

2) Intersubjective realities: e.g., that is a real culture, and not a fictious culture that someone wrote about in a science-fiction novel. Or: a Young-Earth Creationist's reality (emphasis on this being a shared reality among many, here with reality/actuality in the sense given in (1)) is different from an evolutionist’s reality (with same emphasis as before).

3) that reality, else actuality - often, “reality” for short - which is equally applicable to all coexistent sentience, and whose being is therefore not contingent upon any intra-subjective reality or any intersubjective reality: e.g. this is a real table, and not an illusion of one. Or: evolution is real (irrespective of what anyone might believe). And so forth.

Of note, here all three levels, or types, of reality are defined relative to sentience.

I'm frankly getting tired. — javra

Beat you to it. :-) — Wayfarer

:rofl: Yea, point taken.

Adjective
inherent (not comparable)
Naturally as part or consequence of something.
Synonyms: inbuilt, ingrained, intrinsic; see also Thesaurus:intrinsic
Antonyms: extrinsic; see also Thesaurus:extrinsic — https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/inherent

What definition of inherent are you using?

Then again ...

If by reality of purpose you're suggesting that things inherently have purpose without anyone assigning it to them then, not only is that not even incompataible with materialism (just say that the matter itself has purpose, your original option b) but it's also, again, absurd in my view. If you think things have inherent real purposes then please tell me the "real purpose" of a PC. Is it to chat on forums? Answer emails? Play games? Which is it? — khaled

See my answer below:

That difference doesn't exist here. Replace X and Y with what we're actually talking about. You're suggesting a difference between assigning a purpose to a rock and a rock in fact having a purpose. The idea that a rock can "in fact" have a purpose outside of the assigned purpose is absurd. Do you actually defend this idea? — khaled

Was this written material purposely written by you? I'm not asking if your existence has "a purpose". I'm asking if you were purposeful in what you typed. If I'm to assume this text was purposefully written by you, then you were goal-driven in so writing. Were the goal(s) that drove you assigned to you by some other the way you assign purpose to a rock? If not, how was your purpose, your goal-driven behavior, in writing this text not inherent to you? Inherent relative to your brain, if you prefer.

Likewise, is my purpose in replying obtained due to some other assigning purpose to me?

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Ah, I won't erase this, even as I recognize there being too many questions in this post. And I'm frankly getting tired.

We disagree. I'll leave it at that.

It isn't inherently. Some matter we assign purpose. Some matter we don't. Which is identical to saying that some matter has purpose and some doesn't, respectively. — khaled

You are in essence saying that the "we" you're addressing is the "second sort of thing". Does a quark assign purpose? You and I might both agree on a "no". Yet we're built from quarks and such, and we assign purpose.

No, to me you're not getting the difference between assigning X to Y and Y in fact being X. As one difference: The first can be wrong. The second addresses what is factual.

So you're suggesting some sort of monism in the first sentence. Then asserting that materialism doesn't do it. So idealism? I'm losing you. — khaled

I'm not here intending to provide a coherent alternative metaphysics to materialism via the soundbites of of a forum. I'm simply saying that materialism fails to account for the reality of purpose, and that only a non-physicalist metaphysics can do so.

"Goal oriented" is a human construct. Nothing is inherently goal oriented. Humans are what see purposes in things and people. I think we can agree so far. — khaled

While I think I can see the commonsense understanding you're likely espousing, I also see an inherent logical contradiction in terms of the monism which is materialism/physicalism. If:

If "closest" then maybe not quite it. In which case do you believe there is a duality between non-purposeful matter and purposeful matter — javra

No — khaled

And, if matter / the physical is of itself purposeful, then purpose would logically be ubiquitous, in which case inherent goal/aim/end/completion-driven processes would obtain for everything.

Again, we're currently working with the premise that purpose is real, and not merely an illusion which we assign to others as well as to ourselves.

Or whatever you want to call the "second sort of thing" that assigns purposes (which I think there is no need for). — khaled

Yes we humans, and other lesser animals, can assign purposes to things. But this is confounding the act of assigning X with the the process itself of being X. Goal/aim/end/completion-driven processes can be assigned to some object, rightly or wrongly, yes. But this is not the same as the given addressed in fact being goal/aim/end/completion-driven in what they do. And no, there is no "second sort of thing" required for there to actually be purpose.

The question is, can materialism in any way account for purpose? So far, not that much, here being very accommodating.

When? Quote it. — khaled

Please reread what I've written more carefully. From my previous post:

Also as a reminder, you’ve claimed it ridiculous that matter/the physical is of itself purposeful, thereby denying option (b), here (if I’ve misinterpreted, please clarify):

As to the natural arising part: If mater, or the physical, is that which is natural, and if this is in itself purposeful, then you are just expressing that purposeful given X arose from purposeful given Y. So there's no add-on of purpose involved — javra

Yes. That was the point of the sarcastic comment. — khaled — javra

Again, "if I've misinterpreted, please clarify".

I'll again ask from two day's back: Do you find that matter/the physical is in and of itself purposeful, i.e. consists of goal-directed processes?

You've now answered,

[option] B I guess is closest. — khaled

If "closest" then maybe not quite it. In which case do you believe there is a duality between non-purposeful matter and purposeful matter wherein the "purpose sauce" emerges?

This, though, would be a form of dualism, and not monism.

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Apropos, you are aware that the vast majority of materialists/physicalists would find it absurd that a subatomic quark, as well as any matter in general, engages in goal-oriented processes. Right?

Ah, shit. Fire is raging in this thread. Pardon my interruption.

Yes. I said "When did we add the purpose sauce" sarcastically to imply that there is no "purpose sauce". That there is no "guiding force" over and above the things that are moving. — khaled

So, without “purpose sauce” in a materialist or physicalist universe, either:

a) There is no purpose, period.
b) Everything has purpose, including little subatomic quarks and such; i.e., matter/the physical is ubiquitously purposeful and so AI purpose and human purposefulness are nothing but emergent aspects of matter’s purpose in general.
c) ???, but do express what option “c” might logically be as a rational option, if option (c) is needed.

As a reminder, I started off by claiming that there can be no purpose in a materialist/physicalist universe, this being option (a).

Also as a reminder, you’ve claimed it ridiculous that matter/the physical is of itself purposeful, thereby denying option (b), here (if I’ve misinterpreted, please clarify):

As to the natural arising part: If mater, or the physical, is that which is natural, and if this is in itself purposeful, then you are just expressing that purposeful given X arose from purposeful given Y. So there's no add-on of purpose involved — javra

Yes. That was the point of the sarcastic comment. — khaled

It's OK, you can say it if you want to: you're a materialist and for you goal-directed behavior - this, again, being purpose - is not real.

If it's "unmoveable" then yes (conflicts). If it's "unmoved" then no. If it's fundamentally unmovable it's not physical. — khaled

Well, for what its worth, I think Aristotle's intent was that of this ultimate telos/aim/goal being metaphysically fixed, or pre-determinate; not in a partial way (the way an effect can be partially determined by one cause among many) but in a complete or absolute manner. Its my best hunch of what he might have meant. At any rate, not "unmovable" as though it were some concrete thing that could otherwise be moved by something other. It is, after all, only a telos (aim or goal or completion/end).

I'd ask whether or not you think a self driving car has purpose. And if it does, when exactly did we add the immaterial "purpose sauce"? Seems to have risen naturally. — khaled

Wait a minute, I thought we were for the time being addressing the (now pejorative ?) purposefulness as as something material. And not as something immaterial.

As to the natural arising part: If mater, or the physical, is that which is natural, and if this is in itself purposeful, then you are just expressing that purposeful given X arose from purposeful given Y. So there's no add-on of purpose involved, because everything would be purposeful. BTW, this would apply just as well in Peirce's concept of physicality as effete mind.

As a heads up, I'm gonna sigh off for the time being.

So I take it that for you it makes perfect sense to deem material substance, or the physical, as purposeful. This conflicts with the history of materialism/physicalism, but I say, “hey, why not”. It does, however, require a metaphysical interpretation of determinants that – although hearkening back to Aristotle and his four causes – has nowadays been forsaken by most. Apropos, as a reminder, one of Aristotle conclusions given his premising of teleology what that of an ultimate final cause/telos as the unmoved mover of everything that changes/moves. Our of curiosity, would you say that this notion then conflicts with a purposeful materialism? Why or why not?

I've asked on this thread since the start of one thing that requires a materialist/idealist viewpoint and no one has presented anything. It seems both positions can say the same things, provided you use their respective definitions. — khaled

Here is one difference I find pertinent: the reality or unreality of a goal-oriented processes, aka purpose, aka teleology.

Minds are purposeful. In an idealist’s cosmos - regardless of type - purpose will have an ontological presence because mind(s) have an ontological presence by default. Hence, teloi (i.e., goals or aims) will be real as determinants of what occurs, at the very least in some respect. As one simple example, my moving right rather than left was determined by my aim/telos of arriving at point B (had I traveled leftward I would not have arrived at point B, and so my goal of being at point B determined my traveling rightward). In an idealistic system, because everything is deemed mind-stuff of one sort or another (e.g., C.S. Peirce’s notion of physicality being effete mind), purpose will, or at least can, apply to many aspects of what is real, if not to everything.

Other than via thought experiments of what if we apply new senses to the semantics of well engraved terms, no materialist or physicalist system will accept matter or the physical to be to any degree determined by aims, teloi. Either under the construct that mind emerges from physical substrata via emergentism such that a property dualism unfolds or, else, that of brain = mind with no property dualism involved, because mind either is fully contingent upon matter or else is matter, and because matter is deemed to in no way be governed by any teleology, mind too then cannot be teleological in any real, or ontological, sense. There can be no ontological purpose in materialism/physicalism because matter / the physical cannot be teleological and because all that is real is matter / the physical.

The first alternative lacks much explanatory power in regard to many aspects of the physical (of effete mind in Peirce’s terminology). E.g., if idealism, then why the ubiquitously observed correlations between brain and mind in regard to brain damage? And so forth.

The second alternative results in a stark contradiction between experienced reality and theorized reality. For just as we know that minds occur, so too do we know that these minds, namely ourselves, function via goal-oriented processes. Even thought the theorized metaphysics of materialism, or physicalism, insists that no such thing takes place in actuality.

In short, a consequence of idealism is that purpose in the world is upheld. On the other hand, materialism/physicalism upholds an absence of purpose in everything, for here everything is material/physical.

Else expressed, the reality of purpose in any facet of the world requires a non-physicalist metaphysics, of which idealism is one form.

BTW, since I strongly lean toward there being such a thing as goal-oriented processes in the world, I’ll say that there being teleology in the world does not in any way necessitate that the world is thereby the creation of a deity. This being a notion that I find absurd, but this latter is a topic for different threads.

My mother used to wonder how bodies would look in heaven, and I wonder the same about transhuman bodies. Would they look artificial, rather like steampunk robots? — Jack Cummins

:grin:

I here that.

For my part, I find that when people's ideas become a tangled confusion between the reality of science and of science-fiction, they do a grave disservice to the PR of empirical sciences, if nothing else.

Don't like being one of them cheerleading folk, but I don't have anything significant to add. Yours is a very nicely expressed post.

Most existing entities are irrelevant to any specific context. I've been clear,[...] — 180 Proof

:ok: I'll cease my questions. ... back to others discussing the importance of immortality, then.