Dreams are experienced non-physiological perceptions (and concepts, which are not percepts, but to keep things simple ...), this just as much as is a visually imagined bird, its auditorily imagined chirping, the tactilely imagined feel of its feathers, and so forth, experienced during waking states. Furthermore, unless we start to hypothesize the possibility of experiences held by incorporeal beings (ghosts, forest fairies, deities, and the like), all REM dreams are dependent upon the workings of an organism's physiological body.

How does the case of dreams dispel the proposition that "the transcendentally apprehensive self is neither its mind nor its body, though conjoined to both"?

This is merely a differentiation between mind and body. — Heiko

Yet the transcendentally apprehensive self is neither its mind nor its body, though conjoined to both. To what extent do you disagree?

I think your claim was that because of this there was no object other than the subject itself. — Heiko

I'm very surprised by this interpretation. How was it obtained from what I said? No, this is in no way what I've been expressing.

Yet the "subject" in that case means the worldly self. This is quite different from the epistemological subject of transcendental philosophy. — Heiko

I, personally, don't subscribe to a duality between a "worldly" first person point of view and any non-worldly first person point of view which one would, I presume, simultaneously be (in the same respect?). There could be both ideal and possible states of being as an aware being - there hence being a duality between what is momentarily actual and the potential as goal to be actualized in the future which one strives for - but to me the transcendentally apprehensive self is just as much worldly as it is non-worldly at any given juncture of its being.

Can you better elaborate on the difference applicable to the same "I" you've mentioned?

This seems to be a strong indicator that it cannot really be a being of the subject itself but just a stimulus among many. — Heiko

This might be a mistaken phrasing of what I have been saying. I did not claim, with great emphasis, that
thirst is what a subjective being is (!). My only claim is that when a subjective being is momentarily thirsty, that subjective being will at that juncture be in just such state of being.

I'm not here directly focused on the metaphysics of what a subjective being is - nor can be. I'm here simply stipulating - fallible though I acknowledge being - the concrete facts of what we can and do experience as subjective beings.

Why should thirst be that different from a chair or tree as perceived content? Isn't this based on presumptions? — Heiko

Hm, the easiest way for me to answer this is via reference to linguistic convention: When I tactilely feel the chair I am sitting on or else look at a tree, I am that which apprehends said chair and tree as something other – and I therefore don’t express this state of awareness as “I am chair (or chair-ness, or what have you)” nor “I am tree-y”. Yes, when it comes to physiological thirst (as compared, for instance, to an experienced thirst for life), one empirically perceives the state of being of one’s own body via interoception. Yet this culminating perception is not apprehended as other relative to oneself as subject, but instead is the state of being in which the subject momentarily finds him/herself – and therefore we express this state of awareness as “I am thirsty (as a subjective being)”.

To say "I feel thirsty" does not necessarily entail that "I am thirsty".

I'm not here addressing logic but a report of (granted, personal) experience.

In parallel, a physiological perception (as contrasted to, for example, a visually imagined perception) that might serve as a better example is the difference between “I am in pain (due to the pain in my finger from a splinter … which might cause me to sweat, or to momentarily be in some degree of shock)” and “I feel pain in my finger on account of the splinter in it (as something one apprehends of one’s own body without momentarily experiencing the sensation of being in pain as the subject of the experience – and thereby something which one can calmly address as needed)”. If this latter example doesn’t ring true as something experientially evidenced, I’d like to know. It may or may not be a good example for me to use.

Still, to the extent that it might make sense on account of being commonly experienced, when being in pain, the pain sensed would thereby be autologically experienced: indistinguishable by the subject which experiences from the subject which experiences. When sensing pain in a body part from which one as subject is removed, the pain sensed would thereby not be autological – instead being other relative to oneself as conscious subject of the experienced pain as object of awareness ... though the pain obviously would very much yet pertain to one’s total self of body and mind (of which the transcendentally apprehensive self is aware).

Kudos on originality. Under the assumption, of course, that you were not aware of the “transcendental unity of apperception”, which for all intents and purposes, fairly well describes the content of your thesis, but originated in 1787. Sorry ‘bout that. (grin)

Or....you are aware of said apperception, and found it wanting. — Mww

Thanks for the informative reply. From second-hand readings, I’m aware of transcendental apprehension, and agree with it, but on its own find it somewhat wanting. To me it’s not concrete enough to conclusively establish what it seeks to establish: the delimitations of being conscious. It’s a very challenging topic matter, so I’m grateful for any feedback I can get. And so it’s known, what autological awareness is supposed to reference is one of four general modalities of our awareness, which I then endeavor to use so as to demonstrate our three tiers of awareness, one of the latter being synonymous to transcendental apprehension and, hence, the attribute of being conscious. Hence, autological awareness does not of itself equate to transcendental apprehension. The devil’s in the details, though.

As one example, one is autologically aware of one’s own enactive faculty of sight when seeing anything – for one is (some say, "transparently") aware of being endowed with sight when seeing. And one’s own faculty of sight is not other relative to oneself which sees some given – the given seen is other, but not the sight via which it is seen. Nevertheless, one’s faculty of sight is not itself that aspect of self which is perpetually unified but ever-changing. It, instead, is one of multiple and discrete means via which the “transcendentally apprehensive self” (so to phrase), which is unitary and indifferentiable, apprehends that which is other relative to itself (not only empirically but also conceptually … for any concept we contemplate is other relative to us as transcendentally apprehensive selves). All means of apprehending that which is other, from senses such as that of sight to faculties such as that of understanding, will then be autologically known but not in themselves the transcendentally apprehensive self which knows.

Hoping that makes enough sense in its summarized form to illustrate the difference.

[edit: for added clarity, thus understood, not all autologic givens will be the transcendentally apprehensive self, but the transcendentally apprehensive self will always be an autologically known given]

These two are arguable. As to the first, because “thirsty”, “sad”, etc, are not objects, so “simultaneously the object” becomes an empty, hence impossible, judgement, and as to the second, to suggest the conjunction of the two, carries the implication that “....I must have as many-coloured and various a self as are the representations of which I am conscious....” (CPR B135), which is exactly the opposite of what the unity of consciousness is supposed to represent. — Mww

As to the first critique, a proper contextualization for me would be the otherwise existent dichotomy between a) the subject of awareness and b) the objects of its awareness. So generalized, intuitions, concepts, and one’s conscience, would hence all be objects of awareness when thus contextualized – but these are all what I’ve termed “allologic”, for they are other relative to the subject which apprehends them. In contrast, when I am glad, I as subject of awareness am aware of being glad, and my being glad is the object of awareness of which I am aware – but, here, that of which I am aware is momentarily unified and indifferentiable from me as that which is aware. So, here, there is a non-duality between the subject of awareness and its object(s) of awareness.

As to the second critique, I don’t take my being glad to of itself be a re-presentation, not until it is expressed via language which does re-present givens via concepts. So, in being conscious of being glad I am not conscious of a representation of what I am but, instead, am conscious of what I momentarily am as subject of consciousness which apprehends representations. This, then, to me remains consistent with the unity of consciousness, for while this aspect of awareness is unified and indifferentiable, it is experientially evidenced to be in constant change.

What say you?

(On soapbox) [...] (Off soapbox) — Mww

Glad you got off of the soapbox. Thanks though.

Feel like I should also mention, yours was a good point.

Bummer, but OK. :cool:

I’m working on something related to this at the moment. The difficult part is in conveying via what can only be a conceptualization what is referenced to be a first person subjective state of affairs – a state of affairs in which the subject of conscious awareness is simultaneously the object of which it is aware. Without examples of actual experience this would likely go nowhere. So here are some:

First person knowledge of being thirsty, sad, confident, elated, in pain, meditative, angry, anxious, in love, sleepy, and so on.

To express these states of being is, of course, to convey concepts which, as such, are other than the subject which holds conscious awareness of the given concepts – concepts which the utilized language conveys. Yet when one is thirsty, sad, confident, etc., that which one is aware of is no way differentiated from that which is aware. Rather it is the thirsty, sad, confident, etc., subject of awareness that then holds thus colored awareness of anything other – from physical objects, to concepts and intuitions as other than the subject so aware of them to, to awareness of other subjects, etc.

Our wording in at least the English language reflects the reality of this state of affairs: one here doesn’t feel oneself to be X (which expresses one as subject of awareness experiencing some object of awareness via feeling) but, instead, one here is X: “I am thirsty”, “I am sad”, etc.

I’ll try to further comment and support this, but for now I’ll keep it relative short.

Ps. I’m not one to believe that that which is real is created by the language(s) which we use. So, while there is no given term or phrase in the English lexicon for this mode of awareness that I know of, this of itself to me doesn’t negate the personal experiences of this, which we all have – which, as experiences, I deem to be real. In my own work I’ve termed this form of awareness “autological”. So, we are autologically aware of our own states of being as subjects of awareness. It if helps, one can critique this post’s understanding by so addressing the subject matter as autological awareness.

Ha!

Two or three angels
Came near to the earth.
They saw a fat church.
Little black streams of people
Came and went in continually.
And the angels were puzzled
To know why the people went thus,
And why they stayed so long within. — Stephen Crane

This process of alignment, orientation has various aspects including some sense of giving up ones freedom. This is something which is offered freely in the knowledge and surety that nothing is lost because what is gained thereafter is that which was feared to be lost along with the added component of being guided by some ineffable power (I am using this phrase only because it follows on from the phraseology I was using earlier). Which is known to be oneself already, but just an area of the self not realised. So as I suggested earlier, it is not a subjugation to a power over, but rather a power with and power over simultaneously, synthesised into a unity. — Punshhh

What you say resonates with me.

I take the following to be complementary to what you’ve expressed.

I’ve heard some word it as surrender to a higher power, rather than a subjugation. Even so: In my understandings it’s not about surrendering to any other. I still get bad chills of sorts when I hear people praising the virtue of obedience to others as a spiritual goal (obey your priest, your spouse (esp. if you’re a woman), your … anything and anybody that’s supposed to be of authority, sort of thing … don’t dare question anything they tell you or instruct you to do). As you express as well, to me there can be no I-thou relation in this surrender. Imperfectly phrased: if it’s a surrender, it’s a surrender to a greater version of you, one which you’ve tacitly yearned to be. Well, this is kind of Hindu slanted in that the phrasing implies there being a “greater self”, a Brahman if you will. But so articulated for a Christian audience, for example, the mystic or ecstatic experience as goal is likely that of becoming one with Christ, to be a Christ-within-er – such that Christ’s ethics, sensibilities, and virtue become one’s own, as well as the responsibilities, this in due measure. This stands in contrast to obeying Christ in an I-thou relation – which is what I most often experience in Christians. The first is a scenario of intrinsic values; here, one knows what is right and wrong and acts accordingly from one’s own volition. Whereas the latter is a case of extrinsic values, more along the lines of doing things due to punishments and rewards imposed by others: a scary thing to me ... one that in a way reminds me of Son of Sam in a worst case scenario way.

Then things can get weirder when interpreting things from along a Buddhist angle, in which this greater self one surrenders to is actually a non-hyperbolical selfless state of being, what I take at least some Buddhists to consider being the state of Nirvana that awaits to become actualized. I, for example, heard the Dalai Lama in a documentary claiming he still has very very many lives to yet live before he actualizes this state of being – and he’s said to embody the Bodhisattva of compassion. Personally, I don’t subscribe to anyone who claims to have obtained or actualized Nirvana, just because they’re still a self, an ego. But the Dalai Lama I can respect.

So in terms of loss of freedoms. Freedom is always relative to something. A flying bird is free from the requirement to walk, but is yet bound to, unfree from, forces of gravity and the flow of air currents, etc. Supposing the individual’s transcendence of his/her conditioned self can and does occur, they still remain a self, an ego, afterwards – albeit one that is no longer conditioned as they once were. And every self, ego, is yet limited by a distinction of I and other (if nothing else). I’m supposing that what the individual likely gains – here expressed differently for different cultures – is an understanding of Christ-nature, or of Brahman, or of Nirvana (the gaining of Buddha-nature), or of Ein Sof, and so forth. Which, I’d like to believe, might be different labels for the same exact given: Something that without these culturally loaded terms would best be understood as nameless, ineffable, and universally applicable – neutral to all cultural biases. But, then, it wouldn’t be communicable even in principle. Furthering this line of thought, if the individual gains awareness of this state of being to which the individual surrenders, so to speak, he or she would yet be limited by virtue of yet being a self, an ego – and would not be the limitless nature of being which was cognized. But in having gained an understanding of one’s true nature – again, which one has yet to fully actualize – to which one as a self has willfully surrendered, one obtains the freedom to pursue this desired end as one deems fit. And I gather that in this there might be a sense of freedom and serenity. This though life as always still has it pitfalls and obstacles. As one example, the Dalai Lama still hasn’t liberated Tibet, though I’m sure he’s content in having tried his best throughout.

Maybe this is too stream of consciousness. My bad if it is. Posting it anyway out of curiosity for feedback.

:grin: I like that.

I agree with the distinction you make, however as I see it there are many subtleties and nuance here. — Punshhh

I made use of “typically” and “often” with the intention of allowing for such exceptions to the generality I presented. So, yes, I very much agree.

This is an interesting introduction I think into the role of agency and purpose in mystical practice. I would be interested in exploring this further. — Punshhh

What got my interest initially was the use of term subjugation (of the ego). Not sure what avenues you’d like to explore, so I’m mentioning the first thing that came to mind:

Mircea Eliade wrote a rather long book documenting cases of shamanism, what I take to be one variant of mysticism. It can be expressed in different manners by different cultures, and its expressions are normally from pre-scientific times, so I take the following summation to be largely allegorical. From memory, and from a typical European account (Australian aborigines, for instance, express a similar process making use of jewels, best I recall), the pre-shaman enters solitude or is sometimes exiled by the village/tribe into the forest. There, the pre-shaman is, basically, torn to shreds by the spirits and deities, till all that remains is the skeleton. Here he enters into the otherworld, and is often expressed to be dead … maybe neither dead nor living? He then basically needs to place his flesh back onto his skeleton, this to become one of the living again. I interpret this as a regaining of recognizable self. Fast forwarding a bit, if he’s successful, he then reemerges from the forest back to the tribe as a medicine man or healer. OK, that said for background, I give this example of this one form of what I take to be mystical traditions so as to present a situation where the ego is not subjugated by divine power – nor obtains some form of instant bliss – but instead, in a sense, battles with greater powers so as to maintain integrity of being and, thereby, make oneself whole again. And, throughout this whole process wisdom, gnosis, is gained. Though this is very archaic and esoteric, I intuitively find parallels in this to both mythos regarding JC and the Buddha. So, both these guys supposedly underwent periods of extreme solitude (JC in the desert and the Buddha starving underneath some tree) where they gained some understanding or gnosis, after which there were great and sometimes unpleasant temptations offered to them to deviate from their newly found understanding; then, after holding fast, each emerged out of their solitude into the village, so to speak, to become healers (of the mind, to not say soul, if not also the body). I can also liken the same (non-new-age) shamanism tradition to the mythos of Osiris and Isis (guy was cut into pieces than placed back together) as well as to Nietzsche’s parable of the camel turned carnivore turned newly-birthed infant: here, the beast of burden’s broken back parallels the pre-shaman’s death and entrance into the otherworld, wherein the transformation occurs; the dragon of “thou shalt and shalt not” stands for the temptations and tribulations which must be combated or resolved; and the newly birthed infant to the same world stands for seeing the same old world for the first time with newly found eyes.

I know these are personal opinions. May they be taken with as many grains of salt as is required. And, to be explicit about things, I’m in no way here arguing for what is factual. Nor do I address the aforementioned as though it were the only mystical tradition – but, in my opinion, it does represent one well documented path. Again, my reason for expressing all this is that while there might be a sense of losing one’s self or ego, here it is plainly not about becoming dominated by greater powers one unquestioningly follows. Instead, apparently according to mythos, its about holding onto some form of integrity and gnosis despite the challenges … and coming out of it a better, and in some ways transformed, person.

That said, I'm imagining the experience of transcending one’s own (former?) ego to be something akin to what is expressed in the lyrics of a song by Dead Can Dance called Song of the Stars:

We are the stars which sing
We sing with our light
We are the birds of fire
We fly over the sky
Our light is a voice
We make a road for the spirit to pass over

Maybe (I’m guessing) those who are mystics simply think those who lack the given gnosis as just unaware of so being, and of so making a road over which the spirit passes? I’ll link to the song for context, though it’s mostly instrumental, and long.

Depatterning may threaten to disrupt whatever order presides. Nixon claimed that Timothy Leary was "the most dangerous man in America." — praxis

Very true. But implicit to this is a presiding order of "power-over" relations. No?

An important thing to realise, which is often not grasped by people enquiring into mysticism is that there is a subjugation of the ego and in a sense the personality to some other power which then directs one's development. As such an enquiry into the other power, or ones relation to it is, or its purposes, are not important. What is important is in allowing the channel between yourself and the power to flow freely.

I realise that this might sound weird, but when one looks into prayer, or religious based mystical practice this is also going on between the self and God. Such interaction is an important aspect of mysticism. This is not to say that it is necessary. — Punshhh

Commenting in the hope of maybe augmenting the given expression of “subjugation”. In my current understanding, there’s often a critical difference to be found between typical mysticism and typical religion: whereas the latter often concerns an experienced relation of power-over, the former is typically concerned with an experienced relation of power-with.

This being my presumption of why mystics and mystical traditions have often been deemed dangerous heretics or heresies by those who are religious fundamentalists.

To me, one relatively well-known example of this is the obliteration of the Gnostics by the Christians which resulted from the first Council of Nicaea: The Gnostics – which I interpret to be mystics – generally sought power with Sophia as divinity; this, roughly, being the personification of wisdom and of knowledge of right and wrong – which, according to the Gnostics, JC was instructing other about … JC to the Gnostics being one in spirit with the serpent from the garden of Eden: wanting to combat the ignorance of right and wrong which the “Lord” (to the Gnostics, Demiurge) wanted to enforce. Here, “power-with” was not about gaining “power-over” in relation to others but about the obtaining of oneness with what can be interpreted as ultimate reality. In contrast, to the Christians that labeled the Gnostics heretics and disposed of them, their relation with divinity was most often one in which divinity held power over them, a power that had to be appeased via prayer, likewise a power that was deserving of fear.

From my readings, I find the same intent of oneness via power-with in Sufism, in Hindu aspirations to become one with Brahman, and so forth.

Curious to learn if this meshes with what you were expressing.

So it’s known, I uphold that consciousness is causally associated with organic substrates of matter, and furthermore subscribe to a modified bundle theory of mind. Nevertheless, I’m not here posting in relation to this but in relation the eliminativist tendency against the reality of experience.

A child has no idea what 'thoughts' are until they are introduced to the term, so you'd need at least two reasons; 1) having an experience of thoughts, and 2) being embedded in a culture which talks about such things. — Isaac

Sure, (1) is not a sufficient reason but it is a necessary reason.

“I am when I am aware of anything” to me seems to be of a very strong certainty — javra

But what does being 'aware' of something entail? That's part of what I don't seem to be able to get out of anyone. Is it just a fundamental belief for you, that there's this indescribable thing called 'being aware'? — Isaac

All that the statement entails at this juncture is that the proposition “awareness is real (for as long as aware beings are)” can be made with a greater certainty than all propositions accounting for how or why this is so, as well as all propositions contradicting it being so. Hence, for me, it’s not a fundamental axiomatic belief, but a fundamental known regarding what is. The "how is it so" is tangential to its so being.

This all hinges on the idea that awareness is a simple, an indivisible event or property. I don't think it is. I think what we call 'awareness' is a collective term for the mental processes which go on in response to some stimuli. That's how it feels to me anyway. — Isaac

I’m having difficulty understanding this. If you mean in the sense of “a first-person point-of-view cannot hold differing first-person points-of-view at the same time and in the same respect (e.g., cannot both look right and look left at the same time and in the same way)”, then yes, I deem awareness to be a unitary and thereby indivisible event. I may be simultaneously aware of different givens but my awareness of these remains unified.

Explanations of how awareness comes about, regardless of what they may be, cannot then nullify the just mentioned reality. They can only either be in accordance to it or in contradiction to it.

Yes, there are different modalities of awareness. Awareness of a seen tree is not the same as awareness of the generalized idea of (the concept of) tree. But in all cases known to us a first person point of view cognizes, i.e., takes notice of, that which it is aware of.

If you’re experiences are different, how are they so?

I'm not sure how that prevents us from postulating a model for how it works based on the presumption that those experiences have real-world correlates. — Isaac

What I’ve expressed in no way prevents us from so postulating. It does, however, entail that everything we postulate and all evidence with which it is postulated will itself be necessarily experienced by one or more aware beings. Again, this entails that the reality of experience is a fundamental known: succinctly expressed, a reality of greater certainty than our postulations regarding how it comes to be.

How do you know that what you're calling an 'experience' is, in fact, anything at all. — Isaac

This isn’t exactly Descartes’ argument of “I think, therefore I am”, but in seeking to provide an answer to the question: The only reason one would know one thinks is due to one’s experience of engaging in thoughts – i.e., due to one’s conscious awareness of the thoughts one thinks. A resulting Cartesian-like proportion of “I am when I am aware of anything” to me seems to be of a very strong certainty – notably, far stronger than the certainty with which physicalism, dualism, or panpsychism can be either affirmed or denied.

Any ontology which needs or seeks to eliminate the occurrence of experiences in order to be cogent will first need to evidence to me, either logically or experientially, that me being while I am aware is in fact a falsity – including the falsity of me being while aware of the evidence that is so presented. But then, if I am aware of this evidence and thereby experience it, then I am that which experiences the presentation of this evidence – which in turn nullifies the evidence against my so being. This, thereby, makes any such ontology false due to its logically contradicting the reality of experience / awareness / subjectivity / consciousness / sentience. And while this argument can only work in first-person, it seems to me to hold equal validity to all other beings were they to apply it in their own first-person manner. If you think I'm wrong, please explain why.

This just stipulated argument doesn’t imply that experiences are things, nor that that which experiences is/are thing(s); it simply offers a superlatively strong, if at all fallible, certainty that experiences occur for as long as aware beings are.

The aforementioned is how I know that experiences occur.

A question in turn: Is not all evidence something which one or more people either directly or indirectly experience and are thereby aware of? And don’t we know about neural firings and related phenomena due to such evidence?

Your post reminds me of an oldie I like. Man, time flies.

I am not even interested in a fairer distribution of wealth as most people are. I do not care if 10 people ended up with 90% of the wealth...SO LONG AS EVERYONE ELSE HAS PLENTY. — Frank Apisa

How do you square that with greed? Can those who profess “greed is good” (which seems to be the main economic motto of the day) ever obtain what they consider to be plenty? To me needless to say, this being how most of the 1%-ers got there.

Then there’s greed-based competition* to be top-dog winner where everyone else is a looser of the so-conceived game of life. And the end-state of this greed-based competition in which one finally obtains happiness is in fact an illusory reality: an untruth or self-deception. But it does produce a lot of losing parties out there, and correlated misery.

* Loosely understood, there are other forms of completion: for maximized knowledge, understanding, wisdom, good social standing, physical and mental health, etc. But many such forms of competition are a) often ones where one competes against one’s own perceived limitations rather than against other beings for that which is desired and b) where what is gained is then in turn often shared with others via community for the maximized benefit to oneself, as well as to others. Point being, there’s very little winner-looser dichotomy, if any, in many such alternative forms of non-greed-based completion. As one example, scientists compete to discover stuff, but when a discovery is made it doesn’t (typically?) turn the discoverer into a victorious winner and all other scientists into losers. Rather, the whole community benefits.

It has nothing to do with doubt. It has to do with how we obtain conscious knowledge of our decisions, thoughts, and feelings given our supposed unawareness of them, as well as our supposed unawareness of ourselves as actively deciding, thinking, or feeling.

And if you will recall the two initial posts you took issue with, my entire argument pivoted on decisions, thoughts, and some certain emotions not being perceptions – hence on our knowledge of these not being empirical. It would be a strawman to claim that I’ve been presenting these as perceptual.

We seem to be talking past each other. — Ciceronianus the White

It seems to be so to me as well.

If this is of any help, cognition has a lot to do with cognizance, the latter being defined as “notice or awareness” by Wiktionary for the context here addressed. Being cognizant of (e.g., one’s introspections) is thereby interchangeable with being aware of (e.g., one’s introspections).

I'm saying I think it's inappropriate to treat our own decisions, thoughts, feelings as if they were like objects or things [...] — Ciceronianus the White

In your worry about reifying decisions, thoughts, and feelings into objects or things – something which was never once done nor would be by anyone with any amount of reflection – you might in fact be reifying awareness. As if it’s customary for a person to say, “I’m aware of (alternatively: I know, I discern, or I realize that I am) seeing a tree,” instead of just saying, “I see a tree.” Or worse, concluding that because the former expression is not ordinary (this on grounds that it is implicitly understood and thereby redundant) the person is therefore “neither aware nor unaware” of seeing a tree.

I know when I’m thirsty; so were someone to tell me that I’m thirsty when I’m not, I will be disagreeing on matters of fact, not on matters of semantics or of opinion: matters of fact regarding what I hold direct awareness of and the other doesn’t. I might be dehydrated, but if I’m not thirsty, I’m not thirsty. The same applies to major decisions in my life – for which I might feel pride or regret precisely due to knowing what decisions I’ve taken. And so forth. The just mentioned is common practice wherever I’ve been ... with the exception of this forum.

And in your likely reification of “awareness” you seem unable to provide an account of how we arrive at the conclusion that decisions, thoughts, and feelings occur in the first place. Something I find extremely lacking philosophically.

Not to sound too pretentious (nor to deny that I am), but expressing personal opinions in reply to logical questions that are left unaddressed is not philosophy. Its fine as far as it goes, but I'm here to engage in philosophy, myself.

Thus, we don't often hear someone say "I perceive (or realize, or know or discern--or am aware) I've made a decision." — Ciceronianus the White

So I take it that you would say you don't know (edit: or cannot appraise whether you know or not) what decisions you make or have made, nor what thoughts you contemplate, nor what feelings you have. I call bs.

Well, it seems to me to be the case that we simply decide. We don't become aware that we do so. [...] The fact that we might in very limited circumstances become aware we did something doesn't mean that it's accurate to say we are aware that we decide, or think, or feel. — Ciceronianus the White

Your point of view is very curious to me.

If we’re not usually aware of our decisions, thoughts, or feelings (I don’t recall using the phrase “become aware”, which alters the common use meaning of the term) how is it that it can be concluded that these usually occur in us in the first place?

You mention:

Someone else may become aware that we've made a decision, but we don't. — Ciceronianus the White

But if an individual that is contemplating others does not him/herself hold direct awareness of making decisions, of having thoughts, of sensing feelings, and the like, on what grounds would such individual discern others as factually having the capacity to engage in these activities?

Thanks for the replies. I see what you are elaborating on. Though I approach things from a somewhat different perspective, I don’t find much to disagree with. If anything, there’s this nagging issue of lesser animals, sometimes solitary and very primitive, also being emotive beings. But, again, I’m in overall agreement.

‘To be aware of’ is not the same as ‘to experience’. Often what we experience, we are aware of only as sensory events - even though we integrate the information at the level of experience - that is, as a relation of value or potential to act. — Possibility

I acknowledge that there are nuances to the two terms, but can you elaborate on why you find the interchangeability of these two terms inappropriate within the contexts here addressed? Both terms have relatively imprecise definitions, and I so far find that they can both be used to reference the same given attribute of conscious being. To approach this differently: to be consciously aware of X entails one’s conscious experience of X; conversely, to consciously experience X entails one’s conscious awareness of X; such that one cannot be had without the other. If you’re using the terms “awareness” and “experience” in specialized senses that makes the aforementioned usage invalid, can you point me to the literature where the two terms are thus differentiated?

‘Envy’ in relation to core affect has an unpleasant valence and is distinguished from ‘jealousy’ by a relatively low arousal. — Possibility

Envy can sometimes in some people be of a very high arousal, from my knowledge of the world - at times being concurrent with visceral hatred for those envied, with theft, or worse. As to its unpleasant valence, yes, but are there sensory receptors for the interoception of that which is experienced to be unpleasant and for what is experienced to be pleasant? Or do these attributes manifest only cognitively? Please read my next reply to @Ciceronianus the White to better understand where I’m coming from (last I recall, interoception is defined as a perception resulting from physiological sensations within the body, which in turn initially obtain from physiologic receptors located within the body)

I'm not sure what this means. I find it hard to conceive of any decisions we make (or, for that matter, thought, reasoning, beliefs) that aren't related to what is taking place, or has taken place, during our lives, and our lives consist of our interactions with the rest of the world. Are these decisions, thoughts, beliefs you refer to then something that we become aware of in some manner sua sponte (of its/their/our own accord) as it were? What is "non-empirical awareness"? — Ciceronianus the White

I’ll do my best to better explain. (no need to visit all the links; just given for those who prefer references) First off, though the term perception can be used in a variety of ways - including the “conscious understanding of something” (e.g., perceived value) - in the sciences it is interpreted to be the “organization, identification, and interpretation of sensory information” which, as sensory information, originates with physiological receptors – in animals, as these sensory receptors pertain to sensory neurons. This applies to both our exteroception and interoception, both being types of perception thus scientifically understood. Secondly, empiricism is in contemporary thought understood to be "a theory stating that knowledge comes only or primarily from sensory experience", with sensory experience being in turn understood to result from the physiological senses, and, again, with the latter necessarily incorporating sensory receptors.

In short, to consciously perceive is to gain conscious awareness of givens via sensory receptors. And that which is empirically known is known due to such perception, hence due to sensory receptors’ initial obtainment of information. The details are vast, and sometimes debatable, but none of the details contradict the just mentioned, at least as far as I am aware.

As regards decisions:

You’re faced with a choice between A and B. You know of A and B empirically. Say you decide on A at the expense of B. You know what you decide at the moment of the decision and you will be able to recall this decision at least shortly thereafter. You consciously know of your decision because you are, or were, consciously aware of so deciding (if consciously unaware of what was decided, or if a decision was made, you’d hold no conscious knowledge of what was decided, or of whether a decision was made). The decision you make is however neither the empirically known A nor the empirically known B. It is instead your intention upon which of these to choose. If your awareness of the decision taken is obtained from sensory receptors transmitting physiological sensations that are then interpreted by you via perception, this awareness would then be empirical knowledge of your decision. In which case, it seems cogent to affirm that sensory receptors would somehow physiologically transduce you as a conscious-self in the act of making a decision into physiological sensations that you as conscious-self come to perceive - thereby resulting in your awareness of your decision. If this is not what happens, then your knowing what decision you make, or have made, is not empirical knowledge - for it is not acquired via perception as scientifically understood. Nevertheless, you know of the decision because you are aware of what decision you’ve made. Hence, in the later scenario, your awareness of your own decision taken would be non-empirical, but instead strictly cognitive.

I've given what to me is an extreme interpretation in attempts to better convey what I interpret as being empirical awareness of gives (e.g., things perceived) and non-empirical awareness of givens (e.g., givens that occur only within cognizance). The same roundabout perspective would then apply to your awareness of your propositional attitudes, of the concepts you analyze, or of the reasoning you engage in.

As one counterexample, otherwise one could validly claim that a visually imagined unicorn is empirically known to oneself on grounds that one has seen what it looks like (this with the mind's eye).

Not sure what you may be implying by mentioning bodily states emerging from cognitive states. — praxis

I didn’t intend the term “emerge” as in philosophical understanding of emergence but as in “coming out from.” At the time it seemed more appropriate than to say “caused by” (thinking it minimized the metaphysical implications). My use of the term was not optimal.

What I said has a lot to do with my understandings of top-down and bottom-up process of mind. I recognize this is not mainstream, and I don’t intend to here argue for them. I only want to offer a more meaningful reply.

I take it for granted that we’ve been addressing voluntary imagination. The example of envy to me is in this situation farfetched. Why would someone imagine themselves envious in order to so become? It’s an unpleasant emotion to experience. But to imagine oneself calm when one is turbulent and vice versa is common practice in some meditation schools of thought I’ve read. (It is even claimed that those experienced in such practices can, to varying degrees, alter their metabolic rates at will.) Calming one’s body when feeling anxious, this by voluntarily imagining oneself to be calm, would be something willed by the conscious self. Hence, in short, if successful it would be an effect consisting of bodily states caused by the intentions of the conscious self - this then being a top-down process of mind.

However, this is not to say that the conscious self is not resultant of subconscious process from which it emerges (here in the philosophical sense of emergence) - these being bottom-up processes of mind.

Again, though, if possible I’d like to currently abstain from debating how mind can be simultaneously composed of both bottom-up and top-down processes.

it involves subconscious prediction — praxis

To be honest, I find it hard to fathom how a mind could possibly work without these.

Ought to be going, but wanted to say you bring up a good point, if I interpret you correctly. Fear, aggression, and fun are three conceptually distinct emotions that can all result from bodily sensations of immanent peril. So it’s said, by “fun” in here thinking of activities like rock-climbing or roller-coaster rides. There’s the body’s production of adrenaline, this being the core affect in response to sub/unconsciously perceived peril. How one reacts to this core affect cognitively - here trying to keep things as simple as possible - then results in fear of, aggression toward, or a sense of fun. Notwithstanding my previous posts, this to me is one example of how cognition can at times interact with bodily sensations to produce specific emotions. Myself, as per Dewey and contra James’ thesis, I yet take the resulting emotion to temporally precede and be a causal factor to the behaviors that then unfold: e.g., fear resulting in flight, aggression in attack, and fun in bodily states of pleasure.

Then my bad for having misinterpreted the emotive tone.

Here. An number of regions are identified.
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S1053811916303792 — Isaac

I hope I don't need to link to definitions of "interoception" given how long this thread is and the term's repeated use, nor need to make a distinction between first hand experience and the fMRI readings of what's going on in a brain.

To state the obvious: regions in a CNS associated with envy do not address what first hand experience of core affect can and cannot be interpreted via emotion-concepts to result in envy.

What I'm interested in is how you came to your conclusion. Obviously if you feel envy (or imagine yourself feeling envy) you don't have an fMRI scanner wired up to you, so what was your line of thinking that lead you to conclude there were no core affects? — Isaac

This is a bit staggering. Do you need fMRI results to be aware of what you are looking at, what you hear, or what you sense as emotion? I and many others don't.

BTW, the "how" carries the term of introspection - fallible thought it is.

You have still not addressed what interoceptive core affect you'd claim cannot accompany envy. (But if you're going to talk about need for fMRI results to do so ... I will not be replying, for reasons that I find obvious.)

How would you know? — Isaac

I gave one example of envy. What set of core affects correlate to the cognitive state of envy? If any and all, then my conclusion is there is no necessary set of core affects.

Curious to find out what core affect you'd claim cannot accompany envy.

I should have been clearer in trying to point out that in using just imagination to become angry or envious the corresponding bodily stimuli are produced in the body. I imaging that curiosity, for example, corresponds to a bodily state of higher arousal. Whether that means a slightly higher heart rate or whatever I don't know, but there is an altered interoception. — praxis

No denying that. This is a good example of what I'd frame as top-down effects upon bodily states emerging from cognitive states.

I don't believe that the theory of constructed emotion makes that claim or relies on such a notion. — praxis

Haven't read a lot of various constructivist views, only summations of them. Still, in my reading on this thread of Barrett's take, I've interpreted her position to necessarily make use of a) emotion-concepts that are applied to b) core affects of which we become aware, i.e. to interoception. If I'm wrong in so interpreting, I'll do an ol' SNL skit remark of "never mind". Still, what I've been upholding is that some emotions take place in the absence of core affects ("feelings" thus interpreted as interoceptive) being interpreted via emotion-concepts. Some emotions emerge simply from cognition; the example of imagining oneself to be emotion-X resulting in oneself so being then serving as one example of this. And, if this is so, then emotions are not necessarily a conflux of the (a) and, more importantly here, (b) aforementioned; i.e. they don't necessarily emerge from our awareness of our own body's states of being.

Otherwise, you're right. I probably over-generalized.

I could produce the bodily stimuli associated with anger using just my imagination and no external stimuli. I could do the same with envy. What's the difference? — praxis

In respect to imagination (here broadly understood to not literally regard only images), I'd say very little if any. One can become thirsty (an interoception) by imagining oneself to so be just as one can become curious (not an interoception) by imagining oneself to so be.

I can't help thinking how inextricably interlinked the mind and body are, however. — praxis

I'm not denying the interlinked nature of mind and body, but am disagreeing with the physicalist-like notion - or predisposition of interpretation - that all cognition emerges from bodily states of being ... this expressed in my notion of simpleton talk. More correctly expressed: brain, more accurately the CNS, is a bodily organ [edit: in case this needs to be said, that depends on the workings of the total body for its functioning]; but the brain's states of being don't uniformly all emerge from the brain's interaction with the rest of the body's states of being - here taking into consideration that all awareness obtained via sensory receptors are of the latter relation. I don't want to overly-repeat the examples I previously gave, but examples can include our awareness of decisions, of the reasoning we engage in, and of certain emotions.

At stake in this is the status of emotion: is it an 'origin' - a brute biological given that is simply 'activated' in certain circumstances - or is it instead a 'result' - a bio-social 'production' that helps orient one's actions and is the outcome of an evaluative process? It's this latter view which I want to outline and discuss here. — StreetlightX

"Conceptual information about emotion can be thought of as “top-down” and core affect “bottom-up” constraints on the emerging experience of emotion. — Feldman Barrett - Solving the Emotion Paradox

While I concur that emotions are often formed at a conscious level of their manifestation via retroactive application of emotion-concepts to that which is perceived via interoception (what Barrett terms "core affect"), I find this to be a partial, and likely derivative, truth: it is accordant to some of what is, but not all.

For clarity, some working definitions:

• Concept: a generalized idea – commonly understood to be abstracted as such from multiple concrete instantiations.
• Emotion: that which produces or influences movement within the psyche, i.e. cognitive action – often resulting in bodily movements, i.e. behaviors – but which can manifest in the absence of correspondent behaviors. For example, a pang of jealousy can be sensed by the conscious self while being shunned by the conscious self as wrong or inappropriate to act out on – this judgement being a cognitive action rather than a behavior – thereby here being an emotion that is experienced to influence without resulting in corresponding behaviors.
• Experience: awareness of that which is lived through
• Empirical: addressing awareness that is gained via sensory receptors

If “to be aware of” is “to experience” then not all experiences are empirical. As one example, I can enactively experience my decisions (illusory or not) at the instant they are made by me, for I hold awareness of them, but will not gain this awareness via sensory receptors. My awareness of the decision I make – here strictly addressing the decision itself, rather than the alternatives I was aware of – is not obtained via interpretations of what is gained via interoception or exteroception. The same non-empirical awareness may be claimed for many things introspected: thoughts, reasoning, beliefs, and so forth.

While some emotions are commonly understood to be correlated to interoceptive stimuli – e.g. disgust with some degree of bodily nausea – other emotions hold no such correspondence whatsoever. Envy I think is a fairly common emotion – and is one such example of an emotion that is not gained via interoception. Unlike anger or sorrow, there is no set of bodily stimuli obtained via interoception that corresponds to envy. The same may be said for other emotions such as longing. Then there are more atypical and more complex emotions that likewise are not correlated to any set of particular interoceptive instantiations: “sweet sorrow” as one example.

This is to say that not all emotions are associated with interoceptive feeling, i.e. core affect. Some are in no way empirical but, instead, strictly manifest within cognition via non-empirical awareness – same way we hold non-empirical awareness of the reasoning we engage in. We nevertheless metaphorically speak of “feeling” oneself to be envious. But in this case “feeling” is strictly metaphorical; as is the case with “seeing” what something means, or something “chiming” true, or a “hunger” for knowledge and a “thirst” for life.

Since not all emotions are (or are conceptual interpretations of) interoceptive feelings – again, what Barrett terms “core affect” – this to me then indicates that there is something more primary to emotions as a class than what constructivist views of emotion such as that of Barrett maintain. And there are other modern schools of thought as pertains to emotions.

In short, that all emotions are conceptual interpretations of literal feelings obtained via interoception is imv a false premise – in part falsified by emotions such as that of envy. This is not to deny the interplay between conceptual understandings of emotions and the emotions which we enactively experience – via interoception of otherwise – and which we convey to each other as holding. But it does address a need to reappraise what the class of givens we term emotions are – rather than accept the aforementioned premise as addressing a fundamental truth.

It's not worth my time. — Baden

yea, ditto

That death is the obtainment of non-being is a false premise? I don't think that's what you intend. So spell out the false premise to my question.

Bunch of non-sequiturs and red herrings.

Here's the claim: There is no evidence for an afterlife.

Here's the way to refute it: Show me the evidence. — Baden

Intellectual honesty would have addressed my question.

And yet none of this affects the hypothetical of reincarnations. For instance, some CNS gets produced in the far future whose nurture in the formative years results in an ego whose attributes – wants, aversions, metaphysical beliefs, and the like – present the same persona you hold in this lifetime.

I’m not saying this is a sure deal, and there is the issue of working memory not here playing a role between lifetimes, but the scenario doesn’t get nullified by life being an emergent process. Or even by physicalism’s tenets, for that matter. What it pivots upon is what one is to make of the notion of personal identity.

So, it's merely intellectual feebleness to posit an afterlife — Baden

No need to disparage. As it turns out, were death to be the instant cessation of all worry, strife, and pain via the obtainment of non-being, committing suicide would be the only rational thing to do for an overwhelming number of humans on this Earth. Why? Because they are in extreme pain and don’t want any. Do you then hold suicidal individuals – and suicidal murderers to boot – to be endowed with superior intellectual prowess? "No" is an easy answer; but why not, rationally speaking, if death actually is the obtained non-being of self?

It's just a new and kind of disturbing thought that human culture may generally have a natural tendency to devalue the development of virtue, and not just that particular cultures may have that tendency. — praxis

I greatly admire the ideal of the USA founders: a checks and balances of all power. Given human imperfections and tendencies, this imv best stabilizes what would otherwise become competitions for supremacy over others. But our drives to be superior relative to others are most always at a crossroad with our drives to find a home in a community of individuals that all honestly affirm something along the lines of “liberty, equality, fraternity”.

I don’t know, maybe I’m being unrealistically optimistic in this case, but I hold that societies (and thereby cultures) can either move toward the first mentioned structure of interaction, one of slave-master and slaves, or toward the second. Given a checks of balances of power, both political and economic, one that is actively maintained rather than undermined, I think that a society can be structured so as to maximize the social cultivation of virtue. I’m saying this while recognizing the chasm between such possibility and the actualities we are currently living in. And, to further complicate matters, such checks and balances of power would nowadays need to be implemented globally for it to hold any import. Otherwise one power will subjugate the rest – politically, economically, or both. Despite this, I don’t think that all possible societies are inherently antithetical to the development of virtue in individuals. My two pennies’ worth, at least.

societies may have a tendency to devalue the development of virtue. American culture, for instance, doesn't train us to pursue well-being in the eudaimonic sense. It trains us to pursue a good career, wealth, status, etc. The fifth level felt rabit is heaven, nirvana, or whatever. All these dangling carrots are dependent on others, which isn't nessisarily a bad thing, but it does leave us open to West World-like manipulation. — praxis

Much of current American culture, which is spreading worldwide, subsists on insecurities. From Orwellian fears of other that hold no tangible resolution to the feelings of inadequacy which compels us to buy things we don't need and wouldn't otherwise want, this because some commercial so tells us to. Having problems with romance, buy this car; it will change the quality of your life. "Fun food" I still don't get as a concept, but it sells. Were most in society to cultivate virtue and feel more integral by so doing, economy as we currently know it would be devastated.

I very much agree with your statements. Just wanted to complement them a bit.

The development of virtue can be countercultural in the sense that it leads to independence. — praxis

I agree, but believe it would be an empathetic form of independence, rather than a form of self-isolationism. Hoping that makes sense as expressed.

People want scapegoats and saviors. — ssu

Both of which are an evasion from personal responsibility.

All this to say you have essentially covered all of this with your statements that you would rather be in hell anyway instead of a heaven which you feel like you didn't earn, (is that right?) — TheDarkElf

Well, I wouldn't use the term "earned". If some Heaven is filled with brown-nosers who don't give a damn about what is right and what is wrong ... um, they really wouldn't want me there anyway; if it would be eternal (as in no actualization of non-being) I'd likely be causing eternal trouble for them. Besides, I'd much rather be with those that maintained a sense of integrity. So if Hell is filled with those who have, I'd then have earned that which I'd want - in this Cartesian-like hypothetical, to be in Hell. :cool:

and that you can be happy with your own efforts to be living virtuously. — TheDarkElf

That's about it.