but to infer that there's an aware-er we need the premise that says doing implies a doer in all cases of doing but [,,,] — TheMadFool

Are you intending to infer a homonculus to first-person awareness? I'd strongly disagree with that. We don't infer that we are aware so as to conclude that we are aware; instead, we as first-person points of view are aware of any such inference, and are thereby, QED, aware beings. And this regardless of us being entities, processes, both, or neither .... an ontological issue that can only be resolved (if at all possible to resolve) by inference and, hence, thoughts of which we are aware. No? (I'll check back in tomorrow.)

If you can't say, "this is thought now" then there is no thinking. It's an assertion of awareness. Thought is aware of its own authorship. It is fundamental to the nature of thought. — Pantagruel

Hmm. Can't one be aware while devoid of thoughts? As one example, while zoning-out? But this gets into the murky issue of what one interprets by the abstraction of thought. In short, is not awareness and thought two distinct - though intimately entwined - givens?

- is abstracted from a world that, Descartes himself acknowledges could be not real. — TheMadFool

Yea, but I'm not addressing this from that vantage of language realism, or some such.

It's taking place alright. I'm thinking right now, so are you and everybody else too but as crazy as this sounds, we may not exist in the sense there may not be a thing doing the thinking. — TheMadFool

Right, but - again - how do we conclude that thought is taking place?

I'll offer a suggestion: we are aware of our own thought, ergo we conclude that thought takes place. Now, one could play linguistic games with being an "aware-er" or else keep things in tune with commonsense expressions and just stipulate that we are aware beings. Here, epistemologically, our awareness of our thoughts takes precedence as a known over the thoughts in question of which we are aware.

The cogito ergo sum is an unsound argument. It can't prove that thinkers exist just because thinking takes place. — TheMadFool

Yup. As the cogito is most commonly understood - to regard thought but not awareness per se - it doesn't validate the thinker of the thought; it only validates that thought occurs. As wiser folk than I have mentioned along with you:

One common critique of the dictum is that it presupposes that there is an "I" which must be doing the thinking. According to this line of criticism, the most that Descartes was entitled to say was that "thinking is occurring", not that "I am thinking".[3] — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cogito,_ergo_sum

That established, there's a follow up question: How does one know that thinking takes place to begin with? In other words, what entitles Descartes to say "thinking is occurring"?

Realized after my post that I’m not a contributing member of the reading group, so I’ll back off the thread. Just wanted to clarify:

I wouldn’t agree that habit level processes are unconscious and thus that only attentional processing is conscious. — apokrisis

I wouldn’t agree with that either.

Does this mean that experience is not intentionally directed but emerges as an act of subconscious attentional focus? — magritte

It is more complicated. But as a general principle, yes. — apokrisis

If my memory serves me right, you used to talk of top-down process working in conjunction with bottom-up processes.

In your post you address, more or less, bottom-up process that result in what we experientially appraise to be voluntary behaviors that do not require cogitations on our part to accomplish. You’re sitting on a stool; you feel an impetus to drink a beer; then you voluntary ask the bartender for one; this without cogitations of whether or not you should drink a beer rather than a cola or a whiskey, nor with cogitations of which word choice to utilize in order to accomplish the feat of conveying what you want to the bartender (etc.). All good. A multitude of habitual behavior process kicking in. Given that our conscious awareness is not identical to our total mind’s awareness - which in laymen terms consists of both subconscious and unconscious awareness and cognitive activities, with neither the sub- nor unconscious mind (where differentiated) being the conscious awareness we as egos hold - it only makes sense that our non-conscious minds do a heck of a lot without any conscious input; and that this should be observable neurologically. (We, for one example, don't choose, intend, what to perceive; our non-conscious minds, in their interaction with our environment, are from where these percepts develop.)

Yet, when it comes to deliberation - wherein a choice is to be consciously taken between two or more alternatives (with these two or more alternatives themselves being products of the sub/unconscious mind) - the consciously aware ego can (or else cannot) hold top-down effects upon the substratum of its total mind and, therefore, upon the neurological correlates of the respective CNS.

I’m curious at this point. Are you now upholding that consciousness (as differentiated from the total mind within which it is embedded) cannot hold top-down effects upon the CNS via its consciously performed choices during times of conscious deliberation?

Concordantly, how are we to neurologically pinpoint such top-down effects by a consciousness when we can’t even neurologically pinpoint consciousness? … here alluding to the combination aspect of the binding problem.

This could all be part of what you meant by "it is more complicated". To me, at least, top-down process of consciousness - when they occur - do touch upon an important aspect of our cognition.

But I think that our mutual misunderstanding lies in my inability to adequately explain the difference between epistemological and metaphysical solipsism. — Partinobodycular

I’m familiar with both notions of solipsism, its just that I find a non-metaphysical, epistemological solipsism to be a logically incoherent concept - much as I find metaphysical solipsism to be a logically incoherent concept.

1) Again, if there is uncertainty about being the sole self, and if uncertainty about X entails lack of knowledge about X, then how can such a position be logically labeled an “epistemological sole-self-ism”?

2) As to the egocentric predicament you mentioned, an “ego” experiences more than just perception, it also experiences its own volitional actions: e.g., to have your will as an ego thwarted can result in differing intensities of suffering, which is also an experiential given. Which comes back around to the logical contradiction of intending X and intending not-X at the same time and in the same respect as an ego … Something which we as egos never experience, but would nevertheless need to be a known truth either for a metaphysical solipsist (who affirms the ontological stance that only he/she occurs) or for an epistemological solipsist (who affirms that the only knowledge to be had is that he/she occurs, while also claiming that knowledge and what is ontic are, or at least can be, distinct).

3) Likewise, we’re here addressing knowledge, epistemology. And, while you make the case of you being infallible, you as of yet have not provided any notion of what you mean by the term “infallible” so as to differentiate it from what I understand by the term “infallible”.

What you previously said about time being a limited commodity, it applies to most of us. No hard feelings, but if the conversation we’re having in a thread labeled “logically impeccable” isn’t going to adhere to logic, I’d much rather utilize my own time differently.

OK. Take your time. Don't forget about this other question when you reply:

If there is uncertainty about other selves, then there is uncertainty in like manner about being the sole self. The two are entailed. So how does it then make sense to refer to this condition of mind as “epistemological sole-self-ism” when uncertainty regarding what is abounds? — javra

Also, as I'm kind'a laughing my ass off about it:

That way mind can at least grasp what it is that you're mind is attempting to convey. — javra

This sentence has two grammatical typos that I've corrected. Nevertheless, it's unintentional presentation speaks volumes as to a solipsists pov: self without other that is yet conversing with another that is its own self. My bad for the typos, but they're humorous in a way.

Forgive me for neglecting this bit, — Partinobodycular

Well, this is the bit that to me is nothing else be nonsensical equivocation.

If there is uncertainty about other selves, then there is uncertainty in like manner about being the sole self. The two are entailed. So how does it then make sense to refer to this condition of mind as “epistemological sole-self-ism” when uncertainty regarding what is abounds?

As to the issue of infallibilism. I noticed that you ignored what I wrote about it:

For something to be infallible it will need to be perfectly secure from all possible error. Can you given evidence that at no future time will you, your mind, or someone else provide a possible error to your conclusion that "I exist"? If so, please provide this evidence via which to demonstrate infallibility. If not, the knowledge of one's own existence is not perfectly secure from all possible error, thereby not being infallible, therefore being fallible. And, if the only knowledge worthy of the term is held to be infallible, then one does not hold knowledge of one's own existence. — javra

So I currently can't find meaning in this statement you gave:

But the fascinating thing is, that while knowledge is fallible, I'm not...I'm infallible. — Partinobodycular

Rather than asking "how do you know this?" - a very pertinent question - I'll first ask you do define what "infallible" means to you. That way my mind can at least grasp what it is that your mind is attempting to convey. The analogies you've provided have not helped in any way; in part, because it all consists of fallible knowledge.

Thank you for your reply. I do have difficulty with the notion of a non-metaphysical, epistemological solipsism. Your leading disagreement was with the definition of solipsism I provided, from which the rest of your arguments followed. Via the second wikipedia quote you specified:

Epistemological solipsism is the variety of idealism according to which only the directly accessible mental contents of the solipsistic philosopher can be known. The existence of an external world is regarded as an unresolvable question rather than actually false. — wikipedia

Solipsism holds the etymology of "sole self". What am I to understand by the phrase "solipsistic philosopher" if not such being a philosopher who is the "sole self"?

As to issues of knowledge, are you understanding knowledge to be infallible by definition?

For something to be infallible it will need to be perfectly secure from all possible error. Can you given evidence that at no future time will you, your mind, or someone else provide a possible error to your conclusion that "I exist"? If so, please provide this evidence via which to demonstrate infallibility. If not, the knowledge of one's own existence is not perfectly secure from all possible error, thereby not being infallible, therefore being fallible. And, if the only knowledge worthy of the term is held to be infallible, then one does not hold knowledge of one's own existence.

I'm in a little bit of hurry right now. Will try to get back tomorrow.

Keep things simple. Do you disagree with (1), (2), (3), (4), or a combination of these? If so, explain why the disagreement.

I really don't understand the obsession with ordinary language philosophy. Ordinary language has all sorts of assumptions baked into it. Why take those at face value? — Marchesk

Especially when one goes about picking which parts of ordinary language to rely on in ad hoc manners. In ordinary language, intentions are not illusory, for one example. We all speak as though sentient beings are endowed with agency (granted, and sometime speak of insentient things, like computers, as though they are endowed with agency; such as in, “it's thinking,” when a computer program doesn’t process information fast enough).

Apples aren't red. — Marchesk

There are red apples. You're not bothered to be saying something so obviously false? — Banno

To whomever might be interested, my take on red apples:

In short, apples are red, intersubjectively. To make it explicit, this relative to the vast majority of the human species, a populace in which ab-normalities such as color blindness and blindness occur.

Apples are not red in a (intra-)subjective manner, such that their redness is exclusive to the private experiences of one individual and no other. The apple is red to you, is red to me, is red to most humans we interact with, and, therefore, it is (intersubjectively) red - for all of us (save color blind and blind people).

Nor are apples red objectively, such that their redness is universally applicable to all sentient being save for those who are (intentionally so expressed) malformed. As one example, if one accepts biological evolution, lesser animals endowed with sight which don’t see the apple being red are equally evolved in biologically functional manners as are humans; i.e., they don’t have malformed sight. All sentient beings, however, will witness the same spatiotemporal properties of what we humans (intersubjectively) experience as a red apple, this when in proximity to it. Given that objective reality is universally applicable to all sentient beings, this then makes the apple's spatiotemporal properties objective - but not its color, nor its taste, etc., with all the latter being intersubjective realities.

Again, we need to be clear about the difference between epistemological solipsism and metaphysical solipsism. — Partinobodycular

I’m only interested in a discussion if you don’t go about waiving off logical conclusions when they don’t suit your fancy, as was previously done here:

You [as a first-person point of view] can intend X and not X [at the same time and in the same respect] by simply waving it away as a figment of your mind. — Darkneos

--------

1) Solipsism is the position that in the whole of existence only a single self occurs, or else is known to occur.

2) An epistemological solipsism that rejects metaphysical solipsism thereby rejects that only a single self occurs or, else, is known to occur; and can thereby affirm the ontological co-occurrence of multiple epistemological solipsists in the world (a world which is granted to be strictly constituted of mind). Regardless of particulars ascribed to these others, though, to denounce metaphysical solipsism is to uphold the reality of multiple coexisting selves.

3) However, the position that multiple selves (be they fellow epistemological solipsists or not) co-occur and interact directly contradicts (1), thereby making the notion of solipsism nonsensical.

4) Therefore, for solipsism as concept to hold any form of cogent meaning whatsoever, solipsism must be one of metaphysical solipsism.

Where do you find disagreement in this?

"Things as they are" aren' t much. — Heiko

Hmm. And so ontology gets thrown out the window. I'd say fine, but then epistemology would have no ontological grounding.

At any rate, I fully get that what I wrote in my last post was an oversimplification. Aside from which, I just now realize that its deviating too much form the thread's theme, which might make things less fun for some.

Could that be done on purpose? Seems much more plausible. — Heiko

:smile: Personally, I think we each like the stability of our core being - a type of metaphysical self-preservation of the identity we each hold ourselves to have - something along the lines of "ego" when interpreted as the [...] in any statement affirming "I am [...]". Entertaining this concept, then we each desire to hold onto this conceptual identity of being we've acquired via the course of our lives. We, in essence, become attached to the tales we tell ourselves that explain what and who we are. Its no longer a quest to discover what this is but it is already known and must then be safeguarded. Only that different folks hold different conceptualizations of what and who they are. So different folks then abstract different concepts in attempts to confirm (solidify, make firm) their notions of what and who they are - only that these notions often enough conflict, due to being contradictory (relative to each other). And so more such abstractions are then in turn further created for the same core motive - resulting in a massive amount of abstractions that are at odds with each other. Hence the "sea of nebulous abstractions".

So, in a way, yea, maybe it is all done on purpose, as in with a motive.

When asking what is necessary for experience to be possible, the answer should not lead to the conclusion, that it is not. — Heiko

Yes. I firmly reside on this side of the aisle as well. Got it now.

(posted too quickly so I edited the grammatical mistakes I found after posting)

The conclusion fails short. It signifies a level of thought where mind has not yet achieved self-conscousness as the being it is. — Heiko

:up:

... Although, from my way of thinking, its funny (else mesmerizing) how lesser animals are cognizant, (self-)aware, of their own being as one agency among others - this without the use of cogitations, i.e. inferential thoughts - while we humans often loose sight of this due to a sea of nebulous abstractions. This pov is doubtlessly something controversial among the learned. Not so much with, for one example, human children in regard to their pets. The topic is a can of worms, though.

Why does everyone just think, that, when talking about a-priori there would be wisdom beyond the obvious. — Heiko

Can you elaborate on this? Would like to make sure that I understand you properly.

Sigh, solipsism, what a show.

For all the solipsists out there, lyrics to a song that touches upon the issue:

See the animal in his cage that you built
Are you sure what side you're on?
Better not look him too closely in the eye
Are you sure what side of the glass you are on?
See the safety of the life you have built
Everything where it belongs
Feel the hollowness inside of your heart
And it's all
Right where it belongs

What if everything around you
Isn't quite as it seems?
What if all the world you think you know
Is an elaborate dream?
And if you look at your reflection
Is it all you want it to be?
What if you could look right through the cracks?
Would you find yourself
Find yourself afraid to see?

What if all the world's inside of your head
Just creations of your own?
Your devils and your gods
All the living and the dead
And you're really all alone?
You can live in this illusion
You can choose to believe
You keep looking but you can't find the woods
While you're hiding in the trees

What if everything around you
Isn't quite as it seems?
What if all the world you used to know
Is an elaborate dream?
And if you look at your reflection
Is it all you want it to be?
What if you could look right through the cracks
Would you find yourself
Find yourself afraid to see?

Lyrics from the song "Right Where It Belongs" by NIN:

I fail to see how this is unsound though — Darkneos

Why defer to logical reasoning when it is just a figment of your imagination that can be waived off whenever it disagrees with your whims?

Hey, be or don't be a solipisist, whatever you choose to believe. But, in case you choose the former, do keep in mind that when you interact with others the void that is your own projection, the void will interact back with you.

I’m pretty sure he’s coming from the vantage that, as with a dream of sleep, everything he experiences during awakened states is a waking dream produced by HIS mind alone - with this being rationalized by him via him not having certainty for there being other sources of awareness and intention except for he himself.

One problem to this is that, as with any dream of sleep wherein one interacts with others within the given dream, for his non-self-mind to act and react to what he is or is not doing, his non-self-mind has to be aware of what he is or is not doing. Such that the mind addresses is fragmented into numerous sources of awareness and intention of which he is only one of many. This as is is typical in many an REM dream.

We infer all the happenings of REM dreams to occur within our own personal mind, and this because these happenings are found to all be private to ourselves upon awakening from sleep: others do not share our REM dreams. In the conceptualization of reality as the waking dream one awakens to from sleep states, however, the mind in question is not private to any one of the disparate sources of awareness and intention that are to be found in the so conceptualized waking dream. Instead, all these disparate sources pertain to a common mind - such that the given waking dream mind belongs to none of them individually. And there is no awakening (as a self in a world of non-self) from the waking dream such that the waking dream of physical reality becomes “a personal and private fabrication of MY MIND” that is not shared by anyone else.

So in this conceptualization of existence wherein we awaken to a waking dream, the “mind” addressed in effect encapsulates all the sources of awareness and intention that interact (both human and non-human). Thereby not pertaining to any one source of awareness and intention. Thereby constituting one interpretation of a non-physicalist existential reality that, all the same, is constituted of multiple selves which all pertain to a common mind—for instance, a common effete mind as C.S. Peirce would say.

For the solipsist, there is an insistent equivocation between “me”, a source of awareness and intention, and “my mind” which is not “me” but instead belongs to “me”—such that both “me” and “my mind” are illogically affirmed to be identical. This is as equally true of mind (in whichever ontology) that is composed of both conscious awareness and sub- or unconscious awareness—such that both are conflated into “me” as conscious awareness—as it is in regard to the notion of mind as that which constitutes reality as a waking dream—wherein all others are irrationally deemed to be “figments of my imagination as a conscious awareness”.... Or, else, "my mind's figments of imagination" which, again, is conflated with the "me" that is one source of awareness and intention.

Because of this unsound conflation, they then insist that everything is “me”. Hence, the sole-self position … wherein everything, including logic, can be waived off as a figment of “my imagination”.

But if logic can be waived off as irrelevant, I fail to see the point in solipsists (because there’s more than one out there) attempting to use logic to affirm their case.

The fun thing about solipsism, everybody can do it! — Merkwurdichliebe

:rofl: Quite.

But how do you compare the fun factor to other what-ifs? I'm sure better one's can be found, but here's an example: What if extraterrestrials (that they exist is a good what-if for many) teleported the sun out out our galaxy and into another (teleportation is a staple what-if in many a philosophical hypothetical, typically used to gain wisdom (cough) into personal identity issues; I'm here extrapolating), this exactly seven minutes ago such that in one minute's time there won't be any sunlight? In my view, this is a far better roller-coaster ride of what-ifs than is solipsism, which is kind'a bland and boring. One can even converge the two: the same question posed but with everything now being a projection of the given solipsist.

@Darkneos I now find this thread to be more about a phobia (i.e., an unreasonable fear) than about issues of experience based logic. And I'm by no means qualified to address the former. If we'd start taking all the what-ifs we can collectively fathom seriously we'd implode. Life is more than just perception, it is also action. And no, you are not alone. I'll defer to @Merkwurdichliebe and others from here on out. Sincerely, all the best to you from me, me being a different self than the one you are.

It's not really what I think about it but what others say about it. I don't want to believe it but it's a select others that say I am mistaken in dismissing it as false or wrong. — Darkneos

I'm off to work for now, but wanted to make the comment: So too will some argue that Earth is flat irrespective of what you and I say. Why take what they say so seriously?

Especially when it comes to experience and intention ... you know your own better than anyone else, right?

You haven’t answered the question I posed. Expressed somewhat differently: Can you both intend X and not intend X at the same time and in the same respect?

It an important question. If there is either experiential or logical uncertainties about the answer, please explain where this uncertainty could possibly come from.

If no rational doubts occur for the issue, then you have yourself certainty (both experiential and logical) that when others appear to thwart your intentions it is in fact not yourself who is doing so.

Given that a self is at minimum a locus of awareness - i.e., a first-person point of view - which furthermore intends stuff, and given the aforementioned certainty, then via entailment you also hold the certainty that other selves occur. Just as their awareness of you is not your awareness of yourself, so too (and more pivotally to the argument I'm presenting) their intentions are not your intentions. Therefore, there occur other selves: loci of awareness and intention other than yourself.

I should also add, there’s massive amounts of equivocation that can and does occur in relation to what a self is. So, prior to engaging in discussions about the notion of a “sole self”, can you also please elaborate on what a self is to you. This especially if you disagree with the minimalist definition I've provided.

As to the link you’ve posted, I’m not much interested in what others say about the matter; both lies and bullshit can be expressed by others and neither should be believed. I’m interested in what your own experiences and logic have to say about the matter.

I'll further address your questions on the condition that you first address mine.

Quite the compliment. Thank you.

My pleasure. :grin:

Which satisfies Dennett's criterion? — creativesoul

You're making this feel like kindergarten.

I asked you:

Does this conscious experience consist of quality? — javra

to which you replied:

Not on my view, but perhaps on yours it may. What counts as consisting of quality? — creativesoul

to which I in essence replied:

if in your view conscious experiences do not consist of quality, where does quality take place? — javra

to which you answer:

Which satisfies Dennett's criterion? — creativesoul

... after I asked that you don't evade the question.

I'm calling it a day. Have (non-qualitative) fun!

Are those my only choices?

:brow: — creativesoul

Nope. But a non-evasive reply would do.

Does this conscious experience consist of quality? — javra


Not on my view, but perhaps on yours it may. What counts as consisting of quality? — creativesoul

If your asking me to define quality, dictionaries can do this far better than I.

Two definitions stand out: 1) level of excellence [as in quality of life, or the quality of a song, or the quality of an apple (for the purpose of eating)] and 2) a property or an attribute that differentiates a thing or a person [as in one of the apple's properties qualities is that it is red rather than green]

To then answer, if an experience is in any way qualitative, it will then consist of (be made up of) qualities - in sense 1, in sense 2, or, arguably, in both senses.

Given that we both acknowledge the occurrence of the word "quality" in the English language (you've made use of it), and if in your view conscious experiences do not consist of quality, where does quality take place?

Or is it your view that quality does not take place anywhere, that it has no occurrence, thereby making the term fully meaningless to you?

The old gag about beaviourism, which eliminativism is basically a rebage: — Wayfarer

Very much agreed.

It does not consist of qualia or quale. — creativesoul

Just because I'd like to get things straight: Does this conscious experience consist of quality?

I heard it said that solipsism can't be refuted because it's logically impeccable, but does that make it true? — Darkneos

Can you both intend X and intend not-X at the same time and in the same respect?

I take it that you have on occasion had your intentions obstructed by what you experience to be the intentions of others. If there are no others, then your answer to this question could only be “yes”. Yet so answering results in a) inconsistency with your own experiences and b) a logical lack of validity to any assertion imaginable (such as via the principle of explosion).

Ergo, other selves are.

One should add, as well as an impartial reality that is not of your will’s making and will thereby obstruct some of your intentions were you to hold these.

Point being, solipsism is not logically impeccable.

Such intimate conversations will always go awry when "qualia" rears it's ugly head. — creativesoul

Well, of course. One will start arguing about both of them being illusory intuition pumpin' machines; the other starts arguing that the quality to it all is going down the drain. And then presto, the magic is lost and there's no more making whoopee between the two.

-------

On a more serious note, quality occurs as an intrinsic aspect of our experiences. Is this debatable? For me the answer is "no". Then: A) Is a quality not possible to experientially differentiate from any other quality, thereby making quality unquantifiable; B) can a quality be experientially contrasted to other qualities and thereby be quantifiable, or c) something other?

I'm not enamored with qualia, as previously mentioned. Still, being charitable here, if we can discern and thereby distinguish between different qualities, then the philosophical notion of qualia might make some sense in certain philosophical contexts.

What say you?.

It's the too easily accomplished reification of the notion that is a primary problem, I think.

Actually, that phrase: "something it is like to..." is what does violence to the language. It's a recent invention found almost only in philosophical discourse, and so is inherently fraught. — Banno

Right, because sexual partners have prior to recent philosophy readings never asked each other, "what was it like for you?"

It takes a modern philosopher to interpret this and related statements as violence to the language. Which is why I say that those of a philosophical ilk need to get out more. (I speak from experience.)

-----------

On the other hand, there's "qualia": a nifty quantification of quality for those who are endowed with "quanta"-envy.

How many qualia are there to an experience of beauty? Or of the ugly? Or else ... wait for it ... there's no quality to experiences of either. This because materialism can't account for it save via intuition pumps.

----------

In short, bah humbug.

The way in which you frame your argument misses the mark. For example: A property, any property, is bound to the property specified. And so it cannot specify - be it part or in whole - that which is without bounds, else without limits.

As to the conclusion that it returns the "value 0, null, void, cipher, nought", I don't know what (absolute) infinity is other than via description of what it cannot be, which isn't saying much. As an interesting tidbit, though, the description of being without any limit (e.g., as in volumeless, period; neither infinitesimally small nor infinitely large, but volumeless) is ascribed by some in the field of physics to the supposed gravitational singularity from which the Big Bang is supposed to have commenced. (Not a cosmology I subscribe to, but, all the same, the idea goes that finitude causally emerged from lack of finitude via the Big Bang.)

At any rate, given your conclusion that:

It appears that, paradoxical and self-contradictory as it sounds, the mother of all infinity, the be all and the end all of infinity, the infinity of infinities, is the humble zero! — TheMadFool

In assuming that absolute infinity is the humble zero, the question remains: Is the humble zero something potential, something actual, or something other?

:razz:

my personal view is that 1) infinity is, by definition, endless 2) something endless can't be completed, obviously.

How then the notion of an actual infinity, completed as it must be? — TheMadFool

Putting another philosophical spin on things, infinity does, or at least can, translate into “without limit” or “without boundary”.

This creates a misnomer of sorts. For example, most all mathematical infinities are infinities that are limited in some way. A line has infinite extension, but only in one direction; in the perpendicular direction it is bounded and thereby holds the finitude specific to a line (thereby for example distinguishing it from a geometric plane). Likewise with 1/3: the limitless series of 3s that results is nevertheless bounded to the number specified by the fraction, and thereby results in the finitude of 3s following the decimal point.

These, then, are all limited infinities. In effect, when claiming the infinity of X, the X specified remains bounded and, thereby, limited to X. So the infinity addressed in all such cases can be deemed equivocal: “without limit” in some way but “with limit(s)” in another.

We as humans can however also fathom the notion of an absolute infinity (what some term "The Absolute"): that which unequivocally is without limit. But, since even our concepts are by necessity limited to the concept specified, no one can conceptually understand what (absolute) infinity might actually be.

And it is in this fuzzy, else mystical, notion of absolute infinity (infinity proper?) that the notion of God as actual infinity unfolds for many, or at least some. For example:

Cantor linked the Absolute Infinite with God,[1] and believed that it had various mathematical properties, including the reflection principle: every property of the Absolute Infinite is also held by some smaller object.[2] — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Absolute_Infinite

You may misunderstand. I don't believe consciousness is an independent entity with its own substance separate from matter and energy. Wayfarer does. — Philosophim

A comedy of misunderstandings. I assumed you thought this to be my stance. As to Wayfarer, I greatly doubt this, seeing how he is greatly inclined toward Buddhist thought.

I have nothing against panpsychism as a theory, as long as it reduces down to reality. — Philosophim

Hear, hear! As I previously mentioned somewhere in the thread, I'm still trying to grapple with the notion of panpsychism philosophically. @Kenosha Kid's last post speaks to some of the problematic issues with it. But it is so far a position I infer as being readily likely.

I do disagree with this. I know what my own consciousness is from my self-subjective view point. The problem is you seem to be describing consciousness in terms of senses. Consciousness is not light hitting my eyes or soundwaves hitting my ears. That's why its a hard problem. It likely requires its own language to communicate exactly what it is. Which is perfectly fine. As long as the models are in line with reality, postulating and inventing new models to describe consciousness is perfectly fine — Philosophim

Hmm. So, earlier today I finally uploaded my culminating chapter on consciousness's demarcation. And, as you state, it makes use of novel terms to express either what I take to be novel concepts or, else, to make cumbersome phrases (like, "a first-person point of view") more easily communicable in ordinary speech. One will likely also need to read, or skim, through the chapters leading up to it to get a better grasp of what is expressed. Extremely understandable if you're not inclined, but, if it tickles your fancy, I'd would welcome your feedback on the demarcations of consciousness I've offered. (I known. I'm now shamelessly self-promoting a work I've barely begun. But seeing how doing so is moderately acceptable on this forum, why not, right?)

So, if interested, here's the link: https://www.anenquiry.info/index.php/Chapter_7:_Demarcating_Consciousness

You might misunderstand this. Energy and mass are interchangeable mathmatically. The reason why we say light has no mass is due to the mathmatical conclusion that light travels at the maximum speed allowed. — Philosophim

Although physics isn't my strong point (much prefer the biological sciences) what I was alluding to is that we nevertheless conceptualize a photon as being a thing, an entity, when it scientifically doesn't quite fit the bill. As to its particle/wave duality, I've read papers expressing that enzymes can exhibit the same duality. Just now quickly found this reference online: https://www.technologyreview.com/2019/11/09/238365/a-natural-biomolecule-has-been-measured-acting-in-a-quantum-wave-for-the-first-time/

That said, I like process theory, so I'm biased toward this outlook. So maybe that explains the stance I've taken.

Now could we come up with a better model that relates the math to us? Quite possibly. The requirement however is that it must be mathamatically sound when applied to reality as well. This is the attempt by unified field theories. — Philosophim

Yes, of course.

I do agree that consciousness is real, but consciousness is a word that represents an identity we observe, but does not assert it is its own composed entity. We don't say, "matter, energy, and water" exist right? Water is made up of matter and energy. Consciousness is made up of matter and energy. Consciousness is not another form of existence separate from matter and energy. If someone claims this to be, they must provide evidence to counter the evidence that shows consciousness comes from the brain, which is made out of matter and energy. — Philosophim

I'll elaborate a bit on the stance I favor for the sake of clarity:

But first off, stop it with the "conscious is entity" strawman. I won't reply if you don't. For some, such as myself, the belief upheld is that - while consciousness is likely primary to matter (the latter being physical energy, and vice versa ... this per the e = mc2 dictum on which our modern physics by in large rests) - a) consciousness is NOT an entity and b) matter/physical energy nevertheless holds blatant reality on account of its causal interactions with all first-person sources of awareness. The objective idealism of C. S. Peirce should suffice as an example of this ontological outlook. It's not something that can be cogently presented within the sound-bite format of a debate forum, so I'm not inclined to here make a cogent case for it upon request. All the same, neither I - nor those who uphold Buddhist (or Buddhist-like) views, such as I interpret @Wayfarer to - in any way, shape, or form maintain consciousness to be an entity. Quite the contrary.

Approrops, as to the evolution of life from non-life within such an ontological system, one leading inference is that of panpsychism.

Nevertheless, within such a framework, there is no denial nor doubt that for the individual consciousnesses of individual organisms there is a bottom-up causal process between the substratum of living organic matter and what we experience as our personal awareness. So this "separateness from matter or energy" doesn't hold in the day to day reality we experience. It only holds when addressing the utterly existential issue of what is metaphysically primary to existence as a whole.

One possible question might be: "but where does this (non-entity) consciousness come from existentially?" This, however, is just as mysterious - as of yet unknown and possibly unknowable in principle - as is the parallel question that can be placed to physicalists: "but where does physical energy come from existentially?".

So we're implicitly coming from two different schemas that attempt to cogently explain the same commonly shared reality: Yours affirms physical energy/matter to be primary but cannot explain either why physical energy/matter is in the first place nor why consciousness occurs. The one I currently hold affirms that physical reality - replete with is many intricate causalities and the like - is a complex byproduct of awareness dispersed among innumerable coexistent first-person loci of awareness. Which - as our impartial, shared, physical reality - then causally limits, binds, and goads (including via births and deaths) these sources of awareness in manners that are not fully predetermined but, instead, are causally compatibiliistic. Thereby allowing for progressive top-down causation upon the physical reality which is our brains. Here, there is no hard problem of consciousness, this being a physicalist problem. The only quintessential issue is that of what awareness in general actually is and where it comes from - but this is just as unresolved as the same questions applied to a physicalist's energy. Explaining that energy is energy is just as in/valid as stating that awareness is awareness.

In short, when addressing myself at the very least, consciousness is not an entity and it is not causally untethered from the physical reality which, nevertheless, is a product of awareness's global occurrence - as is the case in a system of panphychism, for one example. As to the magicality of its being, it is no more and no less an instance of pure and unadulturated magic as is the occurence of energy within any system of physicalism. One takes one pick of magical component of reality. I tend to pick the former over the latter - for, if nothing else, it at least accounts for the reality of that by which everything else is cognized.

So, I've presented a rough outline of where I, personally, am presently coming from ontologically. I'm not here interested, however, in debating metaphysical systems - with physicalism most certainly being one such.

That said, staying on track with the thread's topic of the hard problem:

I do agree that consciousness is real, but consciousness is a word that represents an identity we observe, — Philosophim

We do not, cannot, observe our own identity as a conscious being. Consciousness is that which observes; and is never that which can be directly observed. If you disagree with this, what then does your consciousness look like, sound like, or smell like, etc., to you? (And if you jokingly tell me something along the lines of "like ice-cream", who could seriously take this to define what consciousness in general is?)

Again, the hard problem can be phrased as a problem in explaining how the observable can account for that which is unobservable but observes - and is thereby known to be real.

Processes are actions, and interactions with other entities. When an electron travels across a wire, we get the process of electricity. When that electron travels to your computer, and allows a signal to alter a logic gate, that is the process of computing. Processes are not separate from the matter and energy, they are the result of their interactions. These interchanges are matter and energy. — Philosophim

OK, but a photon is more basic than an electron, and a photon has no mass last I've heard, thereby not being matter, thereby not being an entity.

Then you get into Zero-Point Energy:

Zero-point energy (ZPE) is the lowest possible energy that a quantum mechanical system may have. Unlike in classical mechanics, quantum systems constantly fluctuate in their lowest energy state as described by the Heisenberg uncertainty principle.[1] As well as atoms and molecules, the empty space of the vacuum has these properties. According to quantum field theory, the universe can be thought of not as isolated particles but continuous fluctuating fields: matter fields, whose quanta are fermions (i.e., leptons and quarks), and force fields, whose quanta are bosons (e.g., photons and gluons). All these fields have zero-point energy.[2] These fluctuating zero-point fields lead to a kind of reintroduction of an aether in physics,[1][3] since some systems can detect the existence of this energy; however, this aether cannot be thought of as a physical medium if it is to be Lorentz invariant such that there is no contradiction with Einstein's theory of special relativity.[1]

Physics currently lacks a full theoretical model for understanding zero-point energy; in particular, the discrepancy between theorized and observed vacuum energy is a source of major contention.[4] — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zero-point_energy

This so as to back up what I've previously said: Though the issue is open-ended, it very much seems to be the case that entities emerge from non-entity processes, of which we still know very little about. Thereby, to make this explicit, resulting in a process theory view of reality.

But will science ever be able to produce the state of being a bat, and then have us feel exactly what it is like to be a bat? Maybe not. That is not relevant to stating that consciousness is separate from the brain. — Philosophim

While I know that I didn't provide an in-depth account, given what I first mentioned in this post, maybe you might understand how claiming that I affirm "consciousness is separate from the brain" isa misinterpretation of my views. No, a human consciousness is causally tethered to the workings of its respective living brain; its just that, in the worldview I endorse, this relation is not epiphenomenal, and so can result in top-down causality upon the physical brain.

Now, when addressing "awareness" just as abstractly as when we address "physical energy/matter", then, and only then, the primacy of awareness comes into play - this, again, as far as the stance I currently uphold goes. But this existential generality of primacy should by not means be mistaken for a consciousness that is causally untethered from its respective central nervous system's workings.

I am stating that the only thing we have discovered in the universe is matter and energy, so those are the only things we can realistically analyze. Is it possible something else exists besides these? Sure, why not? What we know today could be contradicted tomorrow. But we can't talk realistically, and rationally, about things which we have no knowledge of being real. — Philosophim

Are you by this claiming that we do not know whether consciousness - via which we discover things such as matter and energy - is real? If not, please explain why we don't. If, however, you agree that we know consciousness is real, then we at minimum can claim to have discovered three things being real: matter, energy, and the consciousness via which these are known.

Everything that we know points to consciousness forming from the brain. So that is the only thing we can rationally discuss. You can propose that consciousness is some magical entity, but unless you can show some evidence of this magical entity being real, it is a fantasy, and not a rational argument. — Philosophim

Excuse the limitations of the English language via which this is expressed, but not everything will be a thing, i.e. an entity. Processes are for example known to occur, and a process - though being something - is not a thing/entity. The issue of whether processes are primary to existence or, else, entities are primary to existence - though open-ended - does not bode well for the primacy of entities.

By what logical argument would one pigeonhole consciousness into being an entity? This sounds very much like the type of reification that perspectives such as those of Buddhism oppose - and, needless to add, these perspectives are not physicalist.

As of yet, no. And they may never be able to. — Philosophim

Is this not the hard problem in a nutshell?

@Wayfarer, hope you don't mind me contributing for a little while.

Well, you could see this thread for an example of taking the idea further: even electrons have awareness of each other. As an intermediary point: even trees are aware of one another. The point befits the fact that human consciousness is a sophisticated kind of mammalian consciousness, which is a sophisticated kind of animal consciousness, which is a sophisticated kind of biological reactivity, which is a sophisticated set of chemical reactions, which are sophisticated sets of electromagnetic particle interactions. — Kenosha Kid

We're in accord here. Though I'm still trying to wrap my mind around it, so to speak, do you see how all this meshes with the notion of panpsychism?.

If I'm reading you right, you're talking about the third-person/first-person barrier. That is true. If you want to know what consciousness is, that is a third-person question. — Kenosha Kid

I prefer "fourth-person" as the idealized objective view - rather than "third-person", which to me implies "he, she, it (in the case of lesser animals) they, or them" ... all of which are deemed endowed with their own first-person awareness.

Still, maybe this presumption - that consciousness must and can only be understood via what I'll term fourth-person means - is at the crux of the issue. For a physicalist, this must be the case. For many a non-physicalist (I'll give C.S. Peirce like objective idealism as one example), despite the correlation between a human's CNS and a respective consciousness, this cannot ever be the case. Yes, in part because that which is first-person awareness is other relative to all it apprehends.

Of note, in so upholding, the physicalist by implication will then also uphold the stance of epiphenomenalism, right?. Here, top-down effects upon brain are an impossibility given the dictums which hold the worldview of physicalism together. Do you find this statement to be accurate?

Likewise an explanation for consciousness doesn't need to feel like consciousness. — Kenosha Kid

No, of course not. But it would need to give reasons for why tangible X, Y, and Z results in what it feels like to be conscious--rather than taking the latter occurrence for granted.

There's a difference between substance and function. There is a difference, for instance, in an electron and the movement of an electron. There is a difference between a computer and an executing program. You can't just look at the object, you have to look at what it does if you want to explain e.g. electric current, a machine learning algorithm, or consciousness. — Kenosha Kid

With that, now we're getting into metaphysical underpinnings - which could be disputed in multiple ways, depending on the vantage taken.

I was/am here only trying to differently present what the hubbub is about when it comes to the hard problem ... basically just aiming at the issue being better understood by supporters of Dennett et al.

Neurology is a physical discipline. It is not its job to satisfy metaphysicists any more than it's its job to satisfy creationists or dualists. If you're in principle satisfied that the science can isolate what consciousness is, not just correlates (including causal) of consciousness, but want a deeper understanding of why a thing that is something is that thing, which is not a question specific to consciousness at all, you ought to look to other metaphysicists, surely? Is there a specific aspect to consciousness that makes this special? — Kenosha Kid

I’ll try to reframe what is at issue in the hard problem of consciousness. I’m thinking maybe it might be of help. (Then again, it might not.)

A brain is tangible (to a consciousness); a consciousness is not tangible (to any consciousness).
Therein lies a, or maybe the, pivotal ontological difference—even when eschewing the issue of whether a consciousness can hold non-epiphenomenal, hence top-down, effects upon its own substratum of brain.

Tangentially, I’ll add that this thread's persistent reference to brains is overlooking the fact that even amebas hold an awareness of other: such as in an ameba’s capacity to discern what is relative to itself a predator from what is a prey. And that coupled with this awareness of other is a forethought of how to best act towards that which is apprehended as other by it (again, as example, a predator or a prey) so as to maximize its own stability of being. To evade, an ameba needs to foresee how to best evade the moment by moment activities of its predator; likewise to consume pray, it needs to foresee how to best sabotage the moment by moment activities of its prey (which can be smaller amebas). In cases such as that of the unicellular ameba, there is no nervous system involved in the awareness that takes place. And how the single-celled corpus of an ameba brings about a concordant (intangible) amebic-awareness replete with degrees of forethought is anybody’s guess. Point being, first-person awareness is not strictly contingent on living brains.

That mentioned, there’s no doubt that the processes of a central nervous system correlate with those of its respective consciousness—in addition to correlating to the occurrence of a consciousness’s subconscious or unconscious mind. (Despite their awareness of givens such as environmental factors, the latter two aspects of a total mind are not commonly addressed as being of themselves conscious: consciousness being instead reserved for the first-person awareness held by each of us—rather than for our sub- or unconscious mind’s awareness of givens.)

Again, though, we can empirically study the workings of the brain all we want. And, in so doing, we will undoubtably gain greater insights into the bottom-up processes in which the workings of a living brain can result in a respective consciousness (not all living brains do, with coma as an easily addressed example). Nonetheless, the physical brain and all it does will forever be tangible percepts which we perceive as other relative to us as the consciously aware observers. Whereas our living brain and its processes are tangible percepts, the consciousness aware of them is not tangible even to itself. And all our empirical knowledge—including of brains—stems from, and is ontologically dependent on, the occurrence of (always intangible) consciousness.

If, simplistically put, a living brain is identical to a consciousness, they then should both be either tangible or, else, intangible. But they hold different ontological properties in this respect; they are not identical.

Explaining how that which is perceived and is thereby tangible accounts for that which perceives and is intangible will, then, be one vantage to what the hard problem of consciousness is about.

There's a gap - something that we aren't measuring in our computational analysis.

I'm wondering what theories there are that specifically address the question of measuring this gap. — Malcolm Lett

How to measure what remains of the hard problem. Maybe by using the upper left side of a measuring stick that is fit for the task but has yet to be discovered?

The framing, after all, presupposes that consciousness is something measurable and therefore quantifiable. For if it isn’t quantifiable than it can’t be measured. And if it can’t be measured than it can’t be properly termed scientific – most vexing for those who equate that which is real strictly to that which is physical and thereby amiable to quantification by the sciences.

As to the magnitude (as in lesser or greater) of, for example, a particular conscious desire - wherein the difference between slightly wanting and desperately wanting some given X ought to be measurable to the minds of many - there of course is the option of decrying “desire” to be a false concept upheld by the stupidity of folk-psychology (often interpreted by the masses as plain commonsense) that must thereby be fully eliminated from the equation of what is real (equations being quantitatively computable, as is any materialist reality) or, alternatively, there’s always the search for that elusive, magical measuring device, previously alluded to, by whose use all aspects of consciousness can at last be scientifically quantified through and through.

Intensities of happiness and suffering, of beauty and the grotesque, of our sense of justice or injustice, even of our awareness of good and bad, these are all mathematically computable states of conscious being after all, right? No more and no less. We just need to find the correct means of measuring their quantitative, and therefore computational, nature, that’s all. But when we do, the gap will at long last be resolved.

And all this would be upheld by principles other than that of a blind metaphysical faith in what is – one that is on par to that maintained by any opposing party, even that of (heavens forbid) anything one can deride as mysticism.

For one can in practice prove that everything, including consciousness, is quantitative.

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If anyone’s reading, don’t mind me too much in all this. Tis a post intended for no one in particular. And if I’ve unintentionally made a strawman of anyone’s position, please feel free to elaborate on how. Was just passing through as someone who’s a stickler for the notion that not all aspects of what is real are measurable in principle, much less in practice. And yes, to me consciousness, as in "that which is conscious of", serves as one example of something immeasurable - despite admitting to different magnitudes.

You are poor, or even miserable; empathy, humbleness, and other of these "virtues" would not help you out of this state at all. — Gus Lamarch

Think I've read this before. It does not address the question posed, but gives one specific hypothetical where, it would so seem, being a merciless and arrogant person are endorsed. Why wouldn't empathy and humility greatly assist in getting hired at the job interview if one is poor, for one example. Or in getting others' assistance if one is miserable.

As it is, I'll take a break from this conversation.