That they can do this is not merely a theoretical possibility. They can demonstrate their ability to do this. How does one demonstrate that there is a realm of Forms that they have knowledge of? — Fooloso4

Addressing this via the more general issue of insight into deeper levels of reality and with the following in mind:

Brain scans of Buddhist monks exhibit a variety of unique features, including enhanced neuroplasticity. — Pantagruel

If a Buddhist monk’s worldview is in no way comprised of actual knowledge but only of arbitrary imaginations which are thereby devoid of any rational justification and, hence, rational grounding; then the empirically verifiable benefits of their upheld worldview upon their Central Nervous System would by entailment be nothing more than a wild coincidence devoid of any explanation. This then gives warrant in either accepting that a) at least some Buddhist monks have actual knowledge into the nature of reality (edit: this as they by in large claim to have) that others don’t grasp or else b) utterly inexplicable coincidences (which are by definition devoid of any meaningful connection) occur not only very commonly but with very predictable regularity between worldview upheld and its effects upon quality of life and CNS.

Does scenario (b) hold a significantly greater justification than scenario (a)? (And yes, I take it that both scenarios could well be deemed absurd from different vantages.)

No infallible proof to be had by this either way. But to me it does illustrate a sturdy enough justification for upholding the possibility, if not outright actuality, of some people’s insights into reality which others by in large lack. Insights that are in no way “secret” – for most Buddhists desire to be as transparent about them as they can be - but are nevertheless esoteric in that most others find these insights difficult to comprehend.

I don't care what you think, — Janus

Duely noted.

Moreover, were consciousness perceivable then the philosophical problem of other minds would not be a problem of any kind. — javra


"The philosophical problem of other minds", seem to me to be more a problem that some people have that is caused by philosophy rather than something to be taken very seriously.

Yes, we can't very reasonably say we perceive other minds, but I certainly have plenty of good reason to think that I recognize other minds. I.e. that minds have recognizable signatures. Don't you have good reasons to think so as well?

Isn't the performative contradiction rather obvious? — wonderer1

Aye. In many a way its right up there with p-zombies and brains in a vat. But these are only a problem in practice if one is in search of infallible knowledge. Otherwise, such philosophical problems, or issues, in and of themselves give no warrant whatsoever to doubting one’s fallible knowledge of reality at large, which includes other minds.

But that does not then dispel the philosophical, or more specifically epistemological, problem of other minds. "Problem" because that is what the issue is traditionally termed and known by. For example:

Here granting that an AI program has the capacity to become conscious, how would one (fallibly) know when it so becomes? One certainly can’t perceive its consciousness or the lack of. So it would be an inference based on its behaviors. And yet how can we so infer the moment that it becomes conscious?

Here’s another more unavoidable example: At which point in the chain of life does consciousness first occur? Some say that only humans are conscious beings, such that, for example, dogs and cats are not. While I take the opposite view, I have been unable to successfully argue for dogs and cats being conscious beings so as to convince those who disagree. Again, we cannot perceive consciousness, nor the mind which is contingent upon it. We can only infer it from behaviors. And there so far is no established principle(s) by which this inference can be made in impartial ways that thereby resolve the disagreements among humans. (And there are related issues, such as that of whether lesser animals experience emotions, but I'll cut this short.)

In sum, unless one is in search of infallible certainties, I don’t find any performative contradiction in acknowledging the issue - this, for instance, as it was presented in the two examples just provided - while at the same time not in any way doubting one's fallible knowledge of other minds. Goes hand in hand with fallibilism.

I don't think consciousness is outside the range of human perception; you perceive yourself to be conscious, no? — Janus

A different topic altogether, but I wanted to comment: If perception necessarily addresses the apprehension of phenomena, then no, one as consciousness does not perceive owns own consciousness. Moreover, were consciousness perceivable then the philosophical problem of other minds would not be a problem of any kind.

Am I not allowed to argue for what I believe can and cannot be coherently philosophically investigated? — Janus

You sound victimized. Let's refresh.

We can know nothing whatsoever about whatever might be "beyond being". The idea is nothing more than the dialectical opposite of 'being'. Fools have always sought to fill the 'domains' of necessary human ignorance with their "knowing". How much misery this has caused humanity is incalculable. — Janus

You view this as "an argument for what you believe" whereas to me it is nothing more and nothing less than an emotively expressed authoritarian assertion: one which wants to disallow me from thinking freely.

A difference of options.

(Just saw that Wayfarer stated something similar, but will post this anyway.)

Further to this, and apropos of the issue of esoteric philosophy. The following is a comparison of a passage from Parmenides, who is generally understood as the originator of classical metaphysics, and an esoteric school of Mahāyāna Buddhism called Mahamudra. — Wayfarer

Nice. Both passages you quote strike me as coming from folk that have tried to “express heretofore inexpressible insights” via prose and, as such, I can find an aesthetic appeal to both.

Of course, when concepts are poetically expressed, their successful conveyance will in part greatly depend on an already established background of implicit yet commonly shared understandings with the audience. This as can be said of most any poetic expression.

Tangentially brings to mind a poem by S. Crane that addresses the issue of all knowledge being opinion:

Once there was a man --
Oh, so wise!
In all drink
He detected the bitter,
And in all touch
He found the sting.
At last he cried thus:
"There is nothing --
No life,
No joy,
No pain --
There is nothing save opinion,
And opinion be damned."

Which I in part interpret as presenting the case that the more aware one becomes of one’s own lack of perfect knowledge in respect to anything, the more one will long for grasping the firmness of some unwavering truth or truths. Which I find to be Socrates’s predicament. But when one thinks one holds perfect knowledge in some respect or other, such longing does not occur.

At any rate, in Nietzsche’s phrasings (although I gather you’re not enamored with his works), there’s the Apollonian approach and then there’s the Dionysian.

Apollo represents harmony, progress, clarity, logic and the principle of individuation, whereas Dionysus represents disorder, intoxication, emotion, ecstasy and unity (hence the omission of the principle of individuation). — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Apollonian_and_Dionysian#Nietzschean_usage

If the analytic is Apollonian in its clarity, then the more poetic - such as the two quotes you’ve provided - will be Dionysian, filled with greater life.

It strikes me that, at least traditionally, the notion of “a unity of being” (such as can be said of "the One", for an additional example) has largely been expressed in Dionysian manners. And it is these very Dionysian ways of expressing and, maybe, even of being that strikes many as “esoteric”, difficult for most of us to comprehend.

If not 'being' then what do you suggest it means in this context? — Fooloso4

BTW, I should add to the just posted that, as per Neo-Platonism wherein the One is equivalent to the Good, one can interpret that only the Good is a perfectly fixed constant. Other Forms, such as numbers, etc., while far more permanent that others, would yet not be "a perfectly fixed constant" on which all else is dependent. Obvious speculation on my part as to what Socrates/Plato intended, but again it so far seems plausible to me: Only the Good is beyond what Wayfarer describes in the formerly given quote in an absolute and perfect sense, whereas all other forms are not - despite some of these other forms being far more permanent than others.

Added this just to clarify my current best assumptions.

If not 'being' then what do you suggest it means in this context? — Fooloso4

Although I'm not sure, something along the lines of Wayfarer's suggestion currently seem quite plausible:

My interpretation of 'beyond being' is that it means 'beyond the vicissitudes of existence', 'beyond coming-to-be and passing away'. That idea is made much more explicit in Mahāyāna Buddhism than in Platonism, but I believe there is some common ground. — Wayfarer

In the Seventh Letter Plato says: — Fooloso4

I find that passage you quote itself open to a wide enough range of interpretations. And so I can't make heads or tails as what type of reply it's supposed to be - this to the question of whether you yourself find the Socratic dialogs are reputable, or else worthwhile, philosophy.

The term in question is ousia. — Fooloso4

I'm aware of that. While I do not speak Ancient Greek, from my studies the word in Ancient Greek can convey different meanings or else sub-meaning. Here is one reference to this. It can be noted that while etymologically derived from "being" and, in turn, "to be", the term does not have "being" as its one unequivocal meaning.

Again, that the Good is not - this on account of being beyond being (as "being" is understood today) - is something I find nonsensical; and, hence, extremely unlikely to have been what was intended by the text.

"Effing the ineffable" is the job of art and poetry, not rigorous philosophical discussion. — Janus

Though we disagree in some respects, ↪Fooloso4 beat me to it in the example he provided to the contrary. — javra

My example is not to the contrary. It supports it. — Fooloso4

To be clear, do you by this intend to express that the Socratic dialogues by which Platonism was established are not rigorous philosophical discussions - this on account of often being poetically expressed?

If so, we then hold a difference of opinion as to what reputable philosophy can consist of.

As to the quote from Plato, It is fragmented and out of context (from Wikipedia) so I don't want to comment on it. — Janus

Here's a translation I found online:

[509b] the similitude of it still further in this way.1” “How?” “The sun, I presume you will say, not only furnishes to visibles the power of visibility but it also provides for their generation and growth and nurture though it is not itself generation.” “Of course not.” “In like manner, then, you are to say that the objects of knowledge not only receive from the presence of the good their being known, but their very existence and essence is derived to them from it, though the good itself is not essence but still transcends essence2 in dignity and surpassing power.” — Plato, Republic, (509b)

What is here translated as "essence" is in some cases translated as "being", and it was interpretations of this that I was addressing. (you can skip backwards and forwards in the link for further context)

Of course, people may have opinions, but those opinions cannot be informed opinions if what they are about is something outside the range of human perception. — Janus

As just one example among many, consciousness is "something outside the range of human perception". Yet to proscribe philosophical investigations of consciousness seems a bit authoritarian.

So, it is not dogma, but presents a valid distinction between what can be tested and what cannot. And no, I have not said that ideas that cannot be tested have no value, but that they cannot coherently function as claims if there is no way to for the unbiased to assess their veracity. — Janus

What then do you make of value theory in general? Ought it not be philosophically investigated? Meaningful tests regarding, for example, the very validity of dichotomizing intrinsic and extrinsic value are certainly not yet available, if ever possible. Does this, according to you, make the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic value something that "cannot coherently function as a claim"?

Where are the thought police? All I'm seeing is critique, not suppression. — Janus

... Critique regarding what should and should not be philosophically investigated. More precisely, this all started with your stern "critique" of my inquiring into what Socrates/Plato meant by the Form of the Good being beyond being. As in, according to you, this should not be looked into. I take that to be suppression.

"Effing the ineffable" is the job of art and poetry, not rigorous philosophical discussion. — Janus

Though we disagree in some respects, beat me to it in the example he provided to the contrary.

---------



Well said.

I do not affirm that it is true, but I think it is an accurate description of what the text says. — Fooloso4

What any text says can only be understood via interpretation of the said text; namely, of what was intended by the text's author. Plato's writing is no exception to this.

Is what is beyond being something that is or something that is not? — Fooloso4

As I thought I already made clear, to me what is beyond being is by entailment not being, hence it is not.

As to the example you've given, it is nonsensical to me. Hence my opinion that something might be lost in translation of "being" from that era and language to our own. You have not yet addressed my question of whether "neither X nor not-X" is sensible to you.

I haven't read the entire thread. Since Socrates and Plato are not participating in this discussion perhaps you could provide a quote from the latter which unambiguously states this. — Janus

Plato identifies how the form of the Good allows for the cognizance to understand such difficult concepts as justice. He identifies knowledge and truth as important, but through Socrates (508d–e) says, "good is yet more prized". He then proceeds to explain "although the good is not being" it is "superior to it in rank and power", it is what "provides for knowledge and truth" (508e).[1] — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Form_of_the_Good#Uses_in_The_Republic

BTW, if you tack on questions to me after you've made a post, I might not see them. But maybe you already knew this?

Anything that is beyond human perception and judgement...that is anything purportedly "beyond being" or transcendent...God, rebirth, karma, heaven, hell...need I go on. — Janus

And how are any of the examples you've given "beyond human judgement"? Plenty of people judge these notions all the time. Some favoring these notions and others opposing their validity.

Scientific hypotheses are not arbitrary imaginings but are abductive inferences as to what, consistent with the overall body of canonical human experience and judgement, might be the explanation for this or that observed phenomenon. This is an entirely different kettle of fish to religious dogma or esoterica. — Janus

Many who will uphold religions and essoterica will of course disagree with the dogma that they are "arbitrary imaginings". You seem to have some superior knowledge to the contrary. Care to share?

OK, now you seem to be speaking as though that proscription is a right and good thing. I had thought you were railing against it. So, which is it? — Janus

I'm against any proscription of thought regarding reality. Hope that's blunt enough. The thought-police ought not prevent others from thinking freely as they will. As far as I see things, the ideas which result thereof can then be in part judged by natural selection.

I meant an example of someone being unjustifiably proscriptive as to what others are allowed to think. — Janus

Yea. Any suppression of free thought regarding any existential topic will serve as an example of "unjustifiabley proscriptive". Scary to me to think otherwise. But repressive regimes are not unheard of.

But some do affirm that those who are thought (by themselves and others) to be enlightened are capable of ineffable knowledge. So, I am trying to understand whether you are one of those who affirm such things. The other question, even if you do affirm such a possibility, is whether you think it can be part of philosophical discussion. — Janus

Dude, knowledge of what a sublimely aesthetic experience is felt to be shall often enough be ineffable ... other than by saying something like "the beauty of that there is beyond words".

But that aside, why should attempts at effing the heretofore ineffable be off limits?

But then we may be stretching the term "external" a bit. It would be perhaps more accurate to say, these people's thoughts are hidden from me. — Manuel

That's fine by me. But then when you stipulate "external" what are you saying "external" in reference to?

If there are areas in regard to which humans are necessarily ignorant (which I believe is unarguably true) — Janus

Given an example of such "necessary ignorance" which should remain off limits to investigation?

This is not even remotely similar to the human tendency to simply "make shit up" in the face of the unknown. — Janus

Ha. Scientific hypothesis are "made up shit in the face of the unknown" which can be empirically tested for.

What "proscription of thought, debate and investigation" is going on here in your opinion? — Janus

See my first question. If we are necessarily ignorant of X than there is an implicitly affirmed proscription of thought, debate, and investigation as pertains to X.

Perhaps you could offer an example which is not merely the expression of a different opinion. — Janus

Funny. All I have are opinions of various strengths, some of which pass a threshold beyond which I term these opinions fallible knowledge.

The other point is that once one starts to talk about "ineffable knowledge" one has entered a realm where argument simply cannot go. Do you think that can that be counted as "doing philosophy"? — Janus

Where have I affirmed "ineffable knowledge" in any of this debate?

Did someone say that the Good is beyond being? — Janus

You haven't been following the discussion too closely, then. Yes, Socrates/Plato stated that the Good as Form is beyond being.

I think it ironic how often Socrates' claim of ignorance is ignored. As I read them both Plato and Aristotle are skeptics is the sense of knowing that they do not know. — Fooloso4

Socrates's being aware that he does not hold infallible knowledge of anything whatsoever does not equate to a state of him ignoring that which is the case (this act of either willfully or unwillingly ignoring being the state of ignorance). Quite the opposite. Otherwise one runs into equating wisdom to ignorance - wherein one again deems ignorance to be a virtue.

but when we do not know what we do not know and believe we do know we are no longer even in the realm of opinion but ignorance. — Fooloso4

Here we agree in full.

Were Socrates/Plato to have understood "being" within the linguistic and cultural contexts of their time as consisting of that which comes into being and goes out of being, then the affirmation that the Good is not that just expressed would make sense.

By comparison:

It too is something other than what is and what is not. — Fooloso4

You affirm this conclusion as though it is true, or else as though it is the truth of what Socrates/Plato intended. Yet how is this affirmation not equivalent to the nonsensical statement that a certain given is neither X nor not-X? Or do you find this affirmation in any way sensible?

I wasn't gonna comment, but:

Fools have always sought to fill the 'domains' of necessary human ignorance with their "knowing". — Janus

We seem to either be suffering from an absence of mirrors in which to see our own selves and conducts on this forum or else from a self-righteous arrogance of somehow being beyond foolishness. Or maybe both.

Because science and its paradigms does not seek to accomplish the exact same feat? Or any other field of human knowledge?

The proscription of thought, debate, and investigation on a philosophy forum by some is telling.

How much misery this has caused humanity is incalculable. — Janus

Pales by comparison to the view that ignorance is a virtue.

We can know nothing about whatever might be "beyond being". — Janus

The issue was how does one define, else understand, being - this, specifically, in terms of Plato's affirmations.

The idea is nothing more than the dialectical opposite of 'being'. — Janus

I happen to agree. Hence my contention that there is something lost in translation in saying that "the Good is beyond being". This would entail that the Good is not. Which is contrary to Plato's works.

If we cannot know the good then we cannot know that it is beyond being, or that it is the cause both of things that are and knowledge of them. — Fooloso4

As I previously mentioned via analogy of gravitational singularities, this conclusion is erroneous. Here's another example, Kant knew that he did not known what things-in-themselves are but nevertheless knew that they are, that they are not phenomenal, and that they are a necessary cause for our perceptions of objects. As this again evidences, to not know X does not mean that one does not know of X's occurrence and of at least some of X's properties (by which it can be differentiated from not-X).

My interpretation of 'beyond being' is that it means 'beyond the vicissitudes of existence', 'beyond coming-to-be and passing away'. — Wayfarer

:100: And I'm in agreement with your post in general.

So, we are still left with the issue, what is external? — Manuel

Not an easy issue, but it does revolve around “external to what?” Here’s an outline of my current take on this: Suppose idealism. Fine, but even here my mind will be located within that body of percepts (both extrinsic and intrinsic; with no pun intended) which I immediately know to constitute my physical body to which, for example, this keyboard I’m now typing on is external. But then what if the cosmos is all a dream? Fine, but even here the conscious minds of those who I perceive to inhabit different bodies to my own will hold contents (intentions included) that are foreign, external, relative to my own mind. Here, maybe we all share a foundationally common, universal unconsciousness from which the dream of the cosmos in large part results but our conscious minds will yet be other relative to each other. So, even if there were to be no notion of physicality—though physicality is intrinsic to the objective idealism of CS Peirce, for example—there would yet be other conscious minds external to my own with which I interact. But how can I know that they are in fact conscious? They apprehend what I do and at times react to what I do: this then signifying conscious agency, one apart from and independent of my own. I can at times imperfectly predict as best I can what their contents of mind will consist of, but I cannot know what their contents of mind have, do, or will consist of. These other minds, then, inhabiting what is relative to me the external world, i.e. the world which is external to my own conscious mind.

I know there likely are questions/issues that could be raised of the just stated outline, and I'll be grateful for hearing of them. But if one is in search of infallible certainty, I’m as certain as I can be that such does not occur. For anything and at any time. (This likely being a different issue regarding fallibilism.)

If there is a Form of the Good but we do not know what the Good is, what can we say about it that we know to be true? It is not that it is difficult to know but that if only what is entirely is entirely knowable and the Good is beyond being, beyond what is, then it cannot be known. — Fooloso4

That A cannot know what X is does not imply that A cannot know of X's occurrence and of certain properties by which X is delineated.

By analogy, we know that no one knows what takes place within a gravitational singularity and, hence, of what a gravitational singularity thereby in this sense is. Despite this, we do know via inference that gravitational singularities occur - with one such occurring in the center of the Milky Way - and likewise know of certain properties by which they are delineated (e.g., black hole event horizons that lead toward the black hole's gravitational singularity wherein all notions of spacetime break down). A gravitational singularity of itself is thereby an entirety which is not entirely knowable.

Suppose Socrates/Plato in fact had no inferential knowledge of the Good's occurrence as Form (which is other than having knowledge, of any type, regarding what the Good is as Form). Do you then take all of Socrates/Plato's accounts (dialogues) regarding the Form of the Good to be entirely BS (if not outright deceptions)?

As to the Good being beyond being, while I don't speak Greek, much less Ancient Greek, there seems to be something lost in translation. For example, when appraised via modern English, in claiming that "the Good is beyond space and time" the Good is nevertheless postulated to be (although this not in any manner requiring any type of distance or duration).

This latter aspect, however, might just remain a matter of disagreement. But if you can evidence to the contrary, I'd be interested in the evidence you'd have to present.

I'm not entirely sure what point you're making. — Tom Storm

I’ll give it one last go: We all appraise ourselves as being better than some others in some respect, including that of comprehending something which these others seem hindered in grasping; but this does not entail that we thereby deem these others’ lives as being of lesser worth to our own or else in any way beneath us. This lack of entailment will then likewise apply to those philosophers - previously quoted - who have grasped something which the average man has not; something which is thereby esoteric to the masses. Hence, that a person A deems themselves better than person B in some respect doesn’t then necessitate that A finds themselves to be superior relative to B (such that B is then deemed inferior to A by A). In short, being “better than” does not entail being “superior to”. And we often want others to be better than us - this while likewise wanting that they not put themselves above us. Socrates, for example, was better than the masses in many respects but this does not then mean that Socrates found himself to be superior to the masses. The manner of his attested to death speaks to this. And, in for example addressing the Forms, Socrates had a lot of esoteric knowledge which he did his best to impart: by all appearances, he comprehended things which the average man was hindered in grasping.

So, yes, some philosophers are better than us in knowing things which we do not - things we have a hard time in grasping - but this betterness does not then necessitate they they're pricks which deem us as being beneath them.

Between what is entirely, the beings or Forms, and what is not, is becoming, that is, the visible world. Opinion opines about the visible world. But the good is beyond being. It is the cause of being, the cause of what is. It too is something other than what is and what is not. — Fooloso4

Can you expand on this? It so far seems to me to be contradictory: From my understanding, the Form of the Good is supposedly the most real of all givens that are or could be. As such, irrespective of how difficult the Form of the Good might be to know, the Form of the Good necessarily is and, hence, necessarily holds being (although of course not of a physical kind). This seems to me in part evidenced by your previous statement:

But as any reader off the Republic knows the Forms are presented as the fixed unchanging truth. — Fooloso4

It feels to me as if people in the past had some modicum of honour. It was possible to respect, and even love, those that wanted you dead, because you also wanted them dead, so it was that history pitted us against each other. Or maybe I am romanticising the epics of the past. — Lionino

Hard to say how much truth there is to its scenes of battle, but I greatly liked, and still greatly like, Homer's Iliad on this very count.

↪Fooloso4
I hear you; for a lay person this just sounds like a more academic version of, "I'm better than you because I know secrets". Essentially this:

Philosophers are traditionally and for the most part elitist. They regard mankind as children that they must hide the truth from. — Fooloso4 — Tom Storm

I’ll exaggerate this to make the intended point clearer: Who among us does not presume themselves better than all lesser animals in knowing something that is unknown by leaser animals? Be this something systems of mathematics, conceptual understandings of reality, the capacity to experience sublime beauty in life, or so forth.

Appraising ourselves as being better and worse than others in some respect is, it seems to me, intrinsic to our being.

Now, where the sh*t hits the fan, does one then equate being better than another in respect X to being of greater value than the other addressed?

Speaking for myself, if one can excuse the immodesty, I once risked my wellbeing by aggressively driving away an adult bulldog with no leash in a playground from my at the time puppy which the bulldog wanted to kill. (At hearing the scuffle, the owners came and took the bulldog away and that was that.). But my point being, I didn’t then deem my dog worthless and expendable on account of me knowing maths, holding conceptual understandings of reality, having the capacity to experience beauties, etc., all of which my dog was and could only forever remain fully ignorant of.

Tom, I doubt that you deem your views to be on a par in value to those views you vehemently disagree with and thereby are averse to. Neither do I or anyone else. But this being better than another (here addressing humans) on account of knowing something the other doesn’t does not necessarily entail that one then deems oneself as superior in value as a life relative to the life of those one debates with.

Neither ought this to be the case for a parent relative to their children, nor ought this be the case for a teacher relative to their students, nor ought it to then be the case for one of them elitist philosophers that @Fooloso4 was addressing relative to their audience of folk who don’t yet get what the philosopher supposedly gets.

Of course, what often enough does happen in reality-bites scenarios is not this stated ideal but a sense of authoritarian entitlement, wherein one does then deem themselves superior in value relatively to others who lack those insights which one personally has. This leads to bad parents, bad teachers, and to what I’d then appraise as bad philosophers. Same can also be said of bad scientists, bad leaders, bad doctors, bad presidents, etc. I'll even say bad pet owners, at least when it comes to more intelligent pets.

To sum things up, I damn well want my parents, my teachers, etc., and the philosophers I read to be better than me in terms of what they have, or had, to teach. And they ought to confidently known this before attempting to impart lessons to me. But if any were to think of me as an inferior in terms of the value of my life, they could then stick it where the sun don’t shine as far as I care. And I expect no less from those I interact with on this forum and whose views I at times disagree with.

A maybe messy and touchy topic, but there it is.

Thanks.

Metaphor, however, is not synonymous with esoterica. — 180 Proof

Metaphors we all commonly know, like being "lighthearted" or like having "feelings", will in one sense not be esoteric to us. In other ways, because their precise meaning (which we all typically get intuitively) will be difficult to express in literal manners, this in a philosophically satisfactory manner, they can yet be appraised to hold hidden (and in this sense esoteric) meanings.

Other metaphors - the ouroboros comes to mind as an example - will be esoteric in that we do not feel comfortable that we intuitively grasp what they, as metaphors, intend to convey. Or, as is the case with the ouroborous, at least what they intended to convey in past times when they were quite commonly utilized and portrayed in certain populaces.

That said, sure, metaphor is not equivalent to esoterica. But I do find that the two are entwined.

Metaphorical thinking may sometimes be dismissed at the cost of deeper understanding. Some may see the basics of logic as the most encompassing understanding, but it may lead to its questioning, and what are its limitations? — Jack Cummins

I'll venture to say that those who so dismiss metaphorical thinking can only be hypocrites, for - as per my initial post - they live and breathe in metaphorical thinking just as much as anyone else does. As to basics of logic, these to me strictly consist of the laws of thought, which by their very nature we all abide by whether we like to or not. These same laws will hence apply to metaphorical thinking just as much as they will to literalist thinking.

I get what you're saying, and in many ways I agree. As one example, in the absence of transparency and clarity, many who are unscrupulous will use the very notions of authority which they find others heed toward self-serving and unscrupulous ends. But this will apply as much to religions as it will to the sciences - with politics making use of both. I've too often heard of the label "scientifically proven" employed in circles which have no idea what the empirical scientific method is (being inductive, for one example, science always further evidences but does not ever conclusively prove, although it can conclusively falsify) ... and, as a result, a selling and buying of snake oil ensues. And of course, religion is often used as a facade for gaining advantage over those one dislikes or else deems to be in some way weak, etc.

That said:

The esoteric can on the whole not be tested so how do you propose we demonstrate its efficacy and how do we determine the good from the fallacious? — Tom Storm

The same will apply for a plethora of other things: ranging from the more ubiquitous notions of goodness, and justice, and the aesthetic to far more concrete things such as whether the romantic partner that states they love you in fact so does.

Not finding these many other issues either inconsequential or else somehow unreal, I then don't find this test-based reasoning to be sufficient in justifying a renunciation of the esoteric (in any of its various senses).

Its like saying the world should denounce all fables because on the whole we cannot test their contents and moralities, we cannot demonstrate their efficacy as guides to morality and how life should be best lived, and we cannot determine those that are good in this regard from those that instill fallacious morals and ideas.

Metaphor runs deep in our thinking: from being light-hearted to being on top of, and hence superior to, to having feelings, these not being tactile but instead being emotions one touches upon in one’s own total self rather than actively enacting as a consciousness (e.g., feeling a pang of envy rather than being envious)—a very long list, actually, with many examples not being as easy to express—all these convey a deeper sometimes hidden (esoteric) meaning relative to that which is literally affirmed.

As with the arts, some sometimes find metaphors to be the optimal means of conveying deeper, sometimes hidden (esoteric) truths. This then works well for conveying these truths to others who already are of a common enough mindset in many other respects. But it will backfire whenever others hold different foundational semantics, for the latter will at times drastically misinterpret what was intended to be conveyed.

Then there’s the analytic approach to philosophy. The leading benefit to this method of conveying truths is an improvement in clarity as to what is being addressed. But this comes at the cost of dryness, which serves as a big impediment to conveying what was intended. And, unlike the former method, it also limits what is conveyed to concepts that are already commonly known, making it that much more difficult to convey new ways of understanding or else realities that are not already publicly accepted and acknowledged. Here, then, the metaphors employed will be static in already being common standard, rather than being dynamic and new.

They mythical (and, by extension, much of the religious) can thereby be interpreted as the metaphorical, with Carl Jung and Joseph Campbell coming to mind in this field of study. Hence, as attempting to convey deeper, and at times hidden, truths or else realities.

These are my preliminary thoughts on the matter.

aiming to achieve the absolute emptiness, viz Absolute Nothingness, — Corvus

Again, our semantics are too different for me to engage in meaningful discussions with you on this particular topic. But I will point out that there is a distinction in Buddhism between annihilation (which I would again myself term nonbeing) and Nirvana as absolute bliss (which I would myself term being and, hence, not nothingness).

In annihilation, there is no bliss to be had; in Nirvana, however, this absolute bliss does occur.

For those going in different directions on this question I suspect the OP wasn't in the proper form to begin with as he calls it oxymoronic and contradictory. — Mark Nyquist

Well, to affirm that, "nothingness once was" is a contradiction in terms when nothingness is equated to nonbeing.

The term "was" is the past tense of "to be". Hence, the affirmation then claims that there in the past was a time when "lack-of-any-type-of-being held a type of being". Which can be logically contradictory contingent on semantics: At the same time and in the same respect, both a) nothing is/was (entailed by lack of any type of being) and b) something is/was (entailed by their being or once being a state of nothingness).

The only contention here would be if this is strictly due to our linguistic constraints of speech which do not accurately capture metaphysical possibilities or, else, whether our linguistics accurately conveys a logical contradiction in any such metaphysics.

Thank you for the relatively in-depth reply.

But when one believes in the existence of past life, and afterlife, then the existence could be named as non-being. One has lived in the past or existed as some other being in the past before birth, but there were changes of the being via change of time, or some event, the being in the past has gone through transformation to non-being. Then the current being has come to existence. — Corvus

The semantics the two of us use for being and non-being are significantly different. Because of this, I think we would be talking past each other in using these terms, and, by extension, the notion of nothingness. For one example, to me, iff ghosts were to be real and not merely constructs of some humans’ imaginations, then I would label ghosts as spirits or souls that hold actual being in the cosmos. This rather than labeling ghosts as non-beings (noun) or else expressing that they do not hold actual being (in verb form) in the cosmos. I’d hold the same for past lives and afterlives. So, in my use of words, neither ghosts, nor past lives, nor afterlives would pertain to nothingness or else nonbeing. And I would instead affirm that all these are different forms of being.

But again, this is more an issue of how we express ourselves rather than the content which we intend to express. Its just that without uniformity in the former, it is difficult toward impossible to find agreement on the latter.

I am not very knowledgeable on QM, and QM is not my first interest in my readings, but I feel that for the whole universe to exist, there must have been absolute space first. Without absolute space as absolute nothingness, no physical objects, motions or changes are possible. Time itself is from changes of the objects, hence without space there are no motions, no changes hence no time would be possible either. — Corvus

As a technical detail of the theory of relativity via which any linear model of the universe can be established (a linear model here being one in which the universe had an absolute beginning that progresses toward an absolute end), neither time nor space occurred prior to the Big Bang. The here assumed gravitational singularity from which the Big Bang is stated to have occurred is affirmed to be spaceless—this because space, just as much as time, becomes meaningless in a gravitational singularity. In the linear model just described, then, both space and time are stated to have started only upon this cosmically singular, initial gravitational singularity’s explosion, this being the Big Bang. As reference:

A gravitational singularity, spacetime singularity or simply singularity is a condition in which gravity is predicted to be so intense that spacetime itself would break down catastrophically. As such, a singularity is by definition no longer part of the regular spacetime and cannot be determined by "where" or "when". Gravitational singularities exist at a junction between general relativity and quantum mechanics; therefore, the properties of the singularity cannot be described without an established theory of quantum gravity. Trying to find a complete and precise definition of singularities in the theory of general relativity, the current best theory of gravity, remains a difficult problem.[1][2]

[…]

Modern theory asserts that the initial state of the universe, at the beginning of the Big Bang, was a singularity.[7] — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gravitational_singularity

But again, I myself would label this initial singularity as something rather than as nothing(ness).

So that its known, rather than a linear model of the cosmos, I instead favor what could in summation be termed a cyclical model of the cosmos, a Big Bounce rather than a Big Bang as the labels go, which can also be established via the theory of relativity.

A handy concept in your pocket to explain the possible state of the universe before and after its existence. — Corvus

I can very much see this application for any linear model of the universe (as previously described). But again, I'm one to favor a more cyclical model of the universe and, because of this, I personally don't find use for this notion of before and after the universe's being.

As long as you have arguments with possibly some evidence, we are interested in looking into the ideas. — Corvus

This "we" which you here reference, they'd be "interested in looking into the ideas were arguments with possibly some evidence" to be provided by me for the way that the term nothingness gets interpreted by you in your arguments? I don't get it.

I made it clear what my background presumption in this respect was. To be clearer: Do you or do you not interpret nothingness as equivalent to non-being in you're arguments, this as I've explicitly stated I so far assume you do (with emphasis on this being an assumption)? Else do you take non-existence to be something other than non-being? If so, how are the two concepts different to you?

There is no one correct answer here. But the answer you provide will have significant baring on how the issue of nothingness is commonly addressed.

Then why couldn't you call an isolated empty space as absolute nothingness? Because they share the common qualities for the concepts and existence. Absolute space is also a physical entity demonstrated by Newton in his bucket experiment. — Corvus

Because an isolated empty space occurs relative to givens, such as its surroundings, and is thereby not absolute nothingness. (absolute does mean complete without exceptions).

As to the video you've linked to, it seems to me to pose a trick question from the get-go. By the very concept initially specified in the video, an "absolute empty space" (whose very cogency my addressed contention questions) cannot contain a bucket of water, never mind distant galaxies and starts, for the occurrence of any of these things would make it other than an absolute, i.e. a literally complete, empty space. Besides, Newtonian conceptions of absolute space have been debunked some time ago by the theory of relativity, no?

I will think about this point, and get back here for update, if I can come up with any idea either for agreeing or disagreeing. But here is a good article on the topic in SEP. — Corvus

That's perfectly fine, but I want to point out that my post, or else contention, was in the form of a question, and not in the form of an argument one then can agree with or disagree with: Again, in what sense can space occur, and thereby be, in the complete absence of distance(s) between givens?

When you say Absolute Nothingness, it would be the space with absolutely nothing in it, not even a particle of air. The total vacuum state of the space can be called Absolute Nothingness. — Corvus

I take it that by "absolute nothingness" one means absolute non-being rather than being which is devoid of things and hence thingness. Nirvana, as one example, is reputed to be devoid of any thingness while yet being, hence not being nothingness.

If so, in which sense can space occur, i.e. be, in the absence of any and all distances?:

Distance is always relative to things - even if they're construed to not be material (e.g., the distance between two psyches: two psyches might be very far apart, this being a distance, strictly due to their differing views ... if, that is, one were to not take this example as being purely metaphorical). At any rate, here is my contention:

If there are no things between which there is distance, then there is no occurring distance period. And if there is no occurring distance, I so far fail to see how there can occur any sensible understanding of space. Again, what does distance-less space signify?

(The quantum vacuum state yet has distances between particles that appear out of it and disappear into it, for instance.)

This sounds a bit like "consciousness is consciousness of" which is Sartre. I always liked that. I am conscious of a cat, so the cat in a consciousness can also be called me being conscious of a cat, or just summed up as a particular moment of me, of self. — Fire Ologist

There is a logical equivocation in what consciousness is when implicitly stipulating that one’s (consciousness’s) being conscious of the cat is equivalent to the (percept of) the cat being an aspect of one’s consciousness. The first is consciousness in the sense of “that which is conscious of”; the second is consciousness in the sense of “all of which a conscious being, aka consciousness, is conscious of”.

For example, when affirming, “a memory brought into consciousness,” or else, “a conscious memory (rather than an unconscious memory),” one will implicitly stipulate the just mentioned second sense of “consciousness”. But when affirming, “I am conscious of memory X,” one will be implicitly stipulating the first just mentioned sense of “consciousness”. A conscious memory will hence never be a memory which in and of itself as memory holds awareness of other (the first sense of “consciousness”) but will instead always be a memory which one as conscious being is conscious of (the second sense of consciousness).

If interested, I clarify this distinction in the following chapter of my ongoing work: Chapter 12: Volition’s Basic Determinants, Part I—Intentions (specifically, section 12.2). But, so its known, I do make use of several newly coined terms—many of which were introduced in previous chapters—so as to be able to adequately demarcate that which is being addressed.

My main point being, the “I” (or else "self" when thus interpreted) addressed in the thread cannot (or at least should not) then be consciousness in the second sense of “all that a conscious being is conscious of”. It can (or should) only be consciousness in the first sense of “that which is of itself aware”—be this an awareness of its very own self as that which is aware (e.g., I am (aware/conscious of being) content and intrigued as that first-person point of view which is aware/conscious and is thereby aware/conscious of other, such as of a memory) or else be this an awareness of other than itself (e.g., I am aware/conscious of a memory regarding what happened to me a week past—this memory being other relative to me as that which is aware/conscious of the memory).

↪javra
Nice icon. — Banno

:grin: Just saw this. A sincere thanks!

Btw, if you're still interested, can you offer any references in philosophical literature to the notion of change occurring sans time, i.e. in the absence of before and after?

I so far still can't wrap my mind around "change that occurs in the absence of any 'before the stated change' and 'after the stated change'" ... but I know enough to know that I should never say never when it comes to philosophical proposals.

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Sorry @Philosophim, but I am interesting in this issue of alternative interpretations of "change". I might start a new thread if it turns out to be necessary, though.

The main problem with your argument there is that it introduces elements that does not follow out of the science. — Christoffer

The occurrence of consciousness doesn't follow out of the science either. Unless one here wants to deny the reality of consciousness on these very same grounds, then this problem you here express is in no way an impediment to the logically valid supposition of a deity-inclusive physicalism, one accordant to laws of nature both currently known and unknown.

It should also be mentioned that - while the scientific method is contingent on the occurrence of a singular, universally existent, physical reality - the scientific method is in no way contingent upon physicalism. As previously noted, one can logically maintain the same singular, universally existent, physical reality within the objective idealism of C. S. Peirce - for one example of an idealism that supports the physical, replete with its natural laws.

Emergence doesn't mean "anything goes", we don't see a pool of bacteria spontaneously conduct magic because such emergent property "just happened", we still see it as a causal line of events, but engaging in extreme complexity. The emerging property is still dependent on the composition of the underlying systems and parts and limited by their physical composition. Such limitations may also play into the emergent properties. — Christoffer

In respect to emergence, one cannot via current knowledge predict novel cases of emergence. The stipulation of emergence is in no way predictive - but, instead, is always an ad hoc (to the purpose (of accounting for)) explanation for that which is observed or else postulated to be real, and this always after the fact of said observations and/or postulates (hence always also being post hoc).

If emergence is accepted, there is then nothing about the intrinsic properties of emergence that preclude realms of emergent reality wherein deities dwell resulting from supervenience on the consciousness of humans and lesser life forms. (As one can claim that science shall one day figure out consciousness, one here can just as validly claim that science shall in the further future still some day figure out the workings and operations of such corporeal-consciousness-emergent incorporeal deities.)

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As I initially wanted to illustrate, physicalism endeavors to rationally conclude tacitly maintained convictions - but the proposal of emergence as a physical account of (some aspects of) reality does not of itself successful confine physiclaism to that which is tacitly maintained. With the case in point being a logically valid metaphysical possibility of a deity-inclusive physicalism.

For all the reasons just mentioned, emergence is then a red herring in the attempts to validate physicalism as it's commonly understood.

Yet I think the real question is how fruitful is the assumption of reductionism itself? I view physicalism as one general answer to reductionism. The physicalist is happy to stop somewhere and waive off else in philosophy as near nonsense. Brush everything else off with accusing others of talking about spirits. Or at least something that isn't so important. Has this consequences?

Basically naive reductionism leaves us to ask about the foundations of everything from physicists, as if they somehow would have the cradle of knowledge about everything. Yet the fact is that even if a complex system is a sum of it parts, just looking at those parts individually don't answer much about the operations of the complex system itself. A metallurgist just looking at scraps of metal cannot answer how a jet aircraft flies, just as a microbiologist looking at cells has a hard time to explain our current societies. — ssu

:up:

As I tangentially alluded to in another post, were reductionism to be a valid means of explaining - and thereby gaining knowledge of - all that is, we then ought to be able to explain all that is via strict analysis of the omnipresent quantum vacuum state in and of itself. As in, I'm currently motivated to write this post because the quantum vacuum did this and that. One then could even neatly replace the "God did it" answer to everything that explains nothing with a "the quantum vacuum did it" answer to everything that explains nothing.

Just want to second your observations with this. And of course there's other means of approaching the issue of reductionism.

I've decided that ontologies are a lot like impressionist paintings. They look better from far way. :rofl: — Count Timothy von Icarus

For my part, I applaud this sentiment. :grin:

Emergence of individual minds from, and their supervenience on, the physical can be in principle explained just five via certain versions of idealism, such as that of Peirce’s objective idealism.

But I here want to mainly illustrate that this emergence and supervenience route of argumentation is a red herring avoiding the very issues concerned in respect to what physicalism is:

There is no logical reason why spiritual realms—replete with forest and house fairies, ghosts, angels, and less than omnipotent deities that can thereby conflict with each other—cannot all be hypothesized to exist via emergence from, and supervenience upon, that realm of reality consisting of corporeal consciousness, awareness, and mind applicable to life in general—with the latter itself being affirmed to emerge from and supervene on physical particles, fields, and the like … ultimately from and upon the omnipresent quantum vacuum state.

Yet, point being, this supposition would be antithetical to physicalism for tacitly maintained reasons—something to do with an aversion to spirituality as expressed. Physicalism though it would yet technically be given the premise of emergence and supervenience.

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As to rejecting these here hypothesized apparitions on grounds that they are not empirically verifiable, neither are consciousnesses (the philosophical problem of other minds attests to this), whose reality no one here is debating. So lack of empirical proof isn't much of a rational argument against the deity-inclusive physicalism just expressed.

On the other hand, asking me "how" and "why" questions regarding this hypothetical is akin to me asking any physicalist "how" and "why" questions regarding gas atoms (two hydrogen and one oxygen) comprising a liquid when a grouping of H2O molecules are at room temperature. I have no good answer to give, no more than the physicalist does.

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No psychobabble here included or intended, but if by this presented argument one would want to project upon me some laughable fear of annihilation upon death or of some such other physicalist proposition, I’ll then duly project upon the stated physicalist the phobia of an afterlife … together with psychologizations of the deeds in their life which might make this fear so potent.

I'm hoping replies to this post, if any, don’t lower themselves to such speculative and ad hominem rebuttals. If replied to, I'd much rather be rationally evidenced wrong in the argument just made.

You've misinterpreted what I meant by "physicality in total". In the context used, I intended that physicality of which we are a) directly acquainted with via direct experience (this being concrete physical reality of which we know via our immediate physiological senses) and b) that physicality which we infer to have been, to currently be, and to be in the future - with an example of the latter being physicality before life emerged from nonlife within the cosmos.