No, not possibly. It's a conceptual truth.

Acts and beliefs - and only acts and beliefs (and note, to-believe something is to be doing something - so 'believing' is a kind of action) - can be rational.

Note too that in the OP the questioner is askng whether it is 'rational' for us to do something, namely take a blue pill or a red pill.

Rationality is a feature of actions.

Only agents can perform actions.

And it essentially requires reason-responsiveness. That is, to qualify as an agent you need to be reason-responsive.

Why?

Because if you behave without your behaviour being a product of a reason-responsive process, then that's just behaviour and not 'action'.

See?

Actions and only actions are rational or irrational.

To behave 'rationally' is to behave in ways that you have overall normative reason to behave in.

A 'normative reason' is another name for a 'reason-to-do something'. That is, it's another name for a 'reason-for-action'.

Now, to get back to topic: the question is whether it is rational to take the blue pill. Another way to express the same question would be "do we have overall normative reason to take the blue pill?"

And the answer, unsurprisingly, is that 'it depends'. It depends for one thing on what exactly the blue pill does.

Once more, try and answer the question. Stop saying stuff that you hope makes sense. Answer the well formed question I asked you.

Oh, what a brilliant distinction......not. Same applies. See? (Psst...look up Leonardo da Vinci and Picasso and Sargent......note that they produced era defining work....)

Perhaps you should focus instead on the 'clicking the fingers' bit. Is your view that it is producing art by the act of 'clicking one's fingers' that is specifically normatively significant? Is that your view Khaled?

Why can't you people answer questions?

Do you accept that 'rationality' concerns 'action'? That is, that only actions - construed broadly so that we include the 'act' of believing a thing - can be rational?

Or are you going to put it beyond doubt that you really don't know what the words you are using mean and you're just cobbling them together in ways that you hope will constitute something profound?

Rationality can transcend normative reason. — introbert

No. It. Can't. I don't think you know what the words you are using mean.

Do you accept that rationality concerns action? That is, it is only actions - whether the act of doing something or believing something - that can be rational? Or do you think, say, that sunsets can be rational and that bits of cheese can be?

Yes, but YOU just asked how what I said about what rationality involves was consistent with it sometimes being the case that two actions can be equally rational, yes? So I answered you. Jeez, do pay attention.

Now, there is one form of rationality: doing what one has overall reason to do. Okay?

And the question is whether we have overall reason to take the blue pill, if the blue pill does x.

It's not reducible to normative reason, rather 'being rational' is 'being responsive to normative reasons'. And so being rational - perfectly rational, that is - would involve always doing what one has overall reason to do (a reason-to-do something is what a normative reason is).

If I understand you correctly, you are asking how this can be if there can be two or more equally rational actions.

How is that inconsistent with what I have said, though? The claim that being rational involves doing what one has overall reason to do is entirely consistent with there being many occasions where one has as much reason to do one thing as another. It is just no more rational to do one than the other, when that's the case.

Should I have peas or carrots? Well, I have as much reason to go for one option as the other. So I am not irrational whichever I do.

That might be one of the many definitions of rational, but having a reason (cause) is not necessarily having reason (logic). — introbert

You're confusing normative reasons with causal reasons. When it comes to 'being rational' we're talking about what it is rational 'to do'. That is, which actions are the rational ones. Reasons for action are known as 'normative reasons'. So the question of what is rational is one that concerns what we have normative reason to do, not what is the cause of what. Now, it cannot - as a conceptual matter - be rational to do something that you have overall normative reason not to do.

Imagine you are in a loving relationship with Marjory. You are offered the following choice. You can take a blue pill that will give you the experience of continuing your loving relationship with Marjory happily for the rest of your life (but because the pill will render you unconscious for the rest of your life, your actual relationship with Marjory will come to an end. Alternatively, you can not take the pill and just continue your relationship with Marjory - a relationship that may, in reality, come to an end, or it may not. Well, it seems clear in this case that you ought not to take the pill - and that goes for both of you - even though, experientially, this is more hazardous than taking it.

P.s This isn't a question whether the choice is right or wrong. I want to see if anyone can make the case that the red pill is the rational choice, and explore the implications of it in real life. — TheMadMan

It includes matters of right and wrong, for if doing x is wrong, then we have overall reason not to do it, and thus doing it would be irrational.

But anyway, there's an ambiguity in your description of what the blue pill does. Does taking it make one experience a life containing the maximum quantity of happiness, or does taking it mean that one will have one's preferences met?

These are not the same. For meeting some of my preferences may make me unhappy, and I may also not wish to be maximally happy.

Note too, that I typically prefer actually to be doing the things I want to do, not merely to have the experience 'as if' I am doing them. So, for example, if I want to be a famous painter, then that preference will not be met unless I actually become one. If taking the pill will merely result in me having a virtual experience of being a famous painter, then my preference has not been met (I will just not realize that it has not been met).

So, I think the question is really whether it is sometimes more rational to live in a fantasy world than the real one. And yes, I think that can often be more rational.

For the most part it is more efficient, in terms of securing happiness for yourself, to imagine you are doing things rather than actually to do them. Let's say that you quite like the idea of being president. Well, just imagine you are for a bit - engage in the fantasy. That won't be quite as good as the real thing - not unless you're incredibly good at imagining things - but it'll be a hell of a lot easier than actually going to the trouble of becoming the president. Imagining things is really easy and can often give one as much happiness, or near enough, as doing the real thing, but without the hassle of actually doing it.

But there are some things where it seems better to seek the real thing than simply to fantasize that you have it already, even when other things are equal. For example, to be in a real loving relationship is surely better than simply imagining you are, even if there is no experiential difference between the two.

Surely there is only one way to be rational - one is rational to the extent that one does what one has overall reason to do. (The word 'reason' in 'overall reason' here denotes a normative reason).

So, the question is whether taking the blue pill - that is, whether opting to live in a fantasy - is something we have overall reason to do if, that is, doing it would mean that we get what we want (or, and this would need clarifying, if we would be maximally happy).

The statue is made of clay. There is no statue independent of the clay. But if I alter the shape of the clay, it'll still be the same clay, but it won't be the same statue. Indeed, I can destroy the statue by changing the shape of the clay. The clay is the statue, but the clay has properties the statue does not (namely, its shape can be altered without destroying it, whereas the statue does not have this property).

But anyway, all of this is beside the point. The point is that the naturalistic fallacy involves taking the true normative theory to be, by dint of its being the true normative theory, the true metaethical theory.

All you are doing is pointing out that if the true metaethical theory is some form of naturalism, then the true normative theory will be a description of what 'goodness' is made of. But that's beside Moore's point. Moore's point is that you cannot infer that naturalism is true from the fact that the true normative theory will describe which natural properties moral properties track. For that is all a normative theory tells us - it tells us which, if any, natural properties moral properties such as goodness and rightness seem to follow from, but it does not license one to conclude that the moral properties 'are' those natural properties. Whether they are or not remains an open question.

No. The naturalistic fallacy involves confusing "X is good" (where this means that X has goodness" with "X is good" (where this means that X and goodness are one and the same). In other words, it involves confusing the 'is' of predication with the 'is' of identity.

I explained this above. So, normative theories - theories about what makes an act right or something good - are theories about what 'has' goodness and 'has' rightness. But they are not metaethical theories - that is, they are not theories about what goodness and rightness are in themselves. The naturalistic fallacy involves confusing normative theories with metaethical ones. That's another way of saying what I just said in the above paragraph.

Moore himself commits the very same error when he arrives at his conclusion that good is indefinable.

Have you read Moore?

Note, when I attempted to define what good is above, I did not commit the naturalistic fallacy. That is, I did not make the mistake of trying to isolate some feature that all good things have in common aside from being good and then identify the goodness with that feature or features. Rather, I simply noticed that for something to be good is for it to be valuable and for something to be valuable is for it to be the object of a valuing relation that has the source of all moral value and norms as its source.

How do you draw that conclusion? N — khaled

Jeez. You said that if an artist could produce art with the click of his fingers, then he would have an obligation to do so. Yes?

So, unless you think there's something special about the act of clicking one's fingers specifically - in which case you're nuts - then your point is that if one can produce things of beauty with great ease, then one is obliged to do so. That's YOUR view. That's the view you expressed here:

If the artist could magically create era defining pieces of art at the snap of his fingers, and chooses not to do so, then yes I’d think he’s in the wrong. — khaled

Now, it's an implausible view for the reasons I explained. John Singer Sargent's party piece was to draw pictures of people in seconds that were fantastically good. Similarly, Picasso could produce artworks in seconds. Whereas other artists - Da Vinci, Vermeer etc - took ages. It is implausible that the former had an obligation to produce art, whereas the latter did not. The truth is that it is self evident that neither have obligations to exercise their respective abilities, regardless of how easy it would be to do so.

See?

Those points do not seem to connect with my point. That is to say, everything you have said could be correct, regardless of whether what I have argued is correct or not.

To begin with, you need to distinguish between what the artist knows as "beautiful", and what the audience wants as "beautiful". — Metaphysician Undercover

No I don't. The issue here is not what makes something beautiful or what beauty is. The issue is why there is an asymmetry - why is there no obligation to produce the beautiful, but an obligation not to destroy anything beautiful?

I have offered an explanation. The job, then, is to test that explanation.

'If' - my response contained the word 'if'. 'If' you think that "Jane deserves X" is synonymous with "we ought to give Jane X" then - then - you are clearly too confused to be worth debating.

I think harm, is bad by definition because a good harm seems to be an oxymoron. — Andrew4Handel

What about deserved harm? If a person deserves to come to harm - by, say, behaving immorally - then it is good if that person comes to harm, not bad. So harm is not bad by definition. It is often bad, but it is bad when it is not deserved, but good when it is.

I have offered an explanation of the asymmetry. I have proposed that we have a duty not to show disrespect to others, including other things (so, including beautiful things).
That is, we do not have a duty to promote the good, or to prevent harm, except where failure to do so would show disrespect.

This delivers the correct verdict: despite the fact the act of producing beautiful works of art promotes the good - the world will have more good in it for one having done so - it is not morally required. Why? Because omitting to create such works does not show disrespect to any person or to any object.

Is there any reason to reject that analysis?

If the artist could magically create era defining pieces of art at the snap of his fingers, and chooses not to do so, then yes I’d think he’s in the wrong. — khaled

That's counterintuitive. So, Leonardo da Vinci had no obligation to produce art, as doing so clearly took him a lot of effort (he produced barely anything). But John Singer Sargent or Picasso did have an obligation to produce art, as they worked very quickly and with ease (as much ease as clicking one's fingers). That just seems prima facie false

What does deserving something entail then? — khaled

To be clear: you do accept, do you, that 'Jane deserves X' does not mean the same as "We ought to give Jane X"? I mean, if you think those are synonymous claims, there's not much hope for us, as I take it to be self-evident that they are different. Wherein the difference lies is another matter. But if you think they're synonymous, then I think I can't debate with you as you're too far gone to be capable of help.

Not necessarily. They deserve a punishment comparable to being raped. Like multiple years in prison (whether or not that is actually comparable I am not sure). Which they get. — khaled

Er, I didn't say otherwise, did I?!?

Principia Ethica.

I am not defending Moore's view, however. Far from it. As I say, Moore thought that 'good' is indefinable. But he thought that on the basis of an argument that commits the very same fallacy that he was accusing others of. That is, he took the inability of answers to the normative version of the question "what is good?" to answer the metaethical version of the question "what is good?" to be evidence that the latter is unanswerable (or rather, that the answer is that 'it is what it is'). That's as fallacious as thinking that an answer to the normative question is, by dint of being an answer to it, also an answer to the metaethical question. He correctly identified a common fallacy, and then proceeded to commit it!

So, Moore was correct in his criticism of moral theorizing up to that point, he was incorrect in his positive moral theory. He thought the good is what it is. But it isn't. It can be defined.

'The good' is that which features as the object of a valuing relation that has the source of all moral value and norms as its valuer. And as only persons - minds - can be valuers, the source of all moral value and norms is a person. Which person? The person who it is. That last claim is Moorean in spirit, but the view is far from Moorean. It's a form of divine command theory, rather than a form of non-naturalism (the latter being Moore's view).

Moore's view was, frankly, insane.

It's not a truism. It's an interesting asymmetry that cries out for explanation. I am appealing to that which is, i think, self-evidently true: that we who have artistic ability have no obligation to exercise it (that seems self-evidently true) and that it is wrong, other things being equal, to destroy something of beauty (that seems self-evidently true as well). So, those claims are true. But what's philosophically interesting is why that should be the case. I am offering a possible explanation. The explanation in question is not a truism. This is how philosophy works. You try and fine self-evidently true claims and extract their implications.


So, why do we have no obligation to create beautiful things, yet we do have an obligation not to destroy any that already exist?

I have offered a potential answer: that we have a duty not to show disrespect to others, including other things. So, if one destroys a beautiful painting, then one has shown disrespect to that feature of the world. But if one omits to create a beautiful painting, then one has not shown disrespect to anyone or anything.

There can be no such thing as an 'aboriginal' concept of justice (or any other 'insert group's name' concept of justice).

For example, let's say my concept - so, my idea - of cheese is the idea of something made of bricks that one can live in. Whereas your concept of cheese is the idea of some congealed milk. Well, we do not actually have different concepts. Rather, we have this one word - cheese - that I am using to denote things made of bricks that one can live in and that you are using to denote congealed milk. Same word, two different concepts.

So, if I say "My cheese is worth over $1m' and you think "blimey! it must taste great to be worth that much" we are simply talking past each other. I'm talking about my house and you think I'm talking about congealed milk.

There is one concept of justice. There is disagreement about precisely what answers to it. But it is not possible for two people or two groups to have different concepts of the same thing, for 'the thing' - whatever it may be - is 'that which answers to the concept'.

Well, I think goodness in and of itself can be defined, contrary to what Moore thought. (For Moore's entire case for thinking goodness cannot be defined is based on the fact that answers to a different question failed to answer the question....which is no evidence at all that good cannot be defined, it is just evidence that a lot of people confused answers to one question with answers to another.)

For something to be morally good, is for it to be morally valuable. That is, 'morally good' and 'morally valuable' are synonymous expressions.

And for something to be morally valuable is for it to be featuring as the object of a valuing relation. That is, it is for it to be being valued.

For example, if I say "this is valuable to me" I mean no more or less than that I value it. And if I value something, then what I value is the object of a valuing relation. That is, it is 'that which is being valued'.

Of course, if I value something that does not entail that it is morally valuable. So we can rule out that goodness is made of our own valuing activity. (For what I have just said seems to apply to us all).

Whose, then? If moral value is made of valuing activity, whose valuing activity does it consist of? Well, the person whose values constitutes moral values. That's a Moorean-style conclusion. Moral goodness is made of the valuing relations of the person whose values constitute moral values (a person who is not me or you).

You seem to me to be confusing two different issues - the issue of what is just, with the issue of what is right.

The eye-for-an-eye principle - the lex talionis - is a principle of justice. That is, it is a claim about what people deserve. if you take someone else's eye, then you deserve to have one of yours taken.

It's open to a variety of interpretations, but the basic idea is simple: what a wrongdoer deserves in terms of harm is proportionate to the gravity of the wrong they did. The graver the wrong, the more harm one deserves.

I stress: that's a principle of justice. It is not a moral norm. That is, it is not the claim that we ought to take the eyes of those who have taken the eyes of others. That doing x will bring about a just state of affairs does not entail that we ought to do it.

Jane 'deserves' X, does not mean the same as "we ought to give Jane X".

A rapist deserves to be raped (according to the lex talionis). That does not mean we are morally obliged to rape rapists. Indeed, it is consistent with someone deserving something that it might also be extremely wrong to give it to them. A rapist deserves to be raped. But it'd be wrong, surely, to rape a rapist?

So anyway, it seems to me that you are criticizing the lex talionis on the mistaken grounds that it implies we ought to give people the harms they deserve. Yet that's not what it implies. There's what is just and there's what is right, and these are not the same.

I am still unsure what you are asking.

It seems you are asking the metaethical question "what is goodness, in and of itself?" and not the normative question "what things are good?", yes?

It's crucially important to be clear about this, as you'll just confuse answers with one with answers to the other if you do not - which is precisely what Moore was trying to teach us not to do.

I am puzzled by your view and approach.

You say at the outset that you are a materialist. But then you say that you think the self has nothing answering to it on the materialist view.

But you exist, yes? So there is at least one self: you. And you can be more sure that you exist than you can be that materialism is true. I mean, it'd be bonkers to conclude that you don't exist because the favourite theory of a non-existent person delivers that verdict, would it not?

So, why are you a materialist? Surely you should abandon your materialism until such time as you are satisfied that your own existence is consistent with it!

I don't understand that question. Are you asking which things are good, or are you asking what the quality of goodness is?

For an analogy: there's the question "what is green?". That's ambiguous. Are you asking which things are green - that is, which things have greenness? Or are you asking what green is, in and of itself?

Similarly then, are you asking which things are good, or are you asking what goodness itself is?

Incidentally, I should add that Moore failed fully to take on board his own lesson. For he took the fact that answers to the 'what things are good' are not answers to the 'what is good, in and of itself?" question to demonstrate that the "what is good, in and of itself?" does not have an answer. Yet it is only if Moore has committed his own fallacy - that is, confused the answer to one question with the answer to the other - that one can get to that conclusion!

So, although Moore showed that no normative theory is an answer to the metaethical question "what is good, in and of itself?", he did not thereby show that the question "what is good, in and of itself?" lacks an answer. All he did (no mean achievement, incidentally) is show that a whole range of 'answers' to it were no such thing. But that isn't evidence there's no answer to it. It's just evidence that people have been confusing one question with another.

There are two distinct, but fundamental questions in ethics that, at the time Moore was writing, were not carefully distinguished. Indeed, Moore is credited with having made us pay attention to the profound difference between them and how easily they can be confused with one another.

The two questions are these: "What is moral?" and "what is morality?"

The first question is the question at the heart of what has become known as 'normative ethics'. The second is at the heart of what is known as 'metaethics'. (I stress, these distinctions were not employed at the time of Moore's writing, but as a result of it).

These are very different questions. One is about which acts are right and which states of affair etc, are good. Whereas the other is about what the rightness and goodness themselves are.

The problem is that both questions can be expressed using the same words. The ones you have used. "What is good?". That question is ambiguous. There are two quite different questions that could be being asked by the same words. What things are good? And "what is goodness, in and of itself". So, both the normative question and the metaethical question can be asked with exactly the same expression.

What Moore called (somewhat misleadingly) 'the naturalistic fallacy' is essentially the mistake of confusing the answer to one question, with the answer to the other.

So, let's imagine that utilitarianism is true. Well, then that means the answer to "what is good?", when used to express the question "what things are good" is "those things that maximise happiness".

But even if utilitarianism is true, that is not the answer to the "what is goodness, in and of itself?" question.

This is what the open-question argument brings out. For as goodness itself is not identical with the property of 'maximum happiness', then it is possible for maximum happiness to lack goodness and for something else to possess it. That's true even it utilitarianism is true. That is, even if it is true that all right acts have in common that they maximize happiness, it remains entirely possible that there could be an act that maximizes happiness yet is not right. This is because the property of 'maximizing happiness' and the property of 'being right' are not one and the same.

So, the lesson from Moore is that you need to clarify your question. What are you asking when you ask us 'what is good?'? Are you asking us which acts are good and which ones bad? Or are you asking what goodness is, in and of itself?

If someone held a hostage at gunpoint and demanded you draw them a beautiful painting to let the hostage go, I think you would be obligated to draw said painting if you can. The difference between that situation and the situation where you decide whether or not to draw under no stress, seems to be the clarity of the consequences. — khaled

The point I am making in the OP is not that we are never obliged to create beautiful things. There are all manner of circumstances under which one might be obliged to exercise a talent, such as the one you describe, where exercising it is called for in order to prevent someone suffering a great injustice.

The point, rather, is that the mere fact you have the ability to produce beautiful things - things it would be good for the world to contain - does not generate any obligation to exercise the ability in question.

Yes, there are circumstances under which one would be obliged to exercise it. But there is no standing obligation to do so. Whereas, for instance, there is a standing obligation to show others respect and, indeed, not to destroy any beautiful things in existence.

That's because generally, destroying a beautiful thing is entirely unnecessary, whereas an artist may have reasons for not creating a beautiful thing (burnout, no time, mental/physical toll, etc). — khaled

There are lots of things that are unnecessary, yet morally permissible.

And a person who has an artistic ability and is in perfect health, mental and otherwise, is still not under any positive obligation to exercise their ability.

Yes, although my proposal is that what it reflects is the fact it's more important not to disrespect that which exists, than it is to produce something worthy of respect.

The talented artist who decides not to produce anything has not shown disrespect to anyone or anything. The artist does not owe it to anyone else to produce beautiful things. There is no injustice done to anyone if the artist paints nothing, or the writer writes nothing, or the composer composes nothing. (Not unless they made a promise to someone to do so - but that's different as now a debt is owed to someone).

But there is an obligation not to disrespect those beautiful things that already exist. Imagine, for instance, that the talented artist has in their possession a beautiful work of art by someone else. The talented artist decides to paint over it with another beautiful painting of their own creation.

It seems to me that - other things being equal - this act is wrong. The world has not been made any the less beautiful by it - there is the same amount of beauty, as the new painting is every bit as beautiful as the one that it destroyed - but disrespect has been shown to the painting that was already in existence. Indeed, it seems to me that the artist here has done wrong even if their replacement painting is more beautiful than the original.

Yes, I agree that if someone who is capable of producing beautiful works decides not to do so, then there are a whole range of attitudes that it seems appropriate to adopt towards them. Sadness, disappointment, regret being chief among them. Yet these seem to fall short of being moral attitudes. That is, resentment, indignation and so on do not quite seem appropriate. And nor does it seem quite right to deem the person who has failed to exercise their ability to produce beautiful things to be deserving of harm by virtue of this.

And yes, I think there can be aesthetic obligations, although I'd be slightly worried that the word 'obligation' comes with moral connotations (doesn't have to - but I think it does in many people's minds). I think I'd prefer to say that there are aesthetic reasons to do things - including adopt certain attitudes towards things - alongside the other reasons to do things (such as prudential reasons and moral reasons).

It seems to me, for instance, that beauty calls for certain things - one 'ought' (aesthetically) to appreciate the beautiful (or try to), at least other things being equal. Someone who is unmoved by beautiful things seems to be manifesting a rational failing. But if someone fails to fulfil their aesthetic obligations we just deem them a philistine, rather than morally condemn them. That is, being unresponsive to aesthetic reasons seems more akin to a kind of stupidity rather than immorality.

I am not sure, however, that there is even an aesthetic obligation positively to produce beautiful things. I think if one is already in the process of producing something, then one may have aesthetic reason to take it in one direction rather than another. Indeed, artists are presumably responding to these reasons as they proceed. But these reasons did not exist prior to them beginning to produce whatever it was they were producing. That is, if you start to sculpt a piece of marble, then one may detect that there is aesthetic reason to lop off that bit rather than that other bit - for if one does that, then the result will be all the more beautiful. But there was no aesthetic reason to begin the sculpture. Likewise if one is writing something, then one might try and discern what phrase one has aesthetic reason to employ next, even though there was no aesthetic reason to start writing it.

Gauguin famously abandoned his family in order to pursue his art. It seems to me that if there were aesthetic reasons positively to produce beautiful things (as opposed to just aesthetic reasons to behave in certain was towards beautiful things that already exist or that one is in the process of making), then these would operate to lessen the wrong of what Gauguin did to his wife and children. Just as, by analogy, if doing x goes against what i have prudential reason to do, then that can operate to lessen how much blame I deserve for having done x. But when it comes to Gauguin it seems, at least to me, that he deserves the same degree of moral condemnation regardless of how talented he was.

But a square circle is not really something. It is nothing. In mathematics it is the content of empty set. — litewave

It's not nothing - it's a square circle. It'd be a thing if it existed. God is not bound by logic, for God is its creator. But anyway, you're still missing the point as 'refraining from creating a place such as this' is not something forbidden by logic.

So, I am saying that God has not done X. And what you are doing is claiming - falsely and irrelevantly - that God cannot do Y. No, God can do Y. But the issue is whether God has done X.

Now, has God created this world? No. Is that logically consistent? Yes. You've so far said nothing to show it not to be.

Your 'argument' otherwise keeps changing. You have said that anything God does he does in reality. Er, yes. So?

I didn't just make a painting. Ok? A painting was just made. But I didn't make it.

In this analogy I am God and the painting is the world we're living (don't respond 'but the world isn't a painting - that'd be thicker than a thick thing on thick day. So don't. Needless to say 99% of the people on this site would respond in that manner).

So, something happened - a painting was made - but I didn't make it.

Do I have the power to make a painting? Yes. But I didn't exercise it.

Your response? "But anything Bartricks does, Bartricks does in reality".

Er, yes. I know. But I didn't make the painting that exists. I could have done. But I didn't.

Your response?

"But if Bartricks creates something, he creates the best".

Er, yes, I know. But I didn't create the painting.

"But if Bartricks creates something, he might create 10 of the best".

Yes, I might. But I didn't create the painting. Why are you having trouble understanding what I am saying? I didn't create the painting. This painting: this one. I didn't create it.

Everything that happens in reality, happens necessarily. God's free will is at best compatibilist because no other free will is coherent. — litewave

That's just some random claims strung together. It doesn't engage with anything i have argued . You're just saying stuff.

There can't be such things. If there were, there wouldn't be. — litewave

If God exists, there can be. I've already explained why. If someone is omnipotent, they're able to do anything. If there was something they couldn't do, they wouldn't be omnipotent. So, ironically, you're the one with the logically incoherent view: you think an omnipotent person can exist and be unable to do some things. That's a contradiction. A person who can do anything exists and can't do some things. That's what you're saying. That's actually incoherent.

What I am saying is that God exists and can do anything and that he hasn't created the world.

No, I didn't. — litewave

You said if God created the world, then God created the world. Er, yes. And?

The issue is whether God created the world. Saying 'if he did, he did' is a pointless platitude that doesn't address the issue.

I don't know. But maybe an omnibenevolent God would create top 10 best worlds and this is one of them? — litewave

Again, you don't seem to understand what the issue is.

If God exists, God did not create the world. Now, try and focus on the issue.

But even an omnipotent being can't create a logically inconsistent object because such an object cannot exist, for example a square circle. — litewave

Yes they can. They can do anything, including things that violate the laws of logic.

Anyway, it's beside the point, for it is clearly not a violation of the laws of logic to refrain from creating something. I, right now, am refraining from doing lots of things. I am not thereby violating the laws of logic. Similarly, God can refrain from creating anything. Thus, nothing in the idea of God entails that God has created the world. That's true whether one understands omnipotence correctly as the ability to do anything whatsoever, or incorrectly, as the ability to do that which is logically possible.

Reality must be logically consistent, which means that it cannot be what it is not. God's action is a part of reality, which means that God's action cannot be what it is not, and so if God creates a world he cannot not create it. — litewave

That's not an argument. You've just said 'reality must be consistent......therefore God has created the world'. How on earth does that follow? Peas are legumes. Therefore God created peas. It doesn't make sense.

Then God creates the best worlds that are logically possible (consistent). — litewave

You're not following. 'If' God created a world, then he would create the best world. This isn't the best world, is it?! Therefore, God did not create it.

God created this world because he couldn't have done differently. — litewave

Then he wouldn't be omnipotent. God is by definition omnipotent. So God can do anything. That includes refraining from creating a world.

Not creating this world would be logically inconsistent — litewave

That's flagrantly question begging. I've explained that it isn't inconsistent. An omnipotent person can do anything - so that means they do not 'have' to do anything. Thus, there is nothing in the idea of omnipotence that commits one to believing that an omnipotent being created everything. There can be an omnipotent person, and there can be a ton of other stuff, and the omnipotent person can have created none of it. If you think that, logically, omnipotence involves creating this world, then you need to provide an argument.

It gets worse, not only does omnipotence not positively imply that God created the world, omnibenevolence positively implies God did not create it.

You haven't said anything there.

You are the one who has said that Stoicism contains something important. What? What interesting philosophical thesis - so, not a psychological thesis, but a thesis about how things are with reality - does it contain?

That's Plato's definition.