Well that's really no clearer.

Here is the relevant argument:

premise 1: Reason makes assertions
premise 2. Persons and only persons make assertions
Conclusion: therefore Reason is a person.

Now, which premise are you taking issue with?

All asserters of things are Reason... it would follow... not a person. All people who assert. — creativesoul

Eh? What are you on about?

Well, if you really need me to reduce my level of reasoning to yours...how about we start with the ‘no true Scotsman’ fallacy? There are a number of reasonable posters here who object (and have made reasonable objections) to your assumptions. Appealing to Reason as you see it is not the same as being reasonable. So are you the only one here who is being ‘truly’ reasonable? — Possibility

What is the 'no true Scotsman fallacy' and how have I committed it. Remember, I'm a dumbo so I not be understanding this stuff.

Explain.

There are a number of reasonable posters here who object (and have made reasonable objections) to your assumptions — Possibility

No, that's false. Name one. There hasn't been a single good objection yet. Not one. And I haven't encountered anyone reasonable who's objected to my view.

But do correct me. Identify a reasonable objector and then explain to me how their objection is reasonable - that is, how it either identifies a fallacy in my reasoning or raises a reasonable doubt about the truth of one of my assumptions.

It depends on what the quality is. — Bartricks
Not at all. — god must be atheist

Yes. It. Does. See earlier example.

Self-approval is not a quality. It is a noun. Adjectives describe quality. — god must be atheist

Irrelevant, but glad English course well going

You realize that this second quote by you is bad fantasy, gibberish, nonsense. — god must be atheist

Hmm. I spoke too soon.

Aside from your non-sequitur nonsense, you should know that Reason is not a female person. It is not a person. The reason you use female gender for reason is that in German the word "Vernunft", which is the German word for reason, is of feminine gender. It is also capitalized in German, as all nouns are capitalized in German. You simply copied and pasted some passages from the English translation of Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason" too many times, and it mesmerized you to believe that the proper use of reason in English is to capitalize it and use it as a feminine-gender noun. — god must be atheist

Ah, well, you got me bang to rights there. Reason ist not eine lady, but ist eine pig-dog.

I validly concluded that Reason, being an asserter of things, must be a person, a person I refer to as 'she' because that's how she's been traditionally referred to (not just by Germans) and because calling her 'him' might make people identify her with the god of an extant religion.

But meh.

More of the same meaningless incoherent nonsense. — creativesoul

Whiz

Not very good at that are you? — creativesoul

Zip.

Assertions are made with language use. Reason is not the sort of thing capable of using language. Reason cannot make assertions. — creativesoul

Whiz.

Cakes are made with ovens. Cakes are not ovens, though.

I use language to make assertions. But language asserts nothing. I make the assertion, not the language.

Again, for the point is subtle and you're not a subtle thinker. I use language to make an assertion. But I - I - am the maker of the assertion, language asserts nothing.

I use my sight to see things. But my sight sees nothing. I see by using my sight. But my sight sees nothing.

I learn by reading books. But books learn nothing. And on and on.

Now, do up your flies, put the pieces back on the board and start recognising these things.

I’m not ignoring the evidence - you only think I’m ignoring it, because I’m not giving it the same weight as you are. — Possibility

You're not even addressing it. Have I committed a fallacy? No. But by all means correct me on that and point one out.

Have I made a false assumption? No. I have assumed this: I have assumed that all reasonable people will agree that they have acquired the true theory of truth when it is clear to the reason of all of them that the theory in question is asserted by Reason. Is that assumption false? Well, you've said precisely nothing - nothing - to challenge it. You don't seem even to be aware of it. But it is true, is it not? I mean, what more could a reasonable person want before they will be assured of the truth of a thesis?

I have also assumed this: that if all reasonable people will be satisfied that they have acquired the true theory of truth when and only when it seems clear to them all that Reason asserts it to be true, then - other things being equal - it is reasonable to suppose that this is what truth itself consists of. That is, that truth itself is composed of Reason's assertions, given that this and this alone is what assures us we have it.

Have you said anything at all to challenge that assumption? No.

Now, if you consider that an apparently valid argument with apparently true premises does not constitute good - I mean, the best - evidence that a thesis is true, then what else do you consider relevant? I'm intrigued. Does it, perhaps, also have to be a theory that your gran approves of? Does it also have to be a theory that, when described to your cat, produces a meow? I mean, what the hell else carries weight, in your view?!

I have taken no stand on what propositions are, apart from the (uncontroversial) view that they are the bearers of truth. But I'm not even committed to that - for the topic is what the property of truth is, not the nature of that which bears it.

all the way into the quality of my objections and/or your purported 'arguments'. — creativesoul

They're not purported arguments. They 'are' arguments. The truth of that claim doesn't depend on your comprehension skills (thankfully).

Again, if the most we can ever say in support of any view about anything - including any view about what truth is - is that it appears to be being asserted by Reason, then truth itself is reasonably considered to be that property (the property of 'being asserted by Reason').

You have said precisely nothing in objection to that view. Note: objecting to a view, or to the holder of it, does not an objection make.

I am mocking you.

Let me explain how that works. Clearly one cannot win a game of chess by whizzing on the board. That's not a legitimate move. It's not a bad move, it isn't a move at all - that's how bad it is.

What I am suggesting is that your response to my argument is analogous to whizzing on a chess board. That is, your response to my careful opening gambit has been to shower the board with urine.

Any and all arguments appeal to apparent assertions of Reason. So it cannot coherently be denied that Reason makes assertions.

I have argued that truth itself is constituted by Reason's assertions, for any thesis that there is more, or something different to truth than this will itself have to appeal to Reason's assertions. And so there is really nothing more that can be said in favour of a view about truth, than that it appears to be being asserted by Reason - in which case it is reasonable to suppose that truth itself is one and the same as that property.

Your response? "Whizzzzz"

Is it reasonable for you to consider, just for a moment, the possibility that there might be more to reality than what appeals to Reason - the possibility that your perspective of reality might be limited in some way? That is, before you summarily dismiss that thought on account of it failing to appeal to Reason, of course... — Possibility

Address the argument I gave. You're not humble if, when confronted with overwhelming evidence that a proposition is true, you continue to take seriously that it is false.

That's what religious people are like. You show them that the evidence indicates their god does not exist. They then pretend they're the reasonable ones if they continue to take seriously that the god does exist.

No, they're not being reasonable - they're just ignoring evidence.

Now, perhaps their god does exist - perhaps there's excellent evidence their god exists.

the point, though, is that a reasonable person does not ignore evidence and keep playing the 'but let's be reasonable and accept the possibility the view is false" card. That ain't being reasonable, sonny boy, not when evidence has been given that it is true. It's just a pathetic attempt to avoid having to accept a belief you may not like.

Now, engage with that evidence - that is, try and refute my argument.

I am so getting owned. So sorry, I misjudged you. Now tell me again how you won that chess game by whizzing on the board - I love that one, he so didn't see it coming!

Oh, good point. Brilliant. I am clearly up against one of the best. Anyway, my dad is bigger than your dad.

Omg!

Reason does assert things! "If a proposition is true, do not also believe it is false" - that's an assertion.

It isn't true because I assert it, or you, or because it is written by someone in a book. It is true because Reason asserts it.

So, premise 1: Reason makes assertions

Premise 2: Minds and only minds make assertions

Conclusion: therefore Reason is a mind

Which premise is false? And provide evidence, don't just blurt.

Both of those endeavors are existentially dependent upon having an argument with premisses clearly demarcated. Otherwise, I'm shooting blind-folded. — creativesoul

Gibberish.

You're not very good with the spatiotemporal aspects of your own worldview are you? — creativesoul

Gibberish.

You think worldviews are located in space and time? So, er, they have shapes do they? Does my worldview have a shape? Is that what you think? Are you literally in a straightjacket typing with your nose?

It's in the OP. Look, it isn't my fault you don't actually know what an argument is.

Let's go though it, shall we - baby steps.

The question is "what is truth?"

Because no-one currently seems to know - there are several theories, but none enjoys universal support among those who are clever enough to be paid to think about such matters - it is worthwhile stepping back a mo and asking a slightly different question: when would all of those clever enough to be paid to think about such things be happy with an answer? They're not currently, but when would they be?

Well, surely they would all be happy with an answer when it is clear to the reason of all of them that the answer is endorsed by Reason - that is, when their reason represents the answer to be true.

Now, that's one of my 'assumptions'. Challenge it if you like. I think you won't succeed, but by all means try.

If - if - that assumption is correct (and I cannot conceive how it could not be, for it is true for any answer to any philosophical question) - then it is reasonable to have as one's working hypothesis that truth itself just is the property of being a proposition that Reason asserts.

Tell. Me. How. My. View. Is. Inconsistent. With. Dialetheism.

I. Think. You. Can't. Do. That.

You need for me to give you good reason for believing that Reason is not the sort of thing that is capable of making assertions? Really? — creativesoul

Er, yeah - this is a philosophy thread. I made an argument. Either locate a fallacy, or dispute a premise. Now, we both know you can't do that. But yes, that is what I want you to do - and it is what you need to do if you're to qualify as addressing the OP.

Assertions are assertions of thought and belief. Reason is not the sort of thing that has thought and belief or asserts it — creativesoul

Argument? Where is your argument for this claim - it contradicts the conclusion of my argument, so I've refuted your position until or unless you show there to be something faulty in my argument. Refute my argument without assuming you already know what kind of a thing Reason is - you know, refute me without begging the question.

So, you think that if dialetheism is true, it is inconsistent with my theory? Explain - if you can - you know, in a way that a dumbo like me can understand.

Your typical response to almost everyone. — Janus

Yes, because this:

Argument? Oh, I forgot, you're one of those - you know, virtually everyone here - who thinks that if they say something, it is so. — Bartricks

is true. So it is an appropriate response to almost everyone.

I don't respond that way to those who actually engage with the argument. Only those who don't bother and just blurt things out of their face fronts.

Ironic coming from someone who substantiates none of his own insubstantial claims, — Janus

No, there's an argument in the OP. Read it. Not my fault you don't know an argument from your elbow. You just need more edumacation, that's all. Get some, come back. Read the OP. Then address the argument rather than just saying things.

Um, OK. I was hoping you'd provide something I could reply to, though. — javra

You're out of your depth. Not my fault you can't think of anything to say. Go down the shallow end.

Reason doesn't assert. Such talk is nonsense. — creativesoul

Argument? Oh, I forgot, you're one of those - you know, virtually everyone here - who thinks that if they say something, it is so. No need to argue. No need to engage with any argument another has presented. Just say it - just express yourself. It's all about self-expression - just be yourself, you can't possibly be wrong.

Now, Reason does assert things because some propositions are true and as the argument in the OP shows, for a proposition to be true is for Reason to be asserting it. Q.E.D.

Say it, don't spray it. Substantiate your claims. As for abusing language, is English your first language? Methinks not.

I do not know what you mean by LNC, or how what you're saying responds to what I have already said about this.

Dialetheism is the theory that there can be true contradictions.

That's not a theory about truth, but a theory about what can be true.

It is consistent with my theory.

For an analogy: utilitarianism is a first-order theory of ethics. It is a theory about what kinds of acts possess the property of rightness (namely, acts that maximise happiness).

Divine command theory, by contrast, is a second-order theory of ethics. It is a theory about what rightness is (namely, that rightness is one and the same as being an act that is commanded by a god).

The two are not rivals, though if the first theory is true then the second would need to be consistent with its truth (as it is).

If one asks "what is right?" one could be asking either the first order question "which acts possess rightness?" or the second order question "what does rightness consist of?"

These are not at all the same question.

Likewise, if one asks "what is true?" one could be asking either the first order question "which propositions are the true ones?" or one could be asking "what is truth itself?".

These are not at all the same question.

Dialetheism is a first-order theory - it is the theory that among the propositions that are true, are contradictions.

My theory - that truth is made of Reason's assertions - is a second order theory.

They're not competitor theories - they're not answering the same question.

As for the correspondence theory - like I say, it is either not a second order theory (and so not a rival view), or it is a second order theory but one that lacks any content and so is vacuously true (and also entirely consistent with my substantial second order theory).

Reason has her perspective of what is true - it’s a limited perspective, but she’s not aware of this - and she ignores and excludes new information that cannot be reduced to logical argument. — Possibility

Flagrantly question begging. Reason constitutively determines what's true - that's what my argument appeared to demonstrate. Now, if you think otherwise engage with that argument - challenge either its validity or one of its assumptions. Don't just state a different view, as if evidence counts for nothing.

You're conflating the empirical context in which we can of course know that something is the case without knowing why with the rational context in which we cannot. In other words it isn't possible in the context of logical thought which is the basis of reason to know what is the case without knowing why it is the case, even if that merely means knowing that something is self-evident. In order to know that something follows logically or rationally you have to know why. — Janus

Gibberish

All you know there is what others value, whether reasonably or not. People usually have reasons for valuing what they do, and if you ask them they will tell you. If they can't tell why they value something then you might conclude that they don't really value it at all, but are merely paying lip service; just blindly following along without thinking about it. — Janus

You're just not getting the point. The point, once more, is that we can know 'that' something is the case without having to know 'why' it is the case.

We can know that truth is what Reason asserts, without knowing why she asserts what she asserts.

Dialetheism is the position that some statements are both true and false, i.e. that some contradictory propositions express what is termed “true contradictions” — javra

If truth is that which Reason asserts, given that reason can assert both dialetheism and the LNC, would both dialetheism and LNC be true? — javra

I do not know what you mean by LNC. But if - if - Reason asserts that a proposition such as "this proposition is false" is true, then dialetheism will be true.

There is debate over whether it is true, and so we can take from the fact of such a debate that it is not entirely clear what Reason asserts in this respect. I do not see a problem, then, as whichever view turns out to be true, the truth of it will consist of its being asserted by Reason.

the way I see it, dialetheism is a first order theory, not a second order theory. That is, it is not a theory about what truth itself is, but about what the property of truth can attach itself to. As such it is not a rival view to mine, but a theory about something different. That is, it is a theory about how truth behaves, rather than about what truth is.

Of course, a theory about what truth is has to be consistent with how truth behaves. But note that my theory is consistent with dialetheism and consistent with its negation - and so the credibility of my view is not held hostage to how the debate over the credibility of dialetheism pans out.

Sarah is a person who can tell you or show you through her actions what she values. How do know what this fictitious "Reason" of yours values, and how do you know it? — Janus

Via my faculty of reason and by comparing what my faculty says to what the faculty of reason of others reports Reason as valuing.

For example, I seem to remember Sarah saying that she values X. Others who also know Sarah confirm that they too seem to remember Sarah saying that she values X. On that basis I conclude that Sarah values X. But none of us have a clue why she values X, because none of us can remember if or what she said about that.

Again, then, we have a 'faculty' of reason which acquaints us - more or less reliably - with what Reason asserts.

We do not have to be able to know why Reason asserts what she asserts before we can know that she asserts what she asserts.

When it comes to "Reason" valuing certain things, if you knew that "Reason" valued those things, then you would know why it values them. — Janus

That simply doesn't follow. I can know that Sarah values X without knowing why she values X. And I can know that Sarah values X on the basis of Sarah's testimony (she told me she values X) without thereby knowing why she values X (she didn't tell me why).

So, you know, you're wrong.

Reasoning is the act of structuring and restructuring the mind for the purpose of integrating new information to minimise instances of prediction error. — Possibility

Eh? Let's just recap - in the OP I provided an argument in support of a particular analysis of truth. An argument is an appeal to reason - what I am doing in arguing something is trying to show that Reason endorses the conclusion. That's just what arguing is. Someone who doesn't try to show that a given view is supported by Reason is not arguing - they're just asserting. They may disguise this in various ways, but if they're not appealing to Reason, they're not arguing.

So, I made an argument. I didn't say "this is true because I say so" I said "these claims appear self-evident to our reason, and they imply this theory of truth".

What you said is that you don't care as much as I do about what Reason says. In effect, then, what you are doing is giving yourself an out - you want to be permitted to just ignore Reason when it is convenient to do so.

And yes, be my guest - do that. But know that you're not doing philosophy when you do that. You're just indulging yourself. And apart from by pure fluke, you are not going to get closer to understanding anything about the world to the extent that you do that. You're just going to be listening to yourself, rather than looking for evidence.

Again, then, I have made an argument - I have tried to listen to Reason and report what she appears to say. You, though, have said simply that you do not care as much as I do what Reason may or may not be saying. Okay, that's your prerogative, But that's no different to a detective saying "look, here's some evidence that Jack did the crime" and you responding "well, I don't care as much as you do about what the evidence indicates". Fine - but then you're not a detective, or at least you're not a very good one.

Why are you being so obscure. The OP makes an argument - challenge that argument if you think a different theory of truth is true. You haven't yet.

Reason presupposes truth as correspondence by virtue of presupposing the truth of it's premisses. — creativesoul
As should be apparent, I fully agree. — javra

You agree with gibberish? What do you agree with?

The correspondence theory of truth is not a substantial theory of truth. It is true - no one disputes that it is true - but it is true because it is trivial. It says "a proposition is true when it corresponds to the facts", yes?

Now, no one disputes that. But first, that tells us 'when' a proposition is true, which is distinct from telling us what truth itself is.

If I ask "what is water?" and you say "the stuff that comes out of water pipes" then what you've said is true, but not a substantial answer to my question, which was not a request to locate some water or tell me something about where it comes from, but a question about what it is made of.

Likewise then, to ask "what is truth?" is to ask about what truth is made of. To say that proposition have this property of truth when they correspond to the facts is not an answer to that question, anymore than 'water comes from water pipes' is an answer to 'what is water?'

So, first point - the correspondence theory of truth is not, despite its name, a theory of truth. It is a theory about when propositions are true, it is not a theory about truth itself.

Second, what's a fact if not something that's true? It's a misguided and empty theory. But it does allow those who lack insight to talk a lot of gibberish, which given that's all they're capable of it, they're not going to give it up.

Reason presupposes truth as correspondence by virtue of presupposing the truth of it's premisses — creativesoul

Gibberish.

This analogy fails because you know why the burglar burgled your home: it was in order to steal things. We don't have access to "capital 'R' Reason", we only have access to our own reasoning. — Janus

No it doesn't, you're just not getting the point. I don't have to know why someone did something before I can know that they did it.

That's so obviously true it hurts. Do you know how the internet works? I don't. I haven't the faintest idea how the words I am typing on my keyboard are getting to you. But I know - or can reasonably believe - that they are.

Again: you don't have to know why something is happening before you can know that it is happening.

Do you know why you're here, for instance? I mean, do you know the meaning of your life? I bet you don't. Yet you know that you're living a life, yes?

Would you allow that Reason could be metaphorically described as a (the) set of tools/filters that allow reason to judge that something is true or not? — tim wood

No, absolutely not. If the argument of the OP goes through - and so far no one has challenged either its validity of the truth of its assumptions - then truth is constituted by Reason's assertions.

How could a set of tools assert anything? Again, it seems to me that you are continuing to conflate a faculty with 'that which the faculty gives us an awareness of'. Sight allows us to see things. But sight and the things seen with sight are distinct.

Likewise, our reason - lower case r - is a faculty. It gives us an awareness of aspects of Reason, upper case r. Now, that isn't in dispute - these are conceptual truths. Our reason is a faculty, but Reason is the asserter, bidder, commander. Reason and 'reason' are distinct, just as sight and 'the things seen' are distinct.

Reason, as we know from the argument in the OP, asserts things. For it is her assertions that constitute truth, and some things are true.

A faculty cannot assert anything. Our reason itself gives us insight into this - our reason (the faculty) let's us know that Reason says that faculties do not assert things. To put it another way, it appears to be a self-evident truth that only persons - minds - can assert things. That's not something one sees, or smells, or tastes, or hears. It is something we know via our reason, and so it appears, then, to be something Reason herself tells us is the case.

Now, it follows from this that Reason is a mind, a person. For Reason asserts things - and those assertions constitute truth - and among the things that Reason asserts, it would seem, is that minds and minds alone assert things.

So no, faculties do not assert things. And Reason is not a set of faculties, not a set of tools, but a mind.

Let's set aside the circularity in this, because I don't think that's necessarily fatal. — tim wood

No, before setting it aside describe it - what circularity?

If you don't know why "she" thinks things are the case, then how do you know that "her" thinking them to be the case makes them true? — Janus

Because of the argument I gave in the OP. You don't have to know why the burglar burgled your home in order to be able reliably to know 'that' the burglar burgled your home, or be able to explain why the serial killer did that to his victims before we are justified in believing that he did that to his victims, and so on.

The argument given in the OP allows us reasonably to conclude that our working hypothesis should be that truth is constituted by Reason's assertions. We do not need to know why she asserts what she asserts for that to be correct.

Also, if reason alone can determine truth, and we are reasonable beings, then we should be able to know what is true and what not; otherwise what use is reason to us on your understanding? — Janus

You are equivocating between 'reason' (lower case r), which refers to our faculty of reason, and 'Reason' (upper case r) which refers to the being whose attitudes our reason gives us insight into. That's akin to confusing your sight with that which is seen.

It is Reason who determines what is true - constitutively determines it, because 'to be true' just is to be being asserted by Reason - and our faculties of reason give us insight into what Reason asserts.

If you're relying on JTB, do some research on it. — tim wood

What makes you think I haven't?

I was careful to say that knowledge involves - involves - having a justified true belief. That's not the same as saying that those elements are sufficient for knowledge.

You are still conflating my view with a quite different one.

I have argued that truth is a performative of Reason. That is, when Reason asserts a proposition, that proposition is true. It is not that she confers truth on it, it is that being true and being asserted by Reason are one and the same.

My reason is a faculty. We can distinguish between sight and what is seen. Sight is a faculty. but we do not see sight. We see sensible objects. We see sensible objects with our sight.

My reason is a faculty just as my sight is. But my reason does not acquaint me with sensible objects - not directly, anyway - but with what Reason commands, values, and asserts. Not infallibly, of course - no more than my sight infallibly acquaints me with the sensible. The important point, however, is that though my reason acquaints me with what Reason asserts, my reason does not assert anything.

Another analogy: I give you a note on which is written "shut the window!" I am clearly telling you to shut the window. But the note isn't telling you to do anything. I am, via the note. Likewise, my reason tells me what Reason wants me to do, and to believe, and what Reason herself asserts. But my reason itself doesn't want me to do or believe anything, nor does it assert anything.

So, there is Reason - the asserter, the commander, the valuer - and then there is our faculty of reason (the means by which we gain some acquaintance with what Reason asserts, commands, values).

there's a world of difference between the two and it is a category error to confuse Reason with our reason.

Anyway, truth is what Reason - that which my reason gives me fallible insight into - asserts.

My faculty, being a faculty, does not 'assert' anything. That's like thinking my sight sees. My faculty of reason asserts nothing. Nor does yours.

Reason does assert things.

Reason, being assertive, must be a person, for only persons can make assertions.

Note, this is something that can be validly concluded from this analysis of truth.

Now you have said that my argument is build on sand. I see no justification for that claim. My argument appears to me to be very strong.

For surely it is a good idea to ask the question "when would we be satisfied that we have the true theory of truth on our hands?"?

And what is the answer to that question? Well, that we - we who are using reason to find out what's true - will be satisfied when it is clear to us all that Reason asserts the theory in question to be true.

Well, if that's what it would take for us to be satisfied that we have the true theory of truth on our hands, then it stands to Reason that this should be our working hypothesis about what truth itself is.

So, absent some good reason to think otherwise, our working hypothesis should be that truth is a performative of Reason. What it is for a proposition to be true, is for Reason to be asserting it.

Now, that's not a weak argument. If you think it is, highlight the weak step and show me the firmer ground to step on.