I mean that someone who thinks an argument of this form - if p, then q; p; therefore q- is invalid is someone whose powers of rational discernment are useless

3 follows from 1 and 2. If you can't see that we can't continue this

How long were you pulling the push door before someone rescued you? Two days, wasn't it?

I don't know what you mean. 3 is a conclusion and so to reject it you need to reject either 1 or 2

Er, and how on earth is Berkeley not doing that?

Again, try and refute him without assuming a materialist worldview.

If you can't, then all you're doing is insisting materialism is true and then interpreting everything accordingly. That's silly. It's no different from just assuming Christianity is true and interpreting everything accordingly. Which is what you'd have done 200 years ago on "Ye Philosophy Forum"

But the point is that you are attacking a strawman, as physical laws are recognized to be descriptive, not prescriptive.
Insofar as some see in them evidence of God it is due to them seeming designed. And designs require a designer.
So it is not that laws require a lawgiver - for descriptive laws clearly do not - it is that designed descriptive laws require a designer.

It is laws of the prescriptive kind - so, normative laws - that require a law giver

First, to lose innocence one needs free will and sufficient reason responsiveness. As the latter develops much later all the harms suffered in childhood are undeserved. Second, one is not entitled to assume later wrongdoing will occur. Third, even if it will occur, and occur to a degree that all subsequent harms are deserved, then this just compounds the case for antinatalism, for one should not create wrongdoers, other things being equal

The view that it is wrong to procreate is not the view that no one procreate. It is normative: a view about how ought to behave, not a view about how we do behave

Extreme unending agony. Under those circumstances it seems the lesser of two evils and thus rational. So it must be a very great harm if that's what it takes to eclipse it.

Are you paid to think deeply?

It is common to distinguish between descriptive laws and prescriptive laws. A descriptive law attempts to describe how something behaves. And such a description will be refuted by contrary behaviour.
Physical laws are descriptive. That's why contrary behaviour refutes them.

Prescriptive laws are prescriptions. That is, they direct us to do something. A prescriptive law is not refuted by contrary behaviour. For example, I do not show that there is no law against driving 100mph by simply doing so.

If someone thought there was a physical law against travelling at 100mph then I could refute that claim by driving at that speed. But if there is a prescriptive law against it then travelling at that speed will simply break the law without refuting it.

When it comes to God, God is plausibly required for there to be certain sorts of prescriptive law, the most obvious being moral laws. Moral laws prescribe, they do not describe. Thus there needs to be a prescriber. And plausibly that prescriber will turn out to be God.

Moral reasons are among the kinds of normative reason that there can be.

So, philosophers call 'reasons to do things' 'normative reasons', so they are not confused with other uses to which the word 'reason'can be put.

There are different sorts of normative reason. They are all reasons to do things, but they have different bases.

For example, we often have reason to do something due to it being in our interests to do it. The fact doing x is in my interests is the basis upon which I have a reason to do it. That kind of normative reason is called an instrumental reason.

Sometimes we have a reason to do something because it is in someone else's interests that we do it, or because it will give someone else what they deserve, or because it would manifest a good character trait, or because it would respect another. When a normative reason has that kind of base it is called a moral reason.

And sometimes we have a normative reason to believe something because the belief is true. When that is the basis of the normative reason it is known as an epistemic reason.

These are all different kinds of normative reason and they can sometimes come into conflict. But morality, note, is partly made of normative reasons. Morality is essentially normative. But the domain of the normative is larger than morality. It includes morality - at least the normative part of it - but includes much else besides. So it is a mistake to think that I am just talking about morality. I am talking about all justifications - all reasons to do things (so, moral reasons, instrumental reasons and epistemic reasons).

I am not talking about anything else that the word 'reason' might be used to denote. So I am not talking about our faculty of reason. Nor am I talking about motivations. Nor am I talking about the causes of things. I am talking about normative reasons.

If I am motivated to torture john and have no motivation not to, ought I do so?

Clearly not. So what we ought to do and what we are motivated to do are not equivalent.

"I am motivated to do it, but I wonder if I have reason to do it" is a coherent thought, but would be incoherent if the two were equivalent.

Any confusion here is simply due to the fact the word 'reason' is ambiguous. It can be used as a synonym for motivation and many other things besides.(So I am not saying you are incorrect to say that I have reason to torture john, I am just saying that the word reason does not operate as a synonym for a normative reason in that context).

So, a reason-to-do something is not a motivation, for we can have reason to do that which we are not motivated to do and we can have a motivation to do that which we have no reason to do.

I really don't know what you are talking about.

No, not motivations. Reasons to do things. Our motivations are often the basis upon which we have a reason to do something, but the reason to do something and the motivation are distinct. For example, if I am motivated to torture John, that is not equivalent to me having reason to torture John. What we are motivated to do we can sometimes have no reason to do, and thus the two are not the same.
Reasons to do things are known as normative reasons (or justifying reasons). They are what shoulds or oughts are made of.
Clearly an evolutionary story of our development does not challenge the idea that we have motivations. Such an account will mention them. What it challenges - because it will not mention them - is the idea that there is anything we should do or should believe.

What? So you seriously think you should start with a worldview and then proceed to reject views that conflict with it? Okay. Jeez, you people haven't a clue. You're just a bunch of dogmatists. That's clearly not how you find out what's true. It's called 'making shit up'.

No. Just no. To deserve something is not the same as it being expected.

Evolutionarily speaking, there doesn't havta be real reasons for believing/doing something even though you believe there are.

What follows? — Agent Smith

Nothing follows from that.

Now, I laid out an argument for you, didn't I?

Here it is:

1. If the correct explanation of a belief that p does not invoke the actual existence of p, then the belief is debunked because we do not have to posit p.

And to that we add this premise:

2. A purely evolutionary explanation of our belief that there are reasons to do things does not have to invoke the actual existence of any reasons to do things

From which it follows that:

3. If a purely evolutionary explanation of our belief that there are reasons to do things is correct, then our belief that there are reasons to do things is debunked because we do not have to posit any actual reasons to do things. — Bartricks

And then you say this AGAIN:

You claim that the belief that there are real reasons to believe or do something is debunked. It's, to put it bluntly, just convenient/useful/healthy to believe that there are real reasons to believe or do something even though there are none. — Agent Smith

No, fishy, I didn't. Again and again and again. I do not claim that. I claim that 'if' a purely evolutionary account of our development is true, THEN the belief is debunked.

This isn't hard. 'If' doesn't mean 'is the case'. "If we were in a victorian school and I was your teacher, you would now have an extremely sore bottom" I have not just said that we are in a victorian school and you have a sore bottom, have I? We've been over this again and again and again and again and again.

If so, any argument you make, which quite naturally requires you to furnish reasons (duh!), is going to fall flat on its face owing to the fact that according to you there are no real reasons. — Agent Smith

Christ. I give up. If we were in a victorian school I would now be in big trouble for having spanked a pupil to death.

I don't see that.
For it to be reasonable to expect a certain outcome is not the same as thinking the outcome is deserved. Given how the clouds look I expect it will rain shortly. That does not mean I think rain is deserved.
In your example it is the fact a person has expended some effort that makes them deserve something, not the fact what they have done will likely yield a certain outcome.

Ah, the emoticons. Tell me, for a hobby do you ring doorbells and run away?

Er, you haven't refuted his argument. Saying "refuted!!" does not constitute a refutation. Thinking otherwise is called the 'dumb' fallacy. Just naming fallacies is called the 'ignorant idiot' fallacy. Now, try and refute him properly without committing either the dumb fallacy or the ignorant idiot fallacy.
Here's what you do: you construct an argument that has the negation of one of his claims as a conclusion and apparent self evident truths as premises.

Reasoning is an activity. It is the activity of exercising one's faculty of reason.

If a purely evolutionary story of our development is true, then there are no actual reasons to do anything.

That means that any faculty of reason we have developed is not capable of detecting any actual reasons - for there are none - and will instead be a faculty that generates the hallucination of reasons.

One can still exercise that faculty. But exercising it would simply be to generate hallucinations in oneself, rather than any actual awareness of reasons.

These things should not be conflated (but are, by almost everyone).

Our faculty of reason.

Reasons to do things

The belief or impression that there is a reason to do something.

What an evolutionary account does is explain how we have come to be 'without' having to posit any reasons to do things.

So an evolutionary account will explain how we have acquired a faculty of reason, without having to posit any actual reasons.

And consequently it will explain why we subsequently get the impression of reasons to do things without having to posit any actual reasons (the impressions are generated by the faculty).

No, I'm not a goldfish! :snicker: — Agent Smith

Yes you are! No matter how many times I tell you that I think reasons exist, 10 minutes later you're telling me I'm arguing that reasons do not exist.

I'm not. I said - many, many times now (and in the OP!!!!) that reasons exist and that only a scoundrel or a fool denies this.

That's as clear as crystal, yes? Yet in 10 minutes time, you'll attribute to me the opposite view.

I am now going to quote me telling you time and time and time again that I am arguing that reasons exist, not that they don't.

Here's the OP:

Any argument - any case - that ends by concluding that we do not have any reason to believe anything is self-undermining. For arguments are just attempts to show us what we have reason to believe.

We can safely dismiss such arguments, then. They are, in effect, arguments against arguments. Only a fool or a scoundrel makes an argument against arguments. — Bartricks

Now here's me explaining it to you for the first time:

Now for the puzzle: when it comes to our faculty of reason the evolutionary explanation seems to be a debunking one, not a vindicatory one. We seem able to explain why we developed a faculty that produces in us the belief that we have reason to believe things without having to suppose that there are actually any reasons to believe things in reality. So we can explain the development of the faculty without having to suppose the reality of what the faculty gives us an apparent awareness of.

Yet that now means that we've undermined our own case, as any case for anything depends on there being actual reasons to believe things (not the mere belief in such things). — Bartricks

See?

Now here's me saying it again

The puzzle arises becasue we can give an evolutionary account of the development of our faculty of reason without having to posit any actual reasons. And thus such an account debunks our impressions and beliefs that we have reasons to do and believe things. Yet we have to presuppose that there really are reasons to believe things. So the atheist who believes they have reason to believe in evolution by natural selection has an incoherent set of beliefs. They believe there is reason to believe in evolution by natural selection, yet if evolution by natural selection alone (unassisted by God, that is) is true, then there are no reasons to believe anything. — Bartricks

And then again, moments later:

1. If the correct explanation of why a person believes x does not involve positing x, then that person's belief in x is debunked.
2. If a purely evolutionary explanation of our development is true, then the correct explanation of why any person believes there are reasons to believe things does not involve positing any reasons to believe things.
3. Therefore, if a purely evolutionary explanation of our development is true, then a person's belief in reasons to believe things is debunked. — Bartricks

Note what the conclusion of that argument is. It isn't what you think it is. It isn't 'there are no reasons to believe things' is it?

And then, a tiny time later I have to do it all over again, here:

OMG. I think there ARE reasons to do things. I could not have been clearer. I said only an idiot or a scoundrel thinks they do not exist.

They exist.

The PROBLEM - for you, not me - is that an evolutionary explanation of how we have acquired our belief in them will discredit them.

So guess what? That means that an exclusive evolutionary explanation is FALSE. It does not mean that evolution by natural selection is false. It means that it can't be the whole story. — Bartricks

And then, about 10 minutes later, I do have to do it AGAIN:

I'm not attacking Reason. I think there are reasons to do things. You can't make a case against them without presupposing them. So if you don't believe in reasons, you're stuck. You can't defend your disbelief, for the instant you do that you'll be appealing to the very things you think do not exist. And so all you can do is assert: all you can do is declare that you disbelieve in things that appear to exist both to you and everyone else who possesses a faculty of reason. — Bartricks

Note, I think reasons to do things exist. I am not arguing that they do not exist. I think they exist. I think a purely evolutionary explanation of us is demonstrably false. Demonstrably, because if true it implies there are no reasons to do things. But there are, so it is false. — Bartricks

And then again:

1. If the correct explanation of a belief that p does not invoke the actual existence of p, then the belief is debunked because we do not have to posit p.

And to that we add this premise:

2. A purely evolutionary explanation of our belief that there are reasons to do things does not have to invoke the actual existence of any reasons to do things

From which it follows that:

3. If a purely evolutionary explanation of our belief that there are reasons to do things is correct, then our belief that there are reasons to do things is debunked because we do not have to posit any actual reasons to do things.

Note, that conclusion does not assert that there are no reasons to do and believe things or that our belief in such things has actually been debunked. It says 'if'.

This premise is also true:

4. There are reasons to do and believe things and the correct explanation of our belief in reasons to do and believe things does invoke the actual existence of such things.

From which it follows:

5. Therefore, a purely evolutionary explanation of our belief that there are reasons to do things is incorrect. — Bartricks

And AGAIN in a reply about 3 minutes later!!!!:

Er, no. I am saying that there are reasons to do and believe things. — Bartricks

And then AGAIN after you once more attribute to me the view that there are no reasons (I am, you'll note, by this time losing my temper with you):

Oh. My. God. How many times?
I am arguing that reasons exist.
Are you a goldfish? — Bartricks

And that's where we are now.

Do you see how unbelievably patient I am with you?

Now, do you understand that I think reasons do exist? And that this means I think they do exist, not that they don't? Or are you on a sponsored thickathon?

Presumably they recognize that they themselves have moral value? If so then one could simply ask then to identify a morally relevant difference between themselves and others that would justify believing that oneself had moral value whereas others lack it.

But if they do not even recognize this, then one could point out that most others get the impression persons have moral value. If virtually everyone is getting the visual impression of a sun in the sky but you are not, then the reasonable conclusion to draw is that there is a sun in the sky and that your own visual impressions are failing you on this occasion. That's not always reasonable - for sometimes there's excellent reason to think that it is the faculties of others that are systematically failing - but it's the reasonable default assumption. Likewise, then, with moral impressions (which are just a species of rational impression). If most people get the impression persons have moral value, but you do not share this impression, then the reasonable conclusion to draw - other things being equal - is that other persons have moral value and your own moral impressions are failing you on this occasion.

Of course, if in addition to not getting the impression anyone has any moral value they are also unreasonable, then there's really no reasonable way of persuading them for - by hypothesis - they don't care what they have reason to believe or lack the ability to be able to recognize for more than a second or two that they have reason to believe this or that.

How do we determine what we should strive to have for ourselves that isn't selfish (assuming existence itself isn't selfish) and isn't taking from others that are in more need? We seem to do this intuitively, but we never really make deserving objective? — TiredThinker

These questions seem off topic. The answer is that we consult our reason and the reason of others.

But note, to deserve something is not of a piece with there being an obligation to provide it.

"It is right to give x to Roger" does not mean the same as "Roger deserves x".

The OP was about desert, not moral obligation. That a person deserves something can give rise to there being an obligation to provide it, but someone can deserve something and no one be obliged to provide it (a rapist deserves to be raped, for instance, but it would be wrong to do such a thing) and similarly, we can be obliged to give someone something they do not deserve.

I do not know what you mean by 'objective' in this context. Whether a person deserves something is not a matter that is constitutively determined by us. I can't make you deserve something just by thinking you deserve it.

Hi Bartricks - I'm pleasantly surprised - you seem to have a sense of humor. — EricH

If you've only just noticed that, then you don't.

I am not sure what your point is.

Sensations - visual, textural, auditory and so on - are mental states, yes? That is, to be seeing or feeling is to be in a mental state. (A 'mental state' is just 'a state of mind'; that is, a state that a mind is in)

That's all he needs. Put what label on them one wants, the fact remains that mental states do seem to require a mind to have them (the idea of a mental state that is not the state of any mind seems a 'manifest contradiction' to use his expression).

And when it comes to how those mental states can constitute perceptions of a sensible world, they would need to resemble it.

For example, one cannot see a smell. A smell in no way resembles a sight, and thus it is not by seeing that one can perceive smells. And if I read a book about Napoleon, then although I become aware of Napoleon via the content of the book, we could not say that I am perceiving Napoleon by means of the book. For the book does not sufficiently resemble Napoleon. (This is not to say that resemblance is sufficient for perception, just that it is necessary).

Similarly, if the external world in no way resembles any sensation we are undergoing, then we are not perceiving it. On the assumption that at least sometimes we are perceiving a world by means of our sensations, the world we are perceiving must itself resemble those sensations and thus must itself be made of sensations.

I thought you'd read Berkeley? It seems not.

Here are the apparent self-evident truths of reason that Berkeley appeals to (as you'd know if you'd read him): a) mental states cannot exist absent a mind whose states they are; b) the mental states constitutive of our sensations constitute perceptions of the world insofar as they resemble it; c) mental states can only resemble other mental states. From these it follows that any world our sensations constitute perceptions of would itself be made of sensations and thus would be made of the sensations of a mind.

An objection to my moral monster argument is that it undermines the antinatalism I am using it to support. For many, it would seem, want to have children and to live the lifestyle that having them involves (that is, they enjoy changing dirty underwear and sleepless nights and sex-less relationships and having no money and being tiny tyrants and so on). So, for them securing a happy life for themselves involves having children. And although that creates an injustice, they're nevertheless permitted to create such an injustice. Their moral monsterdom extends to procreation itself.

Note: that's a good criticism. This: "you antinatalists are miserable misanthropes and you want us all to die and blah di blah di blah" is not.

In response: first, even if the criticism goes through, the moral monster argument would still establish something like antinatalism (and that may still qualify as antinatalism, depending on how you use the term). For it would still show that refraining from procreation is a good thing to do, it's just that it is beyond the call of duty. That is, refraining from procreation would be a supererogatory thing to do.
Second - and again, even if the argument goes through - the point would only apply to those for whom it really is true that procreation is needed for them to secure a happy life. The fact is that procreating is one of those activities that people have been taught to think will make them happy, but that seems highly unlikely to. It is, in this respect, analogous to thinking that taking up heroin is a good recipe for a happy life. For some, perhaps. But for most - including most who are convinced it is - it is not. There's what will actually make you happy, and there's what you believe will do so, and although the two are often the same, they are sometimes not. Most people procreate without having given it much thought and they do so in ignorance of what it is likely to do to them. So, 'in fact' it may be only a minority for whom procreation is needed to secure happiness. That so many 'think' it will make them happy just reflects the widespread stupidity that infects the bulk of humanity.
Third, the criticism to some extent addresses a straw man, as the claim is not that we are entitled to do anything whatever in order to try and secure for ourselves the happy lives we deserve. The point is that there are limits to what can be demanded of us - we who are not responsible for our situation, that is - in terms of preventing injustices from befalling others. The fact the world is a very unjust place and the fact our own actions are partly responsible for this does, I think, give rise to us having an obligation to do 'something' to ameliorate them. We're not total moral monsters, then. We're not wholly excused from considering to what extent our actions contribute to the injustices of the world. We're not wholly excused from making sacrifices, especially not those that it is very easy for us to make. Refraining from procreating is very plausibly a sacrifice it is very easy to make and that would make a very big difference in terms of how much injustice it would prevent. By contrast giving up meat, say, is harder and makes scant difference in real terms. So in terms of the sacrifice/benefit ratio, refraining from procreating is very plausibly something we are obliged to do, even though we are moral monsters.

What the hell are you on about?

In any context you are only doing philosophy if you're engaging in the practice of using reason to find out what's true.

And in any context you are doing no more than expressing your conviction that your worldview is true if you're just expressing your conviction that your worldview is true.

Try and refute Berkeley without assuming that materialism is true.

There's a practice of following reason to try and find out what's true. There's a word for it. Philosophy. One 'does' philosophy.
If you try and use reason to support the worldview you happen to hold, then you are not doing philosophy. You are just a dogmatist. You are using reason, but not following reason. You think you already know what's true and so you have made yourself, and not reason, the measure of things.

Berkeley did philosophy. He presented an argument that had premises that appear self evident to reason and that entail that the world is made of an external mind's sensations.

To challenge him one would need to do philosophy. That is, one would need to show that one or other of his apparent self evident truths of reason conflict with others that are even more self evident.

One does not challenge him if all one does is point out that the worldview described in his conclusion is not your worldview

No, following reason.
Note how you describe your worldview first. Worldview in, same worldview out. Tedious and pointless.
All you are going to do is tell others that idealism isn't your worldview. By why should anyone care about that? That's not evidence of anything.

No, I understand holism to be a view about how properties behave. That's how it is used in philosophy.
You are not describing its use in philosophy, but using it in the manner of a hippy. That is, for you it denotes something woolly and to do with how the whole is greater than its parts and we are all one and we are all chanting and drinking sludge and giving birth in rivers and so on.

You are free to use a word how you wish, but all you are doing is describing how you use it. Again, you are not describing how it is used in philosophy. In philosophy holism is the opposite of atomism, not the opposite of reductionism.

It's really very simple: one should not start with a worldview. One should simply follow reason.
In practice what this means is that worldviews should turn up in the conclusions of arguments, not the premises. The premises should be self evident truths of reason (or apparent ones).

If one sticks to that practice then one will be following reason rather than simply applying one's arbitrary worldview to the world and only accepting as evidence that which is consistent with your worldview. The latter is what most do. And it's just silly. It's not proper philosophy. It's just echo chamber construction. If you start with a worldview then all you'll do is confirm it. Stop it. Follow reason, don't follow whatever worldview appealed to you first.

Now, if one does that - if one follows reason - then idealism is revealed to be true. This is because Berkeley provided an argument for it that seems to demonstrate its truth. He did not just assume it is true and then interpret everything else accordingly. He just reasoned to the conclusion that it was true.

Desert belongs to a person. That is, there cannot be a desert of happiness absent a person who deserves the happiness in question. So desert is always someone's desert.
We can also say that if a person deserves something, then it is good if they receive it. (The opposite does not hold, however). And we can note too that if a person does not get what they deserve then this constitutes an injustice.
And we can also note that when it comes to deserving harm, it is only our own actions that can create it. That is, no matter what I do, that is not going to make you deserve harm. We each have a monopoly on making ourselves deserve harm.
And we can also note that there is no necessary connection between desert and moral obligation. That you deserve x does not mean that anyone is obliged to give it to you. It 'can' give rise to such obligations, but there is no essential connection.

Above I have described some of desert's features, not said what it is. What it is in itself is an attitude of God.

when we judge that a person deserves something we are not judging that they will be caused to have it. If we were, then the judgement that Roger deserves x but is not going to receive it would be incoherent. (Yet it clearly is not)

Desert is evaluative, meaning that to judge that a person deserves something incorporates a judgement that it would be good if they received it.

Desert is not a concept. We have the concept of desert. That does not mean it's a concept.
The fallacy you are committing is to confuse a concept with its content. I know you people like labels, so let's call it the 'total spanner' fallacy.
Here are some instances of it: we have the concept of a table. Therefore tables are concepts. We have the concept of a house. Therefore a house is a concept. We have the concept of a meal. Therefore a meal is a concept. I have the concept of my neighbour. Therefore my neighbour is a concept. And so on.

Concepts are 'of' things. And what they are 'of' is not a concept, with the exception of concepts of concepts.

I think what you mean is that you are unable to raise a reasonable doubt about any premise of the argument. Like most, all you can do is express negative attitudes towards the argument. In your mind that constitutes a criticism. But reality doesn't have to please you. So, that an argument displeases you is not evidence its conclusion is false.
Once more, you need to argue that newly created people are not undeserving of harm or that life does not visit undeserved harms on them. You have done neither of these things.

1) “This is, I believe, a new argument for antinatalism.

To procreate is to create an innocent person. They haven't done anything yet. So they're innocent.”

- Having done nothing neither makes someone ‘innocent’ nor ‘guilty’. It is irrelevant. — I like sushi

No, it makes one innocent. If you think otherwise, explain - don't just blankly state as if you saying it makes it so. To be guilty one has to have done something, yes? So, if someone has not done anything, they are not guilty of anything. And that's to be innocent. That's an explanation. Now provide me with an explanation of how someone who has not done anything is not, in fact, innocent (don't just nay say).

2) “An innocent person deserves to come to no harm. Thus any harm - any harm whatever - that this person comes to, is undeserved.”

- You have failed to explain this. If your position is that an innocent person deserves no harm but that is what innocent means then you have no argument. You are just stating something and expecting people to follow. — I like sushi

It's a conceptual truth. It's also a premise in an argument, not the argument itself.

If you think the premise is false then you need to do the following: construct an argument in which the negation of that premise is the conclusion and the premises of which are very plausible - that is, premises that seem self-evident to reason.

Note: going through expressing hostility towards premises does not constitute a rational criticism of them. So far this is all you've been doing.

3) “Furthermore, an innocent person positively deserves a happy life.”

- Unsubstantiated claim. — I like sushi

It's a premise. So, yes, it's a claim. Arguments must include at least one. (I've noticed that most people here do not understand this and think it a fault in an argument taht it has premises - including you, it would seem).

Do you think it is false? Does your reason not tell you directly that an innocent person deserves to be happy?
What about this claim: innocent persons deserve respect. That's true, isn't it? And they haven't done anything to deserve that respect.
Now, doesn't an innocent person also deserve to have their interests taken into account, even though they have yet to do anything? And so they deserve to have their happiness promoted. Isn't the best - because simplest - explanation of that that they deserve happiness?

Again: it is no criticism of an argument to point out that it has premises. You need to challenge its premises by showing how a rational consideration implies its negation. (Note, this is a lot trickier than just expressing negative attitudes towards premises)

5) “This world clearly does not offer such a life to anyone. We all know this.”

- We know this because life without any degree of ‘harm’ whatsoever is not ‘life’. Life requires learning and learning is always, at some stage, a hardship. — I like sushi

That in no way challenges the premise. The premise is true, yes? That's all you've said - you've confirmed the premise, not challenged it.

6) “It is wrong, then, to create an innocent person when one knows full well that one cannot give this person what they deserve: a happy, harm free life. To procreate is to create a huge injustice. It is to create a debt that you know you can't pay.”

- None of this follow as you are riding on too many unsubstantiated claims and poorly sketched out terms. — I like sushi

Show it, don't spray it. THis is just another version of the 'the problem with your argument is that it has premises" 'criticism'.

Note, every claim I have made is true. You haven't raised a reasonable doubt about any of them.
Me: 2+ 2 = 4

You: Unsubstantiated claim!! What if I think 2 + 2 = 89? Boom. Owned!

Me: if P, then Q is true, and if P is true, then Q is true.

You: Unsubstantiated claim!

And so on.

Again, if you disagree with a premise, P, then you need to construct an argument like this:

1. If P, then Q
2. Not Q
3. Therefore not P

Now, I would claim that in order to do that you are going to have to write something silly for 2. But we'll see.

Thanks, I admit I did not see this post