For your statements to be valid, we have to accept the possibility of a reality outside of logic. But I don't accept this premise, because logic dictates what can exist in any possible world; and anything that does not follow logic does not exist in any possible world.

A horse exists in the actual world.
A horse with a horn, i.e. unicorn, exists in a possible world.
A horse with a horn and not a horn at the same time does not exist in any possible world.
A god who can do x and not x at the same time does not exist in any possible world.

Do you agree that it is actual nonsense - an actual contradiction - to maintain that of two people, the one with less power is the more powerful? — Bartricks

Yes.

Do you agree that a person who is not bound by logic is more powerful than one who is? — Bartricks

No - not if the idea of "not bound by logic" is itself nonsense. If the concept of logic is in fact the way I understand it, then the question is equivalent to asking "Do you agree that a person who is capable of [insert nonsense, meaningless noise] is more powerful than one who is not?"


Here is a quick explanation of what logic is, which may help to confirm we have somewhat the same idea about it. https://youtu.be/a-PZP_5DPK4?t=221
(Really it's about deduction but logic in metaphysics is equivalent to deduction in epistemology).

I don't think it is possible to go beyond or change the laws of logic when the concept is properly understood. As an analogy, one that doesn't understand the concept of pressure may think it is possible to have negative absolute pressure, but properly understood, we know it is not possible.

The laws of logic are not like the laws of physics which are what they are but could have been otherwise. As you say, anything that is not logical is nonsense. But even an omnipotent being cannot do nonsense, not because they are limited, but because nonsense is simply meaningless. To say that God can create a rock that he cannot lift is as meaningless as saying that God can "afgnzx", where the term "afgnzx" is meaningless.

If you maintain that God is able to do all things that logic permits, but not those things that logic does not permit, then God is constrained by logic and thus not omnipotent - which is a contradiction. — Bartricks

Sure. But in catholicism, the term omnipotence is meant in this sense: The ability to do anything that is logically possible. With that definition, there is no contradiction. Now if this is not how the term "omnipotence" is commonly used, then another term could be used instead.

That God is not three persons and one person at the same time is entirely consistent with him having the ability to be. — Bartricks

Gotcha. It is possible for God to become 3 persons and 1 person at the same time, but he is not that in actuality.

I am not a theologian, so I cannot defend the catholic premises about God. All I can do is show that they do not entail any contradictions.


But I do not fully understand your view. If God can do anything such that there is nothing that he cannot do, then why also claim that he cannot become 3 persons and 1 person at the same time?

For instance, it is an essential property of a bachelor that they lack a wife. That does not mean that a person who is a bachelor is essentially wifeless. It just means that you have to lack a wife in order to qualify as a bachelor. — Bartricks

What you say is true of concepts like bachelor because bachelor is a property and not a substance. Many things can be bachelors. It would also be true of gods (lower case g) such as in the greek mythology. But God in Christianity is not a property but a substance. That substance is goodness, is power, etc.

For to be essentially omnipotent is to be incapable of not being. But then that is a restriction. — Bartricks

This is in agreement with the Catholic doctrine. God can do anything that does not contain a contradiction. God being all-good, all-powerful and all-actuality means he cannot be evil, weak, or cease to exist. In general, this means God cannot have what would be seen as negative properties or conditions; but by common sense alone, this would not be considered a weakness.

I also see nothing in the bible that commits one to the view that God has the properties of omnipotence, omniscience, and omnibenevolence essentially. — Bartricks

Catholic theology is not solely derived from the bible but relies heavily on philosophy and science. A catholic saying is that God wrote two books: scripture and nature. These essential properties might be found in the works of scholastics who combined the bible with Aristotle, especially Aquinas' book called Summa Theologiae.


As for Jesus, I believe the short answer is that he was not omnipotent in his human nature. But that's a whole other can of worms which arguably is even more challenging than the topic of the Trinity haha.

what would you call a person who is all powerful, all knowing and all good in the normal sense of the term good? I'd call them 'God'. — Bartricks

There is a distinction between having properties essentially and having them non-essentially (or accidentally). It would be possible for a being to be all powerful, all knowing and all good in a non-essential way, which means they could lose these properties without losing their identity, and thus they would not be God. They would have these properties but not be these properties. God is identical to those properties.

I see no problem in thinking it denotes exactly the same property it does when applied to us. — Bartricks

They are not wholly the same because we can grasp the concept of goodness as it applies to beings to varying degrees (e.g. we understand that a sinner has a lower degree of goodness than a saint), but we cannot grasp the concept of a being that is goodness essentially.

That property being the property of possessing a character that is fully approved of by the personal source of all norms and values. That is, God is good by virtue of approving of himself. — Bartricks

Indeed God is also the source of these properties in the creatures (the things he has created). But these properties also need to be essential to him. He could not simply be able to disapprove of himself. I.e. the statement "I, God, am not good" is a self-contradiction.

That seems a clear misuse of language. Relations are not persons. I am in front of my computer. That's a relation. It's not a person. There's not me and, in addition, the person of the relation I stand in to my computer. — Bartricks

I agree when we speak of "persons" as used in the common language. But properties assigned to God are to be understood analogically and not literally. E.g. when we say God is good, it is not meant in the same sense are we are good, i.e., that we obey the moral laws. God does not obey the moral law as though the law is outside of him and above him. It is meant analogically. Similarly, Divine Persons are not literally the same as persons in the common language. In the same article, Divine Persons are also called Divine Relations, so you can call them relations if that makes things clearer.

they say that there are three persons in one person - which makes no real sense at all. — Bartricks

Indeed this statement does not make sense; but in catholicism, this is false. The trinity is not 3 persons in 1 person. It is 3 divine persons in (or having) 1 nature. 3 ≠ 1, but it is possible that 3x = 1y.


Your interpretation of 3 conditions for 1 person makes sense; but for reasons I do not know, theologians throughout history have opted against it.

But then don't you have three distinct persons - three gods - not one? — Bartricks

Here is the catholic take as I understand it. Christianity is a monotheistic religion, thus, 1 God. That God has a set of absolute properties plus a few properties of relations. "The Divine Persons are none other than these relations" (from the same article mentioned above). My understanding is that since properties of relations do not make a new substance, they do not make a new God. Yet they are something, and when it comes to divine properties, these make a thing called a divine person.


Regarding your interpretation of the passsages: I agree that if there is a contradiction, then we must look for a different meaning. But it may be only an apparent and not a real contradiction. This is the take of Christian theologians who have thought about this over many years, including the many objections that typically come up.

A person is a mind, a bearer of mental states. A 'nature' is had by something. You can't be 'in' a nature - that makes no sense. — Bartricks

Sure. It can be rewritten as "3 divine persons having the same nature".

There are three distinct minds 'in' what? And if they're distinct minds, they are not one and the same mind. — Bartricks

I'm not sure we can equate "divine person" with "mind". In catholicism, properties assigned to God are said to be analogical and not literal. But that may not matter as long as they are something. Now, divine persons are indeed not one-and-the-same, due to having distinct properties of relation.

What passage from the bible forces one to think that there are three distinct persons [...] — Bartricks

I am not a theologian, but here are some possible passages:

• "Go therefore and make disciples of all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit" - Matthew 28:19 - this shows there are 3 things.
• "But I tell you I am going to do what is best for you. This is why I am going away. The Holy Spirit cannot come to help you until I leave. But after I am gone, I will send the Spirit to you." - John 16:7 - this shows the Son and Holy Spirit are separate things.
• "Father, if you are willing, take this cup from me; yet not my will, but yours be done." - Luke 22:42 - this shows the Father and the Son are separate things.

Or one person who has different properties at different times - just as I was once short and now I am tall? — Bartricks

God is said to be eternal, unchangeable (due to being all actual and having no potential), and thus its properties are not in time.

Ah, yes - thank you.

Not so sure what procession and spiration are specifically referring to. Any thoughts? — Merkwurdichliebe

Here is what I know. Spiration is the "making" of the Holy Spirit through the love between the Father and the Son. Procession is the opposite relation from the Holy Spirit towards the Father and Son.

Hello. Here is my understanding of this Catholic article on the Trinity. (The relevant section is called The Divine Relations).


By Law of Identity, if “two” things have the same set of properties, then they are one-and-the-same, and if not, then they are distinct.

The Trinity is 3 divine persons (Father, Son, Holy Spirit) in 1 nature (Godhead).

Each of the 3 persons and the Godhead have the same set of absolute properties, but each person has a distinct property of relation, which is the relation they have with one another. These properties of relation are: Paternity, Filiation, Procession and Spiration. Here is a flow chart showing them.

With respect to absolute properties alone, each person = Godhead.
With respect to absolute properties along with the property of relation, each person is distinct.


Do I know the meaning of absolute properties and properties of relation? Honestly, no.

Ok, tell me one motive without attraction. I can't imagine that such a motive exists. — litewave

I can't. I too believe that all motives have an attraction. My point was that even though the two general ends have an attraction, the choice to prioritize one end over the other is both unmotivated and without attraction.

But if the coma was not permanent and I saw someone try the pill and testify to its blissful effect without harm to their health, I might try it too. — litewave

Sure. But the condition is that the comma is permanent. Yet, you still feel the effect of great pleasure through it.

Things that don't have strength cannot influence us; they are inert. We can only choose between them unintentionally or without caring about the choice. If general concepts don't have strengths, they cannot influence us - they have no attractiveness for us. We cannot even be conscious of them. — litewave

They are an influence insofar as we have knowledge of them, although indeed they have no attraction. It is not without care if it is willed, as opposed to accidental.

I don't have much expectation that such a pill exists and it also raises questions about how long the pill would work (shorter duration decreases total pleasure) and whether it is harmful physically, mentally or socially, including to my social relationships (all these harms decrease total pleasure). So if it resulted in a long-term blissful paralysis, it is safe to say that it would cause great harm to my relationships, which could decrease its attractiveness for me to such an extent that I would reject it. — litewave

It's only a thought experiment of course. Let's say the pleasure and comma are permanent, and also the pleasure from the pill is significantly greater than the pleasure lost from losing relationships. After all, if pleasure is the only ultimate end, then everything else is only a means to it; and so the particular means is irrelevant, so long as the end is reached.

As previously mentioned, the general concepts of pleasure and the ethical don't have strengths, as they are general and not particular instances. The initial act of prioritizing pertains to the general concepts. That act is unmotivated, that is, free, and yet it is informed.

Let's give an application of that idea. Suppose there existed a "happy pill": a pill that gives immense pleasure. The cost is that, as a result, you are effectively in a comma; you are no longer able to interact with the ones you love, build a family, make an impact in the world; etc. Would you take it?

To be clear, this claim that "strength is not a factor" only applies to the initial act of prioritizing one end over the other. After that, strength is definitely a factor, and so much so that I claim it is not possible to choose against the strongest motive that meets the end we have initially prioritized. Free will only chooses which end to target. After that, all acts are determined by the strongest motive, that is, the most effective means to the end, and any additional choice becomes superfluous.

Why would influences of strength apply only within the same subset? — litewave

Because, as mentioned a while back, it is possible to choose what is ethical at the cost of sacrificing great pleasure, or vice versa, choose pleasure at the cost of sacrificing what is greatly ethical. This shows that the strength of the motive is not really a factor, if at all, when the competing motives are for different ends.

So it appears that we can choose to prioritize pleasure over the ethical or vice versa, no matter their strengths, and this act cannot itself be motivated the strength of those ends.

Even if an ethical concern or desire motivates us with something else than pleasure/satisfaction, it is still a motive in the set of motives that influence us. Every motive influences us with some strength; without strength it would not influence us at all. And the joint influence of all our motives determines our action. — litewave

I agree that both pleasure and the ethical are types of motives. But the two ends differ not in degree (i.e. strength) but in kind. As last ends, we cannot choose pleasure because it is ethical, or choose the ethical because it is pleasurable (otherwise they wouldn't be last ends but a means to another end).

So while they are both in the same set of motives, the two subsets are separate, and the influence of strength applies only to motives within the same subset.

I don't deny that these are all possible motives of pleasure; but I still claim that it is possible to choose the right thing simply on the basis that it is the right thing to do. Sure, satisfaction may result from it as well, but that would be merely a byproduct. This means that even if satisfaction did not result from doing the right thing, we could still choose to do it.

For many religious people, the reward called heaven does not necessarily mean pleasure, but being good.

Alright. So the end of pleasure is the motive, and information is an influence. This clarifies things.

Now, for the sake of argument, let's buy into the following premise: that there is another possible motive, the ethical, which is not necessarily compatible with pleasure. E.g. "I did this, not because it is pleasurable but because it is the right thing to do". What could possibly push us to choose either the end of pleasure or the end of the ethical? It cannot be either pleasure or the ethical, since these are the ends we are choosing from. We must therefore posit another "force" which we call free will. It is influenced by things like information, but not motivated when it comes to choosing between these two ends. Thus it is free.

Most of the concerns above may be cleared up if we can clarify what constitutes "motivation".
If motivation is nothing but "what we expect to bring us pleasure", then being informed of a target and its position is not motivation, because not all targets bring pleasure. If on the other hand motivation includes "anything that influences our choices", then being informed of a target and its position is part of motivation, but then what motivates us is not just what brings us pleasure.

But we are not motivated by general concepts. We are motivated by concrete motives (which are concrete instances of general concepts) experienced in our consciousness, and these motives move us according to their strengths. — litewave

That may indeed be the case. If a motive is like a force that pulls the will in its direction, and if the will were to be truly free in the initial choice, then that initial choice must be unmotivated. The will is however informed by the ends in order to make an informed choice; just like the archer is informed of the targets position in order to aim the arrow towards them.

Can you be conscious of general triangle or general red color? [...] — litewave

I agree that we cannot imagine general concepts (although we can understand them, since we can communicate using general terms).

Right. — litewave

I, on the other hand, claim that we can act in a way that is expected to result in a net displeasure, if we prioritize the ethical. Given the same situation and the same knowledge of it, two agents may act differently if they have prioritized different ends.

Ethics and pleasure are both general/abstract concepts which in a concrete situation manifest in concrete motives, that is, in a concrete ethical concern or a concrete desire for a concrete experience of pleasure, which are both subjectively experienced and move the person toward performing an act. — litewave

Sounds good. So my point is that the initial choice of prioritizing the ends of pleasure or the ethical, which can be made prior to any particular instance, cannot be motivated by their strength, since as general concepts, they don't have one.

My bigger point is that, while the initial choice is not motivated by something other than the ends themselves, it is neither random nor a guess. It is not random since it is willed, and it is not a guess since the choice is informed by what the ends are.

An altruistic act can be seen as "selfless" in the sense that it is directed to benefitting others without giving the actor certain kinds of pleasure such as carnal or corrupt, or while causing the actor carnal displeasure or even harm. — litewave

But it must cause the actor some pleasure that outweighs the carnal displeasure or harm, doesn't it? If ultimately the act is determined by what is expected to cause the greatest net pleasure to oneself, then there cannot be an altruistic act that is expected to result in a net displeasure to oneself.

Then the end is a motive that will make the person choose this end, unless the person has a stronger counter-motive. — litewave

The end is indeed what motivates the will to choose it, but not because of its strength (those general ends don't have a strength; only particular instances of them have a strength); but rather because of its nature. E.g. pleasure is a subjective value whereas the ethical is an objective value.

The pleasure provided to others from an altruistic act is not just a byproduct of the act; it is the condition on which the pleasure of the giver depends. — litewave

That's fine. So it can be a byproduct or a means to an end. But the point is that the pleasure to others is still done for my sake and not theirs. The act is merely a tool for my own pleasure, and if the tool were to cease providing me pleasure, then I would drop it. Altruism is supposed to be selfless, or, at best, it is my pleasure that is the byproduct.

But if a motive appears only after the choice of the goal, it means that the choice itself (the act of choosing the goal) is unmotivated. — litewave

As I see it, nothing prevents the choice of the end to be motivated by the end itself. Choose pleasure because the end is pleasurable, or choose the ethical because the end is righteous.

Even if all acts are motivated by the actor's own pleasure or satisfaction, some acts may be directed to helping or benefitting others so these could be called altruistic. Loving acts typically bring pleasure to both the actor and the person to whom the act is directed. — litewave

Yes, but if the drive is only the pleasure to oneself and nothing else, then the pleasure to others is merely a byproduct or an accident. Like a rock falling down a cliff which happens to hit a criminal and prevents a crime - it's a good outcome, but there is no merit to the rock.

If a person doesn't act in the direction of their strongest motive/pleasure/satisfaction then why would he act so? It seems that such an act would be unmotivated [...] — litewave

It is not unmotivated since the act is motived by the ethical. So to reiterate: The end goal between pleasure and the ethical, i.e. black angel and white angel, is freely chosen. After that, the drive is indeed the strongest motive to that end goal, which once reached, will produce some satisfaction.

Let me try another way: If a seemingly morally good act is always motivated by pleasure or satisfaction to oneself, then it sounds like all acts are inherently selfish. But as selfishness is typically seen as immoral, it would follow that there really are no morally good acts. Doesn't this sound absurd?

I am fine with saying that satisfaction is a type of pleasure, and also that it results from reaching a chosen goal. But it does not follow that we choose the goal based on what results in the strongest overall pleasure. Again, using the criminal example, he may get a bit of satisfaction when turning himself in, but this will not result in the highest overall pleasure, since going to jail is highly unpleasurable.

If satisfaction is a good feeling then it is a type of pleasure. And if, as you say, we choose what brings the most satisfaction, then we are back to saying that we choose what brings the most pleasure. But as previously claimed, the ethical is not necessarily what brings the most pleasure, and yet we can choose it simply on the grounds that it is the right thing to do. Refer back to the criminal with the change of heart example.

Right. But the greater satisfaction comes from the greater of the two goods, which is the one we have freely chosen to prioritize. Given its definition, bringing satisfaction in the argument just makes it circular.

all our freely willed acts are motivated by satisfactions. — litewave

My understanding is that "satisfaction" is the feeling we get from attaining an expected good. E.g. If I have good expectations for a movie and these are met, then I am satisfied.

If that description is correct, then satisfaction occurs after the attainment of any good, pleasure or ethical, and thus it cannot be what drives us to choose one good over the other.

If by "desire" you mean "drive for pleasure", then no, the choice to be ethical does not always come from a desire. If on the other hand you mean "intending", then the choice to be ethical is a desire, but pleasure is not always a factor.

Not everything that is ethical is pleasurable. E.g. After having committed a crime and having a change of heart about it, you decide to turn yourself in; not because it is pleasurable but because you believe it is the right thing to do.

Avoidance of pain is a motive too, but since pain is the opposite of pleasure, avoidance of pain is the same as seeking to increase or maintain pleasure. — litewave

Sounds good. We could say the "pleasurable" is seeking pleasure and comfort, and also avoiding pain and discomfort.

If your act is not motivated by pleasure, it means that you don't care about the act. Caring about an act means that you gain some satisfaction from doing it. — litewave

I'd argue the opposite. If you perform the good act only as a means to the end of pleasure, it means that if the pleasure were to be gone, then you wouldn't do the act, thereby showing that you don't care about the act itself. On the other hand, if you do it for the ethical, then you would always perform the ethical act even if it were not always pleasurable, thereby showing you care about the act itself.

Would you say that for you, there is only one last end or motive, being pleasure? Thus when you say "we do what we want", does it mean "we do what pleases us"?

I say there are not one but two last ends. Yes, being ethical can be pleasurable, but that is not necessary. In fact, siding with Kant (I think), if the intent of a good act is only for the pleasure that results from it, then the act has no moral worth. A good act has moral worth only if done with the intent that it is the right thing to do. Pleasure can still result, but as a side effect.

Why would you set the intention [towards pleasure or the ethical]? — litewave

Why choose pleasure? Because it is pleasurable.
Why do the right (ethical) thing? Because it is the right thing to do.

Pleasure and the ethical are last ends in themselves. This means that these are ultimately the only motives for why we do anything, and also that there cannot be any other motives beyond them.

If not for another motive, then how do we choose one over the other? Free will.

Why? As previously mentioned, free will by definition satisfies the principle of sufficient reason on its own. Thus setting the intention towards one of the two paths can be the starting point.

You can do something without a motive, but that just means you don't care about doing or not doing it, or you do it unintentionally. Is that free will? Any machine can act without care or intention. — litewave

An unintentional act would be the opposite of an act from free will, because the word 'will' is synonymous to 'intention'. E.g. I will to do this = I intend to do this. If you use the word 'motive' in the sense of 'intention', then the original free choice I speak of in (1) is the motive you speak of. In other words:

(1) We freely set our intention to prioritize pleasure over the ethical or vice versa.

This regress goes into infinity or it stops at a motive that you didn't choose and this motive determines all the consequent motives that lead to act X. — litewave

But if the "choice" is determined by a motive that is determined, then the whole system is determined, and free choice is just an illusion. Isn't that simply hard determinism? What part of compatibilist free will is free?

On the other hand, if free will is to exist, at least to be entertained, then there must be a component that is truly free. In which case, there is no prior motive to drive the choice described in (1). Note, this does not violate the principle of sufficient reason, because a free will, by definition, is a sufficient reason to explain the free choice.

Note that I haven't given a reason to believe in free will yet. We can do that once the above has been clarified.

But apparently the second value is greater for you, at least in that moment, and that's why you chose it. — litewave

Indeed, if I choose the second path, then it means that to me, the ethical is a priority over pleasure, no matter how great the pleasure is expected to be. Now I claim that this original choice, i.e. prioritizing the ethical vs pleasure or vice versa, is freely chosen. Then everything else is determined from there.

Here is the order of the events:
(1) We freely choose to prioritize pleasure over the ethical or vice versa. This is free.
(2) For a situation, we predict the outcome resulting from different decisions. This is determined.
(3) We pick the decision that will result in the greatest outcome we have prioritized in (1). This is determined.

You can have motives of various types but they cause forces of the same type in your brain (physical forces), which then cause motion of your body. — litewave

Agreed. The motives are a result of the free choice made in (1). From there, everything else is determined.

Okay. Maybe that last minor disagreement was just a misunderstanding on my part.