Why would you set the intention [towards pleasure or the ethical]? — litewave

Why choose pleasure? Because it is pleasurable.
Why do the right (ethical) thing? Because it is the right thing to do.

Pleasure and the ethical are last ends in themselves. This means that these are ultimately the only motives for why we do anything, and also that there cannot be any other motives beyond them.

If not for another motive, then how do we choose one over the other? Free will.

Why? As previously mentioned, free will by definition satisfies the principle of sufficient reason on its own. Thus setting the intention towards one of the two paths can be the starting point.

You can do something without a motive, but that just means you don't care about doing or not doing it, or you do it unintentionally. Is that free will? Any machine can act without care or intention. — litewave

An unintentional act would be the opposite of an act from free will, because the word 'will' is synonymous to 'intention'. E.g. I will to do this = I intend to do this. If you use the word 'motive' in the sense of 'intention', then the original free choice I speak of in (1) is the motive you speak of. In other words:

(1) We freely set our intention to prioritize pleasure over the ethical or vice versa.

This regress goes into infinity or it stops at a motive that you didn't choose and this motive determines all the consequent motives that lead to act X. — litewave

But if the "choice" is determined by a motive that is determined, then the whole system is determined, and free choice is just an illusion. Isn't that simply hard determinism? What part of compatibilist free will is free?

On the other hand, if free will is to exist, at least to be entertained, then there must be a component that is truly free. In which case, there is no prior motive to drive the choice described in (1). Note, this does not violate the principle of sufficient reason, because a free will, by definition, is a sufficient reason to explain the free choice.

Note that I haven't given a reason to believe in free will yet. We can do that once the above has been clarified.

But apparently the second value is greater for you, at least in that moment, and that's why you chose it. — litewave

Indeed, if I choose the second path, then it means that to me, the ethical is a priority over pleasure, no matter how great the pleasure is expected to be. Now I claim that this original choice, i.e. prioritizing the ethical vs pleasure or vice versa, is freely chosen. Then everything else is determined from there.

Here is the order of the events:
(1) We freely choose to prioritize pleasure over the ethical or vice versa. This is free.
(2) For a situation, we predict the outcome resulting from different decisions. This is determined.
(3) We pick the decision that will result in the greatest outcome we have prioritized in (1). This is determined.

You can have motives of various types but they cause forces of the same type in your brain (physical forces), which then cause motion of your body. — litewave

Agreed. The motives are a result of the free choice made in (1). From there, everything else is determined.

Okay. Maybe that last minor disagreement was just a misunderstanding on my part.

Fair point but I was trying to point out that if you comply, your free will is meaningless, it doesn't matter whether you have it or not. — TheMadFool

I argue it matters, for 2 reasons.
1. Even if you comply, you are still free to change your mind later.
2. Free choice implies more than one option. If the will is only free when saying no and nothing else, then there is only one option, which makes the choice no longer free. This looks like a self-contradiction.

Okay. Depending on what you mean by compatibilist free will, we may or may not be in agreement. My standpoint is that while the will is indeed driven by motives, it is more free than merely picking the stronger of competing values. Examples:

In a situation with 2 competing values of the same type, say pleasure, indeed the stronger of the 2 always wins. E.g. In a situation where I choose between chocolate and vanilla ice creams and all else being equal, if my favourite flavour is chocolate; then I will necessarily choose chocolate ice cream.

In a situation with 2 competing values of different types, say pleasure vs ethical, I am free to choose which type is most important, no matter how strong the values are. E.g. Buying ice cream would give me great pleasure, but giving the money to charity would produce a bit of ethical good works. Although hard to quantify, the first value seems greater than the second one, yet I can still choose the second path.

Why? It's the gist of a standard neuroscientific description. — litewave

It may be a correct neuro scientific description of the brain activities, but the will, being free, must be above those deterministic factors. Picture the cartoon with the white and black angels on each shoulder of the person. The black angel typically represents inclinations. The white angel typically represents reason and conscience. The will is the person in the middle that chooses to side with one of the angels. It makes the final call.

Whatever reason you would have for the resisting, that reason is the minion in your mind that acts against the minion of anger. — litewave

To clarify, are you arguing from the standpoint that free will does not exist? in which case, I would agree with you that our acts are determined by the vector sum of all internal and external forces/reasons. But if we start with the premise that free will exists, then this description leaves no room for a will to be free. Could you clarify your standpoint? Then we can go from there.

Can you tell, from that alone, whether this person is doing so willingly (free) /unwillingly (not free)? No! Therein lies the rub. — TheMadFool

I can't always tell; but there is a difference between perception and reality. And that difference matters. E.g. the difference between freely accepting a marriage proposal, and marrying a robot that is programmed to say yes.

From your description, I picture two minions inside a brain wrestling to pull a lever towards themselves haha. If that description is fitting for what you have in mind, it is unfitting as a description of the will resisting inclinations.

Unlike the example of falling asleep, a drive towards pleasure and away from pain does not take over the body's actions (with a few exceptions like a jump-scare). We may be very tempted to do a certain act, but ultimately the decision to act comes from the will. E.g. out of anger, I may be tempted to punch someone, but ultimately the act of punching was my choice. It would be incorrect to claim such an act was done against my will.

Again, I mostly agree. Now this may be splitting hair, but I wonder if it's worth making the distinction between passively following the will of others and willingly following it. What I have in mind is the Christian notion that ought to will the will of God. This act is different than a non-agent following the will of God in a deterministic way.

Was this meant to refute something that I have previously said? Otherwise, I agree with that description of free will. I would just add that you also have the ability to say yes to the will of others, if that is also your will.

Hmmm... Let's take a step back. A better description of inclination would be a drive towards pleasure and comfort, and away from pain and discomfort. If the drive to fall asleep in your example is purely a physical force and says nothing about comfort, then that drive is not an inclination.

Maybe a better example: You have the choice to help a friend move or to watch a movie. You have an inclination towards the latter because it is more comfortable, but are still free to choose the former.

There is a difference between falling asleep because you choose to, and falling asleep because you have to. Example of the former: you could work late but have no desire for it, and decide to go to bed instead. Example of the latter: You fall asleep from being awake for 3 days. Free will can resist the former but not the latter.

Inclination is an "internal force", not in the sense of a physical force F=ma, but a drive, desire, or temptation. Free will can resist temptations no matter how strong, but not physical forces like lifting boulders. Passing out from exhaustion would be more like a physical force.

Yes, as along as that the drive to sleep is merely an inclination and not a necessity. E.g. if you pass out from exhaustion, then this is too strong to be an inclination.

[...] A low frequency of recidivism, on the other hand, would mean we can override our "programming." — TheMadFool

Indeed, I think that may work. The following assumptions would have to be true:
1. The inclination for recidivism would always or almost always have to be present.
2. If free will exists, many criminals would freely choose to not repeat the crimes.

we can compare humans with artificial entities — TheMadFool

That sounds correct. The robot would have to be virtually the same as the human subject in every way - e.g. same memories, inclinations, situation, etc. - minus free will.

Hopefully there exist arguments on free will that don't rely on waiting on this level of technology haha.

Correct. Inclination is any internal force that drives, though does not compel, you to do something.

I don't think the test would work, because we don't know how effective free will is to counter recidivism. We could know that if we could observe some test subjects with free will and some without it. But in the actual world, either everyone has free will or no one has it. Alternatively, we could compare the frequency of recidivism between humans and dogs, but the two might be too different to compare haha.

the existence of free will would add another "internal force" that can change our behavior. — Samuel Lacrampe

I take back what I said. Free will is not another force that we add to sum up among the other inclinations. Rather, free will can always choose against all the inclinations, no matter their intensity. That's what makes it free.

Mmmh... Let's put it this way: For a given case, if recidivism happens, then deterrence and rehabilitation will not be effective, regardless if we have free will or not. Likewise, if recidivism does not happen, then deterrence and rehabilitation will be effective, regardless if we have free will or not. In short, free will does not change the effects of deterrence and rehabilitation.

That said, I agree that the existence of free will would add another "internal force" that can change our behavior.

Kool I did not know about that word! That said, what is your argument? Are you saying that recidivism prevents deterrence and rehabilitation from being effective? But if so, how would having Free Will solve that issue?

Creatures without free will can also change. Instead of coming from free will, the change can come from external factors that can happen through deterrence and rehabilitation. I'll stick to the dog example, assuming you agree they don't have free will.

You can deter a dog from barking by using a shock collar. Similarly, rehabilitation or training the dog to obey his master can be done by rewarding desired behaviours and punishing undesired ones.

Hello.

You can tell me why you're a determinist all day long, but the real reason you are is because you lacked the power not to be. — Hanover

Of course, if everything is determined, then everything is determined. But we can still talk about things being true or false, and good or bad. E.g. Even if I am forced to state that "2+2=3", it is still a false statement. Likewise, even if I am forced to kill an innocent man, it is still a wrongful act (according to most ethics).

Hello.
This is close to my view. I would however correct you here:

In the absence of free will, retributive, deterrent, and rehabilitative arms of justice don't make sense — TheMadFool

I think deterrent and rehabilitative are still applicable without free will. Most of us would agree that a dog does not have free will; yet we can use processes to deter and rehabilitate.

Talking about normative ethics cannot be done until we have established whether it is possible or not to even do normative ethics — Hello Human

Sure. I have attempted to answer this question here.

using normative ethics to establish whether normative ethics are possible is a fundamentally flawed way to approach the problem. — Hello Human

Of course, this would be circular. But that was not my point. My point here was that we cannot have a justification without first having a normative ethics.

But to propose what reasons are sufficient would be doing normative ethics, a consequentialist would say that an action is justified because it causes more utility, a Kantian would something else, and all the others too. This discussion is focused on metaethics. — Hello Human

There are only 2 types of justifications or causes: efficient cause (what causes the effect), and final cause (the end goal or intention). If you exclude normative ethics from the discussion, which pertains to final cause, then this leaves only the efficient cause. And to @SophistiCat's point, there is always a sufficient efficient cause, otherwise the act would not have occurred.

If you justify an action before committing it, doesn’t that imply free will? If you cannot justify it, you act in a different manner. — NOS4A2

Hello.

I'd say not necessarily. Justifying means "having a good reason", and we can have a good reason without having free will. E.g. killing someone out of self-defense is justified, and compatible with hard determinism.

Free will, which is nonsensically defined anyway (free from what?), plays no role in this. — SolarWind

Hello.

Free will means that our intentions are partially free from the laws of physics (I say partially because we may not have free will when we are dead or unconscious). E.g. if you tie me up, then I am not free to walk around, but I am still free to intend to walk around.

Free will plays a role in ethics because it makes a difference between an accidental homicide and an intended murder. The latter is more severe because it is willed; the former is less severe because it is not willed.

Hello.

We distinguish between 2 types of good and evil: external (sometimes also called physical) and moral. External good and evil are ones that come to you; moral good and evil are ones that come from you, that are intended, or willed, which implies a free will.

Without free will, moral good and evil cannot exist. Granted, external good and evil remain, and an ethics can indeed still be based solely on that; but we could not judge people as being morally good or evil. E.g. we could say that Hitler's actions were bad for society (he produced a lot of external evil), but if all his acts were determined, then we could not say he is himself evil ... which sounds absurd.

Hello.
This is an interesting post, but there seems to be a lot of different topics here. What is your main point?

If it is about whether things can exist beyond our conception of it and language, then the answer is yes, so long as it abides to the Principle of Sufficient Reason (which you have alluded to): It is logically possible, but we must have a sufficient reason to posit it. Something like Aquinas' Five Ways: Since all things in the universe are contingent, it is necessary to posit a necessary being as their cause; even if such a being is not imaginable to us since we have never perceived such a thing.

Hello.

Premises:
P1: Some acts are good, e.g. honesty and saving lives, and some are evil, e.g. lying and killing.
P2: Some good acts are better than others, e.g. saving lives is better than honesty; some are worse than others, e.g. killing is worse than lying.
These premises are known through the Principle of Universal Perception: we all perceive the same value for these acts.

Now the goal is to maximize the good and minimize the evil for a given situation.
To use @Tom Storm's example: It is morally good to lie to the nazi to save the jew because lying is a lesser evil than killing.

[...] And perhaps to a lesser extent lower life forms - worms bacteria etc. — Benj96

In your view, what is the lowest form of being that is conscious? Is a rock conscious? If not, then the point remains: science says that rocks are older than any living being.

Hello.
Does reality require an observer? If by observer we mean a human being, and we believe in science that the universe is much older than the human species, then the answer is clearly 'no'. Am I missing something?

Also I think you nailed it by stating that the observer is itself part of reality. Since nothing comes from nothing, then the observer came from something else that is part of reality.

So 'probable' is 'plausible' but with numbers involved.

Note that, as described previously, it seems that Michael's description of induction is not compatible with yours, because it is not evaluating a hypothesis.

Hello.
That is indeed one of the descriptions I found, as described in the OP. But 2 things to notice.

(1) This description of induction is not compatible with other descriptions above such as here and here. (Not a criticism; just an observation).

(2) It seems like induction is very much deduction, but with a small extra leap. In your example, the reasoning would be deduction if the conclusion was written as "Hence, Louise probably (96%) speaks both Dutch and French". The small extra leap is to assume it is the case if we really had to choose.

So could we generalize and say induction is just choosing the outcome that has been deduced as most probable? It would seem odd to rank such as statement as a type of reasoning.

Thanks anyways!

So it seems the distinction is merely in the chronological order of experience. Abduction is an explanation based on past experience, whereas induction is a revised explanation based on subsequent experience. And had the subsequent experience actually happened before the original explanation, then it would be called abduction instead of induction; right? If this is true, then I find the distinction to be negligible.

As a side question, what is the difference between 'probable' and 'plausible'?

Abduction is formulating a hypothesis, while induction is testing a hypothesis. — aletheist

This distinction is in the function but not in the act. It seems to me that both are IBE, which is used both to build the hypothesis and to test it against new data.

[...] He helpfully characterized the three propositions as rule, case, and result. — aletheist

Yes I'm familiar with how Peirce described it (I gave the link to this example in the OP). In which case, it seems to me that both abduction and induction are IBE, and the distinction is that induction is a general explanation whereas abduction is a specific one.

I notice as well that your definition of induction as "testing a hypothesis" does not seem to fit Peirce's example of induction. The concluding rule "All the beans in this bag are white" does not serve to test either the case: "This bean is from this bag" or the result: "This bean is white". It's just a general IBE.

Deduction derives necessary conclusions based strictly on formal considerations. — aletheist

I accept that claim. Thanks.

But now, how is induction different from abduction? Upon observing a black swan, the only reasoning needed at that point is: "I observe a black swan, therefore some swans are black". But that's just abduction; is it not?

Another way to say the same thing: arguments are composed only of premises and conclusion. Premises are built from abduction, and conclusions are built from deduction. There seems to be no need for a third type of reasoning.