A Man Without Words: https://vimeo.com/72072873

We all think in images, or sensory impressions.

Words are scribbles and sounds. To say that you think in words is to say that you think in scribbles and sounds.

Difficult (or impossible) as it may be, I'm interested in determining whether there is any evidence that English pronouns are supposed to refer specifically to a person's sex or gender (or both). — McMootch

1. The question presupposes that there is a distinction between sex (biological) and gender (social/performative). If you don't affirm the distinction fair enough, but debating it is not the intent of this post. — McMootch

No, the question only presupposes that we use scribbles to refer to things, not what those scribbles should or should not refer to.

It seems to me that you have to first determine what the relationship between sex and gender are to be able to determine whether or not it is meaningful to use some scribble to refer to one or the other, or both.

Haha yes, potentially. When implemented as automation. Then the reference of each symbol token becomes a matter of mechanical fact. As when a machine translates a phonetic symbol into a sound. When considered apart from such automation, the syntactic connections may well be made semantically, so that we acknowledge a pretended connection between, say, a written letter and a phoneme, or between one written token of the letter and another. — bongo fury

The reference to each "symbol" becomes a matter of causal fact. Effects "symbolize" their causes. The tree rings in a tree stump don't pretend to be about the age of the tree. The tree rings are about the age of the tree because of how the tree grows through out the year - cause and effect.

Words and letters are slightly different in that their use is arbitrary. We could use any scribble or sound that we make to refer to any other sensory impression, which may include other scribbles or sounds. In this sense, it is the syntax/semantics that is pretend, or arbitrary.

The same causes lead to the same effects, and that is the syntax (the rule). The semantics is the relationship between cause and effect.

If you've ever read a nonfiction book, you have gained knowledge of things you never had conscious experience of. You do not experience Agincourt when you read about it, but you still acquire knowledge about it. Same goes for science. You can learn about things the brain does that we are not conscious of by study, research, education, reading out of interest, etc. I don't really get why this is where the conversation is going. It seems a tad basic. — Kenosha Kid

Your example is to basic and leaves too many questions left unanswered. How does consciously observing scribbles on a page provide knowledge of unconscious processes?

Is the web page that appears on your computer monitor a unconscious process? If it is, then are you consciously aware of an unconscious process? Is your breathing an unconscious process? Are you consciously aware that you are breathing? You may not be consciously controlling it, but can be aware of it and you can force yourself to breath faster, slower or deeper or hold your breath. You can even make noises when your breath. How do you explain how we can be both not conscious and conscious of our breathing?

What is the observable difference between conscious and unconscious processes?

If i knew, I'd be famous. Assuming I could explain it to the rest of you bullet-biting p-zombies. — Marchesk

I'm not one of those asserting that the mind is an illusion, or doesn't exist. What I'm saying is that our view of the world as "physical" boxes containing "non-physical" images and minds is wrong. The boxes are quantified information. There are no "physical" boxes with "non-physical" items in them. It is all information.

One of the strangest things the Deniers say is that although it seems that there is conscious experience, there isn’t really any conscious experience: the seeming is, in fact, an illusion. — Olivier5

Given that our knowledge and understanding of brains is in the form of conscious visual models, if our minds are illusions, then so is our understanding of brains. All the deniers do is undermine their own theories of how brains work.

How do images "literally" exist inside brains?
— Harry Hindu

I don't know. — Marchesk

Then how do you know that minds or images don't literally exist in computers?

It's a hard problem. But maybe we'll know in another century. — Marchesk

Its only a hard problem if you're a dualist. You have to explain how certain hardware contains minds and other hardware doesn't. The problem is thinking in "physical" and "mental" terms - that there are physical boxes that contain these non-physical things we call images and minds.

Produced by minds, part of the makeup of minds, however you wish to phrase it. Mind being a word for consciousness, thinking, intentionality, desire and anything that's difficult to reduce to neurons firing and chemicals flowing. — Marchesk

Thats just rephrasing your statement that images are in minds. What does it mean for a mind to produce images? Doest your computer produce images on the screen? Where is the image of this web page- in your brain, in your mind, or on the computer monitor?
I don't know what consciousness is, but thinking, intentionality and desire can all be reduced to behavior.

I don't know. The exist in our minds, though, and arguably nowhere else. — Marchesk

Well, that was my question: how do minds exist "inside" brains?

But then I think you need to also explain how images are "in" minds, too.

Like I said, I sounds like a meaningless contradiction. I asked the question to get clarification. Asking a question isnt making bizarre statements. Asking questions stems from trying to understand others' bizarre statements. Why don't you just answer the questions?

Which part of the brain asks questions - the conscious part, or the non-conscious part? Your still haven't made a meaningful distinction between conscious processes and unconscious processes.

Yep, images and sounds don't literally exist inside computers. They're encoded as information for output devices that create sound and light waves for our eyes and ears. — Marchesk

How do images "literally" exist inside brains?

So, everywhere. I disagree. — bongo fury

Your disagreement isn't an valid argument against anything I've said.

But it's a special fiction indulged by animals capable of playing along. — bongo fury

Then semantics/meaning is a fiction?
Wouldn't that mean that syntax is non-fiction?

The definition of consciousness, I'm going to use here is awareness of the external world and also of oneself. It's quite obvious that this is what is meant by consciousness by most folks as when these don't occur e.g. when one is asleep or in a coma, we're said to be unconscious. — TheMadFool

The problem is that you are still aware when asleep. You wake up suddenly to loud noises. How could you do that unless you were at least partially aware? Are you conscious while dreaming?

Is consciousness just an experience, or does the experience have to have some causal connection with the world outside of the mind, i.e, the experience is in some sense about the world?

I'm not sure what specifically you're asking. We have brains that react to external stimuli and convert that reaction into what we consciously experience via various transformations and augmentations. What bit of that are you questioning: How things can react to external stimuli (physics)?; Why we have brains that can do this (evolution)?; How brains do this (neurology)?; Or are you just asking about the first-/third-person distinction, e.g. why a stimulated nucleus accumbens feels like pleasure? — Kenosha Kid

You used the term, "experiences", so I'm asking you how you were using the term.

My bad, I used the term 'phenomena' in an inconsistent way. What I meant was that there are _processes_ in the brain that we are not conscious of (e.g. outline detection, pattern-matching, etc.) and processes that we are conscious of (e.g. rational decision-making). — Kenosha Kid

What does it mean to be "conscious" of something?

A child can just ask 'why?' to every answer; that's not interesting conversation. Do you believe that you are conscious of every thing your brain does, including the cited examples of inverting the retinal image, white-shifting colours, outline detection? Do you claim you make a conscious effort to do these things? Do you consciously regulate your breathing at every moment? Consciously produce dopamine when you spot something surprising that you consciously decide is good?

If not, then you already know that you are unconscious of many (indeed) of the processes occurring in the brain, and your incredulity is less than credible. — Kenosha Kid

It depends on what you mean by, "conscious" and "conscious efforts". How does one come to consciously know that they are unconscious of many processes occurring in the brain? :brow: It sounds like a meaningless contradiction to me.

That would be the fundamental unit of cognition - basic cause and effect. The sand acknowledges the pressure of the footprint and gives way accordingly. Its a long way from the complicated cognition we enjoy, but it is the start of it. — Pop

Exactly! The relationship between cause and effect is information, and information is a fundamental unit of cognition.

Was he saying that the sand on the beach (for example) was capable of cognition? — Daemon

Isn't your footprint information that Daemon passed this way? Doesn't the sand have a memory of your passing - the persistent existence of your footprint in the sand? Once the footprint is washed away, the sand forgets you ever passed this way.

The same as the distinction between an illusion of consciousness that (like the Chinese Room) doesn't have a proper semantics, and one that does. — bongo fury

Then it appears that there is no difference in an illusion of consciousness that doesn't have proper semantics, and one that does. Semantics is derived from the syntax - from the relationship between the rules and what the rules cause one to do or not do.

Meaning is the relationship between cause and effect. Meaning exists wherever causes leave effects. It's not some special thing or process that only exists as a feature of minds.

Harry I don't have a problem defining consciousness and suchlike. Like many words they are defined ostensively.

Wikipedia:
An ostensive definition conveys the meaning of a term by pointing out examples. This type of definition is often used where the term is difficult to define verbally, either because the words will not be understood (as with children and new speakers of a language) or because of the nature of the term (such as colours or sensations) — Daemon

But words are just colored scribbles and sounds. It seems like you'd have a problem defining the nature of words, too.

I don't know what that means any more than Tegmark's mathematical universe. But then who knows what the hell fundamental reality is. — Marchesk

It means that everything is a causal relationship.

I'm partial to quantum fields. — Marchesk

That's information too.

No. That's what I asked bongo many pages back. Its information/causal relations all the way down.

More seriously, the fundamental stuff of physics like fields, energy, matter, forces, spacetime and all the stuff that's logically entailed by that. — Marchesk

This is all just more information. All causal relations, which include logical entailments, is information.

Banno-inspired perception-related debates used to go 100+ pages. And it often included talk of apples. — Marchesk

Because its difficult to derive meaning from anything Banno says. It probably has to do with how he uses words.

What is "physical"? I'm sure I asked that question in this thread before.

Sorry for the late reply. I've seen this argument a few times and never got the sense of it. We don't need any knowledge of the workings of the brain to understand why I don't experience your sensory input. It is not a neurological question. It's not even a sensible question imo. — Kenosha Kid

How about why you have experiences at all?

Actually it doesn't, which is why it is broken down into functional systems not specific parts of the brain. Either system could be, and likely is, distributed. But certainly parts of the brain are dominant in certain functions. — Kenosha Kid

The answer to that is precisely why we labour under the illusion that we make those decisions consciously. Recall that we are not conscious of the unconscious causes of conscious phenomena. Decisions from System 1 are presented to System 2 apparently uncaused (i.e. without System 2 being aware of the process). So from System 2's point of view, decisions originate in System 2. There are lots of published tests for this. — Kenosha Kid

What the heck does this even mean? What is the difference between unconscious and conscious phenomena, or systems? If the systems are distributed, then how is it that they aren't aware of what is going on in the other parts? How is the brain itself not aware of what it's different systems are doing? Can an unconscious system be aware of what the unconscious and conscious systems are doing?

If it is an illusion that you make decisions consciously, then you conscious understanding of brains should be called into question. You basically pulled the rug out from under yourself. Happy landings!

Banno-inspired perception-related debates used to go 100+ pages. And it often included talk of apples. — Marchesk

Have we come to any sort of consensus as to what color is? Or pain?

If it's not qualia, is it ... a model? A language game? A private beetle we can't talk about? — Marchesk

:rofl:
60+ pages so far and you still don't have any sort of consensus as to what color or pain is? Colors and pain are information! Duh!

the piano not perceiving certain inputs from the keyboard? Does it not perceive the meaning of your keystrokes and make the correct sounds for you to listen to? — Daemon

It appears that you've answered your own question.

Harry I don't have a problem defining consciousness and suchlike. Like many words they are defined ostensively.

Wikipedia:
An ostensive definition conveys the meaning of a term by pointing out examples. This type of definition is often used where the term is difficult to define verbally, either because the words will not be understood (as with children and new speakers of a language) or because of the nature of the term (such as colours or sensations) — Daemon

There are terms that we currently have that can define these things. The problem is that you aren't even trying to think about it. What do you think the purpose of feelings and sensations are? Let's start there.

I would say the theory is ideal, in that it's humans creating a map of the territory, while the territory itself might be understood as physical, assuming a physicalist ontology. That does allow for the possibility that the theory is missing something fundamental. A map is only as good as the map makers and their knowledge of the territory. — Marchesk

just means "in terms of observable phenomena". — Janus

Humans, maps and territory are all observable, so I don't know what Marchesk means by "ideal" other than that they like the theory, or that it works for them. The fundamental aspect that is missing is causation - of how maps can be about territories.

If "physical" means observable, then "physical" isn't fundamental as the physical property of some phenomenon is dependent on the existence of observers. Are observers physical? What about observations? Only a fraction of the universe is observable, so does that mean that only a fraction of the universe is physical?

Do you think a piano feels something when you press the keys? — Daemon

Again, what does it mean to feel?
You are driving all over the road. One lane at a time. We were talking about computers. You are the one using these terms that you then have a problem in defining, so why use them?

Are dreams and hallucinations perceivable/physical? What about the majority of the universe that is unobservable?

When it comes to producing speculative hypotheses regarding the origins of life and consciousness physical theories are all we have, because only they are testable. That doesn't mean you can't speculate idealistically; it just means there is no way to test such speculations. — Janus

Is it the theory that is physical, or what the theory is about (what it points to) that is physical, or both?

Is testing physical theories a physical or non-physical process? How can a non-physical thing test physical things? What does "physical" even mean?

This is one of the problems with philosophy. Speaking ways that create the very problem you are trying to solve.

And the appearance is itself part of the body, so you end up getting an appearance feedback loop when your body observes itself, like the visual feedback loop you get when a camera looks back at the monitor it is connected to. This is the infinite rabbit hole that is created when the self processes information about the self.

Self- consciousness is a sensory information feedback loop.

No, the computer is not perceiving inputs in the way you and I perceive things. Press a finger against the back of your hand. You feel a sensation. When you press a key on the computer keyboard, the computer doesn't feel a sensation.

Shall we try to agree on this before we move on to the rest of your ideas? — Daemon

No, because this is the primary point of contention, and you keep ignoring the contradiction that you keep making. What makes the hardware in your head special in that it feels, but computer hardware can't? What does it mean to feel?

If there is no perceivable difference between "simulated" intelligence and "real" intelligence, then any difference you perceive would be a difference of your own making stemming from your human biases.

If meaning is the role words play, then what about how we use words to refer to how computers function, as if they had minds of their own? They have memory, communicate, acknowledge messages, ignores, expects, monitors, and understands. Why is the computer such a good metaphor for the mind?

It doesn't have any understanding. It doesn't perceive the intended meaning, it doesn't perceive anything. It isn't equipped to perceive anything. — Daemon

So understanding has to do with perceiving meaning? What do you mean by, "perceive"? Is the computer not perceiving certain inputs from your mouse and keyboard? Does it not perceive the meaning of your keystrokes and mouse clicks and make the correct characters appear on the screen and windows open for you to look at?

What do you mean by "meaning"? Meaning is the same thing as information. Information is the relationship between cause and effect. Information/meaning is every where causes leave effects.

Computers contain information. They have memory. They have a processor that processes that information for certain purposes. The difference is that those purposes are not its own. They are for human purposes. It doesn't process information in order to survive and propagate. It isn't capable of learning on it's own, for it's own purposes. It can only be programmed for human purposes. But none of this is to say that there isn't some kind of mind there. If the hardware in your head can contain a mind then what makes that type of hardware special from a computer brain that processes information via inputs and outputs, just like your brain does?

No, I'm not a panpsychist that believes everything has a mind. But I do think that we need to rethink what the mind is, because our current theories of materialism, idealism and dualism just don't work.

Semantics, meaning, is not intrinsic to the physics of my PC. The semantics is ascribed, in this case by me, when I tell it how to translate words and phrases. — Daemon

But the semantics weren't ascribed by you. They were ascribed by your teacher(s) who taught you how to translate words. You weren't born knowing any language, much less how to translate them. You had to be taught that. You also weren't the one that created languages, to define what scribble and sound refers to what event or thing. You had to be taught that. You used your eyes and ears (your inputs) and your brain (your processor) to learn, to discern the patterns, so that you may survive in this social environment (produce the appropriate outputs as expected by your peers).

The translation tool often produces quite spooky results, it certainly looks like it understands to a naive observer, but it's easy to see that it doesn't understand when you allow it to translate on its own without my intervention (which I never do in practice). — Daemon

That's because the only thing it knows is to spit out this scribble when it perceives a certain mouse click or key stroke. It has the same instructions as the man in the room - write this scribble when you perceive this scribble. It doesn't have instructions that actually provide the translation, of this word = that word, and then what that word points to outside of the room, which is how you understand it, because that is how you learned it.

Given that the man in the room can understand at least one language - the language the instructions are written in, then a set of instructions that include the Chinese symbol and it's equivalent in the language the man in the room understands would go a long way in helping the man in the room understand Chinese.

I'm sure you produced quite spooky results when you first began learning how to translate a language.

One of the author's conclusions is that "linguistic meaning is derived from the role things and people play in everyday life". I said something about this above, using the word "good" and the translation of machine assembly instructions as examples.

If the translation tool's understanding was the same as mine, as you seem to want to believe, then machine translation would be as good as human translation. But it isn't! — Daemon

Because it doesn't have the same set of instructions, nor the need to learn them, that you did when you learned them, but that doesn't mean that it couldn't if it had the need and the correct set of instructions.

At the least, can you consider the possibility that there are parts of language, things we do with words, for which the meaning is not given by the referent, but is instead found in the role these utterances and scribbles play in our day to day lives? — Banno

What role does "hello" play? Does this not mean that that utterance refers to the role that it plays?

Because the fact that I am bert1 allows me two different perspectives to examine bert1's mental processes: introspection and extropsection. Whereas other people only have extrospection as a way of observing bert1's mental processes (to the extent that the can do so at all).

Is that question equivalent to "Why am I some particular person, rather than no one in particular?"? — bert1

No. The question is just a different way of framing the hard problem of why there are two very different perspectives of mental processes, but only one type of perspective for everything else, like chairs, mountains and trees.

Where is bert1 relative bert1's mental processes? Where is bert1 relative to bert1's digestive processes? Are you saying that bert1 IS bert1's mental processes?

I'll bite.
What's so special about the floor, Banno?

I don't need the translation tool Harry, I can do the translation on my own, the tool just saves me typing. When I come across a word that isn't in my Translation Memory I add it to the memory, together with the translation. Then the next time that word crops up I just push a button and the translation is inserted. The translation tool doesn't understand anything. — Daemon

Isn't that how you learned the translation of a word and then use the translation? Didn't you have to learn (be programmed) with that information via your sensory inputs to then supply that information when prompted? How is the translation tool's understanding different than a brain's understanding?

A dictionary definition of "understand" is "perceive the intended meaning of". Another dictionary says "to grasp the meaning of".

What do you think conscious experiences are? — Daemon

You used the phrase. I thought you knew what you were talking about. I would define it as a kind of working memory that processes sensory information.

I'm a translator, I use a computer translation tool — Daemon

If you are the translator then why do you need a translation tool? Where do the translations reside - in your brain or in you tool? If you need to look them up in a tool, then the understanding of that particular translation is in the tool, not in your brain.

You're right that the rules in the room are not those that Chinese speakers use. But that's the point: a computer can't understand language in the way we can. The reason is that we learn meaning through conscious experience. — Daemon

These are all unfounded assertions without anything to back it up. What are conscious experiences? What do you mean by, understand?

You"re right that the rules in the room are not those that Chinese speakers use. But that's the point: a computer can't understand language in the way we can. The reason is that we learn meaning through conscious experience. — Daemon

The instructions in the room are written in a language - a different language than Chinese. How did the man in the room come to understand the language the instructions are written in? I've asked this a couple of times now, but you and Apo just ignore this simple, yet crucial, fact.

There is a world of difference between rules as algorithms and rules as constraints. — apokrisis

I don't see a world of difference between them. Algorithms are a type of constraint.

And what is it about you that provides you with different evidence of your consciousness than I have of your consciousness?
— Harry Hindu

I can introspect myself, but others can't. — bert1

I'm not clear on how this answers the question.

Introspection is the observation of one's own mental processes. Others can claim that they can observe our mental processes as "shivering brains". The question is trying to ask why we have two different views of our own mental processes - an introspective and extrospective view of one's own mental processes.

Doesn't this also presume a homunculus in the brain with an alternate view of mental processes? What does it mean for the mind to view itself? How is it different from viewing your whole self (your body), or is it a simulated view, or maybe even an information feedback loop - of turning the information back on itself of being about itself?

But life and mind don’t “follow rules”. They are not dumb machine processes. They are not algorithmic. Symbols constrain physics. So as a form of “processing”, it is utterly different. — apokrisis

Of course life and minds follow rules. You are following the rules of the English language that you learned in grade school when you type your posts. Ever heard of the genetic code? Why do you keep saying stuff that only takes a simple observation to see that it isn't true?

Following rules doesn't mean that you are a dumb machine. It seems to me that only smart machines can create their own rules to follow, and to then get others to follow the same rules, as in the use of language as a means of communicating. After all, understanding is the possession of rules in memory for interpreting some sensory data. Understanding cannot be severed from that act of following rules, as it is the same process.

To understand language is to know how to act. That knowing involves constraining the uncertainty and instability of the physical realm to the point that the desired outcome is statistically sure to happen. — apokrisis

No. To understand language is to possess a set of rules in memory for interpreting particular scribbles and sounds. Like I said, understanding is the possession of a set of rules in memory for interpreting any sensory data. The man in the room has a different set of rules for interpreting the scribbles on the paper than the rules that Chinese people have for interpreting those same symbols. Hence, the instructions in the room are not for understanding Chinese because they are not the same set of rules that Chinese speakers learned or use. The room understands something. It understands, "write this symbol when you see this symbol." The room also understands the language the instructions are written in. How can that be if the room, or the man, doesn't understand language?

So you can’t just hand wave about reconnecting the computer to the physics. You have to show where this now hybrid device is actually doing what biology does rather than still merely simulating the physics required. — apokrisis

It seems like that is your problem to solve. You are the dualist, so you are the one that sees this as a hybrid device. As a monist, I don't see it as such. What is it about carbon that is so special in being the only element capable of producing a hybrid device in the sense that you are claiming here? Why do you think that natural selection is often confused as a smart process (intelligent design), rather than a dumb (blind) process?