So you have removed the circularity of that act, of measuring one ruler with another ruler, by referring to a particular assumption. We can use "the assumption" to avoid circularity in this measuring act. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't even accept the premise that using a ruler to measure another ruler is circular per se. I agree that using one ruler to measure another in order to calibrate or justify the accuracy of a ruler by means of comparing it against another could be circular under certain circumstances. I was merely pointing out that you yourself accept that it is not circular to do under particular conditions (e.g. when the measuring ruler has been calibrated against some measurement standard).

Now that you understand this, we can move on to Wayfarer's concern, which I'll call the act of measuring assumptions.

The whole 'circularity' issue is this: that scientific analysis of anything whatever is based on certain axioms, presumptions, and rules. When you're dealing with the nature of reason itself, then you're actually turning around and looking at that which underlies all of those axioms and presumptions - often without actually recognising that this is what you're doing. You're treating the subject of experience as an object. — Wayfarer

Let's say that we can measure an assumption by comparing it to another assumption. But this is circular. How do we remove the circularity in this case? We cannot use "the assumption" to avoid circularity because this is the very circle which we are in.

I'm not clear on what you mean by "measuring assumptions." As I said to Wayfarer, if using our reasoning faculties to study our reasoning faculties is somehow viciously circular, then philosophy of mind is likewise vulnerable to such complaints, as phil of mind employs reason to study, inter alia, our reasoning faculties.

I also warned him against conflating the study of reason with the study of reasoning (the latter is much more in the purview of cog sci or neuroscience): they are not equivalent.

I heard a commentator say the US is locked in an ideological conflict with Russia. When did that happen? — frank

You'd have to ask him, I suppose. It's not anything I said. I don't think Trump and Putin are even that different ideologically: I think that Putin (or perhaps Putin-lite) is someone Trump would resemble were he not constrained by the checks and balances of American democracy, such as they are (for now, anyway).

they're faking it all. — Seastar

I see. Good luck with all that. <slowly backs away with smile frozen on face>

And Trump will do whatever Putin tells him to. — Seastar

A bit of an overstatement. Trump and Putin are not exactly best buds lately. Did Putin tell the Trump administration to impose sanctions on Russian citizens?

https://www.cnn.com/2018/04/06/politics/russia-sanctions-oligarchs/index.html

Do you recognize that the point being made is the necessity of the assumption? You say,there is nothing inherently circular, "if we assume...". Therefore I conclude that you recognize that there actually is something inherently circular about measuring one ruler with another, a circularity which is only removed by the application of that assumption. — Metaphysician Undercover

If there are conditions under which using one ruler to measure another is not circular (which you concede that there are), then the act is not inherently circular.

The question of how we can be justified that our measuring device is well-calibrated when we use it for measuring is a valid one, but it pertains to measuring absolutely anything and everything, not just other implements of measurement (including rulers). The "necessity" of assuming that our measuring device is reliable pertains to all such measurements. If it's not viciously circular in those cases, why, then is it viciously circular in the case of measuring rulers? Again, you have not explained your case, only asserted it.

But that presumes he knows what he's doing. If he doesn't know what he's doing, his not wanting something doesn't mean he won't do it. "I was just trying to get a good deal, honest." — unenlightened

I don't think Trump would accidentally order a nuclear strike, no. But, I don't presume that he knows what he's doing with regard to possessing expertise or knowledge on any substantive area pertaining to foreign relations, foreign or domestic policy, geopolitics, or diplomacy.

Yes, this is the point. Without comparing it to "the standard unit of measurement", the measuring of the ruler's accuracy by measuring it with another ruler will lead to an infinite regress of one ruler measuring another, or a circle of rulers measuring each other. — Metaphysician Undercover

Of course. As I've twice pointed out, there's no problem using one ruler to measure another (even for calibration purposes), if we assume that one ruler has been calibrated. You yourself said, "It is the calibration against the defined object which removes the circularity." Hence my point that there's nothing inherently circular about using one ruler to measure another.

(I am curious: how do you think ruler manufacturers check the quality of their products if not by comparing samples of their output to some standard of measurement - in other words, using rulers to measure rulers?)

Whereas, I say, that when h. sapiens actually reached the point of reasoning, story-telling and language, then their (our) being is no longer amenable to a simply biological explanation; we're no longer 'just animals'. I know that is a shockingly atavistic utterance but there it is. — Wayfarer

Sure. Humans have culture, not all of which is likely reducible to evolutionary explanations. Nothing shocking about that. Most scientists would probably agree with you, actually (and I am sure that most cultural anthropologists would agree with you, as they tend to resist the infiltration of biological explanations into their field).

To measure a ruler with another ruler, is to calibrate or justify it's reliability by comparing it to another ruler. What else could measuring a ruler with another ruler possibly mean? — Metaphysician Undercover

Nope. You can measure a ruler for any reason whatsoever: for shits and giggles, because the hash marks have worn off and you no longer know how long it is, etc. You are attempting to make a logical claim (i.e. measuring a ruler with a ruler is circular) by appealing to the psychological motivations of the measurer (i.e. "why else would one measure a ruler with a ruler if not to calibrate them?").

Having said that, I don't even see an inherent circularity in using a ruler to measure another ruler in order to calibrate the measured ruler's (as opposed to the measuring ruler's) accuracy: if we have good reason to believe that the measuring ruler is well-calibrated (say, by comparing it directly against the standard unit of measurement), then we can use that to calibrate other rulers (if two rulers disagree, and we have good reason to believe that one ruler is well-calibrated, then it follows that the other ruler is probably the inaccurate one).

You presume he knows what he's doing. — Wayfarer

Not at all. I just presume that he doesn't want to be the President who ended civilization.

Yup. I just don't see the circularity or regress that Metaphysician Undercover posited.

True, he is probably less likely to start WWIII than Trump, but I don't think even Trump is likely to start WWIII (if only because his ego won't let him go down in history as the President that did it and because pretty much any other nation would likely be on the losing side of that conflict when fought against the U.S., and so would probably back down before the bombs started flying).

Pence is a hardline theocrat, though, which is even less desirable to me in many ways than Trump's policies. We had 8 years of evangelicals running the White House with GW Bush, and eight is enough (which, incidentally, is the name of an old sitcom).

I don't see why it should be either circular or lead to an infinite regress. Again, we are not trying to calibrate or justify the reliability of a given ruler by matching it against another ruler. We are assuming that the ruler with which we're performing the measurement is reliable or accurate, and then using that to measure other items, including, perhaps another ruler.

If you believe that nothing can be reliably measured with rulers, then that is a different argument. But if you believe that we can reliably use rulers to measure objects why does it suddenly become problematic when said objects are other rulers? I think you have some 'splainin' to do, Lucy.

To those who wish to see Trump impeached (or otherwise removed from office), I have two words for you: President Pence. I'm not sure that that is preferred outcome.

The other interesting thing is the post-Trump backlash that will happen. — ssu

The backlash of that will come — ssu

Perhaps, but I wouldn't bet too much on it. His core supporters seem unfazed by whatever his administration does, either defending his more execrable actions and statements (often using logic so tortured that waterboarding looks tame by comparison), or sweeping them under the rug with the "fake news" mantra. And as long as he has the support of the Republican base, Congress will likely continue to tow the Trump line (however grudgingly).

The Republicans will likely take some hits in the midterms in November, but that usually happens to the party in power, anyway: I'm not sure how credibly that outcome (assuming it even happens in the first place) could be attributed specifically to a Trump backlash.

The point though, is that measuring a ruler with another ruler really is circular. It is the calibration against the defined object which removes the circularity. Then the question is how reliable, for the application, is the defined unit of measurement [underlining mine]. — Metaphysician Undercover

Exactly the point I made above:

Sure, and once the ruler we use for measuring is calibrated against the defined object, we can happily use it for measuring other things, including other rulers [underlining added]. — Arkady

Calibrating one ruler by means of another may well be circular, but it doesn't follow that measuring a ruler with another ruler is circular.

BTW, it is circular to use a ruler to measure another ruler, that's why we have a defined object which constitutes the base for any measuring system. If one ruler measures another, and there is discrepancy, we ought to turn to that base definition to judge which ruler is correct. However, the base definition is merely a convention, an assumption, just like the assumptions which are required in the example above, concerning the relationship between the brain and the mind. — Metaphysician Undercover

Sure, and once the ruler we use for measuring is calibrated against the defined object, we can happily use it for measuring other things, including other rulers. There's nothing inherently circular about that. And when we combine it with the measurements of other rulers, publish our conclusions, and let other measurers study and critique our measuring methodology, we have now have grounds for believing that we've reliability captured a datum about the objects of our measurements.

You're simply assuming that representational realism stands up by itself. You have a mental model in which the mind mirrors or represents what it sees by generating images - then brain-scanning can essentially de-code the neural activity utilised in such representation - and bingo! We can 'read the brain'. But look at what is already assumed in that picture.

As that NYT article says the processes involved are highly speculative - they involve interpreting masses of data and then hypothesising about 'what the brain is doing'. My argument is that, this very activity of hypothesising, inferring, and saying 'this means that' is the very thing that you would need to explain, in order to show that this 'neural activity' really does amount to understanding the nature of thought. — Wayfarer

Again, you are fulminating against an empirical demonstration on the basis of a priori arguments. The fact of the matter is that we can, through technological means, "decode" the content of at least a limited number of mental states by scanning their attendant physical states. So, whatever assumptions (pertaining to "representational realism" or anything else) undergird that endeavor have thereby been demonstrated to be correct. You are working backwards from the assumption that such a feat can't be done, and therefore hasn't been done, but this assumption is falsified by the experiment results.

And, if you took my comments to suggest that such studies provide an exhaustive understanding of the nature of thought, rest assured, I meant no such thing. fMRI studies (or brain imaging studies generally) are but a drop in the bucket of understanding the mind. There are an entire suite of experimental techniques brought to bear in this field. At best, they elucidate but a very small part of the nature of thought.

And how do you split them? — Wayfarer

I think you are confusing "reason" with "reasoning." In any event, not all thought is reasoning. If I ask you to form a mental picture of a hammer, and then scan your brain, you are not engaged in "reasoning" about anything, so far as I can tell: you are just holding a particular concept in your mind. (Which is why I took care to include "conceptual content" along with "propositional content" in describing such studies.)

What is ‘propositional content’ without reason, or language? That’s the whole point.

Again, I never said that one needn't employ reason or language in studying reason or language: I simply denied that there is any prima facie circularity inherent in doing so (though I'm open to being convinced should you care to elucidate it. Perhaps I'm missing something here).

Philosophers likewise employ reason and language in analyzing reason and language: if there is a vicious circularity in doing so for cognitive scientists, why does it not follow that the philosophers' efforts are likewise viciously circular?

My criticism of examining questions about the nature of mind with reference to brain scans was a philosophical objection, based on an argument about the nature of reason and of meaning. Yes, we must employ the mind to raise such objections. — Wayfarer

My objection to your objection was not that one must employ the mind to raise such objections. My point was that phil of mind equally "employs our cognitive faculties in order to study our cognitive faculties," and thus any objection which attaches to that practice must also apply to phil of mind.

But at the same time, from a philosophical point of view, one can do that without claiming that 'the nature of reason' - for example - is something that could even in principle be understood through the perspective of neuro- or cognitive sciences. In doing that, one relies on reason and logic, as do any of the sciences.

I don't think that such research is necessarily meant to elucidate the "nature of reason." The nature of thought, perhaps.

I maintain that there's a kind of category mistake being made in the very attempt, which goes right to the heart of this issue. This is because reason itself, and the ability of the human to grasp meaning and to engage in rational inference, is logically prior to any specifically empirical analysis of what the brain is or does. I explain that already in this post but the fact that you then try and respond on the level of cognitive science, indicates that you're not really coming to terms with the objection.

I don't know what you mean by my "try[ing] to respond on the level of cognitive science." I read your post: you don't need to refer back to it. As I said, I understand there would be an inherent circularity in trying to justify the veracity or reliability of certain perceptual or cognitive faculties by employing those same faculties, but that is not what this type of research is trying to achieve. They are using their minds to study the mind (indeed, what else would one use?); I see no circularity there, any more than it's circular to use rulers to measure the length of rulers.

The fact of the matter is, it has been empirically demonstrated that one can glean the conceptual or propositional content of a subject's mental states based on brain imaging to at least a limited degree, and there's no reason for supposing that this method won't continue to be refined and become more powerful). Your a priori theorizing is simply at odds with reality.

If you wish to assert that this practice entails a sort of vicious circle, then you must explain how philosophy of mind escapes this vicious circle, and not merely claim that it does so (you have a distressing habit of retreating into the "I'm talking about philosophy!" tact when you are challenged, as if scientific claims must somehow be expected to pass muster, but just "anything goes" when it comes to philosophical pontification).

That is cognitive science, but here we’re discussing philosophy, the nature of meaning and of mind. — Wayfarer

"Employing our cognitive faculties in order to study our cognitive faculties" could equally well apply to phil of mind as to cog sci. In any event, you and I were discussing cog sci, specifically the gleaning of the content of mental states from their attendant physical states as detected by brain imaging. You had claimed (following Nagel) that there was some inherent circularity in this endeavor (in that, in doing so, "you’re relying on the very faculty which you’re purporting to explain"), and I said I didn't see it. You then responded that we're not discussing cog sci. I don't find that to be a helpful response.

What I’m arguing is that when scientists analyse image of neural data, they’re employing the very faculty which they’re purporting to explain. After all, if you’re seeking to explain the nature of thought then you’re going to have to explain how logic operates, are you not? Logic or rational inference is fundamental to human thought and language. So you’re purporting to show how these are represented in the visual data. But even to do that, you’re necessarily saying ‘this pattern of voxels is associated with this area of the brain which we think is mainly engaged with such-and-such aspects of language’. But then you’re relying on the very faculty which you’re purporting to explain. It’s not as if you’re demonstrating that faculty ‘from the outside’ as it were - you can’t literally ‘see’ the act of representation in the data. You’re saying ‘that pattern of data means X’.

That interpretive act, the judgement that ‘this means that’, is fundamental to all rational and linguistic thought. We don’t notice it, I contend, because we’re always operating from inside it. That is why ‘denialism’ seems to be able to deny it. It is ‘invisible’ to us because we’re never apart from or outside of it - it is never present among the objective data of experience. But that’s because it’s ‘transcendental’ in the sense that transcendental idealism understands it - constitutive of, but not visible to, experience. The inivisibilty of the mind to objective analysis is the point of the departure for behaviourism, which was to become one of the main forms of what Strawson calls ‘denialism’ in the essay we’re discussing. — Wayfarer

Sorry for the delay in my response: I've been out of town.

Perhaps I am just obtuse, but I still don't see the circularity here. I understand that there is an inherent circularity in trying to offer a wholesale justification, of, say, our senses by employing our senses, but I see no inherent circularity in employing our cognitive faculties in order to study our cognitive faculties. Moreover, I don't see how a priori philosophical analysis can escape these charges of circularity: we must employ the mind to pontificate about the mind, no?

And that is precisely what the article that I linked to is criticizing. — Wayfarer

No: the article you linked to describes a problem with replication in certain types of studies (including those using fMRI), as well as false positives detected by the use of dubious software. It says nothing about the tout court impossibility of inferring the proposition or conceptual content of bran states from fMRI studies (or from brain imaging studies generally: fMRI is of course not the only such method).

Of course, given huge expertise, predictive algorithms, and the like, then an expert can deduce something about Subject X's brain patterns, based on that data. But, let's take that same expert, and say 'OK - put aside all reasoned judgement. Don't use your capacity for inference in assessing that data and all your expert knowledge of what such things mean. Now - what do you see?' And the answer is, they will see a graphic representation, an image. So they have to rely on the very thing they're attempting to explain, in order to explain the data they're seeing. And you can't evade the inevitable circularity involved in that.

I'm sorry, but this paragraph makes no sense to me. Could you be more specific in where the circularity lies in inferring (or whatever your preferred verb is when computers do it) the propositional or conceptual content of a subject's thoughts from brain imaging data?

But this is a completely different kind of phenomenon, to demonstrating velocity or mass or some other basic physical measurable attribute. Here what is being discussed is the basis of meaning, the nature of thought. So it's intrinsically a completely different kind of question, to what can be measured in relatively simple terms. All of your arguments here simply must be question-begging, because they will always assume the very thing that needs to be proven - you can't argue about the nature of reason 'from the outside'.

Again, I fail to see where the question-begging lies. My example was an analogy of our disagreement here; I am aware that measuring an object's velocity is a "completely different kind of phenomenon" from measuring brain states. My point was only that, problems with replication aside, even a single success constitutes proof of principle (in this case, proof of principle that mental states are physically realized by particular types of brain states, brain states which can be detected via neuroimaging in order to say with at least some reliability what the subject is thinking about).

This doesn't mean that fMRI is not useful - it's a clinical procedure, and invaluable in brain surgery and medicine. But what I'm criticizing, is the notion that you can detect anything about the nature of meaning, or logic, or indeed thought, by using such an apparatus. So, no, the machine is not 'making judgements' - it is producing an output, which is then judged by human agents. — Wayfarer

Then your view is at odds with the evidence. I linked to an article study demonstrating just the opposite of what you say. The study found that brain scans could detect what a subject was thinking based on the physical state of his brain. If this isn't detecting the "meaning" of thoughts (in terms of propositional content), then what would constitute such a demonstration? The fact that the machine's output is judged by human agents is irrelevant. (And, lest you think that I'm basing my position solely on one study, this is merely one of several such studies.)

And, yes, psychology has a problem with replication, as do many other fields of science. But unless you're prepared to state that every instance of fMRI gleaning the content of someone's thoughts from the physical state of their brain was some kind of fluke (itself a position which would be going far beyond the evidence), then there is evidence that such a feat is possible. That's the thing about proofs of principle: you only need one success to demonstrate it. If I claimed that faster-than-light speeds were impossible, and you pointed to a raft of studies which detected faster-than-light speeds achieved by, say, electrons in a particle accelerator, it does me no good to say that 61% of such studies failed to be replicated. Even one successful experiment constitutes a demonstration that superluminal speeds can be achieved, and I would be compelled to revise my worldview accordingly.

I notice you have to place judgement in scare quotes, to allow for the obvious fact that computers don't make judgements at all. They compute outcomes, which are then judged. Case in point, from the article I cited: — Wayfarer

I put "judgement" in scare quotes because, insofar as this form of technological mind-reading relies on judgments at all, it is a type of judgment which can be carried out by machine. (The portion of the article you just quoted refers to software making inferences, I will remind you again!)

I would presume nothing of the kind. You might infer anything you like, but again, the act of inference is a judgement. Have a look at Do you believe in God, or is that a Software Glitch. — Wayfarer

Well, then it is a "judgment" which can be accomplished via machine-learning algorithms. I suggest that you check out the article I linked to in my discussion with Galuchat for an example of a primitive sort of "mind reading" accomplished via brain scanning (in any event, the "presumption" was under a physicalistic/supervenient picture of the brain, which was the subject of our discussion).

(BTW, it's interesting that the article which you linked to refers to the software making "inferences" based on the data, something which you apparently believe that software is incapable of doing, even though you cite this as a source friendly to your position.)

The cited research is fascinating, but provides evidence of correlation between mental activity and neurophysiology, not of causation, hence; it is incorrect to say, "...particular physical states encode particular mental states" when the research makes no such claim. — Galuchat

Nothing in "encode" was meant to imply a causal relationship. The research demonstrates a primitive form of technological-based mind-reading, which is exactly what I claimed, and which none of your complaints negates. If you wish to move the goal posts, then that is none of my concern.

For instance, this: https://www.digitaltrends.com/cool-tech/ai-predicts-what-youre-thinking/ . There are other such examples.

Yes, but what changed the physical state? What was the causal factor? It was a change in the understanding, in the perception. That is why it can be described as a 'top-down' causal sequence. Whereas if the mental was indeed supervenient on the physical, then this ought not to happen. You might expect that a pill would change perception - that is 'bottom-up' - but you wouldn't expect that a change in perception would have physiological consequences. — Wayfarer

The perceptual process and the resulting understanding would themselves be physical processes: pressure waves in the air, photons, or tactile stimuli, etc stimulate our nerve receptors, and set up a cascade of events within our central nervous system. The information stating whether the treatment is a placebo or not is physically encoded in some manner, either in a particular sequence of squiggles on a page, or in a particular pattern of pressure waves in the air, or a particular arrangement of Braille, or whatever.

Likewise, with a fine-grained enough brain scan, one could presumably "read off" the mental state of the perceiver from the physical state of his brain: particular physical states encode particular mental states, even if one can't "see" the mental states directly (indeed, this needn't even be taken to be a hypothetical fantasy relegated to a philosophical thought experiment: some very preliminary steps towards "mind-reading" ability using brain scanning technology have already been taken).

But aren't you saying that 'the quark' is 'the fundamental unit'? It therefore serves in the role previously assigned to 'the atom' i.e. the purported 'fundamental particle of matter'. Whereas, whether a quark, or indeed any of the denizens of the 'particle zoo', actually are 'particles' is, I think, an open question.

//ps// This question is addressed by Victor Stenger in Particles are for Real, one of the last things he wrote.

I don't know if quarks are fundamental particles - I don't know enough about particle physics. Electrons, for instance, are taken to be fundamental particles, though.

But in saying that, you’re saying a belief is physical. One minute you believe that the placebo will work - and it will, because you believe it. Then I manage to disillusion you - ‘look, it’s made of sugar’. So it won’t work. Nothing physical has changed - only your belief. Your perception has changed, your understanding of what it is, and that has consequences. — Wayfarer

The portion of your post which I underlined is incorrect: if mental states supervene on physical states, then the physical state which corresponds to believing that the placebo will work is different from the one which corresponds to believing that the placebo won't work; so something physical has changed.

And, there are no ‘point-particles’ which are indivisible - atoms in the original sense, whether they’re conceived as quarks or some other entity. Physics has demonstrated the ambiguity of so-called ‘fundamental particles’ - they’re now understood as excitation in a field, not as an indivisible material unit. — Wayfarer

Uh, I said that the neutron is not a fundamental particle because it's composed of other particles. Ergo, science does not claim it's indivisible (none of this supports theism, of course, contrary to whatever mileage your linked-to article might strive to get out of it).

So - top-down causation even appears to be the case in respect of physical particles themselves! So much for 'fundamental particles', eh? — Wayfarer

The neutron is not a fundamental particle. It is composed of quarks.

What about the placebo effect, then? Those are examples of 'top-down causation' which would mitigate against a physicalist explanation, would they not? — Wayfarer

I don't see how. Per physicalism, believing that a particular treatment is causally efficacious (which is all that the placebo effect is) has a corresponding physical state of the brain, which itself can have "downstream" causal effects, including remission of some disease or condition.

EDIT: I don't know if you did so knowingly, but your above point echoes an interesting argument made by Alvin Plantinga in one of the iterations of his Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism, wherein he invokes the concept of "semantic epiphenomenalism" (EP). EP basically states that since natural selection only "sees" the physical states of an organism (including whichever brain states attend a particular belief), then the content of beliefs cannot be selected for, only their attendant physical states

So, according to Plantinga, EP implies that a purely naturalistic evolutionary process - or, at least one for which natural selection is the primary driver, presumably - would be extremely unlikely to produce organisms with reliable cognitive faculties, meaning that the naturalist would therefore possess a defeater for every belief he holds, including in naturalistic evolution.

Circling back to the question for supervenience, which you pose above, you will recall that supervenience allows for a given mental state to be multiply realizable, meaning that non-identical physical states can in theory each realize identical mental states. I could see this posing a problem not only for the placebo effect, but for virtually every purported mind-body interaction. Let us assume the physicalist thesis that mental states (though themselves non-physical) supervene on physical states. Let us also assume that given mental state M1 can be multiply realized by two distinct physical states, P1 and P2 (perhaps in 2 different individuals, or at different times in the same individual). Let us furthermore assume that the content of M1 is "a hungry bear is chasing me." Said belief would likely lead to certain physiological reactions, including an increase in stress hormones, elevated heart rate, a "fight or flight" behavioral response, etc. But, if we posit that said effects are caused only by the belief's attendant physical states, we are left with the puzzle as to how, in principle, two distinct physical states, P1 and P2, can each be the cause of identical downstream physical effects.

A detailed examination of EEAN would take us too far afield for this thread, but it's an interesting topic, IMO.

DOUBLE EDIT: after I posted, I saw that at least some of what I touch upon has already been discussed above. Apologies both for the lengthy post and for any repetition for the readers of this thread.

A lot rides on the meaning of 'supervenes' here. — Wayfarer

Very roughly speaking, supervenience is a type of relation between states or properties such that A supervenes on B just in case A states are an emergent property of B states, and a change or difference in A necessitates a change or difference in B, but not vice-versa.

Firstly, let me say that I accidentally "flagged" (and then quickly unflagged) your post in trying to respond, so if armed men kick down the door to your house, mea culpa (I'm actually not totally sure what flagging does...).

Yea, I know little of Wittgenstein, and I understand that he's one of the more difficult philosophers (which itself is saying something, given that I'd characterize very little of philosophy as easy reading). I read On Certainty years ago, but not the Tractatus or anything else.

In the social context theft can only occur when someone else's property is stolen but in theory if something isn't someone else's then it isn't technically theft. However the problem with this is that it is only in the legal context of things as doesn't account for the issue of "thing in and of itself" having rights (property or otherwise) which need to be respected. — dclements

Then you may claim that appropriating, say, mineral resources somehow "disrespects" the Earth or whatever, but it doesn't follow that it constitutes theft, in which case you've simply changed the subject. Furthermore, this would require defending the rather tendentious claim that, for instance, the Earth is something deserving of respect and having rights "in and of itself." The Earth is an accretion of rock and metals, with a thin scum of gravitationally-bound gases, with some trace amounts of carbon, hydrogen, nitrogen, sulfur, oxygen, and phosphorus, some agglomerations of which believe themselves to be the center of the universe.

I don't see that the planet is something which inherently deserves respect or which can "own" anything, any more than my wristwatch is inherently deserving of respect, or can own property. We disapprove of the misallocation of resources for its impact on people, not because it takes what rightfully "belongs" to Mother Earth.

If statements such as "property is theft" signify something like "I don't approve of the notion of private property," "people are too greedy or materialistic," or "people should share more," then perhaps one ought to simply defend those positions instead of engaging in sloganeering.

The point of unenlightened's I think you missed is that commons can not steal whatever "it" is because the commons is neither owned by ANYONE nor a entity in and of itself like a corporation is, so it isn't really owned by anyone/anything including itself. — dclements

Then appropriating it for personal use isn't theft, as theft is the unlawful appropriation of someone else's property. If it's not "owned by anyone/anything including itself," then it's not property, and if it's not property, then its appropriation for private use does not constitute theft, contra the thesis that "[all] property is theft."

It was actually in reference to substance dualism, and pretty much anything that that thesis might entail about consciousness. It might also rule out certain other positions such as Leibnizian "pre-established harmony" between the mental and the physical.

He says:

Naturalism states that everything that concretely exists is entirely natural; nothing supernatural or otherwise non-natural exists. Given that we know that conscious experience exists, we must as naturalists suppose that it’s wholly natural. And given that we’re specifically materialist or physicalist naturalists (as almost all naturalists are), we must take it that conscious experience is wholly material or physical. — Wayfarer

I would find a couple of things to quibble with here. First, if "concrete" (as opposed to "abstract") is here taken to mean something like "causally efficacious," then it doesn't necessarily follow from the premise that consciousness exists that consciousness is therefore concrete. An epiphenomenalist, for instance, would probably deny that consciousness is causally efficacious, and claim that only its attendant physical states possess such efficacy (whether, and to what degree, epiphenomenalism, can be reconciled with physicalism or naturalism is another deep question, but I at least prima facie see no contradiction between those positions).

Second, if physicalism is taken to be the thesis that "everything which exists is physical," then they would indeed be committed to either denying that consciousness exists (hardly a tenable position) or claiming that consciousness is a physical phenomenon. However, if physicalism is taken to be the thesis that "everything which exists is either physical or supervenes on the physical," then an immaterial consciousness poses no problem for physicalism/naturalism (provided that said consciousness is not of a distinct "substance," or anything of the sort).

:up: Very good post. Re: your point about ethical philosophers working backwards from the desired conclusion to the ethical thesis which supports it, author Heather Mac Donald (herself a conservative scholar) had an amusing line about "natural law" legal/ethical scholars, basically saying that she'll believe in natural law when its proponents offer a conclusion they didn't already want to believe.

Don't get snippy with me if you can't follow an argument with 2 premises to its logical conclusion.