Thanks!

Cool. I always thought it resembled wounds or blood. Reminds me of something else, but I can’t ever figure out what.

Didn't think to include mine? — The Opposite

Nah. I did like your previous one though, the face in the weather map.

My particular favorites in no particular order:

@James Riley
@Cartesian trigger-puppets
@StreetlightX
@Baden
@Wayfarer
@_db
@Gitonga
@NOS4A2

Any examples that cause problems for the JTB theory of knowledge? — TheMadFool

Here’s an “example” I thought of, and am curious about its implications. I’m not really sure how I feel about it. Anyways, here goes.

You make plans to meet a person you’ve never seen before over the phone (for whatever reason you can come up with). Through the phone call you know that this person is male, middle aged, and named Bob. Bob tells you he will be at restaurant X on Wednesday at 6pm, and that he’ll be wearing a blue shirt. You go to restaurant X at 6pm on Wednesday, see a middle aged man in a blue shirt, whom you assume is named Bob. You approach the man and ask if his name is Bob, and it is. However, it isn’t the Bob you’re supposed to meet. Was your belief that the man in the blue shirt’s name was Bob knowledge? It seems to be a JTB, but only coincidentally. But does that matter? It also seems to be just an issue with language. What exactly is meant by the term “Bob?” If it has the stricter meaning of “the person you’re supposed to meet” then you believing the man in the blue shirt is Bob is technically false, because it’s a different definition of the word “Bob” than the one you had in mind.

Knowledge is being defined as justified true belief, not just as justified belief. — Michael

Yeah, I think that’s a key point that is often overlooked.

I doubt it. I played football, basketball, baseball, and soccer growing up nearly every year. I’m also interested in philosophy, and social sciences in general. There’s actually a lot of strategy involved in game planning, schematics, etc. in football at the professional level. It isn’t uncommon for coaches to have somewhat of a background in logic or analytics.

Same. :smile:

If you want a monism it has to include all the properties (assuming these truly cover everything together) but then you’re just advocating “thingism” , even if you refer to it as “idealism” or “physicalism” — khaled

This is probably right. The only alternative would be to outright deny that the properties from the other side (idealism/physicalism) exists. But at the end of the day we created these categories, as well as their criteria, so we can always choose to define things in such a way that it “supports” whatever position we hold. For example, simplifying the definition of “physical” to be synonymous with detectable; if we can detect it, it’s physical; or making “mind” synonymous with qualia or experience itself.

Searle, though not an idealist, described the difference in physical and mental properties as so:

Mental
Subjective
Qualitative
Intentional
Not spatially located & Nonextended in space
Not explainable by physical
processes
Incapable of acting causally

Physical
Objective
Quantitative Nonintentional Spatially located & Spatially extended Causally explainable by
microphysics
Acts causally and as a
on the physical
system is causally closed

Coincidentally, and perhaps more to your point, his “solution” is to claim this is essentially a false dichotomy.

Here is the link to the PDF version of his book “Mind: A Brief Introduction” if you’re interested. The above was on page 127.

You can't imagine new properties. — khaled

I would consider the concept of souls to be an exception, but maybe you disagree. Actually, immaterialism as a whole seems doesn’t seem like it could be derived from things that actually exist.

But if we define physical so as to include X, Y, Z, A, B and C, there is nothing left for mental. Same with if we define mental to include all the properties. That's seems to me to be what physicalists and idealists are doing respectively. — khaled

I feel like saying that there’s some thing, or some property of some thing, that doesn’t interact with physical material, and isn’t effected by the laws of physics would never be accepted by a physicalist. That seems to be the line between physicalism and idealism.

The example I used was to illustrate how you can't explain what Hakuna Matata is. So you can't say "it was just Matata". We don't know what Hakuna Matata is. — khaled

Seems like an irrelevant example then. We have a working definition of “physical” don’t we? Not saying it’s 100% complete, but we are able to at least partially describe it. If the fundamental thing in the universe fits our definition of “physical,” then physicalism prevails. We can define that without needing to know the definition of mind/idealism. So what’s the issue?

But those things are always combinations of existing properties. Unicorns are horses with horns. We know what horns are and we know what horses are. We can't imagine entirely new properties. Like a new color. Or a new taste. — khaled

I don’t see why this is an issue. Why would the fundamental “thing” possess new properties?

Let's say you find out, after long exhaustive search, that the fundamental thing making up the world is Matata. How would you go about explaining what Matata is? — khaled

“Hey guys, remember how we thought everything was ‘Hakuna Matata?’ Well, it turns out it’s just Matata.”

We are capable of imagining things that aren’t real, so we can always compare our actual findings with whatever we previously imagined them to be.

Idealists and physicalists are using different words to talk about the same thing. — khaled

Because they disagree on what that “thing” is (mental/physical).

"Mental thing" adds nothing to "thing" when "mental" is a property of everything. Same with "physical". — khaled

That’s true, but only if there is complete agreement. As of now there are competing concepts about the fundamental “thing,” so different words are needed to differentiate between these concepts. The properties of a physical thing are different from those of a mental thing. So the debate is about what properties (I.e. mental=A, B, C; physical=X, Y, Z) every “thing” has.

If a bully cannot get to bully others, and this makes him suffer. Does he get to bully others? — schopenhauer1

It isn’t about the bully (who I assume represents parents). It’s about the justification for causing harm by stopping the bully. How do you justify that without undermining your justification for AN?

I also continue to be perplexed by your claim that the amount of harm caused by such an act is irrelevant. Isn’t the point of preventing harm that there’s less harm in the world by doing so? But if by preventing harm you cause more harm than you’ve prevented isn’t that defeating the purpose?

Then they don’t have to follow it. — schopenhauer1

So that justifies you causing harm?

If that doesn’t compel you then I’m not forcing. It’s not forced. It’s not inescapable. — schopenhauer1

Your opinion is presented to people without their consent, and that opinion could be harmful. Sure they can walk away, but that’s after the harm has already occurred. The fact that we can kill ourselves (thereby ending the suffering) doesn’t suffice to justify having children in your view of things. So the escapability of harm seems irrelevant, or at least it doesn’t justify taking the risk of causing harm to someone else.

If I am causing someone to be affected for a lifetime of harm, then lets talk.. — schopenhauer1

It’s possible that you may be. Do you think the pain of not having a child will simply go away? Besides, the amount of harm caused is irrelevant, according to you.

They can walk away, ignore, go away. I am not forcing it on anyone. — schopenhauer1

This is exactly like the argument that we’re not forcing someone to live because they can always just kill themselves. You’re still creating the conditions of their suffering.

"Converting" doesn't harm them if they are doing it voluntarily..Obviously they agree with the argument even if it causes them sadness. — schopenhauer1

If it causes sadness, then it’s harmful. Being sad is a form of suffering, right? And it isn’t like one can’t voluntarily suffer.

So nothing is entirely good nor entirely bad. I can agree with that. — Olivier5

Even rape?

When the two are in conflict, they are competing priorities and one must choose. — DingoJones

Sure, but your moral theory could simply prioritize one over the other. Something like “the needs of the many outweigh the needs of the few.” So that way maintaining social stability necessarily trumps individual needs/concerns.

No, I didnt mean to imply ethical above practical. Indeed, my view is that ethics are merely one of many priorities people have. When these priorities are in conflict, sometimes morality ethics lose out. — DingoJones

That’s interesting, I haven’t thought of it like that before. But…

I would describe that as putting a higher degree of priority on social stability than ethics. — DingoJones

Couldn’t, or shouldn’t, things like “social stability” just be incorporated into a person’s ethical theory? I feel like any form of consequentialism would necessarily have to consider things like social stability and the impact whatever moral choice has on it.

Oh right, I didn’t think I had to bring up the idea of consent and ameliorating greater harms with lesser harms but doing that now. — schopenhauer1

Man, you try really hard to avoid giving direct yes/no answers. We’ve already discussed greater/lesser harm.

EVEN if you found out the sadness of the sociopath is actually greater than the pain he would pursue (he's not a complete monster let's say), then he should not pursue it. — schopenhauer1

Although, you do keep trying to divert the questions away from your own actions and onto parents/sociopaths. So all I can do is assume. Therefore, I interpreted this to also mean that “Even if the harm I cause someone is greater than the harm they would have caused, if my actions prevent them from committing harm, I should act.”

As for consent, I don’t suppose you’ve obtained consent from the people you try to persuade/prevent from having children. IOW’s you’re not concerned about the harm your success at convincing others to not procreate may cause. So you must not think potentially causing harm to others without consent is wrong. However, your justification for AN is that it potentially causes unnecessary harm without consent, therefore it should be prevented, but attempting to prevent it also potentially causes unnecessary harm should you succeed in your attempts to convert others to AN. This is where you contradict yourself.

I don’t think I agree. Your post seems to be focused solely on cognition, whereas “love” is clearly an emotion. Cliched or not, we hear of occurrences like “love at first sight” where one person instantly, and not premeditatedly, feels love for another person. The “X therefore Y” logic you mention is completely lacking in these, and possibly other, situations.

That's okay, cause that sociopath's doing bad X is prevented. Not being able to pursue bad x is not a grounds to allow bad x. — schopenhauer1

So, then it’s justifiable to harm someone (sociopath/potential parent), even cause greater harm to that person, if it prevents that person from unnecessarily harming others (sociopath’s victims/children)? Is that right? I feel like I have to be missing something, because if that’s the case then you are justified in physically intervening in order to prevent childbirth, which essentially justifies eugenics. It also means the same for other scenarios; preventing a doctor from giving a vaccine, the use of lethal force for petty crimes like shoplifting, etc. But maybe that is what you mean? As long as you’re preventing someone from harming someone else your actions, regardless of severity, are justified.

Where are these extreme measures? — schopenhauer1

I’m just meaning AN is considered to be excessive (or extreme) by most people.

I didn't say bring about enlightenment, simply prevent harm. — schopenhauer1

I was referring to this comment…

So, sure maybe putting you in crutches makes you feel enlightened down the line, doesn't mean I should put you in crutches. — schopenhauer1

My point is that bringing about enlightenment does prevent harm (the enlightened person will no doubt experience less harm since he’s enlightened, no?), yet you’re unwilling to cause harm (by putting him in crutches) to bring about this reduction of harm (enlightenment). Yet with AN you’re willing to cause harm in order to prevent future potential harm. I think you said something to the effect that the harm you cause someone in order to prevent a greater harm is a necessary harm. Since you make a moral distinction between these two events, I’m asking you why. Not being a crass utilitarian isn’t an answer. It still doesn’t explain what specifically about these two cases warrants them to be approached differently.

My ethics is based on the dignity of the person being harmed. In one case you already exist.. It's too late. — schopenhauer1

But it’s not too late. You can prevent harm by putting him in crutches and thereby bringing about his enlightenment.

In the other, you are creating wholesale, harm onto someone else, unnecessarily. — schopenhauer1

What are you referring to here? I’m not talking about the harm caused by procreating, if that’s what you’re referring to.

You might have missed my last post here, but to paraphrase I’m not interested so much in whether or not someone is being used, but rather that someone is being harmed.

You’re willing to go to what most consider extreme measures to prevent harming a future person, even if it means harming a living person to do so. And that’s meant to be just a statement of fact. I’m not judging whether or not that’s morally permissible.

The contradiction I see is that in this instance you’re fine with causing harm because you see it as justified, necessary perhaps, but not willing to harm someone in order to bring about enlightenment (which is presumed to decrease/prevent suffering as well). Why is it ok to harm one, but not the other? The outcome is the at least comparable. Admittedly the enlightened person will not be able to completely eliminate suffering, but then we’re splitting hairs on how much suffering needs to be prevented to make it ok to cause harm to prevent it. Either the ends justify the means, or they don’t, right? If you’re going to make exceptions, then you need to explain why the particular case of AN warrants that, when other, very similar as I see it, cases do not.

:rofl:

@schopenhauer1

Still curious to see your reply to my last post.

My question to you is... would she be aware intuitively that something is missing? Would she have a longing/ desire for “somebody” else. Would she consider that there could be more “hers” or another of those “things” she sees looking back at her in the reflection of a puddle. Would she ponder the existence of a “him”. Or would these thoughts never occur to her unless some random human just appeared from the bushes.

How would she think? She has no need for vocalised language. Would she even use her voice in such a quiet animal free place.

Would she be lonely. — Benj96

I think it really depends on her evolutionary history. I’d agree with @Hanover that we have evolved to be social creatures to greater or lesser extents. But there’s lots of factors involved before you can reasonably estimate how she may feel. What is her age? Was she taught anything by her parents? How busy is she in her daily struggle to survive?

Quite an impressive, and saddening, list. Not looking for a debate, but I’m just curious how many items on your list you personally disagree with, or feel that the world would have been better off without the US intervening? Half? 75%?

How are they being used? — schopenhauer1

By being treated as pawns. They’re a means to an end (an AN world).

Did I force them? — schopenhauer1

This is an interesting question. Most people would agree that if you can reasonably prevent suffering, you should. You should save a drowning person if you’re able. AN’s feel that procreating is harmful, so why wouldn’t you intervene if given the option? Stopping someone from having unprotected sex would be like stopping someone from shooting someone else, right?

Also it’s about not allowing an injustice to incur, from that perspective, that someone is sad an injustice is being prevented, doesn’t magically justify the injustice. — schopenhauer1

You feeling like something is unjust also doesn’t make it so. But my point is that you feel justified on the one hand to cause harm (by trying to convince people not to procreate and making those who have feel like they did something immoral) in order to prevent what you presumably view as a greater harm (a clear case of the ends justifying the means), but on the other hand you don’t feel justified to cause harm in order to bring about enlightenment (a clear case of the ends not justifying the means). I don’t see what’s so different in these two examples that warrants they be treated differently; that an exception be made.

Should I respect the sadness of preventing a bully from enjoying their bullying? — schopenhauer1

I don’t know, should you? Is his suffering somehow less important than anyone else’s? If the drowning person is the next coming of Jeffery Dahmer should you still save him?

If someone says they are sad for not eating meat, does that justify the injustice in the eyes of the vegan? — schopenhauer1

I think in this case the vegan needs to justify why the suffering of animals is more important than the suffering of humans.

Well, it’s not really about who/what is being used, it’s about how you justify your actions.

But, if you insist, then whomever you’re trying to convince not to have children is being used to further your agenda. Your success in doing so creates the potential for harm.

How does it not? Your justification for AN rests on a potential future event; an end. It regards taking action now (the means) to prevent a certain end justifiable. IOW’s the end is so horrible that it justifies taking action now to prevent it.

So, sure maybe putting you in crutches makes you feel enlightened down the line, doesn't mean I should put you in crutches. — schopenhauer1

Perhaps I’m mistaken, but the underlying premise that leads you to this conclusion seems to be that the ends do not justify the means. If so, AN appears to violate that premise. The end (a life of essentially unknown potential for pleasure/suffering) is used to justify the means (not procreating).

Try and think of a quote or maxim that is true and insightful to which counterexamples cannot be found. — Bartricks

You can’t please everyone all the time, but you can please some of the people some of the time.

Stupid is as stupid does.

Even a broken clock is right twice a day.

You can’t judge a book by looking at the cover.

Looks can be deceiving.

Dead men tell no tales.

Don’t count your chickens before they hatch.

Don’t put all your eggs in one basket.

You can’t eat your cake and have it too.

Does that say anything at all about the person who links to a particular piece of music ? Or who doesn't want to try any other flavour ? — Amity

I think it probably does, but my reasons for liking X may be different than your reasons for liking X. So it isn’t like you can say “oh, you like X, you nest be Y type of person.”

where does the music take you ? — Amity

I like different styles of music, so it depends. But generally speaking music that’s aggressive or controversial is kind of cathartic to me. I’m a very reserved, self-conscious person; always in control of my emotions, etc. But this type of music allows me to let go of my inhibitions.

So, this has more to do with the lyrics ? The message sent out ? — Amity

Well, it’s both. I mean you can find anti-religious music in many genres, for example, but they all don’t resonate the same way.

Where is the philosophy here ? — Amity

I don’t think this song’s particularly deep.

However, don't you think you were already on a 'quest' of sorts ? Questioning beliefs.
How long ago was that ? — Amity

No. I was raised in a small town where everyone was the same. From race, to religion, to politics, to socio-economic status. As a result, you never bump into someone who challenges your beliefs. I discovered Manson when I was about 16, so 2002-2003. Something like that.

How much have you questioned the 'philosophy' or motivation of the one you are grateful to ? — Amity

I never considered his personal philosophy much. I’m not really sure what that even is. He just got me wondering things like “what if God doesn’t exist?”

Do you still have him buried/burrowed in your head ? — Amity

I don’t know what you mean exactly. I still like his music, at least his older stuff.

Can we separate the product from the producer ? — Amity

I think so. His main three albums (Antichrist Superstar, Mechanical Animals, and Holywood) were concept albums that all connected to form a triptych. So there’s multiple characters involved in the story he’s telling, and it is meant to be a story. But there’s definitely autobiographical information in it as well.

Possibly - a hard, cold, icy, dark granito balsamico ? — Amity

Lol, sounds about right.