I don’t believe I ever used the phrase “token of a noun”, but if I did I wasn’t talking about nouns as tokens - which is what I take you to mean by “an utterance or inscription of the noun itself”.

That would be grossly unfair. Both are fine. It doesn't mean, though, that the phrases "common noun" and "proper noun" refer to any non-linguistic items. Which is what you seem to claim here: — bongo fury

I said from the outset that I don’t think a proper noun, which refers only to a single entity, makes a type. Because it makes little difference to me, I was trying to be accommodating of your view, but it looks like I cannot.

A proper noun does not refer to a noun or a name.
A proper noun is a noun or a name.

A proper noun is a noun that identifies a single entity and is used to refer to that entity, such as Africa, Jupiter, Sarah, or Amazon, as distinguished from a common noun, which is a noun that refers to a class of entities and may be used when referring to instances of a specific class. — Wikipedia

No, only to the name. — bongo fury

Why can a common noun refer to its instances but a proper noun cannot refer to its instance?

A proper noun is a noun that identifies a single entity and is used to refer to that entity, such as Africa, Jupiter, Sarah, or Amazon — Wikipedia

A proper noun is a noun that is used to refer to a single entity. The proper noun "Jupiter", for example, refers to the single entity which is that planet.

Does 'proper noun' refer to the name or the named object? — bongo fury

Wikipedia tells me:

A proper noun is a noun that identifies a single entity and is used to refer to that entity, such as Africa, Jupiter, Sarah, or Amazon, as distinguished from a common noun, which is a noun that refers to a class of entities and may be used when referring to instances of a specific class. — Wikipedia

From this I gather that a 'proper noun' is a noun that refers to a single entity.

Does 'proper noun' refer to the name or the named object? Anyone would assume the first and not the second — bongo fury

I guess, but then the first also refers to the second. So 'proper noun' refers to both the name and the named object?

It can't be both. — bongo fury

I don't see why not. A common noun "refers to a class...and may be used when referring to instances of [that class]". If common nouns can refer to both, then why can't proper nouns?

I'm happy for this to be moved to a new thread if it is warranted.

You overlooked my quote of PI 241.
— Luke

You didn't explain how it was relevant, and I couldn't see the connection. — Metaphysician Undercover

You said that common or conventional language use "may dictate what is correct and incorrect, [but] it does not necessarily indicate what is true and what is false."

At PI 241, W states that "What is true or false is what human beings say".

The English language consists of a multitude of language-games, and we cannot point to one game which could be called "the English language". There is nothing which "the English Language" actually refers to. — Metaphysician Undercover

How can you maintain both that "The English language consists of a multitude of language-games", and also that "There is nothing which "the English language" actually refers to"?

That is why your proposed type/token dichotomy is inapplicable here, where Wittgenstein is talking about "naming". "Naming" is a practice commonly consisting of applying proper nouns. — Metaphysician Undercover

Naming also applies to common nouns, so the type-token distinction is not inapplicable here.

Your writing is so confused, saying that a type is a word, and nouns are themselves classified as types and tokens. Such things always depend on how the word is used, so we cannot make universal judgements about "words" in this way. — Metaphysician Undercover

There are no universal judgements; I'm trying to help you understand the distinction. I'm saying consider the type as a word, a noun, a concept, or a class, because that might help you to distinguish types from tokens, which are concrete instances or objects of that type. Or forget the type-token distinction altogether and look at Wittgenstein's use of the word "recurrence" at PI 258 instead.

There is no problem with naming sensations in our public language; we do do that every day, in case you hadn't noticed.
— Luke

The fact that we do it doesn't imply that there is no problem with it. If that were the case then there'd be no such thing as a mistake. — Metaphysician Undercover

It is your position that:

the so-called PLA demonstrates a problem in naming any objects, private or public — Metaphysician Undercover

our common practise of naming things proceeds in an unjustified manner — Metaphysician Undercover

That is, it is your position that all naming (naming anything) is a mistake. If everything were a mistake, then there'd be no such thing as a mistake.

Therefore it has been concluded that we cannot coherently describe a private language. — Metaphysician Undercover

You haven't gone far enough. It's not that there can be a private language only we cannot describe it. It's that there cannot be a private language at all.

As noted in the earlier article I posted:

Wittgenstein first defined a private language by saying “the individual words of this language are to refer to what can only be known to the person speaking; to his immediate private sensations.” Does this mean that the entire vocabulary of the language must consist of words referring to the speaker’s private sensations? How then could such a language have any grammatical structure? — Richard Floyd

If I say that I am in pain I am not describing my pain — Fooloso4

You are not describing your pain, but you are describing your sensation? I take W to be saying that if you say you are in pain, then you are expressing your pain and this is not a description.

I had assumed MU was being at least offered a correct rendition of general usage of the type/token distinction, but I have to admit to being startled, here: — bongo fury

I'm startled that you are criticising me instead of MU, who asserts:

I'm fully aware of the type/token distinction — Metaphysician Undercover

while at the same time contradicting his claimed awareness with comments such as:

we can have different instances of the very same token. PERIOD. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't claim to be any sort of expert on the type-token distinction. As I've said several times now, I only thought it would help to clarify for MU the difference between two different possible meanings of "the same": the same type and the same token.

I attempted to apply the distinction to PI 258 in order to show that Wittgenstein was not talking about a once-off token of the sensation "S", but that his intention was for the diarist to establish the name "S" for a type of sensation. I see now that my introduction of the type-token distinction was a fool's errand, and that a better approach would have been to stress Wittgenstein's use of the word "recurrence" instead. I did try that early on, but maybe I should have perservered. Either way, MU failed to understand the type-token distinction or the basic meaning of of the word "recurrence".

Do you mean, they each denote a single individual, which is the unique token of its type, making the type/token distinction superfluous? (Though perhaps harmless.) — bongo fury

If I were to follow my nominalist claim that a type is simply a concept or a noun, then it is perhaps more correct to say that a proper noun is both a token and a type - or "the unique token of its type" as you say. However, it's not much of a type if there is only one token. But I'm not too concerned either way.

Then you might or might not want to get into syntax, distinguishing tokens (utterances, inscriptions etc.) of the denoting noun from the word itself, considered as class or type of those tokens? — bongo fury

You are talking about distinguishing tokens from their type. Isn't that just what the type-token distinction is?

common nouns which can be classified into types and their tokens.
— Luke

Again, you mean they each denote either (depending how you look at it), a class or type or extension, or on the other hand severally the several objects which are members of that extension, i.e. tokens of the type? — bongo fury

Yes.

But the general usage admits the implication of such a commitment. Types are an accepted piece of Platonism in linguistics and analytical philosophy. — bongo fury

If that's what the general usage is, then I guess I wasn't following the general usage. My bad.

Why not? Truth and falsity are important features of our communicative reality., and extremely relevant to the subject at hand, the supposed PL:A — Metaphysician Undercover

You overlooked my quote of PI 241.

No I'm questioning the existence of types. You keep claiming that types have existence. I think types are something imaginary, simply made up by peoples' minds, having no real existence. — Metaphysician Undercover

Does the English language have real existence?

Obviously the words are not imaginary, what they represent is. Did you see my example, Santa Clause? — Metaphysician Undercover

Santa Claus or any other proper noun does not really fit types and tokens, because proper nouns only have one token, which does not make a type. However, that is no argument against common nouns which can be classified into types and their tokens. Types represent their tokens in the sense that a type is a word that represents a (class/type of) concrete token/object. So your argument isn't what you think. To argue that "what the words represent is imaginary" is to argue that tokens are imaginary, not that types are imaginary.

I told you to reread 244 because you presented an obvious misrepresentation of what was said there. At 244 Wittgenstein said there doesn't "seem" to be a problem here. You completely ignored the "seem", and claimed that he said there is no problem in naming a sensation. — Metaphysician Undercover

There is no problem with referring to sensations in our public language; we do do that every day, in case you hadn't noticed.

So, "the problem", which didn't "seem" to be there, as it was hiding behind the "but", is expounded on between 244 1nd 258, and expressly laid out in the example at 258. — Metaphysician Undercover

258 is talking about a private language, not our public language. Think about that, instead of pretending to know what you are talking about.

Do you see that? Conventional usage constitutes the existence of a type — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, and who claimed that conventional usage implies that Santa exists? You are confused. Still.

Now, can you see that "common or conventional usage", though it may dictate what is correct and incorrect, it does not necessarily indicate what is true and what is false. In other words, common usage might have us saying something which is false, because it is conventional, and therefore correct, though it is not true. — Metaphysician Undercover

Why are you introducing truth and falsity?

241. “So you are saying that human agreement decides what is true and what is false?” — What is true or false is what human beings say; and it is in their language that human beings agree. This is agreement not in opinions, but rather in form of life. — LW

If the "type" is produced by, or it's existence is dependent on, common, conventional, or correct usage, with complete disregard for truth or falsity, how can we correctly call this "existence"? — Metaphysician Undercover

Correctly call what existence? Are you questioning the existence and use of nouns?

If “X exists” amounts to no more than “X” has a meaning — then it is not a sentence which treats of X, but a sentence about our use of language, that is, about the use of the word “X”. — PI 58

So, let's look at what you call "the existence of a 'type'". If the "type" is produced by, or it's existence is dependent on, common, conventional, or correct usage, with complete disregard for truth or falsity, how can we correctly call this "existence"? Such a "type" is something purely imaginary, and it is incorrect to say that imaginary things have existence. — Metaphysician Undercover

Whose imagination does common usage exist in? If all types are imaginary, then all nouns in the English language are imaginary. But in that case, I could not call you an imbecile.

Simply put, we commonly talk about nonexistent things. — Metaphysician Undercover

We also commonly talk about existent things. What's your point?

If the type-token distinction is merely classificatory, then all tokens would simply be types, because classification just produces types. — Metaphysician Undercover

So the type-token distinction, and classification more generally, is impossible? It's clearly not.

Come on Luke, 258, where "S" is proposed as the name of a sensation, is where he shows that there really is a problem with names referring to sensations.. — Metaphysician Undercover

But you said:

Reread 244 please. He distinctly says, there doesn't "seem" to be any problem here. Then he goes on to explain how there really is a problem with names referring to sensations.. — Metaphysician Undercover

If the problem with naming sensations is found at 258, then why tell me to re-read 244?

You might simply say, a "type" is a thing whose existence is created by common or conventional usage, but conventional usage is insufficient to support "existence". Talking about Santa Clause does not give that named thing existence. — Metaphysician Undercover

Who claimed that it did?

So I'll reiterate, the problem is not with the reality of a private language, there is no problem here. — Metaphysician Undercover

There's a very big problem here.

...All stated in a public language.
— Luke

Obviously you misunderstand. — Metaphysician Undercover

Nothing is more obvious than your misunderstanding of the private language argument.

It is a description of the sensation, although not an complete one. — Fooloso4

Earlier in the discussion, I said:

I think Wittgenstein's point is that having a pain (or other sensation) is not something that one can come to know or to learn of, and so it does not constitute knowledge. In order for it to be (learned) knowledge, one would need to be able to guess or speculate whether one was in pain and then be able to confirm or disconfirm it. — Luke

This summarises the kernel of his On Certainty-style argument that can be found at PI 246, for example.

Along the same lines, in their exegesis of PI 290, Baker and Hacker state:

One says ‘I am in pain’ without justification. Whereas I identify the pain of another by reference to behavioural criteria (including his verbal behaviour), I do not identify my sensation by criteria, nor does a ‘private’ sample warrant my utterance. Indeed I do not identify my sensation (for there is here no possibility of any misidentification). — Baker and Hacker

They go on to explain that descriptions of physical objects are the terminus of that kind of language game, whereas verbal expressions of pain are the start of their kind of language game. We can be misled into thinking that these "descriptions" are on equal footing. As they say:

We take ‘I have a pain’ to be a description of the speaker’s state of mind, and so conceive this language‐game to begin with the sensation, which is observed, identified, ascribed to a subject (I) to whom one refers in the description which is the terminus of the language‐game. For when I describe my room, e.g. ‘The sofa‐table has a K’ang‐Hsi vase on it’, I observe the items in the room, identify them, satisfy myself that I know how things are, and refer to them in the description I give. But these language‐games are altogether different. I do not observe my sensations, nor do I identify them. There is no question of my knowing or not knowing how things are with me here. The first‐person pronoun thus used is not a referring expression, and in an avowal such as ‘I have a pain’ I do not ascribe an experience to a person to whom I refer (cf. Exg. §§404 – 10). An avowal of pain is not a description of one’s state of mind, nor is it a description of one’s pain. — Baker and Hacker

As Wittgenstein himself says at PI 290:

290. It is not, of course, that I identify my sensation by means of criteria; it is, rather, that I use the same expression. But it is not as if the language-game ends with this; it begins with it. But doesn’t it begin with the sensation — which I describe? — Perhaps this word “describe” tricks us here. I say “I describe my state of mind” and “I describe my room”. One needs to call to mind the differences between the language-games. — LW

That "pain" may be defined in different ways indicates very clearly that there is not just one type or class which is called "pain". — Metaphysician Undercover

Aren't we talking about the sensation of pain? What many different ways are there to define "pain" in this sense? (I'm not asking what many different types of pain there are).

You seem to be overlooking the reality of the situation, that most of the time during language use we do not proceed based on "agreed" definitions, or "agreed" usage. — Metaphysician Undercover

Fine, I'm happy to call it "common usage" as you proceeded to do. I never meant to suggest that we each signed a contract; only that the usage is conventional or commonly practised.

If this is what constitutes the existence of a "type"... — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, common or conventional usage constitutes the existence of a "type". Like when Pluto was declassified as a planet. "Planet" is the type, the definition of the word. The rocks in our solar system are the concrete particulars that we classify as planets or not planets.

What I've been telling you, is that in common usage of "sensation", the thing sensed, the object of a sensation (something seen for example), might be called a token of a type. — Metaphysician Undercover

What I've told you multiple times is that the type-token distinction is independent of "things sensed"; the distinction is merely classificatory, distinguishing a class from its instances; a name from the things named.

Reread 244 please. He distinctly says, there doesn't "seem" to be any problem here. Then he goes on to explain how there really is a problem. — Metaphysician Undercover

He says there doesn't seem to be any problem of words referring to sensations, and that "we talk about sensations every day, and name them". Where does he "explain how there really is a problem" with words referring to sensations?

So the problem is not with the "private word/sign 'S'", as you state...
The use of the proper noun, "S" as a name to name a particular sensation, which is a supposed private thing (token for you) cannot be justified. — Metaphysician Undercover

You start by saying the problem is not with "S" but end by saying the problem is with justifying the use of "S"...?

But I take a step further, where you refuse to go, to say that the so-called PLA demonstrates a problem in naming any objects, private or public. — Metaphysician Undercover

Meta's public language argument(!), which demonstrates the logical impossibility of a public language.

...All stated in a public language.

It does more than just refer to a sensation. If it just referred to a sensation the word 'pain' would play no role. 'Pain' and 'S' are not the same. Pain, however incompletely, describes the sensation. — Fooloso4

I don't want to say that you can't call it a description, but I don't find the word apt. It's unclear to me what it is a description of. And is it the same description every time?

I am more amenable to stating it in these terms:

To indicate the kind of sensation that is present is what the sensation word pain means. — Fooloso4

But I wonder whether this account does not also submit to your argument regarding pain management; that it is not necessary for a pain to be present or expressed in order for us to use the word.

What is the exact nature of the pain? — Fooloso4

The exact nature is how it feels (to me), I guess, which ties back to why the word "pain" is not a description of my (or any particular person's) sensation. As Floyd puts it:

...we can see that the word ‘pain’ cannot refer directly to the sensation, because only I could know what that sensation is: if the word did refer to the sensation, the word would mean nothing to anyone but me (as a word in a private language would). — Richard Floyd

I think most people tend to dismiss the ("inner") sensation completely (it "drops out of consideration") and presume Wittgenstein to be identifying a sensation only with its expression.
— Luke

Yes, I agree with this. — Sam26

You agree that Wittgenstein dismisses the inner sensation completely, or you agree only that most people tend to think this?

Why do you think that?
— Luke

I was describing MU's views, — Srap Tasmaner

Ah, I misread you. My apologies. Yes, that is his misconception. :grimace:

Therefore, there are not many different types or classes of pain.
— Luke

That's obviously wrong. Clearly there are many different types of pain. That's exactly what being divisible into many different types means, that there are many different types of the type which is divisible. — Metaphysician Undercover

I misspoke here, but I corrected it in my following response. Yes, there are many different types or classes of pain (these are the subclasses), but there is only one type or class that is "pain".

If I don't have the type, and you don't have the type, then where is the type? I think you're wrong here. A type must be somewhere, if it has any existence at all. I think that types are within my mind, and they are within your mind as well. They do not exist in some realm of Platonic Forms. — Metaphysician Undercover

I agree the type exists only as in knowing how to use the word "pain" correctly; as the definition of the word "pain"; or as our agreed usage of the word "pain". Tokens are the actual instances to which the word refers. Hence, "Ford Mustang" as a type is an abstract concept. whereas a Ford Mustang is a concrete particular (token) that we classify as belonging to the type "Ford Mustang".

See also my earlier post where I mentioned Platonic Forms.

Correct, but - in this example - a "sensatIon" is a token of the type "inner experience". And each subtype will have its own tokens. That's the mere taxonomy I was referring to.
— Luke

No that's not true, because you are again using sensation to refer to a type of inner experience. — Metaphysician Undercover

I wanted to correct this, too. I should not have suggested that all subtypes are themselves tokens. As above, all types are abstract concepts, whereas tokens are (what we might consider to be) actual instantiations of those types.

But, as Wittgenstein demonstrates at 258, "a sensation" cannot be identified as a particular thing, due to the lack of a criterion of identity. — Metaphysician Undercover

I disagree with this reading. The word "sensation" as it is used in our public language does have criteria of correctness. And he clearly indicates at PI 244 that our reference to sensations is unproblematic:

244. How do words refer to sensations? — There doesn’t seem to be any problem here; don’t we talk about sensations every day, and name them? — LW

If you took some time to analyze your own inner experience, and sensations, through introspection, as Wittgenstein did, you'd probably come to the same conclusion as Wittgenstein does at 261 " he has something—and that is all that can be said". Inner experience is "something", sensation is "something", but we surely cannot say that it consists of tokens. — Metaphysician Undercover

He is referring here to the mistaken idea that "the connection between the name and the thing
named" can be established privately. He is not saying that this is a problem for the words "sensation" or "pain" as these are words of our public language. The problem is with the putative private word/sign "S".

261. What reason have we for calling “S” the sign for a sensation? — LW

That is, what reason have we for calling the private sign "S" the sign of a sensation, given that the word "sensation" has a public meaning?

No, because no pain exists as "an Instance", so it's equally wrong to say that different pains are different instances of pain. — Metaphysician Undercover

If there are no instances of pain, then there is only the abstract concept of "pain"; only the meaning of the word with nothing (no tokens) that belongs to that type. That obviously contradicts how we use the word.

It makes no sense to say that we each have a type called "pain".
— Luke

I think this is exactly what he believes. We each have our own type system, each have different meanings for the words we share. — Srap Tasmaner

Why do you think that?

This would imply that we all use words differently (assuming meaning is use) and that there are no criteria of correctness in the use of words .Therefore, we could not correct anyone's usage or teach anyone a language. That is the opposite of my reading, and of what is obviously the case.

Isn't the word 'pain' itself a description? From it we know that the sensation is not pleasant, that it is something I want alleviated rather than prolonged. — Fooloso4

Earlier in the article, Floyd offers this "possible interpretation":

Wittgenstein thus claims that the word ‘pain’ does make reference to a sensation, but does not describe it. So the actual sensation that you feel does not affect the meaning (ie public use) of the word, but whether or not there is a sensation being felt does. — Richard Floyd

Following this interpretation, the word "pain" is used as a reference to a sensation, rather than a description of it.

A diagnosis is aided by a description of the sensation, its severity, where it is located, whether it is sharp or dull or throbbing, sudden or continuous, tender to touch, whether better or worse with activities or conditions heat or cold, — Fooloso4

I would consider these as descriptions of (various instances of) pain, rather than showing that the word "pain" is a description.

In the same way, we can see that the word ‘pain’ cannot refer directly to the sensation, because only I could know what that sensation is — Richard Floyd

Refer directly to the sensation of what? The pain? It would be odd if the word pain did not refer to pain! — Fooloso4

I think what he means by "directly" here is that the word 'pain' cannot refer to the "exact nature" of the pain (he uses this phrase in your next quote of him), such as the exact nature of the quale or of what the sensation feels like. In other words, a description of (the exact nature of) the sensation.

No, there are many different types of pain. — Metaphysician Undercover

a type, or class, is often divided into subtypes, or subclasses. — Metaphysician Undercover

You are right that the type "pain" can be divided into subtypes. But the type "pain" is not its subtypes. There is only one type or class that is "pain". Therefore, there are not many different types or classes of pain. There are many different subtypes and subclasses of pain.

The type of pain which I have could easily be different from the type of pain that you have, especially if I have a different type of injury from you. And, the fact that we'd be talking about different types of pain, does not imply that we are not talking about "pain" any more. If you and I are talking about different types of Ford Mustangs, that does not mean we are no longer talking about Ford Mustangs. This fact is a big reason for the existence of misunderstanding. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm not talking about types of pain, which are subtypes, but the type (or class) itself: "pain". This includes all things/tokens that we classify as "pain".

If I can't have a type, then neither can you. — Metaphysician Undercover

You're right, neither of us can. We can't have the class/category. We can only have tokens or instances of that class/category.

Look, "inner experience" refers to a type. Then we have specified a type of inner experience as "sensation", so we have just named a new type. — Metaphysician Undercover

Correct, but - in this example - a "sensatIon" is a token of the type "inner experience". And each subtype will have its own tokens. That's the mere taxonomy I was referring to.

Now, the diarist wants to say that the thing referred to with "S" is a token rather than a type, but there is no criterion (other than the law of identity which Wittgenstein has rejected as nonsense) as to what constitutes a token. — Metaphysician Undercover

That's right. Now you're catching on, and seemingly starting to get what the word "token" means. It's only taken several pages. Except the diarist is supposed to create a type ("S") from the tokens; from the recurrence of the sensation.

Thanks Banno, I agree with you about enacting rules. I guess I should have specified my interest in the article, which I thought was a somewhat unique take on Wittgenstein's Beetle:

At §293 the ‘beetle-in-the-box’ argument itself suggests a similar but more general conclusion. Public words that refer to inner sensations do not get their meaning from the sensations themselves. All these words tell us is that there is a sensation, not what the sensation is. To Wittgenstein, linguistic meaning is the use of words, and as mentioned above, the use of the word ‘pain’ is to express rather than to describe the sensation:

“Suppose everyone has a box with something in it: we call it a “beetle”. No one can look into anyone else’s box, and everyone says he knows what a beetle is only by looking at his beetle. – Here it would be quite possible for everyone to have something different in his box...The thing in the box has no place in the language game at all”

What Wittgenstein is saying is that the word ‘beetle’ cannot be referring to the beetle itself, because if it did then only I could know what I meant by the word ‘beetle’, as only I know what is in my box. In the same way, we can see that the word ‘pain’ cannot refer directly to the sensation, because only I could know what that sensation is: if the word did refer to the sensation, the word would mean nothing to anyone but me (as a word in a private language would). Clearly our sensation words have to tell us something about what kind of sensation they’re referring to, otherwise it would be difficult to see any difference between ‘pain’ and ‘pleasure’. But what Wittgenstein is trying to show is that what we actually feel – which no one else can really know – is irrelevant to the meaning of the word.

Wittgenstein’s position therefore seems to be that sensations definitely are private, and that sensation words do not have sensations themselves as their meaning, and in fact the exact nature of the sensation has no bearing on the meaning (use) of the word whatsoever. The word merely indicates that a certain kind of sensation is present. — Richard Floyd

I think most people tend to dismiss the ("inner") sensation completely (it "drops out of consideration") and presume Wittgenstein to be identifying a sensation only with its expression.

In the interests of "re-railing" the discussion, I came across this article only this week. I found it to resonate with my own views on the PLA:

https://philosophynow.org/issues/58/The_Private_Language_Argument

See what you think.

That's right, I think it's nonsensical, incoherent, and inconsistent with the definition of "token", to call pain a token. — Metaphysician Undercover

That doesn't answer my question of what you think a token is, or how you think I am using the word "token".

We each have a type of sensation which we call "pain". Why do you say that this makes no sense? When I have a sensation of the type I call pain, I call it "pain". When you have a sensation of the type you call pain you call it "pain". — Metaphysician Undercover

We don't each have our own types of "pain". There is only one type, which is "pain" - i.e. the category or class called "pain". There is not your type of pain and my type of pain; there is your token of pain and my token of pain and they are both tokens of the same type: "pain". Likewise, if you had a Ford Mustang and I had a Ford Mustang, then there would not be two different types of car (yours and mine); instead there would be two different tokens of the (one) same type of car: "Ford Mustang".

We cannot possibly have different types of "pain" in the way you suggest. In order to have different types we might call your type "pain A" and my type "pain B". But all that distinguishes pain A from pain B is that one is yours and one is mine. Either they both still refer to what we were previously calling "pain" or else we are no longer talking about "pain".

In order to be different types, if you had something of the type "pain", then I would need to have something of a different type that is not "pain". That is, for us to have different types, if you have a pain, then I must not have a pain. Moreover, you cannot have a type. A type is a category or class. You can only have instances or tokens of a category or class. I don't understand your resistance to this mere taxonomy.

And, as Wittgenstein explains at 258, it would not even make any sense to think of the sensations which I call "pain", as tokens, because there is no criterion of correctness by which to judge whether the sensations I call "pain" are really of the type pain. — Metaphysician Undercover

Wittgenstein does not mention the word "pain" at all at PI 258. He mentions only the word/symbol "S", which has a supposedly private use in a supposedly private language.

Therefore they are just sensations which I say are of the type pain, but do not qualify as tokens of pain because there is no correctness as to whether they really are pain or are not pain.. — Metaphysician Undercover

As a word of our public language, the word "pain" has a criterion (or criteria) of correctness.

I have sensations, but as I explained to you, they do not consist of tokens, if I maintain consistency with the way you use the word "token". — Metaphysician Undercover

What way is that (or what do you think it is)?

You said that if I express "I am in pain", then it is necessary that I have a token of pain. — Metaphysician Undercover

I never said that.

But you accept that the expression is not itself the token. So you seem to completely overlook the possibility that I might be intentionally lying. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't care if you're lying or not. It's not about me trying to work out if you genuinely have pains. I directly asked you whether you have pains. I already know that you do, and you have already said on multiple occasions that you do. I do not understand why you are refusing to refer to separate instances of having pain (or any other sensations) as "tokens".

How is a dog's supposed experience of pain even relevant to what we're discussing? — Metaphysician Undercover

What reason might there be to think that dogs or other animals are ever in pain? Why even call it "pain"? After all, it's not as though we can compare their sensations with ours.

You seem to be saying that Wittgenstein argues that sensations are not private, yet at 246-251 he acknowledges that sensation are private. — Metaphysician Undercover

He argues that a private language is impossible, not that a private sensation is impossible. He takes it as given that sensations are private.

But if this is the case, we are talking about a type, called "pain", not tokens of pain. — Metaphysician Undercover

"Pain" is the type. That there are two of them - you have one and I have one - and that they are both "pain" means that we each have a token of that type. It makes no sense to say that we each have a type called "pain". There is only one type called "pain" and we each have a token of it.

If we have no means for comparison how can we even talk about whether they are one token or two? — Metaphysician Undercover

Either you and I each have pains (and therefore we each have tokens of pain) or else we don't and so we cannot correctly call either or both of them "pains". In the latter case, what we have is simply not of that type, so we would be miscategorising what we have or misusing the word "pain".

You can tell me about your claimed token all you want, that's a far cry from producing it. — Metaphysician Undercover

You want me to produce my sensations? Do you not have them yourself?

246. In what sense are my sensations private? [...]
Other people cannot be said to learn of my sensations only from my behaviour — for I cannot be said to learn of them. I have them.
This much is true: it makes sense to say about other people that they doubt whether I am in pain; but not to say it about myself. — PI 246

Do you want to contradict Wittgenstein and say that you doubt whether you are in pain? Also, what do you make of the remarks at 250 which relate to your comments on lying:

250. Why can’t a dog simulate pain? Is it too honest? Could one teach a dog to simulate pain? Perhaps it is possible to teach it to howl on particular occasions as if it were in pain, even when it isn’t. But the right surroundings for this behaviour to be real simulation would still be missing. — PI 250

Is a dog so honest that it cannot help but express only real pain? Note Wittgenstein's distinction between pain and its expresssion (pain-behaviour), such as at 281, 244, 245, or, again, at 246:

Other people cannot be said to learn of my sensations only from my behaviour — for I cannot be said to learn of them. I have them. — PI 246

I cannot show you my sensations because sensations are private. Wittgenstein's is not a private sensations argument (unless you count PI 246-251, where he acknowledges that sensations are private). Did you think he was a behaviourist?

I am waiting for you to produce this token of pain — Metaphysician Undercover

What is a token of the type "pain" is an actual instance of pain (e,g, actually having a pain). — Luke

This is an invalid conclusion. That there is a token, an example, or instance of pain which is referred to when I say "I'm in pain", requires that I am not lying. The possibility that I am telling the truth when I say "I'm in pain", does not necessitate that there is a token, instance, or example, being referred to, because it's only a possibility. It is required that the token actually serves as an example, to be a token.. — Metaphysician Undercover

A token is an instance is an example. Either you have pains or you don't. Are you claiming that you lie about it in every instance? You seem to be claiming you don't have pains. I guess this is all you have left to say.

My pain does not exist as an instance, or as a token. — Metaphysician Undercover

You said that "A token is an example of a type, by definition." So that means your pains are not examples (or instances) of the type "pain"?

Yes, and it was you who insisted that the same token, or instance, of pain could not go away and come back at a later time. My pain usually goes away and comes back at a different time, when I sleep for example. Therefore I have concluded that my pain cannot exist as a token or an instance, as you are defining these words.. — Metaphysician Undercover

I did not insist that. Our discussion on the subject began with the definition of types and tokens, and with what a token is for Wittgenstein's diarist. You refused to acknowledge that Wittgenstein was talking about the recurrence of a sensation, despite Wittgenstein's explicit use of the word. I then reminded you that in Wittgenstein's scenario, he states that he writes "S" "for every day on which I have the sensation." This implies that he writes "S" either one or zero times per day.

Furthermore, you are being dishonest because I acknowledged on more than one occasion that a token could be defined as lasting longer than a day. For example:

I will grant you this one point. It is possible for someone to have the same pain for several days in a row, and we might consider this to be a single token or instance of pain. Admittedly, I had assumed that the sensation 'S' was fleeting and was presumed to last less than a day. Whether we call it a different token or not makes little difference, however, because the problem remains: how can you be sure that you are remembering it correctly as the same sensation after you have stopped sensing it for a while (e.g. after you have slept or lost consciousness)? In other words, are you correct to still call it 'S'?
— Luke

OK, I'm glad we're finally getting to the point. Whether or not you believe it is possible to have the same token of a type of sensation on numerous occasions, is not what is at issue. What is at issue is that the private diarist is claiming this, and is claiming to mark down S every time the very same token of sensation occurs, "a particular sensation". Whether it is possible for the person to actual have the same particular sensation is not the issue. — Metaphysician Undercover

I also coined the term "broken token" for such an example, and more recently stated that you might tell the doctor you've had the same pain for weeks, months or years.

No, I have never had an "instance" of pain as you are using "instance". — Metaphysician Undercover

That's a much weaker claim than your earlier insistence that "There is no such thing as a "token of sensation"". Anyway, as I've acknowledged several times and as per my quote above, I am not using "instance" or "token" any differently than you. Moreover it seems that, given the absence of response in your latest reply, you are no longer defending your assertion that I am applying the type/token distinction to "pain" in the "context of a private language". Therefore, you apparently still want to deny that you have pains at all. Maybe you express them without having them?

Yes, I told you lying is a real possibility which proves that what you are asserting is false.

You invalidly concluded that I must be in possession of a token of that type (beetle in the box), from the fact that I assert that I have something of that type. That your conclusion is invalid is evident from the fact that I could be lying. .
— Metaphysician Undercover — Metaphysician Undercover

And, as I indicated in my response at the time, the possibility of lying implies the possibility of telling the truth. If it is possible that your tokens (or "somethings") of pain are a lie, then it is also possible that your tokens (or "somethings") of pain are not a lie. Which proves that your assertion "There is no such thing as a token of sensation" is false.

You don't seem to understand the fact that the type/token distinction cannot be applied in the context of the private language. — Metaphysician Undercover

I hate to break it to you, but "pain" is a word in our public language.

As I said, I do not believe there is any such a thing as an actual instance of pain. You'll have to show me one before I believe you. That's how you're using "instance", to signify an example of something, a "token". A token is an example of a type. So you'll have to show me your example. To talk about the existence of a token is insufficient, because you are telling me about a type, "pain" and insisting that there is such a thing as examples of this type, "tokens" without showing me these tokens. — Metaphysician Undercover

I would be more than happy to show you an instance of pain if you would let me. Otherwise, try pricking yourself with a pin (see PI 288).

You are insisting that you have something in your box, a token of the type "beetle" (in this case, a token of pain), But to be tokens of a particular type, they must serve to exemplify that type. Since you cannot use what's in your box, as an example of the type you are talking about, "pain", to demonstrate that type to me, we cannot truthfully say that what is in your box is a token of pain. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm not using what's in my box. I have asked you several times whether you have had any instances of pain before. You keep avoiding this very straightforward question. Now you are pretending not to know what the word "pain" means.

Do you understand the reality of the type/token distinction? A token is an example of a type, by definition. If there is something which cannot serve to exemplify a type, such as an inner, private sensation, it cannot be called a token. Otherwise, you could make up all sorts of fictitious types, and claim that there are real existing tokens of those types, like unicorns and flying spaghetti monsters, but all the tokens are in your mind. — Metaphysician Undercover

If you think that tokens of pain are fictitious, then you don't know the meaning of the word.

This means that we can have real existing things which are not tokens. You seem to be bogged down by some type of dichotomous thinking within which everything must be either a type or a token of a type — Metaphysician Undercover

You cannot have a token that is independent of its type. That is, I don't think it makes any sense to talk about tokens unless you are talking about them in terms of their type, or in terms of the type/token distinction. And I don't think that everything is a type. To repeat, I introduced the distinction to raise your awareness of two different possible meanings of the word "same": the same type or the same token.

So you do not recognize the fact that I can claim to have something, and even call it by the name of a type, "a pain", yet it is not a token of that type because I cannot use it to exemplify that type, as required by the name "token". Therefore it is not a token of that type, as required by the definition of "token". — Metaphysician Undercover

If you have something, and you call it a "pain" when it is not a pain, then you are either lying or misusing the word.

One more try, because I'm tired of your inability to grasp the type/token distinction.

An expression, such as "I have a headache", is not a token of the type "pain". — Metaphysician Undercover

Right, an expression is not a token of the type "pain". What is a token of the type "pain" is an actual instance of pain (e,g, actually having a pain). Perhaps you will understand it if I say that the type "pain" is like Plato's Form of "pain"; the pure idea of pain. However, there is no such Form, there is only the word/concept/type "pain" that we use to refer to actual instances/tokens of pain. This is why having a toothache is a token of (the type) "toothache", and why having a sore toe is a token of (the type) "sore toe". I can have a toothache and you can have a toothache and so can everyone else, and we can all refer to it as "a toothache".

You invalidly concluded that I must be in possession of a token of that type (beetle in the box), from the fact that I assert that I have something of that type. — Metaphysician Undercover

I simply assumed that you have had instances/tokens of pain before. You said as much when you mentioned your nightly toe pain. Do you want to say that you've never had any instances of pain?

That your conclusion is invalid is evident from the fact that I could be lying. . — Metaphysician Undercover

Lying about what? That you've had pain before? You could be lying, but you could also be telling the truth. What then?

Then, when it's pointed to, we can see it as an example of a type. — Metaphysician Undercover

“An example of a type” is an instance of a type, i.e. a token. The toothache or toe pain you have on a particular day or for a particular period of time is a token, or an “example of a type”.

Your “pointing to” stipulation is something you’ve just made up.

There is no such thing as a "token of sensation". — Metaphysician Undercover

Pain is a sensation. Surely you’ve had an instance (token) of pain before. And more than one separate instances of pain. No?

I think that the diarist would do that, because I see that people do that all the time. The sensation isn't exactly like the other one, but it's close enough, so I'll mark it as S. — Metaphysician Undercover

Where have you seen this use of a private language before? How does the diarist know the sensation is not “exactly like the other one”?

Applied in this case, we can see that a person might continuously have a tooth-ache, and refer to it as one thing, the same thing. This might be for the sake of convenience in the public communication. But in the privacy of one's own mind, the person would see that it is not the same pain from one moment to the next, it goes through many different phases of intensity, etc.. So the person would know that it is incorrect to call it by the same name, "S". Yet in Wittgenstein's example, the person proceeds to do what is known to be incorrect. — Metaphysician Undercover

It entirely depends on the diarist to write "S" in their diary for each recurrence of the sensation, so "the convenience of public communication" is irrelevant. "S" is supposed to have a private use only, which is the point. Why would the diarist mark "S" if they thought it was incorrect to do so?

Since this knowing that it is not the same (because there is no criterion by which it could be the same), necessitates that I am wrong in naming it as the same, therefore there is no possibility of me being right, we cannot talk about being "right" in this context. — Metaphysician Undercover

What criterion is there by which the sensation could be different? And what constitutes a single instance/token of the sensation?

The only reason we cannot talk about "right" here, is because the person knows oneself to be wrong. — Metaphysician Undercover

Whatever is going to seem wrong to me is wrong. And that only means that here we can’t talk about ‘wrong’.

This demonstrates a peculiar use of words by Wittgenstein. He says "whatever is going to seem right to me is right. And that only means that here we can't talk about 'right'." What is really the case, is that there is no such thing as "right" here, and we cannot talk about 'right', because the person always knows oneself to be wrong. So the only reason why we cannot talk about "right" here, is because the person has excluded the possibility of being right, by knowing oneself to be wrong.

This implies that a person can know oneself to be wrong, without reference to any rules. — Metaphysician Undercover

Here we can’t talk about ‘wrong’, either.

I'm looking at my car right now. It is the same car, the same unique instance of a type, that I was looking at yesterday.

I'm feeling confusion now, but it is a brand new unique instance of confusion; it is not numerically identical to the confusion I felt yesterday, not the same confusion.

Why is feeling different from looking-at? That's what I'm wondering. I'm not suggesting it isn't; I'm just wondering why we assume that it is. — Srap Tasmaner

You started out comparing a token of a feeling to a token of a car. But you then asked why a feeling is different from looking-at, instead of why a feeling is different from a car.

I'd say the reason for this difference is that cars typically last for about 10 or 15 years, while feelings typically don't last as long. However, feelings can last for more than a day, as I noted earlier. You might tell the doctor that you've had the same pain for weeks, months or years.

Your mode of argumentation, as commonly displayed, is to pay no respect for what the other person is saying — Metaphysician Undercover

That's a bit bloody rich coming from you.

In one context I was speaking about instances of sensation of a token. In the other context I was replying to your talk about instances of existence of a token. — Metaphysician Undercover

Hilarious. Here's a reminder of how the discussion transpired with no changes or omissions to the direct responses:

Different tokens are different instances. PERIOD.
— Luke

You are refusing to acknowledge that despite the fact that "Different tokens are different instances. PERIOD", we can have different instances of the very same token. PERIOD. Why is this so difficult to you?
— Metaphysician Undercover

We cannot have different instances of the very same token, by definition. A token is an instance of a type, not an instance of seeing or encountering something.
— Luke

I didn't say we can have two different instances of the same token, that doesn't even make sense to me. — Metaphysician Undercover

But tell me again how your contradiction is a result of "different contexts". You're delusional.

you ceaselessly insist that a token of sensation can only exists if it is present to the conscious mind — Metaphysician Undercover

This is easily solved. Provide an example of a token of sensation that is not present to the conscious mind.

We are discussing a metaphysical issue — Metaphysician Undercover

We are discussing Wittgenstein who says in the same work: "What we do is to bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use."

.

So we can remove all this type/token distinction as a distraction, and get right down to what Wittgenstein is actually saying with the example. — Metaphysician Undercover

Rather than a distraction, I introduced the type/token distinction intending to help provide clarity for what could be meant by "the same sensation" or "the same chair". But we got bogged down in your continual misunderstanding and argumentation about what is a token. So you go ahead and give your metaphysical reading.

My point was only that we seem to assume all of our inner experiences are numerically distinct, unique instances of types, and that the words we use to refer to them must refer to the types. Thus "I have the same feeling I had when we were about to lose the playoff game" is presumed to be literally false; it's not literally the same feeling, but a numerically distinct instance of the same type of feeling. (Or not -- I'm not getting into whether we're right.) I was just wondering where this assumption comes from. I think it's a perfectly good assumption, but it's not just logic. Is it empirical? What is it? — Srap Tasmaner

In relation to your book example, I think it is largely to do with "time and chance" and maybe also physiology. We typically only consider ourselves to experience one token of a "certain sensation", such as a headache, at a time. It seems odd to me to consider having two similar but unique headaches (i.e. of the same type) at the one time, in the same way that we might speak of having two similar but unique books (i.e. of the same type; such as having two copies of 1984) at the one time.

Does that answer your question, or is that what you were asking?

So I'll repeat what I said before. The ambiguity inherent in your preferred type/token distinction produces the confusion required for your mode of argumentation. — Metaphysician Undercover

What confusion? The only confusion here is yours, caused by your ignorance and misunderstanding of the type/token distinction, which for the umpteenth time has nothing to do with encountering. The definition of a token is not “encountering a token”, as you obviously think it is.

You know what I meant. Your pretense continues to baffle me. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don’t know what you meant by your glaring contradiction.

we can have different instances of the very same token. PERIOD. Why is this so difficult to you? — Metaphysician Undercover

I didn't say we can have two different instances of the same token, that doesn't even make sense to me. — Metaphysician Undercover