Unless I’ve misunderstood, I think your comments would be better directed at Meta than myself.

I agree with you that tokens, or unique individual instances of a type, are numerically distinct. And I agree with you that one cannot have a unique individual instance of a type twice.

But I therefore think that there is a logical barrier to having the same unique individual instance of an experience or a sensation twice, for that is what makes them unique individual instances (i.e. tokens). You can only have the same type of experience or sensation twice.

I’m afraid I don’t understand your question regarding the return of the loaned book.

Clearly, what distinguishes one instance from another is the coming into the conscious mind, coming to the attention of the conscious mind. Just like when you see the very same chair twice, what distinguishes one instance of seeing it from another, is the coming to the attention of your conscious mind. I don't understand why this is a problem for you. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is one token of a chair: “the very same chair”. You are not distinguishing two instances of chair here.

You are refusing to acknowledge that despite the fact that "Different tokens are different instances. PERIOD", we can have different instances of the very same token. PERIOD. Why is this so difficult to you? — Metaphysician Undercover

We cannot have different instances of the very same token, by definition. A token is an instance of a type, not an instance of seeing or encountering something.

The assumption is that a type is a human creation, artificial. And, since only human beings know humanly created types, then to be be a member, token, of a type is a human judgement. Of course it might be a mistaken assumption, — Metaphysician Undercover

What does this have to do with your false assumption that tokens must be encountered?

Back to square one, Luke demonstrates that he doesn't know how to read. How is "the sensation", as used four times in 258, in Wittgenstein's description of what it might mean to "name" a sensation, supposed to refer to a type, called "sensation", rather than to a particular sensation? — Metaphysician Undercover

Back to square one, indeed.

• As I said in my previous post and others, "the sensation" refers to both/either the token and/or the type.
• You have acknowledged there is no problem with naming a single token of the sensation.
• The problem is in establishing the name/type of the sensation, 'S'.
• Your constant repetition that Wittgenstein uses the phrase "the sensation" is no support for your claims.
• It is not my claim that he refers to a more general type called "sensation", but that he refers to a type of "certain sensation" called 'S'.

If each instance of sensation was actually the token itself, then there would be nothing which differentiates one instance from another, and we'd have no basis for a claim that they are distinct tokens. — Metaphysician Undercover

If you assume that the sensation occurs continuously, then what distinguishes one instance from another in Wittgenstein's example is every (different) day. Once again, the text states:

"258. Let’s imagine the following case. I want to keep a diary about the recurrence of a certain sensation. To this end I associate it with the sign “S” and write this sign in a calendar for every day on which I have the sensation."

However, Wittgenstein's use of the word "recurrence" is indicative that the sensation does not occur continuously, but that it...recurs. "Recur" can be defined as:

recur
• occur again periodically or repeatedly.

Now imagine if each instance of pain is itself a token. Then each instance of pain is exactly identical to every other instance of pain, as merely "pain", It is the described object, 'pain in my tooth', 'pain in my toe' etc., which provides the basis for a difference. — Metaphysician Undercover

"Pain" and "sensation" are both types and have their tokens. "Pain in my tooth" and "pain in my toe" are also both types and have their tokens. What distinguishes different tokens of a type are their different instances/instantiations.

Yes, it's a conclusion which would hold for external objects as well, but it's only the result of the assumption that each encounter with the object, is an encounter with a different object (token), as you assume with sensations. — Metaphysician Undercover

It's not about "encountering" a different object. Different tokens are different instances. PERIOD. Don't even try to argue that this imples that you encounter different instances when it comes to sensations. Of course it does, as I've already explained, but not all tokens are about "encountering" something. All tokens are simply different instances/instantiations of their type.

This assumption of yours, implies that the object of the sensation, the token, only exists when it is being sensed. Therefore the object, the token, must be a creation of the act of sensing. — Metaphysician Undercover

How does that follow? It's equivalent to saying that seeing something is a creation of the act of seeing.

We assume that we encounter the same objects (tokens) multiple times, and they continue to exist while not being encountered. — Metaphysician Undercover

Which part of "it's not about "encountering" something" do you not understand? I'm not going to follow you in your metaphysical nonsense.

A token of a chair is not a token of a chair without being encountered and classed as such. — Metaphysician Undercover

"Encountering" or "experiencing" is not a requirement of the type/token distinction, nor is it part of the definition of a token. That is nothing but your own mistaken and unnecessary assumption.

It was your choice to bring us away from Wittgenstein's words of particular things, to use the type/token terminology, now you cannot simply slip back without suffering the consequences. — Metaphysician Undercover

Is this empty posturing necessary? Stop being a moron.

If both, the particular chair, and the particular sensation have been judged to be of a specific type, making them "tokens", then it's nonsensical to say that one of them might not have been encountered. — Metaphysician Undercover

Who encounters all the chairs in the world? You? Or just anybody? I have no doubt that there are instantiations of stars and moons that nobody has ever encountered or experienced. Regardless, it makes no difference to the type/token distinction.

The sensation itself cannot be the token because sensation is a type — Metaphysician Undercover

'S' is the type of sensation. The recurrence of particular instantiations of 'S' had by the diarist are supposed to be the tokens of that type of "certain sensation". That's why the diarist is said to write 'S' every time the sensation recurs.

if we allow that there is variance in sensation, differences in sensation, then there must be an object of sensation at each different instance of sensation — Metaphysician Undercover

"The sensation" refers to both the type and its tokens. "Each different instance of sensation" is a token (that's what "token" means), despite you just having claimed that "the sensation itself cannot be the token".

But if this is true, then the objects, or tokens, only have existence if they are being apprehended by the conscious mind, and this implies that the conscious mind itself, and only the conscious mind, creates these object, or tokens. — Metaphysician Undercover

According to that logic, the same must also be true of external objects.

Your argument is both that all tokens must be encountered and apprehended, but also that encountering and apprehending tokens implies that the mind creates them.

Sorry, but I can't be bothered trying to explain it to you or to put up with your charades any more.

Doesn't your timestamp proposal amount to fitting experience to theory, rather than vice versa? — sime

I don't know; I'm only applying the type/token distinction to sensations in order to clarify what could be meant by "the same sensation", by noting the difference between the "same type" of sensation and the "same token" of a sensation.

In other words, there aren't always criteria available by which to say that an experience is unique or different from another experience. — sime

It may have been sloppy of me to talk about experiences here instead of sensations. Anyhow, couldn't we use the timestamps of sensations as the criteria in order to differentiate two tokens?

I didn't say anything about a "private meaning". I don't know what you're talking about here, — Metaphysician Undercover

You asked for proof regarding the type/token distinction. I can only refer you to the definition, otherwise I don't know what sort of proof you mean.

I fully understand the type/token distinction. — Metaphysician Undercover

Then you should understand, per the article, that "The type–token distinction separates types (abstract descriptive concepts) from tokens (objects that instantiate concepts)."

I don't understand the basis of your claim that a single token of a sensation cannot be experienced (since you do not like "encountered") by a person more than one different time. Isn't any duration of time "more than one different time"? — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, a duration of time is "more than one different time"; it is a period of time. A single token of a sensation also lasts for a period of time. What I am saying is that you cannot have the same token of a sensation twice (unless you can time travel and relive some period of time over again).

Obviously we experience the same token of chair many different times, and as I described the other day, it appears like we must experience the same token of memory, and the same token of idea, many different times. I do not understand why you think a token of sensation is different. — Metaphysician Undercover

Instantiations of sensations necessarily depend on our experience; instantitations of chairs do not. There are many chairs that exist without you ever encountering them, but there are no sensations that you can have without sensing them. This is why a token of a sensation is different. The instantiation of a chair does not require you to "encounter" or "experience" it. However, as I noted before, what they have in common is that chairs and sensations both have particular life spans of their existence/instantiation.

If a sensation is an inner experience, just like memories and ideas are inner experiences, how is it that we appear to experience the same token of a memory many different times, and the same token of an idea many different times, yet you still insist that we cannot experience the same token of sensation a multitude of times. — Metaphysician Undercover

We don't experience the same token of an "inner experience" many times. A token of an experience can be timestamped. You cannot have the same timestamped token of an experience twice. You clearly do not understand the type/token distinction if you think this. You can only have the same type of experience twice.

Why do you think that it's not possible for the person not to be consciously aware of that token of pain during some period of its existence? — Metaphysician Undercover

If the person is not consciously aware of the pain during some time, then they are not having any pain (not in pain), so there is no pain during that time.

So that particular token of pain could be existing somewhere in the subconscious, while the conscious mind is not at that time aware of it. Isn't this what we say about memories? The memory is 'stored' somewhere so that it is not always present to the conscious mind throughout the entirety of its temporal existence. Yet it must exist somewhere as that particular memory, or else the conscious mind would not be able to access it. — Metaphysician Undercover

I suppose, but now you are no longer talking about "inner experiences" (and their instantiations) like we are with sensations.

However, it may actually be the case, that each time a person remembers, or accesses the memory of the same event, the mind recreates the so-called token of memory. If this is the case, then it is not really truthful to say that it is the same memory, because it's really a new scenario created each time. — Metaphysician Undercover

That's right, this is what tokens are about. Tokens of "inner experiences" are each unique instantiations that can be timestamped. This is why you are wrong to speak of there being more than one of "the same token".

Likewise with ideas, the idea of 'two' for example. If the mind must recreate the idea of two, instead of pulling that token of idea from a stored memory bank, then it is not really the same particular idea. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't know what you mean by "recreate the idea of two". The type/token distinction distinguishes between abstract classes - which are themselves ideas - and real instantiations, so applying the type/token distinction to ideas might be confusing (are you talking about the type of an idea or the token of an idea?). Let's stick with sensations.

It is incorrect for the reasons I explained. If the person wants to say that it is the very same particular, a criterion as to what qualifies as "the same" is required in order that such naming can be correct. But if the person wants to name two distinct things as the same type, simply naming them as "the same type" is sufficient criteria for them to actually be the same type (270). — Metaphysician Undercover

But a person can simply name them as "the same token", too, and that is also sufficient criteria. We can agree to define the criteria for types and tokens however we like. Moreover, an instantiation of a chair depends on what counts as a chair. So we could equally say that criteria are required for what qualifies as being of "the same type".

As I've repeated numerous times now, you've provided nothing to support this assertion. You are claiming two distinct types of tokens, ones which can be encountered numerous times and ones which cannot. But such a distinction needs to be justified, and as I explained many inner experiences like memories and ideas seem to involve encountering the same token numerous different times. — Metaphysician Undercover

Look up the type/token distinction. It doesn't have a private meaning.

But such a distinction needs to be justified, and as I explained many inner experiences like memories and ideas seem to involve encountering the same token numerous different times. — Metaphysician Undercover

What do you mean by "the same token"?

So the distinction cannot be based in an internal/external division. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm not basing it on an internal/external division; I'm basing it on types (classes) and tokens (instances of those classes). You are incorrectly basing it on instances of "encountering".

You seem to be putting "sensations" in a category other than "inner experience", and other than "external object". — Metaphysician Undercover

No, I'm saying you have sensations as an "inner experience".

Whether or not you believe it is possible to have the same token of a type of sensation on numerous occasions, is not what is at issue. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm not saying that; I'm saying it is supposed that you have different tokens of a type of sensation on numerous occasions, where each token is a different instance of having the (supposedly same) sensation.

What is at issue is that the private diarist is claiming this, and is claiming to mark down S every time the very same token of sensation occurs, "a particular sensation". — Metaphysician Undercover

It's the same type, not the same token. The diarist claims to mark down 'S' every time the very same type of sensation occurs, with each instance of the sensation being a different token.

The question Wittgenstein asks, is if the person might be correct in judging that a present instance is the same as a prior instance. — Metaphysician Undercover

Right.

And, he concludes that since there is no criteria which will tell the diarist whether it truly is the same or not, it doesn't make sense to even talk about the possibility of being correct. — Metaphysician Undercover

Which is why the use of 'S' cannot be established.

I think you need to rethink this, because it is not correct. If the diarist is judging the distinct instances, as distinct particulars, rather than as one and the same particular, the problem of a criterion of identity evapourates. The diarist can make up any criteria whatsoever as to what constitutes "the type". He can even say that they are the same type because he named them both S. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't see why you say this is incorrect. As I said in my last post, it could be considered to be the same "particular" or token of the sensation both before and after one has slept or been unconscious. The problem is in remembering it correctly after waking up or regaining consciousness. Therefore, the problem can equally apply to tokens. That is, if you prefer to define a token, or a particular instance of a sensation, such that it includes a discontinuity in your awareness of it. We commonly refer to some pains in this way.

The diarist can make up any criteria whatsoever as to what constitutes "the type". — Metaphysician Undercover

The same applies to a token that includes a discontinuity of your awareness of it. (Although not entirely accurate, it may be easier to call this a 'discontinuous token' or a 'broken token'. Or, we could simply refer to them as two different tokens.) The diarist can make up any criteria whatsoever as to what constitutes it being the same token both before and after the discontinuity.

Can a person encounter the same token more than one time or not? — Metaphysician Undercover

It depends on the token/type. In terms of sensations, "encountering a token" is a particular instance of having the sensation. Unless you can time travel and live that moment over again, then you cannot have the same token of a sensation more than once.

Or are you saying that a person can see the same token more than one time, but a person cannot 'sense' the same token more than one time? — Metaphysician Undercover

It's not about seeing a token. A token is a particular instance of a type. In the case of iPhones, my iPhone is one particular instance and your iPhone is another particular instance. In the case of chairs, a particular chair is one instance. In the case of sensations, having the sensation at a particular time, or for a particular duration of time (i.e. for as long as the sensation lasts), is one instance.

Your assertion, that if a sensation goes away and comes back it cannot be the same token, makes no sense because it is completely unjustified. I get a pain in my toe sometimes at night, I can get it many nights in a row, or some nights I don't get it. It wakes me up when I'm sleeping. I cannot see what causes it to come and go. But the fact that it comes and goes does not give me reason to claim that it is not the same token of the type "pain" every time it occurs . — Metaphysician Undercover

I will grant you this one point. It is possible for someone to have the same pain for several days in a row, and we might consider this to be a single token or instance of pain. Admittedly, I had assumed that the sensation 'S' was fleeting and was presumed to last less than a day. Whether we call it a different token or not makes little difference, however, because the problem remains: how can you be sure that you are remembering it correctly as the same sensation after you have stopped sensing it for a while (e.g. after you have slept or lost consciousness)? In other words, are you correct to still call it 'S'?

It's the same problem if it were a different token. If you didn't have the sensation for a day or more and then it apparently returned, you could not be sure that you were remembering it correctly as the same sensation. The point I have been making is: why would you call it by the same name ('S') if it is not the same token/instance of the sensation? If it goes away for a week or a month or a year and then returns, then it is not the same instance of the sensation. This shows that 'S' is supposed to be the name of a type of sensation, not the name of only an instance or token of (having) the sensation. To write 'S' in a calendar "for every day on which I have the sensation" implies that there may be some days that I do not have the sensation.

Nevertheless, the point is moot. I raised the type/token distinction because you have long-standing problems with identity and what "the same" means. You are right that Wittgenstein does not talk about the type/token distinction, but I never claimed or meant to imply that he did. I thought that the type/token distinction might help you. I still think it's easier to think of it in terms of different tokens of the sensation, but it needn't be. The problem is in remembering whether it is still the same type or token of the sensation - whether it can still correctly be called 'S' - after you have stopped sensing it for a while.

If what you claim as "proof" was true, then every distinct time that I see a chair, it would necessarily be a different token — Metaphysician Undercover

A token does not refer to how many times you see something. In the case of chairs it refers to one (instance of a) chair.

All I have to do is point at 258 where Wittgenstein uses "the sensation" four times to stress that he is talking about a particular sensation rather than a type. — Metaphysician Undercover

He says: "I want to keep a diary about the recurrence of a certain sensation. To this end I associate it with the sign “S” and write this sign in a calendar for every day on which I have the sensation."

For "every day" on which he has the sensation means more than once. He is not talking about a single instance which would be a token of the sensation. You clearly do not understand the type/token distinction. All you have done is attempt to argue against it, displaying your ignorance. I'm not going to waste my time arguing with you about it anymore.

When there is ambiguity in the words used (as there always is to some extent, especially in philosophical writing), the latter is very conducive to misreading. This is a danger which is amplified by reading secondary sources prior to the primary source. — Metaphysician Undercover

Don't presume to know what I've read or in what order. You're a sad little man.

The point I’ve unsuccessfully been trying to make is that Wittgenstein is talking about establishing the name of a sensation. This means not only establishing the name for a single token, but for a class of tokens, i.e., a type. Wittgenstein is debunking the idea that a name or word can be established in the way he describes.

Where is your proof? — Metaphysician Undercover

The “proof” is that it is assumed by the scenario that the diarist writes ‘S’ “every time”, for each token or instance of the sensation. What prompts the diarist to write ‘S’ is the recurrence of the sensation.

it is who who needs an argument to show that your interpretation which switches in "type" for Wittgenstein's "particular" — Metaphysician Undercover

I didn’t switch in “type” for “particular”. A “particular sensation” could mean either a particular type or a particular token. Your repetition of “a particular sensation” does not resolve which one it is. On the other hand, I have cited further context to support that he means a particular type.

Every object is a token of some type or types. Why would it be senseless to ask what type is that object a token of? — Metaphysician Undercover

The type/token distinction is used to clarify the distinction between a particular class and its instances, so it is senseless of you to question which instances belong to which class.

If the same token of a chair can come and go many times, relative to my conscious experience, then why can't the same token of sensation come and go many times, relative to my conscious experience? — Metaphysician Undercover

Because it isn't the same token of the sensation, obviously. If you have a sensation and it goes away, then it's not the same token of the sensation when you have it again.

Why would you think that each time the memory occurs to you, it is a different token? — Metaphysician Undercover

You have changed the subject to talk about memories.

You are still refusing to acknowledge Wittgenstein has explicitly said that the diarist is naming a "particular sensation" — Metaphysician Undercover

That could be either a particular token of the sensation or a particular type of sensation. Unless you can provide an argument for why 'S' must be the name of a particular token of the sensation (only), and not the name of a particular type of sensation, then stop mindlessly repeating this.

What happened to "let's suppose you are right..." , and proceeding from there? — Metaphysician Undercover

You said there was no problem with naming a token! But there is a problem with the diarist scenario, right?

I am arguing that the same token can occur to the conscious mind, two, or a multitude of distinct times. — Metaphysician Undercover

What do you think a token is?

An instance of a sensation or an instance of a chair is not how many times these things appear to your consciousness or your memory, or whatever rubbish you are spouting. I already explained to you that a token or an instance of these things is their entire existence or "lifetime". It is one unit or one instance of a class of objects, which is what 'S' denotes with regards to a sensation. The word "sensation" does not apply to one token only; it applies to a class of objects - a type.

But I'm not going to allow you to redefine terms as we go. Many different types of tokens occur to a person, — Metaphysician Undercover

Do you know what the type/token distinction is? Have you ever heard of it? I'm not the one trying to "redefine terms". You're the one not using the word "token" correctly. Look it up.

Why would you think it is senseless to determine the identity of a particular token? — Metaphysician Undercover

I never said it was senseless to determine the identity of a particular token. I said it was senseless to question whether two distinct tokens are of the same type.

you think that it's impossible that two distinct occurrences could be of the same token (an opinion which of course is disproven by the chair) — Metaphysician Undercover

It's not disproven by the chair. The chair is no different. A token of the chair just means the existence or "lifetime" of the chair. Excluding any kind of Ship of Theseus issues, the token of the chair is a single chair that can only be the same as itself, as per the law of identity. It cannot be the same as any other chair that looks identical or that is of the same type.

We can equally speak of the existence or "lifetime" of a sensation. Sensations typically have a duration; they start and end, or come and go. A particular instance or duration of a sensation is a token of that sensation. Like the chair, the token of the sensation is a single (instance/duration of the) sensation that can only be the same as itself.

What is assumed in Wittgenstein's scenario is that the diarist will write 'S' in their diary for each instance or token of the sensation. The next time the diarist has the sensation it is a new token; a new instance of the sensation. Therefore, it is not possible that two distinct occurrences of the sensation could be the same token.

You have two unjustified assumptions here. First that it's impossible that the same token could appear to a person at two distinct times, and second, that two distinct tokens must be tokens of the same type. — Metaphysician Undercover

I am assuming neither of these things. First, it is impossible to have two of "the same token", by definition. Second, tokens are of the same type, by definition. It is clear that you still do not understand the type/token distinction. The type/token distinction distinguishes between naming a class (type) of objects and naming the individual instances (tokens) of that class. Each class has its own individual instances, so it is senseless to question whether two distinct tokens are of the same type.

I can see the same chair last week and this week. Why can't I have the same sensation last week and this week? — Metaphysician Undercover

You can have the same type of sensation, but not the same token of sensation. Anyhow, I thought you were talking about the same chair. It is sensible to question - as you did earlier - whether it is the same type of chair that only looks similar to the one you saw here yesterday, or whether it is the same token of chair - in fact, the same chair - that you saw here yesterday. This is how the type/token distinction can help to clarify the matter.

Second, and this is a significant point to the PLA, if you assert that the person is wrong in naming it the same token, because you insist that it must be two different tokens, then you have no capacity to judge the two as the same type, having no access to the person's private inner feelings which are being named. — Metaphysician Undercover

My access is not the issue. We can each consider doing this sort of private inner labelling process ourselves. Actually, that's what Wittgenstein wants us to do in order to try and free us from the misconception that the way sensations are named and what gives words their meanings is simply memorising the connection between the sign and the sensation.

That's why it receives the same name. It's not a type being named, it's the sensation itself. — Metaphysician Undercover

What is supposedly being named is a type of sensation, not a token of the sensation. That’s my point.

If the diarist believed that it was a different token it would be nonsensical to give it the same name. because the diarist is not naming a type. — Metaphysician Undercover

Your iPhone 12 and my iPhone 12 are different tokens and are both named “iPhone 12” because they are the same type of phone. Likewise, the sensation the diarist had last week and the sensation the diarist has today are different tokens and are both named ‘S’ because they are (seemingly) the same type of sensation. There is nothing nonsensical about this.

It will turn out that the diarist is not naming anything, but Wittgenstein has us suppose at the outset that the diarist is naming a particular type of sensation.

That is not problematic. What's problematic is the criterion by which you say that the next sensation is the same sensation. — Metaphysician Undercover

It's good to see you finally acknowledge that the issue concerns the recurrence of the sensation, and not just a single instance of the sensation.

How do I know it's the same chair, or just a different one which appears to be "identical"? So when the second occurs, you judge it as "the same" ,and this is why you call it by the same name, but the only real reason for it being the same is that you have called it the same. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is correct. I could be picky and say that it is not possible for a sensation to be "the same" in the sense of being the same token you had before. A different token of the sensation that seems identical to the previous token is supposedly what would prompt the diarist to write 'S' again.

But Luke does not believe that it is "the same", as you've argued. — Metaphysician Undercover

But I am Luke...?

So, if the only thing which supports the second occurrence being named with the same name as the first occurrence is your belief that it is the same, and you really do not believe it is the same, then this use of the symbol is just a sham (260 - the note has no function whatsoever). You could call anything "S", the decision might be totally arbitrary. — Metaphysician Undercover

Now you're getting it.

The tricky part to understand is his move toward "a justification which everybody understands", at 261. This need, for such a justification is produced when he introduces a common (public) word , "sensation" to replace "S" (private symbol). How can we say that "S" refers to something which is "a sensation"? At this point the private word "S", has to get introduced into, integrated into, the public language, so its use need to be demonstrated (justified). — Metaphysician Undercover

That's right. So I take it you no longer view what Wittgenstein is trying to do with the passages on the private language argument in this way:

He is drawing our attention to a way of speaking in which we refer to internal, "private" feelings, sensations, and even ideas, as individual, particular things, like objects. That's why "S' refers to "the sensation". — Metaphysician Undercover

What justifies that "S" refers to a particular sensation? Nothing but the way S's use in the language-game, "S" is used that way. The sensation referred to by "S" is one particular sensation (not a type), because that's what we say it is by naming it this way. — Metaphysician Undercover

Obviously he is not saying "a type" of sensation he's saying "a particular". What justifies that "S" refers to a particular sensation? Nothing but the way S's use in the language-game, "S" is used that way. The sensation referred to by "S" is one particular sensation (not a type), because that's what we say it is by naming it this way. — Metaphysician Undercover

Let’s suppose you are right and that Wittgenstein is talking only about a single particular token of the sensation. As he describes it at PI 258:

258. Let’s imagine the following case. I want to keep a diary about the recurrence of a certain sensation. To this end I associate it with the sign “S”

So I have a sensation and write ‘S’ in my diary. How is this problematic?

Look at it as if "meaning" disappeared completely. Our shared judgments for doing one thing rather than another, what is important in an activity, what is crucial, what counts in failing, etc., is what is meaningful, in explaining, clarifying, distinguishing what is meant by an expression. — Antony Nickles

Yes, but what is important, crucial and meaningful in an activity is not equivalent with what an expression means or the use it has, is it?

However, in the same vein that, as you say, we do not "invent" the use of concepts, neither do we ensure an expression nor make it particular (in the sense of a certain instance) and neither does any rule we might "use". — Antony Nickles

Right, but I don't think that intention entails ensuring an outcome. My intention to achieve an outcome does not ensure the outcome; that's not what "intention" means.

And that others can know what I mean but I might not is simply because of the public nature of how expression is meaningful. I know the same way you know (#504). — Antony Nickles

Yes, and this is why I can intend for my words to have a particular meaning. Again, there is no guarantee my words will have the meaning I intend, but they often do have the meaning I intend, and I think they often must (for everyone) in order for language to work as effectively as it does.

He never makes that type/token distinction anyway, so I don't see why you're bent on applying it. — Metaphysician Undercover

I raised it because it helps to clarify the different meanings of "the same". I started responding to your comment on the chair at PI 253 because the type/token distinction can dispel your confusion here:

The chair here today seems to be identical to the one here yesterday, but I can't be sure that they are the same chair, because they could have been switched in the meantime. — Metaphysician Undercover

For tokens:
If the chairs were switched then you would see a different (token of) chair.
If the chairs were not switched then you would see the same (token of) chair.

For types:
You would see the same (type of) chair regardless of whether the chairs were switched or not.

If you have an iPhone 12 and I have an iPhone 12, then we each have different tokens of the same type.

The problem which Wittgenstein is talking about in the PLA is the uncertainty involved in saying that this sensation I have today, is the very same as the sensation I had last week. — Metaphysician Undercover

You appear here to be talking about two different tokens of the sensation - the sensation you have today and the sensation you had last week. You are saying that they are "the very same" type of sensation, but two different tokens of that sensation - the one you had a week ago and the one you have today.

That is, I presume it is a different token of the sensation a week later and not the same token of the sensation that you have had continuously all week, otherwise there would be no need to question whether it was the same. If you have had the same token of the sensation continuously all week, then you would simply call it 'S'. The question Wittgenstein raises is whether or not you can justify calling it by the same name - that is, whether it is the same type of sensation - the next time it occurs so that you can also call the new token of the sensation 'S'.

I cannot appeal to the universal, and say that I know beyond the shadow of a doubt that these are instances of "pain", because there are many different types of pain, and the issue here concerns identifying one particular sensation, not a general class of sensations. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is where I see you as going wrong and confusing different senses of "the same". 'S' refers to a general class of sensation; the same type of sensation. 'S' does not refer to only one particular token of sensation. Otherwise, you would be giving a different name to each new token of 'S', and so you would not be calling it 'S' every time, despite the fact that it is meant to be the same type of sensation every time.

I hate to have to inform you of this Luke, but "a particular sensation" can in no way be interpreted as a number of different tokens indicating a "type of sensation" — Metaphysician Undercover

I hate to have to inform you Meta, but you cannot have the same token of the sensation "every time" when each token of the sensation occurs only one time. It only makes sense to have the same type of sensation every time.

Because you are the person who said it (as in, not me). You didn’t keep it to yourself. The identity of the expression of pain is that it is yours, individually, not particularly. You own it--you either express or deny it. You stand by what you said or weasel out of it. — Antony Nickles

This seems similar to what I was saying in the other discussion: that I intend my use of the public language, but I do not invent the conventional uses/meanings that exist in the public language.

The point of disagreement seems to be this: I say that we use words intentionally to have a particular meaning (in accordance with conventional uses/meanings), whereas you say that we use words unintentionally and leave it up to others to decide what we mean by it. How is it that others can know what we mean by it but we cannot? That seems to imply that I cannot say what I want, or mean, or intend to say.

You didn't seem to notice that he says "a particular sensation", which is the same one every time. — Metaphysician Undercover

EVERY TIME implies more than one time. A token occurs only one time, so W cannot be talking about a singular token of the sensation. If he was talking about a singular token then the diarist would make only a single entry of ‘S’ in their diary, but W says “we’re supposing, aren’t we, that we write “S” every time.” EVERY TIME.

Then why does he repeatedly say "the sensation", and he ends this section with "And why a 'particular sensation,' that is, the same one every time?"? — Metaphysician Undercover

In case you don't understand the type/token distinction, "the same one every time" implies it is the same type of sensation every time. A token of the sensation is a particular instance of having that (type of) sensation on one of those occasions, or at one of those times.

I commit to memory the connection between the sign and the sensation. — But “I commit it to memory” can only mean: this process brings it about that I remember the connection correctly in the future. — PI 258

“Well, I believe that this is the sensation S again.” — PI 260

“Surely I can (inwardly) resolve to call THIS ‘pain’ in the future.” — PI 263

And why a “particular sensation”: that is, the same one every time? Well, we’re supposing, aren’t we, that we write “S” every time. — PI 270

So, consider his example at 257, a "tooth-ache". Is the tooth-ache I had yesterday not the very same tooth-ache that I had the day before, and the same tooth-ache I have today? I might sleep in between, so that my tooth is not aching at that time, or it might go away for a few days, and come back. Why would you assume that Wittgenstein is talking about distinct tokens of the same type, when he is very explicitly talking about naming something? — Metaphysician Undercover

Do you call it "toothache" every time you have toothache? Why don't you call it something different every time (for each token of toothache)? Or do you just have one continuous token of toothache throughout your life but sometimes you don't notice it (and for some reason the pain is located around different teeth at different times)?

You are the cause of the meaning of an expression in that you are the one answerable for it, responsible for having said it. — Antony Nickles

How am I be responsible for it if I did not intend it?

For starters, chairs don't recur. If you were to see an identical chair "day after day, week after week", then it would be the same token of chair. I don't see any reason to believe that Wittgenstein is talking about a single instance of a sensation over an extended period of days and weeks. The problem is in remembering the sensation correctly the next time it occurs, so it must be a different instance, a different token, a different occurrence (i.e. recurrence) of the sensation at different times.

I did, the same chair recurs to me day after day, week after week. There is no impossibility here. — Metaphysician Undercover

And I've just pointed out to you that Wittgenstein is talking about two objects the same; not one object the same.

What support do you have for your claim that it's impossible that the sensation I have today is the same sensation I had last week? — Metaphysician Undercover

The argument I gave about recurrence. Perhaps you'd care to address it?

Notice that the PLA is concerned with identifying a particular sensation, a certain sensation, or what Banno called a specific sensation. — Metaphysician Undercover

He is talking about the same type of sensation; not the same token of sensation. This is evident because he speaks of the recurrence of the sensation. It is not possible for the same token of a sensation to recur. If it did recur, then it would be a different token (of the same type), not the same token.

This is the same type of doubt as in his example of the chair. The chair here today seems to be identical to the one here yesterday, but I can't be sure that they are the same chair, because they could have been switched in the meantime. — Metaphysician Undercover

At PI 253, Wittgenstein asks us to consider "two exactly the same":

What counts as a criterion of identity here? Consider what makes it possible in the case of physical objects to speak of “two exactly the same”: for example, to say, “This chair is not the one you saw here yesterday, but is exactly the same as it”. — LW (my emphasis)

You are talking about one exactly the same, so you have misread.

and, by "certain", here you mean specific, which is a different sense of certainty — Antony Nickles

How could I mean one sense instead of another? You just said that "Saying something particular is not caused by my intention".

If, seconds later, those signals fail to materialise (for whatever reason) I'll adjust my model response and update my priors - in other words, I'll have been wrong about the only thing we could possibly say constituted being in pain.
— Isaac

What if they do materialise?
— Luke

Then we'll have been 'right' to assume such. — Isaac

I thought you said there are no such things as sensations or pain. So what are we right to assume? What is "the only thing we could possibly say constitutes being in pain"?

A sensation is a single category, the interocepted physiological state signals are manifold and form a non-exclusive set. — Isaac

This sounds like family resemblance, and you are seeking the essence of pain.

And if it does have the intended effect on those states, then we're right to reach for it.
— Luke

Yes. Although, we could later revise that in the light of other goals, we have more than one objective that these outputs form part of the subsequent model for. — Isaac

Yes, but right now, we are feeling pain. Wasn't that "the intended effect on those states"?

Note this is not just us not having learned the right use of the word, since the modelling of the "I'm in pain" response at inappropriate times can result from nothing more than a misfiring of triggering signals, or an overlap with similar signals in a noisy part of the network.
— Isaac

It sounds like there are also appropriate times that 'I'm in pain' gets used.
— Luke

Yes. I think that's undeniable, the expression wouldn't exist otherwise. — Isaac

So, just to be clear, what makes the usage appropriate in this context is when there is not a misfiring of signals and no overlap with similar signals in a noisy part of the network. So it's when your body gives you the right signals that you are in pain. Which is what most of us would call a pain sensation. So why are there no such things as sensations or pain?

What I'm saying is not that we can't treat "I'm in pain" as a simple functional expression, and therefore not amenable to being right or wrong, we can.
— Isaac

Then it's not about the use of the word "pain", as you've been claiming.
— Luke

Not sure what you're getting at here... — Isaac

If we can treat "I'm in pain" as a simple functional expression, then it's not a problem with our use of the word "pain", right? The "problem", as far as I can tell, is that there is no unique or exclusive set of physiological signals that answers to the name "pain". Nonetheless, the word "pain" still has a use in our language.

What I don't get is if there is no such thing as pain and no exclusive set of signals that answer to the name "pain", then how can the word "pain" (in the sense we are using it here) have a use, how can it be used "appropriately", and how can your body give you the "right" signals and "the intended effect" that you are in pain?

Again 'pain' does not 'follow', it's not a physiological state, it's a modelling relationship and we make decisions about those. — Isaac

Meteorologists who model and forecast the weather do not decide what the weather will be.

If, seconds later, those signals fail to materialise (for whatever reason) I'll adjust my model response and update my priors - in other words, I'll have been wrong about the only thing we could possibly say constituted being in pain. — Isaac

What if they do materialise?

So "I'm in pain" is a response which does something in a social context, and - being triggered by interocepted physiological states - it's those states we intend the word to act on. — Isaac

How does a sensation differ from an interocepted physiological state?

So if we reach for that word and it doesn't have the intended effect on those states, we're wrong to reach for it. — Isaac

And if it does have the intended effect on those states, then we're right to reach for it.

Note this is not just us not having learned the right use of the word, since the modelling of the "I'm in pain" response at inappropriate times can result from nothing more than a misfiring of triggering signals, or an overlap with similar signals in a noisy part of the network. — Isaac

It sounds like there are also appropriate times that 'I'm in pain' gets used.

What I'm saying is not that we can't treat "I'm in pain" as a simple functional expression, and therefore not amenable to being right or wrong, we can. — Isaac

Then it's not about the use of the word "pain", as you've been claiming.

Also, what counts as "right" and "wrong" here? Because it sounds very much as though what is counted as 'right' is if there follows a sensation (or an interocepted physiological signal) of pain.

I'm saying that there's an additional matter to be talked about when we speak of as pain responses modelled from what are typically pain triggers. Here we definitely have a moment when we decide, post hoc, if we're going to trigger the 'pain' responses or not and if we decide in such a way as to elicit an unexpected response, we change the prior (ie we consider ourselves to have been 'wrong' the first time). How do we speak about this psychology if not by saying that we decide if we're in pain and can be right or wrong about that? — Isaac

You said that if we hit our thumb with a hammer, then we expect a painful sensation to follow but we may find that it does not follow. I would not call that "deciding" whether to be in pain or not. Wittgenstein is only talking about those cases where the pain does follow and we find that we are in pain.

Once again:

That is, if someone said “I don’t know if what I have is a pain or something else”, we would
think, perhaps, that he does not know what the English word “pain” means; and we’d explain it to him. — How? Perhaps by means of gestures, or by pricking him with a pin and saying, “See, that’s pain!” This explanation of a word, like any other, he might understand rightly, wrongly, or not at all. And he will show which by his use of the word, in this as in other cases.
If he now said, for example, “Oh, I know what ‘pain’ means; what I don’t know is whether this, that I have now, is pain” — we’d merely shake our heads and have to regard his words as a strange reaction which we can’t make anything of. — LW

There's no such thing as 'sensations'. — Isaac

LOL. You've never been in pain? You don't know what "pain" means? I wouldn't want you to upset your theories by feeling anything.

I would say an explanation does not show something's significance. Or that a definition imposes itself over anything else of consequence. What I was getting at is that the model of meaning based on a word's definition, imagines it as particular and certain; which creates the picture that I cause or intend something particular and/or use rules for a certain outcome. Wittgenstein is taking apart that explanation to see how each thing is important to us (all). — Antony Nickles

Doesn't what you've written here have a meaning that is "particular and certain"?

3) That a word can be defined (which we do call: its "meaning") does not reflect the way language works, e.g., a sentence cannot be defined. Meaning is not an action (a cause/our "use") or a thing (internally, like, intention; or externally, like rules for a practice); it is what is meaningful to us as a culture, what is essential to us, expressed in the implications (grammar) of our expressions and actions. — Antony Nickles

How does this relate back to the private language argument? I don't view the PLA as being about what is meaningful or essential to us as a culture.

You're now talking in terms of third-person modelling
— Luke

No, I'm talking about the first-person, doubting that they are using the word "pain" correctly (or any other response to their set of physiological triggers) — Isaac

I was referring to another person's first-person experience, but it makes no odds I could have said "I doubt that I use the word 'pain' correctly" — Isaac

Why are you doubting that you or someone else is using the word "pain" correctly?

There is a hypothesis to be tested, it's how all modelling in the brain works - hypothesis testing. — Isaac

I just said that you were now talking in terms of third-person modelling, and you denied it, saying "No, I'm talking about the first-person" and doubting their (or your) use of the word "pain".

Anyhow, how one's brain works is not a first-person perspective, or something that we are consciously aware of in the first-person. Being in pain is not the same as having knowledge of our brain functioning. Otherwise, we'd all be experts in the science; or, perhaps, those who knew nothing of the science could not feel pain.

We quickly learn what the word does. That doesn't require us to refer to any private 'sensation' at all. — Isaac

I don't see how the word could be used (in the sense we are using it here) without reference to the sensation. Pain is a sensation. I might cry in pain, but it doesn't mean that pain is crying (nor any other expression/s of pain).

No, I'm talking about the first-person, doubting that they are using the word "pain" correctly — Isaac

First-person is you, not they.

288. I turn to stone, and my pain goes on. — What if I were mistaken,
and it was no longer pain? —– But surely I can’t be mistaken here; it
means nothing to doubt whether I am in pain! — That is, if someone
said “I don’t know if what I have is a pain or something else”, we would
think, perhaps, that he does not know what the English word “pain”
means; and we’d explain it to him. — How? Perhaps by means of gestures,
or by pricking him with a pin and saying, “See, that’s pain!” This
explanation of a word, like any other, he might understand rightly,
wrongly, or not at all. And he will show which by his use of the word,
in this as in other cases.
If he now said, for example, “Oh, I know what ‘pain’ means; what
I don’t know is whether this, that I have now, is pain” — we’d merely
shake our heads and have to regard his words as a strange reaction
which we can’t make anything of. (It would be rather as if we heard
someone say seriously, “I distinctly remember that sometime before I
was born I believed . . .”)
That expression of doubt has no place in the language-game; but if
expressions of sensation — human behaviour — are excluded, it looks
as if I might then legitimately begin to doubt. My temptation to say
that one might take a sensation for something other than what it is arises
from this: if I assume the abrogation of the normal language-game with
the expression of a sensation, I need a criterion of identity for the
sensation; and then the possibility of error also exists. — LW

.

I think all three could be used as a public referent for the word 'pain', it's not like we have much trouble with non-exclusive sets in other areas of language ('game' as an obvious example). But the non-exclusivity opens the space for doubt. "Am I using this word right? Is it doing what I expect it to do in the circumstances?" — Isaac

You're now talking in terms of third-person modelling. Wittgenstein says that it is possible for other people to doubt whether I'm in pain. But if you're the one who is obviously hurting, then doubt is misplaced. There is no hypothesis to be tested or knowledge to be gained from the perspective of the one who's in pain. Maybe the "unpleasant sensation" of pain covers a wide range of sensations that causes some difficulties for scientists, but we all quickly learn what the word means.

The point is that "pain" is used to describe a complex state, not an autonomous response — Isaac

I'm not saying that "pain" is used to refer to an autonomous response nor to a natural expression or reaction. Pain is not identical with its expression.

This is what I found odd about your post where you said:

Image you've six physiological signals (a, b, c, d, e, and f) you generally model any combination of four or more as 'pain' (by model I mean things like a tendency to use the word 'pain', a tendency to say 'ouch', a tendency to withdraw from the perceived source...etc). — Isaac

You started that post talking about the sensation of pain as a natural kind, but then you went on to talk about constructing models in terms of expressions of pain. Except you didn't note the distinction between pain and its expression, so you ended up denying that there are any natural expressions of pain or reactions to pain, instead of denying that pain is a natural kind.

The point is that "pain" is used to describe a complex state, not an autonomous response, so when determining if it refers to a simple, what matters is whether such states are natural kinds. Whether autonomous responses are natural kinds seems immaterial. — Isaac

It's only immaterial because you started talking about expressions of pain instead of pain.

Also, if the abstract to your primer is anything to go by, then it discusses emotions, not sensations.

3) That a word can be defined (which we do call: its "meaning") does not reflect the way language works, e.g., a sentence cannot be defined. Meaning is not an action (a cause/our "use") or a thing (internally, like, intention; or externally, like rules for a practice); it is what is meaningful to us as a culture, what is essential to us, expressed in the implications (grammar) of our expressions and actions. — Antony Nickles

Do you acknowledge two different senses of "meaning" here? One sense of "meaning" (as in word meaning) is definition, explanation, or sense. The other sense of "meaning" (as in meaningful) is significance, consequence, or worth.

But the subject here is language, no? The use of the word "pain". — Isaac

Yes, but not with my recent questioning of your implication that there are no natural expressions or reactions.

By examining what's going on in the brain. Autonomous reactions don't have any connections to areas of the brain we know to be involved in conscious processing, language use etc. — Isaac

I don't see what conscious processing and language use have to do with natural reactions/expressions.

I provided a paper to indicate the support for the model, I can give more if you suspect I'm being dishonest in saying it's the prevailing model. I could give a full account here, but that would be considerably dry and totally off-topic, and it's better you read it directly from the scientists doing the work. What other kind of evidence were you expecting to raise my comment above the level of mere assertion? — Isaac

Explain to me how your autonomous reactions are different from natural reactions/expressions and maybe I'll read it.

he part of the brain dealing with language doesn't even get a look in on this type of signalling, it gets the second hand messages from the proprioceptive neurons, and the eyes that it's body has already pulled away from the hot thing, or shielded the pain site. — Isaac

I was only talking about natural expressions/reactions, not language.

Beyond those autonomous responses, then yes, I am saying there are no natural human expression or reactions. — Isaac

How are you distinguishing those autonomous responses (such as "already pulled aware from the hot thing, or shielded the pain site") from natural expression/reactions?

I've just given an account of why - we have a cultural belief in natural kinds. — Isaac

I don't understand your account. Your account of why we don't actually say "I wasn't in pain, I was just cold and cross" is because we believe in natural kinds, not because there are natural kinds. I don't see how that's an account rather than an assertion. We might believe in natural kinds because there are natural kinds.