If there is no direct perception for humans, then that’s the case. We need not a comparator. — AmadeusD

There is direct perception for humans. We have it already. The kind of direct perception you seem to envisage involving no representation or process of perception is a fantasy; it's not possible.

(the dispute consists in) whether the fact that real world objects [that] initiate the process of perception constitutes a “directness” required for DR to make any sense. But it doesn’t viz. the fact that 'perception' the process, is initiated by an external, real-world object does not negate the several way-points that prevent our 'perceptions' i.e perceptual experiences being of the real-world object. — AmadeusD

I don't follow how the "several way-points" of the process of perception prevent our perceptual experiences from "being [directly] of the real-world object."

What process of perception do you envisage that would provide a (more) direct perceptual experience?

There is no way to pretend that the perceptual experience is 'direct' in any sense other that it is an immediate apprehension of representations. — AmadeusD

What does "apprehension" mean here other than "perception" or "perceptual experience"?

If that's what a DR means, I think that would undercut the entire debate and reduce it to literally a problem of stubborn people (may be) misusing words. — AmadeusD

The direct realist argues against the idea that we have perceptual experiences of representations, and argues for the idea that we have perceptual experiences of real objects.

Where did I say that our perceptions are of representations?
— Luke

My position is that our perceptual experience typically represents real world objects. That is, our perceptual experience is typically of real world objects; we typically perceive real world objects. The perceptual experience is the representation.
— Luke

^^ this seems to indicate, if one cuts through the grammar, to indicate from the bolded that position.. Unless there's some smuggling of the object into the mind going on in the intervening lines? — AmadeusD

There is a difference between saying that a perceptual experience is a representation and saying that a perceptual experience is of a representation. Our perceptual experience is a representation, but it is not of a representation (unless we are looking at a photograph or some other external representation of a real object).

In the quote above I say only that our perceptual experience is a representation. Contrary to your accusation, I have never said in this discussion that our perceptual experience is of a (internal) representation.

I believe that where the indirect realist errs is in thinking that we have perceptual experiences of the "way-points" of the process of perception. In my experience, that is rarely, if ever, the case.

Direct experience: Awareness of a perceptual experience.
Indirect experience: Awareness of an object (via perceptual experience) — hypericin

Perceptual experience entails awareness of the perceptual experience. — hypericin

If perceptual experience entails awareness of the perceptual experience, then awareness of an object (via perceptual experience) must equally entail awareness of the perceptual experience and, by extension, awareness of the object. Therefore, it seems to me that you are still unable to coherently maintain a distinction between direct and indirect experience.

On your view, if I smell smoke then I am directly aware of the smell of smoke but indirectly aware of the smoke. So I can never know if I am smelling smoke or smelling something else? In that case, how can I be directly aware of the smell of smoke?

Unless our perceptual experiences were sometimes veridical, then it would never be possible to identify those perceptual experiences.

"Awareness" is my replacement for "see" or "perceive". We don't "see perceptual experience", we don't "perceive perceptual experience", we are "aware of perceptual experience", — hypericin

If you use "awareness" as a replacement for "perceive", and if you have direct awareness of your perceptual experience (as you claim), then surely you must "perceive [your] perceptual experience".

Perceptual experience entails awareness of the perceptual experience. — hypericin

...there is no such requirement to be aware of the perceptual experience itself. — hypericin

These statements seem to contradict each other?

P1: We are aware of perceptual experiences.
P2: Perceptual experiences are representations of mind-independent reality.
P3: We are aware of representations of mind independent reality. (From P1, P2)
P4: If one is aware of a representation, one has indirect awareness what it represents.
C: We are indirectly aware of mind-independent reality. (From P3, P4).

We agree on P2. So do you challenge P1, P4, or both? — hypericin

I challenge P4.

I do not deny that we are aware of perceptual experiences (P1). I also agree with you that perceptual experence entails awareness of the perceptual experience. This is why I argued earlier that it makes no sense to be unaware of a perceptual experience.

However, if perceptual experience entails awareness of the perceptual experience, then you have the same awareness of both the perceptual experience and the perceived object. Your awareness of the object is limited to your awareness of the perceptual experience, so it's the same awareness in both cases. Your awareness of the object is not a step removed (indirect) as compared to your awareness of the experience (direct). Your awareness of the object is part of the experience. You cannot compare your awareness of the experience to your awareness of the object, because these are the same.

No one here is doubting that the photograph is of real world objects. But does that mean the photograph gives you direct experience of the real world objects? — hypericin

A photograph is a coherent example of an indirect perceptual experience. This is a perceptual experience of an external object that represents another external object.

However, the indirect realists' example of an indirect perceptual experience is incoherent. This is a perceptual experience (or awareness) of an internal object that represents an external object..You do not perceive an internal object that represents an external object; you perceive an external object. Indirect realists misuse the word "perceive".

It is incoherent to have a perceptual representation without an awareness of the perceptual representation.
Therefore, perceptual experience is representation coupled with an awareness of the representation.
Therefore, perceptual experience is (in part) awareness of the representation.
Therefore, perceptual experience is (in part) awareness. — hypericin

We appear to agree that a perceptual experience is a representation. We also seem to agree that we have perceptual experiences of; representations of; perceptions of; real objects.

Your position boils down to this:

Direct experience: Awareness of a perceptual experience.
Indirect experience: Perceptual experience of a real object.

However, you recently said that:

Perceptual experience is awareness. — hypericin

And you now say that:

perceptual experience is (in part) awareness. — hypericin

You appear to be vacillating over whether awareness is perceptual experience or not. Nevertheless, if awareness is perceptual experience then the distinction underpinning your argument between direct and indirect experience (as described above) collapses. If awareness is perceptual experience, and if perceptual experience is a representation, then our awareness, perceptual experience, or representation, is of real objects. That's not indirect, it's direct.

Otherwise, you should acknowledge that your position—that of the indirect realist—is that we have perceptual experiences of; representations of; perceptions of; representations.

You merely attempt to distance yourself from this regress by substituting "perceptual experiences of representations" with "awareness of perceptual experiences".

No, none of the links mention the possibility, "representation of a representation". — hypericin

None of the links mention "awareness of a perceptual experience", either.

The IEP article defines indirect realism as involving a "perceptual intermediary" and offers examples of intermediaries such as “sense datum, ” “sensum,” “idea,” “sensibilium,” “percept” and “appearance.” Your intermediary, however, is awareness.

Instead of the usual indirect realist position, where it is supposed that we have perceptual experiences of a perceptual intermediary, your position is instead that we have a direct awareness of perceptual experiences, whereas our perceptual experiences of real objects are relatively indirect in comparison to this direct awareness. You still have a perceptual intermediary, which is either the perceptual experience itself or the awareness of the perceptual experience, but it's difficult to say which it is. Is it the awareness doing the perceiving or is it the perceptual experience doing the perceiving? Maybe this is why you are vacillating over whether awareness is perceptual experience or not.

If the awareness is doing the perceiving, then you are perceiving the perceptual experience. Since we seem to agree that a perceptual experience is a representation, it follows that if the awareness is doing the perceiving, then you are perceiving a representation. Having a perceptual experience of a representation is having a representation of a representation. Otherwise, if the perceptual experience is doing the perceiving, then you are perceiving real objects, and that's direct realism.

"Merely" is not a value judgement. It is a contrast with the perceptual process, which itself may be directly of an object. — hypericin

Where is the distinction between direct and indirect in the perceptual process? From what you've said, I take it that the perceptual experience is direct and the rest of the process is indirect, because you are aware of the perceptual experience. That is, you appear to define "direct" and "indirect" in terms of your conscious awareness. However, when you say here that "the perceptual process...may be directly of an object", you seem to be using "direct" in a different sense. It does not seem that "direct" is defined in terms of conscious awareness here, because you are not consciously aware of the whole perceptual process. So what does "direct" mean when you say "the perceptual process...may be directly of an object"? What would it mean for the perceptual process to be indirectly of an object?

Perceptual experience is awareness. "What is the awareness of?", is the question. A representation, or the world? None of these links mention the possibility, "a representation of a representation". — hypericin

If "perceptual experience is awareness", and if there is no possibility that the awareness is of a representation (since none of the links mention this possibility), then perceptual experience/awareness can only be of the world, given that:

"What is the awareness of?", is the question. A representation, or the world? — hypericin

Earlier you said:

the only part of this process the subject is directly aware of is the perceptual experience itself. — hypericin

Your position up until now has been that we are directly aware of perceptual experience and only indirectly aware of real world objects. However, you are now saying that "perceptual experience is awareness". In that case, we are not directly aware of perceptual experience, because awareness and perceptual experience are the same thing.

Additionally, you claim that the point of disagreement in the dispute is "whether perceptions allow direct or indirect awareness of real world objects." If "perceptual experience is awareness", as you now say, then what prevents direct awareness of real world objects?

But perception is a process, what we are actually, directly aware of, the perceptual experience, merely represents the object. — hypericin

What do you mean by "merely represents the object"? How might perception or perceptual experience be improved upon so that it does not "merely represent the object"? What better possibility are you alluding to?

It’s possible my reply to you didn’t land because this was directly addressed, in relation to at least one other commenter. I invite you to reread what I’ve said there :) — AmadeusD

Said where?

One of the deeeper (and imo dumber) disputes has been whether the new inclusion of real world objects at the initiation of the process of perception constitutes a “directness” requires for DR to make any sense. But it doesn’t. — AmadeusD

Could you elaborate or clarify this? I can't make much sense of it.

Then I couldn’t know what to say. This directly contradicts your earlier assertion that our perceptions are if representations. — AmadeusD

Where did I say that our perceptions are of representations?

You are conflating perception and perceptual experience. A "perceptual experience" is not a perception when you are hallucinating, dreaming, etc. There is nothing you are perceiving, you are only experiencing. I call a "perception" the overall process that connects real world objects with the perceiving self, and "perceptual experience" what the self actually subjectively experiences. — hypericin

I have been using the terms "perception" and "perceptual experience" interchangeably because in deciding whether we perceive real objects or only representations, the perception side of that equation concerns the content of the perception, i.e. the perceptual experience. The two sides of the dispute argue over what that content is of, or what that content represents; whether it represents a real world object or whether it represents another representation.

Is this a disagreement on terminology, or substance? If terminology, what other word could fill the role I am giving "perception"? — hypericin

If it helps, I could avoid using the word "perception" and will use only the phrases "perceptual experience" or "the content of perception" instead, and then we could both use "perception" in the manner you prefer. Otherwise, you could use phrases such as "the process of perception" or "the mechanics of perception" to make it clear that you aren't referring only to the perceptual experience. It may be easiest if I avoid using the word "perception". I will henceforth use only "perceptual experience".

The brain, the nerves and real world objects are not part of our subjective, perceptual experience; they are not contained in the content of perception. When you see a real world object, that real object is neither physically inside your head nor even physically inside your mind.

My position is that our perceptual experience typically represents real world objects. That is, our perceptual experience is typically of real world objects; we typically perceive real world objects. The perceptual experience is the representation. We don't have another--a second--perceptual experience of that perceptual experience.

The dispute is over whether perceptions allow direct or indirect awareness of real world objects. — hypericin

None of these references indicate that the dispute concerns awareness, only that it concerns perceptual experience:

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/perception-problem/
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Direct_and_indirect_realism
https://iep.utm.edu/perc-obj/

But mostly, I believe that the dispute between direct realists and indirect realists concerns whether or not we have direct perceptions/perceptual experiences of real world objects
— Luke

I also believe that a real world object is not part of a perception, and that only a representation of a real world object is part of a perception. I don't have physical (real world) objects in my mind; only representations of them.
— Luke

It would have been good if either this, or your other conception of the conflict, were actually agree upon in the first pages of this thread. Read together, these two passages end the dispute. I have a feeling even Banno would be shown to be prevaricating on this account of the terms. — AmadeusD

I invite you to go back and read all of my posts. I have maintained from very early on, if not since my first post, that our perceptions include representations, but that our perceptions are not of representations.

The dispute is over what our perceptual experiences are of, and whether they are of real world objects or are of representations of real world objects. Direct realists claim that our perceptual experiences are of real world objects. Indirect realists claim that our perceptual experiences are of representations of real world objects.

It might be the naive realists' view that physical objects are in our minds, but I'm not defending naive realism.

To describe what is part or is not part of the content of a perceptual experience--what is included in the experience--says nothing about whether that perceptual experience is of a real world object or is of a representation of a real world object.

I see no inconsistency in maintaining that although the content of our perceptual experiences consists of representations, those perceptual experiences are of real world objects. I consider indirect realists to be mistaken in thinking that because the content of our perceptual experiences consists of representations, then those perceptual experiences must also be of representations. This implies that what gets represented is another representation.

If DR amounted merely to a claim of 'direct perception of representations' it would be a useless term - a fig leaf. — AmadeusD

This is the claim made by indirect realists, not by direct realists.

Here is a diagram of my conception of perception. Which parts do you disagree with? — hypericin

I believe that a perception is equivalent to a perceptual experience. My brain and nerves are not what I have perceptual experiences of, so I would not include these as being part of a perception. (Your diagram indicates that the brain generates the perception, and that the nerves transmit the perception, so maybe you agree.)

I also believe that a real world object is not part of a perception, and that only a representation of a real world object is part of a perception. I don't have physical (real world) objects in my mind; only representations of them.

But mostly, I believe that the dispute between direct realists and indirect realists concerns whether or not we have direct perceptions/perceptual experiences of real world objects. You seem to believe that the dispute between direct realists and indirect realists concerns whether or not we have direct awareness of our perceptions/perceptual experiences, instead of direct perceptions of real world objects. In fact, you appear to agree that we have direct perceptions of real world objects.

Object perception in smell, sight, hearing are indirectly mediated by molecules, light, and sound waves respectively. — hypericin

Aren't these in direct contact with our senses and nervous systems as equally as the objects that we touch or taste? I don't know whether it is possible to perceive objects via smell, sight and hearing any other way.

But to be clear, this is not the indirection we are discussing. — hypericin

Agreed.

Who is the typical indirect realist here? — hypericin

I would have thought you are the typical indirect realist here, since you are arguing that we cannot have direct perception of objects, but instead that we can only have indirect perception of objects or, in other words, that we can only ever have direct perception of representations of objects.

How does the lack of awareness of a perceptual experience differ from the lack of a perceptual experience?
— Luke

There is no difference.

I'm not sure why you are getting hung up over "awareness of perceptual experience". We already agreed that the self is aware of perceptual experience. — hypericin

While I agree that the self is aware of perceptual experience, the dispute remains between us that I label perceptual experience as a perception, whereas you label awareness of perceptual experience as a perception.

What distinguishes direct realism from indirect realism is whether we can perceive (real) objects, or whether we can only ever perceive representations of (real) objects.

When I say, "the self is only directly aware of perceptual experience", to point out that the self is *not* directly aware of what the perception is *of*, nor any of the other components of perception, would you have me say, "the self is only directly perceptual experience"? The "aware of" is necessitated by English. — hypericin

I don't believe we need to say that "the self is only directly perceptual experience" in order to express that we can directly perceive real objects. But then, I disagree with you that a perceptual experience is not a perception, and that one needs an awareness of a perceptual experience in order to qualify as a perception. My argument is to question what it means to have a perceptual experience without an awareness of it; whether such a thing can be called a perceptual experience at all. If there is no such thing as a perceptual experience without an awareness of it, then a perceptual experience and a perceptual experience with an awareness of it are the same thing. Therefore, you cannot say that a perceptual experience is not a perception, and that only awareness of a perceptual experience is a perception.

Perceptual experience is a necessary but insufficient condition for perception. If the perceptual experience is there but other parts are missing, we have things like dreams, hallucinations, and nerve misfirings. — hypericin

What "parts" could be missing?

For a "perception to be directly of worldly objects " makes sense to me by contrast with the case when the perception is mediated by other objects, i.e. a photo of an apple vs an apple. — hypericin

I agree. However, the typical contrast for the indirect realist seems to be that a perception is, instead, directly of a representation. You seem to be taking a similar line with your awareness of a perceptual experience.

A perception happens when an object in the world directly (touch, taste) or indirectly (smell, sight, hearing) stimulates nerve endings — hypericin

It's unclear to me how you are distinguishing direct from indirect here.

the only part of this process the subject is directly aware of is the perceptual experience itself. — hypericin

I don't see why you need to introduce an awareness of the perceptual experience and why you seem to consider the perceptual experience itself to be insufficient. How does the lack of awareness of a perceptual experience differ from the lack of a perceptual experience? That is, how can you have a perceptual experience (e.g. the experience of a smell, a sound, a taste, etc.) and not be aware of it?

The experience is of odor molecules. The whole point is we have no direct awareness of what experience is of. This is very obvious in the case of smell; until recently we didn't know odor molecules existed at all. All we are directly aware of is the smell, by way of which we are indirectly aware of odor molecules. — hypericin

Your position seems to be that a perceptual experience is a representation, and that the perceptual experience or representation is directly of worldly objects. Furthermore, that it is our awareness of these perceptual experiences or representations which makes it an indirect perception.

Whereas I would call the perceptual experience the perception, you want to include an additional step and call your awareness of the perceptual experience the perception.

If our body’s perceptual machinery represents odour molecules to us as a smell, then how can there be any smell if you are unaware of it? You wouldn’t smell or perceive anything in that case. So I don’t see why the additional step of our awareness of the smell is necessary. If you are aware of the smell, you have a perception and if you aren’t aware of the smell, you have no perception. But that’s no different to having the perceptual experience or not. The extra step of awareness is unnecessary.

This is not necessarily weaker, just different. It seems more accurate to say that perceptual experience is a representation, and that language and knowledge might be stimulated by the perceptual experience, or might not, depending on whether we attend to it . — hypericin

Sure, and perceptual experience might also include, and/or be affected by, expectation, environmental conditions, and other stuff too.

Perceptual experience without language and knowledge is still perceptual experience. But language and knowledge without perceptual experience is just language and knowledge. — hypericin

This is not nitpicking, these distinctions are crucial to the discussion. If knowledge of an object is part of the perceptual experience itself, it may be considered as immediate as the representation. But if it only follows/stimulated from the representation, then this seems implausible — hypericin

I'm no expert, but I believe that studies have shown that our perceptual experience can be shaped by expectations, and also (possibly?) by language, among other things.

Moreover, if a perceptual experience is a representation (or is a representation plus language), then we do not have a perceptual experience of this representation.
— Luke

Agreed — hypericin

Have I convinced you of direct realism, then?

If you agree that our perceptual experience is not of a representation (i.e. is not of itself), then what do we have a perceptual experience of? Odour molecules?

In your account, when we smell this unidentifiable smell, you say the perception involves a representation, but we are somehow unaware of this representation. — hypericin

We may be unaware of what happens behind the scenes to produce our perceptual experience of the smell, but (presumably, in the scenario you describe) we are not unaware of our perceptual experience of the smell. It could be said that a perceptual experience simply is a representation. However, I made the weaker assertion that representation is only involved in a perceptual experience, because language and knowledge can also form part of a perceptual experience. These allow us (e.g.) to identify or recognise a smell as the smell of X, or to see and identify an object as an X, etc.

What I said was that we may be unable to identify or recognise the smell (as X), or that we may be unable to identify or recognise the object (that emitted the odour molecules) that is the source of the smell. This need not imply that we are unaware of the representation or unaware of the perceptual experience.

Moreover, if a perceptual experience is a representation (or is a representation plus language), then we do not have a perceptual experience of this representation. As I've said, the representation helps to form the perceptual experience.

My position is that perceptual experiences necessarily involve representation, but that we do not perceive a representation. Instead, the representation helps to form the perceptual experience, which is then directly of its object.
— Luke

What exactly are we doing then, when we smell something but are unaware what it is? — hypericin

Perception need not entail recognition or identification of objects. We can have a perceptual experience of an object (e.g. for the first time) and be unable to identify the object.

Is the experience (G) different to the perception? Some might say that perception refers to our sensory experience of the world.
— Luke

That's true, some might say that. But it makes no sense to me... — AmadeusD

That's strange, because the first line of one of the articles that you posted (here) in support of your definition of perception states that: "Perception refers to our sensory experience of the world."

More relevantly, the SEP article on The Problem of Perception that has been discussed throughout the thread, and which covers the topic of direct vs indirect realism, states in its opening paragraph:

The Problem of Perception is a pervasive and traditional problem about our ordinary conception of perceptual experience. The problem is created by the phenomena of perceptual illusion and hallucination: if these kinds of error are possible, how can perceptual experience be what we ordinarily understand it to be: something that enables direct perception of the world?

Perhaps I could have used the word/phrase “percept” or “perceptual experience” instead of “perception” for the sake of clarity. However, it is the perceptual experience of objects that is said to be direct or indirect. Even on your concept of a process of perception, what makes the process direct or indirect is the number of steps between the perceptual experience and its object.

The article proceeds to say:

A.D. Smith claims that what most authors have in mind in talking about the Problem of Perception is the “question of whether we can ever directly perceive the physical world”

You keep arguing against naive realism only, whereas the article indicates that there are also non-naive versions of direct realism, such as intentionalism. Therefore, the question of whether a perceptual experience is direct or indirect cannot be settled only by counting the number of steps in a process.

The question that needs to be settled is whether our perceptual experience can be directly of its object or whether our perceptual experience is always indirectly of a representation of its object. My position is that perceptual experiences necessarily involve representation, but that we do not perceive a representation. Instead, the representation helps to form the perceptual experience, which is then directly of its object.

:up:

It is not A-B. It is A-B-C-D-E-F and maybe G is the experience. This isn't complicated... — AmadeusD

Is the experience (G) different to the perception? Some might say that perception refers to our sensory experience of the world.

Fair enough. I'm unsure that's supportable, or helpful.
Here, here and here make it plain (to me, at any rate) that 'perception' is the word used, in normal language situations, to refer to the process and faculty of getting from an object to an experience (those particular terms, mine). — AmadeusD

If perception is the entire process “of getting from an object to an experience”, then in what sense is that entire process indirect?

Using "a perception" is a bit misleading though as 'perception' is symbolizing the process, which we do not grasp fully, of getting from object to experience. The resulting images are one aspect, and likely the final result, of perception as a process. If that final product then labeled 'a perception', i think its a bit incoherent. Maybe that's an issue here. — AmadeusD

I disagree that the word “perception” typically refers to a process (or to the unconscious workings of the brain/body) that results in… a perception. The perception is the final product. There’s nothing incoherent about that.

The odour molecules are a part of that unperceived causal chain.
— Luke

The odour molecules are perceived. I smell them. — Michael

I think we more commonly speak about perceiving the object that is the source of a smell or sound or (reflected) light, rather than perceiving the proximal stimulus, such as odour molecules. There may be evolutionary or biological reasons for this.

But, even if we did directly perceive odour molecules instead of a cake, there would still be no intermediary between your perception of the odour molecules and the odour molecules. That is, your perception would not be of a representation of the odour molecules; your perception would be of the odour molecules themselves. But, again, I think we more commonly refer to the perception being of the source of the odour molecules (or other proximal stimulus).

I'm not saying that we perceive the causal chain. I'm simply trying to explain the inconsistency in your position. You say that there are no intermediaries between perception and some distal object, and yet there are; the odour molecules in the air are an intermediary between perception and the cake in the oven. — Michael

You say you don’t perceive the causal chain. The odour molecules are a part of that unperceived causal chain. According to indirect realism, the intermediary is something that is perceived. The perception one has is not of a causal chain but of a distal object. Otherwise, the perception is of an intermediary/representation of the distal object. Odour molecules are neither the distal object nor a representation of it. Odour molecules are part of the causal chain that you say you don't perceive. The perception you have is of the cake in the oven.

I'm also trying to understand why you say that the perception is of the cake in the oven, and not of the odour molecules, given that it is the odour molecules that stimulate the sense receptors in the nose. — Michael

The perception you have is the smell of cake in the oven. You don't smell the odour molecules, even if they stimulate the sense receptors. The odour molecules are part of a causal explanation for why you have the perception of smelling the cake. You don't smell the causal explanation; you smell the cake.

As I quoted from the article you referenced, the problem with your idea of smelling the odour molecules is that:

...it commits the representationalist fallacy of confusing the object of awareness with the vehicle of awareness (Huemer 2001). One may perceive the environment (the object of awareness [i.e. the cake]) by means of an internal state (the vehicle of awareness [i.e. the odour molecules being converted into brain signals to produce the perception]), but to say that one perceives the vehicle of awareness itself is a category mistake that leads to the regress. The representationalist ends up claiming that we only perceive our internal states, which involves creating an internal representation of an internal representation (etc.), thereby ringing down the veil of perception. — Direct Perception: The View from Here

So how do you determine which object that is a part of the causal chain is the direct object of perception? — Michael

The direct object of perception is, normally, whatever your phenomenal perception is of; whether it's a cake, Joe Biden, a coloured object, or something else.

You just say it's the cake without explaining why it's the cake. — Michael

You originally asked:

In what sense is an olfactory sensation caused by odour molecules in the air stimulating the sense receptors in my nose the "direct" perception of a cake in the oven? — Michael

So you originally told us that the perception is of a cake in the oven. What makes it direct is that it is not, instead, a perception of an intermediary or representation of a cake in the oven.

Surely, the intermediary - whatever it is - does not provide a direct perception of its distal object, and allows only a representation of the object to be perceived without allowing the distal object to be immediately perceived. — Luke

If the above isn't actually your position, and i'm missing context, I am sorry. — AmadeusD

I'm not arguing for an intermediary; indirect realists are. My point here was about where the intermediary lies: between the perception and its perceived distal object, and not between the perception and its prior, imperceptible causes.

I directly perceive images, formed by my brain
— AmadeusD

You don't directly perceive images formed by your brain. Those images are your perceptions
— Luke

That is, in fact, what that sentence means. I do not see the distinction you're trying to make here. — AmadeusD

If those images are your perceptions, then your sentence means "I perceive perceptions". If those images are your perceptions, then those images aren't the objects of your perceptions; they aren't the things you perceive. What you perceive is the world, not the images.

A representation is indirect. It is something re-presented. Unless you're positing that looking at an apple causes an apple to appear physically in my, physical mind.. I'm unsure how this question is sensible. — AmadeusD

I think you're asking too much of a perception if you expect it to present objects, instead of to represent objects.

It is literally enough to say that my sight is caused by light bouncing off an object an entering my body to reject Direct Realism. — AmadeusD

Maybe that's enough to reject naive realism, but naive realism isn't hard to reject.

If the Realist argument boiled down to "I directly perceive images, formed by my brain, — AmadeusD

You don't directly perceive images formed by your brain. Those images are your perceptions.

...which are indirect representations of distal objects... — AmadeusD

What makes them "indirect representations of distal objects"?

...caused by intermediaries between the objects and my sense organs" — AmadeusD

The relevant intermediary is between the objects and your perceptions, not the objects and your sense organs.

Let's take Direct Perception: The View from Here as a starting point: — Michael

Did you read all of this article? It argues in favour of direct realism. For example, the first sentence of the Reprise states:

I have argued that Gibson's ecological theory provides the elements of a plausible account of direct perception and offers means to fend off the standard arguments against it.

The article also presents strong arguments against indirect realism, which are similar to those I have been making (especially the category mistake mentioned at its third point):

How does Gibson's approach to perception compare with the representationalist one? On the standard representationalist view, perception is conceived as a process of getting an image, description, or symbol—some representation—of the environmental object into the head or mind of the perceiver. The representation stands for something in the world and constitutes the object of awareness; the observer does not immediately perceive or experience the environment, but only her mental representation thereof.

However, getting a representation of the world into the head does not really solve the problem. First, it sets up a logical regress analogous to the classic homunculus problem of picture-in-the-head theories: if the object of awareness is an internal image or representation, who perceives the image or interprets the representation? Second, this returns us to Hume's problem, for interpreting a representation presumes prior knowledge of the environmental entities for which the representations stand, and how they correspond. Third, it commits the representationalist fallacy of confusing the object of awareness with the vehicle of awareness (Huemer 2001). One may perceive the environment (the object of awareness) by means of an internal state (the vehicle of awareness), but to say that one perceives the vehicle of awareness itself is a category mistake that leads to the regress. The representationalist ends up claiming that we only perceive our internal states, which involves creating an internal representation of an internal representation (etc.), thereby ringing down the veil of perception.

Alternatively, perception may be conceptualized as a relation between the perceiver and the environment, in which the perceiver is aware of or in contact with ordinary environmental objects. Gibson's view of direct perception is of this stripe. But the question persists: what goes on in the perceiver when she becomes aware of an environmental object, if not getting a description of it into her head? For Gibson, the observer's perceptual system, which is attuned to specific information, resonates to that information. There are thus coordinated changes of state in the environment and the perceiver. The perceptual system's activity covaries with distal environmental features and properties, enabling actions to be oriented to them. The object of awareness is the environmental object, and the vehicle of awareness is the resonating perceptual system.

The relationship between these percepts and distal objects is in a very literal physical sense indirect; there are a number of physical entities and processes that sit between the distal object and the visual percept in the causal chain. — Michael

The causal chain is prior to the visual percept. If, by "visual percept", you mean a "perception" of a distal object, then it cannot be a perception of the causal chain, since the causal chain is prior to, and is the cause of, that perception.

Surely, the intermediary - whatever it is - does not provide a direct perception of its distal object, and allows only a representation of the object to be perceived without allowing the distal object to be immediately perceived.

You do not perceive the causal chain that produces your visual percepts.

If awareness of sensations is direct and awareness of objects is indirect then perception of objects is indirect. — Michael

The relevant issue is about perceptions of objects, not awareness of sensations. The directness or indirectness of awareness is irrelevant.

So? Why is the object of perception not the specific thing that stimulates the sense receptors? Why do you get to go back a step in the causal chain and say that it's the cake? — Michael

Is the causal chain the perception or not? If so, then it cannot also be the intermediary. If not, then it is irrelevant to the question of whether our perceptions of objects are direct.

Yes, you can describe what happens as "smelling cake" or you can describe it as "smelling odour molecules", much like you can describe it as "seeing fireworks" or you can describe it as "seeing lights in the sky". — Michael

As I said earlier, "smelling" odour molecules (i.e. odour molecules entering the nose) is, by itself, insufficient for smelling cake. There is more to the causal chain that results in smelling cake.

That's not the same as saying that "perceptions are equal to their causes", so you prior question is misguided. — Michael

The question is whether our perceptions of objects are direct or not. How do the causes of a perception act as an intermediary between the perception and its object?

What does it mean to say that some sensation is the "direct" perception of some distal object? What conditions must be satisfied for some distal object X to be the "direct" object of perception? — Michael

When there is no intermediary between the perception and its object. We can speak of an indirect intermediary such as a mirror, a television broadcast or a drawing.

What if, say, the cake has since been taken away and eaten, but the smell lingered. What am I (directly) smelling now? Nothing? The contents of my family's stomachs? Odour molecules in the air? — Michael

You are still smelling the cake that emitted the odour molecules.

If we are directly aware of sensations and not directly aware of distal objects then we do not directly perceive distal objects. — Michael

The relevant issue is whether perceptions of objects is direct or indirect, not whether awareness of perceptions/sensations is direct or indirect.

The odour molecules in the air are the more proximal cause. So why is it that the interaction between the odour molecules in the air and the sense receptors in my nose is the (direct) perception of a cake in the oven? — Michael

Because it's not a perception until the odour molecules in the air have entered your nose and olfactory system and have been converted into brain signals to produce the perception of the smell of cake. And the cake produces the odour molecules.

The cause of the sensation is odour molecules in the air stimulating the sense receptors in my nose. The perception is (the rational awareness of) the sensation. — Michael

Earlier you seemed to be saying that smelling a cake and "smelling" odour molecules were equivalent, just like watching pixels/light and watching Joe Biden on television.

What's the connection between either of these things and the cake in the oven? — Michael

The cake emits the odour molecules, presumably.

You provide an accurate account of the mechanics of perception (odour molecules stimulating the sense receptors in my nose, leading to a sensation) but then just throw in the non sequitur "therefore it's the direct perception of a cake in the oven" at the end with no explanation — Michael

FIrstly, you are confused about direct perception of objects and direct awareness of perceptions/sensations. If the issue were about a direct or indirect awareness of perceptions, then what is the intermediary between your awareness and your perceptions? But that's not the issue.

Secondly, if perceptions are not equivalent to their causes, then we can ignore the causes, which are irrelevant to the question of whether or not our perceptions are directly of objects or not. If perceptions are equivalent to their causes, then you need to identify the intermediary between a perception and its object.

Sensations are the intermediary that sit between rational awareness and distal objects. — Michael

The relevant issue is whether perceptions are direct or indirect, not whether awareness is direct or indirect. What is indirect awareness?

The colour red is not a property of some distal object but a visual sensation. I am directly aware of the colour red and indirectly aware of a surface that reflects light with a wavelength of ~700nm. — Michael

The smell of cake is not a property of the cake either; it’s an interaction between the cake and the perceiver. That doesn’t mean the perception is not of the cake.

It sounds like you are directly aware of your perception of colour and “indirectly aware” of the causes of the perception. Are the causes the same or different from the perception?

Your intentionalism seems to accept that existence of such sensations but nonetheless wants to say that we are directly aware of the distal object, and even though something like odour molecules are the more proximal cause of the sensation. — Michael

Is the perception of smelling cake equivalent to the cause of the perception?

If the causal chain of odour molecules, olfactory system, etc. is equivalent to the perception of smelling cake, then what’s the intermediary? The causal chain can’t be both the perception and the intermediary. What’s between the perception and the cake?

You're just reasserting the irrelevant argument about grammar. — Michael

I disagree we are saying the same thing. I don't think you read this properly:

The causal chain of odour molecules entering the nose, interacting with the olfactory system, converting to brain signals, etc. can explain its effect: our smelling cake. But molecules entering the nose is not equivalent to smelling molecules, and molecules entering the nose, by itself, is insufficient to cause us to smell anything. Therefore, we don't smell odour molecules. The effect of this causal chain (the sensation of smell) cannot be its own cause. Moreover, it doesn't work the other way: the sensation is not an explanation for its distal cause. That is, smelling cake isn't an explanation for why odour molecules enter the nose, etc. So, I don't believe these are equivalent. — Luke

You're saying we smell the odour molecules, an intermediary, which is an indirect realist view. I'm saying we don't smell the molecules, we only smell the cake.

Everything you say here is consistent with indirect realism. — Michael

I don't believe so. I directly smell the cake. I do not smell an intermediary.

The pixels are the distal cause of the sensation. You can describe this event as "watching Joe Biden's inauguration" if you like, or you can describe it as "watching pixels" if you like. The latter is certainly an unusual way to describe it, but strictly speaking it's factually correct.

The odour molecules are the distal cause of the sensation. You can describe this event as "smelling a cake in the oven" if you like, or you can describe it as "smelling odour molecules" if you like. The latter is certainly an unusual way to describe it, but strictly speaking it's factually correct. — Michael

The causal chain of odour molecules entering the nose, interacting with the olfactory system, converting to brain signals, etc. can explain its effect: our smelling cake. But molecules entering the nose is not equivalent to smelling molecules, and molecules entering the nose, by itself, is insufficient to cause us to smell anything. Therefore, we don't smell odour molecules. The effect of this causal chain (the sensation of smell) cannot be its own cause. Moreover, it doesn't work the other way: the sensation is not an explanation for its distal cause. That is, smelling cake isn't an explanation for why odour molecules enter the nose, etc. So, I don't believe these are equivalent.

The "ordinary way of speaking" is not an accurate account of the ontology of perception. The "ordinary way of speaking" developed according to our naive, pre-scientific understanding of the world. — Michael

It's not just a semantic difference, then?

Even the SEP article adds:

Thus, like sense-datum theorists and adverbialists, intentionalists reject Direct Realist Presentation, and admit that we are not ever directly presented with ordinary objects, not even in veridical experience.

It's not clear to me what the intentionalist means by "we directly perceive ordinary objects that are not directly presented to us". It seems hopelessly confused. At best they're equivocating and mean two different things by "direct". — Michael

It means that we don't perceive things directly in the naive realist sense of taking physical objects directly into one's mind (somehow). It is just as I am describing: a perception (including representation) is the end result of a causal chain; for example, taking odour molecules into the olfactory system and converting them into brain signals, etc. The output of this causal chain is a perception such as a smell, which is directly of an ordinary object, such as a cake. That's what I would call a perception.

Your account is akin to saying: I'm not watching pixels activate on my television screen, I'm watching Joe Biden's inauguration. — Michael

Are the pixels the perception or the cause of the perception? In your previous example you said that the odour molecules were the cause of the smell. Here you appear to imply that the perception and its cause are equivalent.

This "semantic" directness is so far divorced from the phenomenological directness that concerns the epistemological problem of perception and the dispute between naive and indirect realists that it seems entirely misplaced in these discussions. — Michael

It's odd, then, that Intentionalism was included in the SEP article you were quoting. Is the article only relevant for the parts of interest to you?

That it's "as direct as it can be" isn't that it's direct. The point made by indirect realists is that you can't smell the cake directly. Direct perception of a cake would require naive realism to be true, which it never is. This non-naive sense of "directness" is a misnomer. — Michael

I think I am using language in an ordinary way when I say that you can smell the cake directly. I agree that naive realism isn't true (and is very strange), but you can oppose naive realism without also making the mistake of saying that we always perceive the world indirectly, which only follows the errors and assumptions of naive realism.

Suffice to say, no, and i direct you to my previous post. The question contain therein is crucial to my understanding how you could possible think that was the question. — AmadeusD

I wasn't referring to a question of yours, but to the question of the discussion: direct realism vs indirect realism.

Obviously I think there is a difference between a smell the and the causes which produce it. I've been arguing that the perception is the smell, not its causes.

Again, it’s a question of whether our perceptions of objects are direct or indirect. The perception is the smell, not the data which produce it. You don’t smell data.

The experience is the perception is the smelling.

if Bob told me what Jodie said this morning, I may indeed be aware of what Jodie said this morning, but only indirectly. What I am directly aware of, my actual experience, are the words Bob told me. — hypericin

When you are watching something, say a baseball game, you are experiencing it, but only indirectly, via the direct experience of the TV itself. The baseball game is casually connected to the TV, the features on the TV map to features of the game. Yet, what you experience is not the game itself, but in fact a representation of it. — hypericin

If Jodie had told you herself, instead of hearing it from Bob, or if you went to the baseball game and saw it live, instead of watching it on TV, then these would be direct perceptions, right?

If we're only directly in touch with our perceptions, we're not directly in touch with objects. — AmadeusD

Are you unable to touch objects?

Seriously, though, it is a question of whether our perceptions of objects are direct or not. I don’t know what kind of perception you envisage that would be more direct.

In what sense is an olfactory sensation caused by odour molecules in the air stimulating the sense receptors in my nose the "direct" perception of a cake in the oven? — Michael

To put it bluntly:

The perception is: the smell (of cake).
The causes of the perception are: the odour molecules in the air stimulating the sense receptors.

What you perceive/smell is the cake.
What you don’t perceive/smell are the causes of the perception.

The perception is the final product; the smell. All you smell is the cake. You don’t smell the causes of the perception.

I don’t know how you could smell the cake more directly. Without the causes, perhaps?