So if "direct" in the naive sense doesn't mean the same thing as "direct" in the non-naive sense then there are two different meanings of "direct", and so two different meanings of "we directly perceive ordinary objects". Which meaning of "we directly perceive ordinary objects" do you think the indirect realist is arguing against? — Michael

Why must indirect realists only be negatively arguing against a particular meaning of "direct", instead of positively arguing for a particular position of their own? You and Robinson appear to be arguing that indirect realists only oppose the meaning of "direct" in naive realism, and otherwise you would be direct realists. But given your positive statements indicating that you are a sense datum theorist, I don't think that's true.

The thesis of Direct Realism (at least, according to the SEP article) is that "we can directly perceive ordinary objects". Some of us believe this thesis but disagree with naive realism. We are also direct realists. I genuinely disagree that we always perceive an intermediary and that we cannot directly perceive ordinary objects. Call that a semantic disagreement if you will, but we can't both be correct.

If the indirect realist is arguing against the naive sense of "we directly perceive ordinary objects", and if we do not directly perceive ordinary objects in the naive sense, then indirect realism is correct. — Michael

Against naive realism only, perhaps, but not against all forms of direct realism. Indirect realism is true only if we cannot directly perceive ordinary objects and/or only if we perceive a representation (or some other intermediary) of ordinary objects.

What I find strange about your position is that you seem to accept the existence of something like sensations/sense-data/qualia, seem to accept that we are (directly?) aware of sensations/sense-data/qualia, but also claim that we are directly aware of ordinary objects. I just don't understand what you mean by "direct" in this final claim. — Michael

I think I understand the distinction between direct and indirect perception in relation to the perception of ordinary (external) objects. However, I do not understand the distinction between direct and indirect awareness. What is indirect awareness?

And as I suggested here, naming these non-naive direct realisms as being "direct" realisms seems to be a misnomer. At the very least they seem to mean something different by "direct" than what is meant by naive and indirect realists. — Michael

This strikes me as a no true scotsman. You asked for a non-naive version of direct realism. Intentionalism is a non-naive version. According to the SEP article, direct realism is the thesis that "we can directly perceive ordinary objects." It doesn't say only in the "direct" sense of naive realism.

Semantic Direct Realism (SDR), the theory that perceptual experience puts you in direct cognitive contact with external objects but does so without the unmediated awareness of the objects'
...

It is this concept of an "unmediated awareness of objects" that I consider to be incoherent. Do indirect realists only hold the negative view that this concept is incoherent? Or do they also hold the positive belief in their position that we cannot directly perceive ordinary objects?

If there’s such a thing as non-naive direct realism that can avoid the common kind claim without arguing that distal objects are actual constituents of experience then it needs further explanation. — Michael

3.3.1 Intentionalism in Outline

The intentionalist holds that we directly experience ordinary objects. The distinguishing feature of the view is a specific conception of the manner in which experiences are directly of ordinary objects: here the intentionalist appeals to intentionality conceived of as a form of mental representation (hence it is also sometimes called the representationalist theory of experience)...

Intentionalists endorse the Common Kind Claim. So, a veridical experience of churchyard covered in white snow, consists in direct representation of such a scene, but so do corresponding illusory and hallucinatory experiences: these experiences have the same nature...

3.3.5 Intentionalism and Perception of the World

In response to this, the intentionalist can suggest that although they reject Direct Realist Presentation, they do not reject Direct Realism. They can suggest that the former is not the only way to understand the latter. As we saw above, another way to understand Direct Realism is with a causal understanding of direct perception.

...The object-directedness of experience is at the heart of their approach. Even though intentionalism denies that experiences involve the direct presentation of ordinary objects, it (a) respects and is motivated by the phenomenological observation that experiences are directly of ordinary objects, and (b) offers an alternative account of the manner in which experiences are directly of ordinary objects. As we’ve seen, instead of presentation, the intentionalist appeals to representation.

Thus, the intentionalist can maintain that when you see a snow-covered churchyard for what it is you do directly perceive a snow-covered churchyard. This is not because your experience itself directly presents you with a snow-covered churchyard. It doesn’t. After all, your experience is of such a kind that it could occur in a hallucination, where it wouldn’t directly present any ordinary object. It is rather because your experience directly perceptually represents the presence of a snow-covered churchyard and is non-deviantly caused by the churchyard in question. This is what direct perception amounts to for the intentionalist — SEP article

Compared to what other sort of perception? It's as direct as you can get.
— Luke

"Direct" does not mean "as direct as you can get". "As direct as you can get" may still be indirect. What is it compared to? The directness of the perceptual experience itself. — hypericin

You don't perceive your perceptual experience. Your perceptual experience is a perception.

How can "perceptions of the world" be "direct", if the "of the world" must be inferred from the perceptions, and other context? — hypericin

What inference(s) are you making? Are you inferring that your perceptions are indirect because they're of the world, or are you inferring that your perceptions are of the world because they're indirect?

What is the distinction between direct and indirect awareness?
— Luke

I think the distinction is clear. The feeling of heat on my skin, feelings of anger or contentment, the sound s and feeling of playing the drums, are all direct. My awareness of the exact temperature from my thermometer, my awareness of what Jodie said, via Bob's telling me this morning, and my awareness of your thinking on this subject, are all obviously indirect. — hypericin

I don't understand the meaning of "indirect awareness". What makes it indirect? It seems like you've labelled experiences without an external cause as "direct" and experiences with an external cause as "indirect". That's kind of just stipulating that perception of real-world objects is indirect, which is begging the question.

You will have to provide a convincing argument that we are not aware of our perceptions. On the face of it, perceptions are exactly what we are (directly) aware of. — hypericin

We are aware of our perceptions. I take issue with your distinction between direct/indirect awareness.

The indirect realist argues that the "primary" qualities of veridical experience are of the same kind as the "secondary" qualities of veridical experience and the "primary" qualities of dreams and hallucinations, and that the sorts of things that are the (direct) objects of perception when I dream and hallucinate are the sorts of things that are the (direct) objects of perception when awake and not hallucinating.

This is the common kind claim. — Michael

Forgive me for not following the argument along traditional lines. I would probably tend to agree that primary and secondary qualities are of the same kind; it's all just phenomenal experience.

If there’s such a thing as non-naive direct realism that can avoid the common kind claim without arguing that distal objects are actual constituents of experience then it needs further explanation. — Michael

My argument is that the indirect realist's concept of a direct perception is incoherent. Therefore, their indirect position has no contrast. Your concept of an indirect perception, with representations being part of the mechanics of perception, is what I would call a direct perception. This has a contrast with coherent examples of indirect perceptions such as seeing objects in a mirror or looking at a map.

EDIT: I note that your concept of an indirect perception, with representations being part of the mechanics of perception (e.g. as you describe here), differs from indirect realism's concept of an indirect perception, which is a perception of a representation of an object.

That's my point. Michael was asserting that a direct perception must be when a perception is identical with its object...
— Luke

I don't quite understand what you're suggesting I'm saying here — Michael

What part don't you understand? You said earlier that:

Distal objects are not present in phenomenal experience and the features of phenomenal experience are not the properties of distal objects. That is indirect realism to me, as contrasted with the direct realist view that distal objects are present in phenomenal experience and that the features of phenomenal experience are the properties of those distal objects. — Michael

It follows that your criterion for a direct perception is to have the distal object somehow be physically present in one's phenomenal experience. In other words, your criterion is that the object is identical with one's phenomenal experience. How would that work? How is that kind of perception possible? If this is not what you mean by a direct perception then please clarify.

...but the representational theory of perception is indirect realism. — Michael

There's a difference between my position and indirect realism. As I understand it, indirect realism asserts that we perceive representations (of objects). My position is not that we perceive representations (or some other intermediary), so my position is not indirect realism. My position is that perception involves representations. Representations are not the object of perception, as indirect realism asserts; instead, representations are formative in having perceptions. Or, as you put it earlier, representations are part of the "mechanics of perception".

My reply was that this isn't a perception at all, because it excludes any representation (and, more simply, because objects are not identical with perceptions). You can't have a perception without a representation
— Luke

Reading this, why wouldn't you conclude: perception is inherently indirect? — hypericin

Compared to what other sort of perception? It's as direct as you can get.

Since it makes no sense to talk about experience of perceptions, then it makes no sense to say that experience of perceptions is direct.
— Luke

No problem. Lets say then, experience, including perceptual experience, is direct. — hypericin

No problem. Assuming you mean experience of the world, or perceptual experience of objects in the world, then that makes us both direct realists.

How do you reply to this argument from hallucination? — hypericin

How do you reply to it?

Nothing logically prevents us from hallucinating in a way that appears identical to the real thing. — hypericin

Sure, I think that's what a hallucination is.

Any object O you perceive may either be real, or hallucination. — hypericin

Okay.

Therefore, that we are in the everyday, veridical case, P of O, cannot be a part of the perception P itself. — hypericin

This is irrelevant. The dispute is about whether our perceptions of the world are direct or indirect; it is not about how we know or whether we know that those perceptions are veridical or not.

It must be an inference (We are wide awake and alert, O is consistent with memory and environment, others acknowledge O). Similarly, if we are hallucinating, we only know that by inference as well (We are delirious, O is incongruous, no one else acknowledges O). — hypericin

The dispute is over whether we directly perceive objects or not; it is not over our knowledge of our perceptions. Our knowledge about (the veridicality of) our perceptions is not our perceptions.

In short, that what we experience is real, is an inference, not a perception. We are indirectly aware, via inference, of the realism of the world, and only directly aware of perceptual content. — hypericin

What is the distinction between direct and indirect awareness? The dispute is not over our (direct or indirect) awareness of our perceptions. This talk of "awareness of perceptions" is just another of your attempts to push our perceptions back a step; to create a gap between ourselves and our perceptions (much like your earlier talk of "experience of perceptions"). We do not perceive our perceptions; we perceive the world.

Given representations (R), perceptions (P) and objects (O), direct realists believe that R are part of the mechanics of P and are subsumed under P.
— Luke

Indirect realists also believe this. — hypericin

Yes, I said that, As you quoted me as saying:

Your [indirect realist] position is this:

A direct perception is: P (excluding R) of an O.
An indirect perception is: P (including R) of an O.
— Luke

Perceptions are representations, and so there isn't really "P (excluding R) of an O" — hypericin

That's my point. @Michael was asserting that a direct perception must be when a perception is identical with its object. My reply was that this isn't a perception at all, because it excludes any representation (and, more simply, because objects are not identical with perceptions). You can't have a perception without a representation, yet Michael calls this a direct perception.

Experience of perceptions is direct. Experience of objects is indirect, this happens via perceptions. — hypericin

I would not say that our perceptions are something that we have an experience of. You have experiences and you have perceptions. You don't have an experience of a perception; you have a perception. Your perceptions are not external to, independent of, or separate from, you and your experience. Perceptions form part of your experience. Since it makes no sense to talk about experience of perceptions, then it makes no sense to say that experience of perceptions is direct.

Is there anything left to say on this forum that you haven't already said Banno? :razz:

Thanks :blush:

Perhaps you could explain how to properly interpret the parts in bold.

Under any ordinary reading, the flower is not "directly presented in" or "a constituent of" the photo. The photo is just a photosensitive surface that has chemically reacted to light.

And by the same token, the flower is not "directly presented in" or "a constituent of" phenomenal experience. Phenomenal experience is just a mental phenomenon elicited in response to signals sent by the body's sense receptors.

So given the above account of direct/naive realism, direct/naive realism is false. — Michael

Then maybe I'm not a naive realist, but that's not required to be a direct realist.

Given representations (R), perceptions (P) and objects (O), direct realists believe that R are part of the mechanics of P and are subsumed under P.

My position is this:

A direct perception is: P (including R) of an O.

An indirect perception is: P of an R of an O.

I think we may be saying the same thing but in different ways.

Your position is this:

A direct perception is: P (excluding R) of an O.

An indirect perception is: P (including R) of an O.

We both appear to agree that the correct characterisation of a perception is: P (including R) of an O, but you call this indirect whereas I call it direct.

Since I consider this "correct characterisation" to be a direct perception, I accuse your side of taking a homunculus view of directly perceiving representations (of objects). Since you consider this "correct characterisation" to be an indirect perception, you accuse my side of identifying perceptions with their objects.

I favour my direct realist view because P (excluding R) of an O isn't a perception at all.

No it's not. The flower is on the ground. The photograph is in my pocket. The photograph is just a photosensitive material that has chemically reacted to light. — Michael

You must have a lot of difficulty with captchas when they ask you to choose all the photos with buses or traffic lights in them, since your answer must always be none.

Distal objects are present in phenomenal experience in the same sense.

Which is not a direct sense. It's an indirect sense. — Michael

A direct perception is not when the perception and the physical object are identical. Perception concerns receiving information about one's physical environment via the senses, not receiving large physical objects via the senses.

You really are just describing indirect realism but refusing to call it that. — Michael

You aren't talking about the sensory perception of mind-independent objects if you think that a direct perception requires a phenomenal experience to be identical with a distal object.

Phenomenal experience doesn't extend beyond the body. Distal objects exist beyond the body. Therefore, distal objects are not present in phenomenal experience. Distal objects are a cause of phenomenal experience, but that's it. — Michael

If I take a photograph of a flower, then the flower is in the photograph. Distal objects are present in phenomenal experience in the same sense.

Your criterion for a direct perception seems to be that the perception must be identical with the physical object. By that standard, no perception can be direct (or a perception, for that matter).

Distal objects are not present in phenomenal experience — Michael

In what sense are they not?

Sometimes I see a rabbit, sometimes I see a duck. A duck is not a rabbit. Therefore, is it the case that sometimes I see one distal object and sometimes I see another? No; the distal object is the same. — Michael

I agree, and that's the point.

In this context "seeing a rabbit" and "seeing a duck" has less to do with the distal object and more to do with my brain's interpretation of the sensory input. — Michael

Your interpretation (the intermediary) is either part of the perception, or else it occurs after the perception. Either way, your interpretation (the intermediary) is not the perceived distal object. In other words, the intermediary (your interpretation) is not the object that is perceived. Your perception is of the distal object. GIven that both sides of this dispute are realists, the distal object is the same regardless of whether you interpret it as a rabbit or a duck. But, in order for your perception to be indirect, the intermediary (your interpretation) must be the distal object of perception.

Otherwise, it just boils down to an ambiguity in the meaning of "perceive", with one camp taking it to refer to perceiving real objects and the other camp taking it to refer to the way those objects are perceived and the contents of our phenomenal experience. The latter has little to do with realism or mind-independence.

There are many intermediaries between phenomenal experience and, say, a painting on the wall. There's light, the eyes, and the unconscious processing of neural signals. — Michael

Is your phenomenal experience of the painting on the wall, or is it of the light, the eyes, and the unconscious processing of neural signals?

There are many intermediaries between the distal stimulus and conscious awareness. — Michael

Do we perceive the intermediaries or the distal stimulus? The intermediaries are part of the "mechanics of perception"; they are not the perceived object.

There are (at least) two parts to perception; sensation and cognition. — Michael

Right, sensation and cognition are both part of perception; they are both involved in our perception of an object. As you say, these are "facts about the mechanics of perception". The dispute is over whether our perception of an object is direct (i.e. whether we perceive the object itself) or whether our perception of an object is indirect (i.e. whether we perceive an intermediary representing the object itself).

If sensation and cognition are both parts of the perception of an object, then the putative intermediary (of indirect realism) can be neither a sensation nor a cognition as these are both part of "the mechanics of perception". Neither a sensation nor a cognition can be the perceived object if these are the mechanisms behind the perception, which generate the perception. If the intermediary is neither a sensation nor a cognition, then what could this intermediary possibly be that is situated between the perception and the object?

What does "direct presentation" mean if not literal presence? — Michael

What do you mean by presence?

Given the actual mechanics of perception, conscious experience does not extend beyond the brain/body, and so distant objects and their properties are not present in conscious experience, and so in no meaningful sense does conscious experience involve the "direct presentation" of those distant objects. — Michael

Why must conscious experience extend beyond the brain/body? Must an object be touching a brain in order to be directly perceived; to be a "direct presentation"? It sounds like you want to eliminate perception altogether.

The only thing about the environment that is a given to any organism is the sensory information it receives from it. — hypericin

The sensory information that an organism receives from its environment is a perception. You are basically saying that our perceptions are direct.

What else can an organism do with this information but infer things (consciously or otherwise) about its environment? — hypericin

In that case, the inference must occur after the perception. If we perceive first and infer later, then how could the perception be indirect? The inference does not precede the perception, so it cannot come between the perception and the environment.

Well, the first step is to explain what it means to experience something directly and what it means to experience something indirectly. — Michael

I take a direct perception of the world to involve two things: a perception and the world. A direct perception is a perception of the world without any intermediary between the perception and the world. I take an indirect perception of the world to involve three things: a perception, the world, and some third thing that lies between the perception and the world, such as a representation. An indirect perception of the world is a perception of something which exists between the perception and the world.

Indirect realists may take exception to this definition and they may prefer to define an indirect perception of the world as being a perception of the world via an intermediary. But, in that case, the intermediary would be part of the perception and wouldn't be a third thing that is perceived. The perception would be directly of the world and the representation would be subsumed under the meaning of "perception". In that case, the representation isn't part of the world (the perceived object) but is part of how we perceive things in the world.

So let's take olfactory experience. Do I smell a rose? Or do I smell the geraniol in the air, produced by the oils in a rose's petals? — Michael

What's relevant is whether we perceive the world or some intermediary between the perception and the world. The rose and the geraniol are both parts of the world. At a guess, I imagine science would tell us that smelling geraniol in the air is what it means to smell a rose.

After that, we should ask if there's such a thing as a correct smell. — Michael

I don't think so. Perceptions can differ between perceivers, but this needn't imply that they each perceive something other than the world.

First, to the indirect realist we see objects in the everyday sense. It's just that everyday seeing involves indirection. — hypericin

I agree that everyday seeing involves indirection. However, the position of the indirect realist is not merely that perception involves indirection, such that we can choose to perceive either directly or indirectly. The position of the indirect realist is that all perception is indirect and that we cannot perceive the world directly.

Perhaps this is the source of much of the disagreement. The debate is a factual one; about whether we do or do not perceive the world directly. The direct realist position is that we do perceive the world directly; the indirect realist position is that we do not.

However, there is also the question of whether it is possible or impossible to perceive the world directly. Indirect realism entails the impossibility; that we cannot perceive the world directly. Direct realism entails not only the possibility but also the necessity; that we can and must perceive the world directly.

Therefore, given the factual nature of the debate, direct realists cannot make any compromise that, although we perceive the world directly, it is possible that we may also perceive it indirectly at times. Likewise, indirect realists cannot make any compromise that, although we perceive the world indirectly, it is possible that we may also perceive it directly at times.

That is, the indirect realist can only ever directly "experience" or "attend to" or "see" representations and can never directly see objects.
— Luke

No, this is a misconception. We see objects, just indirectly. — hypericin

That's what I said.

Indirect realists claim that we see objects indirectly because we can only see their visual representations.

We can choose to attend to objects, or to their visual representation itself — hypericin

You cannot attend either to objects or to their visual representation when you can only see their visual representation.

Even though the same word "see" is used, these are not the same operations. We don't see our visual representations in the same way we see objects. Rather, we can choose to attend to the visual representation itself, instead of attending to the object it represents. — hypericin

Wouldn't the position of the indirect realist be that we can only "attend to" (or "see") visual representations and are unable to choose otherwise? That is, the indirect realist can only ever directly "experience" or "attend to" or "see" representations and can never directly see objects.

So in your account, qualitative features of perceptions are akin to a perceptual appendage? So for instance, to touch the world I need to use my hand. My hand is mine, not the world's, but this doesn't stop us from saying we directly touch the world. And so the same goes for the qualitative sensation of touching, this is just like the hand, another mechanism we need to touch the world? — hypericin

I think so, although I'm not exactly sure what you mean. To clarify: if the direct realist account is that we directly perceive the world, and if the indirect realist account is that we indirectly perceive the world, then, at the very least, our perceptions must be something other than the world in order for them to be perceptions of the world; 'the world' and 'our perceptions' must be separate. However, it seems that indirect realists want to re-locate some parts of 'our perceptions' (such as our representations) over to the side of 'the world' instead, such that we can perceive our representations.

You did not answer my earlier question: What is the difference between directly seeing a representation and directly experiencing a representation?
— Luke

Really there is no difference. — hypericin

This implies that we see/perceive our representations. I disagree.

"See" can refer both to the subjective sensation of looking and to the external object. While "experience" only refers to the subjective. — hypericin

How can "see" also refer to the external object?

I wanted to point out that we don't "see" representation in the same way we see objects. — hypericin

I still don't understand the difference. Why don't we "see" representations in the same way? (And why the use of scare quotes?)

Perceptions are representations. — hypericin

This implies that we do not see/perceive our representations. We cannot see/perceive our representations if perceptions and representations are identical. Or, it at least indicates that perceptions and representations are on the same side, both opposed to 'the world'. If you are saying that perceptions and representations are both of 'the world', then I agree.

Maps inform, becase they correspond to real features, but they are radically not those features. If all you had access to were maps, would you be directly aware of what those maps represent? — hypericin

Maps are part of the world that we can have perceptions of. Maps are not part of our perceptions or human visual system, unlike our representations.

Naive realism requires that the qualitative features of perception mirror the features of reality sans perception. But they do not. They only exist during perception, and are features of the perceiver, not the perceived. — hypericin

Naive realism posits that we directly perceive the world, not that "the qualitative features of perception mirror the features of reality sans perception".

Qualitative features are a part of perception, not a part of the world.

Let's keep our perceptions, and all they involve (including our representations), separate from the world.

As long as our perceptions are of the world, then we directly perceive the world, regardless of the qualitative features of those perceptions.

Therefore, it is not required that the qualitative features of our perceptions exist in the world. They belong to our perceptions of the world, not to the world itself.

But these qualitative features are exactly what we directly experience. — hypericin

You did not answer my earlier question: What is the difference between directly seeing a representation and directly experiencing a representation?

How does directly experiencing a representation differ from directly seeing or directly perceiving a representation?

If representations are not a part of our perceptions, then where do they come from and how do we know about them? That is, if we do not perceive our representations of the world then how do they come about? If we experience our representations of the world without perceiving them, then what causes those experiences?

The features of our perceptions must be present in reality, so that barns really look red, and violins sound as they do, independently of an observer. — hypericin

How can the world possibly be perceived “independently of an observer”?

Nobody is saying that representation is the thing seen. Following language usage, objects are the things seen. But seeing is indirect. The only thing we experience directly is the representation. — hypericin

What is the difference between directly seeing a representation and directly experiencing a representation? What do you directly experience when you indirectly see an object? What would it take to directly see an object?

It's intended as an example; one might differentiate seeing the hand in the mirror as indirect, in contrast to seeing it without the mirror - directly. — Banno

You might say that you directly see the reflection of your hand in the mirror, but this is not what an indirect realist would say. In principle, nothing can be directly seen for an indirect realist (except for an internal representation?). For an indirect realist, seeing a reflection of a hand in the mirror would be twice removed from directly seeing the hand; both seeing the reflection and seeing the internal representation of the reflection. So, I still think there is a difference between what you and an indirect realist mean by the term "indirect" (or, specifically, indirect seeing). However, I take it you may only have been using the distinction (in the conventional way) to help make your point. Furthermore, this is a minor quibble as it seems we are on the same side of this issue.

So in other words, seeing is inherently indirect. — hypericin

I wouldn’t say that seeing is indirect. But if I did, then I suppose that seeing representations would be doubly indirect..?

Otherwise, seeing real objects is direct and seeing representations of real objects is indirect.

Direct realists can hold the view that seeing/perception involves representations in our visual system without also holding the view that all we can see are representations.

The human visual system may also involve the movement of our eyes. It does not follow that all we can see is the movement of our eyes.

Representation is constitutive of seeing/perception. It doesn’t also need to be the thing seen.

Isn't that exactly what indirect realists are claiming? That perception involves representation? — flannel jesus

No, indirect realists make the stronger claim that our perceptions are only of representations. Our perceptions can involve representations without also being perceptions of representations.

That's just what all versions on non skeptical realism have in common - direct and indirect realism are variations of that — flannel jesus

Realism is more generally a view about existence: that the world or objects exist independently of our minds. Despite the name, direct and indirect realism specifically concern perception; and whether our perceptions are of real objects or of representations of real objects.

I don't know why he's assuming indirect realists want or demand direct realism to be true. — flannel jesus

I don't think indirect realists want direct realism to be true.

You seem to take direct realism to be the view that we can perceive things as they really are (in themselves). However, I take direct realism to be the view that we do perceive real things but not things as they are in themselves (i.e. perception which is absent any representation of those real things). Perception necessarily involves representation.

I take indirect realism to be the view that all we can perceive are representations, such that we are unable to perceive any real things. I therefore think that indirect realists fail to acknowledge that perception necessarily involves representation. I can only assume that indirect realists are attempting to account for the fact that perception necessarily involves some form of representation, but when their conclusion is that all we can perceive are representations, it strongly points to a kind of homunculus inside of us who is doing the perceiving (instead of us).

I take Luke to be saying that indirect realists think perception would have to be “untainted by representation” for it to be direct. — Jamal

Exactly. Thanks for articulating it more clearly than I could.

I haven’t read about this stuff for many years; it’s mostly my own thoughts on the subject.

The indirect realist says that what we see is not a real object; only a mere representation. They therefore desire a perception untainted by representation. Doesn’t that make sense?

As @hypericin notes, and I agree, I think the concept of perceiving the world as it is (in itself) is an incoherent one.
↪Luke

yeah, I fully agree, and that's the part of direct realism that doesn't sit with me. — flannel jesus

I don't see it as being a part of direct realism, but as a part of indirect realism. The indirect realist desires a perception of the world as it is in itself, not the direct realist.

↪Luke
for me, the question is "is the representation -the world as it is- or does it have some big differences from the world as it is?" — flannel jesus

As @hypericin notes, and I agree, I think the concept of perceiving the world as it is (in itself) is an incoherent one.

Yep.

I see my hand directly when I look down, indirectly when I see its reflection in a mirror. Here I have a clear enough understanding of what it means to see my hand directly and indirectly.

But if someone says that when I look down at my hand I am seeing it indirectly, I do not have a way to make sense of what they say.

If they say I am not seeing my hand, but a "mental image of my hand" or some such, my reply is that, the "mental image", so far as it makes any sense, is me seeing my hand. — Banno — Banno

I'm not sure that I would even describe seeing a hand in a mirror as seeing it indirectly. Or, at least, that's a different meaning of "indirect" compared to what it means in the direct/indirect realism discussion, imo. However, I fully agree with the rest.

I would not put it this way. I don't think indirect realists abuse language the way you say they do. To them you see objects, but seeing is mediated by the indirection of representation. The only thing you directly experience (not "see") is perceptions/representations, which, while they map to objects, are themselves entirely not the objects they represent. — hypericin

I would say that "seeing objects" and being "mediated by the indirection of representation" are one and the same thing. If you eliminate the mediation (that indirect realists complain about), then you eliminate the seeing. Indirect realists desire (if not demand) a way of seeing that involves no representation, but that's not a thing. It's like a camera that can somehow take a photo without taking a photo.

Whereas, to the non-naive direct realist (as I understand them), perception is the organism directly rubbing against the world. It contacts the world, and responds to it. — hypericin

Even a cheap camera can take a photo of real objects. Our perception of the world might be different from a gazelle's or a hyena's, but we can each see if there's a lion nearby. I imagine an indirect realist would not be satisfied with the representation involved in the different visual systems of these different animals; that none of us really sees the lion as it is. It seems that no representational visual system is satisfactory. God's perhaps? Even that would be too representation-y for them, I'd imagine.

There is no such thing as perceiving an object as it is, the concept is incoherent, and so perceptual representations are as direct as you can get. — hypericin

Right. The concept of perceiving an object as it is, paradoxically, would involve no representation; no perception.

The conversation between direct realism and indirect realism isn't about "demands", I don't think the word "demand" is helping with clarity here. — flannel jesus

Fair enough, it was perhaps a poor choice of word. Please see my reply to @hypericin.

There is no such demand. To make it would be foolish as perception is inherently indirect, it necessarily involves construction of a representation. — hypericin

Direct and indirect realists can both agree that perception necessarily involves construction of a representation. They disagree over whether the construction of a representation is only the act of seeing or whether it is also the object that is seen.

Direct realists consider the construction of a representation to be what enables us to see anything. They consider the first-order construction of a representation of an object to be “seeing” a real object. Indirect realists disagree and say that the construction of a representation is not only the act of seeing, but is also the object that we see. The problem for indirect realists (from a direct realist's point of view) is that seeing a representation would require a second-order construction of a representation of a representation, and so on.

For direct realists, the construction of a representation is only the act of seeing, or the bodily function that enables us to see, which therefore allows us to see real objects.
For indirect realists, the construction of a representation is both the act of seeing and the object seen, which allows us to see... nothing other than how our visual system functions, I suppose.