No, the scheme is supposed to mean that a word in one language has a group of meanings and a word in another language has a different group of meanings, and that the two groups partly overlap (see discussion with ↪Harry Hindu
). — baker

Your distinction between mother and mati indicates that you were talking about one word from each language with the same meaning, but that those words may have other meanings in their respective languages that are not shared by the two languages. I suppose this could be relevant where non-literal or double meanings are possible, such as double entendre, but I don't think this is what the article or the OP is talking about.

I'd say that as bread may be of quite different kinds and have somewhat different uses and roles in the cuisines of Germany and France, that these differences of practice vis a vis bread constitute the differences of intention in how the words 'Brot' and 'pain' embody meaning in their respective cultures. — Janus

This seems about right, I think. It sounds as though the French and the Germans have intended to distinguish their national breads from each other to make them as distinct or as different as possible. But I'd imagine they would still consider each other's bread as a type of bread. So it remains unclear what this has to do with the meaning of words.

We can see that many words have a cross-language translation relationship like this (L: language, M: meaning, ):

Word in L1
M1
M2
M3

Word in L2
M1
M2
M4

(L2 has a different word to express M3) — baker

We would expect L1 and L2 to contain different words (to express M1, M2, etc.), because they are different languages. Your parenthesis appears to indicate M4 is a "different word" used to express the same meaning as M3, yet you distinguish them as "M3" and "M4" which denotes different meanings.

Hamlet says of himself that he is a rogue and peasant slave and that he is pigeon-liver'd and lacks gall. Now what is it that is lost or added in translation when we say that he thought of himself as timid, cowardly? What is it that is Shakespearely? — baker

Thank you for a better explication here: that "how it means" is related to what "is lost or added in translation". Unfortunately, you don't explain what is lost or added in translation. Are you able to answer the question you posed: what is it that is Shakespearely? Is it anything other than the original (untranslated) style or form of expression?

You take forms to be a substance, so you’re a dualist. I don’t so I’m a physicalist. In the end, I don’t think we disagree on much other than what counts as a substance. — khaled

Substance dualists might consider the disagreement to be more substantial. :grin:

This is best illustrated by and explained with examples, but for this, all the participants need to be fluent enough in the languages compared. It's a phenomenon that multilingual people can easily understand, but otherwise, it's tedious to explain. — baker

You might consider it tedious to explain, but that the same expression in different languages can somehow mean (or "how it means") differently - as opposed to the traditional way of meaning - is supposed to be the topic of the discussion. If "how it means" cannot be explicated, then what are we discussing? And what are further examples meant to show? It doesn't help that the example cited in the OP is puzzling to all.

If a proposition is static symbols on a page, then how is that different than a picture on a page? — Harry Hindu

It's not. Both words and pictures can have different uses and thus different meanings or senses. Think of different uses/meanings of emojis, for example.

Observing someone use the word is also remembered visually and reproduced from the visual memory. — Harry Hindu

Okay, but that's observing someone use a word (in some context), not just observing a picture or proposition.

Think about watching a ball game — Harry Hindu

Here you're no longer talking about pictures or propositions.

Importantly though, I'm expressly not comparing it to the picture theory. For as I read it, the picture theory can be jettisoned while still retaining the distinction between saying and showing that is at work in the TLP. For instance, take 4.022: "A proposition shows its sense. A proposition shows how things stand if it is true. And it says that they do so stand." I think the first sentence of this is exactly correct, while I think the second sentence - which sets a constraint upon what 'sense' is - is exactly wrong. Moreover, I think the PI is a recognition of exactly this, and that it too is a working out of what it means to jettison the picture theory while maintaining the saying/showing distinction. — StreetlightX

I disagree that "A proposition shows its sense" is "exactly correct", particularly taking into account the preceding remarks, say from 4.01 to 4.021. I think Wittgenstein takes aim at this in PI 141, regarding the different applications (or lines of projection) that a picture (or proposition) may take. That is, a proposition is just a static bunch of symbols on a page. Wittgenstein is incorrect in the Tractatus to say "I understand the proposition without having its sense explained to me" (4.021). This reminds me of the moral of the story of PI's opening quote. Obviously, we must be taught how to use and understand language, including propositions.

This is why I found it odd that you would reference the Tractatus rather than the PI, especially given Benjamin's different ways of meaning.

Since Benjamin's essay is on translation, it's ironic that I found a different translation of the article, including the passage you quoted. I include some preceding sentences for additional context (although I admittedly still struggle with it):

While all individual elements of foreign languages - words, sentences, structure - are mutually exclusive, these languages supplement one another in their intentions. Without distinguishing the intended object from the mode of intention, no firm grasp of this basic law of a philosophy of language can be achieved. The words Brot and pain “intend” the same object, but the modes of this intention are not the same. It is owing to these modes that the word Brot means something different to a German than the word pain to a Frenchman, that these words are not interchangeable for them, that, in fact, they strive to exclude each other. As to the intended object, however, the two words mean the very same thing. While the modes of intention in these two words are in conflict, intention and object of intention complement each of the two languages from which they are derived; there the object is complementary to the intention. — Walter Benjamin

I'm still unclear on this. Are the different ways of meaning simply different attitudes by the speakers of different languages toward the words/meanings of their respective languages? Or a different attitude towards the signified objects? Or something else?

"In the words Brot and pain, what is meant is the same, but the way of meaning it is not. This difference in the way of meaning permits the word Brot to mean something other to a German than what the word pain means to a Frenchman, so that these words are not interchangeable for them; in fact, they strive to exclude each other. As to what is meant, however, the two words signify the very same thing".(Readers note: Brot in German and pain in French mean "bread" in English - this is not talking about 'pain' as in 'ow it hurts' pain). — StreetlightX

I may have missed something, but if Brot and pain both signify bread, then I don't follow why "these words are not interchangeable for them" or how they "strive to exclude each other".

Also, this sounds more like meaning as use rather than the picture theory, so I'm curious why you compared it to the picture theory instead.

My argument is that such things are wrongly called mathematics, due to faulty conventions which allow imaginary fictions, cleverly disguised to appear as mathematical principles, to seep into mathematics, taking the place of mathematical principles. And obviously, it's not a stipulation but an argument, as I've spent months arguing through examples. — Metaphysician Undercover

What "disguise"?

Of course it's an attempted stipulation, since you are attempting to stipulate what the mathematical conventions should be (because you consider them "faulty"). Regardless, does your claim that mathematics should conform to "real world boundaries" (whatever that could mean) apply not only to infinite infinities, but also to infinity, zero, negative numbers, imaginary numbers and the like?

Mathematics has been created by human beings, with physical bodies, physical brains, living in the world. It has no means to escape the restrictions imposed upon it by the physical conditions of the physical body. Therefore it very truly is bound by the world. Your idea that mathematics can somehow escape the limitations imposed upon it by the world, to retreat into some imaginary world of infinite infinities, is not a case of actually escaping the bounds of the world at all, it's just imaginary. We all know that imagination cannot give us any real escape from the bounds of the world. Imagining that mathematics is not bound by the world does not make it so. Such a freedom from the bounds of the world is just an illusion. Mathematics is truly bound by the world. And when the imagination strays beyond these boundaries, it produces imaginary fictions, not mathematics. — Metaphysician Undercover

The concept of infinite infinities is already part of mathematics today. Therefore, in your dubious distinction between mathematics and “imaginary fictions”, your placement of infinite infinities on the side of "imaginary fictions" makes no sense; infinite infinities is already on the side of mathematics. Your attempted stipulations to the contrary are pointless.

No, I am saying that the person who assigns possibility, in that situation, has no regard for truth or falsity, in that act. How could possibility be the type of thing which might have a regard for truth or falsity? — Metaphysician Undercover

It concerns what is possible in reality; what may come true or happen.

You are ignoring the fact that I repeatedly said that we see the inherent order without apprehending it with the mind. — Metaphysician Undercover

And for several pages prior to this position, you said that we could not perceive the inherent order. You still have not defined the two different meanings of "see" that you claim is at work in this apparent contradiction. More recently, you said that we do not perceive the inherent order with the senses, only that it is "present to" the senses. That does not mean "see". Ultraviolet light might be considered "present to" the senses in the same way, but we cannot see it with the naked eye, either. When I put this argument to you, you argued a minor point from an article regarding infrared light which we might be able to see in some cases, but you did not address any of the other forms of electromagnetic radiation that we cannot see. How can we both "see" and not see these other forms of radiation?

So, when the mind produces an order, which is supposed to be a representation of the inherent order, within the thing, the order which is being sensed must be regarded in order that the representation be a good one. — Metaphysician Undercover

You would need to apprehend the inherent order in able to compare and judge the representation as good or bad. You claim we cannot apprehend the inherent order. Unless you can justify or explain your different meaning of the word "see", then neither can we see the inherent order.

If you are convinced that the assumption of an inherent order is a "bullshit assumption", then why didn't you just say this two months ago — Metaphysician Undercover

Because I thought you were changing your position and I wanted to prove that you were. Alternatively, if you were not changing your position, then you were just espousing obvious contradictions, and I thought you might come to realise that it was a bullshit assumption after your several glaring contradictions were shown to you. Alas, you are not prepared to even view your plainly contradictory statements as contradictory.

I already explained in what sense we see the inherent order, and do not see it, just like when we look at an object and we see the molecules of that object. The order is there, just like the molecules are there, and what our eyes are seeing, yet we do not distinguish nor apprehend the molecules nor the order, so we cannot say that we see it. We are always seeing things without actually seeing them, because it is a different sense of the word "see". — Metaphysician Undercover

I replied to this, in the last post go back and read it. — Metaphysician Undercover

You said:

the assignment of possibility is done without regard for order. — Metaphysician Undercover

So you are saying that possibility has no regard for truth or falsity, i.e. no regard for the inherent order. I still have no idea what this means. But what regard should the inherent order be given if it cannot be perceived or known?

I can't tell you the inherent order.. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yeah, that's why I asked. It's a bullshit assumption that can't be known.

It's useful to recognize the reality of it, to understand the deficiencies of mathematics. — Metaphysician Undercover

The "reality of it" is nothing more than your useless assumption.

What's not true? You said: "(sets) can be assigned any possible order (in the sense of humanly created order), with absolutely no regard for truth or falsity." I asked what it means for the possibility (of the order) to have "absolutely no regard for truth or falsity". — Luke

I said, the assignment of possibility is done without regard for order. — Metaphysician Undercover

Do you think I misquoted you? Here:

(sets) can be assigned any possible order (in the sense of humanly created order), with absolutely no regard for truth or falsity, — Metaphysician Undercover

My question, again, what do you mean possibility has "no regard for truth or falsity"?

Sorry Luke, your interpretation is so bad — Metaphysician Undercover

What interpretation? I asked you a question.

A bag of items has an inherent order, as I've spent months describing to you. — Metaphysician Undercover

So tell me what is the order of the three coloured balls before they are drawn from the bag.

Furthermore, fishfry could not explain how an imaginary fiction could be useful toward obtain a higher truth. — Metaphysician Undercover

Can you tell us how the imperceptible, unapprehendable inherent order could be useful to anyone?

Possibility has "no regard for truth or falsity"? What does that mean? — Luke

That's not true. — Metaphysician Undercover

What's not true? You said: "(sets) can be assigned any possible order (in the sense of humanly created order), with absolutely no regard for truth or falsity." I asked what it means for the possibility (of the order) to have "absolutely no regard for truth or falsity".

Possibilities are limited by the actual state of the world. Anything claimed to be possible, which is not allowed for by the present state, is actually impossible. — Metaphysician Undercover

Right, so if I presently have a set (or bag) of three balls coloured red, white and blue, then there are six possible orderings in which I can draw out those three balls: (RWB, RBW, WRB, WBR, BRW, BWR). What's wrong with that? And what is their order before they are drawn from the bag?

And this is not even true. If determinism is the true description of reality, then true possibility is actually impossible, such that we would have the impossibility of changing the eternalist block universe, without any real possibility. — Metaphysician Undercover

Has that been the basis of your argument from the start? Funny, since I've seen you argue against the eternalist block universe in other threads. You really are a troll.

By removing "inherent order" from the things called sets, as fishfry did, with the assumption of "no inherent order", these things (sets) can be assigned any possible order (in the sense of humanly created order), with absolutely no regard for truth or falsity, — Metaphysician Undercover

Possibility has "no regard for truth or falsity"? What does that mean?

My point of contention is that there is no such thing as something with no inherent order, it is an impossibility as self-contradictory, a unity of parts without any order to those parts. — Metaphysician Undercover

You can't have impossibility without possibility.

I'll continue to wait for you to produce some substance, and indication that you understand, rather than demonstrating that you can search keywords throughout a lengthy thread, and take quotes out of context to produce the appearance of contradiction. — Metaphysician Undercover

And I'll continue to wait for you to produce some support for your accusation that I have taken any of your quotes out of context, or that the clear contradictions I have quoted are merely apparent. Your contradictions are a result of your constantly changing position. Since you are unable to clear them up, you can only accuse me of misunderstanding. Or else complain of the difficulty in choosing your words and say you were flustered and didn't mean to say that.

This is false, I never said inherent order is apprehended. — Metaphysician Undercover

Your previous comments suggest otherwise:

I am talking about their spatial ordering, their positioning on the plane, like what is described by a Cartesian system. Do you not apprehend spatial arrangements as order? — Metaphysician Undercover

If there are points distributed on a plane, or 3d space, the positioning of those points relative to each other is describable, therefore there is an inherent order to them. If there was no order their positioning relative to each other could not be described.. — Metaphysician Undercover

A classroom full of kids must have an order, or else the kids have no spatial positions in the classroom. Clearly though, they are within the classroom, and whatever position they are in is the order which they have. To deny that they have an order is to deny that they have spatial existence within the room, but that contradicts your premise "a classroom full of kids". — Metaphysician Undercover

The inherent order is the exact spatial positioning shown in the diagram. — Metaphysician Undercover

What is "THE INHERENT" order you claim that the dots have?
— TonesInDeepFreeze

The one in the diagram. Take a look at it yourself, and see it. — Metaphysician Undercover

You strongly imply that the inherent order is able to be apprehended in these quotes. We must be able to apprehend the inherent order if it is "describable" and we are able to see it.

If you recall fishfry introduced "inherent order" by claiming that a set has no inherent order. I haven't been using "mathematical order" so I don't even know what you're talking about here. — Metaphysician Undercover

That's right, and then you forced upon the conversation your idiosyncratic idea of "the inherent order" that is unrelated to sets or ordering in mathematics. Fishfry and Tones tried telling you this, but you weren't interested.

I haven't been using "mathematical order" so I don't even know what you're talking about here. — Metaphysician Undercover

"Order" in relation to sets and ordering as it is understood in mathematics. I don't claim to be an expert, but I know you aren't talking about the same thing.

Near the beginning of the thread there was no consensus between the participants in the thread as to what "order" referred to. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, because of you. Your concept of "the inherent order" was the main obstacle to a consensus. Did you think you were helping to build consensus?

I developed the distinction between inherent order, and the order created by the mind as the thread moved on. — Metaphysician Undercover

Thanks? I guess. But this does not answer the question of how your concept of "the inherent order" relates to "order" more generally. You could start with your own ideas of "order" and "the inherent order" and explain how these relate to each other. Why is "the inherent order" not a type of "order"?

The appearance of contradiction is inevitable, to the person who refuses to look beyond the appearance, and try to understand what the other person is trying to say. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm not responsible for your contradictory statements or your inability to account for them. If you say that we can and cannot see the inherent order, or that we do and do not perceive the inherent order with the senses, then that is a contradiction. Have you considered that what you say might appear to be contradictory because it is contradictory, and that the problem is with your metaphysical edifice rather than with my understanding?

Your response to my last post makes it overwhelmingly clear that you are trying to see contradiction in my words, and not trying to understand. What a surprise! — Metaphysician Undercover

The principle of charity is a two-way street.

Go way back, to when I said "see" the inherent order in the dots on the plain in the diagram. — Metaphysician Undercover

This was before you let anyone know that the inherent order was noumenal and invisible, which is right around the time I believe you changed your position. You started from this position:

Again, look at fishfry's post: ↪fishfry

Do you not see that there is an actual order to those dots on the plane? How could there be "many orderings" if to give them a different order would be to change their positions? Then it would no longer be those dots on that plane. And if your intent is to abstract them, remove them from that plane, then they are no longer those dots on that plane. Why is something so simple so difficult for you to understand? ...

I am talking about their spatial ordering, their positioning on the plane, like what is described by a Cartesian system. Do you not apprehend spatial arrangements as order? — Metaphysician Undercover

That is, you started out telling us that the actual/inherent order can be perceived with the senses and apprehended, then you changed your position to say that the inherent order cannot be perceived with the senses or apprehended, and now you're saying that the inherent order is invisible but it can (again) be perceived with the senses. At least, that's your latest position.

In the quoted passage you seem to be looking at what is referred to by "inherent order", as a type of what is referred to as "order". This would constitute a misunderstanding, they are completely distinct and one is not a type of the other. — Metaphysician Undercover

Inherent order is not a type of order? Then what have you been talking about this whole time?

Inherent order, as inhering within the object, is not a type of order, as created by the mind, like the description indicates, this is impossible. — Metaphysician Undercover

If inherent order is not a type of order, then I don't understand what you have been arguing about regarding mathematical order. Why did you previously allow for other types of order, such as best-to-worst?

Sorry, that was a mistaken statement, instead of "sense" I should have used a better expression, like "perceive" or "apprehend". I was flustered by your ridiculous claim that I had earlier implied that sense was not involved at all. — Metaphysician Undercover

Oh come on. You previously spoke of "perceive" and "apprehend" as opposing concepts, but now you consider them synonymous? For a long stretch of the discussion, you repeated in various forms that we perceive with the senses, as distinct from apprehending with the mind:

We apprehend order with the mind, we do not perceive it with the senses. — Metaphysician Undercover

I told you, we don't perceive order with the senses, we create orders with the mind. — Metaphysician Undercover

The inherent order is shown. It is not perceived by the senses. — Metaphysician Undercover

We perceive something with the senses and conclude something with the mind. — Metaphysician Undercover

We neither perceive nor apprehend the inherent order — Metaphysician Undercover

Clearly, this is hardly a once-off error said only because you were flustered, so I do not find this reason for contradicting yourself to be credible.

Apart from your attempt to re-write history regarding your use of "perceive", these quotes are further evidence that you are contradicting your earlier comments by now saying that we "see" or somehow "sense" the inherent order and other invisibles. -- And we can "see" or "sense" the inherent order but not perceive it?

In the case of "inherent order" the order is within the thing sensed. It is sensed (in the manner I described), but not apprehended by the mind due to the deficient capacity of the sensing being. I've also used "order" to refer to orders created by the mind, within the mind, sometimes intended to represent the inherent order, as a model does. This order is apprehended by the mind, being created within the mind, but it is in no way sensed, because it is created within the mind and is therefore not part of the thing sensed. — Metaphysician Undercover

To be clear, your argument is now that:

1. We do not perceive (i.e. see) order with the senses; but that
2. We do perceive (i.e. see) inherent order with the senses.

Inherent order is only one type of order (you also allow for other types such as best-to-worst). How is it that we do not perceive order with the senses in general, but that we do perceive inherent order with the senses specifically?

You can see that in one context the referent of the word "order" is sensed but not apprehended by the mind, while in the other context the referent order is apprehended by the mind, but not sensed. — Metaphysician Undercover

Let's take a look at the context, then. It was not until recently that you began arguing that we do perceive inherent order with the senses and can "see" or otherwise "sense" invisible physical entities such as molecules, ultraviolet light, and the inherent order. This contradicts what you said earlier, that: "1) We do not perceive order with the senses." This was said in response to a fragment of mine that you quoted:

Your current argument is that we do not perceive order with the senses, and that we cannot apprehend inherent order at all. Therefore, how is it possible that the inherent order is the exact spatial positioning shown in the diagram? — Luke

You will note I maintain the distinction here between order and inherent order. You must have been aware of this distinction in your own response when you contradicted your latest argument and affirmed that: "1) We do not perceive order with the senses". It is therefore a complete fabrication to attribute your own contradiction to my misunderstanding or lack of awareness of the distinction between order and inherent order.

Furthermore, as quoted at the top of this page from your earlier remarks:

My point was that we do not sense the order which inheres within the thing, we produce an order in the mind. — Metaphysician Undercover

In other words, you explicitly state here that we do not sense the inherent order specifically.

Anyway, I look forward to you once again trying to attribute this to my misunderstanding instead of your own blatant contradiction.

So, your failure to recognize the distinct ways that I used "see", which I explained over and over again, constitutes contradiction on my part. — Metaphysician Undercover

What failure to recognise? I suggested that you use another word or notation to mark the distinction. One meaning is to see what is visible, the other is to "see" what is not visible.

You have stated both that we do and do not perceive (i.e. see) order with the senses. This is not a failing on my part.

Yes, I think the eyes most likely do sense infrared and ultraviolet in some way: https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2014/12/141201161116.htm — Metaphysician Undercover

The article does not mention ultraviolet light. I'm sure you understand my point. The same point applies to molecules.

You don't seem to have a mind which is inclined toward trying to understand complicated ontological problems, instead thinking that everything can be described simply by is or is not, because otherwise would be contradiction. — Metaphysician Undercover

It's not complicated; you contradicted yourself. I think you see that now, which is why you have given up.

Perhaps, but I disagree. It's a matter of opinion I suppose. You desire to put a restriction on the use of "see", such that we cannot be sensing things which we do not apprehend with the mind. I seem to apprehend a wider usage of "see" than you do, allowing that we sense things which are not apprehended. — Metaphysician Undercover

You did not address my argument. Do you think that we can see infrared and ultraviolet light just because it exists in the world? This is your argument regarding molecules. Infrared and ultraviolet light are defined as frequencies of the non-visible spectrum. We cannot see them with the naked eye, by definition. This is not a matter of opinion over the definition of the word "see", unless you think that the dictionary, or the way that most people use the word "see", is an "opinion".

If you insist that we can "see" ultraviolet light and molecules then I propose that you use a synonym which has the meaning "to see what is not visible", in order to avoid any confusion. However, I don't know of any words with that meaning. Maybe you could use the notation "see(not see)" or "see(MU)" instead.

So in my mind, when one scans the horizon with the eyes, one "sees" all sorts of things which are not "forgotten" when the person looks away, because the person never acknowledged them in the first place, so they didn't even register in the memory to be forgotten, yet the person did see them. — Metaphysician Undercover

Not "forgotten"? LOL. What are you talking about?

No, I think you misunderstood. Perhaps it was the use of "perceive" which is like "apprehend". I said we could not apprehend it with the mind, the mind being deficient. This does not mean that we cannot sense, or "see" it at all. — Metaphysician Undercover

I have not misunderstood. Your recent talk about "seeing" molecules and "scanning the horizon" is not about "apprehending" order; you are talking about perceiving order with the senses. This is also what your contradictory quote is referring to:

1) We do not perceive order with the senses. No problem so far, as we understand order with the mind, not the senses. — Metaphysician Undercover

Did you even read the quote? Your latest argument regarding molecules is that we can somehow "see" invisible things because we "sense" them. However, you already contradicted this earlier, as demonstrated by the above quote: "1) We do not perceive order with the senses". - You are now arguing that we do perceive (i.e. see) order with the senses, correct?

I already explained in what sense we see the inherent order, and do not see it, just like when we look at an object and we see the molecules of that object. The order is there, just like the molecules are there, and what our eyes are seeing, — Metaphysician Undercover

We sense things without apprehending what it is that is being sensed, as in my example of hearing a foreign language. — Metaphysician Undercover

But then again:

Consider, that in seeing objects we do not see the molecules, atoms or other fundamental particles — Metaphysician Undercover

Of course sense perception is involved! Where have you been? We've been talking about seeing things and inferring an order. My point was that we do not sense the order which inheres within the thing, we produce an order in the mind. — Metaphysician Undercover

2) We cannot apprehend the inherent order. Correct — Metaphysician Undercover

Molecules are not visible to the naked eye. But we see the object, and the object is composed of molecules, therefore we must be seeing the molecules. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is like saying that we can see infrared or ultraviolet light with the naked eye. We can't; not according to any common usage of the word "see".

You can be looking right at the stars, and see them all, therefore you are seeing the mentioned constellation, yet you still might not be able see that specific constellation. — Metaphysician Undercover

Then you don't see it.

See the different senses of "see", and how "visible" might be determined based on the capacity of the observer, or the capacity of the thing to be observed? The inherent order is not visible to us, due to our deficient capacities, yet we do see it, because it exists as what we are seeing. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, we simply don't see it. And you claimed earlier that we could not possibly see it, in principle:

1) We do not perceive order with the senses. No problem so far, as we understand order with the mind, not the senses. 2) We cannot apprehend the inherent order. Correct, because the order which we understand is created by human minds, as principles of mathematics and physics, and we assign this artificially created order to the object, as a representation of the order which inheres within the object, in an attempt to understand the inherent order. But that representation, the created order is inaccurate due to the deficiencies of the human mind. 3)The inherent order is the exact positioning of the parts, which is what we do not understand due to the deficiencies of the human mind. — Metaphysician Undercover

And if you cannot see what is right in front of you, you think it must be "hidden" from you, instead of considering the possibility that your eyes are actually sensing it, but your mind is just not apprehending it., — Metaphysician Undercover

1. I note your recent change from talking about "seeing" to talking about "sensing". Have you rejected your claim that we can see the inherent order?

2. How do you reconcile this with your statements that order is not visible?

order is inferred by the mind, it is not visible. — Metaphysician Undercover

Therefore the order [is] in the mind it is not the order shown by the thing. — Metaphysician Undercover

I already explained in what sense we see the inherent order, and do not see it, just like when we look at an object and we see the molecules of that object. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is what we were discussing before you changed the subject to the meaning of a foreign language.

We sense things without apprehending what it is that is being sensed, as in my example of hearing a foreign language. — Metaphysician Undercover

Keep spinning your bullshit.

I don't see the problem. Do you not grasp a difference between hearing people talking, and apprehending the meaning? Meaning as analogous with order, was the example. — Metaphysician Undercover

The problem is that you weren't talking about meaning before. You said that we sense a foreign language without apprehending it. Now you're talking about something else: that we can neither sense nor apprehend the meaning of a foreign language. What happened to your position from a day ago about being able to sense the inherent order?

A moment ago you were talking about "the reality of the situation" that we see the inherent order without apprehending it, and now you've switched back to saying that we can neither see nor apprehend the inherent order. If you think there are two different senses of the word "see" involved here, then define them both. Because one of them seems to refer to what we cannot see, which is not a familiar definition of the word "see". — Luke

According to your new position, we cannot see the meaning of a language. But you only introduced this analogy to support your claims regarding our ability to see the inherent order. I could now counter your new position, explaining how the analogy still does not work because we are able to apprehend a foreign language (by learning it), but we can never apprehend the inherent order. But why I should I bother? I'm tired of your constantly moving target. It's intellectually dishonest.

Earlier, you said that we sense or perceive a foreign language without apprehending it:

We sense things without apprehending what it is that is being sensed, as in my example of hearing a foreign language. — Metaphysician Undercover

Now you say that we neither sense nor perceive the meaning of a foreign language:

we neither perceive nor apprehend the meaning in the foreign language — Metaphysician Undercover

Do you have an attention deficit or memory disorder? You seem incapable of maintaining your own position. A moment ago you were talking about "the reality of the situation" that we see the inherent order without apprehending it, and now you've switched back to saying that we can neither see nor apprehend the inherent order. If you think there are two different senses of the word "see" involved here, then define them both. Because one of them seems to refer to what we cannot see, which is not a familiar definition of the word "see".

I assume there are many different senses to the word "see". The word is used sometimes to refer strictly to what is sensed, and other times to what is apprehended by the mind. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm not familiar with any sense of the word "see" which means "not see".

We sense things without apprehending what it is that is being sensed, as in my example of hearing a foreign language. — Metaphysician Undercover

Can you not hear foreign languages? This is a terrible analogy. This is something which we can perceive but cannot apprehend. Your analogy with molecules is equally bad, since it is something we can apprehend but cannot perceive. It is (or very recently was) your position that we can neither perceive nor apprehend the inherent order. Remember? You said that order is "not visible".

We are always seeing things without actually seeing them — Metaphysician Undercover

And this includes the inherent order? There's no contradiction here, I take it?

You have said that the inherent order can neither be perceived nor apprehended. So how can it be seen?

I haven't changed my position. You have not yet understood it. — Metaphysician Undercover

I have understood it. According to your latest position, the inherent order is the true order of actual physical objects which humans are unable to apprehend; akin to Kantian noumena. The order that we are able to apprehend - which is not the inherent order - is the apparent order, which is invented by humans and assigned to those objects "from an external perspective". The inherent order is not something that can be truly spoken, perceived or apprehended.

Although we can neither perceive nor apprehend the inherent order, you claim that it is not hidden.

But this only evolved into your current position at about this post, after you were pressed (and unable) to specify the inherent order. Your change in position is the reason for these contradictory statements:

We both can see and can apprehend the inherent order:

What is "THE INHERENT" order you claim that the dots have?
— TonesInDeepFreeze

The one in the diagram. Take a look at it yourself, and see it. — Metaphysician Undercover

But we cannot see the inherent order:

order is inferred by the mind, it is not visible. — Metaphysician Undercover

And we can see the inherent order, but we cannot understand or apprehend it:

The order is right there in plain view, as things are, but it is just not understood, because we do not have the capacity to understand it. — Metaphysician Undercover

The inherent order cannot be apprehended by us. — Metaphysician Undercover

An order that is shown can be seen:

the order is right there, in the object, as shown by the object, and seen by you, as you actually see the object, along with the order which inheres within the object, yet it's not apprehended by your mind. — Metaphysician Undercover

But an order that is shown cannot be seen:

Therefore the order [is] in the mind it is not the order shown by the thing. — Metaphysician Undercover

order is inferred by the mind, it is not visible. — Metaphysician Undercover

The exact spatial positioning is logically demonstrated in the diagram:

The inherent order is the exact spatial positioning shown in the diagram. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is "showing" in the sense of a logical demonstration. — Metaphysician Undercover

But the exact spatial positioning is not logically demonstrated in the diagram:

"the exact spatial positioning" is not what is being demonstrated. — Metaphysician Undercover

Therefore "the exact spatial positioning" is not what is being demonstrated.
— Metaphysician Undercover

Here you say that "the exact spatial positioning" is not what is being demonstrated (i.e. shown) in the diagram.
— Luke

No that's not a good interpretation. — Metaphysician Undercover

What interpretation? It's exactly what you said.

You need to respect the fact that — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't care about your latest position. In case you missed it, my entire point for the last three or four pages is that you changed your position three or four pages ago. This is obvious from the quote that you somehow managed to overlook:

What is "THE INHERENT" order you claim that the dots have?
— TonesInDeepFreeze

The one in the diagram. Take a look at it yourself, and see it. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is so obviously the opposite of your updated position: that we cannot see the inherent order in the diagram. This is all the evidence I need to make my point. Of course, you won't admit to it because that's why you're here: to bullshit and troll people.

There is a logical demonstration of an order. The order which the mind apprehends, based on the demonstration is not the same order as that which inheres within the things shown. You keep neglected the principal point of the argument, that the order apprehended in the mind is not the same as the order in the object. Therefore "the exact spatial positioning" is not what is being demonstrated. — Metaphysician Undercover

Here you say that "the exact spatial positioning" is not what is being demonstrated (i.e. shown) in the diagram. However:

The inherent order is the exact spatial positioning shown in the diagram. — Metaphysician Undercover

Here you said that the exact spatial positioning is what is being demonstrated (i.e. shown) in the diagram.

Which is it?

And as an indicator of how you continually change your position:

What is "THE INHERENT" order you claim that the dots have?
— TonesInDeepFreeze

The one in the diagram. Take a look at it yourself, and see it. — Metaphysician Undercover

I explained that this is not what I meant by "shown"., and the reason why, being that order is inferred by the mind, it is not visible. — Metaphysician Undercover

By "shown" you do not mean "displayed". After all, "it is not visible". Therefore, you must not be making the argument - as you did earlier - that we see the order but do not apprehend it.

By "shown" you mean "logically demonstrated". If something is logically demonstrated then it is apprehended, right?

I stated repeatedly that we do not apprehend the exact spatial positioning — Metaphysician Undercover

You are saying that the "exact spatial positioning" is logically demonstrated by ("shown" in) the diagram, but it is not apprehended? If the exact spatial positioning is not (or cannot be) apprehended, then how has it been logically demonstrated by the diagram?

We perceive something with the senses and conclude something with the mind. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm glad that you finally acknowledge the role played by the senses in "showing". Only a couple of posts ago, you stated:

I told you, we don't perceive order with the senses — Metaphysician Undercover

But you now concede that sense perception is involved in showing.

You appear to be making up a difference in the meaning of "shown", for the sake of saying that I contradict myself. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm not making anything up; the word has more than one meaning. Google's definitions of the verb "show" include:

1. allow or cause (something) to be visible.
2. allow (a quality or emotion) to be perceived; display.
3. demonstrate or prove.

In the context of your statement:

The inherent order is the exact spatial positioning shown in the diagram. — Metaphysician Undercover

I would say that the word "shown" here means what is visible in, or displayed by, the diagram; not what is demonstrated or proved by the diagram.

Regardless, I never claimed that there is no apprehension or awareness involved in showing. It was immediately before you began on this detour that I said:

It sounds very much as though the inherent order is identical with what is apprehended as the "exact spatial positioning shown". Otherwise, why specify the "exact spatial positioning shown"? You have not merely said that the diagram has an inherent order which we are unable to apprehend despite what we see; you have identified the inherent order with the "exact spatial positioning" that we do see [and apprehend]. — Luke

Hopefully, this now clarifies my original intent. My omission of "[and apprehend]" seems to be what sent you off on a tangent. But I'm glad you now concede that sense perception is involved in "the exact spatial positioning shown in the diagram" (even if you refuse to concede that you intended "shown" in the seemingly more obvious sense that I outlined above).

All that remains for you to explain is your contradictory pair of claims that (i) the inherent order is the exact spatial positioning that we do apprehend in the diagram; and that (ii) we are unable to apprehend the inherent order.

If we are unable to apprehend the inherent order (in any case), then how can the inherent order possibly be (demonstrated or proved by) the exact spatial positioning shown in the diagram?

Do you think that location can be shown to someone without it being sensed?
— Luke

Of course, location is intelligible, conceptual, so it's not actually sensed it's something determined by the mind, just like meaning. When you tell someone something, they do not sense the meaning. This is "showing" in the sense of a logical demonstration. And the point is that upon seeing, or hearing what is shown, the mind may or may not produce the required conceptualization, which would qualify for what we could call apprehending the principle. More specifically, the conceptualization produced in the mind being shown the demonstration is distinct and uniquely different from the conceptualization in the mind which is showing the demonstration, therefore they are not the same. That is why people misunderstand each other.. — Metaphysician Undercover

You avoid the question instead of answering it. How can location be shown to someone without it being sensed?

"Shown" in the sense of a logical demonstration is different to "shown" in the sense of your statement: "the exact spatial positioning shown in the diagram". That's obvious.

Do you think that we sense location? — Metaphysician Undercover

Do you think that location can be shown to someone without it being sensed?

Anyway, that's not what I said.

I told you, we don't perceive order with the senses — Metaphysician Undercover

Exactly, so why did you identify/equate "the inherent order" with "the exact spatial positioning shown in the diagram"?

It sounds very much as though the inherent order is identical with what is apprehended as the "exact spatial positioning shown". Otherwise, why specify the "exact spatial positioning shown"? You have not merely said that the diagram has an inherent order which we are unable to apprehend despite what we see; you have identified the inherent order with the "exact spatial positioning" that we do see. Otherwise, to whom is the exact spatial positioning "shown", and from which perspective?

So we assume that there is something, the sensible world, and we assume it to be intelligible, it has an inherent order. To answer your question of how do we "know" this, it is inductive. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is irrelevant to my question. I did not ask you about the history of philosophy or why there must be inherent order; I asked you specifically about your statement regarding @fishfry's diagram:

The inherent order is the exact spatial positioning shown in the diagram. — Metaphysician Undercover

Given that (1) we do not perceive order via the senses and that (2) we cannot apprehend inherent order, then how can the inherent order be the exact spatial positioning shown in the diagram? Even if I grant you that there is an inherent order to the universe, how can you say that the inherent order of the diagram is the same as the order that we perceive via the senses, or "the exact spatial positioning shown"?

But we cannot completely apprehend that order because our minds are deficient. — Metaphysician Undercover

I note your change in position. You are no longer arguing that the inherent order cannot be apprehended. You have now adopted the weaker claim that the inherent order cannot be completely apprehended.

Is it our approach (are we applying the wrong principles in our attempt to understand), or is it the reality, that the object truly has no inherent order? The latter is repugnant to the philosophical mind, and even if it were true, it cannot be confirmed until the possibility of the former is excluded. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, it cannot be confirmed at all. Assuming that the world is random (or not) makes no difference to our ability to find patterns and order in the world. More importantly, as far as I can tell, inherent order is not the kind of order that mathematicians are concerned with.

3)The inherent order is the exact positioning of the parts, which is what we do not understand due to the deficiencies of the human mind. — Metaphysician Undercover

You said that "1) We do not perceive order with the senses" and that "2) We cannot apprehend the inherent order". Therefore, how do you know that what's shown in the diagram is the exact positioning of the parts (i.e. the inherent order)?

Isn't the positioning of the dots that I perceive the "perspective dependent order" which you earlier stated was not the inherent order? So how can the diagram show the inherent order to anybody?

The inherent order cannot be perceived by the senses and we can't apprehend it, anyway.

2) We cannot apprehend the inherent order. Correct, because the order which we understand is created by human minds, as principles of mathematics and physics, and we assign this artificially created order to the object, as a representation of the order which inheres within the object, in an attempt to understand the inherent order. But that representation, the created order is inaccurate due to the deficiencies of the human mind. — Metaphysician Undercover

If "We cannot apprehend the inherent order", then how do you know that our representations are inaccurate?

If the inherent order is unintelligible to the human mind by definition, then what makes inherent order preferable to (or distinguishable from) randomness?

I don't believe I said anything about an internal perspective. — Metaphysician Undercover

You spoke of an "external perspective", which implies an internal perspective. You might recall I asked you about it and you responded:

If the true order cannot be assigned from an external perspective, then what is the "internal perspective" of an arrangement of objects? Will I know the "true order" of its vertices if I stand in the middle of a triangle?
— Luke

Are you aware of Kant;s distinction between phenomena and noumena? As human beings, we do not know the thing itself, we only know how it appears to us. — Metaphysician Undercover

It was when I asked you about the implied "internal perspective" of an arrangement/order that you drew the analogy with Kant's distinction between phenomena and noumena, saying of a thing that "we only know how it appears to us".

In that context, "apparent" must mean "seems". If you used "apparent" to mean "perceived by the senses", I would say that you had stated an oxymoron. We apprehend order with the mind, we do not perceive it with the senses. — Metaphysician Undercover

Bullshit. You are trying to pretend you were never talking about sense perception? Sense perception is exactly what Kantian phenomena is about, and clearly what you meant when you said that we can only know how a thing "appears to us".

If we apprehend order with the mind and not with the senses, then perhaps you could finally explain this:

The inherent order is the exact spatial positioning shown in the diagram. — Metaphysician Undercover

Your current argument is that we do not perceive order with the senses, and that we cannot apprehend inherent order at all. Therefore, how is it possible that the inherent order is the exact spatial positioning shown in the diagram?