That's because I don't think it really requires much additional explanation once you accept the basic premisses of eternalism, namely that all moments in time have the same 'existence'. If you accept that, you already assume that we don't see the entire picture, but only a slice of it at a time... and so you already accept that the way we perceive things is limited or 'illusionary'. That is the big one, and then it doesn't take that big of a leap that, given that assumption of limited perspective, we would experience things as moving through time. — ChatteringMonkey

So you accept that all moments in time have the same existence and you accept that our perception of this is limited or 'illusionary'. But how do you get from there to the inference that we should expect to "experience things as moving through time"?

This also strikes me as backward. You're not making an inference that this is how we should expect to experience things; this is how we experience things, regardless of any metaphysical theory. Furthermore, the premisses of eternalism do not imply that we should only experience part of the picture at a time; they imply that we should not have any experience at all. Nothing really passes through time, including our experiences. Unless some explanation can be offered for the illusion, it is not the limited experience which is illusory, but the fact of having experience.

Huh? I thought you didn't want to discuss this. Why make such a strange analogy? — Metaphysician Undercover

Simply to point out your appalling logic, You originally stated:

You dismiss eternalism because it requires religion to make sense of time passage. — Metaphysician Undercover

I can't dismiss eternalism because it requires accepting religion if I also dismiss religion.

However, now you are claiming that you meant the opposite of what you said originally:

What I meant, is that you dismiss eternalism, because accepting eternalism requires that you also accept religion in order to understand the passage of time. — Metaphysician Undercover

So now you are claiming that when you originally said that I dismiss eternalism because it requires religion to make sense of temporal passage, what you meant was that I accept eternalism because it requires religion to make sense of temporal passage. Except this doesn't make sense, because I don't accept eternalism either.

You have been harping about how eternalism makes the passage of time unintelligible, and I explained how if you accepted a religious principle (the soul), you could make sense of time passage in an eternalist framework. — Metaphysician Undercover

The Moving Spotlight theory already makes sense of temporal passage in an eternalist framework so no "religious principle" is required.

I think I once read somewhere that the mathematics is the same with or without the passage of time, so @ChatteringMonkey could be right that temporal passage makes no difference to an Eternalist universe. Motion can be inferred by looking at the difference between two points, just like @noAxioms's cup being on his desk at t1 and being in the dishwasher at t2. Despite the absence of temporal passage, the Eternalists in this discussion have no issue with our experiences having the appearance of temporal passage. This must be some sort of illusion, although nobody has offered any explanation of what type of illusion it is, or how the illusion of temporal passage in a static universe works. Some posters have posited that events are eternally recurring but that we only experience them one at a time and in sequence for some reason. Others have been willing to concede that we are space-time worms who exist in our entirety in four dimensions, but they maintain that motion remains somehow possible within this type of existence. Motion seems to make sense for a three-dimensional object travelling through the fourth dimension; I just can't make sense of the possibility of motion with four-dimensional objects. Motion can be assumed by Eternalists, I suppose, but it seems to me that Eternalists should be arguing that motion is illusory just like our experience of temporal passage, for the sake of consistency.

You dismiss eternalism because it requires religion to make sense of time passage. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is like saying you dismiss salt because it requires religion to make sense of pepper. Good logic bro.

And I'm not here to serve on your whim. I have already spend time trying to give you an example, if you don't care for it then I guess I'll just leave you to it. — Echarmion

I'm attempting to argue that a B-theory Eternalist universe precludes motion. You seem to be assuming motion in your explanation for why there is no motion.

Motion only appears because you're traveling that web in one direction.
— Echarmion

Nothing is travelling.
— Luke

It's a metaphor. — Echarmion

Your explanation for the appearance of motion assumes actual motion: "because you're travelling..." Did I misunderstand the metaphor?

As to your question, objects are arranged in space in an orderly way. Their arrangement can be described without referring to "passage of space" or some equivalent of motion. You can start your description at any point in the coordinate system and move in any direction, look at subsets in arbitrary order etc.

The same thing could be true for time. This wouldn't mean that events are no longer connected to each other. There'd still be the same laws that describe how one event (a region of time) is connected to another. — Echarmion

I'm not here for a lesson on Eternalism, unless it involves an explanation of how anything is supposed to work in a motionless universe, including the supposed illusion of temporal passage.

Motion only appears because you're traveling that web in one direction, seemingly getting events that follow another. — Echarmion

Nothing is travelling.

The core idea here is that "everything you think you know is false" or more specifically: It is possible that the metaphysically objective world is entirely different from the physical world. One of these differences could be that time isn't what we think it is, that our concept of time is a construct of the human mind. — Echarmion

Sure, and this could all be a dream. That's hardly an explanation.

It could simply be that the relations of events in the time dimension are not fundamentally different from the relations of things in the spatial dimension. There'd still be a continuum where changes occur, just like there is a point where your desk ends and a wall begins. Just the specific appearance of a unidirectional passage of time would be just that - an appearance rather than an ontological reality. — Echarmion

Either there is motion or there is not, unless you know of a third option. I thought you had already accepted that there is no motion or no "continuum where changes occur" in an Eternalist universe. I'm not buying your "never mind the details" argument.

In case you haven't yet noticed, religion offers the most intelligent understanding of time. — Metaphysician Undercover

Not interested. Please take it elsewhere.

The human body would be less of a problem, since what we know about it is based on perception, and thus would simply be subject to the same construction. — Echarmion

I don't know what "subject to the same construction" is supposed to mean. You said that there is neither passage of time nor motion. I don't follow how this is not problematic just because our understanding of physiology is "based on perception". I get that it's not a problem if there is passage of time and motion, but how is it supposed to work if there isn't?

The soul, as an eternal unchanging being — Metaphysician Undercover

Please don't bring religion into this discussion. Thanks.

Here is what an eternalist might say: There is neither passage of time nor motion. Simply different spatio-temporal locations. Your mind simply apprehends temporal locations as a series of events, rather than as a region of coordinates, and this creates the appearance of motion. — Echarmion

How does a mind work if there is neither passage of time or motion? How does the human body work? What becomes of our understanding of beating hearts, circulation, respiration, vision, and all the rest?

They apply to a presentist view only, and you are using them to arrive at a conclusion about motion in eternalist view.

I'm not even sure 'passage of time' the way you use it, is even essential to motion in a presentist view. — ChatteringMonkey

To which premisses are you referring? We seem to agree (finally) that time doesn't pass in a B-theory Eternalist universe. I take this to imply that the B-theory Eternalist universe precludes motion.

I'm not even sure 'passage of time' the way you use it, is even essential to motion in a presentist view. — ChatteringMonkey

Presentism isn't really relevant to this discussion. However, maybe you are referring to something like the following observation, found in the Wikipedia article on B-theory of time:

The terms A and B theory are sometimes used as synonyms to the terms presentism and eternalism, but arguably presentism does not represent time being like an A-series since it denies that there is a future and past in which events can be located.

But, again, the A-series is not the A-theory. My concern in this discussion is with temporal passage, not with the A-properties of past, present and future.

The motion of a body is observed by attaching a frame of reference to an observer and measuring the change in position of the body relative to that frame. — ChatteringMonkey

How is a frame of reference and/or an observer to be understood if time does not pass?

Yes if motion is defined in presentist terms of passage of time, then yes that conclusion follows logically. — ChatteringMonkey

How else do you define motion? How can you have motion without the passage of time?

I'm saying there is something wrong with the premisses, not with the validity of the argument. — ChatteringMonkey

What's wrong with the premisses?

There is an notion of time (nevermind the passage of time) in eternalism, right? — ChatteringMonkey

Yes, in which time does not pass.

So what i'm saying is that you should take that notion and how it's used in eternalism (and not the presentist notion) into account when you speak of stuff like motion in that view. That seems pretty uncontroversial to me. — ChatteringMonkey

I thought you agreed that there is no motion because time does not pass, and that this conclusion is already contained in the definitions?

What I think you should say instead is something like this, 'in an eternalist view passage of time is replaced by things existing at different times' and motion is therefor re-defined as 'an object existing at different spaces and times'. This all a bit crudely formulated, but I'm just trying to get the point across. — ChatteringMonkey

The passage of time is not "re-defined" under B-theory Eternalism. Time does not pass according to the B-theory. You seem to want to retain temporal passage in Eternalism, just as a different way of looking at it. No: If time passes, it's A-theory; if time doesn't pass, it's B-theory. You can't have it both ways.

The conclusion is allready assumed in the definitions, so what's there to talk about?

It's not meaningfull because it assumes there is a present moment. If there is no present moment what could passage of time possible mean? — ChatteringMonkey

I wouldn't call it an assumption; it's how we experience the world. Nonetheless, there is no passage of time under B-theory Eternalism, so the assumption of a present moment is equally absent. I don't understand how this is problematic or meaningless.

But this is all per definition. The conclusion is allready assumed in the definitions, so what's there to talk about? — ChatteringMonkey

Beats me. Some seem to disagree.

If 1) B-theories are defined by the absense of the passage of time, and 2) Eternalism is a B-theory, but 3) the passage of time is not a meaningfull thing to talk about in eternalism… then maybe something is off with the whole qualification sceme. — ChatteringMonkey

I don't know what you mean by "the passage of time is not a meaningful thing to talk about in eternalism". However, if "Eternalism is a B-theory" and the B-theory is "defined by the absence of the passage of time", then time does not pass in Eternalism. Therefore, I argue, there is no motion in an Eternalist universe. That's what I'm arguing for here and what this discussion was supposed to be about.

instead of insisting on using the qualifications and definitions you set out in the OP, and God forbid trying to logically proof something from them about eternalism, maybe you should be asking the question if they make sense to begin with. — ChatteringMonkey

If you want to talk about something else in relation to Eternalism, then start another discussion.

The title of the thread is Eternalism vs the Moving Spotlight Theory. I haven't "switched" anything. Read the OP.

Time doesn't pass according to the B-theory. That's it's defining aspect.
— Luke

That's not its defining aspect, it's the lack of preferred moment, or a question of what exists. — ChatteringMonkey

Are you talking about B-theory or Eternalism? You clearly don't understand the difference, because your entire post is about Eternalism, while my statement was about the B-theory.

The fact that I don't subscribe to it, is evidence that I don't understand it? — ChatteringMonkey

No, it's all of these things you've said:

The temporal passage thing is not the problem, the block is only static viewed from the outside.

What is this "temporal passage" that is supposedly absent from the B-series and essential to time?

In 4d spacetime an object exists temporally extended, "wormlike" over time, but that doesn't mean it doesn't change, or that time doesn't pass... it does

Honestly, I have no idea whatsoever what you mean with temporal passage.

Temporal passage again eh, if only I knew what it meant

You seem to think that there is something fundamentally different about an object existing over all the intervals of time (t1, t2, t3, etc) and the passage of time, I don't. Time passes just the same — Chattering Monkey

Time doesn't pass according to the B-theory. That's it's defining aspect. Temporal passage was the first thing I defined in the OP and the thing I have had to keep repeating to you throughout this discussion. It also marks the difference between Eternalism and the Moving Spotlight theory, which was the intended topic of this discussion. But you seem to have wanted to talk about something else.

Like I said I don't subscribe to any metaphysical theory of time. — ChatteringMonkey

Are you kidding me? You've variously accused me of "not engaging the ideas", of being "incapable of entertaining another perspective", and of being mistaken about the topic of the discussion that I started, yet you can't even commit to either the A-theory or the B-theory, i.e. to whether time passes or not? You clearly don't understand what B-theory or Eternalism are about.

You seem to think that there is something fundamentally different about an object existing over all the intervals of time (t1, t2, t3, etc) and the passage of time, I don't. Time passes just the same — ChatteringMonkey

Do you believe that future events become present and then past? That's the passage of time; the thing you seem to have trouble to comprehend. If you believe in this, then you believe in temporal passage. This is what B-theorists do not believe. It's that simple.

You at time x1 and you at time x2 are at different locations, so you move. — ChatteringMonkey

The Eternalist needs to account for how one moves from t1 to t2 if temporal passage is not real.

It doesn't make sense to say that 'the whole temporally extended object" doesn't move as a whole. — ChatteringMonkey

Look, you said that "In 4d spacetime an object exists temporally extended, "wormlike" over time, but that doesn't mean it doesn't change, or that time doesn't pass... it does, per definition". I've shown you that this is incorrect. B-theorists assert that time does not pass. You can always opt for the Moving Spotlight theory if you want to retain temporal passage.

Now you say temporal passage is something that exists over and above everything else? — ChatteringMonkey

I said that it's not only a question of existence IF temporal passage is something more than that. However, I had concerns this may have been unclear. To clarify, Eternalism or the block universe supposedly includes all of existence, but an A-theorist would disagree and say that it omits the existence of temporal passage. It's a different type of existence compared to all other things which exist at a time.

Temporal passage again eh, — ChatteringMonkey

Yes, it's the difference between the A-theory and the B-theory, which is the difference between Eternalism and the Moving Spotlight theory, which is the topic of this discussion.

But I give up, like noAxioms said, you seem to be incapable of entertaining another perspective — ChatteringMonkey

You want me to entertain a perspective which is not the topic of this discussion?

In the case at hand, all you're doing if you move from the A-theory to the B-theory is abstracting from the individual observer to a hypothetical universal observer. — Echarmion

As I understand it, there is a genuine dispute between A-theorists and B-theorists as to the nature of time, with the former affirming that temporal passage is real and the latter denying it.

Because the universal observer has no individual position in time and space (physics being assumed to be uniform across both) "A-properties" necessarily disappear in the process, being replaced by "B-properties". — Echarmion

I don't know of any B-theorists who claim that time actually passes and that temporal passage only "disappears" (or is not real) due to it being a more objective perspective. This seems contrary to the definitions I've posted and to what I've read on the subject. I'd welcome any information you have that says otherwise.

Your complaint could be levelled at much of philosophy, it seems. It's a metaphysical and a conceptual issue. I think it logically follows from the tenets of Eternalism that it precludes motion.

How would anyone know whether it's real? There is no possible source of information on that question. — Echarmion

Now now.

Per what definition?
— Luke

The 4th axis of 4d spacetime. — ChatteringMonkey

Is that a definition?

The parts at different times are different right? Well, that simply is change. I don't know how to put it any other way really. Change is part of the thing that exists temporally extended. — ChatteringMonkey

How so?

My concern, as presented in the OP, is with temporal passage and motion. I'm not sure whether "change" is really the same thing. Your use of this term seems to be a way for you to try and have both the A-theory and the B-theory.

You cannot expect the whole temporally extended object to change in yet another 5th dimension. — ChatteringMonkey

I don't. I deny that "the whole temporally extended object" changes at all. However, this might depend on your definition of "change". I'm not all that interested in change unless it means the same as temporal passage or motion.

I get that if you think only the present exist, the future and past are ontologically different... And so yes you would take tense seriously. But that is just a question of what exist, which I agree is different in the two theories. I'm just not sure what the word "genuinely" is supposed to add to all of this. — ChatteringMonkey

As I keep repeating, what it adds is the difference between the A-theory and the B-theory, which is temporal passage. A-theorists think it's real; B-theorists do not. It is not "just a question of what exists" if temporal passage is something over and above everything that exists. If it's not, then there's no distinction between B-theory Eternalism and the Moving Spotlight theory, which would imply there's no distinction between the B-theory and the A-theory.

I agree that the eternalist need to give an explanation for the apparent asymmetry of time, which unlike space, seems to move only in one direction. But, as I alluded to in an earlier post, I think they probably can with the second law of thermodynamics. Entropy only increases, and so that gives time an apparent direction, only one way. — ChatteringMonkey

A direction to time assumes temporal passage, which B-theorists reject. Entropy won't help you. To provide an account of why temporal passage has a direction is to concede that temporal passage is real. The Eternalist doesn't need to account for the direction of apparent temporal passage, but for apparent temporal passage itself (i.e. for how and why apparent temporal passage is not real).

I've read the things you referred to, and my question is still the same, what do you mean with genuinely passage of time and genuine change? I can't answer the question if I don't know what it means. — ChatteringMonkey

As the SEP article notes, it's taking tense seriously, which means "the irreducible possession by times, events, and things of genuine A properties", which simply means that future events become present and then past. Genuinely! But I'm sure you already knew that.

For a more detailed answer, I could refer you to Tim Maudlin's 'On the Passing of Time', which you can download directly as a pdf file by clicking here: http://philocosmology.rutgers.edu/images/uploads/TimDavidClass/05-maudlin-chap04.pdf

The passage of time is an intrinsic asymmetry in the temporal structure of the world, an asymmetry that has no spatial counterpart. It is the asymmetry that grounds the distinction between sequences which run from past to future and sequences which run from future to past. Consider, for example, the sequence of events that makes up an asteroid traveling from the vicinity of Mars to the vicinity of the Earth, as opposed to the sequence that makes up an asteroid moving from the vicinity of Earth to that of Mars. These sequences might be ‘matched’, in the sense that to every event in the one there corresponds an event in the other which has the same bodies in the same spatial arrangement. The topological structure of the matched states would also be matched: if state B is between states A and C in one sequence, then the corresponding state B* would be between A* and C* in the other. Still, going from Mars to Earth is not the same as going from Earth to Mars. The difference, if you will, is how these sequences of states are oriented with respect to the passage of time. If the asteroid gets closer to Earth as time passes, then the asteroid is going in one direction, if it gets further it is going in the other direction. So the passage of time provides an innate asymmetry to temporal structure. — Tim Maudlin

This is the temporal passage that B-theorists reject.

In 4d spacetime an object exists temporally extended, "wormlike" over time, but that doesn't mean it doesn't change, or that time doesn't pass... it does, per definition. — ChatteringMonkey

Per what definition?

And that is not merely 'apparent change', change is part of the existing temporally extended object and just as real as change is in A-theory it seems to me. — ChatteringMonkey

You've introduced this talk of "change" rather than temporal passage. What changes about a space-time worm? Obviously, it has different parts at different times, but nothing about it changes. Moreover, any assumption that time actually passes from one temporal part to the next is rejected by B-theorists.

I don't think characterization as A-series or B-series explains anything by itself. It seems to be merely about the language we use to describe things, and so not about the nature of things. — ChatteringMonkey

I haven't been talking about the A-series or the B-series. I have only been talking about (and only asked you about) the A-theory and the B-theory. Therefore, you have not answered the question, and before you accuse me of not engaging with the ideas, you may want to read the SEP article you are quoting from a little more closely:

(It is worth noting that some discussions of these issues employ terminology that is different from the A series/B series terminology used here. For example, some discussions frame the issue in terms of a question about the reality of tense (roughly, the irreducible possession by times, events, and things of genuine A properties), with A Theorists characterized as those who affirm the reality of tense and B Theorists characterized as those who deny the reality of tense.)

You can refer back to the OP for my quote from the same article where it states that time passes according to the A-theory, and time does not pass according to the B-theory. A more extensive explanation is provided in the SEP article, just prior to the above quote:

According to The B Theory, there are no genuine, unanalyzable A properties, and all talk that appears to be about A properties is really reducible to talk about B relations. For example, when we say that the year 1900 has the property of being past, all we really mean is that 1900 is earlier than the time at which we are speaking. On this view, there is no sense in which it is true to say that time really passes, and any appearance to the contrary is merely a result of the way we humans happen to perceive the world.

The opponents of The B Theory accept the view (often referred to as “The A Theory”) that there are genuine properties such as being two days past, being present, etc.; that facts about these A properties are not in any way reducible to facts about B relations; and that times and events are constantly changing with respect to their A properties (first becoming less and less future, then becoming present, and subsequently becoming more and more past). According to The A Theory, the passage of time is a very real and inexorable feature of the world, and not merely some mind-dependent phenomenon.

What is "genuine change" as opposed to change that is merely things being different at different moments in time? What is this "temporal passage" that is supposedly absent from the B-series and essential to time? — ChatteringMonkey

The dispute between A- and B-theorists is "genuine change" as opposed to apparent-but-not-real change. This might be better understood in terms of three-dimensionalism vs. four-dimensionalism (see here): i.e. the (3D) whole of you passing through time vs. different temporal parts of your (4D) space-time worm (not passing through time, but eternally existing).

The takeaway here is that B-theorists deny that time genuinely passes, so if you think it does, then you might not be one.

The temporal passage thing is not the problem, the block is only static viewed from the outside. — ChatteringMonkey

Is that A-theory or B-theory?

So things change and we interpret that as time passing, though we never actually see a thing like time passing. — ChatteringMonkey

Is that A-theory or B-theory?

Imagine a transparent ball rolling along a table. People live in the ball and look out at the surface of the table (time) going by. But all of the table is there all of the 'time'. Just a thought... — EnPassant

I do understand Eternalism, believe it or not.

If time is real and the future did not happen yet then the earth of tomorrow (or the earth in one second from now) does not exist. Likewise with the past. The earth of one second ago does not exist. This means the earth, and everything else, must be recreated every nanosecond??? — EnPassant

I am aware that Presentism has its own problems, but the intended topic of this discussion is whether a B-theory Eternalist universe allows for motion.

I think 'belief' is OK as a metaphor, but I do see how it can work against expressing the stuff we may agree on. — path

It also brings out that knowledge-how is not JTB.

(I like what you have posted on this thread.) — path

Thanks and likewise! :blush:

'Bedrock beliefs' are 'what everyone knows,' with the important twist of this 'knowledge' being primarily tacit. It's doing/saying the 'right thing' in the context of a world with others. We can, with effort, articulate some of this tacit know-how. — path

Welcome @path. I agree with much of what you said. However, would you call this "tacit know-how" a belief (or set of beliefs), like @Sam26 does?

Or alternatively that they just stay where they are. We are talking about a static view after all. — Mr Bee

What do you mean "stay where they are"? You suggested that there are infiinite stage counterparts of yourself "who experience their own moment". I'm just trying to make sense of this. Why do you imply that they may not "stay where they are"? Does their having experience require them to move? Also, you didn't answer the question: is their experience on eternal repeat?

For the record, I only brought up the stage view as a way to account for the limited contents in our experience. Less accounting for what we do experience, but more about what we don't. I'll leave it to the eternalists in general to address that question. — Mr Bee

Okay, thanks for your responses. Unfortunately, there doesn't seem to be an account by the Eternalists of how we experience time the way we do. Except for those who simply assume (Presentist/A-theory) temporal passage within what is supposed to be a static block universe.

You can think of stages like counterparts of yourself who experience their own moment parallel to yours. Since there are infinite instants in your life, then there are infinite versions of "you" so to speak.The stages don't light up, nor will you become those other stages via. the passage of time, for obvious reasons. — Mr Bee

It's unclear why the stages are parallel to me. Aren't they stages of me?

Also, does this imply that each individual stage is on eternal repeat, replaying over and over again?

Is there an account of why we experience time sequentially instead?

Ouch. Under eternalism, we beings are worldlines, and experience every moment along that worldline. — noAxioms

Or alternatively we are stages which are located at a single instant and experience only that one instant of time while other counterparts experience the others. — Mr Bee

Does this imply that there's a stage of you, e.g. tomorrow, that is having its experience now (from our perspective here today)? Or do we need to wait until tomorrow for that stage of you to 'light up', i.e. to have its experience?

I'd probably travel less.

OK, then it works the same way that my thermostat turns on the heat in the winter despite the fact that it's warm in mid-May.

I'm very sorry that you seem totally incapable of understanding an alternate point of view. I cannot help you with that. Not asking you to change your beliefs, but you have no argument for or against one side or the other of any philosophical issue if you don't have even a rudimentary understanding of both points of view. — noAxioms

I'm afraid your ad hominem attack does not help me to understand your position.

Please help me to understand where you disagree with my argument.

Do you disagree with the definitions of the A- and B-theory given in the OP; that time passes according to the A-theory, and that time does not pass according to the B-theory? I quoted from the SEP and Wikipedia articles. Do you disagree with these and, if so, do you have any supporting evidence for your views?

Do you disagree that the Moving Spotlight theory is a combination of Eternalism + the A-Theory?

Do you disagree that the block universe/four dimensionalism/plain old Eternalism is a combination of Eternalism + the B-theory?

Do you know of some other version of Eternalism + A-theory, besides the Moving Spotlight theory, which would allow for motion under Eternalism? Can you reference any literature about your view?

Or maybe you believe that motion does not require temporal passage. If that is the case, then please explain.

Or something else? Thermostats?

Good luck if you ever find yourself before the court trying to convince a judge that you can't be held responsible for your actions because of hard determinism. Too many philosophers have been (unfairly?) imprisoned already.