Suppose I ask: "What are they doing?" and you answer "Following the rule". "What is the rule?" "What they are doing". — Fooloso4

Are they following a rule by going wherever it is that they are going? Am I also following this rule even though I do not know where they are going? What if they are just wandering about. Is the rule to wander? How does one know in which direction to wander? Is there a rule for wandering? — Fooloso4

To play a game of chess is not follow a rule or set of rules. There is no rule that says I must move this piece rather than that. The game is played in accord with the rules. — Fooloso4

To follow a rule may be a custom but a custom is not simply following a rule. Here's a quick story to illustrate, something I heard on the radio. A cookbook author was talking about her mother's recipe for brisket. Following what her mother always did, before putting the roast in the pan she would cut off a piece at the end. After doing it this way for years one day she asked her mother why she did it that way. Her mother answered: "Because otherwise it would not fit in the pan". The daughter was not following a rule that one must cut off the end. If her mother had a larger pan or a smaller brisket she would not have had to cut off the end. But the daughter thought she was following a rule by doing what her mother always did. — Fooloso4

Why do you think these are somehow incompatible? Maybe that might throw light on where, if anywhere, we disagree. — StreetlightX

Exactly. So the satisfaction of some other objective is what truly governs play. If the rules no longer suit it, they are changed. The rules are a convenience, an aide memoir for what worked last time. — Isaac

The question is whether such 'governance' - another word that appears nowhere in the PI with respect to rules - exhaustively characterizes language, on Witty's view. — StreetlightX

I mean seriously, if the PI amounted to 'language is a rule governed activity', one wouldn't need to read a jot of it. One would just need to listen to your grade school teacher. — StreetlightX

You are right, but you cited unenlightened saying: "grammar is extracted by pedants from pre-existing communication. It starts as description and becomes prescription - we convene, and from there comes convention." He is not referring to Wittgenstein's idea of grammar and I was responding to this. — Fooloso4

It is the practice that governs the language. — Fooloso4

When we do as others do it might be said that we are following a rule, but we are simply following along. — Fooloso4

And is there not also the case where we play, and make up the rules as we go along? And even where we alter them - as we go along. — PI 83

One of the things Witty does in the PI is to expose the differential nature of rules, the fact that rules can and do play different roles in language (e.g. §54), so to say something like "For using words in speech is a rule-governed activity" is not so much wrong as simply empty - this says nothing in particular. — StreetlightX

Furthermore, Witty's constant refrain about rules governing rules ad infinitum (e.g. §84, §86) - and the ridiculousness of such an idea - also shows, to me anyway, what little stock he put in the idea of rules 'governing' language. — StreetlightX

The rule itself is dead. — StreetlightX

But then the use of the word is unregulated — the ‘game’ we play with it is unregulated.” —– It is not everywhere bounded by rules; but no more are there any rules for how high one may throw the ball in tennis, or how hard, yet tennis is a game for all that, and has rules too. (§68)

133. We don’t want to refine or complete the system of rules for the use of our words in unheard-of ways.
For the clarity that we are aiming at is indeed complete clarity. But this simply means that the philosophical problems should completely disappear.

To follow a rule, to make a report, to give an order, to play a game of chess, are customs (usages, institutions).
To understand a sentence means to understand a language. To understand a language means to have mastered a technique. (§199)

There can be no debate about whether these or other rules are the right ones for the word “not” (I mean, whether they accord with its meaning). For without these rules, the word has as yet no meaning; and if we change the rules, it now has another meaning (or none), and in that case we may just as well change the word too. (Boxed note (b), p. 155)

558. What does it mean to say that the “is” in “The rose is red” has a different meaning from the “is” in “Two times two is four”? If it is answered that it means that different rules are valid for these two words, the retort is that we have only one word here. — And if I attend only to the grammatical rules, these do allow the use of the word “is” in both kinds of context. — But the rule which shows that the word “is” has different meanings in these sentences is the one allowing us to replace the word “is” in the second sentence by the sign of equality, and forbidding this substitution in the first sentence.

How do we learn rules? How do we follow them? Wherefrom the standards which decide if a rule is followed correctly? Are they in the mind, along with a mental representation of the rule? Do we appeal to intuition in their application? Are they socially and publicly taught and enforced? In typical Wittgensteinian fashion, the answers are not pursued positively; rather, the very formulation of the questions as legitimate questions with coherent content is put to the test. For indeed, it is both the Platonistic and mentalistic pictures which underlie asking questions of this type, and Wittgenstein is intent on freeing us from these assumptions. Such liberation involves elimination of the need to posit any sort of external or internal authority beyond the actual applications of the rule. — SEP article

The use of a word, Wittgenstein averred, is determined by the rules for the use of that word (AWL 30). For using words in speech is a rule-governed activity. The rules for the use of a word are constitutive of what Wittgenstein called 'its grammar'. He used the expression 'grammar' in an idiosyncratic way to refer to all the rules that determine the use of a word, i.e. both rules of grammar acknowledged by linguists and also what linguists call 'the lexicon' and exclude from grammar - i.e. the explanations of meaning (LWL 46f.). To grammar belongs everything that determines sense, everything that has to be settled antecedently to questions about truth. The grammar of an expression, in Wittgenstein's generous use of 'grammar', also specifies the licit combinatorial possibilities of the expression, 'i.e. which combinations make sense and which don't, which are allowed and which are not allowed' (ibid.; emphasis added). 'What interests us in the sign', he wrote, 'the meaning which matters for us, is what is embodied in the grammar of the sign.... Grammar is the account books of language' (PG 87). Wittgenstein contended that the questions 'How is the word used?' and 'What is the grammar of the word?' are one and the same question (ibid.). The use of a word is what is defined by the rules for its use, just as the use of the king in chess is defined by the rules (AWL 48). The meaning of a sign lies in the rules according to which it is applied, in the rules that prescribe its use (MS 114 (Vol. X), 4r). Two words have the same meaning, he said, if they have the same rules for their use (AWL 3). — G. P. Baker P. M. S. Hacker

Grammar, usually taken to consist of the rules of correct syntactic and semantic usage, becomes, in Wittgenstein’s hands, the wider—and more elusive—network of rules which determine what linguistic move is allowed as making sense, and what isn’t. This notion replaces the stricter and purer logic, which played such an essential role in the Tractatus in providing a scaffolding for language and the world. Indeed, “Essence is expressed in grammar … Grammar tells what kind of object anything is. (Theology as grammar)” (PI 371, 373). The “rules” of grammar are not mere technical instructions from on-high for correct usage; rather, they express the norms for meaningful language. Contrary to empirical statements, rules of grammar describe how we use words in order to both justify and criticize our particular utterances. But as opposed to grammar-book rules, they are not idealized as an external system to be conformed to. Moreover, they are not appealed to explicitly in any formulation, but are used in cases of philosophical perplexity to clarify where language misleads us into false illusions. — SEP article

Grammar is structural, form without content. — Fooloso4

That might be the case when someone who is unfamiliar with the larger activity comes across the rule, an anthropologist, for example, studying a tribe. — Fooloso4

The syntactical rules determine word order or structure of a sentence but the understanding of the those rules do not tell us what it means to put the cat on the mat. — Fooloso4

The meaning of a word is found in its use. Rules or grammar determine proper and improper use. — Fooloso4

If I do not know the grammar I might say: "Put you out the cat". You may understand each of the words but not the combination. — Fooloso4

If, on the other hand, the direction was grammatical you will not understand what you are to do unless you understand the meaning of each of the words. — Fooloso4

Then again, you might understand the words but still not understand what you are to do. — Fooloso4

grammar is extracted by pedants from pre-existing communication. It starts as description and becomes prescription - we convene, and from there comes convention. — unenlightened

This is the rule: '<' = 'this way to' & '|' = 'This is". — unenlightened

There might be a rule for signposts that a pointed end is used for direction indicators, and a flat end for boundary markers (along with the rule about how the point works). Equivalent to '<' = 'this way to' & '|' = 'This is". — unenlightened

and neither would mean anything much without the writing. — unenlightened

If one understands the rules then one knows what to do, but a set of rules is meaningless if one does not understand them. The meaning is not in the rules but in some larger activity. If, for example, the rules for how a knight or bishop moves in chess cannot be understood without knowing what these pieces are, that they are moved on a chess board, etc. — Fooloso4

The meaning of a word is found in its use. Rules or grammar determine proper and improper use. — Fooloso4

Thanks Luke. Always nice to see that someone agrees with you. — Fooloso4

If one is entangled in the rules and the rules prevent one from saying what he means, then the meaning is not the rules. — Fooloso4

So its creation ex nihilo. — Devans99

With eternalism, its not creation ex nihilo - there is something other than 'only now' to do the creating. — Devans99

But when the system is viewed as a whole, it has no first event, so none of the events in the infinite regress can exist. — Devans99

Stuff happens in spacetime without time: photons get around without experiencing time. So change without time seems possible; hence timeless creation maybe possible — Devans99

- An endless infinite regress in time of some sort
- A timeless first cause

I am pretty sure the first is impossible; not so with the second. — Devans99

With eternalism, there is something else beyond time there to do the creating of time — Devans99

With eternalism something other than 'only now' is allowed to exist so there is something 'there' to create time. — Devans99

So as we go back in time, still only the present exists. — Devans99

So the present ALWAYS existed. That implies no start of time. — Devans99

Then if there was a start of time; that would be creation ex nihilo of a sort - creation without time itself which seems impossible — Devans99

(PA) Always, only present things exist. — Devans99

Wittgenstein’s crucial difficulty was that “our grammar lacks surveyability.” (PI, 122) In order to appreciate that thought we must understand that “grammar” is meant to be in this context not merely a system of abstract grammatical rules but the organized pattern of linguistic uses and practices. Wittgenstein’s claim is that the actual structure or order of our language game proves to be unsurveyable. He is thinking, in fact, not only about language in the narrow sense. It is the “grammar” of the human form of life, which includes society, culture, and history, that lacks surveyability. Wittgenstein draws our attention, in fact, to this broad phenomenon when he writes in section 122 of the Philosophical Investigations (in my translation) that “we do not survey the use of our words” and that “our grammar lacks surveyability.” Since he considers language central to the entire human form of life, it follows that our form of life must also be unsurveyable. No wonder then that unsurveyable wholes raise for him issues “of fundamental importance.” That we do not survey the use of our words, our grammar, language, and form of life he declares to be, indeed, “a main source of our lack of understanding.” He goes on to suggest in PI 122 that we need “a surveyable representation” that can generate “the comprehension that consists in ‘seeing connections’.” The concept of a surveyable representation, he adds, “signifies our form of representation, how we see things.” And he closes the section with the somewhat puzzling question: “Is this a ‘worldview’?”

1. The effect is in the present
2. The cause must exist
3. The cause must come prior to the effect
4. So 'prior to now' must have existed. — Devans99

I think thats a debatable statement, see here for example: — Devans99

I think you could say that every effect in the present has a cause in the past else it would not exist so therefore the past must have existed. — Devans99

What I mean is: does the state 'only now exists' apply to the past, IE did 'only then exist' in the past if you see what I mean. Because if 'only now exists' applies to all time then there cannot be a start of time (because that would be creation from nothing). — Devans99

The past does not exist but it provably did exist (else the present would not exist). — Devans99

From the fact the past did exist and from 'only now exists' we reach 'only now always existed'. — Devans99

What would the nature of a creator outside temporal existence be? — Devans99

There is a distinction:

- You believe the past exists
is different from
- You believe the past did exist. — Devans99

And if the past did exist, the conclusion is that the past must have always existed, IE no start of time — Devans99

Then that would mean it is not presentism - because something timeless IE other than only now exists. — Devans99

Presentism claims that 'only now exists'. That can be qualified as a statement that is:

- True for all time.
- Not true for all time.

If you take the first assumption above which I thought all presentist did, — Devans99

But if there is a start of P, what came before it, bearing in mind nothing else exists apart from P? — Devans99

The fact that the past HAS existed means there WAS an infinite regress. The past does not need to still exist... even if the past does not exist then we still know there WAS an infinite regress — Devans99

Why must something other than 'only now exists'? — Luke

If there was a start of time, there must be something 'other' to cause the start of time. And that 'other' must be timeless. — Devans99

If something other than 'only now exists' then presentism (the vanilla definition anyway) can't hold. — Devans99

So with presentism it is impossible for time to start. — Devans99

I should qualify that type of eternalism I'm talking about assumes that there is something 'timeless' that caused the start of time. — Devans99

'Only now exists' and 'there is a start of time' are incompatible views — Devans99

(IE what then caused the start of time?) — Devans99

Meaning is not in the rules. — Fooloso4

Or we may say: “These people are so trained that they all take the same step at the same point when they receive the order ‘+3’. [§189]

Let me ask this: what has the expression of a rule — say a signpost — got to do with
my actions? What sort of connection obtains here? — Well, this one, for example: I have been trained to react in a particular way to this sign, and now I do so react to it. [§198]

206. Following a rule is analogous to obeying an order. One is trained to do so, and one reacts to an order in a particular way.

Presentism posits 'only now always existed'... — Devans99

...so all forms of it require an infinite regress, — Devans99

1. The number of events in an infinite regress is greater than any number.
2. Which is a contradiction; can’t be a number and greater than any number*. — Devans99

...we are not striving after an ideal... [§98]

...we misunderstand the role played by the ideal in our language. That is to say: we too would call it a game, only we are dazzled by the ideal, and therefore fail to see the actual
application of the word “game” clearly. [§100]

We think the ideal must be in reality; for we think we already see it there. [§101]

103. The ideal, as we conceive of it, is unshakable. You can’t step outside it. You must always turn back. There is no outside; outside you cannot breathe. - How come? The idea is like a pair of glasses on our nose through which we see whatever we look at. It never occurs to us to take them off.

We have got on to slippery ice where there is no friction, and so, in a certain sense, the conditions are ideal; but also, just because of that, we are unable to walk. We want to walk:
so we need friction. Back to the rough ground! [§107]

The preconception of crystalline purity can only be removed by turning our whole inquiry around. [§108]

My intent is to move forward, to get passed the stall that threatens to be terminal. — Fooloso4

This 'linguistic endeavor' (innocent sounding, right?) has been associated with philosophers calling the statements of other philosophers meaningless. But that's about as 'metaphysical' or 'superscientific' as it gets. Our linguistic metaphysicians claim a position so lofty that they don't even have to argue. Their system assures them that there is nothing there to argue with. — old

Instead of appealing to a theory of what's meaningful or not, I prefer to just respond on a case by case basis, with the same automatic knowhow that gets me through the rest of life. For me PI is one book among others that encourages this attitude, but Wittgenstein was a complex personality, and other interpretations will tempt others.

Because I prefer to read the book as a return to 'automatic knowhow,' I frame it more in terms of unlearning than learning, so that it's more anti-profound than profound. The difference is that a profound book makes you feel smarter than those who haven't read it, while an anti-profound book makes you feel like other people who maybe haven't read it are smarter than you wanted to give them credit for. This hurts at first but feels like progress later. This is the spiritual junk I had in mind. — old

116. When philosophers use a word — “knowledge”, “being”, “object”, “I”, proposition/sentence”, “name” — and try to grasp the essence of the thing, one must always ask oneself: is the word ever actually used in this way in the language in which it is at home? —
What we do is to bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use.