Hi Sam

I'm glad we agree that sense does not require a referent. However, it seems to be the lack of a referent which leads you to assert that the Christian use of the word 'soul' is incorrect. Given a community who share a use of this word in similar ways (you even offered a definition of the word on the previous page yourself), I don't see how it's at all like W's beetle.

I think there's a definite distinction between saying one person is using a word incorrectly and saying an entire community is using a word incorrectly. It seems inappropriate to label the usage 'incorrect' in the latter case.

How do we know if we're even referring to the same thing? — Sam26

Many words have no referent (e.g. 'the', 'of', 'if', 'then' or names of fictional entities) but this doesn't make the use of these terms incorrect.

Moreover, if I make a claim that a word is not used correctly, it's incumbent on me to demonstrate how it's incorrect. I've been making the claim that Christians generally use the word soul incorrectly, because much of the time it's exactly like Wittgenstein's beetle-in-the-box. — Sam26

It might be incumbent on you to demonstrate this. But seriously, how do Christians use this word incorrectly, or how is it like Wittgenstein's beetle? It has an established usage among Christians, AFAIK.

In that case, isn't the concept of a (some) thing required in order to individuate it and understand it?

I'll try again: isn't this just direct realism?

Nietszche's view (of God's view) seems to be direct realism more or less; or the unmediated perception it presupposes. I don't wish to dampen the enthusiasm of the potentially interesting discussion that the OP goes on to talk about, about being in the moment or spirituality or whatever, but I don't see that that's what N means, based on the quote of the OP. Could the connection between N's view and the later stuff be clarified a little?

I don't really understand your "revenge paradox".

As I understand it, the paradox of the Liar Paradox is that IF "This sentence is false" is true then it's false, and if false then it's true.

But this is not the same for "This sentence is meaningless", which if true is meaningless, and if false is meaningful. I don't see a paradox here. It is false.

This sentence.

I'm not saying the word or concept belief doesn't get it's meaning from public behavior, of course it does.

When I sit on a chair, am I not showing that I believe a chair is there to sit on? No one has to state the belief to know that the person showing the belief, has the belief. You can state it, or I can state it, but that doesn't mean there is no belief prior to the statement. It's often seen in our public actions even before it's stated.

Are you saying that a concept cannot refer to something prior to it's linguistic creation? When I read what others are saying it seems they're implying this, as though beliefs can't exist apart from the concept belief, or the linguistic use of the term belief. — Sam26

If you accept that the concept belief takes its meaning from public behaviours, then what of your "private beliefs"? If you are merely saying that there is some internal aspect to belief, as there is e.g. an internal aspect to pain, then I agree - although I'm not sure what pre-linguistic man's internal aspect of a belief could be without language. But also, as I've said before, I think it confuses matters to use the word private here, given its Wittgensteinian usage, i.e. where something cannot be made public or can be known only by a single individual. If you accept that the word belief gets its meaning, and that beliefs can be expressed, via external, public behaviours, then it confuses matters to refer to beliefs as private, especially when the discussion is also about Wittgenstein.

I'm simply saying, again, that the beliefs, the private beliefs apart from language, are similar to the private sensations we have. And these private sensations are also prelinguistic. They have an existence quite apart from any statement about them. Their existence is not dependent upon language. — Sam26

Okay, but it seems much more reasonable that the word "belief" gets its meaning from, and refers to, public behaviours in much the same way that sensation words like "pain" do. And I would assume that the word originally referred to human beliefs before anything else. This would make your attribution of beliefs to other animals and prelinguistic man an anachronism, a potential misuse of the word "belief", or at least an error in Wittgensteinian grammar.

ETA: Basically, I'm just reiterating Banno's concern that a belief is not "a thing in the mind".

You said it!

So you assert that no statement is indubitable (except that one?), then question what indubitable means, then claim a distraction? No, it's not important.

It could be dubitable. But first, you have to give me an example of what it means to doubt such a statement. Apparently, it should mean that there are indubitable statements. But what would be the definition of an indubitable statement? — Magnus Anderson

I dunno, mate. You said it. You tell me.

There is no statement that is indubitable. — Magnus Anderson

Including this one?

Note though that he's talking about the public use of the word pain, which is associated with the public expression of our sensations. — Sam26

Right, that's what sensation terms refer to and how we learn their meanings.

None of this denies that there are private sensations, or that there are private beliefs. — Sam26

A belief is about something: "I believe that..." What follows the ellipsis can only be a linguistic statement. Unless by "private" you mean something like "unformulated", where the person is unaware that they hold a particular belief. If that's the case, then I don't think they should be called "private", given the Wittgensteinian connotations (i.e. that they are unable to be made public).

Yes, it's easy to imagine. But what sort of properties are you inventing? Can't say? I guess we'll just have to disagree then.

How can it be similar to a private language, especially if there is no language present. If we can have beliefs apart from language, and beliefs can arise apart from language, then how is this even remotely similar to having a private language? — Sam26

Non-linguistic beliefs are similar to a private language in that Wittgenstein's arguments against a private language apply equally to non-linguistic beliefs. There is "no language present" in a private language either, which Wittgenstein assumes only to demonstrate the absurdity or impossibility of the assumption. How can beliefs be held or expressed except in language? If they cannot be expressed or shared with others, because they are intelligible only to one solitary believer, then how is this any different to a private language?

I do believe that language evolved from scratch, but not without very active and sophisticated brain phenomena. Even if you want to say they evolved together from one primitive state to another, I don't see how this hurts my position. I also don't think it's the same thing as going from the absence of life to the presence of life. I'm not saying we're going from the absence of something to the presence of something. I'm saying we're going from the presence of brain activity, to then, linguistic activity, which occurred very slowly and deliberately. Unless I'm misunderstanding you. — Sam26

The analogy that I drew between non-linguistic beliefs and a dormant life force was made in response to your question/assertion that without non-linguistic beliefs, "what would be the springboard of language? How does one get from a mind of no thoughts and no beliefs, to a mind that is able to express one's thoughts linguistically?" This appears to indicate that language could not have evolved from scratch, without some assistance from non-linguistic beliefs. I tend to agree with Banno's complaint that this smacks too much of a private language.

Causal beliefs can arise in the following manner: Mary was bitten by a snake, and as a result of the bite she now believes snakes are dangerous. This is a causal explanation of Mary's belief, namely, it shows the relationship between the bite and her belief. The bite is sufficient to cause her belief. — Sam26

This example relies entirely on the shared meanings/concepts of words like "snake" and "dangerous". I really don't believe that Wittgenstein had much interest in what causes our beliefs or how our language developed, which is much more theory than description. I mention this only because you claim this to be your view based on your reading of Wittgenstein.

This kind of explanation is different from beliefs that arise based on evidence, or what we deem to be evidence — Sam26

How is it any different? Aren't the snake bite and its subsequent effects evidence that snakes can be dangerous?

First, it seems that there are beliefs that arise apart from language — Sam26

How does it seem like this? Care to offer an example? Perhaps this is nitpicking, but in the feeble examples I can imagine, it usually seems more suitable to say "he/it thinks..." rather than "he/it believes..." That is, the "belief" seems short-term or fleeting.

Instead of there being non-linguistic beliefs, could it just be that we apply statements of belief to the non-linguistic behaviours of others in an attempt to explain those behaviours?

For if there are no beliefs and no thoughts prior to the formation of linguistics (language), what would be the springboard of language? How does one get from a mind of no thoughts and no beliefs, to a mind that is able to express one's thoughts linguistically? — Sam26

Perhaps language just evolved from scratch, like life. It's similar to asking how did we get from the absence of life to the presence of life unless there was some mystical dormant life force (where the dormant life force is analogous to your non-linguistic belief).

How are beliefs causally formed? It seems to be the case that beliefs arise causally within the mind based on the interactions between our sensory experiences and the world around us. — Sam26

This seems to apply equally to linguistic beliefs, including those beliefs that we learn in school and which are taught to us by others. What about instincts and natural physical/bodily reflexes - do you consider these to be a kind of non-linguistic belief? Is there a way to distinguish these just by observing behaviour?

To be fair though, Wittgenstein presents his view of belief, similar to yours, in Part II of his Investigations:

This is how I think of it: Believing is a state of mind. It has duration; and that independently of the duration of its expression in a sentence, for example. So it is a kind of disposition of the believing person. This is shewn me in the case of someone else by his behaviour; and by his words. And under this head, by the expression "I believe . . .' as well as by the simple assertion. — Wittgenstein

Although I still maintain my suspicions about your non-linguistic beliefs and causal theory.

I agree that it wouldn't be properly called language, but that makes it no less real. — Metaphysician Undercover

I agree - it wouldn't be properly called language. As Wittgenstein responded to his own question of whether he was really just a "behaviourist in disguise" and whether, for him, "everything except human behaviour is a fiction", he said, "If I do speak of a fiction, then it is of a grammatical fiction." And "grammar" for Wittgenstein was used in the wider sense of his philosophical treatment, where language is embedded in social customs, institutions and use.

As I said, we would use the resources of the communal language, but would be free to create private words. — apokrisis

Have you created any private words? What purpose do they serve? How do you know that you are using them the same way (i.e. correctly) each time? Why can't your left hand pay your right hand money?

Who is this person really? Is s/he a social construct or is s/he a neurobiological individual? — apokrisis

That probably depends on the context/aims of the discussion when talking about the person. I don't believe there is a universal, context-free (metaphysical) answer.

So I am focused on what it could even mean to be private - in any sense. Or public, in any sense — apokrisis

I think the sense of privacy that Wittgenstein had in mind was the traditional philosophical sense, such as that presupposed by St Augustine in the opening quote of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations, or such as that presupposed in Cartesian dualism and in many other philosophical theories.

Otherwise, "public" and "private" have well-established usages in the English language.

You need an actual theory of wholes which makes sense of the forming of the parts. Which is the issue I am focused on. — apokrisis

I hope you are able to resolve that issue.

So if I have a beetle in my box, I can talk about it to myself. — apokrisis

In what language?

It might be private, but how can it be a language, especially if the private aspect is what is not, or what is unable to be, communicated (per your depiction above)?

"The trouble with Worf is that he was always, at least from the Klingon perspective, a pussy."

- jamalrob

As I said, numerous times, I use "rules" in different ways — Metaphysician Undercover

You have equivocated by referring to a rule as both a rule and your interpretation of a rule.

Notice, that in your quoted passages, I am referring to "following rules". In order for a person to follow a rule, one must hold a principle within one mind, which is adhered to. So, when I follow a rule, I am following this principle which I hold in my mind. This is despite the fact, that there may be a written rule, and I might call this written rule, the rule which I am following. In this case, "rule" refers to two distinct things. The writing on the paper is called the rule, and the principle in my mind which is my interpretation of what's on the paper, is also called the rule which I am following. We could say that this is "the same rule". — Metaphysician Undercover

Bullshit. You said previously that a rule is not part of an external object such as a game, that "there is no such set of [written/stated] rules", and that the written rules are physical symbols which "must be interpreted". More recently you said "they do not need to be interpreted by me to become rules, because they were written as rules." This is not about different usages. You have clearly contradicted yourself.

I told you, we can use "rules" to refer to the written rules. I have no problem with that. And, they do not need to be interpreted by me to become rules, because they were written as rules. — Metaphysician Undercover

Really? That's a change from your earlier position, where you said:

"In reality, when a human being follows a rule, that individual holds within one's mind, a principle which is adhered to. The principle, or "rule" which is followed, is within the individual's mind. It is not part of an external object such as a game."

And:

"Therefore if a "game" consists of a stated set of rules which must be followed, there is no game because there is no such set of rules."

And:

"What is the case, is that written rules are physical symbols on paper, or whatever medium, which must be interpreted. When the symbols are perceived (read), they are interpreted. If the individual desires to play the game, then the person will create principles within one's mind, and adhere to these principles in the act of playing the game."

Please clarify which view you hold.

Yes, it is possible to break rules. I don't see the problem. One can hold in one's mind a rule to follow, yet still not follow it. — Metaphysician Undercover

You're conflating the written rules with your interpretation of the rules again. Just answer me this: are the written rules the rules, or not? Or do they not become rules until you have interpreted them?

If it's the latter, then how can you break a rule? Because then it seems that each of us can only act contrary to our individual interpretation of the rule [rather than contrary to the rule itself], and nobody can ever be certain of what the rule actually is, or whether we each have the correct interpretation of it. Who the hell knows what "checkmate" really means, right?

The words in my mind are not identical to the words I speak. The words I speak have a physical presence, as sound, and are public. The words in my mind have no such physical presence, and are private. There is only equivocation if we say that our use of "words" to refer to these two distinct types of words, is the same usage of "words".. That's why I am trying to differentiate these distinct usages, such that we do not equivocate. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, I already distinguished between them as "words in your mind" and "words you speak". As I said, I have no problem calling both of these "words".

The "rules" in my mind are not really the same as the "rules" on the paper. The word "rules" refers to two distinct things here, regardless of the fact that we call them the same rules. This must be the case to account for the fact that I might interpret the rules in a way slightly different from you. — Metaphysician Undercover

If I interpret the chess rules such that rooks can only move diagonally and you don't, how do we resolve this? All we have is a bunch of different interpretations, right?

When someone is using the same word in two distinct ways, and clearly indicates these two distinct ways (as I indicate with 'private' rules), yet the reader fails to acknowledge these two distinct ways, then the reader equivocates. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, you equivocate. How are 'private' rules different from written rules? That you have interpreted the former? Then they are not rules, but an interpretation of them.

Stop pussyfooting around and just admit you think that the written rules are not rules, just some uninterpreted symbols and God knows what they really mean. Furthermore, admit that the actual rules are those that you interpret. Or I interpret. Or someone else interprets. But we can never really know what those mysterious "symbols" (i.e. English words) ever really mean. That is your position, right?

So, you have made a mention of "actual rules" in the last post, and I asked you in one post to clarify what you mean by this. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'll make it simple: the actual rules are the rules (that have been written down or agreed upon or whatever). The rules are not some individual's private interpretation of the rules.

I would say that this symbol represents the number two, and the actual number two is the interpretation of that symbol which exists in my mind. — Metaphysician Undercover

Is there any difference between them (besides that fact that one's a number and the other's your so-called interpretation of it)? Well, is there?

I don't mind saying that rules exist externally to me, in the form of symbols on paper, just like I don't mind saying that concepts exist in that way. Someone might hand me a paper and say "here is my concept". But I do respect the fact that in order to follow such a rule, I must interpret the symbols, and accept the meaning which I derive, as a principle to adhere to. So if I am "following a rule", I am adhering to this principle in my mind which I have derived from my interpretation. You seem to have no respect for this fact. — Metaphysician Undercover

Except one of these is the rules, and the other is your claimed interpretation of the rules, yet you wish to call them both "the rules". On your view, you always remain one step removed from the rules since you need to interpret them, and everyone has their own interpretation, and nobody can ever really know what "the symbols" truly mean. But that's just rubbish. We (English-speakers) all know how to speak English, and misunderstandings or ambiguous meanings are the exception rather than the norm.

I also note that you never answered my question about whether it is possible to break a rule, which I consider to be a related problem for your position.

As I said, we us the word "rules" in different ways, and we must be careful not to equivocate. I have words in my mind, and there are also spoken words. You seem to be implying that I ought only refer to one or the other as "words". You say either the "rules" exist in my mind or the "rules" exist on the paper, in ignorance of the fact that we use "rules" in both ways. But that's just you being completely unreasonable. — Metaphysician Undercover

If the words in your mind are identical to the words you speak, then I have no problem calling them both words, but I do think you are equivocating when you refer to both the written rules of a game, and everybody's alleged differing mental interpretation of those rules, as "the rules".

Right, now you're starting to understand. When we play games, we use strategies, and strategies are private rules, which are not part of "the game", they are part of the player. This is where we reach the limits of the game analogy. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is simply you again misusing the word "rules". Strategies employed within the game are not rules of the game. Your attempt to call them "private rules" just adds to the confusion and equivocation. You seem to agree to the distinction between the written rules of a game and your interpretation of those rules, so stop conflating the two. Until then, I see no merit in discussing the game analogy.

The last time I tried to make up my own rules in a game I got kicked out of the game. No one yet has denied me the right to use language, though Sam26 might like to kick me out of the thread. — Metaphysician Undercover

That's not a fair comparison. If you were to speak nothing but gibberish (e.g. Forest the upon warmly eight marshmallow Lebanon it unicycle), then you might get kicked out of a conversation. But denying you the right to use language is like denying you the right to play any and all games. Has anyone denied you the right to play all games? I doubt it. And surely you and your friends/family have made up your own games or made up your own variation of the rules of an existing game before? Maybe to finish up a game quickly, you invent the rule that the person who wins the next point wins the game, or something similar. Similar variations to the rules of language get made all the time, either by a small subset of the community or by the entire community.

I went through this, I interpret the symbols. — Metaphysician Undercover

That's a huge dodge. You claim that the rules are not part of any external object such as a game, yet you refer to the written rules of the game to help settle disputes? Clearly the written rules of the game are external to you. If the rules are entirely "within the individual's mind" (which individual, btw?) then why do you need to consult the external written rules? Are they not the rules?

Either the rules are entirely "within the individual's mind", as you claim, or else the external written rules printed in the game's instructions are not rules at all. But if they aren't the rules of the game, then why do we call them that? Is everybody but you using the word "rules" incorrectly?

Right, that's another reason why the game analogy fails. Not only do we follow "the rules of the game", we make up our own strategies, private rules, which are part of the play, but not part of "the game" itself. So the rule-following employed in actually playing the game goes far beyond the actual rules of "the game". We could not even understand playing a game, by studying the game itself, because how one plays a game goes far beyond the game itself. To understand how different people play a particular game, we must refer to something other than "the game". If studying a game cannot even provide us with an understanding of how different people play that game, and we must turn to something else to obtain that understanding, then clearly the game analogy can only go so far, and it must be dropped at this point. If we cling to it, it will mislead us. — Metaphysician Undercover

Strategies aren't rules of the game. The rules set the boundaries of permissible moves; strategies are employed within these boundaries.

Also, you make no reference to language here and speak only of games, yet you claim to demonstrate how the game analogy fails.

It's clearly relevant to the principles or "rules" of language use, because I choose my words in a similar habitual way. — Metaphysician Undercover

Okay, but you aren't the only one using the language, and if language is a "method of communication", as you say, then you might want to adopt the habit of using language in mostly the same ways that everyone else does if you want your communication to be effective.

It's not very relevant to "rules" of games though, and that's the point. We use "rules" in numerous ways and we ought not to equivocate when doing philosophy. — Metaphysician Undercover

Right, don't conflate actual rules, such as the written rules of a board game, with some imaginary private mental "rules" that only apply to you.

I think you misunderstood what I said. I didn't mean to say that board games do not exist. I meant, that if "game" refers to something which consists of a set of rules which must be followed, then in the case of language, there is no game. — Metaphysician Undercover

You were talking about where the game analogy breaks down, but I still don't see how language is any different. The rules of both games and language are man-made and we can make up new rules for both.

If you and I are playing a game, and you carry out an action which is discordant with my interpretation, I will claim that you have not followed the rules. If you insist that you have, we may have to consult the written symbols, and each of our own interpretations, to try and decide who is right. — Metaphysician Undercover

You stated in your previous post:

"The principle, or "rule" which is followed, is within the individual's mind. It is not part of an external object such as a game."

Why would you consult the written rules of the game when you claim that the rules are not external to you?

In the case of the various authorities which you have named, we trust them as authorities due to their training, such that we grant to them different degrees of power, to provide an official interpretation in the relevant situations. The statement "break the rule" is based on the authoritative interpretation. — Metaphysician Undercover

Again, why defer to these external authorities if the rules are not external to you?

The statement "break the rule" is based on the authoritative interpretation. So for instance, we assign to the police the power to make arrests based on their interpretations. But what the police do is charge the person, whom according to their interpretation has broken the law. This still does not mean that the person has necessarily "broken the law" though, because the person has the right to go in front of a judge, or jury, to provide a more authoritative interpretation. So in the case of "law", in which breaking the rule is taken very seriously, we employ multiple levels of interpretation to ensure fairness. — Metaphysician Undercover

Has a person "necessarily" broken the law if a judge and jury then decide it? Or can people never actually break the law?

Yes, each one creates one's own principles within one's mind, and adheres to these principles. It is something mentally private. This is very evident, all you need to do is take at look at how you personally follow a rule. You have your own interpretation of what you ought to do to follow that rule, you hold some principles within your mind, and you adhere to them. Consider Banno's chess example, the bishop must move diagonally. You hold this interpretation within your mind, and adhere to it when you play chess. — Metaphysician Undercover

Maybe I interpret the rule differently because I've always viewed the chess board at the wrong angle, so I believe that the bishop can only move vertically or horizontally. However, in practice, this is not how we learn or teach the game. This shows that our normative behaviours inform our uses of language, rather than the kind of interpretations in the abstract that you are advocating.

.

That is how you follow a rule, you hold a principle within your mind, and adhere to it in your actions, you do not consult some externally existing rules each time you are going to act. The actual rules, or principles, which one follows when playing chess go far beyond one's interpretation of the written rules, to include principles of strategy. They must be mentally private or else one could not proceed with a strategy. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is confused. The strategy you employ in any given game is not a part of the rules of the game. Otherwise, where can I find this in the rules?

That specified set of rules constitutes "the norm". This is determined by some authorities. Falling outside the norm does not mean that one has not followed rules, it means that one has not followed that specific set of rules which are designated by the authorities as the norm. — Metaphysician Undercover

Uhh, those are the rules, as you say.

We might commonly say that I do not follow "the rules". But "the rules" here refers to that specific set of rules which is determined as constituting the norm, it in no way means that I do not follow any rules in the general sense. So "normative" refers to a judgement as to whether specific rules have been followed, not a judgement as to whether rules have been followed in general. — Metaphysician Undercover

What are these other ("in general") rules, besides the rules, that you are attempting to make an allowance for here? You mean thinking, or something? What rules does thinking follow? And what relevance does it have to the rules of games and language that we are discussing here?

Therefore if a "game" consists of a stated set of rules which must be followed, there is no game because there is no such set of rules. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is patently false. Board games don't exist?

As I explained to Banno, the game analogy assumes a faulty description of what it means for a human being to follow a rule. It assumes that there is a set of rules, which are part of an external object, a game, which the human being follows. In reality, when a human being follows a rule, that individual holds within one's mind, a principle which is adhered to. The principle, or "rule" which is followed, is within the individual's mind. It is not part of an external object such as a game. — Metaphysician Undercover

You speak about an individual person but games are more often played with/against other people, who teach us the rules of (i.e. how to play) the game and who ensure that we don't break the agreed upon rules of the game (i.e. cheat).

If you apprehend the rule, or principle, which the individual adheres to when following a rule, as existing within the individual's mind, then you may understand that the process of learning is a process whereby such rules are created within one's mind. This perspective allows us to understand the fact that rules are created by human beings, because it respects the fact that each human being creates one's own rules to follow in the process of learning. — Metaphysician Undercover

Why do we have written rules, sports referees, teachers, driving instructors, ombudsmen, judges, police, etc. if "each human being creates one's own rules to follow in the process of learning"? And what does it mean to break a rule in that case?

What you seem to want to say is that 'each human being creates one's own rules to follow in the process of learning the rules', but 'one's own rules' is redundant here. Following rules is a normative practice, rather than something mentally private.

Moore's knowledge that he has hands is indubitable. — creativesoul

As I understand it, If it's indubitable then it can't be knowledge. For a statement to be classified as a piece of knowledge, then it must be open to doubt.

I don't know that I am now speaking English, but only because it doesn't make any sense to doubt it. However, there might be circumstances where it would make sense for me to doubt that I was speaking English (although I can't think of any off the top of my head), and then it may be sensible to make a knowledge claim about it.

This goes back to Sam26's claim that hinge-propositions (I'll just refer to them as "some rules") ought not be doubted, because they are necessary. If these rules are "necessary" in the sense of determined, necessarily existing, such that they cannot be doubted, rather than "necessary" in the sense of needed for some purpose (in which case it could be reasonable to doubt them) then they are nothing other than platonic Forms. In other words, these rules would require the status of "eternal truth", which is equivalent with platonic Form, in order that it would be unreasonable to doubt them.

The point being that the game analogy is good, until we get to the point where the rules need to be justified. To say that you ought to follow this rule requires justification because someone might doubt the correctness of this rule. But justification heads toward an infinite regress when this rule is justified by that rue which is justified by another rule, etc. So Wittgenstein and Sam26 propose that some rules, hinge-props have a special status as "unreasonable to doubt", which makes them necessary. But unless they are claimed to be necessary in the sense of "eternally true" platonic Forms (therefore cannot be doubted), then any claim of special status and "unreasonable to doubt" is just arbitrary, as they are really no different from any other propositions. — Metaphysician Undercover

As far as I can tell, nobody here - including you - believes that the rules of language, knowledge and/or games exist as Platonic Forms. How does the analogy break down if those rules are all man-made?

Okay, then I'm confused by you making a distinction between the existence of rules as man-made vs the existence of rules as Platonic Forms. Why make this distinction when games, language and knowledge all have man-made rules?

But you also agreed with the following..?

Consider board games that usually come with a written set of rules. These games are man-made, but this doesn't mean that anyone can use their "free will to decide" what the rules of this game are. You have to follow the rules to play the game, otherwise you aren't playing that game. — Luke

The point I was trying to make is that in the case of language and knowledge, unlike games of chess and such, we actually do make up the rules as we go. This is very evident from history. So that is where the "game" analogy falls short. When we reach the limits of an analogy we ought to drop it and move on, rather than trying to clutch for straws and apply the analogy where it is not suited. — Metaphysician Undercover

That's different to what I responded to before where you said that if the rules of the game are man-made instead of existing in eternal Platonic Forms, then the players don't have to follow the rules and basically anything goes.

What kind of existence do the rules have? If they always existed, then they are eternal platonic Forms. If they are not eternal Forms, then we have to allow for them to come into existence. If they come into existence, then they are most likely created by the human beings playing the game. But then the game analogy gets lost because the players really do not have to follow the rules, they use their free will to decide, and create the rules as they go. — Metaphysician Undercover

Consider board games that usually come with a written set of rules. These games are man-made, but this doesn't mean that anyone can use their "free will to decide" what the rules of this game are. You have to follow the rules to play the game, otherwise you aren't playing that game.

If two (or more) players agree to play by a different set of rules then they are no longer playing the same game. In order to play the game named on the box, you can't make up the rules as you go. Even if two or more players agree to play a different game with a different set of rules, one person can't simply decide that those rules don't apply to her (and still be playing the same game).

Who else could you be?

It depends on the context.

Right, that's what "raining" means.