here's my position: for it to be raining, water has to be falling from the sky (or something to that effect). there don't have to be any languages, or any verification procedures, for it to be raining. — The Great Whatever

There need to be languages in order for "it to be raining" to have meaning - the same meaning that you still want it to have without any languages.

"So in the end when one is doing philosophy one gets to the point where one would like just to emit an inarticulate sound.—But such a sound is an expression only as it occurs in a particular language-game, which should now be described." (Philosophical Investigations §261)

truth conditions have nothing to do with representation or 'viewpoints.' they have to do with whether sentences are true, i.e. whether certain things are so. — The Great Whatever

Unless you're an antirealist, as per the OP.

also, of course language games get outside of language games! — The Great Whatever

I don't know what this means.

[Language games] make reference to all sorts of things totally indifferent to language. — The Great Whatever

Language has no feelings or desires, so everything is indifferent to language..?

oh, no, that something might be outside our recognition! boy, that's just a reductio, isn't it? — The Great Whatever

Yes, "something". Quite absurd.

I wonder if what the author means by realism and anti-realism is different to want Dummett means. From the article, "if representationalism is rejected as incoherent or empty, the stakes in affirming either realism or antirealism go down considerably, if not completely." He understands the debate as one over whether or not sentences "represent" reality-as-such, with anti-realism treating truth as a convenient fiction, whereas Dummett turns this around into debate over whether or not truth is bivalent, and so doesn't depend on this notion of representation at all. Truth isn't a fiction under anti-realism, according to Dummett; it's just that truth-conditions are not recognition-transcendent. I think this claim is consistent with Wittgenstein's account of meaning, and even entailed by it if Dummett's argument is valid. — Michael

Whether truth conditions are recognition-transcendent or not assumes an impossible viewpoint from outside our language games (and outside our recognition!). In the words of the article, this is an attempt "to represent outside all representation." It may be consistent with Wittgenstein's account of meaning (possibly), but it is not consistent with Wittgenstein's philosophy.

I think this essay provides a good gist of Wittgenstein's philosophy and an answer to the OP.

That's prediction, not prescription. We use descriptive rules to make predictions. Prescriptions are commands of what one ought to do, predictions are statements about what one believes will occur in the future. — Metaphysician Undercover

So, prescriptive rules ("commands of what one ought to do") are limited only to human actions, whereas descriptive rules are not so limited? Seems somewhat ad hoc...

Can you provide an example of a prescriptive rule? Who prescribes these commands?

No, descriptive rules are not prescriptive rules, to conflate the two is category error. That's the point I'm making. — Metaphysician Undercover

Okay, but earlier you offered these two examples of "descriptive rules":

All human beings are animals. Objects fall when dropped. These are rules produced by inductive conclusions. — Metaphysician Undercover

But aren't these also examples of "prescriptive rules"? For example, doesn't this prescribe what ought to happen to objects when dropped?

Sure it's a rule, inductive conclusions create rules. All human beings are animals. Objects fall when dropped. These are rules produced by inductive conclusions. The laws of physics are "rules" aren't they? Ever hear the expression "exception to the rule"? — Metaphysician Undercover

Your "descriptive rules" are not prescriptive then? Or are you conflating the two?

Is an inductive conclusion the same as a "descriptive rule", or does an inductive conclusion produce a "descriptive rule"?

4. Descriptive rule: Human beings stop their cars at red lights. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't think what you are calling a "descriptive rule" is actually a rule.

The object of agreement is different. For Wittgenstein as for Cavell, there is 'agreement in the form of life' at stake. It is not an agreement with respect to the conventional (by which I mean 'already-established') use(s) of language. That's the key difference. There are two analytic axes at work here: a language game and the form of life in which that language game operates. 'Agreement' operates at the latter level, as it were. — StreetlightX

But agreement in form of life and agreement in convention are both of the same type: neither are agreements of opinion. Agreement in linguistic convention is just a particular species of agreement in form of life.

Really, I am taking issue with your claim that conventional use is not at all what Wittgenstein refers to with regard to meaning-as-use. We learn the meanings and uses of words just as (or perhaps while) we learn language games. We say that someone "knows how to go on" when they demonstrate that they use words as others usually do (i.e. conventionally). And is there any word or phrase that is not "conventionalizable"? There is only the conventional and the unconventional, as well as right and wrong ways to use words.

Again, despite the popular misconception, neither convention nor 'communally agreed useages' play much of a role - if any - in Witty's understanding of meaning and language (the same can't be said of something like 'communally cultivated habits, dispositions, affects, and activities' and all the stuff Cavell puts under the heading of the 'whirl of organism'). — StreetlightX

If a "convention" is simply "a way in which something is usually done" - which presumably includes the ways in which we are usually taught to do things - then I don't quite understand how it is much different to your (or Cavell's) contrasting class of "communally cultivated habits" and the like.

There are plenty of times where we use perfectly sensible sentences and people still don't get what it is that you mean. Just look at this philosophy forum and try to count how many times people ask for clarification, or ask "what do you mean", or talk past each other, etc. It would be a misuse, even when using the correct grammar and spelling, when you didn't take into account the reader's own understanding of words and their experience with them. Using words requires more than simply uttering sounds in the correct order, with the correct number of syllables, etc. It requires that you get into the listener or reader's head. — Harry Hindu

I realise that this is how you are using the term 'misuse', but this is not how I am using the term 'misuse'. You would be aware of this if you had checked inside my head. Did you check?

If you can note someone's incorrect grammar, YET still understand what they mean then, using your own words, meaning isn't the same as correct grammar. You may say that you understood what they meant to say, meaning that you understood what the words they should have said in order to refer to some state-of-affairs. The state-of-affairs is what they mean, or what they are referring to, not the correct use of grammar. If you correct them, you aren't correcting their meaning, only their grammar. — Harry Hindu

What constitutes correct grammar? Someone could use a word such as 'sanguine' incorrectly, thinking that it means pessimistic. If they had intended to use a word with a meaning opposite to 'sanguine' then my correction of their 'grammar' is a correction of their meaning. I understood what they meant to say, given the context of the utterance, but the word they actually used had the opposite meaning compared to what they were trying to say. Context plays a large part in meaning because when and where and why you use words is all a part of the use of those words. Is context a part of grammar?

I did use the correct grammar and spelling, no? So how is it that you don't get my meaning if I used the correct grammar and spelling? If we can be grammatically correct and have the correct spelling and people still can't understand what was said, then meaning cannot be related to correct grammar and spelling of words. — Harry Hindu

Despite your impeccable grammar and spelling, you didn't state why you disagree with Wittgenstein.

It is a misuse of words when toddlers and people with limited English skills don't understand. As I said, We have to adapt our use of words to the listener. This isn't uncommon at all. We make assumptions all the time that people will understand us if we just use the proper grammar and spelling of words, but the fact is that they don't always understand us, even when speaking or writing properly. You can't expect everyone to know English as you do, or for everyone to have the same education level, and the same experience in speaking and writing English. Some even write better than they speak and vice versa. — Harry Hindu

I agree that we sometimes need to "adapt our use of words to the listener". But I disagree that using a perfectly sensible sentence that any fluent speaker would understand should be characterised as a misuse of language. If it's being used correctly, how can it be a misuse?

As I said, we alter the use of words frequently. We create metaphors, which would be an alteration, as you put it. We also engage in inside jokes, where only a select few, maybe only two people, understand an altered use of the word. So, if you are saying that "use" vs. "misuse" is simply following the way the majority uses English, then how is it that we use words that don't follow how the majority uses the word, and we still mean to say it that way (we purposely misused words)? How can we say that we misused words if the listener reacts in the way we predicted (we achieved our goal). Do you say that you misused a chair if it accomplished the goal it wasn't initially designed for? If so, then am I misusing words when I say, "I used that chair as a step stool to reach the higher shelf." Would it be better if I said, "I misued the chair as a step stool to reach the higher shelf."? Does anyone speak like that? — Harry Hindu

You appear to identify an effective communication as a use of language and an ineffective communication as a misuse of language. That is, you equate a misuse of language with failing to achieve the goal of effective communication.

On the other hand, I equate a misuse of language with not following the conventions/rules of language (i.e. with incorrect usage). Therefore, I can note someone's incorrect grammar yet at the same time understand what they mean.

I didn't mean that your intent and use are the same thing. They are related causally. You can only use some tool after your intent comes to play. You have a plan in mind and then you go about executing that plan by using tools to accomplish the goal. To say that one exists, does not imply that the other exists in the moment. After all, we can have a plan without executing it. We can have the intent to do something tomorrow, well before our actual use of some thing. What I'm saying is that they are causally linked in a way that is fundamental. Use always follows intent. — Harry Hindu

I'm still unclear on why you disagree with Wittgenstein.

Right. So sarcasm would be a misuse of words per your own explanation. — Harry Hindu

No.

When I think about getting others to understand me, I think about putting myself in their head to know how they use words (what words they know the meaning of (what they refer to)), so that I may use words in a way that they would understand what I meant (what I intended to refer to). — Harry Hindu

Really? Sounds exhausting.

But we aren't talking about those other people. For those other people, we would use the words differently to accomplish our goal. We would simply be adapting our speech (our use of words) to the goal at hand (getting the current listener to understand what we intend to say). — Harry Hindu

You stated that it is a misuse of words simply when others don't understand you. If this doesn't apply to toddlers and people with limited English skills, then you need to amend your claim that this constitutes a misuse.

As I said, people can "misuse" words in the sense that they aren't being grammatically correct, we can still understand their intent. How is it that people can "misuse" words in this way yet we can still understand what they mean? This question needs to be addressed. I've posed it several times and it gets ignored. — Harry Hindu

As I said, people can "misuse" words in the sense that they aren't being grammatically correct, we can still understand their intent. How is it that people can "misuse" words in this way yet we can still understand what they mean? This question needs to be addressed. I've posed it several times and it gets ignored. — Harry Hindu

It's not uncommon for a fluent speaker to understand what someone is/was "trying to say". If meaning is use (and vice versa) then the relevant misuse is a lack or alteration of meaning.

Exactly. You use a word to refer to something else. That is your intent - to refer to something - to convey information. If you didn't intend to convey that the car is a "lemon", then you would have never spoken (used) those words. Can you use words, or any tool for that matter, without intent? To say that you use anything is to imply intent. You cannot separate the two concepts of intent and use. To say one, is to imply the other. — Harry Hindu

I thought you were disagreeing with Wittgenstein? If you cannot separate intent and use, then what's your disagreement with the assertion that meaning is use?

But how would they know that you meant something else to admonish you? — Harry Hindu

Probably based on the context in which the words were spoken. If I described a pessimistic person as sanguine, others might think I was being sarcastic or they might question my use of the word.

This means that we can use any word we want to refer to what we want, and it is simply a matter of that way of using words becomes popular or not. — Harry Hindu

If you want others to understand you, then it's easier to use words conventionally rather than to say something and then wait for the conventions to possibly change in your favour at some future time.

If the "meaning"/"use" vs. the "non-meaning"/"misuse" of words is based on the listener's understanding of the words - of them getting what was said, then this is the argument I'm making. You can say that you used words when the person you're speaking to, or writing to, gets what you are saying, and you misused words if they didn't get the gist of what you were saying. — Harry Hindu

What if the person you're speaking to is a young child or someone with limited English abilities? It doesn't seem right to label it as a misuse of words if most other English-speaking people would understand it.

If meaning is use, then telling me why you made and submitted that post (your intent) won't tell me the meaning of the words. I will argue that I can tell you the meaning of the words the moment you tell me why you made and submitted it (your intent). — Harry Hindu

I might use the word 'lemon' to refer to an inferior automobile, and I might do this intentionally, but the meaning of the word is (or refers to) the car, not to my intention.

Alternatively, I might use the word 'sanguine' believing it to be a synonym for and intending it to mean 'pessimistic', but its actual meaning is the opposite, and I can be rightfully admonished for my incorrect use which has caused so much confusion for my audience. However, if my unconventional (i.e. incorrect) use were to become conventional (i.e. correct), if most people started to use it that way, then that would become its actual meaning, and people would finally come around to my way of thinking. But that's quite rare.

Dreams take us out of reality for a reason – to expand our reality – to see over the horizon – to envision a new horizon. This is an important function. — woodart

I don't deny that the content of our dreams might sometimes reflect our fears or desires or whatever, but I don't consider this to be the main purpose of dreams. Personally, I find that I have stranger and more memorable dreams the more tired I am, which supports my view that the main purpose of our dreams is to keep us asleep. I don't believe that the main purpose of our dreams is to "tell us something," to "give us an alternative reality," to "jolt our thinking," to "expand our reality," or to help us find solutions to problems. Some of these may occasionally be a fortunate byproduct of some dreams, but it strikes me as too 'new age-y' or mystical or unscientific to consider this as their main function.

They are unusual from an evolutionary perspective since they appear to present false information which could endanger the animal itself. — JupiterJess

There are also physical dangers when we don't get enough sleep. My view is fairly simple: dreams help the body to stay asleep and to rest. We need sleep and dreams are the body's way to help achieve this. Sometimes actual sounds and other sensory information from the environment can be incorporated into our dreams, so we can keep on sleeping. I don't consider the "meaning" of dreams to be very significant.

Philosophy is such a wide-ranging subject that I find it difficult to pin down what makes any film distinctly philosophical. However, some films do strike me as less (or non-) philosophical than others. Perhaps it's a matter of entertainment vs. questioning or something like that, and so I agree that sci-fi movies tend to be more philosophical, as someone mentioned. Two that I would consider somewhat philosophical (and worth watching) involve time travel, which are About Time and Primer.

Philosophy Club membership is restricted only to those who are not members of themselves.

What do you mean by it, then?

It seems that you are tying yourself in knots trying to find contradictions in Wittgenstein's work.

Firstly, I am confused by your use of the term "propositional". It was the early Wittgenstein who limited all of language only to propositions (i.e. assertions about the natural world), while he was working more within the philosophical tradition. The later Wittgenstein took a more relaxed view and allowed more than propositions into language. The later Wittgenstein also placed more emphasis on the context of utterance and considered meaning as use. The early Wittgenstein, in his attempt to locate the most general form of a proposition, had no regard for any context. The later Wittgenstein's focus on context, and introduction of terms of art such as 'language game', were a reaction to the philosophical tradition that had gone before him. This tradition is the context for Wittgenstein's use of the phrase 'language game'.

Ironically, the point on which you attempt to criticise Wittgenstein, is the same point on which Wittgenstein criticises much of philosophy and the reason for his invention of the concept of language games: traditional philosophy often speaks of language outside of any context. Wittgenstein sees this as language going on holiday, which he considers to be the cause of philosophical problems.

So W used a philosophical doctrine to conclude that philosophy is a waste if time. Self-undermining? — Mongrel

You're implying that this conclusion can never be reached without being self-undermining? That's an air-tight way of fending off any criticism of the subject, I suppose.

If you are saying that there is no context for the concept of language games, then I disagree. As Pneumenon said earlier, the context is philosophical discussion.

If you are saying something else, then please elaborate.

Yes.

I apologise if I have contributed to any derailing, but I must say that it's unclear to me exactly what question you are asking, or what your enquiry is, in this discussion.

So in what light should we see Wittgenstein? — Mongrel

One of the main aims of Wittgenstein's later philosophy (or philosophical therapy) is to "bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use." (116) Language games are one of the devices that Wittgenstein uses to restore some perspective and ground language as an activity rather than as some idealised abstraction: the received view of many philosophers. As Wittgenstein puts it:

I shall also call the whole, consisting of language and the actions into which it is woven, the "language-game".

(7) [my emphasis]

Here the term "language-game" is meant to bring into prominence the fact that the speaking of language is part of an activity, or of a form of life.

(23)

I think that your view of having "a transcendent viewpoint on language" is the kind of metaphysics that Wittgenstein is trying to dispel with his introduction of language games. But please clarify if this does not address your enquiry about language games.

This reminds me of the following passage from the Investigations:

121. One might think: if philosophy speaks of the use of the word "philosophy", there must be a second-order philosophy. But that's not the way it is; it is, rather, like the case of orthography, which deals with the word "orthography" among others without then being second-order. — Wittgenstein

To add to what Sam said, I believe this is well summarised by Wikipedia's Tractatus article, particularly in its reference to a geometric projection:

In order for a picture to represent a certain fact it must in some way possess the same logical structure as the fact. The picture is a standard of reality. In this way, linguistic expression can be seen as a form of geometric projection, where language is the changing form of projection but the logical structure of the expression is the unchanging geometric relationships.

So, for example, Wittgenstein's law court dolls possess the same logical structure as the facts if they stand in the same relationships to each other as the facts they represent, or if they are are projected in the same way as/from the facts.

The problem is accounting for how our visual system has color experience, since all the physical facts about vision would be without color. As such, Mary inside or outside of her room cannot explain how it is that we have color experiences, despite knowing all the physical facts. — Marchesk

I believe that science (or Mary) can tell us something about how we have colour experiences.

It seems that your enquiry has more to do with why we experience colour, rather than how we experience colour. That question could be up there with why anything exists.

I just read the article in the OP. Fascinating stuff and a great read!

Presentism is consistent with our experience of time: constantly passing from one moment to the next, getting older. We keep track of this passage with clocks and calendars. This passage characterises our everyday understanding of what time is. This passage is also the very thing which is missing from eternalism. Presentism and eternalism both have their shortcomings.

Well, given that we are talking about having multiple experiences in the sense of the eternalist worm theory, then of course that is irrelevant. According to the eternalist, time does not pass. You apparently think that this means that they cannot have conscious experiences, but I am willing to grant that they do, and then work towards what that would mean. — Mr Bee

It seems that we are each referring to something different by the word "experience". I am using the common definition, while, to be charitable, you are using your own 'technical' definition. As a result, it seems that we have been talking past each other.

Tell me, when you talk about having two experiences together, are you bringing in some notion of the flow of time into the mix? That is, when a person has two experiences, one of skydiving and one of smelling burnt toast, then do you see the person as having them in sequence with the passage of time, according to an A-theory of time? — Mr Bee

Yes, of course. Do you know of any other way to experience something?

I have given reasons, if you have been reading. We have no problems considering having multiple experiences in space for a single subject that would necessarily combine together. Experiences may be "separated by space" but that doesn't mean anything to saying they are had together. Space is not time, but they are very similar to one another (even more so under eternalism, where it is often claimed that time is another dimension of space), so it seems there is no reason for us not to say the same applies for a being who is temporally extended through time.

The only reason why I think you would disagree is if you just simply assume that having a larger experience means that all the experiences are had "at the same time". But I see no reason for this understanding. Furthermore, your sense of "together" as "together at a time" is too restrictive. The worm theory says that a temporally extended being has their temporal parts "together". Do they mean "together at a time" where "time" means one of the moments of the worm's life? Certainly not, any more than we would say that have all of our body parts at a single point in space. But does this mean that the worm theory is obviously false? Maybe it is to you, but it seems like a lot of people are fine with saying that a person has their temporal parts together without trouble, so either they're wrong or you are.

Whether you have read these reasons or not, you certainly haven't addressed them, instead repeating the same unjustified assumption that just because two experiences that a subject experiences are temporally separated, there is no larger experience which contains both. — Mr Bee

You address my concerns by complaining that I have not addressed your concerns?

Time is considered to be a space-like dimension under eternalism, not "another dimension of space". Time is not considered to be a dimension of space.

Clearly the term "experience" is problematic here, due to its many shades of meaning. However, I disagree because I don't necessarily consider any two of my experiences to be part of the same "larger experience". Your use of the term to cover one's entire lifetime seems a stretch of the meaning of the term, especially when used to combine two clearly separate and otherwise unrelated experiences in one's life.

I was asking if it is possible for you to not have a larger experience featuring them both. And again I should note that we are talking about both experiences being had at the same time. — Mr Bee

I have experiences (or an experience) at a particular time. I don't agree that this must necessarily be a part of some larger experience, which I can only take you to mean something like the rest of my life. Please correct me if you are referring to some other "larger experience" than this. To be clear, I consider an experience to be a part of my entire life, I just take issue with calling my entire life "an experience".

And I imagine that this "single glance" implicitly means "at a time", "simultaneously", and "at the same moment" right? — Mr Bee

Perhaps. I was trying to imagine how a worm might experience two temporally distant experiences as a combined experience. I imagine that they would have to be experienced together, at the same time.

Do you think the temporally extended worms of human lives are not "human beings"?
Do you think that temporally extended worms cannot possibly have experiences? — Mr Bee

I think that a worm is a representation of a person/object's lifetime/existence. I don't think that a representation or a lifetime can have its own experiences. I believe that a person can have experiences over their lifetime, however.

I'm not sure I understand you. Earlier I said that the disagreement laid with me saying that having an experience x and an experience y means having an experience of "x and y". You said I misrepresented you and said that the real disagreement laid with the fact having both experiences entails having a combined experience. This suggests that you see a difference between the two. Explain what that difference is. — Mr Bee

I've explained it several times and you continually fail to address it: I find it peculiar to consider two distinct, temporally-distant experiences (e.g. decades apart) to be referred to as a singular experience. How do you justify this unusual use of the term?

Let's say that both experiences are had at the same time. Is it possible to have an experience of x and an experience of y without having a combined experience? If so, can you imagine what that would even be like? For instance, is it possible to have an experience of seeing red and seeing blue without seeing an image of red and blue? — Mr Bee

I've already granted that a person can have more than one experience at a time, and I provided the example of having a conversation and hearing background noise simultaneously. Now let's say that the two experiences are not had at the same time, and that they are temporally-distant, since this has been my unaddressed counter-argument for several posts now.

Indeed. I believe that is a general feature of a single conscious subject having two experiences. — Mr Bee

I believe that it is a general feature of a single conscious subject to be continually ageing and moving forward in time.

We can distinguish individual parts of our experiences easy. If I am looking at a picture of the Mona Lisa, then I can identify the visual experience of her hair, and the visual experience of her eyes. In fact I can even identify and compare the different parts that visual experience I have. Nothing wrong or problematic with that. But that doesn't mean that I have those experiences separately or that I do not have the visual experience of the Mona Lisa in full. — Mr Bee

The relevant difference being that we don't experience our lives all at once, or have every experience of our lives available to us "in full" at a single glance. For example, two distinct experiences might be had decades apart, where they do not form a combined, singular experience.

If I am a being who is extended through space and time, and the parts that I have at every spatio-temporal contain experiences, then shouldn't be relevant to what I, as a being who is composed of those parts, experience? — Mr Bee

I don't know, should it? Why should it? You are attributing the experiences that you actually have (in the real world) to the eternalist model, and then subsequently make the assumption that the eternalist model has implications on what we should experience. Sounds backwards to me.

So you think the notion of temporal worms itself is nonsensical? I am not sure what else you think I am talking about here. — Mr Bee

No, I think that your talk of worms having experiences is nonsensical. Also, how you seem to think that it is unproblematic for a worm to have a combined experience of two distinct experiences which may be years or decades apart. Worms don't have experiences of a person's entire lifetime; people have experiences throughout their lifetime, and in a particular sequence.

The problem is that most such arguments as far as I have heard them, seem to be unjustified. I have heard people say that if time doesn't flow then experience cannot happen, but they usually misinterpret eternalism or assume requirements about conscious experience that aren't plausible. The eternalist, for instance, wouldn't say the world is motionless because motion does not require the flow of time, it only requires that objects change position over time. In addition, I do not see how consciousness would require the flow of time either. — Mr Bee

How do objects "change" their position over time without a flow of time? You need to implicitly assume a flow of time for the concept of change to make any sense. Changing where I focus my attention on the static timeline does not constitute any real change, it's just an attempt to smuggle in change via my attention (which really does change!). And I'm pretty sure that if (e.g.) blood doesn't flow through our veins, if our brain impulses don't fire, and if we don't continue to breathe in and out, then we will soon lose consciousness.

An experience of x and y is a combined experience. I am not sure what the distinction is to you. Similarly an experience of a red patch on my left side of my vision and a blue patch on my right is a combined experience of red and blue. It is an experience of red and blue. — Mr Bee

I thought that was the point in contention? An experience of x and an experience of y need not be a combined experience, as they can be two distinct, separate, temporally-distant experiences. Although you could refer to them as a singular experience, I take you to mean that the experience of red on my left and blue on my right are not temporally-distant experiences. If they were temporally-distant, then it would be peculiar to refer to them as a single experience, instead of two individual experiences.

Besides, if any two (x and y) experiences must be combined into a single experience, then all experiences must be combined into a single experience. How, then, can you distinguish, or even speak about, one experience as distinct from the rest? It then all becomes just one big experience. This seems to create some problems for your OP, where you speak of having more than one experience.

The worm conception of time is an ontological theory of time that has implications on what we should experience. I am making no such assumptions about the experience of temporally extended beings apart from those we usually make to spatially extended beings. — Mr Bee

How does it have implications on what we should experience? I don't know what beings you are talking about, but I'm talking about normal human beings and the way that we actually have experiences. You are talking about some abstract nonsense which has little to do with human beings.

There is a difference between saying that eternalism says that we shouldn't be consciousness whatsoever (that the phenomenon of conscious experience necessarily requires a flow of time) and that eternalism cannot account for our experiences of feeling like time flows. The former is not charitable because it assumes that beings in an eternalist world are zombies which we evidently are not. However this seems like too strong a stance to take. — Mr Bee

Charitable or not, I find it impossible for us to have consciousness or experiences, or for there to even be the illusion of a flow of time, in a static, motionless universe. I don't think that beings in an eternalist world would be zombies, because even that suggests some sort of motion. If the eternalist theory proposes that the universe is truly motionless, then why be charitable about it? Advocates of the theory are welcome to explain it.

I am sorry, but what is the difference between being temporally extended and being an aggregate of more than one time? — Mr Bee

I was attempting to distinguish between the sequence of experiences that we actually have, and the type of abstract aggregate experience that you are proposing our worms might have (over and above our actual ones).

Does that matter? The point in contention is merely whether the fact that a person has an experience of x and an experience of y means that they have an experience of x and y. — Mr Bee

You misrepresent the point in contention. The point in contention is whether the fact that a person has an experience of x and an experience of y means that they have a combined experience of x and y. My going to Disneyland when I was five years old and my going to Disneyland last week do not constitute some "combined experience" - they are separate and distinct experiences. I suppose I could talk about the singular "experience" of my entire life, but this strikes me as a virtual misuse of the word, and it is not the same meaning of "experience" as you have used when describing our 'point in contention' above. Also, you are not referring to the experience of a person, but of a person's worm.

If you want to say that such a temporally extended entity cannot possibly have any sort of experiences then it would seems the worm conception of time is obviously false because evidently, you and I do have experiences. — Mr Bee

Eternalism (and the worm conception of time) is an ontological theory of existence, not experience. You are importing your own bizarre assumptions about experience.

Of course that would also work to rejecting the view (which is my goal anyways) as will TGW's overall rejection of eternalism in general, but I find it either to be question begging or uncharitable to the view. — Mr Bee

Presentism is a theory of time which is consistent with the way we have experiences and apparently move forward in time. It is up to eternalism to try and account for why it seems this way to us. You can presume that a temporal worm has experiences, and has all of the experiences that an individual will have across their lifetime, but this still won't account for (temporally-speaking) the main issue: why does time appear to flow and why do we appear to have these experiences in a presentist way, moving forward in time from one moment to the next? It's not being uncharitable to eternalism that it cannot account for this; that's just the problem with eternalism.

I think it reasonable to believe that temporally extended beings can have experiences just as much as spatially extended beings do, and my argument is simply to show how the implications of those facts lead to conclusions that we just don't find in our own experiences. — Mr Bee

I agree that it is reasonable to believe that temporally extended beings, like us, can have experiences. However, I disagree that some aggregate of our entire existence, unlike us, can have its own consciousness or experience, including any meta-experience (or "larger experience") of two distinct, temporally-distant experiences at once.

I was giving you an example of what I mean when I talk about what a larger experience is. Nowhere does this definition refer to anything like having to experience red and blue "simultaneously". You were the one who imposed that restriction earlier and here you continue to insist upon it now. But I see no reason for this restriction.

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But that doesn't stop me from having a combined experience which includes both. I can have a combined experience which is described as "red at the left side of my vision and blue on the right". In fact, I always find I do have to have such an experience if I were to have them both. — Mr Bee

Personally, I have never had a "combined experience" of two distinct, temporally distant experiences, and I'm pretty sure that nobody else ever has, either. Humans just don't experience things in this way. Why you are so intent on attributing experience to a hypothetical aggregate of your temporal existence (i.e. your temporal worm) is beyond me.

Similarly, I see no reason why a temporal worm extended in time, who would be exposed to, say, experiencing skydiving at t1 and smelling burnt toast at t2 would not have a combined experience of "skydiving at t1 and smelling burnt toast at t2" in a manner similar to how we can experience "red on the left side of my vision and blue on the right". — Mr Bee

Because "we" have experiences. Why make the bizarre assumption that temporal worms do, too?

In the case just described, it is an experience of "Skydiving and Smelling burnt toast". It is not just having an experience of "Skydiving" and an experience of "Smelling burnt toast" separately.

Or if you are okay with a completely visual example, in the case where I am seeing a red patch in my vision and a blue patch, there will be a larger visual experience of seeing both of them together (for instance, it could be an image that has red on the left side and blue on the right). — Mr Bee

But the skydiving that I did five years ago and the burnt toast that I am smelling today are separate experiences and do not form a combined singular experience. I don't have some meta-experience of both experiences, except maybe in memory, but recalling them is not the same experience as undergoing them. You seem to want to attribute experience to the worm itself. For you, it's not just that a person has experiences one-by-one with the passing of time, in a presentist sort of way. You also want to say that there is some sort of eternalist way to have experiences. I reject this claim, and your example of simultaneously seeing a red and a blue patch (at the same time!) does not help to address how one can possibly have some "larger experience" of two different experiences that are temporally distant from each other.

And I'm asking what that "larger experience" is. You don't have some overall (meta-) experience of all your experiences; you only have the experiences.

Wasn't your distinction between having the experiences one-by-one or (being able to) having them simultaneously? Either way I have both experiences, don't I?

Wait, I am not sure if you are trying to disagree with me or are agreeing with me. Under what theory of time are you saying that you have both experiences? Are you saying that you have them one by one with the passing of time (as in tensed theories of time) or are you saying that you have them both in the way, say I have an experience of seeing a computer screen and an experience of a buzzing noise in my room (in the manner according to the worm theory)? — Mr Bee

I have "both" experiences under either theory of time. But when I speak of having them "together", I mean having them simultaneously, at the same time. It probably depends how you wish to define "experience", but I don't see any problem in talk of having more than one experience at the same time, such as having a conversation and hearing background noise at the same time. But I deny that two disparate experiences separated by a long period of time can be said to be had together or simultaneously or at the same time. That quite obvious, so I still don't understand your claim that it requires some "larger experience".

Also, I don't see why you seem to think that worm theory entails that experiences can only be had simultaneously. Is this the distinction you are making between worm theory and stage theory: whether experiences are had one-by-one or whether they can be had simultaneously? That's not how I understand it, but I also don't know that much about it.

I don't experience skydiving five years ago and smelling burnt toast today as some "larger experience". This would require experiencing each moment of my life simultaneously or "all at once". Didn't you already argue against this kind of thing in the OP?