If you can pick up apples for sixty pence a pound in Tesco, then you can pick up a pair of elementary particles for the same low price. — Cuthbert

It's even a better deal than that, in that for the low price of 60 pence, one can get from Tesco's 5 * 10 to the power of 29 elementary particles. Though Asda are slightly cheaper. And Waitrose definitely more expensive.

My point was that the mind is no different than everything else in that everything is both the effect of causes and the cause of subsequent effects. — Harry Hindu

Agree, the mind is part of the world, having evolved in synergy with the world, possibly over a period of 800 million years.

None of this explains what "consciousness" or "proto-consciousness" is. — Harry Hindu

Agree, the nature of consciousness is mysterious. Panprotopsychism is just establishing the map, not explaining the territory.

If these relations did not exist ontologically, then what reason would there be for us perceiving them? — Harry Hindu

The original Steve French article is arguing for an Ontic Structural Realism, the view that structure is ontologically fundamental, and where objects at at both the fundamental and "everyday" levels should be eliminated.

FH Bradley used a regress argument against the ontological existence of relations.

Question One
If relations only existed in the external world and not the mind, how are we able to perceive things that don't exist in the external world, such as Sherlock Holmes, ghosts and unicorns ?

Question Two
When looking at an object in the external world, our knowledge of it must necessarily be incomplete. Yet when looking at something in the world that is incomplete, the mind will fill in the blanks and make a complete image. When thinking about an object about which we have limited knowledge we still think of it as a complete whole.

If relations only existed in the external world and not the mind, how to explain the principle of closure ?

Question Three
If relations exist in the external world, then a table, which is a particular set of elementary particles, exists as an object. It follows that every possible set of elementary particles in the external world will also exist as an object. For example, a single elementary particle in the apple and a single elementary particle in the table will exist as an object, the set of elementary particles in the table and a single elementary particle in the apple will also exist as an object, etc. It follows that the number of objects in the external world will be more than the number of elementary particles in the world.

How can there be more things existing in the external world than there are elementary particles ?

Question Four
If the apple exists as an object in the external world, then every pair of elementary particles in the external world would also exist as an object. It logically follows that a single elementary particle in the table in front of me and a single elementary particle 90 billion light years away must also exist as an object.

The question is, does this object exist instantaneously, or is its existence dependent of information passing between the two elementary particles at the speed of light ?

Question Five
If relations only existed in the external world, the apple as one set of elementary particles will be an object, the table as another set of elementary particles will be another object, but also the combined set of elementary particles in the apple and table will be another object again.

Where is the information in the external world that the apple as an object exists independently of the table as an object ?

Question Six
We know that we perceive relationships that don't exist in the external world, such as Sherlock Holmes, ghosts and unicorns. Therefore, relationships don't need to exist in the external world in order for us to be able to perceive relationships, meaning that there are some relationships that exist only in the mind.

When we observe the external world and perceive a particular relationship, such as a table, as we are able to perceive relationships that don't exist in the external world, how do we know that the relationship we are perceiving exists in the mind or in the external world ?

Summary
It seems to me that FH Bradley's regress argument makes more sense than relations having an ontological existence in the external world.

Well, maybe, but I see no reason to believe that my table does not exist, nor any reason to attribute any protopsychism to it. — Olivier5

1) I agree that the elementary particles that make up what we call a table exist in the external world, and where each elementary particle is located at a particular time and space. I agree that the table exists as a concept in our minds. The information that this particular set of elementary particles each located at a particular time and space is in the form of a table exists in our mind.

The question is, where in the external world is the information that this particular set of elementary particles each located at a particular time and space is in the form of a table ?

2) The Universe has been around for about 14 billion years. It is estimated that the first neurons appeared on Earth about 600 million years ago.

If consciousness did not come from a pre-existing proto-consciousness, then where did consciousness in the mind come from ?

I don't like using terms like "external" and "internal" because it seems to divide the world into two (dualism) unnecessarily. — Harry Hindu

In any discussion of the mind the concept of dualism is unavoidable, as you say yourself: "We all know that the world has an effect on the mind and the mind affects the world", instantly setting up a dualism between the world and the mind.

Steve French is misusing the term eliminativism...........Not neccessarily. — Harry Hindu

I agree that in principle, anyone denying the existence of some type of thing is an eliminativist.

However, in practice, within philosophy, eliminativism always refers to eliminative materialism, which is a theory about the nature of the mind. Even within your own text - Holbach (1770) are eliminativists with regard to free will - Hume (1739) was arguably an eliminativist about the self. The SEP article concludes with the line: "While it is true that eliminative materialism depends upon the development of a radical scientific theory of the mind, radical theorizing about the mind may itself rest upon our taking seriously the possibility that our common sense perspective may be profoundly mistaken"

Then it seems that if the relations in our mind don't represent the world as it is then our understanding of the world is radically wrong. — Harry Hindu

As you later say about observing an apple: "Visually, you only perceive one side of the apple" and "You can perceive the whole apple tactilely, but not visually".

When observing an apple, our mental representation of the apple must always be incomplete, in that we may only be looking at one or two sides, we may not be looking inside the apple, we may not be smelling the apple, etc. As our representation must inevitable always be incomplete, we can never represent the apple as you say "as it is".

The fact that any representation can never be complete does not mean that such representation is radically wrong, all we need is that such a representation is "good enough" for our present purposes.

If current conditions are not related to past conditions or to future conditions then causation (a type of relation) is false so all of our reasons for believing things would be wrong. There would be no justification for anything and the basis for ethics and politics would be false — Harry Hindu

I agree that causation is a type of relation.

Between two objects in the world A and B we observe a spatial relationship - object A is to the right of object B. Because we observe a spatial relationship between A and B, it does not follow that in the world there is a something that exists between objects A and B independent of and in addition to the space between them, a thing called a "spatial relation" which exists as much as objects A and B.

Similarly, between two objects in the world A and B we observe a causal relationship - object A hits a stationary object B and object B moves. Because we observe a causal relationship between A and B, it does not follow that in the world there is a something that exists between objects A and B independent of and in addition to the interaction between them, a thing called a "causal relation" which exists as much as objects A and B.

For us to apply our reasoning and judgements, it is sufficient that spatial and causal relationships exist in our mind

In denying that relations have an ontological existence then you are implying that solipsism is the case. — Harry Hindu

Solipsism may be defined as the philosophical idea that only one's mind is sure to exist. As an epistemological position, solipsism holds that knowledge of anything outside one's own mind is unsure; the external world and other minds cannot be known and might not exist outside the mind.

Being an Indirect Realist, I believe the external world exists, but I don't know for certain. Isn't everyone a solipsist to some degree ?

To deny that relations have an ontological existence in the external world is not to deny that time, space, matter and forces don't exist. Why should the existence of an object in the external world depend on its being in an ontological relationship with something else ?

In rejecting dualistic notions of reality, I believe that minds and everything else are the same type of thing, which I identify as relationships, processes, or information. — Harry Hindu

If the mind and everything else, such as a table, are the same type of thing, are tables conscious ?

How is the "internal" contents of ypur mind different than the internal contents of say, your stomach? — Harry Hindu

I assume because my mind is conscious, but my stomach isn't.

Visually, you only perceive one side of the apple — Harry Hindu

Yes, as you say, "you can feel all sides of the apple even though you can't see all sides of the apple".

Because you cannot see the relationships on all sides of the apple, yet can feel the relationships on all sides of the apple, these missing relations must have originated in the mind, not the world.

This is a problem because other minds are external to yours. — Harry Hindu

It comes down to belief. As I believe that tables are not conscious, I believe that other minds are conscious. I may be wrong. I will never know for certain. It is just a working hypothesis.

In asserting that proto-consciousness is fundamental in the world, and that relations only exist in the mind, are you not admitting that relations exist in the external world? — Harry Hindu

I don't know for certain that proto-consciousness is fundamental in the world, and even if it is, it is still beyond my understanding, but it is the least implausible explanation that I have come across.

Yes, it would follow that if I believed in panpsychism this would lead me to concluding that relations ontologically exist in the external world, which is why I tend to protopanpsychism which doesn't require such a conclusion.

Bradley must be wrong. Because it would be a miracle if the human mind had relations and nothing else did. — Olivier5

Not unless there is truth in panprotopsychism.

In that event, there would be a world with proto-consciousness and without ontological relations, and a mind with consciousness and with ontological relations.

In the conscious mind, distinct objects are united by the relationship between them into a single experience (the binding problem).

If relations exist in the mind and not the external world, is the mind a miracle? — Olivier5

A miracle may be defined as "an extraordinary and welcome event that is not explicable by natural or scientific laws and is therefore attributed to a divine agency"

For me, not a miracle, as I am sure that the mind is explicable by natural or scientific laws.

However, even if there was someone to explain it to me, my understanding would probably be no more than that of a penguin trying to understand the foreign exchange market.

Bradley's Regress Argument against external relations..................So we already know that this reasoning must be faulty, since there would be no possibility of any reasoning if it was true — Olivier5

If Bradley is correct, and relations exist in the mind and not the external world, an observer of the apple and the tree will be aware of many relationships, such as - the apple is below the tree - the apple is smaller than the tree - the apple is more red than the tree - etc.
Given knowledge of these relationships, the observer will be able to exercise their powers of reasoning, for example - the apple is likely to have fallen from the tree - the apple has probably grown from the tree - the chemical composition of the apple as far as one can tell is different to that of the tree - etc.

Now what does it mean "to be something to them"? — Olivier5

It means that relation R relates a to b

The tree or the apple are obviously not expected to know something about their respective position — Olivier5

Of course, as trees and apples have no minds. But what is the case is that there is no information within the tree that relates it to the apple, and vice versa.

Still, their respective position remains an objective fact. — Olivier5

"Respective" is defined as "belonging or relating separately to each of two or more people or things". You are starting off with the premise that relationships in the external world are objective facts. Bradley is giving a justification as to why relationships in the external world are not objective facts.

It looks to me that either he is projecting intentionality on mindless thing — Olivier5

Bradley refers to things, not minds

Is not the mind part of the world? — Harry Hindu

Yes, I should have written: "relations do exist, but in the mind, not in the external world". I agree that the mind is part of the world, having evolved in synergy with the world, possibly over a period of 800 million years.

Steve French is misusing the term eliminativism (it seems to me).
Steve French relates eliminativism to objects in the world, such as tables. However, in philosophy, eliminativism is a theory about the nature of the mind, not about the nature of the external world.

IE, within his article he should have used the term reductionism when referring to tables.

Where do relations exist, if they do exist.
For me, there is a mysterious difference between the mind and "external world", in that, although I believe that relations don't have an ontological existence in the external world, I do believe that relations have an ontological existence in the mind.

As regards the mind of the observer, I know that I am conscious. I know that I have a unity of consciousness, in that what I perceive is a single experience. John Raymond Smythies described the binding problem as "How is the representation of information built up in the neural networks that there is one single object 'out there' and not a mere collection of separate shapes, colours and movements? I can only conclude, from my personal experience, that relations do have an ontological existence in my mind, such that when I perceive an apple, I perceive the whole apple and not just a set of disparate parts.

IE, relations do exist, but in the mind, not in the external world.

Reductionism and eliminativism
Slightly back-tracking, I am reductionist as regards the "external world" and non-eliminativist as regards the mind. I feel that I can justify my belief in being a reductionist as regards the external world, but the binding problem is my only justification for my belief in non-eliminativism as regards the mind. My understanding of the unity of consciousness is as much as a goldfish's understanding of the allegories in The Old Man and The Sea.

IE, I would still argue that being a reductionist as regards the external world is a justified true belief.

How can the mind be part of the world
The question is how to equate being reductionist about the external world and non-eliminativist about the mind. My answer is panprotopsychism, in that a proto-consciousness is fundamental and ubiquitous in the world. This allows the mind to be part of the world, as well as allowing monism whilst avoiding the problems of dualism. Using an analogy (not an explanation), as the property of movement cannot be observed in a single permanent magnet, but only in a system of permanent magnets alongside each other, the property of consciousness cannot be observed in the physicalism of the external world, but only in a system of neurons having a particular arrangement within the brain.

IE, still keeping within physicalism and monism, the mind as a system has properties, such as consciousness, not observable in its individual parts, analogous to the property of movement in a system of permanent magnets not being observable in an individual permanent magnet, one of several examples of the weak emergence of new properties.

Therefore if relations do not exist, texts do not exist either. — Olivier5

When I, as an observer, look at the page, I agree that the symbol "i" physically exists on the page and the symbol "f" physically exists on the page to the right of the symbol "i", in that they are spatially located.

Along the lines of Bradley, there is no information within the symbol "i" that there is a symbol "f" to the right of it. Similarly, there is no information within the symbol "f" that there is a symbol "i" to the left of it, and there is no information in the space between the "i" and the "f" that there is a "i" at one end and a "f" at the other end.

It follows that the meaning of the shape "if" does not exist in the world.

The shape "if" only has meaning in the mind of an observer, as only an observer can turn the relationship between the "i" and the "f" into a meaning.

IE, relations do exist, but in the mind, not the world.

Amazon.........They sell tables too. — Olivier5

:smile: Very true, tables must exist if Amazon sells them. Forget the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,
perhaps Amazon is where we will discover the answers to our deepest philosophical questions.

Before doing so, are you satisfied that Bradley himself existed ontologically? And if yes, what makes you so sure? — Olivier5

Because Amazon sells his books.

two particles in the same universe can interact with one another — Olivier5

I agree that "two particles in the same universe can interact with one another". But as you said "So the challenge is to prove that relations do exist "ontologically". That is to say (I guess) that they exist objectively "out there", and not just as ideas in our minds."

Steve French argues against non-eliminativism, where non-eliminativism is the position that the whole is more than the sum of its parts, possibly because there are ontologically real relations between the elementary particles making up the whole.

I go back to Bradley's Regress Argument against external relations (SEP - Relations), which concluded that we should eliminate external relations from our ontology.

Either a relation R is nothing to the things a and b it relates, in which case it cannot relate them.
Or, it is something to them, in which case R must be related to them.
But for R to be related to a and b there must be not only R and the things it relates, but also a subsidiary relation R' to relate R to them
Now the same problem arises with regard to R'. It must be something to R and the things it related in order for R' to relate R to them and this requires a further subsidiary relation R'' between R', R, a and b.

This leads into an infinite regress, because the same reasoning applies to R' and to however many other subsidiary relations are subsequently introduced.

IE, particles will still interact even if relations are only spatial and not ontological.

Do note that these particles exist in the same universe. Therefore they are already in a relation with one another, a spatial relation: they share the same space. Now you could say that this is a purely conceptual relation, not an ontic one. But if that is the case, then space does not exist ontologically. — Olivier5

I don't understand why there couldn't be a space that exists independently of any human observer within which there are particles that are, as you said, "entirely alone" (ignoring for the sake of the argument any forces between the particles).

Using an analogy, if there is a cat in a box, it does not follow that because the cat is entirely alone there is neither a cat nor a box.

I agree with @Olivier5 that the question is "do relations exist objectively "out there", and not just as ideas in our minds"

Using particle to also mean elementary particle.

Particles ontologically exist in the world
Materialists historically held that everything was matter, but we now know that not everything is matter in this historical sense, for example, forces such as gravity are physical but not material in the traditional sense. As the world exists, at least particles exist.

If relations ontologically existed in the world
If relations ontologically existed in the universe, then between any two particles in the universe there is a relationship that ontologically exists. For example, it follows that between a particular particle in the table in front of me and a particular particle somewhere in the Andromeda Galaxy there is a real ontological relationship.

One could ask if the relationship between two particles is limited by the speed of light or is instantaneous across the universe.

Do relations ontologically exist in the world
Consider two particles A and B. Each particle A and B has an ontological existence.
The question is, does the relation AB between the particles A and B have its own ontological existence in addition to the ontological existence of each particle ?
The problem for an observer is in recognizing the ontological existence of the relation, in that a world with ontological relations between ontological particles would be indistinguishable from a world only consisting of ontological particles. What purpose do ontological relations serve ?

As the human observer uses their mind to add relationships between observed particles, the existence of relations ontologically existing in the world serves no purpose, and if they serve no purpose, by Occam's Razor, it should be assumed that they don't exist.

So the challenge is to prove that relations do exist "ontologically"................A chemist would answer yes to this question — Olivier5

I agree that the concept of the world implies interconnectivity between the elements of the world, but concepts exist in the mind, not the world. Elementary particles located in time and space are sufficient for a world to exist. A world with ontological relations between these particles would be indistinguishable from a world without ontological relations between these particles, meaning that ontological relations serve no purpose. And if they serve no purpose, why have them.

I agree there may be forces between particles, there may be forces between oxygen and hydrogen atoms, but forces are not the same thing as relations ontologically existing in the world.

relations do have ontological existence... Ryle and anyone who has written about category mistakes for the last 70 years — Cuthbert

Ryle's examples are based on examples whereby relations exist in the mind, not the world.
Ryle gave examples of category mistakes in The Concept of Mind 1949.
A visitor to Oxford upon viewing the colleges and library reportedly inquired "But where is the University".
There is the category 1 of "units of physical infrastructure", and category 2 of "institution"
The visitor made the mistake of presuming that the "University" was part of category 1 rather than category 2.

Category 1 includes those parts that physically exist in the world independent of the visitor - colleges, library, etc. Category 2 includes unseen relations between those physical parts - role in society, laws and regulations, etc

Ryle's examples make use of the fact that relations don't exist in the world but do exist in the mind, supporting the idea that relations don't have an ontological existence in the world.

how to reply to an argument Steven French makes below. — Ignoredreddituser

A whole is a particular relation between its parts, in that a table is a particular relation between its atoms. If the whole is more than the sum of its parts, then relations must have their own ontological existence over and above the ontological existence of the parts (putting to one side the question of what exactly is a part).

To argue against Steven French and argue for the non-eliminativist view, one will also need to argue that relations ontologically exist.

As the SEP on "Relations" notes: "Some philosophers are wary of admitting relations because they are difficult to locate. Glasgow is west of Edinburgh. This tells us something about the locations of these two cities. But where is the relation that holds between them in virtue of which Glasgow is west of Edinburgh? The relation can’t be in one city at the expense of the other, nor in each of them taken separately, since then we lose sight of the fact that the relation holds between them (McTaggart 1920: §80)"

I know that Glasgow is west of Edinburgh, but does Glasgow know that it is west of Edinburgh !

IE, the non-eliminativist must also argue for the ontological existence of relations - not an easy task.

D is the winner! — Alkis Piskas

:up:

In what the OP said, I have replaced "Ayes" with "animals", "Bees" with "four legs" and "Seas" with "cats". All the rest is the same. The conclusion (D or E) is what the OP also thought (maybe for another reason though). — Alkis Piskas

I have redrawn my Venn Diagram, including @Raymond and @tim wood's suggestions, and using animals, etc rather than Ayes, etc. The solution is still D.

Some animals have four legs
All cats have four legs — Alkis Piskas

However, I'm not sure about the left drawing. It doesn't show that mammals are a subset of animals. It shows that only a part of mammals are also animals. — Alkis Piskas

I agree that the left hand drawing is not correct for "our" world, where i) all mammals are animals (all B's are A's) ii) all cats are mammals (all C's are B's)

But the OP is not asking a question about "our" world. The OP is asking a question about a "possible" world, perhaps a fictional world, where i) some animals are mammals (some A's are B's) ii) all cats are mammals (all C's are B's), in which case the left hand drawing is correct.

I prefer to "translate" your puzzle-problem into something more meaningful: — Alkis Piskas

Then let a move — Raymond

would D still be a valid conclusion — DavidJohnson

@TonesInDeepFreeze gets to the heart of the matter. Personally, trying to solve in words would make my head explode, so I normally have to resort to diagrams.

Meaning of "which conclusion can be drawn"
Because the question is neither "which conclusions can be drawn" nor "can any conclusion be drawn" - the question is saying that there is only one correct conclusion.

D) No Ayes that are not Bees are Seas
The statement is using abbreviated language, making life more difficult.
In full - is the proposition "there are no A's that are not B's are C's" true or false.

Potential ambiguity in "there are no A's that are not B's are C's
Potential meaning one - There are (A's) that are (not B's are C's) - is ungrammatical, therefore ignore.
Potential meaning two - There are (A's that are not B's) that are (C's) - must be what is meant.



It reminds me of the "Four colour map theorem"

more examples — Josh Alfred

I am afraid the image is not from an "authoritative" source.
I used Microsoft "Paint".
For a few dollars a year one can subscribe to the Forum and be able to upload images onto the Forum - well worth the money.

Physicalism

What we understand as physical is a matter of definition and is constantly changing — Wayfarer

Yes. Physicalism is sometimes known as ‘materialism’. Materialists historically held that everything was matter. But physics itself has shown that not everything is matter in this sense. For example, forces such as gravity are physical but it is not clear that they are material in the traditional sense Physicalists don’t deny that the world might contain many items that at first glance don’t seem physical, such as biological, psychological, moral, social or mathematical, but at the end of the day, such things either are or are founded on the physical.

The importance of the Law of Causation

the mind's contribution to everything asserted about the mind-independent world. — Wayfarer

I agree with the quote, as my position is that of Indirect Realism (our conscious experience is not of the real world itself but of an internal representation of the real world) rather than Direct Realism (our senses provide us with direct awareness of the external world, and the world derived from our sense perception should be taken at face value).

My immediate perception is of the sensations through my senses, not what caused these sensations. I perceive sensations through my senses - the colour red, a sharp pain, a bitter taste, an acrid smell, a screeching noise. The question is, how much can we discover about the reality of the external world just using these sensations through our senses

The only key we have to discover what is on the other side of our senses is the Law of Causation. As I believe in the Law of Causation intellectually and know the Law of Causation instinctively, being a priori innate, I both believe and know that there is an external world causing these sensations.

Critical Realism, RW Sellars and causation
Critical realism follows from RW Sellars and Critical Realism (1916). Sellars argued against Idealism, and proposed real substances (as opposed to ideas, universals, etc) as objects of perception. Sellars held that the normal objects of perception are real full-bodied independent substances, rejecting “the historical desiccation of the category of substance,” that is, the whittling down of the Ancient and Medieval robust notion of substance to Locke’s “I know not what”.

Critical Realism, Roy Bhaskar and causation
Roy Bhaskar is known as initiating Critical Realism, including A Realist Theory of Science (1975). He held the position that unobservable structures cause observable events, which supported the ontological reality of causal powers independent of their empirical effects. It follows that what scientists are learning about, therefore, cannot be causal laws, understood as invariant patterns of events, rather they are learning about causal mechanisms, tendencies that tend to bring about certain types of outcome, but do not always do so. Objects are able to exert causal powers, but only within a complex structure.

Summary
To say the world is physical within Physicalism encompasses many things, and includes both matter and forces.
We can only discover what is on the other side of our senses using the Law of Causation. If our sensations such as pain had no cause and happened spontaneously, the world we live in would be a very unpredictable place.
The earlier Sellars Critical Realism required a world of real, full-bodied independent substances.
The later Bhaskar Critical Realism argued for objects in the world having causal powers.

IE, the Law of Causation is key in being able to discover what is not directly observable.

Your posts are written from the perspective of uncritical realism, starting with the assumption that the sensory domain possesses inherent and unquestionable reality, when in fact that is what is at issue in philosophy. — Wayfarer

Don't think I agree.

A physical world exists independently of us
I agree with Critical Realism in a belief in Ontological Realism, that a physical reality exists and operates independently of our awareness, knowledge, or perception of it.

Our knowledge is both a priori and a posteriori
I believe that we have knowledge of the world both a priori and a posteriori.
A priori knowledge is innate knowledge - of space, time, causation, colour, etc - that has been genetically built into the brain after millions of years of evolution.
A posteriori knowledge we gain through our senses.

Indirect Realism explains more than Direct Realism
I agree with both Direct and Indirect Realism that there is a correspondence between events in the world and how we perceive these events in our minds, even though in Direct Realism the correspondence is direct whilst in Indirect Realism the correspondence is indirect.
Because I believe that relations don't ontologically exist in the world, but do exist in the mind, and as Direct Realism is the claim that our senses provide us with direct awareness of the external world, then I don't believe in Direct Realism.
As regards Indirect Realism, taking an example, because an object emits a wavelength of 700nm, and yet we perceive it as the colour red, our perception of the colour red can only be a representation of the wavelength of 700nm, pointing to Indirect Realism as the true explanation. Accepting Indirect Realism as a true explanation, we can never know what is on the other side of our senses, we can never know the true nature of reality.

Trying to understand what is on the other side of our senses
I agree that when we perceive, we are directly perceiving our senses and not what is on the other side of them. Yet, because I also believe in the Law of Causation. I believe that what I perceive in my senses is an effect of a prior cause, and that prior cause is a world independent of me as an observer.
Each moment in time is a different reality. What I perceive in my senses is real, what caused these sensations in the world is real, going back in time through successive cause and effect to some time in the beginning.

I agree with Critical Realism
I agree with empiricism that the the only way to gain knowledge is what we sense through the senses, making the note that our a priori knowledge originally came through the senses.
I agree with positivism that only knowledge supported by facts is valid.
But I also agree with Critical Realism that knowledge is not gained by a simplistic conjunction between cause and effect, but rather is an ongoing process whereby we gradually and incrementally improve our concepts in trying to make sense of a complex world that exists independently of us.

Make sense, not in the sense of understanding the nature of absolute reality, but make sense sufficiently for us to pragmatically survive in the environment that we find ourselves in.

So if apples do not exist on account of being wholes, nothing exists — Olivier5

I agree that the parts of what we think of as an apple do physically exist in the world.
But the parts will still physically exist whether or not relations have an ontological existence in the world.
Therefore, the existence of the parts neither proves nor disproves the existence of relations.

In Newtonian physics, an atom in the Taj Mahal must by necessity attract an atom in the Empire State Building, — Olivier5

Considering atom A in the Empire State Building and atom B in the Taj Mahal
I agree atom A may experience a force from atom B, and vice versa.

Atom A may experience a force from atom B, but there is no information within the force that relates atom A to atom B.
Similarly, atom B may experience a force from atom A, but there is no information within the force that relates atom B to atom A.
There is also no information within the space between atoms A and B that relates atoms A to B

If an ontological relation does exist in the world between atom A and atom B, the question is, where is the information that there is such a relation.

Modern realism is the conviction that objects exist independently of any mind............Scholastic realism believes that universals exist 'in the mind of God'. The way I would interpret that is to say that universals are what is real for any rational intelligence, but that they're only perceptible by the mind — Wayfarer

What are objects
The whole is the relationship between its parts
An object such as an apple is the relationship between its parts
The parts of an an apple have a physical existence in the world.
The question is, does the whole, the object, the apple, have an ontological existence in the world.

Do relations ontologically exist in the world
As regards the world independent of any observer, if relations don't have an ontological existence, then objects such as apples, which are relations between its parts, cannot ontologically exist in the world.
If relations do have an ontological existence, then objects such as apples, which are relations between its parts, can ontologically exist in the world.

FH Bradley argued against the existence of external relations in his regress argument, whereby either a relation R is nothing to the things a and b it relates, in which case it cannot relate them, or, it is something to them, in which case R must be related to them.
I personally don't believe relations exist ontologically in the world for two reasons
Reason one. When looking at two parts A and B, there is no information within Part A as to the existence of Part B, there is no information within Part B as to the existence of Part A, and there is no information within the space between A and B as to the existence of either A and B located at its ends.
Reason two. If ontological relations exist in the world, then there must be ontological relations between all parts in the world, not just some of them. For example, there must be an ontological relation between my pen and the Eiffel Tower, between an apple in France and an orange in Spain, between a particular atom in the Empire State Building and a particular atom in the Taj Mahal - none of which makes sense.

Do relations ontologically exist in the mind
As regards the mind of the observer, I know that I am conscious. I know that I have a unity of consciousness, in that what I perceive is a a single experience
John Raymond Smythies described the binding problem as "How is the representation of information built up in the neural networks that there is one single object 'out there' and not a mere collection of separate shapes, colours and movements?
I can only conclude, from my personal experience, that relations do have an ontological existence in my mind, such that when I perceive an apple, I perceive the whole apple and not just a set of disparate parts

Modern Realism
I believe that parts in the world have a physical existence independent of any mind.
As I don't believe that relations have a physical existence in the world, then no object, such as an apple, a table, a chair, etc, can have a physical existence in the world.

Scholastic Realism
I can only believe that both parts and relations do have an ontological existence in the mind, meaning that objects, such as apples, tables, chairs, etc do have an ontological existence in my mind.

The word "object" has two distinct meanings
Confusion arises in language as the two distinct meanings of "object" are generally not differentiated.
There is the "object" in my mind and the "object" in the world
The consequence is that when I perceive an object such as an apple, the apple I am thinking about exists in my mind but not in the world.
It would be wrong to say that the "apple" is an illusion, as the "apple" does exist, but in my mind rather than the world.

Conclusion
Objects such as apples ontologically exist in my mind but not in the world.
When I perceive an apple, I am perceiving something that is real, just that it is in my mind rather than the world
That relations do exist in the mind, allowing me a unity of consciousness is an absolute mystery to me, although a fact.

However, even the fact that relations exist in my mind neither supports nor opposes the question of dualism. Relations may exist in the mind whether the mind is separate substance to the brain or the mind is an expression of the brain

I wonder how you would account for the occurrence of extra-spectral colors in the purple-magenta range, for - not being part of the (visible) electromagnetic light spectrum - they don't seem to satisfy your requirement for being "objects in the world". — javra

Are extra-spectral colours "objects in the world" ?

Taking magenta as an example of an extra-spectral colour
To my understanding, in our eyes we have three kinds of cones configured to receive red, green and blue/violet light. We perceive magenta when both our red and blue/violet cones fire together. Magenta does not exist in the visible electromagnetic spectrum, it only exists in our conscious perception.

The are are two meanings to "object in the world"
The first meaning is from the viewpoint of an observer of the "object". For example, I observe a rock in front of me, and the rock is "an object in the world"
The second meaning is independent of any observer. For example, I am sure that on Mars there is a rock that has never been observed, yet is still an "object in the world".

Do relations ontologically exist in the world
An object is a whole comprising relationships between its parts.
A "rock" is a whole thing made up of parts, typically minerals, which are made up of atoms, which in their turn is made up of subatomic particles, such as bosons etc.
Whether relations have an ontological existence in the world is debated.
FH Bradley used a regress argument against the ontological existence of external relations.
However Russell dismissed Bradley’s argument on the grounds that philosophers who disbelieve in the reality of external relations cannot possibly interpret those numerous parts of sciences which appear to be committed to external relations.

Terminology of Idealism, Direct Realism and Indirect Realism
Idealism = the world only consists of ideas, ideas are the only reality, and there is no external reality.
Direct Realism = our senses provide us with direct awareness of the external world, and the world derived from our sense perception should be taken at face value.
Indirect Realism = our conscious experience is not of the real world itself but of an internal representation of the real world

In Idealism, there are no "objects in the world"
In Idealism, as there is no external world, there are no "objects in the world"

In Realism, whether one believes "objects in the world" exist or not depends on one's belief in the ontological existence of relations
If relations do have an ontological existence in the world, then a "rock" exists both as "an object in the world" and in the mind.
If relations don't have an ontological existence in the world, then a "rock", which is a relation between its parts, cannot have ontological existence in the world. As we are talking about rocks, they do exist in the mind.

Summary
Both red and blue/violet physically exist in the world as electromagnetic radiation.
Magenta is a relationship between red and blue/violet.
The question is, in what way does magenta exist as an "object in the world".
If Idealism is true, then magenta isn't an "object in the world"
If relations don't ontologically exist, then magenta isn't an "object in the world"
If relations do ontologically exist, then magenta is an "object in the world"

I personally don't believe relations have an ontological existence in the world for a couple of reasons, and therefore, for me, extra-spectral colours only exist in the mind and therefore are not "objects in the world"

“what do you think of “whiteness” — Mww

Abstract nouns are part of physicalism
If I hear the word "whiteness", in my mind I link the physical word "whiteness" with several physical objects in the world, such as snow, paper, milk, chalk, each of which has the physical property of being white.

It is interesting that the abstract noun "whiteness" can be explained as the product of a set of physical events - a physical link, a physical word, a physical object and a physical property.

IE, abstract nouns is an example of a universal that doesn't require dualism as an explanation.

white is not an object in the world. — Mww

White light is an object in the world
I agree that white is not an object in the world, as it is an adjective, though I would still argue, as I wrote before, "white light is a physical object"

An object is white if it emits electromagnetic radiation composed of a fairly even distribution of all of the frequencies in the visible range of the spectrum, ranging from 750 to 400nm

Consider red light. Red light is electromagnetic radiation of 750nm. Red light is a physical thing that is visible, tangible and relatively stable in form.

White light is the set of violet light, blue light, cyan light, green light, yellow light, orange light and red light. Such a set is visible, tangible and relatively stable in form.

The definition of an object is anything that is visible or tangible and is relatively stable in form.

IE, it follows that white light fulfils the definition of an object.

The world is the existence of things, so the simultaneous thing and no-thing cannot be a condition of the world — Mww

Humans may invent many logical systems, but only that logical system which corresponds to what has been discovered in the world is accepted and used

Humans are able to invent numerous logical systems. For example, I could invent a logical system whereby i) a single identity can exist and not exist at the same time, ii) a statement can be true and false at the same time, iii) one plus one equals three. Tomorrow, I could invent a totally new logical system.

The question is why is one invented logical system accepted and used rather than another.
The answer is that logical system which corresponds with what has been discovered in the world.

IE, Humans may invent many logical systems, but only that logical system which corresponds to what has been discovered in the world is accepted and used.

Metaphors are never sufficient for knowledge; only the literal will suffice. — Mww

I would say that to date we have no literal knowledge of anything, meaning that there is no alternative but for the metaphor to suffice.

As the saying goes "Getting knowledge about something is like making a map of a place or like travelling there. Teaching someone is like showing them how to reach a place".

stuff like.....the object whiteness and the word "whiteness" are physical things in the world. — Mww

Bertrand Russell wrote "That which many different thoughts of whiteness have in common is their object, and this object is different from all of them". Perhaps I should have written "the object white light", where white light is a physical object, having the wavelength between the ranges of 400 and 700 nm. Though I am sure endless debates could be had as to whether light is an object as much as is an apple an object.

The word "whiteness" exists as a physical object on the screen that you are currently reading.

You’re of the opinion that human thought is not anything to be taken seriously — Mww

I don't understand your logic in saying that because I believe that an object in the world cannot both exist and not exist at the same time then it follows that I also believe that human thought is not to be taken seriously.

A determined object cannot be independent of that which determines it. — Mww

I agree. That is why I wrote "for the present purposes of discussing the nature of logic, I am simplifying the true nature of "apples" by assuming that they exist as facts in the world as apples"

I could have based my post on "logical objects" rather than "physical objects", but this would have created more questions than it answered

Perhaps one should think of the apple as a metaphor rather than something literal.

You need to show how the principles of logic can be derived from materialist principles. — Wayfarer

Some scholars think that the passage "In the beginning was the word (logos) " is more accurately translated "In the beginning was logic"

Logic is intrinsic to reality
Logic is primordial, intrinsic to reality, requires no proof, is self-validating, requires no justification and needs no validation. Reality if the initiator of logic, reality produces the basic laws of logic and the nature of logic is reality itself. The basis law of logic exists independently of the mind. The fundamental laws of logic are intuitively obvious and self evident. The burden of proof will be on the sceptic to disprove them. The fundamental laws of logic are universal and have been discovered not invented. They applied when the Solar System formed and they apply today. They apply on Earth and they apply on Mars.

The fundamental laws of logic
As described by Aristotle, the foundation of logic is the proposition “It is impossible for the same thing to belong and not to belong at the same time to the same thing and in the same respect”

There are three fundamental laws of logic:
1) The law of identity, where every entity has an identity, an entity cannot possess two identities and an entity without an identity cannot exist because it would be nothing. IE, an apple is an apple.
2) The law of non-contradiction, where a statement cannot be both true and false, such that A is B and A is not B are mutually exclusive. IE, The object is an apple and the object is not an apple are mutually exclusive.
3) The law of the excluded middle, where a statement is either true or false, and there can be no middle ground. IE, "the apple is on the table" is either true or false, in that the apple cannot be both on the table and not on the table.

Knowledge starts with logic
True knowledge starts with logic. We use logic to evaluate the truth, and we use our reason to manipulate the laws of logic in order to evaluate the truth using valid arguments.

Logic is more than a proposition
Confusion may arise because people think of the basic law of logic as a proposition, but the basic law is not a proposition in this sense, it is simply a reality. In discussing logic we have to use language, with the inevitable confusion between the statement "an apple is an apple" and the fact in the world - an apple is an apple. The situation is further confused by the nature of the "apple" itself, whether one's position is that of Direct Realist or Indirect Realist. For the present purposes of discussing the nature of logic, I am simplifying the true nature of "apples" by assuming that they exist as facts in the world as apples.

We have derived logic from materialistic principles, as logic is the nature of materialistic principles.
Consider an object having a physical existence independent of any observer, such as an apple. Logic, as primordial and intrinsic to reality, dictates that the apple is an apple is true, and the apple is not an apple is not true.

It is for those who don't believe that logic is intrinsic to reality to show a single instance whereby an object in the world exists at the same time as not existing.

IE, we have derived logic from materialistic principles, as logic is the nature of materialistic principles.

logical relations are abstracted from, derived from perceptible actualities — Janus

:up: :up: :up:

To me the killer argument against materialism is simply that there is no physical equivalent for the fundamental terms of logic, such as ‘is’, ‘is not’ and so on — Wayfarer

Computers are instruments of the mind. Nothing they do is meaningful in the absence of a mind — Wayfarer

Logic is not an invention of the mind but a discovery in the world

Independent of the mind, logic exists in the world. The world is a logical place, in that we don't observe the world doing anything illogical.

In the world, an apple "is" an apple, an apple "is not" an orange, an apple falls from the tree "because" of gravity, an apple "is the same as" an apple, an apple "is different from" an orange, etc.

We use the logic we use because it corresponds with the logic we observe in the world. If we discovered that the logic we were using was different to the logic in the world then we would stop using it. For example, if an engineer designing a bridge decided in their calculations that one plus one equals three, they would quickly discover that their constructions would start to fall down.

The logic of the world is such that one apple plus one apple "equals" two apples. For example, if on the table was one apple, and I placed another apple alongside it, and discovered that I had ended up with three apples, I would either doubt my sanity or try the same thing with kruggerands.

IE, as logic exists in the physical world independently of any human mind, logic cannot be used as an argument to show that materialism is not true.

To me the killer argument against materialism is simply that there is no physical equivalent for the fundamental terms of logic, such as ‘is’, ‘is not’ and so on. — Wayfarer

A computer can deal with the logic of 'is', 'is not' and so on without the need of a mind.

A computer is an example of what a physical brain can achieve.

universals — Wayfarer

Limiting myself to Russell's quoted text. In our minds are concepts such as whiteness, trees, government, two, time, space, etc. In what sense are concepts universal ?

Russell's text ignores the crucial role of language in universals
Russell's analysis is incomplete in his ignoring the crucial role of language in the world of universals. Below is a simplified example to illustrate how language underlies the world of universals.

The importance of language in universals
On one particular day, Tuesday 5th March, a group of people gather.
Over several occasions during the day they observe several examples of whiteness, and to each example is attached the same nominated public word "whiteness", such that each individual learns to associate their concept of whiteness with "whiteness".
The mental concept of whiteness has now been created in the individual minds of a group of people on this particular Tuesday 5th March.
As days follow, this group can now sensibly discuss "whiteness" using a common language.

Comments on Russell's text
Russell is correct when he says - "We shall find it convenient only to speak of things existing when they are in time, that is to say, when we can point to some time at which they exist". Within this group, the concept whiteness came into existence on Tuesday 5th March

Russell is correct when he says - " The world of universals, therefore, may also be described as the world of being". Within this group, the concept whiteness subsists through time, not only as the concept whiteness within their individual minds, but also as the word "whiteness" within their common language.

Russell is also correct, but besides the point, when he says - "That which many different thoughts of whiteness have in common is their object, and this object is different from all of them". It may well be that when I observe an object in the world labelled "whiteness", within my mind I may subjectively experience it as blueness, and in the mind of another person they may subjectively experience it as orangeness, but this is irrelevant in preventing any sensible discussion amongst a group of people as to objects labelled "whiteness".

Summary
IE, whiteness and "whiteness" came into existence on Tuesday the 5th March, and subsist through time within the minds of a group of people having a common language. Whiteness will remain a universal as long as the group having a common language survives.

As regards materialism, both the object whiteness and the word "whiteness" are physical things in the world. In my mind is the concept whiteness, and in the neurons of my brain the idea of whiteness is somehow stored. The question as to whether the the mind is a separate substance to the brain or an expression of the brain remains unanswered. Therefore, the question as to whether concepts as universals challenges materialism remains unanswered.

thoughts and feelings — Mww

:smile: Maybe what we need is a conjunction between the thoughts of analytic philosophers and the feelings of continental philosophers. :smile:

Because of the idea that even sense data (pain) could be deceiving, or doubted for the sake of the argument. — Olivier5

I may be deceived by a splitting headache but I can never doubt that I have one.

There's no analogy for universals in the physical world — Wayfarer

Aristotle universals are incorporeal and exist only where they are instantiated in material things. If relations between objects have an ontological existence, then Aristotle's Universals have an ontological existence, and so are part of the material world.

FH Bradley used a regress argument against the ontological existence of external relations.
However Russell dismissed Bradley’s argument on the grounds that philosophers who disbelieve in the reality of external relations cannot possibly interpret those numerous parts of sciences which appear to be committed to external relations.

So whether Aristotle's Theory of Universals challenge materialism or not depends on one's opinion as to the ontological existence of relations.

It is usually enough to say I am that which these two different things have in common. — Mww

I would not say that "I am what thoughts and feelings have in common". I would say that "I am my subjective experiences. My subjective experiences include thoughts and feelings. What thoughts and feelings have in common is that they are part of my subjective experience"

For example, a car is an engine and wheels (simplifying). Engines and wheels have nothing in common. Therefore, cars are made up things that are not only different but have nothing in common. IE, we don't say that the essence of the car is what engines and wheels have in common.