It isn’t judged, it is an event. Object rolls down a hill. The object interacts with the ground in the way round objects act. It’s manifest in how the object interacts. It’s roundness is manifest in how it rolls. No one needs to label it round to interact as round objects will. — schopenhauer1

You say the object rolled down the hill. Who is to say that it didn't bounce, slide, skid, glide, skip or skim down the hill.

A judgement must have been made as to the manner of the object moving down the hill.

What if, however unlikely it might seem, dogs turned out, on further investigation, not to be mammals? — Janus

If something that was not a mammal had been named "a dog", then the statement "a dog is not a mammal" would be analytic.

So then, what if the meanings of the words are ambiguous? Would that make the truth of such an expression undecidable and hence no longer analytic? — Janus

The statement "this is cool" is ambiguous, in that cool can mean "low temperature" or "fashionably attractive".

If "low temperature" has been named "cool", then "cool is a temperature" is analytic. If "fashionably attractive" has been named "cool", then "cool is fashionable" is analytic.

Even if the meaning of a word was ambiguous, for each meaning an analytic statement can be found.

What does i-langage do that is not captured by "cognition"? — Banno

Cognition is the mental action or process of acquiring knowledge and understanding through thought, experience, and the senses. The I-language exists in the physical structure of the brain.

Cognition requires thoughts in the brain, but doesn't distinguish between Chomsky's Innatism, where some thoughts result from structures biologically preset in the human brain, from Skinner's Behaviourism, where all thoughts are products of learning from interactions with the environment.

Wouldn’t degrees of roundness suffice? — schopenhauer1

Who judges the degree of roundness? There is nothing in a mind-independent world that can make judgements about the degree of roundness. Judgements can only be made in the mind.

I find it difficult to think of the brain as operating like a grammatic machine — Moliere

The SEP article The Computational Theory of Mind asks "Could the mind itself be a thinking machine?". This brings in the problem of consciousness, in that it doesn't seem that a thinking machine would need to be conscious in order to calculate. Does the fact that we are conscious mean that we are more than thinking machines, or is it the case that consciousness is a by-product of very complex thinking machines.

- that what we choose as an I-language, even if we delimit our domain to the brain, will be over-determined by the E-language we already know — Moliere

According to Chomsky, E-language (language) is something abstract externalized from the actual apparatus of our mind and I-language (grammar) is the physical mechanism of our brain. If the E-language is generated by the I-language, then, the E-language won't be over-determining the I-language, in the same way that naming the colour red as "red" isn't an instance of over-determination.

Grammar and language are as real as beans and brains, in my view. (it's the theories about grammar and language that end up in the land of abstractions) — Moliere

In a sense, everything is both abstract and concrete. For example, a university is both an abstract idea yet is concretely instantiated in buildings and staff.

The I-language, at least my understanding of it, is built upon my understanding of the E-language and my ability to use it — Moliere

E-language is what is written and spoken in our daily lives, and the I-language is the physical mechanism of the brain. E-language is the externalized language and I-language is the internalized grammar.

I agree that we have been using the E-language for quite some time, but no E-language can exist without the brain that has created it, even though the brain can exist without an E-language.

The E-language didn't evolve independently of any brain. Its form, character and nature can only be a function of the physical mechanism of the brain.

It cannot be the case that first there was an E-language existing in the world independent of any user, rather, first was the brain and subsequently there was the E-language.

Chomsky argued that it has been generally assumed that language is thought to be something existent whilst grammar is considered something abstract. So grammar, unlike language, does not exist in the same way as language.

However, Chomsky proposed instead that it is language that is abstract and grammar that is existent. He argued that language is something externalized from our brain whilst grammar is the physical mechanism of our brain. He named language “externalized language (E-language)” and grammar “internalized language (I-language)”.

I find it easier to believe that E-language has been founded on the physical mechanisms of the brain, an I-language, than there is an E-language operating in the world independently of any mind controlling it that is capable of making sense of the I-language.

How about like this -- if the only way we can express our I-language is through E-language, as we are doing in this thread, then what does "I-language" add? — Moliere

If the only way the Empire States Building can remain vertical is because of its foundations, one could also ask, then what do its foundations add ?

If we accept that analytic statements are analytic on the basis of convention then we accept that they are, at the same time, not going to have anything philosophically interesting about them. — Moliere

As the meaning of every word in language derives from convention, in what other way can a statement be analytic if not by convention.

Let's just grant the I-language of simple concepts and what-have-you. Somehow this allows us to use an E-language. The examples of analytic statements aren't in terms of simple concepts, though -- they're in E-language. And it seems you agree there's an element of convention in the E-language. Isn't analyticity on the side of E-language, rather than I-language? — Moliere

When driving through a busy city, I don't have time to put all my thoughts into words taken from my E-language. Yet, I couldn't successfully navigate the streets and other traffic without being aware of complex concepts existing within my I-language,

Chomsky in New Horizons in the Study of Language and Mind seemed to argue that not only are there complex concepts in the I-language but that they are also innate. I can understand primitive concepts being innate and complex concepts learnt but would agree that both are within our I-language.

If analyticity requires complex concepts, and complex concepts exist within the I-language, then analyticity can also exist within the I-language.

Are the metaphors supposed to reduce to very primitive ones? — schopenhauer1

Perhaps the advantage of a metaphor is that it doesn't need to be reduced to more primitive ones, but allows understanding by relating a complex abstract concept to more familiar concrete ones.

For example, I may be perplexed by the concept of gravity, but I feel I have some understanding by observing one snooker ball rotating around a football on a sheet of rubber stretching under their weight.

How can properties be said to be instantiated in the object and not the mind? ..........................That is to say, humans really do "see" a small portion of the essence of an object, but that the object is always withdrawn or "hidden" besides the vicarious properties of objects it interacts with. — schopenhauer1

As I see it, I observe something having the properties round, green and sweet and name it "apple".

When I observe the object apple, I am observing a set of properties, in that if each property was removed one by one, once all the properties had been removed, there would be nothing left.

It is not the case that the properties round, green and sweet are instantiated in the object apple, rather, the object apple is an instantiation of the properties round, green and sweet

It is not the case that an object has an essence hidden behind the properties of the object , rather, the essence of an object is its set of properties, in that if all the properties were removed, neither an essence nor an object would remain .

Bradley questioning the nature of properties. He started with the example of a lump of sugar. He noted that there appears to be such a thing as a lump of sugar and this thing appears to have qualities such as whiteness, sweetness, and hardness. But, asked Bradley, what is this “thing” that bears properties? On the one hand, he thinks it is odd to assume that there is something to the lump of sugar beside its several qualities, thus implying that postulating a property-less bearer of properties is incoherent. On the other hand, he notes that the lump cannot merely be its qualities either, since the latter must somehow be united. For Bradley, the unity properties presupposes relations, which is why he went on to question our concept of relations.

The alternative is that the apple supervenes on its properties, in that the apple has an essence which is more than the sum of its properties. But how this is possible needs to be justified.

If the property of roundness was instantiated in the object in the world rather than existed in the mind as a concept, as nothing in the world can be exactly round, how can roundness be instantiated in the world if no instantiation of roundness is possible in the world.

is the statement: "a dog is a mammal" analytic? — Janus

The meanings of words can change. For example, a dog can mean a domesticated mammal or it can mean a terrible film.

If a dog means a domesticated mammal, then the statement "a dog is a mammal" is analytic, whereas, if a dog means a terrible film, then the statement "a dog is a mammal" is not analytic.

IE, even though the same word may have different meanings, it is still possible for some statements, such as "a dog is a mammal" to be analytic.

Can analytic statements be ambiguous? — Janus

The Merriam Webster defines analytic as "being a proposition (such as "no bachelor is married") whose truth is evident from the meaning of the words it contains". The Cambridge dictionary defines analytic as "(of a statement) true only because of the meanings of the words, without referring to facts or experience"

There is some ambiguity between these definitions of analytic

IE, even though the definition of analytic may be ambiguous, given a particular definition, the analytic expression itself cannot be ambiguous.

So, would "The Eiffel Tower is located in France" still be be meaningful if all of humanity were suddenly wiped out, but it could not be true or false because no one would know it's meaning, or would it no longer be meaningful at all? — creativesoul

Consider "ya mnara lipo nchi". This object has no meaning until some one gives it a meaning. If there is no one to give it a meaning, it cannot have a meaning. As with a pebble, which is neither true not false, if "ya mnara lipo nchi" has no meaning, it cannot be either true or false. Similarly with "The Eiffel Tower is located in France".

Therefore, both will be true. As there would be no one around, i) it could not be true or false because no one would know it's meaning and ii) it would no longer be meaningful.

Metaphor? Can you explain? — schopenhauer1

It could be argued that any understanding we have is metaphorical. Some theorists have suggested that metaphors are not merely stylistic, but that they are cognitively important as well. In Metaphors We Live By, George Lakoff and Mark Johnson argue that metaphors are pervasive in everyday life, not just in language, but also in thought and action. Cognitive linguists emphasize that metaphors serve to facilitate the understanding of one's conceptual domain, typically an abstraction such as "life", "theories" or "ideas" through expressions that relate to another, more familiar conceptual domain, typically more concrete, such as "journey", "buildings" or "food".

For example, metaphors are commonly used in science, such as: evolution by natural selection, F = ma, the wave theory of light, DNA is the code of life, the genome is the book of life, gravity, dendritic branches, Maxwell's Demon, Schrödinger’s cat, Einstein’s twins, greenhouse gas, the battle against cancer, faith in a hypothesis, the miracle of consciousness, the gift of understanding, the laws of physics, the language of mathematics, deserving an effective mathematics, etc.

For example, within your own post one could say that the following are more metaphorical than literal: tricky, one can argue, created, one step beyond, primitive, indexed, tokenized, notion, abstractions, instantiations, riffing, idea, intermediary, analytic, reflection, externalization of the internal.

I observe something in the world that is round, but the Nominalist and Conceptualist would argue that roundness doesn't exist in the world, only in the mind. They would say that what I actually observe is one particular instantiation of roundness. In fact, nothing in the world can be exactly round, the most would be an approximation of roundness.

It is still the case, however, that I observe something round, even though no round thing can exist in the world. Therefore, the roundness that I am observing can only exist in the mind as an abstraction, as a concept. Merriam Webster lists abstraction as a synonym for concept.

I can name my concept of roundness as "round" and make the statement "I see a round ball", knowing that what I am referring to doesn't actually exist in the world but only in my mind.

Would "The Eiffel Tower is located in France" be true if all of humanity were suddenly wiped out? — creativesoul

Is "ya mnara lipo nchi" true if there is no one who knows what it means. If no one knows its meaning, then it isn't a language, it's an object like a pebble, and as a pebble cannot be true or false.

Similarly, "the Eiffel Tower is located in France" would no longer be a language, it would become an object, and just like a pebble, cannot be considered as either true or false.

Are primitive concepts concepts, or are they just primitive epistemological tools? — schopenhauer1

I think of concepts more as a metaphor than a literal physical thing.

My point being that, the very fact of such mechanisms discounts convention-only theories of language acquisition...Thus, nativists and empiricists are both right. — schopenhauer1

I totally agree. I understand certain primitive concepts as innate, such as the colour red, pain , etc. We then use these primitive concepts to build complex concepts based on our observations of the world, such as governments, mountains, etc.

Without the foundation of primitive concepts, the building of complex concepts would fall down.

Would the thing that we've named the "Eiffel Tower" be located in the place that we've named "Paris" if all of humanity were suddenly wiped out? — creativesoul

Yes.

We observe something in the world and then name it "The Eiffel Tower". This something existed before we named it. As this something existed before being named, its existence doesn't depend on being named.

Similarly, we observe somewhere in the world and then name it "Paris". This somewhere existed before we named it. As this somewhere existed before being named, its existence doesn't depend on being named.

As both the something that has been named "The Eiffel Tower" and the somewhere that has been named "Paris" can exist without a name, they can continue to exist even if there was no one around to name them.

RussellA seems to have avoided this conclusion by enlarging the notion of innate concepts to include everything, at least up to carburettors. — Banno

I limit innate concepts to primitive concepts, such as the colour red, pain, simple relationships such as to the left of, simple shapes such as a straight vertical line. Chomsky weirdly seems to extend innate concepts to carburettors.

Though I am pleased you are mixing me up with a major figure in analytic philosophy and one of the founders of the field of cognitive science.

RussellA would both eat the cake that all sentences are true by convention while keeping the cake that some sentences are true by the meaning of their terms. — Banno

All names are named by convention. It is by convention that the colour red has been named "red" rather than "sawdust", for example.

By convention, if a sentence is thought to correspond with the world it is named "true", otherwise it is named "false". For example, the sentence "the Eiffel Tower is in Paris" is true and the sentence "all unicorns live in Paris" is false. IE, some sentences are true by convention because the meaning of "true" has been agreed by convention.

Whether the statement "the Eiffel Tower is in Paris" is true or false can only be known by first knowing the meaning of its terms. IE, some sentences are true because the meaning of their terms has been agreed by convention.

it shows that the statement "a bachelor is an unmarried man" is not analytic, because it is not definitively and unambiguously true. — Janus

There seems to be three types of statements: "a bachelor is a bachelor", "a bachelor is an unmarried man" and a "bachelor is always rich".

It seems that there is general agreement that "a bachelor is a bachelor" is analytic and "a bachelor is always rich" is synthetic, though there doesn't seem to be agreement as to whether the statement "a bachelor is an unmarried man" is analytic or synthetic.

My argument that "bachelor is an unmarried man" is analytic because:

1) Before it can be decided whether "a bachelor is an unmarried man" is analytic or synthetic, the meaning of the words in the statement must be known.

2) We know that the set of words "unmarried" and "man" have been named "bachelor".

3) So knowing that the set "unmarried" and "men" has been named "bachelor", we know just by virtue of the meaning of the words alone that "bachelors are unmarried men" is an analytic statement.

Is there a flaw in my logic ?

In regard to language, it prompts me to question the clean separation between the 'innate' and the 'environment' as put forward by Chomsky. — Paine

I agree that it is very difficult to put a clean break between a person and their environment. Enactivism discusses this.

There are two aspects:

First, how an object can interact with its environment is a function of its physical form. For example, a kettle in having the physical form it has cannot play music, the horse having the physical form it has cannot enjoy the subtleties in a Cormac McCarthy novel and the human in having the physical form it has can probably never understand the nature of consciousness.

Second, an object's physical form has been determined by its environment.

There is feedback between the innate and the environment. The Wikipedia article on Feedback notes:

Simple causal reasoning about a feedback system is difficult because the first system influences the second and second system influences the first, leading to a circular argument. This makes reasoning based upon cause and effect tricky, and it is necessary to analyse the system as a whole. As provided by Webster, feedback in business is the transmission of evaluative or corrective information about an action, event, or process to the original or controlling source. Karl Johan Åström and Richard M.Murray, Feedback Systems: An Introduction for Scientists and Engineers.

Also, is identity ever proposed as an innate mechanism? — schopenhauer1

I see my brother enter the room and immediately leave the room. There is no doubt in my mind that I have seen my brother enter and leave the room.

There is no doubt in my mind that the person entering and leaving the room are identical.

I would suppose that the brain's ability to know that it is the same object that moves through space and time is an innate mechanism that has developed over 3.7 billion years of evolution, rather than something that needs to be learnt.

After all, when we see a snooker ball roll over a snooker table, we don't think that every second the old snooker ball disappears and a new snooker ball appears. We know without doubt that it is the same snooker ball. We know without doubt the nature of identity.

If I-language only refers to basically syntax (merge/compositionality) and not semantics, then indeed this would not have much to inform analyticity. — schopenhauer1

Chomsky said concepts wouldn't exist without an I-language, so, the semantic part of an I-language are its concepts.

Primitive innate concepts such as the colour red is one thing, but Chomsky weirdly argued for more complex innate concepts such as carburettors, Knowing that a carburettor is a device for mixing air and fuel means knowing the analytic fact that a carburettor is a device.

I think I answered in the affirmative in my opening post, while relying on a theory of analytic statements that reduces them to convention. — Moliere

The SEP article The analytic/synthetic distinction writes:
“Analytic” sentences, such as “Paediatricians are doctors,” have historically been characterized as ones that are true by virtue of the meanings of their words alone and/or can be known to be so solely by knowing those meanings.

As regards the statement "bachelors are unmarried men", it is not possible to know whether it is analytic or synthetic until first knowing the meanings of the words used, in the same way that it is not possible to know whether the statement "moja ndio si ndoa mwanadamu" is analytic or synthetic until knowing the meanings of the words used.

Therefore, the first task is to know what the words mean.

You are right that naming is by convention. The set of words "man" and "unmarried" has been named "bachelor", though the set could equally well have been named "giraffe", "mountain" or "sawdust".

Therefore, even before trying to determine whether the statement "bachelors are unmarried men" is analytic or synthetic, we know that the set "unmarried" and "men" has been named by convention "bachelor".

So knowing that the set "unmarried" and "men" has been named "bachelor", we know just by virtue of the meaning of the words alone that "bachelors are unmarried men" is an analytic statement.

Not to be pedantic, but does an unmarried man in a de facto relationship count as a bachelor, or must a bachelor live alone? — Janus

It depends on the definition of "marriage"

According to Merriam Webster, "A bachelor is an unmarried man".

But Merriam Webster goes on to say that the definition of "marriage" is changing:
The definition of the word marriage—or, more accurately, the understanding of what the institution of marriage properly consists of—continues to be highly controversial. This is not an issue to be resolved by dictionaries. Ultimately, the controversy involves cultural traditions, religious beliefs, legal rulings, and ideas about fairness and basic human rights.

In the past, "unmarried man" was defined as "a man who has not taken part in a contractual relationship with a woman recognised by the law". By this definition, an "unmarried man" includes a man living in a relationship with another person. Therefore, a bachelor may or may not be a man living in a relationship with another person.

Today, "unmarried man" may be defined as "a man who is not living in a relationship with another person". Therefore, a bachelor is a man not living in a relationship with another person.

The definition " a bachelor is an unmarried man" hasn't changed, but whether a bachelor, being a man, is or isn't living in a partnership with another person has changed.

Hume's argument was that concepts like causation are not inherent in the world but rather are products of our thought patterns or "habits of thought." However, if Hume's philosophy relies so heavily on a priori reasoning, why did Kant feel the need to refute him? — schopenhauer1

Hume is a realist about causation, in that although he believes that causation is real in the world it is unknowable. He rejects the idea that we directly know that events in the world are necessarily conjoined, as this would require a priori knowledge, but he does accept that we indirectly know about causation from the observation of constant conjunction of certain impressions across many instances.

Kant on the other hand, is also a Realist, but argued that a genuine necessary connection between events is required for their objective succession in time, and using his revolutionary conception of synthetic a priori judgments, rescues the a priori origin of the pure concepts of the understanding.

So yes, Hume rejected an a priori explanation for causation whilst Kant didn't.

But this raises the question, when patterns are observed in the world, how is the mind able to see these patterns. Is the mind's ability to see patterns innate a priori or learnt from the patterns themselves. Who is right, Chomsky's Innatism or Skinner's Empiricism.

Empiricism is a problem of circularity. If I have no innate rules, and I can only learn the rules from what I observe, then, as the Tortoise could have said to Achilles, where is the rule that tells me when I have discovered a rule. Empiricism proposes that there is something in the rule that I observe that tells me this is the rule that has to be followed, but where is the rule that tells me I have to follow it.

Kant expressed the problem of being able to gain all knowledge from observation in B5 of Critique of Pure Reason
Even without requiring such examples for the proof of the reality of pure a priori principles in our cognition, one could establish their indispensability for the possibility of experience itself, thus establish it a priori. For where would experience itself get its certainty if all rules in accordance with which it proceeds were themselves in turn always empirical, thus contingent?; a hence one could hardly allow these to count as first principles.

It is true that Hume argues we can only indirectly observe causation, and as such is not a priori, but it is also true that he does write about instinct, which is innate and a priori, as being more powerful than thought and understanding. It is perhaps this innate and a priori instinct that allows the mind to observe causation in the first place.

Hume in Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding wrote:
What, then, is the conclusion of the whole matter? A simple one; though, it must be confessed, pretty remote from the common theories of philosophy. All belief of matter of fact or real existence is derived merely from some object, present to the memory or senses, and a customary conjunction between that and some other object. Or in other words; having found, in many instances, that any two kinds of objects—flame and heat, snow and cold—have always been conjoined together; if flame or snow be presented anew to the senses, the mind is carried by custom to expect heat or cold, and to believe that such a quality does exist, and will discover itself upon a nearer approach. This belief is the necessary result of placing the mind in such circumstances. It is an operation of the soul, when we are so situated, as unavoidable as to feel the passion of love, when we receive benefits; or hatred, when we meet with injuries. All these operations are a species of natural instincts, which no reasoning or process of the thought and understanding is able either to produce or to prevent.

On the one hand, Hume argues that we only know causation from observation and not, as Kant argues, a priori, but on the other hand Hume many times refers to instinct, which is innate and a priori, and it is perhaps this innate a priori instinct that allows us to see patterns in our observations in the first place.

We agree analyticity is an aspect of language. — Moliere

This answers the OP, "Are there analytic statements?"

So all Brambles are Unbrimbled Tembres................................The example is meant to demonstrate how nonsense terms can come to make sense from the English grammar, rather than because of an I-language.. — Moliere

Yes, the E-language can be grammatical without making sense.

One advantage of the I-language is that every thought about a concept makes sense, in that meaning within an I-language is self-referential. IE, it is not possible to have a thought about a concept without that thought making sense, having meaning. If I think about the concept triangle, the thought is its own meaning. Unlike the E-language, it isn't necessary to go outside the I-language to find meaning.

The meaning of my concept of pain is the pain itself. As Searle wrote:
The relation of perception to the experience is one of identity. It is like the pain and the experience of pain. The experience of pain does not have pain as an object because the experience of pain is identical with the pain. Similarly, if the experience of perceiving is an object of perceiving, then it becomes identical with the perceiving. Just as the pain is identical with the experience of pain, so the visual experience is identical with the experience of seeing.

The SEP article Concepts wrote that "Concepts are the building blocks of thoughts". The Wikipedia article Concepts wrote "Concepts are defined as abstract ideas. They are understood to be the fundamental building blocks underlying principles, thoughts and beliefs". As the dictionary explains thoughts as occurring in the mind, concepts must also also occur in the mind.

As with many words in language, such as evolution by natural selection, F = ma, the wave theory of light, DNA is the code of life, the genome is the book of life, gravity, dendritic branches, Maxwell's Demon, Schrödinger’s cat, Einstein’s twins, greenhouse gas, the battle against cancer, faith in a hypothesis, the miracle of consciousness, the gift of understanding, the laws of physics, the language of mathematics, deserving an effective mathematics, etc, the word "concept" should also be thought of as a ,metaphor, not something that has a literal physical existence.

In an E-language, meaning is extralinguistic, whereas in an I-language, meaning is the I-language itself.

The relationship between the learner and the environment can mean very different things. In the Skinner model, stimulus is always on one side and response the other side of events. For Vygotsky, for example, there is a dynamic where the stimulus becomes modified by changes in the learner....................This approach does not cancel the domain of the 'innate' but neither does it make it a realm where 'e-language' can be clearly separated from 'I-language'. — Paine

I agree, sentient life must evolve through interaction with the world in which it exists, which is why it has taken 3.7 billion years for life to have evolved to its current form.

From the Wikipedia article Enactivism
Sriramen argues that Enactivism provides "a rich and powerful explanatory theory for learning and being."[66] and that it is closely related to both the ideas of cognitive development of Piaget, and also the social constructivism of Vygotsky.[66]

The I-language cannot be separated from the E-language, in the same way that the subject of a painting cannot be separated from the colours and shapes of the paint used in the painting, yet both fulfil different functions.

It's because the I-language is not spoken that I doubt concepts are at work. We talk about concepts fairly frequently, and successfully. Freedom, Love, Democracy..............I think I'd just include concepts, as well as logic, within E-language. — Moliere

There is the I-language in the mind, and the E-language in the world.

There is the word "love" in the E-language which refers to the concept of love. The concept being referred to doesn't exist in the either the E-language or the world independent of any mind.

Where else can the concept of love exist if not in the I-language of the mind.

This sets out how to use analyticity. It's a convention -- if we interpreted "is" in a certain way, and we interpret the terms in a certain way, then it follows that A is D, analytically. It reads more like a stipulation than a feature of knowledge. — Moliere

Following on from the OP, the analytic and synthetic are aspects of language. The necessary and contingent are aspects of logic, and the a priori and a posteriori are aspects of knowledge.

Yes, analytic statements are not necessarily statements of knowledge.

I was thinking an I-language would be anything but a concept........I'd say an I-language is public, in principle.................but the I-language would be formed from our social environment. — Moliere

If I touch a hot stove and see my hand blisters, in my I-language, I am conscious of pain and quickly remove my hand. But if my I-language was formed by my social environment rather than my innate instinct, in a different social environment on touching a hot stove and seeing my hand blister I could well be conscious of pleasure and leave my hand where it was.

But this is not something that is empirically discovered. In all societies, if someone touches a hot stove, they don't leave their hand there but quickly remove it. This suggests that their I- languages are the same, meaning that I-languages are not determined by the social environment but have been determined by innate instinct.

As Chomsky proposed, the I-language is not a “language” that is spoken at all, but is an internal, largely innate computational system in the brain that is responsible for a speaker’s linguistic competence.

We can classify statements such as the case of bachelors and unmarried men and dub them analytic. And we can also say "War is war" and know that the meaning is not analytic -- it's the "is" of predicating rather than the "is" of identity — Moliere

True, "war is war" is analytic if "is" refers to identity, and "war is war" is synthetic if "is" refers to predicating.

But also, using "is" as identity, if the set of words "A","B","C" and "D" is named "war", then the statement "war is B" is analytic, regardless of the meaning of "A", "B", "C" and "D".

Similarly, if the set of words "A" and "B" is named "bachelor", then the statement "a bachelor is B" is analytic, regardless of the meanings of "A" and "B".

So what about Hume or Quine's extreme empiricism (the denial of innate mechanisms at all)? Where does that fit in, and what is your analysis? — schopenhauer1

For me, the mechanism linking concepts in the mind and language in the world can be explained by Hume's principle of the constant conjunction of events, illustrated here, in Kant's terms, a posteriori. But the mind's ability to perceive patterns in the world, to perceive the constant conjunction of events is innate, a product of 3.7 billion years of life' e evolution within the world, in Kant's terms, a priori.

I'm not sure that Hume would have denied the innate. He writes in Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding:

By the term impression, then, I mean all our more lively perceptions, when we hear, or see, or feel, or love, or hate, or desire, or will. And impressions are distinguished from ideas, which are the less lively perceptions, of which we are conscious, when we reflect on any of those sensations or movements above mentioned.

It is an operation of the soul, when we are so situated, as unavoidable as to feel the passion of love, when we receive benefits; or hatred, when we meet with injuries. All these operations are a species of natural instincts, which no reasoning or process of the thought and understanding is able either to produce or to prevent.

I would assume Hume takes certain abilities as innate natural instincts, such as hearing, seeing, feeling, loving, hating, desiring and willing. It would follow that rather than learning the instinct of loving and hating from the world, we project our instincts of loving and hating onto the world.

The sort of studies done by Tomasello and such, no? But he strongly disagrees with Chomsky. He is very much of the social cognition camp — schopenhauer1

It comes down to the debate between Chomsky, who argued that language is founded on innate concepts biologically pre-set and the Behaviourists, such as Skinner, who argued that that all language is learnt during one's interaction with the environment.

There seems to be a link between Tomasello and Hume in that humans have an ability to recognize patterns.

Tomasello argued:
The essence of language is its symbolic dimension which rests on the uniquely human ability to comprehend intention. Grammar emerges as the speakers of a language create linguistic constructions out of recurring sequences of symbols. Children pick up these patterns in the buzz of words they hear around them.

Hume in An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding wrote:
When we say, therefore, that one object is connected with another, we mean only, that they have acquired a connexion in our thought, and give rise to this inference, by which they become proofs of each other's existence: A conclusion, which is somewhat extraordinary; but which seems founded on sufficient evidence.

Yes I was actually going to point that out regarding the difference between "A triangle is 180 degree, three sided polygon" and "Bachelors are unmarried males". Kant may have said that the triangle is in some sense "a priori" whereas the bachelor is always a posteriori true. However, I think this distinction is muddled as there doesn't seem to be any clear distinction. — schopenhauer1

There is the E-language, whereby there are statements such as "A triangle has 80 degrees, and is a three sided polygon". The set "180 degrees, three sided and polygon" has been named "a triangle", such that the statement "a triangle is three sided" is analytic.

There is the I-language, whereby there are concepts such as a triangle has 180 degrees, is three sided and is a polygon.

I can have the concept of a triangle without knowing the word "triangle", and I can know the word "triangle" without knowing what it means, without having the concept triangle.

Though interacting with the world, my private concept of triangle is linked with the public word "triangle". By interacting with the world, my private I-language is linked with the public E-language

The Nominalist view is that abstracts don't exist in the world, only in the mind, meaning that as triangles and bachelors are concepts they only exist in the mind as abstractions.

In the sense that concepts exist in the mind as an I-language and definitions exist in the world as an E-language, I agree with Fodor that concepts cannot be definitions

I also agree with Fodor that concepts don't have an internal structure, and are, in Kant's terms, unities of apperceptions

Both the words "triangle" and "bachelor" exist in the E-language which exists in the world, whereas triangles and bachelors exist as concepts in the I-language which exists in the mind.

The next question is, how are concepts in the I-language linked with words in the E-language.

You want to talk about vague and muddled notions, both:
a) Chomsky's view on analyticity as described in your OP article is just that.
b) The article itself is kind of meandering and muddled touching a little of here and there — schopenhauer1

Chomsky sensibly believes that a basic range of concepts are innately represented in the human mind, because, after all, life has been evolving on Earth for about 3.7 billion years.

I would agree about some primitive concepts are innate, such as the colour red.
(1) The first one is to say that most of our concepts are definitions which are defined in terms of primitive concepts. The primitive concepts are either defined as sensory primitives such as RED, SQUARE etc., or as abstract concepts such as CAUSATION, AGENCY, and EVENT etc.

But Chomsky goes too far in arguing that some complex concepts are also innate, such as carburettor
(1) It is of course possible that Chomsky is correct that children are born with innate concepts such as: CARBURETTOR, TREE, BUREAUCRAT, RIVER, etc.; however an incredible amount of evidence is needed to support such an incredible claim.

I will take the opportunity to argue again that the statement "bachelors are unmarried men " is analytic.

Philosophers often use definitions to explain analyticity
(2) Quine suggests that one might, as is often done, appeal to definitions to explain the notion of synonymy. For instance, we might say that “bachelor” is the definition of an “unmarried man,” and thus, synonymy turns on definitions.

Quine in Two Dogmas of Empiricism attacks the analytic/synthetic distinction in large part because of the problem of substituting synonyms for synonyms
(2) However, Quine attests, in order to define “bachelor” as unmarried, the definer must possess some notion of synonymy to begin with. In fact, Quine writes, the only kind of definition that does not presuppose the notion of synonymy, is the act of ascribing an abbreviation purely conventionally. For instance, let’s say that I create a new word, ‘Archon.’ I can arbitrarily say that its abbreviation is “Ba2.” In the course of doing so, I did not have to presuppose that these two notions are “synonymous;” I merely abbreviated ‘Archon’ by convention, by stipulation. However, when I normally attempt to define a notion, for example, “bachelor,” I must think to myself something like, “Well, what does it mean to be a bachelor, particularly, what words have the same meaning as the word ‘bachelor?’” that is, what meanings are synonymous with the meaning of the word ‘bachelor?’ And thus, Quine complains: “would that all species of synonymy were as intelligible [as those created purely by convention]. For the rest, definition rests on synonymy rather than explaining it” (Quine, 1980: 26).

Quine fails to understand the function of a definition.

It is not the case that in attempting to define the notion of "bachelor", I must think to myself what does it mean to be a bachelor, and conclude that bachelor means a man that is unmarried. Rather, a definition is a set of other words, and the meaning of the words in the set plays no part in the definition. The function of the dictionary is not to explain the meaning of each word, its function is to group sets of words together and then name this set, as illustrated by @Banno here.

For example, within a language are a set words "dirisha", "mlango" and "chumba", none of which I know the meaning of, but for convenience the set may be named "nyumba". As "nyumba" names the set of words "dirisha, mlango, chumba", regardless of knowing the meaning of each word, it is necessarily known that "nyumba = chumba", ie, which is analytic.

The meaning of each word may only be discovered out with of the dictionary, external to the dictionary, for example using Hume's principle of constant conjunction of events, as illustrated here, or Wittgenstein's picture theory in the Tractatus.

As a definition is the name of a set of words, regardless of the meaning of those words, all definitions are analytic, including the definition of a "bachelor" as an "unmarried man".

1) = CHOMSKY AND QUINE ON ANALYTICITY PART 1
2) = IEP - Willard Van Orman Quine: The Analytic/Synthetic Distinction

Seems to me bringing vague, muddled notions of objective and subjective into the discussion can only lead to it becoming vague and muddled. — Banno

The Wikipedia article Objectivity (philosophy) notes:
In philosophy, objectivity is the concept of truth independent from individual subjectivity (bias caused by one's perception, emotions, or imagination). A proposition is considered to have objective truth when its truth conditions are met without bias caused by the mind of a sentient being.

The SEP article Analyticity and Chomskyan Linguistics notes
He sharpens this distinction in his (1986, pp. 20–2) by distinguishing what he regards as essentially the ordinary, folk notion of external, what he calls “E-languages,” such as English, Mandarin, Swahili, ASL and other languages that are commonly taken to be spoken or signed by various social groups, vs. what he regards as the theoretically more interesting notion of an internal “I-language.” This is not a “language” that is spoken at all, but is an internal, largely innate computational system in the brain (or a stable final-state of that system) that is responsible for a speaker’s linguistic competence

How can one know that within an I-language the thought that the sky is blue has an objective truth ( its truth conditions are met without bias caused by the mind of a sentient being) or a subjective truth (caused by one's perception, emotions, or imagination) without introducing the concepts of objectivity and subjectivity.

Again, it seems to me you have not grasped the gist of Quine's argument — Banno

I'll keep reading.

Indeed, why take the triangle as being important? What rule was followed? And even if triangles are taken as primal, why not AME or AJK? What counts as prime depends on the task in hand. — Banno

True, language is use. Wittgenstein PI para 23 "Here the term "language-game" is meant to bring into prominence the fact that the speaking of language is part of an activity, or of a form of life."

Elaborating, I look at parts in the world, and these parts can combine into numerous mereological wholes.

In a sense, each mereological whole exists in the world, and each may be discovered in the world, although it would take an inordinate amount of time

It is therefore true that in the world there is something with three sides which can be named "triangle", but it is also true that every possible mereological whole could also be named, again taking an inordinate amount of time

As Wittgenstein said, language is part of an activity, a form of life

As it would take too much time to discover each possible shape in the world and then decide which I had a use for, in practice, I start with a task, and then discover in the world that shape that would be suitable for the task in hand.

My judgement that a particular shape is suitable to my task at hand is based on a predetermined requirement as to the suitability of any shape, and is therefore an a priori judgement

My judgement that there is something in the world that has three sides is synthetic, as I can only know that there is something with three sides by discovery.

IE, my judgement that there exists something in the world that has three sides and has the name "triangle" has been synthetic a priori.

The sky is blue is synthetic a posteriori because it is discovered but true only by way of the content we pick out and not by way of how our faculties must operate. An X is NOT not X is analytic a priori as not only is it true by our faculties but the very terms don’t need to be discovered but are true immediately based on how logic operates a priori. — schopenhauer1

Using the convention of "snow is white" is true IFF snow is white, perhaps one could say:

"the sky is blue" is synthetic, the sky is blue is a posteriori, "an X is NOT not X" is analytic and an X is NOT not X is a priori.

"The sky is blue" being synthetic brings in the debate between Indirect and Direct Realism

As you wrote:
Direct realism seems to me, to posit that we "objectively" see the thing "as it is in itself". What is something "in itself" though? A tree is the tree you see as a perceiver when there is no perceiver? Mind you, I'm not saying the tree doesn't exist without a perceiver. If you answer, "Well, no the tree isn't what an average human 'sees' when observing a tree", you have your answer- and it doesn't indicate direct realism. Sense data, goes through other layers of the brain, and creates something we have called a tree. Even if you (oddly) posited just "sense data" and no other layers involved (whatever that might mean), then there is still something there as a barrier to what is the tree in itself. It is its own "indirect".

For the Direct Realist, the sky is objectively blue, in which case the statement "the sky is blue" is synthetic and refers to a world that is external to the mind.

However, for the Indirect Realist, as the sky is not objectively blue, but only subjectively blue, the statement "the sky is blue" is still synthetic but refers to a world that exists in the mind and not external to the mind.

Right, but the key idea here is they discovered something about the concept first. — schopenhauer1

Many parts are observed in the world

But from any set of parts, numerous mereological wholes can be discovered

For example, from the 15 parts shown - thousands of possible wholes may be discovered - for example -
ACHN - BFGM - AB - ABG - etc

It is true, the observer discovers a triangle, CKO


But why discover one particular shape, rather than any of the other thousand possibilities.

Presumably, because the observer knows a priori that the triangle is a shape important in their interaction with the world.

1) Therefore, a priori, the observer knows that the triangle is a shape important in their interaction with the world.
2) It is a necessary truth that the triangle is a shape important in their interaction with the world.
3) The statement "triangles are important in their interaction with the world" is analytic, because it is known a priori that triangles are important in their interaction with the world.

That is to say, a triangle necessitates it being three sides in all possible worlds. However, the discovery of this truth is in some way synthetic when first discovered. The passing on of this discovery as a convention that we learn very early on, makes it "analytic", but this is only the way we discover the information. — schopenhauer1

In the beginning, someone discovered something that had three sides and it had no name. They didn't discover a "triangle", they discovered something that had three sides. The statement "triangles have three sides" would have been meaningless, as the word "triangle" didn't exist.

They named this something with three sides "a triangle", though they could equally well have named it "a circle".

Once named, as the statement "triangles have three sides" is true by virtue of the meanings of the words alone, it is therefore an analytic statement.

IE, when the statement "triangles have three sides" first occurred, it was already an analytic statement.

Now you will not find "rown" in Merriam Webster, but we knew what she meant, as does everyone reading this. — unenlightened

Would you know what a child meant if they said something more complicated, such as
"habari za asubuhi, habari gani" without having to look in a dictionary.

Suggestions welcome. — Banno

Chomsky likes Locke.

From IEP - Locke:Epistemology
Locke defines knowledge as the perception of an agreement (or disagreement) between ideas (4.1.2). This definition of knowledge fits naturally, if not exclusively, within an account of a priori knowledge. Such knowledge relies solely on a reflection of our ideas; we can know it is true just by thinking about it. Some a priori knowledge is (what Kant would later call) analytic.

Would it be possible to get Chomsky to talk about the analytic in reference to Locke, someone he likes.
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An odd word, now becoming surprisingly common. What could it mean to have properties supervene onto individuals... green supervene on grass... that the green "occurs as an interruption" to the grass? Hu? And what does it relate to what I have said? — Banno

In my mind is a box that includes both the knowledge of my private experience of grass, something not available to anyone else, and the knowledge of the word "grass", which is publicly available to everyone else, as described by Wittgenstein in PI para 293.

As some philosophers, including Searle, believe in supervenience, the concept should be taken into account.

If there is no superveninece, then the word "grass" is simply the set of words "a typically short plant with long, narrow leaves, growing wild or cultivated on lawns and pasture, and used as a fodder crop".

As the SEP - The Analytic/Synthetic Distinction notes
“Analytic” sentences, such as “Paediatricians are doctors,” have historically been characterized as ones that are true by virtue of the meanings of their words alone and/or can be known to be so solely by knowing those meanings.

In this case the meaning of "grass" is fully known by knowing the meaning of the words "a typically short plant, etc". In this event, as the SEP notes, analytic.

However, if there is supervenience, then the word "grass" is more than the set of words " a typically short plant, etc". In this event, the meaning of grass cannot fully be known just by knowing the meaning of the words "a typically short plant, etc". IE, the expression cannot be analytic.

IE, whether an expression is analytic or not partly depends on one's attitude to supervenience.
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Why? A child knows its mother, despite not being able to provide a definition. And so on for the vast majority of words. I think you are here just wrong. — Banno

We are communicating using written language. I have no other clues to your meaning other than the words on my screen, such as tone of voice, facial expression or bodily movements.

You have written the word "mother". You may not believe me, but I don't know what this word means. Within the context of the paragraph it could mean, "a child knows its neighbourhood", "a child knows its school", "a child knows its pet", etc.

In order for me to fully understand what you are saying, what does "mother" mean ?
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The following argument is stolen from Austin: Look up the definition of a word in the dictionary. Then look up the definition of each of the words in that definition.Iterate. — Banno

There are two types of concepts, simple and complex (there may be better terminology).

As I wrote before
The gavagai problem may be solved by taking into account the fact that there are simple and complex concepts, and these must be treated differently. In language, first there is the naming of simple concepts, and only then can complex concepts be named, such as the complex concept "gavagai".
Simple concepts include things such as the colour red, a bitter taste, a straight line, etc, and complex concepts include things such as mountains, despair, houses, governments, etc.

Dictionaries allow us to learn complex concepts, where a complex concept is a set of simple concepts. But we cannot learn simple concepts from the dictionary

In Bertrand Russell's terms, the dictionary allows us knowledge by description but not knowledge by acquaintance.

For simple concepts, we need knowledge by acquaintance, achievable using Hume's constant conjunction of events.
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Is this your opinion, or your view of Chomsky, or both? — Banno

True, I should have made it clearer when I wrote " As I see it".

@Dawnstorm asked "So, if deep-structure thought (I-language thought?) can proceed without words, what stands in for words in such a situation?"

It seems inconceivable that we use words such as "road", "traffic light", "pedestrian", "blue sky" in an I-language.

As I wrote:
When driving through a busy city street, if I had to put a word to every thought or concept, I would have crashed in the first five minutes.

I see no alternative to the idea that in an I-language thoughts and concepts stand in for words.
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Analyticity without language? What could that be? — Banno

Starting with E-language, if "grass" has been defined as "vegetation consisting of typically short plants with long, narrow leaves, growing wild or cultivated on lawns and pasture, and as a fodder crop", then the statement "grass has long narrow leaves" is analytic.

There is a direct analogy between analyticity in E-language and analyticity in I-language.

Within the I-language, there are no words such as "vegetation, consisting, etc", but rather thoughts about concepts.

It follows that within the I-language, if I know that grass is vegetation consisting of typically short plants with long, narrow leaves, growing wild or cultivated on lawns and pasture, and as a fodder crop, then I must also know that grass has long narrow leaves, which is also analytic knowledge.

When one shouts "Fire!" in, say, a theatre, one does not mean merely to refer to "the rapid oxidation of a material (the fuel) in the exothermic chemical process of combustion, releasing heat, light, and various reaction products.".......Rather, it is a call to action in a matter of life and death. — unenlightened

True, the same word may be defined in many different ways. The Merriam Webster dictionary for "fire" lists almost 42 different uses.

Though the same principle applies, in that is is more convenient and quicker to say "fire" than "I am making a call to action in a matter of life and death."

Suggestions welcome. — Banno

Chomsky says that concepts cannot exist without language. See Noam Chomsky on the Big Questions (Part 4).

7min "Even the simplest concepts tree desk person dog, what ever you want , even these are extremely complex in their internal structure . If such concepts had developed in proto human history when there was no language they would have been useless. They would have been an accident if developed and quickly lost as you cannot do anything with them. So the chances are very strong that the concepts developed within human history at a point where we had computational systems which satisfy the basic property"

Perhaps Chomsky would say that as concepts cannot exist without language, if there is analyticity in language then there must also be analyticity in concepts.