That is, existential claims are verifiable and not falsifiable, universal claims are falsifiable and not verifiable. — jorndoe

Universal and Existential

Universal quantifier ∀ - “All cat’s are mammals.”
Existential quantifier ∃ - “There exists a cat.”

"There is supernatural witchcraft" is a universal claim. "There is a supernatural witch" is an existential claim. The existential claim that there is a supernatural witch logically follows from the univeral claim that there are supernatural witches.

Either supernatural witches exist or they don't.

Universal claims

I can verify my statement "cats exist", because I can point to two cats. No-one can falsify my statement "cats exist", as I can point to two cats.

I cannot verify my statement "cats don't exist", because there may be two cats that I am unaware of. Someone can falsify my statement by pointing out two cats.

I cannot verify my statement "unicorns exist", because I cannot point to two unicorns. No-one can falsify my statement, as there may be two unicorns that they are not aware of.

I cannot verify my statement "unicorns don't exist", because there may be two unicorns that I am unaware of . No-one can falsify my statement as there may be two unicorns that they are unaware of.

Existential claims

I can verify my statement "a cat exists", because I can point to a cat. No-one can falsify my statement, as I can point to a cat.

I cannot verify my statement "a cat doesn't exist", because there may be a cat that I am unaware of. Someone can falsify my statement by pointing out a cat.

I cannot verify my statement "a unicorn exists", because I cannot point to a unicorn. No-one can falsify my statement, as there may be a unicorn that they are not aware of.

I cannot verify my statement "a unicorn doesn't exist", because there may be a unicorn that I am unaware of . Someone cannot falsify my statement as there may be a unicorn that they are unaware of.

Cats exist as I can point to one. The fact that I cannot point to a unicorn does not mean that they don't exist.

IE, both existential and universal claims can be i) either verifiable or unverifiable and ii) either falsifiable or unfalsifiable.

Verification

People are guilty of making unverified statements all the time: in the pub, at the bus stop, on the Forum, in the media.

It is not the case that unverifiable statements should not be made on the Forum, after all, this is philosophy, but if an unverifiable statement is presented as a fact, such as "there is no such thing as supernatural witchcraft", the author should be required to verify their use of an unverifiable statement presented as a fact

IE, it is not that an unverifiable statement should be verified, rather, it is the use of an unverifiable statement presented as a fact that should be verified.

witch-hunts — Agent Smith

Comme on dit, le terroriste des uns est le combattant de la liberté des autres.

It's quite a paradox that the Saudi ethos, by extension the entire Middle Eastern Islamic mindset, can be both so open-minded (witchcraft) and so narrow-minded (witchcraft). — Agent Smith

YouGovAmerica did a poll 2019 that contributes to this topic, including:

"YouGov asked Americans about their belief in various paranormal entities. Turns out that more than four in 10 Americans believe that ghosts, demons, and other supernatural beings do exist."

"More than one in five (22%) say that demons “definitely exist” while slightly more (24%) believe that they “probably exist.” The numbers are similar when Americans are asked about ghosts: 20 percent say they “definitely exist” and 25 percent say they “probably exist.”"

"Far less common is the belief that vampires live among us. Only 13 percent of Americans say that vampires definitely or probably exist."

"More than one-third of Americans (36%) say that they have personally felt the presence of a spirit or ghost. Once again, women (41%) are more likely than men (31%) to say that this has happened to them. Just over one in ten (13%) Americans say that they have communicated directly with a ghost or spirit of someone who has died."

Polls can be interesting, but it is not always clear what conclusions can be drawn from them.

This is a case where existential verification, not falsification, applies — jorndoe

You are right that to say that the proposition "there is such a thing as supernatural witchcraft" requires verification, but it follows that the proposition "there's no such thing as supernatural witchcraft" also requires verification.

As you made the statement "There's no such thing as supernatural witchcraft", it is your responsibility to provide a verification, not a third party's responsibility to provide a falsification.

There's no such thing as supernatural witchcraft. — jorndoe

Evidence, please.

Is there a concept — Skalidris

Perhaps two concepts: polarised and nuanced arguments.

Possibly hyperbole - deliberate exaggeration.

A kind of unspecified completeness is imagined from the beginning. — igjugarjuk

Yes, as with Kant's a priori pure and empirical intuitions, people have a historically-effected consciousness and they are embedded in the particular history and culture that shaped them. Given this, our interpretation of the world is a matter of "the give-and-take of question and answer, and our understanding of the world changes with the questions we ask of the world and the answers we get back.

It looks to me that we have an entire system here of inherited concepts, which only make sense together. — igjugarjuk

Yes, as with Kant's a priori pure and empirical intuitions, which provides the framework of the mind, as you say: "we have an entire system here of inherited concepts". Through millions of years of evolution we have an inherited framework of the brain, and consequently the mind and self, which of necessity sets limits to what we are able to reason and judge.

But 'forever private experience' opens up an abyss of possibility. It's outside the space of reasons — igjugarjuk

However, even if I may never know your particular subjective experience when observing a wavelength of 700nm, through reason, judgment and imagination, I am able to gain an extensive understanding about it.

The tool we use is language, allowing private sensations to be publicly discussed.

For example, the start of the Universe may forever remain private to us, yet through reason scientists have developed a cosmological model explaining the existence of the observable universe from the earliest known periods through its subsequent large-scale evolution. They have understood how the universe expanded from an initial state of high density and temperature, and have offered a comprehensive explanation for a broad range of observed phenomena, including the abundance of light elements, the cosmic microwave background (CMB) radiation, and large-scale structure.

IE, even private experiences are not outside the space of reason, if the tool we use to understand them is language.

Hume is like an actor on a stage among other actors. His speeches are unified as his speeches..and interpreted as such a unity. — igjugarjuk

Yes, in the world is the mind and the mind-independent. Yet the mind is part of the world, so the mind must share characteristics with what is mind-independent, giving us a link between the mind and what is mind-independent.

In a sense, the mind and the mind-independent make up one unity, giving the mind the possibility of being able to understand the mind-independent, because the mind has evolved in synergy over millions of years within the world. The mind is a product of the world, as is that which is mind-independent.

IE, the mind and mind-independent are part of one greater unity, the world.

Understood correctly, Berkeley was a defender of common-sense who cannot be interpreted as saying that the world is a 'figment of the imagination — sime

Did Berkeley believe that the world is a "figment of the imagination"

Bertrand Russell The Problems of Philosophy - 1912
He then proceeds to consider common objects, such as a tree, for instance. He shows that all we know immediately when we "perceive" the tree consists of ideas in his sense of the word, and he argues that there is not the slightest ground for supposing that there is anything real about the tree except what is perceived. Its being, he says, consists in being perceived: in the Latin of the schoolmen its "esse" is "percipi." He fully admits that the tree must continue to exist even when we shut our eyes or when no human being is near it. But this continued existence, he says, is due to the fact that God continues to perceive it; the "real" tree, which corresponds to what we called the physical object, consists of ideas in the mind of God, ideas more or less like those we have when we see the tree, but differing in the fact that they are permanent in God's mind so long as the tree continues to exist. All our perceptions, according to him, consist in a partial participation in God's perceptions, and it is because of this participation that different people see more or less the same tree. Thus apart from minds and their ideas there is nothing in the world, nor is it possible that anything else should ever be known, since whatever is known is necessarily an idea.

IEP - George Berkeley
Berkeley’s famous principle is esse is percipi, to be is to be perceived. Berkeley was an idealist. He held that ordinary objects are only collections of ideas, which are mind-dependent. Berkeley was an immaterialist. He held that there are no material substances. There are only finite mental substances and an infinite mental substance, namely, God.

AC Grayling - Berkeley's Argument for Immaterialism
Berkeley's philosophical view is often described as an argument for "immaterialism", by which is meant a denial of the existence of matter (or more precisely, material substance.) But he also, famously, argued in support of three further theses. He argued for idealism, the thesis that mind constitutes the ultimate reality. He argued that the existence of things consists in their being perceived. And he argued that the mind which is the substance of the world is a single infinite mind – in short, God.

Blake Winter - Berkeley's Arguments on Realism and Idealism
Bertrand Russell credited Berkeley with being the first philosopher to show that the position of idealism may be held without contradiction (Russell, 1997). However, in addition to this, Berkeley also attempted to show that realism was absurd, because it required concepts which could not in fact be conceptualized (1977). From this, Berkeley concluded that idealism was not merely possible but necessary, or at least necessarily the only theory we could understand. That is, he concluded that we are epistemologically forced to renounce realism in favour of idealism.
We will take realism to mean the ontological position that there are things which exist that are neither minds nor ideas in minds. We will take idealism to mean the ontological position that everything that exists is either a mind or an idea in a mind.

If Realism is the belief in a mind-independent world, and Idealism is also a belief in a mind-independent world, then how do Realism and Idealism differ ?

Realism may be defined as the ontological position that there are things which exist that are neither minds nor ideas in minds. Idealism may be defined as the ontological position that everything that exists is either a mind or an idea in a mind.

From the above texts, Berkeley's position was that of Idealism, believing Realism to be absurd. Berkeley was also an Immaterialist, in that there are no material substances but only ideas in the mind and ideas in the mind of God. Berkeley may admit that the tree continues to exist when we shut our eyes, but this continued existence is due to the fact that it remains as an idea in the mind of God.

Imagination is defined as the faculty or action of forming new ideas, or images or concepts of external objects not present to the senses.

IE, as Berkeley's position is that all that exists in either in our minds or the mind of God, and as something that exists as an idea is part of an imaginative rather than real world, I stick by my statement that "some Idealists think the world is a figment of the imagination", including Berkeley.

There's also the problematic issue of 'private knowledge' — igjugarjuk

Private knowledge of representations
I observe an object in the world and have subjective knowledge of the colour red in my mind. As the object in fact emitted light of a wavelength of 700nm, my perception of the colour red can only be a representation of a wavelength of 700nm. My perception of red is private, in that no-one else will be able to perceive what I perceived. It is private knowledge and will forever remain private knowledge. And yet there is a public word "red" that allows me to discuss publicly what I have privately perceived.

My understanding of how this is achieved I wrote here

Universals are thoughts — RussellA

Inferentialism and Representationalism are both required within language
For Brandom, the meaning of a sentence comes from its relationship with other sentences using inferential logic. This is along the lines of Wittgenstein's "meaning is use" in Philosophical Investigations.

As I see it, both Inferentialism and Representationalism are required within language.
Inferentialism is about coherence within a given language, and Representationalism is about correspondence between the language and the world. Inferentialism allows new ideas to be discovered by finding new relationships between existing ideas and Representationalism allows new ideas to be discovered in the world.

Reason and judgement are needed by both Inferentialism and Representationalism, whether the inferential logic of Inferentialism or the discovering of concepts in the constant conjunction of events in the world. As reason and judgement are attributes of the mind, they can only be the responsibility of the individual making that reasoning and judgement.

Inferentialism uses inferential logic within language itself, but as language exists publicly within the world, there is no difference in the way in which we perceive objects in the world within Representationalism and language as an object in the world within Inferentialism.

IE, our knowledge is always of representations of objects in the world, whether the subjective colour red in the mind representing the object 700nm in the world or the subjective concept red in the mind representing the public word-object red in the world.

It's absurd to rationally question the very framework of rationality — igjugarjuk

I agree

The mind cannot change without a corresponding change in the brain

I am arguing from a position of Reductive Physicalism rather than Non-Reductive Physicalism, where mental states are nothing over and above physical states, and are reducible to physical states. For every actually instantiated property F, there is some physical property G such that F=G.
The mind exists within the brain. The brain is a physical structure and is the framework. The mind is the content. What is in the mind corresponds to what is in the brain. What is expressed in the mind must be in some way be expressed in the brain, in that the mind doesn't have a soul outside of time and space allowing it to act independently of the brain. The mind cannot change without a corresponding change in the brain.

The Self cannot inspect itself

Hume’s denial that there is an inner perception of the self as the owner of experience is one that is echoed in Kant’s discussion in both the Transcendental Deduction and the Paralogisms, where he writes that there is no intuition of the self “through which it is given as object”

On the nature of self-awareness, for example, in an unpublished manuscript Schopenhauer concurs with Kant, asserting that, “that the subject should become an object for itself is the most monstrous contradiction ever thought of”

The same can be said of the Wittgenstein of the Tractatus, who famously likens the self to the eye which sees but does not see itself.

Change cannot be spontaneous

A physical structure can be changed by something exterior but cannot spontaneously change itself, in that a snooker ball can start to move when hit by a snooker cue, but a snooker ball at rest cannot spontaneously start to move.

The brain is a set of physical parts. Each part may be changed by something exterior to the part, but each part cannot spontaneously change itself.

Even if there is nothing external acting on the brain, the brain may change because of the interaction between the parts that make it up. The brain as a whole is changed by its parts, not by the set of parts acting as a whole. The brain as a whole cannot be changed by the brain as a whole, meaning that the brain cannot change itself.

A framework consisting of a set of parts may change by the interaction between its parts, but not by the set of parts as a whole, ie, a framework cannot change itself.

IE, our rationality, our self, is not the content of the framework of the brain. Our rationality, our self, is the framework of the brain. As a framework cannot question itself, as you say, "It's absurd to rationally question the very framework of rationality."

Idealists do not think that the world is a figment of the imagination — Wayfarer

There are different kinds of Idealism.

For example, as described by the SEP - Idealism, there is Berkeley's "Ontological Idealism", where the mind is the ultimate foundation of all reality, or even exhaustive of reality, and there is Kant's "Epistemological Idealism", where Idealism is not about any existence of things but only our representation of them.

IE, some Idealists think the world is a figment of the imagination.

there is a genuine philosophical insight that I think Stove is somehow missing — Wayfarer

Berkeley's argument "the mind....is deluded to think it can and does conceive of bodies existing unthought of, or without the mind, though at the same time they are apprehended by, or exist in, itself" may be countered by common sense justifications.

"RussellA - Transcendental Idealism" should be treated as a figure of speech.............That's really not the case — Wayfarer

"Transcendental Idealism" does not address Stove's problem

Kant's "transcendental" is about a priori pure and empirical intuitions. Kant's "Epistemological Idealism" is not about any existence of things but only our representation of them.

The expression "transcendental idealism" can only be a figure of speech as it is about more than the transcendental and idealism, in that it does not include any reference to the world of the noumena, an important part of Kant's theory.

Experiencing certain phenomena through my senses, I have subjective knowledge of the colour red. I was born with the innate ability to perceive the colour red. "Transcendental idealism" is the combination of my innate ability to perceive red and my perceiving the colour red.

Using reason, understanding and imagination, I arrive at the belief that my perception of red was caused by light in the external world having a wavelength of 700nm. This light having a wavelength of 700nm is Kant's noumena.

IE, Kant's "Transcendental Idealism" does not address the problem of how we are able to know what precedes, if anything, our phenomena.

However, Kant then grants that you can be both a transcendental AND an empirical realist: — Wayfarer

As you wrote about Kant's theory of "Transcendental Idealism": "you can be both a transcendental AND an empirical realist", this indicates the phrase "Transcendental Idealism" should be treated as a figure of speech rather than something to be taken literally.

In my terms, Kant's phrase "Transcendental Idealism" includes both Epistemological Idealism and Ontological Realism. The problem is, how to link them ?

For the Ontological Idealist, ie for those not believing in the ontological existence of a mind-independent world, this is not a problem, as there is no "Ontological Realism".

However, for the Ontological Realist, it does remain problematic.

We can only ever have knowledge of representations in our mind. The belief that something mind-independent caused them we can justify in various ways. However, if we can never have knowledge of what caused these representations, we can never know that our belief is true.

For example, I have subjective knowledge of the colour red. I believe it was caused by a wavelength of 700nm. I can justify this using scientific procedures, but as science itself is founded on representation, a science founded on representation is incapable of getting behind the representations themselves.

David Stove's Discovery of the Worst Argument in the World addressed this problem, raising the inevitable conclusion that there is no way to get out.

IE, many justifications can be made for our belief in a mind-independent world, but none
as far as I know beyond doubt. One can only say that from the weight of evidence there is most likely a mind-independent world, and perhaps pragmatically that is all one needs.

even the most apparently-obvious scientific hypotheses are mental constructions — Wayfarer

As my belief is that of Indirect Realism, I agree.

That's because you have in your mind the firm belief in an external reality. I understand that questioning that belief is difficult. — Wayfarer

It is true that I find it impossible to question the ontological existence of a mind-independent world.

Otherwise I would find it difficult to fill the kettle with water, switch on the kettle and put a tea bag into my cup if I didn't think these things were real and not a figment of my imagination.

Otherwise I would be diagnosing myself as schizophrenic, hallucinating about things that are not really there.

Otherwise, I would be diagnosing myself as having Dissociative Identity Disorder, in having long conversations about science and philosophy with myself, between two distinct personalities both existing in my mind.

IE, my sanity requires me to believe that I am interacting with a world that is mind-independent.

Kant.......His philosophy is described as transcendental idealism — Wayfarer

The term "Transcendental Idealism" is more metaphorical than literal

A better description than "transcendental idealism" could be "justified belief within Indirect Realism" in that we hypothese the cause of representations discovered in phenomena from the senses using justified belief.

A wave function collapses when a wave function reduces to a single eigenstate due to an interaction with the external world. The fact that this interaction is called an "observation" does not mean the observer has to be a conscious being. It can be a particle of light, a molecule of air, a wall, a ceiling, a window, etc.

"Observation" is being used as a metaphor in that only conscious beings can observe. A rock cannot observe the air, the tree cannot observe the wind, etc. That wind howls does not mean that wind is in anguish. That a wave of terror washed over him does not mean that terror is a wave. That to say that Jess is dynamite does not mean she is made of dynamite.

It is true that Kant as an Indirect Realist believed in Epistemological Idealism, but it is certainly not true that he believed in Ontological Idealism.

IE, the fact that Kant's philosophy is called "transcendental idealism" does not of necessity mean that it can be described as either transcendental or Idealism.

abstracts.........But the subject of the analysis are purely intelligible in nature, i.e. they can only be grasped by a mind, so they don't exist in the way that sensory objects exist. — Wayfarer

I agree that abstracts can only be grasped by the mind.

The question that remains to be answered is how can something exist in a mind-independent world outside of time and space ?

(See Does the Universe Exist if We're Not Looking?, Discover Magazine.) — Wayfarer

Can anyone make a valid argument that a mind-independent world did not exist in the 13 billion years before the arrival of human observers ?

There is an interview with John Wheeler Does the Universe Exist if We're Not Looking

We inhabit a cosmos made real by our own observation

John Wheeler has a gut feeling that we inhabit a cosmos made real by our own observation.

The article notes that "When physicists look at the basic constituents of reality— atoms and their innards, or the particles of light called photons— what they see depends on how they have set up their experiment."

In addition "Our observations, he suggests, might actually contribute to the creation of physical reality. To Wheeler we are not simply bystanders on a cosmic stage; we are shapers and creators living in a participatory universe."

IE, from the standpoint of Epistemological Idealism within Indirect Realism, I agree with the above, and I am sure that not only Kant but also Schopenhauer would as well.

Are humans necessary for the existence of the universe

The article also asks "Does this mean humans are necessary to the existence of the universe? While conscious observers certainly partake in the creation of the participatory universe envisioned by Wheeler, they are not the only, or even primary, way by which quantum potentials become real. Ordinary matter and radiation play the dominant roles.........In this case the mica, not a conscious being, is the object that transforms what might happen into what does happen."

IE, the article raises the question "Does the Universe exist if we're not looking", and its answer is yes.

Philosophical idealism can accept that material objects and forces have a degree of reality — Wayfarer

Some have said that "definitions are not all that helpful", but it has also been said about Ordinary Language Philosophy that traditional philosophical problems are rooted in misunderstandings philosophers make by distorting or forgetting how words are ordinarily used to convey meaning in non-philosophical contexts. Such philosophical use of language creates the very philosophical problems they are employed to solve.

Idealism may be simply defined as a belief that there is no mind-independent external world. Realism that there is a mind-independent external world. Within Realism is Direct Realism and Indirect Realism. Direct Realism may be simply defined as the belief that we directly observe objects in the external world as they really are. Indirect Realism may be simply defined as the belief that we only observe representations of objects we believe to be in the external world. Kant was an Indirect Realist.

IE, it is true that Idealism accepts that material objects and forces have a degree of reality, but that reality is in the mind, not in a mind-independent world.

The view that abstract objects are real is generally associated with Platonism or scholastic realism. But you've already indicated that you reject this with reference to F H Bradley's argument. — Wayfarer

The Platonist believes in the existence of abstract objects, where abstract objects exist outside time and space, are not causal and are necessary. The Nominalist believes in concrete objects, where concrete objects exist in time and space, are causal and are contingent.

It is still possible for the Nominalist to reject the Platonism of abstracts while still believing in the ontological existence of relations.

I personally reject the Platonism of abstracts because I find the idea of objects existing in the external world outside of time and space incomprehensible.

For a similar reason, I also reject the ontological existence of relations, as they also exist in the external world outside of time and space.

My belief that elementary particles and elementary forces do ontologically exist in a mind-independent world — RussellA

This is just what has been called into question by 20th Century physics — Wayfarer

The age of the universe is about 13.8 billion years, and human intelligence has been on the Earth for about 7 million years. That a mind-independent world existing 13,793 billion years before the arrival of human observers has been called into question makes no sense to me. It brings to mind the belief of Young Earth Creationism, whereby lifeforms were created in a supernatural act about 6,000 to 10,000 years ago.

I am also sure that most contemporary philosophical interest in the quantum world is comparable to that of medieval discussion about the philosopher's stone and its relevance to alchemy.

Yeah, no. Not buying. Aren’t you the one supposed to be defending realism? — Wayfarer

Luckily, my livelihood is not dependent on my selling.

I believe in Realism
Idealism is the view that things exist only as ideas, with no reality of material objects outside of the mind. Realism is the view that objects exist in themselves, independently of our consciousness of them. My position is not that of Idealism, as I believe objects exist in themselves, independently of our consciousness of them. It comes down to exactly what "objects" are. My belief that elementary particles and elementary forces do ontologically exist in a mind-independent world, though relations don't, is consistent with Realism.

Do you believe in Realism or Idealism ?
As you wrote on page 3: "Ever since I began to think about it, I've held that numbers and basic geometrical principles and the like are real, in that they're the same for anyone who can grasp them. So they're not dependent on your or my mind, but can only be grasped by a rational mind." It would follow from your position that if numbers are real and not dependent on your or my mind, then there must be a mind-independent world." This is a belief in Realism.

Yet you also wrote on page 3: "I question the coherence of the idea of a 'mind-independent world'. This is a belief in Idealism."

Are these positions compatible ?

I can't see how Newton's equations of motion are metaphorical, — Wayfarer

Newton's second law F=ma is a metaphor, not a literal fact.

Andrew May makes a strong point that even Newton's second law is a metaphor, in that that when a body is acted upon by a force, the time rate of change of its momentum equals the force, in that F=ma,

Andrew May Metaphors in Science 2000
"In his article on the use of metaphors in physics (November issue, page 17), Robert P Crease describes several interesting trees but fails to notice the wood all around him. What is a scientific theory if not a grand metaphor for the real world it aims to describe? Theories are generally formulated in mathematical terms, and it is difficult to see how it could be argued that, for example, F = ma "is" the motion of an object in any literal sense. Scientific metaphors possess uniquely powerful descriptive and predictive potential, but they are metaphors nonetheless. If scientific theories were as real as the world they describe, they would not change with time (which they do, occasionally). I would even go so far as to suggest that an equation like F = ma is a culturally specific metaphor, in that it can only have meaning in a society that practices mathematical quantification in the way that ours does. Before I'm dismissed as a loopy radical, I should point out that I'm a professional physicist who has been using mathematical metaphors to describe the real world for the last twenty years!"

The equation F=ma cannot be literal because of Hume's problem of induction. Through logic and reason and the empirical observation of constantly conjoined events, we hypothesise that F=ma. Through further empirical observation we discover that this equation proves to be effective in the prediction of future states of affairs. We believe the equation to be literal, but this belief is only a hypothesis.

We believe, we hypothesise, that there is a regularity in what we call the "laws of nature", and accordingly create a mathematics also founded on regularity in the expectation that the regularities in our mathematics will correspond with the regularities in the "laws of nature". That our mathematics are effective in predicting future states of affairs in the world infers that our hypothesis that there are regularities in the laws of nature is correct, is true. But, this is not knowledge, as our hypothesis can never be proved, only a justified belief.

A metaphor may be defined as i) a figure of speech in which a word or phrase is applied to an object or action to which it is not literally applicable and ii) a thing regarded as representative or symbolic of something else.

IE, as the equation F=ma can never be proved to be a literal description of states of affairs in the world, and must always remain a hypothesised representation, it falls within the definition of metaphor.

My point remains -- the metaphor works for believers in ultimate truth. — Moliere

I agree that as a metaphor, the "ultimate truth" works for atheists in their belief of an "ultimate truth".

The language he uses is deeply religious throughout. — Moliere

There is no indication in the article that Wigner proposes the mystical or religious to explain why our theories work so well.

Wigner wrote - "The miracle of the appropriateness of the language of mathematics for the formulation of the laws of physics is a wonderful gift which we neither understand nor deserve".

Metaphors are commonly used in science, such as: evolution by natural selection, F = ma, the wave theory of light, DNA is the code of life, the genome is the book of life, gravity, dendritic branches, Maxwell's Demon, Schrödinger’s cat, Einstein’s twins, greenhouse gas, the battle against cancer, faith in a hypothesis, the miracle of consciousness, the gift of understanding, the laws of physics, the language of mathematics, deserving an effective mathematics, etc.

IE, it would be more true to say that the language he uses is deeply metaphorical rather than religious.

:smile:

I think before going further, you should explain further what you mean by your term 'ontologically exist'. — Wayfarer

The mind is of a different kind to the mind-independent world

Realism is the belief that the world comprises the mind and a mind-independent world.

Although the mind is part of the world, my belief is that the the nature of the mind is different to the nature of the mind-independent world. FH Bradley's Regress Argument persuades me that relations don't ontologically exist in the mind-independent world, whilst the Binding Problem and Kant's Unity of Perception do persuade me that relations do ontologically exist in the mind.

Although everything in the mind-independent world exists in the mind, such as matter and the forces between them, there are some things that exist in the mind but not the mind-independent world, such as concepts, unicorns, apples, numbers, universals, abstracts, love and hate, ethics, pain and pleasure, fictional characters, ghosts, gods, relations, etc.

Therefore, there is a set of things that ontologically exist in the mind, and a different set of things that ontologically exist in the mind-independent world, though the sets do overlap.

IE, in the mind-independent world, quarks and the weak nuclear force do ontologically exist, but love and hate don't.

My point is that dead matter seems to obey many mathematical structure — Landoma1

Mathematics obeys matter, rather than matter obeys mathematics

From observations of the world, we arrive at the belief that there is a regularity in what we call "the laws of nature". We are able to justify such a belief through further experimentation.

In order to model what we believe to be the intrinsic regularity discovered within the "laws of nature", we invent mathematical systems also having intrinsic regularity.

If our intrinsically regular mathematical systems prove to be effective in predicting future states of affairs, then we can infer that the "laws of nature" are also intrinsically regular. We can never prove that the "laws of nature" are intrinsically regular, as this leads into Hume's problem with inductive reasoning. We can never know that the "laws of nature" are intrinsically regular, as knowledge requires a justified true belief, and the truth is beyond what we can inductively reason.

The "unreasonable" effectiveness of mathematics is a strong indication that within the "laws of nature" there is an inherent regularity.

The main issue is Eugene Wigner's The Unreasonable Effectiveness of Mathematics in the Natural Sciences

As regards the unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics, it is initially truly amazing that from sitting on a train using Richard Hamming's thought experiment, I can disagree with Aristotle and agree with Galileo that heavy objects should fall at the same speed at lighter ones, not only on the train but universally on the far side of the universe.

However, the starting position is the amazing regularity and invariance of what we call "the laws of nature". Given such regularity, the "laws of nature" applicable on the train will also be applicable on the far side of the universe.

The fact that I can codify and quantify using reason, logic and mathematics the "laws of nature" that I observe on the train, and still be applicable on the far side of the universe, is not a measure of success of my reasoning, logic and mathematics, but rather is a measure of the regularity and invariance of the "laws of nature".

Without such regularity and invariance in "the laws of nature", our reasoning, logic and mathematics would count for nothing.

IE, mathematics is only effective because of the unreasonable regularity in the "laws of nature"

An associated issue is the question as to whether universal concepts such as "north of" and "whiteness" are or are not dependent on thought. Are they discovered in the external world or invented in the mind ?

Wayfarer - page 2 - The second, and crucial, point, is that such qualities or relations or whatever they are, (Bertrand Russell's "north of", "whiteness") are not dependent on thought, but they can only be perceived by thought.

RussellA - page 2 - If universals don't exist in a mind-independent world, yet we can perceive them in our minds, then they must have been created in the mind. As universals have been created by thoughts in the mind, they must be dependent for their existence on thoughts in the mind.

IE, not agreed yet.

You're defending the empiricist view that all concepts are derived from experience — Wayfarer

Yes. In the sense that concepts are created in the mind based on observations of the external world, not that concepts ontologically exist in a mind-independent world.

Quite right! That is the point at issue, which here you appear to be conceding. — Wayfarer

I agree that the mind uses the inventive power of intellectual reasoning, and part of its inventive power is in the invention of universal concepts, such as "north of".

The 'law of the excluded middle' didn't come into existence when it was discovered by h. sapiens; it would be true in all possible worlds — Wayfarer

SEP - Disjunction - The law of excluded middle (LEM) states that any proposition of the form (ϕ∨¬ϕ) is logically valid. The semantic principle of bivalence states that every proposition is either true or false (and not both).

SEP - Structured Propositions - For example, when a German speaker utters the sentence ‘Schnee ist weiss’ and an English speaker utters the sentence ‘Snow is white’, they have said the same thing by uttering the sentences they did.
The proposition is taken to be the thing that is in the first instance true or false

IE, as propositions don't exist in a mind-independent world, and as the "law of excluded middle" is based on propositions, the "law of excluded middle" doesn't exist in a mind-independent world.

This is the point of the a priori nature of the pure concepts of reason in Kant — Wayfarer

Exactly, a priori in the mind.

So universal concepts are not created by thought, but can only be discerned by a rational intellect — Wayfarer

If universal concepts were not created by thought, then the universal concepts of love and hate could be discovered in a mind-independent world.

If relations do not exist, then it is not the case that something is to the west of something else.
Glasgow is to the west of Edinburgh.
Therefore (at least one) relation exists. — Cuthbert

This leads to:

Statement 1 = If relations do not exist, then it is not the case that Glasgow is to the west of Edinburgh

Statement 2 = Relations exist, and It is the case that Glasgow is to the west of Edinburgh.

The conclusion that "therefore (at least one) relation exists" of necessity follows from statement 2 rather than prove anything about the ontological existence or not of relations.

But you don't know that. It's quite feasible that the wheel was invented because some Cro-Magnon discovered that you could roll a big rock on logs. Basic empiricism. — Wayfarer

Concepts are invented not discovered

One day, a Cro-Magnon on a walk through the forest happened to observe a big flat rock that had fallen from the side of a mountain rolling along on some logs on the ground. Let us call the Cro-Magnon George.

George had made a particular empirical observation and discovered something in the world, in that a flat rock can continue to move freely along the ground as long as it is supported by round logs.

George was able to make the intellectual leap from the particular to the general, and reason that any flat object may move more freely along the ground as long as it is supported by round objects. George using reason was able to use a particular observation to arrive at a universal concept, the concept of the wheel.

If concepts existed in a mind-independent world then they would be "out there somewhere"
and discoverable. However, if that were the case, two people independently observing an object, for example a rock, should be able to write down all concepts discoverable within the object, in which case, when compared, their lists should be the same. Concepts in objects cannot be discovered by observation alone, but require the inventive power of reasoning using the intellect.

IE, because the concept of the wheel does not exist in either a mind-independent rock, log or relation between the two, George could not have discovered the concept from an empirical observation. But as the concept of the wheel exists in George's mind, and because it cannot have been discovered from an empirical observation, it must have originated in George's mind, been invented in the mind of George.

This conclusion, however, is met by the difficulty that the relation 'north of' does not seem to exist in the same sense in which Edinburgh and London exist. — Bertrand Russell, The World of Universals

"North of" and London exist in exactly the same way

The object Edinburghlondon has the related parts i) Edinburgh and ii) London
London has the related parts i) north of the Thames and ii) south of the Thames
South of the Thames has the related parts i) built up areas and ii) trees and grasslands
Built up areas have the related parts i) buildings and ii) roads
Roads have the related parts i) paving and ii) junctions
Paving has the related parts - etc

Russell writes that " the relation 'north of' is radically different from such things" as London, in that "north of" subsists whilst London exists. Yet London only exists as a relation between its parts north of the Thames and south of the Thames.

IE, the object London depends on its existence on relations between parts - the area north of the Thames and the area south of the Thames. If, according to Russell, relations don't exist in a mind-independent world, then it follows from Russell's own argument that neither can London exist as a mind-independent object.

That which many different thoughts of whiteness have in common is their object, and this object is different from all of them. Thus universals are not thoughts, though when known they are the objects of thoughts. — Bertrand Russell, The World of Universals

Universals are thoughts

A group of people may agree to share a common language. It may be agreed within the group that white objects are linked with the word "white". In the world being observed by the group, not only do white objects physically exist, but also and the word "white" physically exists as an object.

Each individual may develop their private concept of "whiteness" by observing white objects in the world. But also each individual may also link their private concept of "whiteness" with the associated public word "whiteness"

It is true as Russell writes "One man's act of thought is necessarily a different thing from another man's" - in that my concept of "whiteness" is of necessity not identical to yours.

But it is not true as Russell wrote that "if whiteness were the thought as opposed to its object, no two different men could think of it", as one person's private concept of "whiteness" is linked to everyone else's private concept of "whiteness" through the public linguistic object "whiteness".

IE, universals, such as the concept of "whiteness" not only exist in the mind as a private thought, but also are universally understood by a group sharing a common public language.

One is the distinction between the existence of universals and of sensable objects. — Wayfarer

Universals and sensables are of the same kind

There are sensable objects such as Edinburgh and London and universals such as "north of" and "whiteness".

IE, a sensable object such as London is no more that a relation between its parts, and if relations are universals, then sensable objects cannot be argued to be of a different kind to the universals from which they are comprised.

such qualities or relations or whatever they are, are not dependent on thought, but they can only be perceived by thought — Wayfarer

Universals are dependant on thought

It has been well-argued that universals such as whiteness, apples, houses, governments can not be explained as Platonic Forms that exist in a mind-independent world.

Universals can be perceived by thought, in that we can discuss them.

If universals don't exist in a mind-independent world, yet we can perceive them in our minds, then they must have been created in the mind. As universals have been created by thoughts in the mind, they must be dependent for their existence on thoughts in the mind.

IE, universals are dependent on thought and can be perceived by thought.

You wrote:
We have to show that relations exist.
Glasgow is west of Edinburgh - so we are told.
It could mean that if we turn over the whole universe item by item we will find at least one thing that is to the west of another thing.
There is a case - at least one case - of something being to the west of something else.
From which if finally follows that relations exist...........we can see that relations have ontological existence.

As regards the ontological existence of relations, there are two possibilities - either i) relations don't exist and after turning over the whole universe item by item we won't find at least one thing that is to the west of another - or ii) relations do exist and after turning over the whole universe item by item we will find at least one thing that is to the west of another

However, the problem with your statement "There is a case - at least one case - of something being to the west of something else" is that the statement can only be made on the assumption that relations do exist.

It is equivalent to saying that if relations exist then relations exist.

Amazing that inventions work so well, then. Or maybe they're all in the mind as well? — Wayfarer

Take the wheel as an example. As with all inventions they were invented in the mind, and then made into a physical thing of perhaps wood and steel, a circular rim supported by spokes revolving around an axle.

The parts of the wheel physically exist in the world, and once created, exist independently of whether anyone is thinking of them or not. This is compatible with Realism, in that there is a mind-independent world of matter and forces.

For the Naive Realist, our sense provide us with a direct awareness of the wheel as it really is.

For the Indirect Realist, we do not perceive the external world as it really is, but are only aware of a representation of the external world. Our awareness is of the concept of the wheel, not the "wheel" itself.

The concept of a wheel definitely exists in the mind, otherwise we would not be having this conversation. The question is, do wheels ontologically exist in the external world ? A wheel is a spatial relation between its rim, spokes and axle. Whether wheels ontologically exist in the external world depends on whether relations ontologically exist in the external world.

I am persuaded by FH Bradley's Regress Argument that relations don't ontologically exist in the external world, meaning that wheels don't ontologically exist in the external world.

If one is going to argue that wheels do ontologically exist in the external world, then this will require a justification that relations also ontologically exist in the external world.

Is there any reasoned argument that relations do ontologically exist in the external world ?

Referring to Eugene Wigner's - The Unreasonable Effectiveness of Mathematics in the Natural Sciences

Mathematical systems are invented and then discarded if discovered to be ineffective

(I hope @jgill agrees)

As Wigner wrote: "I would say that mathematics is the science of skilful operations with concepts and rules invented just for this purpose. The principal emphasis is on the invention of concepts".

I can invent the elementary mathematical system such that 1 + 1 = 3. Many mathematical systems can be invented. The mathematical system whereby 1 + 1 = 2 has also been invented.

As it has been discovered through observation of the external world that the mathematical system 1 + 1 = 2 is more useful than the mathematical system 1 + 1 = 3, the former has been kept and the latter discarded.

IE, Wigner was correct when he wrote about "the unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics in the natural sciences", because any mathematics that has been shown not to be unreasonably effective has been discarded

Reason, logic and mathematics require regularities in the external world

Wigner wrote - The laws of invariance of physical theories.........regularities in the events in the world around us which can be formulated in terms of mathematical concepts with an uncanny accuracy"

If there were not inherent regularities in the world, we could not predict that two rocks dropped at the same time from the same height reach the ground at the same time, regardless on whether on the Earth or the far side of the Universe.

"Laws of nature" exist only in the mind and not the external world

Wigner wrote "It is not at all natural that "laws of nature" exist, much less that man is able to discover them"

As concepts such a tables, apples, governments, ethics, laws of nature, etc require relationships between their parts, and relations have no ontological existence in the external world (see FH Bradley) but only in the mind (see the Binding Problem and Kant's Apperception and its Unity), such concepts exist only in the mind and not the external world.

Our beliefs are always "unreasonably effective"

Wigner wrote: We are in a position similar to that of a man who was provided with a bunch of keys and who, having to open several doors in succession, always hit on the right key on the first or second trial. He became sceptical concerning the uniqueness of the coordination between keys and doors".

In general, our beliefs in tables, apples, governments, ethics, laws of nature, mathematics, etc are always "unreasonably effective" and well suited to our understanding because beliefs are self-referential.

On the one hand, I have a concept of or a belief about a law of nature existing in the external world, and on the other hand, a law of nature is a concept or belief that only exists in the mind and not the external world.

IE, even if our belief is wrong, we still believe it.

Parts may exist in the world, but the whole only exists in the mind
The whole is a set of parts, but even a part is a set of parts. For the sake of argument, treat the parts as elementary and logical rather than real. As relations have no ontological existence in the world, but only in the mind, the parts may exist in the world, but the whole only exists in the mind.

From particular observations to general laws
From my particular observations in different locations over a period of time that the mere fact that my pen touches my pencil does not result in a change of velocity of either, I can make the general assumption that two objects in contact does not result in the change of velocity of either. I can also make the general assumption about the regularity of the laws of nature. This confirms Richard Hamming"s thought experiment that universally, heavy bodies fall at the same speed as lighter ones, contrary to Aristotle's teaching.

That I can predict a heavy object and a lighter one will fall at the same speed not only on Earth today but on the far side of the universe millions of years from now does initially seem to illustrate the unreasonable power of reason, and by extension logic and mathematics.

General laws only exist in the mind
As general laws, such as the law of nature that two objects when touching does not cause a change of velocity of either require relations between parts, a relation between object A and object B, then general laws can only exist in the mind and not the external world.

We have a whole concept of a universal table (apples, government, ethics, etc) in our minds, which is based on the observation of the relationship of particular parts in our external world. We have the whole concept of a universal law of nature in our minds, which is based on the observation of the relationship of particular parts in our external world. Both the concept of universal table and universal law of nature extend to the far side of the universe. Does our ability to extend the law of nature to the far side of the universe show the unreasonable power of reason ? No, no more than our extending the concept of a table to the far side of the universe shows the unreasonable power of reason.

Concepts such as tables and the law of nature remain in the mind. It does not follow that our projection of these concepts onto the external world makes them states of affairs that obtain in the external world. The fact that we can project our concept of tables and laws of nature onto the far side of the universe cannot be said to show the unreasonable power of reason, as neither of these concepts actually obtain as states of affairs.

As reason, logic and mathematics are self-referential, they cannot be said to be either reasonably or unreasonably effective
Our beliefs are self-referential, in that my concept of a table or a law of nature is of necessity well-suited to what I observe in the external world. IE, on the one hand I have a belief in my mind of a table or law of nature existing in the external world. On the other hand a table or law of nature is a belief that exists only in the mind and not the external world.

Thought experiments and the "unreasonable" nature of mathematics

Aristotle taught that heavy objects fall faster than lighter ones.

— RussellA

However, Richard Hamming's thought experiment gives a powerful reason why heavy objects should fall at the same speed as lighter ones. This thought experiment allows us to predict that universally a heavy object should fall at the same speed as a lighter one, not only on Earth today, but on the far side of the universe and millions of years from now. Such thought experiments can predict both what cannot be seen and what cannot be experimentally foreseen.

Personally, I have consistently observed across space and time that the mere fact of my pen touching my pencil does not result in a change of velocity of either of them, from which I may reasonably agree with Hamming that it follows that there is a universal law that heavy objects should fall at the same speed as lighter ones.

Does not such a prediction show the "unreasonable" power of reason, and by extension logic and mathematics ?

Beliefs are always self-referential, and therefore always well-suited to the world and always "unreasonably" effective

For example, a table is the relation between a table top and table legs. The same applies to apples, governments, unicorns, houses, ethics, etc. As relations don't ontologically exist in the world (FH Bradly) but only in the mind (the Binding Problem), tables don't ontologically exist in the world but only in the mind. As the concept of tables only exists in our thoughts and talk, it should be no surprise about the "unreasonable" effectiveness of our thoughts and talk about tables, as thoughts about tables and tables are one and the same thing.

The question is, are our laws of nature comparable with the situation as regarding the table? As tables only exist in the mind, perhaps our laws of nature only exist in our mind, and consequently, as both self-referential, obviously both well-suited to the world and "unreasonable" effective.

My deduction of the universal law that heavy objects should fall at the same speed as lighter ones is only valid as long as there is a condition of satisfaction between my beliefs and the state of affairs that obtains in the world. My belief clearly does not determine the state of affairs in the world, but as my belief is self-referential, my belief is both well-suited and "unreasonably" effective as to what I believe to be the state of affairs in the world.

Paradigm shifts in my beliefs does not alter the self-referential nature of belief

However, my belief in such a law of nature, my belief in how the world is structured, is no guarantee that what I observe will continue to comply with my present beliefs, in which case I may be forced through the same kind of paradigm shift as described by Thomas Kuhn and be forced to develop a new set of beliefs that correspond with my new experiences and observations.

The point remains that even this new set of beliefs will also be self-referential, in that even my new beliefs will be well-suited and "unreasonably" effective as to what I believe to be the state of affairs in the world.

Our self-referential belief in reason, logic and mathematics can only ever be well-suited to the world and "unreasonably" effective

IE, regardless of what beliefs I may have, what reasoning. logic or mathematics I use, my beliefs will always be well-suited and "unreasonably" effective to my understanding of the world around me because of the self-referential nature of belief.

I think all participants here know about the statement of the unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics. Shouldn't we, rather, speak of it's reasonable effectiveness? — Landoma1

The effectiveness of mathematics is neither reasonable nor unreasonable.

I observe the world. I observe that all things being equal, what happened in the past will happen in the future. This is neither reasonable nor unreasonable, it is just a fact about the world. I observe on the table in front of me my pen touching my pencil, and observe that the mere fact of touching does not cause a change of velocity of either my pen or my pencil. I discover facts about the world by observing the world. These facts are neither reasonable nor unreasonable, they are just how the world is.

"The Unreasonable Effectiveness of Mathematics in the Natural Sciences" is a 1960 article by the physicist Eugene Wigner.

A biography by Galileo's pupil Vincenzo Viviani stated that Galileo had dropped balls of the same material, but different masses, from the Leaning Tower of Pisa to demonstrate that their time of descent was independent of their mass. This was contrary to what Aristotle had taught: that heavy objects fall faster than lighter ones.

Richard Hamming reflected on and extended Wigner's Unreasonable Effectiveness in 1980. Hamming proposes that Galileo discovered the law of falling bodies not by experimenting, but by simple, though careful, thinking. Suppose that a falling body broke into two pieces. Of course the two pieces would immediately slow down to their appropriate speeds. But suppose further that one piece happened to touch the other one. Would they now be one piece and both speed up? Suppose I tie the two pieces together. How tightly must I do it to make them one piece? A light string? A rope? Glue? When are two pieces one?

Humans can invent many different mathematical systems. Those mathematical systems that are found to correspond with the world consistently through time are kept, otherwise they may be discarded. That some mathematical systems are discovered to be more effective that others is neither reasonable nor unreasonable, it is just what is.

Who is to say that the mere fact of my pen touching my pencil does not result in a change of velocity is a reasonable or unreasonable thing to happen ?

the game of the US constitution cannot continue if a small group of folk storm the Capitol Building — Banno

You do not have to worry about the rules of the game of chess yourself. It has been codified for you — Tobias

I feel like Daniel thrown into the lion's den.

There are different kinds of games
Within a particular game are duties and obligations. An institution has deontic powers in establishing duties and obligations on those who want to take part in that institution. The participant of the game must accept these duties and obligations. The game of the US Constitution cannot continue if the rules of the game are not followed by its citizens. The game of chess cannot continue if the rules of the game are not followed by its players.

However, the game of chess and the game of society are different. If I am not willing to accept the duties and obligations within chess, I am able to leave the table. However, society is different, in that if I am not willing to accept the duties and obligations within society I am not able to leave, as one of the rules of society is that everyone is a member.

Problems arise in obligatory games
Problems arise for those who disagree with the rules and obligations imposed by an institution that they are not able to leave. To illustrate the problems that arise when members of a society disagree with the rules and obligations imposed on them, one can look at a contemporary situation, the 6 January event, and a historical event, Galileo's championing the Copernican heliocentrism.

Galileo
At the time of Galileo's conflict with the Church, the majority subscribed to the Aristotelian geocentric view that the Earth is the centre of the Universe and the orbit of all heavenly bodies. Galileo championed Copernican heliocentrism - the Earth rotating daily and revolved around the sun. Galileo's position met with opposition from within the Catholic Church, the matter was investigated by the Roman Inquisition in 1615, which concluded that heliocentrism was foolish and absurd. For the next decade, Galileo stayed well away from the controversy. In 1632, Galileo published Dialogue Concerning the Two Chief World Systems, and was called to Rome the same year to defend it. He was brought to trial in 1633 before the Inquisitor. Throughout his trial, Galileo steadfastly maintained that since 1616 he had faithfully kept his promise not to hold any of the condemned opinions. However, in 1633 he was threatened with torture if he did not recant, ultimately being found "vehemently suspect of heresy", his Dialogue was banned, and he spent the rest of his life under house arrest.

Promise and obligation in games
Searle wrote: "How can my stating a fact about a man, such as the fact that he made me a promise, commit me to a view about what he ought to do ? In thinking about games, there are different situations:
1) There are voluntary games such as chess that the person neither needs to take part in nor wants to take part in, and as they make no promise to follow the rules, they are under no obligation to follow the rules, and therefore make committent as to what they ought to do
2) There are voluntary games such as chess where the person when promising to follow the rules is declaring that they will be playing the game of chess, not through obligation but through choice, and make no committent as to what they ought to do, only what they will do.
3) There are those obligatory games such as society where the person need make no promise to follow the rules are they are obliged to follow the rules and are committed to what they ought to do.

Unfortunately, I have to leave this game of philosophy, as we are about to get underway for Las Vegas to play a different kind of game.

With that very utterance, the promise is made, and the obligation created. — Banno

Searle says that within social institutions are duties and obligations

Within a social institution are duties and obligations. I sit down with someone for a game of chess, and we both agree that a particular piece is a bishop. For me, that the bishop moves diagonally is declarable even if I don't declare it. For the other person, that the bishop moves perpendicularly is declarable even if they don't declare it. We both promise to use the bishop correctly.

Searle in Ought and Is wrote: "With these conclusions we now return to the question with
which I began this section: How can my stating a fact about a man, such as the fact that he made a promise, commit me to a view about what he ought to do? One can begin to answer this question by saying that for me to state such an institutional fact is already to invoke the constitutive rules of the institution."

Who has the right to determine the duties and obligations within a society

As soon as the game starts I am annoyed that they have broken their promise to use the bishop correctly. The question is, why do I believe that the other person is under a duty and obligation to follow my understanding of the game. I could argue that the majority agree with me that the bishop moves diagonally and therefore the other person must have a duty and obligation to follow the majority.

But if the majority believe that the world is flat, why am I under a duty and obligation to also believe that the world is flat. Why does the minority have a duty and obligation to follow the majority ?

Edmund Burke - "The tyranny of a multitude is a multiplied tyranny."
Arthur Balfour - The tyranny of majorities may be as bad as the tyranny of kings.
Mark Twain - Whenever you find yourself on the side of the majority, it is time to pause and reflect.
Nietzsche in Beyond Good and Evil - The European herd man, on the other hand, puts on airs nowadays as if he were the only acceptable type of man, glorifying the characteristics that make him tame, docile, and useful to the herd as if they were the true human virtues: such as public spirit, benevolence, consideration, industriousness, moderation, modesty, concern, sympathy.

Summary

I am sure that Searle is correct when he says that the test of a social institution is whether it has deontic power in establishing duties and obligations on others. These deontic powers can only come from its own members, whether an elite minority or a heterogeneous majority. One further question to ask is how does one set of members gain deontic power over others of differing opinions. A further question is once having gained such deontic powers, how do they keep them.

Duty and obligation may be admirable, but surely not at the expense of the tyranny of a small elite or a heterogeneous majority.

If the other person is using the same words as I do, but defining them in different ways, I may be mistaken in thinking that they have made me a promise, and should not be surprised if they break what I think are their obligations.

The implications of the performative utterance are manyfold.

Private Facts and Public Facts

I see an object. There are brute facts that it is made of wood, has a weight and is larger at its base than its top.

I declare in a performatory act that "this piece is a bishop and can only move diagonally". The fact that this piece is a bishop and not a castle is a Private Fact for me. Someone else could equally have said "this piece is a castle and can only move perpendicularly". The fact that this piece is a castle and not a bishop is a Private Fact for the other person.

However, we could have both declared that this piece is a bishop, and the fact that this piece is a bishop for both of us becomes a Public Fact, ie, an Institutional Fact (assuming that we are both important figures in society).

But note that the piece becoming a bishop as a Public Fact, an Insitutional Fact, only happened after the declarations had been made

The apparent paradox "this statement is a lie"

Consider the paradox "this statement is a lie. We can then compare the statement "this piece is a bishop" with "this statement is a lie". The fact that this piece is a bishop only happened after the performative declaration, ie, the piece was not a bishop before the declaration. The fact that this statement is a lie only happened after the performative declaration, ie, the statement was not a lie before the declaration.

On the first reading, the statement "this statement is a lie" is a paradox of self-reference, in that the statement seems to have one meaning that is paradoxically self-contradictory. However, the statement "this statement is a lie" has in fact two different independent meanings. The first meaning is before he conclusion of the performatory act. The second meaning is after the conclusion of the performatory act.

IE, as these two independent meanings are not contradictory, there is no longer any paradox.

The direct realist argues that I'm looking at you and the indirect realist argues that I'm looking at your reflection. I don't see why we can't say both. — Michael

I don't think that we can say both.

I look at a rose and light of a wavelength of 700 nm travels from the rose to my eye. I look at a sunset and light of a wavelength of 700 nm travels from the sunset to my eye.

The Direct Realist would say that I have direct awareness of the external world.

If, as a Direct Realist would say, that I have a direct awareness of the external word, how does the Direct Realist know that the wavelength of 700nm entering the eye was caused by a rose or a sunset ?

If the ontology must be put in such terms, then Searle is pretty much a direct realist. Speech acts are very much public. — Banno

In JR Searle's lecture at the Czech Academy of Sciences 2011 on visual perception, he said "I think the rejection of naive realism was the single greatest disaster that happened in philosophy after Descartes"
See www.youtube.com/watch?v=7PfWedgBWag (terrible sound quality)

Indirect Realism may be unsatisfactory but must be better than Naive Realism

Although I say that I believe in Indirect Realism, it is in a sense an unsatisfactory position as it does fly in the face of common sense, and as Searle said: "But the idea that you can't ever perceive the real world but only a picture in your mind that creates a disaster, because the question that arises is what is the relationship between the idea you do perceive or the sense datum of the impression that you do perceive and the real world, and there is no answer to that which is satisfactory once you make once you make the decisive move of rejecting Naive Realism"

Searle supports Naive Realism

Searle points out the major argument against Naive Realism is that the naive realist cannot account for hallucinations: "And the rejection says what really all you can ever see is this thing here, because the naive realist cannot account for hallucinations"

However, for Searle, such an argument against Naive Realism is based on a single fallacy, an ambiguity in the use of such words such as be aware of, be conscious of, to perceive.

Searle says that opponents of Naive Realism use this ambiguity in the concept of awareness to attack Naive Realism by pointing out the indistinguishability between the perception of an hallucination and the perception of a veridical situation.

Searle argues that awareness has in fact two senses. The first sense is intentionalistic, about objects and states of affairs in the world, for example, being aware of a cup. The second sense is constitutive, such that an awareness of something is identical to the awareness itself, for example, being aware of a headache.

Searle's position may be put into a diagram.



Several things follow from the diagram.

In Searle's terms, Institutional Facts are hallucinations

I see an object on a table. As it is a Brute Fact that it is a piece of wood, I may put it on the fire for warmth. As it is a Brute Fact that it has a weight, I may put it on my papers to stop them blowing away.

However, I declare in a performative act that it is a bishop and can only move diagonally. However, someone else could just as well declare that it is a castle and can only move perpendicularly.

Institutional Fact means that the nature of the object is not mind-independent, but rather, the nature of the object is dependent on what is in the mind of the observer of the object. So, when I observe an object, the fact that it is a bishop that moves diagonally, is not in the object itself as a Brute Fact, but is in my mind as an Institutional Fact.

Thinking about the object as a bishop is the same situation as thinking about an object that does not exist in a mind-independent world. In Searle's terms, this is an hallucination. And also in Searle's terms, an hallucination is a synonym for an Institutional Fact. Searle said that he has never experienced an hallucination, yet every time Searle experiences marriage, money, chess, government, he is experiencing, in his own terms, an hallucination.

Searle's Intentional Awareness has the same problem of those who oppose naive realism

As seen in the diagram, Searle's Intentional Awareness appears similar to Kant's position as set out in Jäsche Logic 9:33 “consciousness is really the representation that another representation is in me”. However, both approaches push the problem further back, in that in Intentional Awareness I am not able to be conscious of a representation, but I can be conscious of a representation of a representation.

The question is, if I can be conscious of a representation of a representation, then why cannot I be conscious of a representation. Otherwise one is led into an infinite regress of being conscious of a representation of a representation of a representation, etc, forever.

The central problem with Searle's proposal remains is that how do I know that I am being conscious of the representation of a representation rather than being conscious of a representation, as both of these are indistinguishable. This is the same problem Searle attacks, in that opponents of Naive Realism also argue that a veridical situation and an hallucinatory situation are also indistinguishable.

Language requires both Brute Facts and Institutional Facts

I observe a physical cup in the world, which is a brute fact. Next to this object I see another physical object, the letters CUP, which is another brute fact.

In my mind, I associate these two Brute Facts using a relation. As relations only exist in the mind, as argued by FH Bradley (the nemesis of external relations), then such as relation is an Institutional Fact.

Language, therefore, requires both Brute Facts in a mind-independent world and Institutional Facts in the mind.

Summary

Searle supports Naive Realism. He proposes a mechanism of Intentional Awareness and Constitutive Awareness in order to counter attacks on Naive Realism by those who point out that veridical and hallucinatory situations are indistinguishable within one's conscious state.

Yet his proposal arrives at the same problem, in that an Intentional awareness of a representation of a representation and a Constitutive awareness of a representation are also indistinguishable within one's conscious state.

For the Indirect Realist, Institutional Facts must be metaphorical

From a position of Indirect Realism, in that I cannot perceive the external world as it really is and Husserl's phenomenology, where phenomena through the senses are the primary experience, I can write and think about Institutional facts - my driver's licence, the money in my account, the job I once had, the club I might have belonged to - but only metaphorically, as figures of speech that are not literally applicable.

Searle's intentionality refers to content in the mind not object in the external world

For Searle, the representational properties of a mental state are inherent in the nature of the mental state itself, whether or not it is actually related to some extra-mental object
or state of affairs. Intentionality of a mental state describes its content, not the object.

The consequence is that Speech Acts must be part of a private language

Wittgenstein in Philosophical Investigations argued that a language understandable by only a single individual is incoherent, yet, if my only certain knowledge is with these phenomena, whilst only having a belief in any external world the other side of them, then any speech act I take part in can only be directed at the phenomenal interface between what I know for certain and what I can only believe.

Promises are an example of a type of performative utterance that makes something the case. — Banno

An object becoming a bishop or a combination of letters becoming a word are historical events
A combination of letters or a piece on a chess board don't have intrinsic meaning, but have been given a meaning at some time in the past during a performative act.

The inventor of chess (simplifying history) in a performative act said that a piece having a rounded top with slit cut into it would be named a "bishop" and could only move diagonally. If, perchance, a piece on the chess board does not move diagonally, then it is not a bishop.

Language has developed in a series of performative acts, such that the combination of letters "p-r-o-m-i-s-e" means that that the person who has used it is obliged to carry out what they said they would do. If, perchance, the person does not carry out what they said they would do, then whatever word they used was not a promise - even if they had used the word "promise".


The situation for the subsequent user of language or player of chess is different.
The statement "the Bishop moves diagonally" is true, part of the "state of affairs" of the world, is an institutional fact, is part of a collective intentionality and is constative.

The statement "I ought to move the bishop diagonally" is incorrect use of language, as bishops must be moved diagonally.

As the statement "I promise to move the bishop diagonally" refers to a future event, it is nether true nor false and therefore performative.

However, that I made the statement ""I promise to move the bishop diagonally" is either true or false, and is therefore constative.

Summary
A word in language or a piece on a chess board have a meaning because they have been given a meaning in the past in a performative act. If a piece on a chess board does not move diagonally then it is not a Bishop. If a combination of letters does not result in what the speaker said they would do, then it is not a promise.

As Searle said "One can begin to answer this question by saying that for me to state such an institutional fact is already to invoke the constitutive rules of the institution".

Interpreting Searle, we naturally assume that we live in a social group that shares fundamental beliefs. In such a social institution, if someone has made a promise then this commits me to a view about what they ought to do, because if I had no committent to a view about what they ought to do, then that person had not made a promise - even if they had used the word "promise".

At weekly meetings, refugees from reason gather and reaffirm their reason-denying beliefs. — Art48

You are defining "reason" and "truth" in a limited way, as being dependent upon what is on the other side of the "wall". You say that reason is the attempt to look past the "wall" at what may be uncomfortable truths.

But why cannot reason also be remaining this side of the "wall" and accepting beliefs that not only do we believe to be true but also are comfortable with, and which, when all said and done, do pragmatically work ?

Only one impossible answer: we do in fact experience the (noumenal) world; and our experience is not localized to this grey physical mass. Consciousness is, after all, noumena. Nothing escapes this. Certainly not phenomena. — Constance

Interpreting what you wrote in my own terms.

You wrote: I am far less interested in objects than I am in the self.

We begin with the self, the "I" that is conscious, the "I" that has thoughts. The "I" has thoughts about things external to the thoughts themselves, things that change with time, and these things are called phenomena. All the "I" knows for certain are phenomena - the colour red, a sharp pain, an acrid smell, a sour taste, a crackling noise. The "I" has thoughts about these individual phenomena, but more than that, the "I" combines these individual phenomena in various ways. The "I's" thoughts are about phenomena and various combinations of phenomena.

A whole is only conceivable in relation to a part, just as up is only conceivable relative to down. Meanings are generated in opposition.

The nature of relations is critical. My belief is that relations do ontologically exist in the mind (the Binding Problem). We call these combinations of phenomena "noumena". We think about particular combinations of phenomena and sometimes we give them a name. The combination of phenomena, the colour red, an acrid smell, a crackling noise we can name "fire", and this "fire" is a noumena. We can say that combinations of phenomena exist in a logical reality, in that noumena exist in a logical reality. A logical reality that exists in the mind.

I don't think of noumena as objects at all. I think of noumena as the indeterminacy inherent in all that is.

Noumena are combinations of phenomena. But a combination is a relation. As relations only ontological exist in the mind, noumena only ontologically exist in the mind. We can think about the noumena occupying a space, but such a space is only a logical space, nothing more than that. When thinking about space, as we are thinking about the relation between phenomena, we are thinking about a logical space.

On the other hand, there we are observing the world and it is intuitively powerful, this presence of things and our engagement. It is not possible that I am not experiencing "reality" for what is real can only be a measure of the way reality is presented.

Our thoughts about these combinations of phenomena, these noumena, are intuitively powerful because they ontologically exist within our mind, within a logical space and a logical reality.

Nothing at all can escape the what we see as eternal, noumenal, infinite.

There is almost no limit to the number of possible combinations of phenomena, in a mereological sense, meaning that there is almost no limit to the potential number of noumena existing in a logical reality

Space and time, when pressed for basic meanings, are apodictically eternal.

In experiencing phenomena, I have freedom to combine them in an almost unlimited number of spatial and temporal ways, a logical space and time unbounded and eternal.

I am surely receiving the (noumenal) world indirectly. But one can never get around, in an empirical way, that the thick membrane of brain tissue simply has no epistemic access to the "outside"

The mind needs no epistemic access to the external world in order to perceive noumena. The mind perceives the noumena directly as combinations of phenomena in a logical space existing within the mind.

Only one impossible answer: we do in fact experience the (noumenal) world; and our experience is not localized to this grey physical mass. Consciousness is, after all, noumena. Nothing escapes this. Certainly not phenomena.

Our consciousness is of phenomena and combinations of phenomena , both having an ontological existence within the mind. These combinations of phenomena, which we know as noumena, exist in a logical world that exists within the mind.

Kant's a priori pure intuition

Kant's a priori pure intuitions of time and space may be explained as being a logical time and space created by ontological relationships between phenomena, ie, noumena, within the mind.

Logic and the world

a perverse belief in a logically structured world can generate a false sense of paradox

Relations are an ontological part of the logical world we perceive in our minds. The world we imagine outside of the phenomena we perceive is a world that we cannot imagine to have relations (FH Bradley's Regress argument). It is inevitable that the application of relational logic onto a world without relational logic will inevitable lead to paradox.

But that is not Kant. We do not become aware of noumena indirectly. We do not become aware of this at all. This is the trouble with analytic philosophy and the attempt to tall about Kant and transcendental idealism.It does not have any thematic development for this. And I will say this with emphasis: If you are looking for some way to make sense out of Kant's idealism, and to build on this, elaborate on what Kant laid out there, then talk about direct and indirect realism is not a viable alternative as it insists that empirical observation, somewhere in the discoveries through microscopes and telescopes, is going to be relevant. — Constance

A question
Kant said that a priori knowledge is "knowledge that is absolutely independent of all experience". I propose that such priori knowledge is innate within the brain, a product of over 4 billion years of evolution and is part of the physical "hardware" of the brain.

I am curious as to your belief as to the source of this a priori knowledge, this pure intuition of time and space intrinsic in our minds?

What are "noumena"

Kant wrote in Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics 1783: "And we indeed, rightly considering objects of sense as mere appearances, confess thereby that they are based upon a thing in itself, though we know not this thing as it is in itself, but only know its appearances, viz., the way in which our senses are affected by this unknown something."

Kant included causation within the category of pure understanding, an a priori pure intuition, where an effect requires a cause. Given causation as an a priori pure intuition, it follows that the observer must know without doubt that there has been a cause to the phenomenon, and this cause may be called a "noumenon".

In my terms, a belief in causation is a Kantian a priori pure intuition because it has been wired into the brain through evolutionary processes,

The problem remains that although such an a priori belief may be pragmatically useful, there is no guarantee that it corresponds with the reality of the external world.

IE, I am not aware of any justification by Kant as to why a priori pure intuitions should of necessity correspond with the reality of the external world. This is the same problem found in Indirect Realism, in discovering the reality of the external world through internal representations.

Concepts

There must be a distinction between the whole and its parts. When we observe something, we are observing a whole made up from a relationship between parts. As relations don't ontologically exist in the external world, as illustrated by FH Bradley, and relations do ontologically exist in the mind, as illustrated by the Binding problem, we can say that the parts of the object do exist in the external world, but the whole object, as a relation between its parts, can only exist in the mind as a concept.

The parts we observe are assembled in the mind into concepts - a table is a table top plus table legs, a house is a roof plus walls plus windows, etc. But many mereological permutations are possible of the parts we observe within the external world - a table top plus table legs, my pen and the Eiffel Tower, etc. We sensibly choose and name those particular combinations that are beneficial to our evolutionary well-being and survival.

It follows that if we think of noumena as objects in the external world consisting of a relationship between a set of parts, then it is true that noumena don't ontologically exist in the world, as relations don't ontologically exist in the external world, but only in the mind of the observer as a concept.

You wrote "If you are going to take seriously some impossible interface with noumena, it is not going to happen through a discursive reasoning process of what is "out there" because what is out there will always be conditioned evidence and noumena are not conditioned"

IE, in my terms, it follows that our understanding of noumena as defined as objects in the external world must be transcendental in that objects in the external world don't ontologically exist.

Meaning

Meaning in language is in the relationship between parts. "Apple" has no meaning in itself. "The apple is green" has meaning because of the relationship between its parts, "apple" and "green". As relations have no ontological existence in the external world, but only in the mind, and as meaning is a relationship between parts, meaning cannot exist in the external world, but only in the mind

You wrote: "This is why hermeneutics is so important, for it sees this and therefore puts interpretation first, and it is not physicality that takes priority, but meaning, and this goes to language and logic."

IE, in my terms, any meaning discovered in the external world must be transcendental, as meaning has no ontological existence in the external world but only in the mind.