A thing having a property is an entirely different subject than something's knowledge of a property. Whether the property is conceived of or not seems off topic. — noAxioms

But how can you know about the properties of a thing-in-itself if you have no knowledge of the thing-in-itself?

Going down this path is once again why the disclaimer is there in the OP. I see no productivity to it. — noAxioms

Our only knowledge comes from mental abstractions.

Metaphysically speaking, how can we know something that doesn't depend on our mental abstractions? If metaphysically impossible, the disclaimer in the OP makes the OP unanswerable.

So, it is not bad thing to have the strict legal system in some aspect, would you not agree? — Corvus

I agree, as long as society thinks that a strict legal system is moral.

Hallucination is not extreme case. It is a subjective case. — Corvus

The Argument from Hallucination against Direct Realism is making an objective case against Direct Realism.

Anything requires predication, since a lack of properties is itself a property, and a contradictory one at that. — noAxioms

I don't think that it is grammatically correct to say that a lack of properties is itself a property.

Both the EPP and Meinong accept that properties are attributed to objects. A property is any member of a class of entities that are capable of being attributed to objects (Wikipedia - Property (philosophy). The EPP means that the existence of an object is prior to the object's predication. Meinong said that there are three types of objects, those that exist, those that subsist and those that absist.

Objects have properties. In the absence of properties there must be an absence of an object. In the absence of an object there must be an absence of properties. Therefore, in the absence of properties there must be the absence of any property

For the EPP, the lack of properties means the lack of any property. For Meinong, the lack of properties means the lack of any object, which means the lack of any property. Therefore, the lack of properties cannot be a property.

It wouldn't be accepted as valid or meaningful arguments on the basis of either non relevant or highly unlikely example. — Corvus

Hardly highly unlikely. "In the 21st century, hudud, including amputation of limbs, is part of the legal systems of Brunei, Iran, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen" (www.studycountry.com)

Again, the other party can reject the arguments on the basis of highly unlikely example or irrelevant example for the main point. — Corvus

Direct Realists may reject the Argument from Hallucination, but many Indirect Realists accept it as a valid argument.

Appealing to Extremes is a formal fallacy. — Corvus

Being an extreme case doesn't in itself make a logical fallacy.

I agree that an extreme case, where an argument is exaggerated to such a hyperbolic degree that it distorts the argument, would be a logical fallacy.

However, an extreme case, where an argument is not exaggerated to such a hyperbolic degree that it distorts the argument, would not be a logical fallacy.

The Argument from hallucination deals with an extreme case and is used as an argument against Direct Realism. That it is an extreme case does not mean that it is not a valid argument.

Isn't the law formally accepted legal system by the people of the society? — Corvus

I don't think that society would willingly accept a legal system that was immoral. I have no evidence, but I am sure that this is the case.

Isn't this an appeal to extreme case fallacy? — Corvus

Being an extreme case doesn't make it a fallacy.

Good point, so long as 'properties' isn't confined to your experience. — noAxioms

The problem is that it is impossible to talk about properties independent of our experiences of them.

The question is about the relationship between existence and properties. But what do we mean by "properties". You raise the problem as to how we can know something that is outside our experiences.

However, you present an impossible task when you say "Good point, as long as "properties isn't confined to your experience", in that how can we discuss something that we have never experienced. We can only talk about things we have experienced. We cannot talk about things we haven't experienced. We can only talk about those aspects of properties that we have experienced. We cannot talk about those aspect of properties that we haven't experienced

Kant made the point when he said that we cannot discuss things-in-themselves, as they are the other side of anything we experience. Something outside our experiences is an unknown, and if unknown, we cannot talk about it. It is impossible to know about something about which we have no experience. It is impossible to know how those aspects of properties we have experienced relate to those aspects of properties we haven't experienced.

When we do discuss properties, we can only discuss those aspects of the property that we know about, and we can only know something by experiencing it. There may well be aspects of the property that we haven't experienced, but these aspects must remain unknown to us. Being unknown, we cannot talk about them. Everything we know about our experiences we can describe in words as part of language. The properties we describe in language only includes those aspects of properties that we have experienced.

We only know about properties because of our experiences. Because we have experienced the colour red, we are able to talk about the property of redness. We are only able to describe the properties we have experienced in words, within language, and this surely is the distinguishing feature of what we know about properties. Everything we know about properties can be described in words. For us, a property is a description. We can only describe what we have experienced.

A property is a description in language of something we have experienced. A property is not something that exists independently of the human mind in the mind-independent world. Such a thing would be a thing-in-itself, an unknown unknown.

What we mean by "properties" is of necessity confined to our experiences, and exist as propositions within language.

Morality only judges the moral actions of the folks. Legality judges the acts and also hand down the punishments according the law, hence legality precedes morality. — Corvus

The law could state that the punishment for stealing anything valued up to £50 was the amputation of the right hand.

You are right that the law judges the act and hands down a punishment according to the law.

Are you arguing that a particular law must be followed by a society even if that society believes that that particular law is morally wrong?

Isn't it itself an act of moral wrongness to break the law, revolt and overthrow the system? — Corvus

No, as only moral laws are valid. It is not morally wrong to break a law that itself is not moral.

I agree that it is the moral thing to do to follow the laws of the country.

However, the assumption is that laws are founded on moral principles. Only laws founded on moral principles are valid laws. If a law is not founded on moral principles then it is an invalid law. Therefore, the moral thing to do is to follow valid laws, and valid laws are founded on principles of morality. It is not immoral to not follow invalid laws, those laws that are not based on principles of morality.

Breaking a law not founded on moral principles is not morally wrong.

You have options to get adjusted to the system whatever system you live in, and flourish under the system knowing it and abiding by it — Corvus

Even if the system is morally wrong? In abiding by a system that is morally wrong, then one is condoning it, meaning that abiding to a morally wrong system is in itself an immoral act.

There is the commonly held principle (does it have a name? "EPP" if not) that existence is conceptually prior to predication, prior to it having any property at all. So an apple is red only if the apple exists Santa is not meaningfully fat — noAxioms

What does prior in "existence is prior to predication" mean?

From SEP - Existence

There are two sets of reasons for denying that existence is a property of individuals. The first is Hume and Kant's puzzlement over what existence would add to an object. What is the difference between a red apple and a red existing apple? To be red (or even to be an apple) it must already exist, as only existing things instantiate properties

The thing's existence is prior to any predication to it and so it is incoherent to think of existence as a property had by the thing. This thought is behind Aristotle's thesis that existence is not a further feature of a thing beyond its essence.

Hume argued (in A Treatise of Human Nature 1.2.6) that there is no impression of existence distinct from the impression of an object, which is ultimately on Hume's view a bundle of qualities.

From Merriam Webster, "prior" may mean i) earlier in time or order ii) taking precedence (as in importance).

For an apple to be red, the apple must exist.

It cannot be the case that an apple exists and at a later time the property "is red" is added, so meaning i) is not relevant.

In Hume's view, existence is no more than a bundle of properties. Therefore for Hume, ii) is not relevant.

We can only know about the existence of something in the world by observing its properties. If we never observed the property red we could never know about the existence of an apple in the world.

In what way does the existence of something take precedence over its properties, when that something cannot exist without properties?

Looking at it the other way round, in what way do the properties of something take precedence over the existence of that something, when there would be no properties if that something didn't exist?

It seems, that the word "prior" is not the correct word in relating the existence of something with the properties it has. Perhaps the phrase should be "existence requires predication"?

Humans are more important. — Patterner

For humans, humans are more important than cats.
For cats, cats are more important than mice.
For mice, mice are more important than cockroaches
For cockroaches, cockroaches are more important than bed bugs.

Philosophically, is it right that one part of nature is more important than another part of nature?

Why do you think that is the case? Does morality precede legality? Or vice versa? — Corvus

It is the moral thing that morality precedes legality, even if that is not always the case.

I don't think the public would accept a legal system that was not fundamentally moral. Sooner or later they would revolt and overthrow the system.

If you are a citizen of a country, then would you have choice not to accept the legal system? — Corvus

True. I have no choice, regardless of whether I believe the system to be immoral or not. Though I could emigrate.

That's why the difference between being able to judge and not being able to judge is more philosophically important than the difference between the electron and the Higgs Boson. — Patterner

That means that philosophical questions about the nature of time, space and the Universe are less important than philosophical questions about the human mind.

Is it right that humans consider themselves more important than the world in which they live?

But that's completely groundless speculation. — Wayfarer

Perhaps, but as you correctly wrote:

The capacity to grasp what could be, might be, or should be, is what distinguishes humans from other species — Wayfarer

As to why the ability to judge should be argued to be of special importance—it very obviously is — Janus

Why is the ability to judge of "special" importance? I agree that it is an important philosophical question, but why more important than other philosophical questions, such as those of space, time, existence, consciousness, the quantum theory, knowledge, the origin of the Universe, etc?

Is there a philosophical difference between the electron and the Higgs Boson? — Patterner

A very good philosophical question. The philosophy of particle physics is an academic topic.

For example, the Cambridge University press has a series about elements in the philosophy of physics.

From Philosophy of Particle Physics

This Element offers an introduction to selected philosophical issues that arise in contemporary particle physics, aimed at philosophers who have limited prior exposure to quantum field theory. One the one hand, it critically surveys philosophical work on the representation of particles in quantum field theory, the formal machinery and conceptual implications of renormalization and renormalization group methods, and ontological and methodological questions raised by the use of effective field theory techniques in particle physics. On the other, it identifies topics in particle physics that have not yet received philosophical attention and sketches avenues for philosophical analysis of those topics.

There is the commonly held principle (does it have a name? "EPP" if not) that existence is conceptually prior to predication, prior to it having any property at all. So an apple is red only if the apple exists Santa is not meaningfully fat. — noAxioms

I believe that for Bertrand Russell, there is something that is an apple and is red.

Being an apple is a predication in the same way that being red is a predication.

Should one say existence is prior to predication or existence is contemporaneous with its predication?

It is not as if something exists and then at a future date a predication is attached.

Certainly, mortality is relative. But I'm suggesting there's a common reason for all morality.........................Perhaps moral codes are all rooted in what gives the individual the best chance of continued life and prosperity. — Patterner

Moral absolutism is a meta ethical view that some or even all actions are intrinsically right or wrong, regardless of context or consequence (Wikipedia - Moral absolutism)

Is it possible for a moral code to be intrinsically right, even though it may not give the individual the best chance of continued life and prosperity?

That process is nothing to do with morality. — Corvus

I agree that once the criminal laws have been established, it then becomes a legal rather than moral judgment.

But the criminal justice system will only work if the criminal laws are moral.

Would you accept as a citizen of a country criminal laws that were not moral?

The punishment is a legal judgement. It has nothing to do with morality. — Corvus

Yes, legal judgments are different to moral judgements. But as bread is different to wheat, bread is made from wheat. Legal judgements are founded in moral judgments. Any law not judged to be moral would be unacceptable

From Law vs. Ethics: The Debate Over What’s Legal and What’s Right

While the law functions as a system of rules backed by political authority to maintain order, ethics is a broader concept grounded in personal, cultural, and societal values.

Law is a formal system of rules enforced by governmental institutions. The law’s objective is to maintain social order, protect rights, and promote justice.

Justice, after all, is a product of moral values.

The protection of rights is a moral duty.

Social order is the moral thing to achieve.

If Legal judgment is not founded on moral judgment, where does legal judgment get its authority?

Perhaps moral codes are all rooted in what gives the individual the best chance of continued life and prosperity. — Patterner

Moral Relativism rather than Moral Absolutism.

Moral normativity is effective for the time period and the societies we live in...................That would be a fallacy of anachronism. — Corvus

OK, lets consider 2025 and avoid anachronism.

Stoning to death is a legal punishment for adultery in Iran, and therefore normative within Iran today (Wikipedia - Capital punishment in Iran).

Some within Iran may disagree with this law. That some disagree with the moral normativity of the society that they live in, does it follow that this makes them necessarily morally corrupt or morally insensitive?

Of course there would be folks who don't agree, or understand the maxim...In that case, they would be treated as morally corrupt or morally insensitive......................Morality is also based on what is called "normativity" — Corvus

Slavery was normative in Ancient Rome and played an important role in its society and economy (Wikipedia - Slavery in ancient Rome)

It may well be that the minority who did not agree with slavery were treated as morally corrupt or morally insensitive by the majority

But does that mean that they were in fact either morally corrupt or morally insensitive?

It would be like asking "Why 1+1=2", wouldn't it? — Corvus

Some would say that 1 + 1 = 10

It depends on what number system you are using.

Doing X harms others, therefore X is morally wrong. Could this be not a justification of moral code? — Corvus

The moral code "Doing X harms others, therefore X is morally wrong" can be described.

But, how can you justify in words why that X harming others is morally wrong?

Why is harming others wrong?

I think it's because what is described nowadays as philosophy doesn't have the foundational concepts required to comprehend why it's important. — Wayfarer

Why is one difference more philosophically important than another difference?

Life may be common throughout the Universe, and H.sapiens may not be the only example of something that can judge the world around it. In which case, being able to judge may be a natural expression of the nature of the world.

Yes, something having the ability to judge, such as a human, is different to something that doesn't have the ability to judge, such as a tree, but how can this be argued to be of special importance, if no more than a natural expression of nature.

Why is the difference between being able to judge and not being able to judge more philosophically important than the difference between the electron and the Higgs Bosun?

Does everyone who does things that don't make sense have a disorder? — Patterner

No.

Intuitively doing something that makes sense

Sometimes people do things intuitively because it makes sense at the time. Sometimes these acts are intuitive, such as giving up a well paid job or starting to take a particular drug. It may not be possible to put their reasons into words, other than the feeling that it is the right thing to do.

Sometimes these acts are beneficial, such as finding another job that is even better paid, and sometime these acts are detrimental, such as in becoming an addict.

The consequence of an intuitive act is only known subsequently. The consequence of an intuitive act that makes sense at the time can only be known subsequent to the act. Sometimes it may be beneficial and sometimes it may be detrimental. With hindsight, someone who makes an act that is subsequently seen to be detrimental can be said to have a disorder, and someone who makes an act that is subsequently seen to be beneficial can be said to be sensible.

Whether someone who makes an intuitive act because it makes sense at the time can only be said to have a disorder or be sensible subsequent to the act when the consequences of the act are known.

Moral codes
A moral code is an example of something that is followed intuitively because it makes sense at the time.

As Wittgenstein wrote in the Tractatus, ethical values cannot be put into words. The reasons why something is moral cannot be put into words, even though the moral code itself can be put into words. "Thou shall not kill" can be included within a proposition even though why thou shall not kill cannot be. One follows the moral code because it intuitively makes sense. This doesn't mean that one cannot break one's own moral code if the circumstances require it, for example, if "thou shall not kill" conflicts with one's personal survival.

Moral codes can be described but not justified.

The capacity to grasp what could be, might be, or should be, is what distinguishes humans from other species. — Wayfarer

There are examples now showing an animal's ability to grasp what might be.

From Crows could be the smartest animal other than primates

Crows have long been considered cunning. But their intelligence may be far more advanced than we ever thought possible.
Crows, in fact, might be like us not so much because they are clever (and so are we) but rather because they sometimes engage their cleverness simply for fun – and so do we.
The crows McCoy studies have a natural curiosity, she says. They cheekily grab scientific equipment and fly off with it in the aviary. Young birds especially, she says, love to play.
That said, “clever” animals can sometimes perform tasks beyond those strictly demanded by nature.

From Are crows the ultimate problem solvers? - Inside the Animal Mind: Episode 2 - BBC

The bird is familiar with the individual objects, but this is the first time he's seen them arranged like this. 8 separate stages, that must be completed in a specific order if the puzzle is to be solved.

The ability to work through 8 separate stages in a specific order infers that more than a simplistic instinct is at play.

The capacity to grasp what might be is now being found in animals other than humans.

There is evidence that some animals can be altruistic. Altruism is linked with having a conscience.

Altruism is the concern for the well-being of others, independently of personal benefit or reciprocity (Wikipedia). Having a conscience is being aware of the moral goodness of one's own conduct (Merriam Webbster)

From Are Animals Altruistic?
.

Take African grey parrots, for example: A recent study revealed that they voluntarily gave the tokens they were trained to exchange for food to parrots that had no tokens. The biologists who conducted this study were surprised when they realized that the parrots seemed to have a genuine understanding of when and why their partners needed their help—they would rarely give the tokens over when the window to exchange them for food was closed.

The concern for the well-being of others is an example of moral behaviour

Having a conscience is being aware when one should be being altruistic towards others but for some reason isn't.

If the African grey parrot has an understanding of when and why their partners needed their help, but doesn't provide any help for whatever reason, being torn between ought to do something but not doing something is the hallmark of having a conscience.

This is not to say that a parrots sense of morality equals that of a human, but does suggest that the parrot has a glimmer of morality, and consequently the glimmer of a conscience.

Humans are animals after all. The human animal evolved from non-human animals. The human animal didn't appear ready-formed from nowhere.

But if it did ‘make sense’ to you, nothing you’ve said would prevent you from so doing. You’re not describing a moral code — Wayfarer

If a moral code didn't make sense, it wouldn't be followed.

A moral code can be a set of principles of ethical conduct established by an individual for that individual (Dictionary.com, Definitions.net). Ethics is concerned with what is good and bad, right and wrong. (Britannica.com)

If something doesn't make sense to me then I avoid doing it.

I think that it is good that I avoid doing something that doesn't make sense to me. I think that I am right in avoiding doing something that doesn't make sense to me.

What I think good and right of necessity follows from what makes sense to me.

Morality is not an abstract concept that has no bearing on how I live my life, but is a concrete concept directly related to my relationship with the world.

If being good made no sense, and if doing the right thing made no sense, neither being good nor doing the right thing would be part of my moral code.

I have a personal moral code precisely because some things make sense and some things don't.

I'm afraid the attitude that you're describing is very close to that of a psychopathology. There's no reason for any action, other than what makes sense to me. Nature may have reasons, but there's no way you or I can know what they are. — Wayfarer

Stealing doesn't make sense to me, therefore I avoid stealing. I wouldn't conclude that my avoiding stealing because of my subjective belief that stealing is wrong should therefore be studied as a mental illness. :smile:

Humans are natural. Humans judge good and evil. Therefore, nature judges good and evil. — Patterner

P1 Humans are part of nature
P2 An individual human can make a judgment as to what is good or evil
P3 There is no consistent judgment across all individuals as to what is good or evil, and it may be that different individuals judgments are in opposition to each other.
C1 Each individual's judgment as to what is good or evil is particular to them and is subjective.

P1 Within nature, either i) there is an objective judgment of good or evil or ii) there is no objective judgment of good or evil

P1 Assume that within nature there is an objective judgment of good or evil.
P2 Humans are part of nature.
P3 Each individual's judgment as to what is good or evil is particular to them and is subjective.
C1 As within nature there is an objective judgement of good and evil, yet only subjective judgments of what is good or evil within individual humans, humans are not aware of the objective judgment of good and evil.

P1 Assume that within nature there is no objective judgment of good and evil
P2 Humans are part of nature
P3 Each individual's judgment as to what is good or evil is particular to them and is subjective
C1 As between different individuals there may be a range of judgments as to what is good or evil, it is not possible to determine an objective judgment of what is good or evil.
C2 Within nature, whilst there may be a range of judgments as to what is good or evil, there can be no objective judgment of what is good or evil.

In conclusion, within nature there may be an objective judgement of what is good or evil, but humans are not aware of it. The fact that humans are part of nature and make subjective judgments as to what is good or evil does not mean that within nature there is an objective judgment of what is good or evil.

It doesn’t present an argument or arguments, but a series of declarations. — Wayfarer

:smile: Plenty to take on board and food for thought. There is plenty to say, but limiting myself to Wittgenstein.

The basis of ethics is neither subjective nor objective, but transcendental. That is what Wittgenstein means when he says ‘ethics is transcendent’ (TLP 6.41) - objective propositions are what ethics are transcendent in respect to. Conscience is traditionally that faculty which is guided by or drawn towards a transcendent source of ethics, something lacking in animals for whom such matters do not arise. — Wayfarer

In TLP 6.421, does Wittgenstein write "Ethics is transcendent" or "Ethics is transcendental"?
What does Wittgenstein mean by "Ethics is transcendental"? (TLP 6.421)
When Wittgenstein says "transcendental", does he in fact mean "transcendent"?
How does "transcendent" differ to "transcendental"?
Why are ethics transcendental rather than subjective or objective?
Why is conscience drawn to a transcendent source of ethics?
Does Wittgenstein think that ethics can be put into propositions?
How do we know that the transcendent source of ethics is objective?
How do you know that animals have no conscience?

Underlining declarations doesn’t make them valid arguments. — Wayfarer

Of course not. That is why the underlined declaration is immediately followed by my argument, hopefully valid.

But I hope that underlining the declarations makes it easier for the busy Forum reader, who is often contributing to several threads at the same time, to more easily follow the structure of my reply.

Headings are sometimes advised. For example, in the article Should you Include Headings and Subheadings in an Essay?

If you have ever tried reading a large blob of text, then you know how hard it can be. However, it becomes easier to read when broken into headings and subheadings.

Academic writings like essays have a standard of writing that must be upheld. While not every essay requires headings and subheadings, they are important for organizing your writing.

For example if someone's society judges them to not be fit to participate in that society and subsequently banishes or imprisons that person, I'd expect that person to find society's judgement to be meaningful. — wonderer1

The imprisoned person may feel angry, but this would be an emotion, not a subjective judgement by the prisoner.

Being imprisoned would be an objective fact for the imprisoned person, not a subjective judgment of the prisoner.

If every judgement I make, "killing is wrong", can be countered by its opposite, "killing is right", what value do my judgments have?

That's what I was getting at when I said that the tendency to idolise nature and the environment in modern culture really amounts to a kind of faux religiosity. — Wayfarer

Humans are a part of nature and not separate to it
Humans are a part of nature and not separate to it. Particular features of human existence, such as self-awareness, ability to judge, being intellectual rather than instinctive and having a morality may be explained as natural expressions of nature. Nature is using the agency of the human to express these particular features, rather than being expressed by a human existing separately to a world in which they have evolved.

Knowledge is different to good and evil
There is knowledge, the Moon is about 384,000 km away from Earth, and there is good and evil, kindness is good and killing is evil. But these are different things, in that we have knowledge about things that exist in the world, but good and evil only exist in the mind.

Human self-awareness is not evidence that humans are separate to nature
That humans are self-aware is not evidence that humans are separate to nature. If humans are a part of nature rather than separate to it, then it may be argued that it is the case that nature is self-aware through the agency of the human. Human self-awareness is the mechanism by which nature is self-aware. In the same sense, the hammer is the tool by which I hammer in a nail. It is not the hammer that is hammering in the nail.

Human judgement is not evidence that humans are separate to nature
It is true that humans are capable of judgement and are intellectual rather than instinctive, but this would be the case regardless of whether we had free will, where we can decide to act in a certain way, or were determined by forces over which we had no control. For the Determinist, all behaviour has a cause, meaning that even though we make judgements these have been determined. For the believer in Free-will, we have some choice in how we behave. That humans are determined is evidence that humans are not separate to nature, as it is nature which makes the determination. That humans have free-will is not evidence that humans are separate to nature. As with self-awareness, nature has free-will through the agency of the human. Human free will is the mechanism by which nature has free will.

Human subjective morality may be an illusion
Humans are aware of morality and have ethical dilemmas, but such concepts of good and evil, better or worse, right or wrong don't objectively exist in the world but only subjectively in the mind. However, as you wrote about the tendency to idolise nature and the environment as a kind of faux religiosity, it may well be the case that our concepts of good and evil are no more than a faux morality, no more than an illusion having no substance. The problem with a morality that is subjective is that it must forever remain particular to the individual, particular to a particular time and particular to a particular context. One person knows that Pro Life is good and Pro choice evil, another person knows that Pro Life is evil and Pro choice is good. The moral approach to slavery today is very different to that of the Romans two thousand years ago. Whilst killing may be evil, in different circumstances, during a war for survival, killing may be good.

Subjective morality has no objective foundation
If any moral position may be countered by an opposing moral position, if killing may be evil but may also be good, if Pro choice is evil but also may be good, then the concept of a subjective morality becomes meaningless. There is no objective reality against which to know whether any particular moral position is right or wrong, good or bad, better or worse.

Humans are the mechanism by which nature operates
That humans are self-aware, capable of judgement, are intellectual rather than instinctual and aware of morality is not evidence that humans are separate to nature. All these may be explained as the mechanisms by which nature expresses itself, which is though the agency of the human.

We cannot not be part of nature. However, we have qualities that, to our knowledge, no other part of nature has. I don't think it's out of line to judge us. Especially since some of those qualities are what gives us the concept of judgement. We, alone, can judge. — Patterner

Humans make subjective not objective judgements.
There are no general agreement as to foundational objective judgments. Killing may be wrong, but then again it may be right. Abortion may be wrong, but then again it may be right. It may be asked of what value are subjective judgements, when no one subjective judgment can take precedence over any other subjective judgement. Pro life believe unborn babies have a right to life and Pro choice believe unborn babies may be aborted.

In nature there are no judgements.
Apples are not right and oranges wrong. Trees are not better and mountains worse. Whales are not good and scorpions bad.

Animals do judge.
Across the animal kingdom, infanticide has been observed in totally disparate mammal species, from dolphins to lions to baboons. Since it was first witnessed in the wild, researchers have come up with a variety of explanations as to why males might kill infants of their own species. ( www.smithsonianmag.com). It may well be the case that animals do judge what course of action to take, but not necessarily why a particular course of action is morally right or wrong.

Humans make subjective judgements.
An individual may say that "killing is wrong", thereby making a moral judgement, but this is a subjective rather than objective judgement. The subjective judgement is particular to one individual, at one particular moment in time and in one particular context. Different people make different judgements about the same issue. For example, regarding abortion, some are Pro life and some are Pro choice. Some believe that unborn babies have a right to life, and some advocate for abortion throughout all nine months of pregnancy. There is no one objective judgement towards abortion. Judgements towards abortion are subjective to each individual.

A judgement is not about a certainty.
A Judge may judge someone guilty given the evidence, but they don't know for certain that the person is guilty. It may be that the weight of evidence infers that they are guilty. A judgment infers an uncertainty. I may judge that killing is wrong. However there may be some circumstances, such as a war for survival, when I judge that killing may be right.

No subjective judgement can take precedence.
Any subjective judgment is an acceptance that it may be wrong. As subjective judgments may be different in a different individual, time and context, no subjective moral judgement can take preference over any other subjective moral judgment. Therefore, no moral judgement should be taken as having precedence over any other moral judgement. No moral judgement may take precedence over its antithesis. The moral judgement that killing is wrong may not take precedence over its antithesis that killing is right .

If no subjective judgement can take precedence, then any subjective judgement is meaningless.
However, if no moral judgement can distinguish between its thesis and antithesis, then moral judgements lose validity and become meaningless. In nature there are no objective judgements, and in humans subjective judgements are meaningless. Nature cannot judge. Humans can judge, but they cannot objectively judge, only subjectively judge. As no subjective judgment can take precedence over its antithesis, any subjective judgement becomes meaningless.

Humans are a part of nature, and as nature has no objective judgement neither do humans.
Even if the individual has free will, this has been determined by nature, of which the human is a part. Any judgment the individual makes is an expression of nature. As nature is neither right nor wrong, any human expression of judgment cannot be right or wrong. The individual may judge killing wrong, but this is a subjective not objective judgement. A subjective judgement is an illusion of an objective judgement.

Humans cannot make objective judgments, and subjective judgements are meaninglesss
Nature doesn't make objective judgements of right or wrong, true or false or better or worse. As the human individual is a part of nature, an expression of nature, neither can the human individual make objective judgments. However, a human individual can make a subjective judgement, but as no one subjective judgement can take precedence over any other subjective judgement, subjective judgments become meaningless.

Besides, what does it mean to say that h.sapiens is ‘part of nature’? Why is that meaningful or important? — Wayfarer

Whether mankind is a part of nature or separate to it has important consequences, specifically in whether mankind's relationship with nature is open to judgement or not.

Nature is non-judgemental. Nature includes all the laws, elements and phenomena of the physical world, including life. If the wind blows down a tree, this is neither good nor bad. An apple is neither better nor worse than an orange. A whale is not good and a scorpion is not bad. A lake is not true and a mountain is not false. Nature is outside any judgment.

On the one hand, if mankind is a part of nature, and not separate to nature, then any act of mankind is no more than another act of nature, no more than any other expression of nature, and is therefore entirely natural. As acts of nature are non-judgemental, then any act of mankind, being a part of nature and not separate to it, are also outside being judged. As nature blowing down a tree is outside any judgement of right or wrong, mankind cutting down a tree must also be outside any judgement of being right or wrong. It seems clear that mankind is an intrinsic part of nature and not separate to it, being totally dependent on nature for its existence, and having evolved as a part of nature over a period of at least 3 billion years.

On the other hand, if mankind is not a part of nature, and is separate to it, then mankind's relationship with nature is open to being judged, and mankind's cutting down a tree is open to be judged wrong. The question is, if mankind is separate to nature, and not part of nature, then for what reason does mankind have any responsibility towards nature.

If mankind is a part of nature, then no act of mankind within nature is open to judgement. However, if mankind is separate to nature, for what reason does mankind have a responsibility to nature, and if mankind does have a responsibility, then its relationship with nature may be open to judgement.

If there is a human fall, it is our fall from nature; our infatuation with knowledge, the this and that of our own constructions, and our concomitant turning away from life, or nature, or so called God's creation — ENOAH

Mankind falls from a nature where there is no better or worse, no truth or falsity, no right or wrong, no morality and no ethics.

Mankind is a part of nature not separate to it. Mankind was created by nature, and is an expression of nature.

When mankind attempts to separate itself from nature, it attempts to differentiate itself from a nature that is non-judgemental by introducing concepts of judgment, of right and wrong, truth and falsity, better or worse, morality and ethics.

These judgements it then projects onto the world around it, projecting its own beliefs onto a world absent of them.

Mankind perceives truth and falsity in nature because of its attempt to differentiate itself from nature through the invention of judgements such as truth and falsity. These judgements it then projects onto a world absent of them.

In which case ‘natural’ has no meaning, because it doesn’t differentiate anything. — Wayfarer

The fact that a word may have more than one meaning does not make the word meaningless

Most words have more than one meaning. For example, "heavy" can mean "having great weight" or "difficult to bear". The fact that a word has more than one meaning doesn't make the word meaningless.

On the one hand, as mankind is a part of nature, one meaning of "natural" could be everything that mankind makes, including LED bulbs. On the other hand, the meaning of "natural" could be restricted to those things that are not made by mankind, such as sunlight, and differentiated from those things that are made by mankind such as LED bulbs, which can be named as "artificial".

The word "natural" is not made meaningless because it has more than one meaning.

If you were parachuted into a completely natural environment with no artifacts and minimal clothing, I suggest you would find survival extremely difficult — Wayfarer

True, but doesn't mean that mankind is not a part of nature.

I agree that if I was parachuted into a different natural environment, such as the Sahara, I would probably die. But if a whale was parachuted into a different natural environment, such as Provence, it would also probably die.

That something is a part of nature does not mean that that something is able to survive outside its natural environment.

If a tree, one part of nature, found itself in a volcano, another part of nature, the tree couldn't survive.

That mankind is not able to survive in a different natural environment does not mean that mankind is not a part of nature.
===============================================================================

But our 'separateness' from nature seems perfectly obvious to me - we live in buildings, insulated by clothing, travelling in vehicles, none of which are naturally-occuring. — Wayfarer

This is a circular argument. If mankind is a part of nature, then anything mankind does, such as building houses, is a part of nature.