It is both a theory and not a theory. — schopenhauer1

Yes, the phrase "the meaning of a word is its use in the language" is more a theory encompassed in a metaphor, as is "“theory of evolution by natural selection.”

As the National Library of Medicine in the USA wrote:
Metaphors in biology and ecology are so ubiquitous that we have to some extent become blind to their existence. We are inundated with metaphorical language, such as genetic “blueprints,” ecological “footprints,” “invasive” species, “agents” of infectious disease, “superbugs,” “food chains,” “missing links,” and so on.

Wittgenstein may be read the same way, metaphorically rather than literally.

Don’t you know Witt, can’t be categorized — schopenhauer1

As the IEP article Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889—1951) writes:
Both Realism and Anti-Realism, though, are theories, or schools of theories, and Wittgenstein explicitly rejects the advocacy of theories in philosophy. This does not prove that he practised what he preached, but it should give us pause.

Though the famous PI 43 does very much sound like a theory:
For a large class of cases—though not for all—in which we employ the word "meaning" it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language. And the meaning of a name is sometimes explained by pointing to its bearer.

I'm suggesting that the state of affairs is itself made, or perhaps, presupposed, by the language game; that it is fundamental that things are considered to be so-and-so in order that the game occur. — Banno

Is this the position of Antirealism?

IE, if someone says "bring me the slab", are you saying:

1) the state of affairs that there is a slab in the world is made by using the word "slab" in language. IE, the sentence "bring me a slab" creates a slab in the world.

2) the state of affairs that there is a slab in the world is presupposed when using the word "slab" in language. IE, there must be a slab in the world before being able to say "bring me a slab".

Perhaps I am one of the few on the Forum that is not a ChatGPT. That would explain why words have conscious meanings to me. How can I ever know for sure! Could there be a test to know for sure?

But Wittgenstein - the better interpretation is that he shows the realist/idealist division is flawed. That's why anscombe's paper is so careful. But you can find people that put him in either camp. Idealism is pretty well irrelevant. Wittgenstein to a large extent set up the discussion of realism/antirealism in the nineties and noughties. — Banno

Thanks for that. That's what I thought, in that the Investigations takes neither side in the realism/anti realism debate.

This whole statement is not meaningful because no pub owner would hire a person who doesn't understand the meaning of the word "Bring"as a barmaid for his pub. — Corvus

Very true. :up:

Folk have been at pains to try to get you to understand that language games involve both the world and words. It's not one or the other, but both. — Banno

We both accept that there is a "world" in the Investigations, but you're refusing to give your opinion as to where this "world" of Wittgenstein exists.

For the Indirect Realist, it exists only within language and thought, not outside.

For the Direct Realist, the world exists outside of language and thought and is perceived immediately and directly within language and thought.

My understanding is that the Investigations does not give an opinion. There is nothing wrong with this, but it does affect how people read the Investigations.

The sensation of pain is only accessible to the owner of the sensation. Therefore the observer of the other person's pain doesn't know if it is pain or pretention of pain. The observer can only guess. Meanings learnt from guessings are bound to be empty and unreal — Corvus

This is the reality of life.

You keep conflating the builder's language with other language games. — Fooloso4

Even the builder has different language games.

All the assistant needs to know is to bring a slab when the builder calls "Slab!". The builder needs to know how to build with slabs, but there are no words for instructing the builder. His knowledge is not based on a language that consists only of the words “block”, “pillar”, “slab”, “beam”. — Fooloso4

True.

He will not be an assistant unless or until he learns the language. — Fooloso4

You haven't visited the UK.

How do I know that you are pointing to running rather than the runner? — Fooloso4

Certainly not from one example of running, but numerous example of running, all of which have some family resemblance.

You quoted me and then quoted Cavell. You are going to have to explain the connection (or disconnection) if you want me to understand. — Antony Nickles

You contrasted the metaphysical with the interlocutor and the ordinary use with Wittgenstein.

Cavell is pointing out that Wittgenstein accepts both the ordinary and the metaphysical, ie PI 304 Not at all. It is not a something., but not a nothing either!

Cavell in The Later Wittgenstein makes the point that Wittgenstein never denied that we can know what we think and feel.

There is another problem with the pain behaviour of others. What if the person was acting as if he was in pain?  How do you tell if it is genuine pain or acting or pretending to be in pain? — Corvus

Yes, as Wittgenstein wrote:PI 304 "But you will surely admit that there is a difference between pain-behaviour accompanied by pain and pain-behaviour without any pain?"—Admit it?

It can but neither of these is what slab means in the builder's language. — Fooloso4

You haven't been on some the the building sites that I have been on, where a slab of cake has been the highlight of the day.

In the builder's language it cannot be described at all, but what it means can be shown by bringing the builder a slab when he says slab. — Fooloso4

Unless it weighs 10 tonnes, then it would be inconvenient.

All of its uses are uses within the activity of building. — Fooloso4

Yes, but we must understand what the slab is before knowing how best to use it.

In the builder's language it means one thing - bring me a slab. Pointing to a slab does not explain the meaning of "slab". — Fooloso4

Unless the assistant is a foreign worker who doesn't know the language yet.

a language is not a collection of names. — Fooloso4

One can point not only to objects such as slabs, mountains, trees but also to actions such as running, walking, wincing.

Developing the idea, one can then point to a behaviour such as wincing, and replace the behaviour by the word "pain". On the assumption that every effect has a cause, together with the natural inclination of humans to conflate effect with cause, we can then start to include the word "pain" within our language as referring to something that is hidden from sight.

I have shown some example sentences which can be meaningfully used without knowing the meaning of the word in the sentence in the previous posts such as "I don't know what the word bring means." — Corvus

If the barmaid doesn't know the meaning of X in the sentence "X me a lager", then the sentence cannot be meaningfully be used in the context of a pub, though it is true that it could be meaningfully be used in the context of a language class.

I would rather have thought one learns the word pain by feeling it oneself , or reading about the description of pain rather than looking at someone else's pain behaviour. — Corvus

Isn't learning the word pain by feeling it oneself the point of Wittgenstein's Private Language Argument?

Is it possible to learn the meaning of every word one uses just from a dictionary?

Some of the error is to think of "mwanasesere" as having any meaning at all apart from the place it has in the games we play. As if our words all have meanings apart from what we do with them. — Banno

PI 43 For a large class of cases—though not for all—in which we employ the word "meaning" it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language. And the meaning of a name is sometimes explained by pointing to its bearer.

This has been my problem with PI 43, in that it states that the meaning of a word is its use in the language.

The word "mwanasesere" clearly has a use, as we are basing a discussion around it. Even if it has no intrinsic meaning, it has an extrinsic meaning deriving from the other words within the sentence.

However, if the intrinsic meaning of any word is irrelevant to its being able to take part in the language game, but that each word does have an extrinsic meaning deriving from the other words within the sentence, then we end up with a language, whilst being internally coherent, is totally self-referential.

In PI 2, Wittgenstein opposes the Referentialism of Augustine , where the word "slab" names a slab in the world.

In PI 19, Wittgenstein writes "Bring me a slab", and slabs clearly exist in the world. But is this world in the Investigations a world that exists inside language or a world that exists outside of language?

Does Wittgenstein in the Investigations say?

Use refers to the activity of building. The meaning is determined by the role of "slab" in this activity. — Fooloso4

A "slab" can refer to a slab of concrete used in a builder's yard or a slab of cake used in a cake shop.

If it is the type of slab used in a builder's yard, it may be described as a large, thick, flat piece of stone or concrete, typically square or rectangular in shape. But such as slab can have many uses: as a roof, as a road barrier, as a floor, as a counterweight, etc.

But we know the meaning of "slab" even before we have decided what we want to use it for. In fact, we cannot use the slab until we understand what the slab is. Therefore, it is not the case that we have to use something in order to discover what its name is.

When the builder calls "slab" the assistant does not bring a mackerel or an onion. Whatever theory you have about what you think must be going on in his mind, the fact is, he brings a slab. — Fooloso4

If the assistant had no intrinsic theory in their mind as to the meaning of words, they would be bringing onions as often as they brought slabs.

What you ignore is that in this language there is no word for 'bring'. "Slab" does not function simply as the name of an object. "Slab" means bring the builder a slab. "Slab" gets its meaning from its use. Its use is determined by the form or way of life. Nomads do not have the word "Slab". Not because there are no slabs but because they do not build, slabs are not used in this way. — Fooloso4

This is circular. If "slab" gets its meaning from use, then how do you know how to use it before knowing what it means.

I have worked with Bedouin nomads, and we were using the word slab all the time.

And the use of “private” is not Wittgenstein’s; it’s the skeptic’s, the interlocutor’s; it’s the “metaphysical use”; Wittgenstein contrasts that with its “ordinary use”, which has particular criteria and contexts in which it is used, which is, as I said, similar to personal, secret. — Antony Nickles

There is not some “color” in you that someone else cannot see. — Antony Nickles

Cavell in The Later Wittgenstein makes the point that Wittgenstein never denied that we can know what we think and feel.

Other philosophers, I believe, are under the impression that Wittgenstein denies that we can know what we think and feel, and even that we can know ourselves. This extraordinary idea comes, no doubt, from such remarks of Wittgenstein's as: "I can know what someone else is thinking, not what I am thinking" (II, p. 222); "It cannot be said of me at all (except perhaps as a joke) that I know I am in pain" (§5!46). But the "can" and "cannot" in these remarks are grammatical; they mean "it makes no sense to say these things" (in the way we think it does); it would, therefore, equally make no sense to say of me that I do not know what I am thinking, or that I do not know I am in pain. The implication is not that I cannot know myself, but that knowing oneself-though radically different from the way we know others--is not a matter of cognizing (classically, "intuiting") mental acts and particular sensations.

As Wittgenstein also writes, the sensation is not a nothing.

PI 304 "But you will surely admit that there is a difference between pain-behaviour accompanied by pain and pain-behaviour without any pain?"—Admit it? What greater difference could there be?—"And yet you again and again reach the conclusion that the sensation itself is a nothing"—Not at all. It is not a something., but not a nothing either!

If everyone were zombies, and/or if no one had an internal understanding of a word that roughly corresponds to the concept, but its use (outward behavior way they expressed and acted when they spoke or heard the word) was always correct, would you really say that people understand the "meaning" of a word? — schopenhauer1

Exactly. I can say to a robot "bring me a slab", and it would be able to do so, even though it didn't know the meanings of the words.

But it can only do so because a human, who did know the meanings of those words, had programmed it in the first place.

I feel successful language use is only possible when you use language cogently to the situation. — Corvus

Yes, the successful use of language requires several things, of which one is using words in the correct context. Another is knowing the meaning of the words used, in that if the barmaid didn't know the meaning of "bring", she would never be able to bring you your pint of lager.

The other point is that the meaning of words is not learnt by pointing to the objects in the world exclusively, unless it is the case with a child learning language for the first time in her life, or in certain situations such as when you are ordering or buying an item in shops or market — Corvus

We know the meaning of angst, not because we can point to angst, but because we can point to to the visible effect of angst in the world, such as a person's behaviour.

We can have the word "pain" in language because we can point to pain behaviour, whereby the word "pain" replaces pain behaviour.

If not by "pointing", how do we learn the meaning of words such as angst?

I don't see why you would call your personal experience a concept. — Luke

I agree that only part of my personal experience is that of a concept.

If I have a personal experience as a consequence of looking at a wavelength of 700nm in the world, there are two aspects to this personal experience, the phenomenological and the cognitive.

As regards the phenomenological, I have a particular momentary colour experience caused by the wavelength 700nm

As regards the cognitive, at the same time as having the phenomenological experience, I think of this particular colour as "red". Even though all my phenomenological experiences of the wavelengths 625nm to 750nm have been different, there still has been something similar about them, and this similarity is what a concept is. A similarity in different phenomenological experiences.

It is on these concepts existing in the mind that language must be built upon.

The assistant brings the builder a slab because he has been trained to do so. His training consists of being able to identify a slab and bring it to the builder. Being able to identify a slab does not mean forming an inner concept. All that is required is being able to distinguish this thing from the other things he has been trained to identify and bring. All with this one word "slab". — Fooloso4

As regards the thing the assistant brings to the builder, are you a Platonist, such that the slab is a Platonic object that exists independently of the mind and is able to exist through time and space, or a Nominalist?

I am a Nominalist, such that the thing is a particular set of atoms, etc, that exists in the form it has at one moment in time and space, and exists independently of the mind. IE, the particular set of atoms, etc, is one unique, momentary example in the world of what we have in our minds as the general concept "slab".

Yes, of course. I would say to you "What the heck do you mean by that? I have no clue what the bloody non-sense you are talking about." This is a meaningful sentence in our conversation. — Corvus

At least we agree that meaning is an important part of communication.

If "X" simply meant the object, there would be no activity. The meaning of "X" is determined by the activity and not simply by the name of the object. — Fooloso4

True, that's why the foreman doesn't just say "X" but rather "bring me X". The word "bring" determines the activity, not the object "X".

What if the other party didn't know the meaning of "bamba", then what, what would be point of you saying it thinking that you knew the meaning? — Corvus

True, if I said "xx xyx yyxx yxyx", and neither of us knew the meaning of any of the words used, would anything meaningful arise from our conversation?

I recall the first time when I was confronted with the word, I had no idea what it meant, but by reading up the definition in the book, I roughly knew what it meant. — Corvus

We cannot learn the meaning of every word we use in language just from the dictionary, otherwise none of the words we use would have any connection with the world outside language. Sooner or later, there must be some words we use that we learn their meaning directly from the world outside language

The question is, if not "pointing" from the word to something in the world outside language, then how?

Synonyms are not to be used blindly to replace another synonyms just because they are synonyms — Corvus

True, they don't have the same meaning, only similar meanings. As Wittgenstein said, family resemblances.

What do you mean by "successfully" here? Could you please clarify? — Corvus

For the listener to understand the meaning of the sentence.

The word "peffel" can be used by anyone to mean ""part [your] pen and part Eiffel Tower" regardless of your personal feelings about the words "pen" or "Eiffel Tower". — Luke

True, once "peffel" has been defined as "part my pen and part Eiffel Tower", anyone can use it in language regardless of my personal concepts of either "my pen" or "Eiffel Tower".

In the same way, anyone can use the word "pain" in language, regardless of anyone's personal sensation of pain.

Violet is not your concept. But your understanding of the concept is accessible to others, depending on how you use it. — Luke

There are public concepts, such that "Violet light is at the higher end of the visible spectrum, with a wavelength from 380 to 450 nm". There are also private concepts, such as my personal experience when looking at something in the world having a wavelength of 400nm.

The point is that our experiences are irrelevant to linguistic meaning; to language use. — Luke

I agree, as with the beetle in PI 293, the beetle drops out of consideration in the language game.

This is obviously not true especially when you consider how a child learns. — Apustimelogist

How can a child successfully use the word "mwanasesere" if they don't know what is means?

Peffel is inaccessible presumably only because its an unusual concept but I see it as no different from a concept like a liger or mule or any other kind of hybrid thing that actually exists in reality and so is therefore an accessible concept. — Apustimelogist

It is true that I can define "peffel" as part "pen and part Eiffel Tower".

But the problem leads to my personal concepts of "pen" and "Eiffel Tower", both of which are unique to me, as they have developed over a lifetime of experiences that only I have had.

People can and do use words without knowing the meaning of the word. — Corvus

How can you successfully use the word "bamba" in a sentence if you don't know what it means?

Many things follow from this, but two are central here. The first is that we do not need a theory of the meaning of "slab" in order to do the task at hand - to build the structure. — Banno

In the world is something X that has been named "X". The foreman experiences this something X in the world in his mind as the concept Y. His assistant experiences this something X in the world in his mind as the concept Z.

As shown by PI 293, the beetle, the concepts Y and Z, drop out of consideration in the language game.

It is true that what the something X is in the world is irrelevant as long as foreman says "bring me X" and the assistant brings X.

It is true that the foreman's concept Y may be different to the assistant's concept Z

The foreman may look at something X in the world, but if this observation didn't give rise to an inner concept Y, they would be a philosophical zombie, and wouldn't be able to say "bring me X". Similarly, the assistant may look at something X in the world, but if this observation didn't give rise to an inner concept Z, they would also be a philosophical zombie, and wouldn't be able to bring X.

In order for something to happen, for there to be an activity, there must be all the following:

1) There must be an X in the world
2) X must have been named "X"
5) The foreman must say "bring me X"
3) The something X that the foreman looks at must give rise to his inner concept Y
4) The something X that the assistant looks at must give rise to his inner concept Z

If one of these is missing, then nothing will happen. There will be no activity and the assistant won't bring X.

The same principles apply also to "bring" and "me".

If "X" didn't mean X, then nothing would happen and there would be no activity.

What the words "pen" or "Eiffel Tower" mean to you are irrelevant to the meaning of "peffel", which means "part [your] pen and part the Eiffel Tower". Is this not what "peffel" means? — Luke

There are different uses of the world "meaning". The absence of pain means a lot to me and "pain" means "a sharp unpleasant sensation usually felt in some specific part of the body".

In what way is the concept of "peffel" inaccessible to others? You have already defined it for us. Also, in what way is "peffel" a part of any language? Do you ever use the word "peffel" and, if so, how do you use it? — Luke

My concept of "peffel" is inaccessible to others as my concept of violet is inaccessible to others. Can you describe in words your personal experience of the colour violet to a colour blind person?

Pointing at objects seems not a key ability to use language. Pointing at objects is primarily for learning words for children.........................Our key ability to use language is, from my point of view, not just uttering simple words, and simple sentences pointing at the object, but also being able to explain the situations, problems as well as trying to solve the problems by giving out some kind of verbal instructions or more information on the object...............I was unsure of your claims that pointing at objects is our key element to use language. — Corvus

We have to learn the meaning of a word before we can use it successfully.

Consider the word "angst".

We could use the dictionary, where "angst" is defined as "a feeling of deep anxiety or dread, typically an unfocused one about the human condition or the state of the world in general". "Anxiety" is defined as "a feeling of worry, nervousness, or unease about something with an uncertain outcome". Continuing, "worry" is defined as "feel or cause to feel anxious or troubled about actual or potential problems". "Troubled" is defined as "beset by problems or difficulties". Either the definitions become circular or are never ending.

The alternative to understanding the word "angst" is by reference to the world outside language. If "pointing" to something in the world cannot be used in our learning of a word such as "angst", then what is the alternative? How do we learn the meaning of "angst" without resorting to "pointing"?

I am using "pointing" to include its synonyms, such as signalling, showing, indicating, gesturing, flagging, labelling, motioning, etc.

So personal and private (as Wittgenstein terms it) are two different things, and you are using the word "private" in the place of both, — Antony Nickles

The experience within my mind caused by a wavelength in the world of 700nm is a private experience, inexpressible to others, in the same sense as Wittgenstein's use of the word.

The point being, if two objects are "red" (based on the context), the color is the same, and not because our personal experiences match up (or that we "agree"). — Antony Nickles

I agree, this is the point of PI 293, that the beetle drops out of consideration in the language game. Within the communal language game we can talk about the colour "red".

If we take the case of someone actually being blind, philosophy would say they have never "experienced" color. But we can still explain the experience of color. — Antony Nickles

I can talk about the colour "red" as being defined as having a wavelength of between 625nm to 750nm, but I can't talk about the private experience within my mind caused by a wavelength of 700nm in the world, as this is inexpressible to others.

Language Idealism presumably means that language shapes reality for humans. — schopenhauer1

A two way process, language shapes reality and reality shapes language.

Richard Gaskin discusses Linguistic Idealism in the YouTube Determinate Content #3: Richard Gaskin on Linguistic Idealism

Suppose someone names an object in the world consisting of the the top half of an apple and the bottom half of an table and names it "appable". Pretty soon people would discover that this object named "appable" had no practical use, and the word would drop out of language. Suppose someone names an object in the world consisting of the top half of an apple and the bottom half of an apple and names it "apple". Pretty soon people would discover that this object named "apple" had a practical use, and the word would become a part of language.

We are told to "bring me an apple". On the one hand, we discover an apple in the world, and are than able to take it to them. Our language has determined not only our conception of the world but also the kind of contact we have with the reality of the world. But on the other hand, the world has shaped our language in that there has been something in the world that has been named "apple" in language.

There has been a synergy between he world and our language. A mutual dependence of which neither takes precedence.

That is to say, there are fundamental things underlying language that means that language might not be the foundational way humans interact with the world. — schopenhauer1

Yes, life began on Earth about 3,700,000,000 years ago, and for about 3,699,900,000 years life managed to survive and evolve within a harsh and unforgiving world, suggesting that language is not fundamental in how life is able to interact with the world.

Thus, we have a direct correlation of object with its "use". — schopenhauer1

There would be no word in language for an object that had no use.

PI 43 For a large class of cases—though not for all—in which we employ the word "meaning" it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language. And the meaning of a name is sometimes explained by pointing to its bearer.

There are an almost infinite number of possible objects that may be discovered in the world outside language, each of which can be named. Objects found useful outside language may be named, such that the word "appable" is discarded and the word "apple" is kept. This leaves about 500,000 useful words in a typical language.

Wittgenstein wrote that the meaning of a word is its use in language. Within the world outside language, the object appable is as real as the object apple, but within language, the word "appable" may be discarded as of no practical use outside language whilst the word "apple" may be kept as having practical use outside language.

Note that some words such as "unicorn" don't exist in the world outside language but do have a use in language.

Therefore, all possible words have a meaning, whether "appable" or "apple". Yet some of these words are more useful than others, meaning that PI 43 can be reworded as "all possible words have a meaning, but only those words that have a use, whether inside or outside language are used in language.

Embodied embedded cognition...................The theory states that intelligent behaviour emerges from the interplay between brain, body and world. — schopenhauer1

Behaviour emerges from an interplay between brain and world.

George Lakoff talks about Embodied Cognition in the YouTube How Brains Think: The Embodiment Hypothesis

This is related to Enactivism, the proposal that cognition arises through a dynamic interaction between an acting organism and its environment.

He says that we are born with certain embodied structures in place, within the 100 billion neurons and between 100 trillion and 1 quadrillion connections between these neurons

Within these neurons and connections are embodied concepts. This has the consequence that, in a sense, cognition drops out. When I see a glass of water, it is not the case that "I think I need to drink" but rather "I need a drink".

This is the same point Wittgenstein makes in PI 246:"It cannot be said of me at all (except perhaps as a joke) that I know I am in pain", because when "I am in pain", there is no point in saying "I know I am in pain".

It may be wrong to describe human behaviour as "intelligent behaviour" if cognition has dropped out of consideration. Unless one defines "a behaviour that allows the body to survive" as "intelligent".

After 3.7 billion years of evolution, the brain has evolved in synergy with the world in which it is living. The structure of the neurons in the brain and their connections is therefore a direct consequence of the particular world in which it exists.

It is then the case that behaviour emerges from an interplay between the brain and the world, accepting that the structure of the brain is a direct consequence of the particular world within which it exists.

That's just quibbling over the definition — Luke

Similar and same mean different things. "The Eiffel Tower is similar to the Blackpool Tower" is true. "The Eiffel Tower is the same as the Blackpool Tower" is false.

Individuals (humans) don't experience Form of Life differently; it's who we are. It's the shared human behaviours and judgements that are common to all humans; our human form of life. — Luke

How can a thirteen year old girl living in Dzivarasekwa, Harare experience the same Form of Life as a sixty year old lawyer living in Bel Air, Los Angeles?

I wrote: Even assuming that in the world there is one Form of Life that encompasses everything within it, whether nature, animals or humans, then the Form of Life will be external to each individual living within it. It may be true that each individual is living within the same Form of Life, but no two individuals can ever have the same experience of it. Each individuals experience of the Form of Life will be different and unique to them.

What is the correct use of Form of Life ?

Since you were able to explain the meaning of the "peffel" concept, then I don't believe this qualifies as a private language — Luke

According to Wikipedia Private Language
In order to count as a private language in Wittgenstein's sense, it must be in principle incapable of translation into an ordinary language – if for example it were to describe those inner experiences supposed to be inaccessible to others. The private language being considered is not simply a language in fact understood by one person, but a language that in principle can only be understood by one person.

I can define the word "peffel" as "part my pen and part the Eiffel Tower", and I can define "pen" and "Eiffel Tower", but I cannot put into words what the words "pen" and "Eiffel Tower" mean to me, as my concepts of "pen" and "Eiffel Tower" have grown and developed over a lifetime of unique multiple experiences.

Even if I defined "The Eiffel Tower" as "a 300-metre tower built almost entirely of open-lattice wrought iron in Paris", I would then have to define "tower" as "a tall, narrow building". I would then have to define "building" as "a structure with a roof and walls", where a "structure" is "a building constructed from several parts". Definitions are problematic in deciding meaning.

Even in Wittgenstein's terms, as my personal concept of "peffel" is inaccessible to others, it is part of my private language.

What if today assistant doesn't remember which slab he brought to you yesterday, because he delivered so many different type of slabs — Corvus

I would sack him for incompetence.

I guess defining Linguistic Idealism as saying that language is what shapes our understanding more than pre-linguistic or meta-linguistic faculties........However, I would argue there are things that need to be in place for language to even be a thing..............a history of human evolution leading to the ability to use language as humans do................. So in this sense, I would say that leads to a sort of "realism" that gets to a world that has preconditions for his Language Idealism to be a thing — schopenhauer1

I agree that in today's terms, a pre-language Neanderthal would surely be a Realist, with an instinctive belief in the reality of the world with all its present and real dangers.

But the Neanderthal would quickly realise the disconnect between their perception of the world and the reality of the world. In looking for a straight stick, the Neanderthal would initially ignore the stick in the water that appeared half-bent, but would later discover that because a stick is perceived as bent does not mean it is bent in reality. They would also quickly realise that the world didn't disappear when they closed their eyes. They would conclude that things in the world are not perceived immediately or directly. IE, they would not be Direct Realists.

From a review of Dilman Ilham's book Wittgenstein's Copernican Revolution: The Question of Linguistic Idealism one reads the following about Linguistic Idealism

Linguistic Idealism is a philosophical concept that explores the relationship between language and reality. It posits that our language is not founded on an empirical reality with which we are in contact through sense perception. Instead, it suggests that our language determines the kind of contact we have with such a reality and our conception of it. Linguistic Idealism is not a form of realism or idealism, but rather an attempt to undermine certain presuppositions of the realist/idealist debate.

In observing the world, we perceive different colours when looking at different wavelengths of light. For some inexplicable reason, even though we perceive the colours from the wavelengths 620 to 750nm as different, we find some similarity between them, and arrive at the concept that can be named "red". This is in a sense Idealism, as our concept only exists in the mind. But in another sense is Realism, as our concept depends on real examples of wavelengths existing in the world. As with Linguistic Idealism, the word "red" is a function of both concepts that only exist in the mind and examples that only exist in the world.

Similarly the Neanderthal must be both a Realist, with an instinctive belief in the reality of the world with all its present and real dangers, and an Idealist, in realising the disconnect between their perception of the world and the reality of the world.

One will never know what slab you are talking about, when you say to your assistant "Bring me a slab." over the phone or in a text message out of blue. However, if you and your assistant are talking facing the piles of slabs in the site, and when you point to a slab from distance "Bring me that slab.", he will know exactly what slab you are referring to. — Corvus

Yes, if me and my assistant are talking facing a pile of things on the site, when I point to one of them and say "Bring me that", he will know exactly what I am referring to.

When pointing to something, I don't even need to name it.

The next day, over the phone, when I tell my assistant "bring me the same thing that you brought me yesterday" he will know exactly what I am referring to.

Once something has been pointed out, it can be referred to without needing to name it again.

Pointing at something in the world is a key aspect in our ability to use language.

I presume that your concept of "slab" is the same as mine, referring to one of the builder's building materials. — Luke

Is the first definition, i), your concept of slab a large, thick, flat piece of stone or concrete, typically square or rectangular in shape.................If so, then it is the same concept as mine (in this context). — Luke

As definition i) is your definition of a slab but not mine, then we don't agree as to the definition of a "slab". For me a "slab" can be "a large or small, thick or thin, flat or uneven piece of stone or concrete, typically square or rectangular in shape".

I find it hard to believe that two people can have the same concept of any word. For example, in the form that my life has taken, I have designed reinforced concrete slabs, supervised their construction, overseen their movement and have built them with my own hands. Even if you have lived a similar form of life to me, which is probably unlikely, I doubt your concept of slab would be the same as mine.

Form of Life may allow for some relativism between different cultures or time periods, depending on your reading, but it does not allow for relativism between individuals. An individual does not have their own unique Form of Life, just as (and for the same reasons that) an individual does not have their own unique language. — Luke

Even assuming that in the world there is one Form of Life that encompasses everything within it, whether nature, animals or humans, then the Form of Life will be external to each individual living within it.

It may be true that each individual is living within the same Form of Life, but no two individuals can ever have the same experience of it. Each individuals experience of the Form of Life will be different and unique to them.

For many years, I have had the concept of a "peffel" as well as its name, part my pen and part the Eiffel Tower. This word I have found useful when thinking about the ontology of relations, and has been part of my private language, and so far, unique to me.

You may have been butting heads with people (and with understanding the Investigations) because you are saying the word “private” for two things. — Antony Nickles

I appreciate your pointing out that as I don't understand the Investigations, I should be learning from people wiser than me.

The word "private" has many uses, as shown in the Merriam Webster Dictionary. As an adjective:
1a: intended for or restricted to the use of a particular person, group, or class
1b: belonging to or concerning an individual person, company, or interest
1c (1): carried on by the individual independently of the usual institutions, also, being educated by independent study or a tutor or in a private school
1c (2): restricted to the individual or arising independently of others
1d: not general in effect
1e (1): accommodating only one patient
1e (2): staying or recovering in a room accommodating only one patient
2 a (1) not related to one's official position
2a (2) not holding public office or employment
2b: being a private
3a: not known or intended to be known publicly
3b: preferring to keep personal affairs to oneself: valuing privacy highly
3c: withdrawn from company or observation
3d: unsuitable for public display or use
4: not having share that can be freely traded on the open market

So you have been correct to insist that we do have individual feelings, and even experiences that are inexpressible to others entirely (the awe of a sunset)—though ordinary language is perfectly capable of making us intelligible (for us to agree we are like others),..........most of the time your “experience” is just like mine — Antony Nickles

I have a friend who is colour blind. How would you describe to them in words your personal experience of the colour violet?

If it is the case that neither of us can describe in words our personal experience of the colour violet, then how do we know that my personal experience is just like your personal experience?

yes, we might be a “zombie”, a puppet, speaking only others opinions, etc. — Antony Nickles

From Wikipedia Philosophical Zombie: "A philosophical zombie is a being in a thought experiment in philosophy of mind that is physically identical to a normal person but does not have conscious experience." A philosophical zombie is not someone who doesn't have their own opinions.