I don't have a lot of time to dive into what you're saying, but you might find this post of mine links into yours. https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/15203/in-any-objective-morality-existence-is-inherently-good/p1

Sorry for the delay Bob, my work and life have recently picked up quite a bit, and I have not had enough time recently to sit down and address your post in full. The conversation seems to be continuing on with others at least, so keep examining apriori and aposteriori with them. I'll see you in another post when my time becomes more available again.

If you want to use ‘real’ in your more generic sense, then that is fine: it does not avoid the issue that the a priori preconditions for that experience are not a part of reality—they are, rather, the epistemic ‘tools’ which human cognition has for cognizing reality. Do you see this difference I am noting (irregardless of the semantics)? — Bob Ross

I think so, but this is usually handled with the terms empirical and non-empirical. Both experiences of the empirical and non-empirical are real. The only question is when we state that our conclusions of the experience are not contradicted by reality. I may experience a tree, but if I then claim, "That tree exists as an entity, not only in my experience, then we are making claims about reality that extend beyond our experience. To claim it exists as a tree is to claim that it exists independently of me.

So for example, if I experience a tree in a forest, that's real. But if I say, "I know that tree exists as a real entity apart from me," then we are applying our discrete experiences in ways beyond the experience itself. This is where the terms belief and knowledge come into play. Deductively I can know its a tree by going over a careful process. Inductively I can believe the tree will still be there when I shut my eyes. Empirical experiences are experiences that are assumed to be sensations that represent things outside of myself. Non-empirical sensations are those which are generated inside of myself. But they're all sensations, and they're all real.

The term real simply means, 'what exists'. I feel the above terms are clear and largely unambiguous, which is important for any model and discussion of knowledge. My issues is, "What is apriori"? Its not clear, and its not unambiguous. And if we can't make it clear and unambiguous, then maybe its not a great term to use. In the above two paragraphs, what would you consider apriori? What clarity and accuracy would the term add?

My point is, is that any discrete experience is real.

It is not a part of reality, though. Do you agree with that? — Bob Ross

No, your discrete experiences exist. They are real. It is our interpretation of those existences when we start to claim, "Because I experience X, I know that X exists apart from myself," that we get into beliefs and knowledge.

“discrete” is a word which references an idea engrained, fundamentally, in space. You may say that ‘space’ is not conceptually known, self-reflectively, by merely discretely experiencing, but do you agree that, at least, space is the ingrained form of that experience in virtue of which it is discrete? — Bob Ross

No, I can't agree that the term 'discrete' references space in some way. I feel like you're confusing 'living in space' with 'knowing space'. Because we live in space, we will act and sense things from space. Again, my reference to an amoeba. All things act as if they live in space, because they are beings that live in space. There is a basic instinct and capability to come to terms with this, and to learn how to ambulate, eat, and live in space. But no living thing has knowledge prior to interacting with space. Go one further. An electron circles around a hydrogen atom. Does it do this because it knows space and time apriori? When it is flooded with energy and separates, does it do this because it innately knows how? This is just the way its being reacts to stimulus. So too with living beings.

The way a being lives, even a conscious one, is to have experiences. These discrete experiences become memories, and beliefs can form about them. Only a process of deductive justification can result in knowledge of whether those beliefs are true or not. As such, no knowledge is innate, because all knowledge is born of experience.

I need clarification: are you asking for an example of a prior vs. a posteriori aspects of experience OR a priori vs. a posteriori knowledge? — Bob Ross

I don't know myself. What do you see as 'apriori'? What does the word mean without ambiguity? Does it need to have another term tied to it like experience or knowledge? If so, give both.

My point is that I am unable to see your division between aprior space and aposteriori space.

There is no a posteriori space—it is pure intuition. What I think you are confusing is self-reflective knowledge with transcendental knowledge (and innate capacities, as you would put it). — Bob Ross

Apriori and aposteriori are often seen as divisions between 'knowledge apart from experience (I generously say "apart from the empirical"' to fix this, and "Knowledge from experience (or the empirical). So there should be an aposteriori conception of space. If I measure the table as being 1 meter long, isn't that an aposteriori conception of space? If that's not, what is it? Further, what is a clear term of 'transcendental knowledge' vs 'self-reflective knowledge'? How are these different from beliefs?

1. Babies experience (outer objects) in space.
2. Babies do not have any self-reflective conceptual capacities (through reason) that they experience (outer objects) in space nor what ‘space’ is as ‘extension’.
3. A child can, at some stage of development, understand notionally what space is without being about to apply language to explain it.
4. Adults have a self-reflective understanding of what space is, and can apply language to explain it. — Bob Ross

Translated:
1. Babies have discrete experiences. Some of these are empirical, or through the senses.
2. Babies do not express apparent knowledge beyond instinct that there is a thing that exists outside of themselves that we identify as 'space'.
3. A child eventually comes to realize that there is an outside reality apart from itself.
4. Adults can create an identity for the idea that there is something outside of one's own consciousness called 'space'.

No, we are continually experiencing. Then, we create discrete experiences

Hmmm, maybe I am misremembering your theory: I thought you agreed with me that our experience is inherently, innately, discrete; which implies that space and time are the forms, even if you don’t think they are pure a priori, of that experience. — Bob Ross

No, my point is that we experience, then we focus on parts of that experience. Over time we refine this. Thus a child has the experience of living, but the discrete identity of 'space' is not formed yet. It is like looking out into the vast ocean for the first time, then realizing there's waves, and that patch over there is a different color. We can also go reverse. Experience the parts, then then expand to a whole. But as a new being, there can only be the flood of sensations that we slowly part and parcel over time. I have a theory that shrooms diminish or shut off this discrete experience aspect for a time based on testimony of people saying they stopped seeing divisions and saw everything as one. (Just a fun aside)

Here’s one of the roots of our confusion: you are failing to recognize that cognition has a dual meaning on english—it can refer to our self-reflective cognition (e.g., thinking about our experience) or our transcendental cognition (e.g., our brains thinking about how to construct experience). I would like you to address this distinction, because you keep equivocating them throughout your posts. — Bob Ross

I see no difference between these two definitions. Empirical and non-empirical are clear and distinct. I don't see how these definitions are clear or add anything to the discussion. What is the difference between thinking about the experience and how to construct it?

If I see red and think, "That's red" how is that different from I see red and "That' red, and I want to imagine red"? In both cases, we observe red, so that seems self-reflective. But what thought that we are conscious of is not self-reflective? Experiences are by nature, conscious. How is that conscious thought any different from saying, 'that red, and..."?

For the senses:

"But your body also has receptors for events occurring inside you, such as your beating heart, expanding lungs, gurgling stomach and many other movements that you’re completely unaware of. They’re traditionally grouped together as another sense, called ‘interoception’."

All of this can simply be summed up as, "empirical sensations". Non-empirical thoughts are things like imagination. They aren't instantly deemed to represent something outside of our internal consciousness in reality. We can invent a thing like a unicorn and say, "Maybe that exists." But that's not the same as getting the image of a horse with a horn from our sight. Analyzing our thoughts is not a sense, because senses are empirical. This makes a nice and clear division which allows logical discussion. The less muddy the terms, the better.

Your thoughts are not represented to you. You experience them

Do you deny that your brain is organizing your thoughts in time to construct your experience of them (of which you can introspect)? — Bob Ross

No, your brain organizes information and gives it to you, the conscious part. And that conscious part of you is the brain as well. Its been long known that certain portions of the brain process different sensory areas and allow us certain functions. Damage the sight part of your brain for example, and you can no longer see or visualize. "You" are the conscious entity that is able to discretely experience. To focus on certain aspects, refine, and make judgement calls that the rest of the brain must follow. But I don't see how this processing has anything to do with apriori or aposteriori.

Ok, good discussion again Bob! I think I've addressed everything and made my position more clear. Can you make a clear and unambiguous distinctions between apriori and apoteriori for both being and knowledge? I look forward to your thoughts.

it suggests that experience is structured by inherent cognitive faculties that synthesize sensations into a unified whole, making perception itself possible. — Wayfarer

Understood. But this is a different claim then, "Innate knowledge apart from experience". Its not knowledge. Its instinct and being. We do not have to have ever thought of the concepts time or space, and we would still function because we are beings of time and space. The argument that our ability to function is innate knowledge, means that even a single cell amoeba has an innate knowledge of time and space. That's absurd. It is a being in time and space. That doesn't mean it has innate knowledge of it apart from experience.

That process is what is described as 'transcendental' - not in the sense of 'beyond experience' but implicit in the nature of experience. It is 'transcendental' in the sense that it refers to the conditions that are always operative within experience, shaping it from within, not transcending it in a mystical or otherworldly sense. The transcendental conditions Kant describes, which Brook highlights, operate in a way that is fundamentally invisible to direct introspection. They’re not accessible through casual reflection or even careful self-observation, because they are so ingrained in the structure of experience that we can’t “see” them directly. They function as the very backdrop against which experience is possible, like the frame of a picture that remains unseen because our attention is always focused on the content within. — Wayfarer

Yes, this is my point. There is experience, and there are innate ways of experiencing dependent on your being. But this is not 'knowledge'. Knowledge is a process that concludes an interpretation of experience is not contradictory to reality. So the reality of the experience itself is known as one experiences. If I see a pink elephant, it is a real experience that I know I'm having. If I take an extra step and state, "My experience is an accurate representation that there is an actual pink elephant apart from my experience," then we run into beliefs, and must find a way to ascertain whether we can know that it is so. My point has been that 'apriori knowledge' is a misnomer. The definition of knowledge itself does not allow it to exist apart from experience.

One of Brook’s focal points is Kant’s idea of the “transcendental unity of apperception,” which describes the self’s role in providing coherence to experience. Brook interprets this as a fundamental cognitive function: the capacity to unify various sensory inputs and thoughts under a consistent self-conscious perspective. He connects this to modern discussions on self-awareness, suggesting that understanding the self’s role in cognition is critical to grasping how mental states are integrated. Brook also argues that cognitive science benefits from a Kantian perspective in addressing issues like consciousness, self-reference, and the structured nature of perception, showing that Kant’s insights help bridge philosophical inquiry and empirical study, while deepening our grasp of the mind’s foundational structures. — Wayfarer

I have no disagreement with this. But that does not mean 'apriori knowledge' is a term that holds up under scrutiny. Kant is not describing knowledge, he is describing being.

In all these approaches, Kant’s idea that our minds contribute fundamental structures to experience remains a guiding principle. Each tradition takes up Kant’s insight in its own way, exploring how knowledge, perception, and meaning arise through active engagement with the world, rather than as direct imprints of objective reality. — Wayfarer

I agree that Kant's influence on philosophy and its evolution are phenomenal. My disagreement is not with Kant, or to imply he is a bad philosopher in any way. My point is that the apriori and aposteriori distinction has serious problems with it that can be resolved with a much better model of 'being' and 'knowledge'.

The a priori aspects of your experience exist (viz., ‘there are these a priori aspects to your experience) but they are not real (viz., ‘these a priori aspects of your experience are not in reality but, rather, modes of cognizing reality). — Bob Ross

How is it not real? Its a real experience. Its our interpretation by noting whether our real experience can be accurately applied beyond the current experience we are having. So, I can discretely experience what I call a 'tree', and that discrete experience is real. But is my belief that it is a tree something that I know, or something that I believe? That's when we apply. If we have to have two definitions of 'real', perhaps we should re-examine how we're putting our model together.

Space, as a pure intuition, is not in reality nor it is a property sensed of the objects that are in reality: it is the way that your brain is pre-structured to intuit phenomena; and so space, as a pure form of sensibility, is not real (because it is not of reality) but certainly exists (as a pre-structured way for your brain to represent and intuit sensations). — Bob Ross

My point is, is that any discrete experience is real. You experience space. Then, when you apply that belief about space by reaching out to grab something, you apply that belief accurately and are able to retrieve that cup. But we have all misjudged space before in application. I've reached out to grab something and missed. Thought I would catch a ball when I opened my hand and didn't. But I don't know 'space' as a discrete experience apart from experience. Knowledge cannot be gained without experience.

Perhaps what would help is to clearly show a non-empirical aposteriori example and an empirical apriori example?

I did that with space: what did you disagree with there? — Bob Ross

You need to be extremely clear. If I judge space as catching a ball, what part is apriori, what is aposteriori? If babies cannot grasp spatial relations prior to six months, what do they know about space apriori?

The scientific fact you pointed to was whether a young person knows what space is; and not if it transcendentally uses it to intuit and cognize objects for its conscious experience; nor if it transcendentally uses it with its self-reflective reason to understand its own conscious experience of things. — Bob Ross

My point is that I am unable to see your division between aprior space and aposteriori space. Philosophy should always side with what is currently known, and the solid science of spatial awareness development in kids is something we should not dismiss. Otherwise we're debating fiction.

Space and time are identities we create to label experiences

Then, you must believe that you aren’t consciously experiencing in space and time before you conceptually understood that you were; which is nonsense. — Bob Ross

No, we are continually experiencing. Then, we create discrete experiences. Two of those are 'space' and 'time'. We then apply these identities to the reality we experience to make it to work on time by driving a car to another location. Just because we use the concepts of space and time without thinking, does not mean that these concepts and their application was done apart from the experience we built from our first moments out of the womb (Possibly within too).

Space and time are pure a priori, because they are not based off of sensations at all. — Bob Ross

No. This is just wrong. It is a fact that the concepts of space and time are developed over time. It is on you to show proof that space and time are concepts apart from experience. I'm siding with science on this one.

How is this different from any other identity like 'red', 'giraffe' or 'Bob'? :)

It depends on what you mean. If you mean an concept which we self-reflective deploy for our conscious experience, then it is no different. — Bob Ross

Correct. Then everything is apriori. Because we experience everything by discrete experiences. But that isn't knowledge. That's just the ability to sort our experience into 'pieces' or 'identities'. Creating an identity is distinctive knowledge. It is not applicable knowledge. But no distinctive knowledge is gained apart from experience. There is no innate knowledge. Just the innate capability to discretely experience.

No, reason does not fundamentally think in terms of space. It thinks in terms of discrete experience.

That’s what conceptual space is! It is transcendental, because it is necessary precondition for the possibility of using self-reflective reason. Therefore, I am right in concluding, even in your terminology, that we must already use space even when we don’t know what space is. — Bob Ross

Incorrect. Space is a concept we learn by bodily extension. Discrete experience comes first, the concept of 'space' comes after. Discrete experience happens whether we come up with the concept of space or not. Lets take your point in another way. "I breath, therefore I must already know what breathing is before I've ever breathed." No, you don't know what its like to breath before you breath. You have the potential and capability to. But it is not 'innate knowledge'. Existing and living in space, and learning that and adapting to it, does not mean you have innate knowledge of time and space.

There are only five of them.

We already agreed this is false; and scientifically it is utterly false. — Bob Ross

No, I did not agree to this. Please link to a scientific reference to senses beyond the five.

Let’s take the simplest example of inner sense: thoughts about thoughts. I can introspectively analyze my own thinking about other things, and this is because my inner thoughts are presented to me in time. If my inner thoughts were not presented to me, if they were not represented to me, then they would not be formulated experientially, consciously, in succession. — Bob Ross

Your thoughts are not represented to you. You experience them. There is really one thing in itself that we know of. Your experience. The act of 'experiencing' is the subjective reality that is, and there is nothing more that it represents. We can think about it. We can wonder how its put together. Adding an extra layer of 'represents' doesn't mean anything. We have thoughts, and we have thoughts on thoughts. But those thoughts on thoughts are still thoughts. They are experiences. We can know them as we have them. But we do not know them before we have them.

I can know I discretely experience. But I don't have to know what I discretely experience to discretely experience. The act itself is not knowledge. Knowledge comes after/during the act. We can exist in time and space without knowing about time and space. It doesn't mean we innately know about time and space. This false conclusion you are drawing is that because we exist in time and space, that we must have innate knowledge about time and space. No. Knowledge is learned by experience. Knowledge by definition, cannot be innate.

there's a current philosopher, Lawrence BonJour, who writes about role of a priori knowledge and philosophical rationalism. As it happens, I've found a rather good and quite brief video on BonJour's ideas, by a professor of philosophy, which you can review here. — Wayfarer

That's nice of Wayfarer, thank you.

I was using my terminology too loosely and that is my fault: what I should have said is “<…> independently of our experience of reality”, as that denotes the aspects of experience which are a posteriori—i.e., empirical. — Bob Ross

If reality is 'what is', then isn't anything we experience reality? Again, what it seems you want to say is there is a distinction between the classic empirical and non-empirical modes of experience.

By “experience”, I just generically mean the conscious awareness of which one is having; so why would I say there’s an a priori and a posteriori aspect to that experience? Because, simply put, there are things which my brain is adding into the mix (i.e., are synthetical) which are not actually of the sensations (of objects in reality) in order for it to represent them in the conscious experience which I will have of them. — Bob Ross

Again, this seems to be an empirical and non-empirical distinction. Perhaps what would help is to clearly show a non-empirical aposteriori example and an empirical apriori example?

If the sensations are intuited in space and time, then space and time are not contained themselves in the sensations; and it is even clearer when you realize that your brain cannot possibly learn how to represent things with extension nor succession to do it in the first place. — Bob Ross

But this is just wrong. Modern day neuroscience and understanding of brain development shows this is a learned process. I get what Kant was saying hundreds of years ago, but we've learned much more about the brain since then. Again, I will note what is possible is that we have the capacity to understand space and time through our being. But that is not knowledge that we already know without experience. Space and time are identities we create to label experiences. But we don't know these identities before we encounter them.

So, e.g., space and time are forms in and of which your brain represents things and are not properties of the things-in-themselves (whatever they may be). — Bob Ross

But this is everything, and not exclusive to space and time. Any identity attributed as a representation is not the property of the thing in itself. The thing in itself is the logical layer of the unknown upon which all representations rest. And that's it. There's nothing that can ever be concluded from it besides that.

in which the content of experience is placed; and this is just a simplified way of saying that they are a priori and used to represent a posteriori content.[/quote]

How is this different from any other identity like 'red', 'giraffe' or 'Bob'? :)

— Bob Ross

No. I think that there’s a difference between the self-reflective reason—i.e., meta-cognition and self-consciousness—and non-self-reflective reason (i.e., cognition and consciousness). My brain has the “capacity”, as you put it, to represent in space and this extensional representation is not a reflection of any extension, per se, that an object itself actually has; but I must come to know, by experience, that I can extract out one of the forms of my experience as spatiality and that is is a priori. — Bob Ross

you cannot have thoughts without separation of objects/concepts/abstractions. This requires a spatial aspect not deduced frmo the objects/concepts/abstractions. — AmadeusD

Bob, are you talking about the ability to discretely experience? This requires no innate understanding of space, just the ability to separate what one experiences into identities. "Space" is a very particular identity that assumes depth and location. We can learn this, but its not innate knowledge. Having experience, then being able to focus and divide that experience into 'experiences' is innate. We can also know the division of these experiences once we have make them. This division of experiences at its base, does not necessitate space or any form of empiricism. That is developed later.

It was an catchy way of saying “not all knowledge is acquired and grounded in empirical data—a posteriori data”: there are certain ways we are pre-structured to perceive which necessarily are not reflections of anything in reality. — Bob Ross

The problem is this assumes that experiences apart from the empirical are not reality. Every experience you have is part of reality. The question of whether your interpretation of that experience represents aspects of reality beyond the experience itself (I see water, therefore water is a X location in space and not a mirage) is correct when applied beyond the inductive.

How is knowledge gained apriori?

Through experience, but not through empirical data. It is a transcendental investigation into how our cognition represents things, independently of what is being represented, in pre-structured ways. — Bob Ross

Again, there are problems here because you note that empirical data is reality, while non-empirical data is not.

I was entertaining your idea that someone could be thinking, self-reflectively, without ever having an inner or outer sense of space. If that is true, then they still would implicitly being using the concept of space, because reason fundamentally thinks in terms of space. — Bob Ross

No, reason does not fundamentally think in terms of space. It thinks in terms of discrete experience. It thinks in terms of inductions and deductions based off of this discrete experience. I see water over there, when I normally see water, in my past experience this means there is water over there. I go over there, and the water vanishes. It was a mirage. Distinctive knowledge, beliefs, and the application of those beliefs. Empirical experiences are merely one subset of discrete experiences. "Space" is one such concept that is formed and reasoned on. It is not known innately.

Of course there are inner senses: they are senses of oneself or, more broadly, any sense capable of sensing the being which has those senses. — Bob Ross

Senses refer to the empirical. There are only five of them. Using the term, 'inner sense' as if it means 'one of the five senses' is a misnomer. Self-reflection is a type of thought, not a sense. If you start blending sense into internal thoughts, then the this easily makes every experience a sense. Its good to have tight separations of terms at times or else you run into making it too generic. Self-reflection after all is simply conscious awareness. Which means non-self-reflective awareness can also be a sense...and now the term 'sense' doesn't really mean much anymore beyond 'experience'.

There’s so much densely packed into section 4, of which you wanted me to read, that I am clueless as to what you are wanting to discuss about it. — Bob Ross

It was more to note the point between apriori as 'without experience' vs aposteriori as 'with experience' and your note that there is a difference between empirical and non-empirical experience. My point is that finding that dividing line between what is gained with empirical experience, vs none at all, doesn't leave us with anything we could commonly call knowledge.

Isn't how we perceive reality also how we empirically experience reality? A color blind person would have a different empirical experience then a normal color sighted person. Is that experience apriori or aposteriori?

“empirically experience” doesn’t make sense, and is the source of your confusion: like I said before, ‘experience’ is both in part a priori and a posteriori; and it necessarily must be that way. — Bob Ross

Then I need a little clarification as to what you mean by this below:

How can one have experience and also not have experience?

I was noting that not all aspects of experience are empirical; — Bob Ross

I interpreted this to mean we can have empirical experience, and non-empirical experience. What is the difference between apriori and aposteriori experience in your view then?

We do not have five senses: any pre-structured means of receptivity of objects (which includes ourselves) is form of sensibility. So, introspection, proprioception, echolocation, and electrolocation are straightforwardly senses; — Bob Ross

I'll agree that proprioception and echolocation are definitely senses, but introspection? There's no reading of the outside world in this case. So if I'm thinking about the outside world, its not a sense, but if I'm thinking about myself, its a sense?

memory is just the reinvocation of previous experience and so is has both a priori and a posteriori aspects to it; and hallucination, although they didn’t mention it, has for its a posteriori aspects fabricated data. — Bob Ross

And where is this distinct separation in memory? If an illusion, which is a misinterpretation of empirical sense data is aposteriori, is any misinterpretation of anything aposteriori? The point here is its difficult to see the dividing line.

What truly separates the two?

I’ve made it clear what separates them: what are you contending is wrong with my distinction? — Bob Ross

If it was clear, I would not be asking again. :) I'm noting that in practice, giving an example of how one can have knowledge apart from experience doesn't make any sense. Apriori knowledge is often understood as understanding something independently from experience. You noted earlier that apriori does involve experience, but you seemed to divide this experience between the empirical and non-empirical. This is where I'm confused.

a priori justification is linked closely to knowledge: it would be evidence grounded in the way we experience as opposed to what we experience if we take the Kantian use of the terms, and more broadly it would be any evidence grounded in the way we think about reality as opposed anything about reality itself (e.g., law of identity as a logical law by which we self-reflectively reason about our experience). — Bob Ross

See this is generally not seen as knowledge. If I have the capability to see red, that's just an innate part of my being. Its not something I 'know'. If I've never seen red before, I can have the capacity to know what it is when I see it, but I don't know what red is apart from experience.

In principle, there can be a human which lacks the faculty of understand and reason such that there is no space in which objects are being represented, because there’s nothing being represented (from the outer senses) at all. — Bob Ross

Right, they don't know what space is in that sense, because they've never encountered it before. They have the capacity to understand what space is, but no experience to know what space is in that way. What you seem to be claiming, and correct me if I'm wrong, is that someone knows what space is before they've experienced it. Even under the JTB, knowledge is a 'justified true belief'. Where is the justification, or the belief in something one has never experienced?

As I've noted, there really is no mental difference between the empirical and non-empirical. To me, the true difference is in 'application' or 'assertion'. The empirical asserts that one's mental constructs represent an intake of something independent of oneself, while 'mental' aspects, such as thoughts and memory, are taken to be something that is dependent on oneself. Or maybe a better phrasing is, "of the self". But they are both experiences. — Philosophim

Then I'm not sure you're actually using apriori correctly. I agree with this notion, but I'm not sure that's what Kant actually believes. We seem to have a notion of 'without experience, but experience'. There's a lack of a terminology that doesn't devolve into contradictions here.

Not everything you said is rooted in the empirical aspect of experience; and that’s what you are equivocating. That a person could think without experiencing anything in space and, let’s grant for your point, which I highly doubt is possible, who lacks a concept of space does not lack it because of lacking empirical data—they lack it because one of the a priori pure forms of sensibility, space, was never used by the brain (because perhaps their brain is damaged and cannot do it). They lack the concept of space self-reflectively because they’ve never had an outer experience (which would include that a priori form). — Bob Ross

Breaking this down, you're pointing out what I am. You can't reflect on space if you've never experienced space. Meaning that any knowledge gained from this would come from experience. How is knowledge gained? How is knowledge gained apriori? How is this 'apriori knowledge' a JTB?

On a separate note, this hypothetical is impossible in actuality; for one cannot think, self-reflectively, through reason without using the concept of space—even if they have never experienced it. — Bob Ross

This makes no sense. If you've never experienced space or its concepts, you don't know it. Moving your fingers and coming up with an idea or notion of space is learned by experience, not apart from it.

How does a person who has no senses understand space?

Assuming you mean that they have no outer or inner senses; then they cannot understand space, because they lack the ability to understand anything—what you are describing is a dead person. — Bob Ross

I'm just talking about lacking the five senses. "Inner senses" is a misnomer. Senses refer to the five ways we are able to gain information from the outside world.

Babies from birth represent objects in space, but they do not from birth know that in which the objects are represented is space; but once they have the sufficient self-reflective cognitive abilities, they can know it and it is a priori knowledge because it is not justified by any empirical data—it is justified by the non-empirical way that their brain is representing. — Bob Ross

But it is justified by the experience of space. Again, I agree that babies have an innate capacity to come to certain conclusions about space, but that knowledge is learned by experience. Where is the knowledge of space without experience, which is the idea of 'apriori knowledge'? The ability to see red, does not mean one knows what red is before one has experienced it. Do we have apriori knowledge of red? No. Because apriori knowledge doesn't make sense as Kant defined it.

Sorry I didn't see this: I wasn't linked to it. Philosophim, I am not going to make your argument for you (: — Bob Ross

Yes I just wanted you to read section 4, but there's no direct link. You can ctrl+F and type the phrase in to find it directly. I'm also not trying to have you make my argument, I just know when there are other better references then myself. I read Kant's work on knowledge many moons ago, and I would not deign to be an expert on the specifics. We are not really at a point of debating if Kant's ideology works, but we seem to be debating the meaning of what Kant was saying. That type of discussion requires good references.

I think you are thinking that a priori knowledge is knowledge which one has independently of ever having experienced anything; and I am partially to blame to for that: I was misusing the term a while back. — Bob Ross

Yes, and so now I need a new clarification of what you mean by apriori. That was the crux of what I was against. Kant is easy to read at a surface level, but when you get into the specifics of it, problems start to crop up.

a posteriori knowledge is knowledge which is grounded in empirical data, and is, thusly, about reality; whereas a priori knowledge is about how we perceive reality. — Bob Ross

Are you sure this makes sense? Isn't how we perceive reality also how we empirically experience reality? A color blind person would have a different empirical experience then a normal color sighted person. Is that experience apriori or aposteriori? Let me link the first section of the article I linked.

"A standard answer to the question about the difference between a priori and empirical justification is that a priori justification is independent of experience and empirical justification is not, and this seems to explain the contrasts present in the fifteen examples above. But various things have been meant by “experience”. On a narrow account, “experience” refers to sense experience, that is, to experiences that come from the use of our five senses: sight, touch, hearing, smell, and taste. However, this narrow account implies that justification based on introspection, proprioception (our kinesthetic sense of the position and movements of our body), memory, and testimony are kinds of a priori justification. And if we had different senses, like those of bats (echolocation) and duck-billed platypuses (electrolocation), experiences based on those senses would provide a priori, not empirical, justification on this account which takes a priori justification to be independent of experiences based on the senses we have.

Given these considerations, perhaps “experience” should be taken to mean “sense experience of any sort, introspection, proprioception, memory, and testimony”. This sounds like a hodgepodge of various sources of justification but perhaps what unites them is that, leaving aside memory and testimony, these sources provide us with information either about the physical world or our inner world, either the outer world through perception or the inner world of what we are feeling or thinking, or information about our bodies, through introspection and proprioception. Memory and testimony are not primary sources of justification; their primary epistemic function is to transmit either a priori or empirical justification. So the proposal should be seen as a way of distinguishing the primary sources of justification into two categories of justification: a priori and empirical.

As noted above (see, sec. 3) and below (secs. 4.4 and 4.5), “independent of experience” should not be taken to mean independent of all experience, but, as a first approximation, to mean “independent of all experience beyond what is needed to grasp the relevant concepts involved in the proposition”. It is sometimes said that a priori justification can depend on experience insofar as it enables the person to acquire the concepts needed to grasp the meaning of the proposition which is the object of justification, but experience cannot play an evidential role in that justification (Williamson 2013: 293). Later we will see that the notion of enabling experience might better be expanded to include experience needed to acquire certain intellectual skills such as those needed to construct certain proofs or create counterexamples (see, secs. 4.4 and 4.5, below).

Suppose there is a significant difference between a priori and empirical justification. This still does not tell us what the basis of a priori justification is. One view is that rational intuitions or insights are the bases of a priori justification; experiences, as construed above, the bases of empirical justification. Before discussing the nature of rational intuitions or insights, we should first distinguish between intuitions and intuitive judgments and consider what the content of intuitive judgments evoked in thought experiments is."

The point of the above is trying to make the definitions of apriori and aposteriori work, because Kant is unclear and seems to contradict himself at times (or perhaps through the language translation of his works) when he says "experience". What truly separates the two? As I've noted, there really is no mental difference between the empirical and non-empirical. To me, the true difference is in 'application' or 'assertion'. The empirical asserts that one's mental constructs represent an intake of something independent of oneself, while 'mental' aspects, such as thoughts and memory, are taken to be something that is dependent on oneself. Or maybe a better phrasing is, "of the self". But they are both experiences.

Taking space as another example, the axiom in geometry that “the shortest path between two points is a straight line connecting them” is a proposition that is true in virtue of the way we experience as opposed to what we experience — Bob Ross

So if I am blind and have no sense of touch, it is true in virtue of the way I experience? That doesn't make any sense. It is known 'to be true' (known by application) based on empirical experience. We can also know it 'by definition'. But knowing a definition of something doesn't make it true in application. I can know the definition of a pink elephant, but it doesn't mean I'll ever know one empirically.

I'm talking about instincts as the being of a person prior to any experience.

Then the root of our disagreement there is merely semantical: that’s not usually what an “instinct” means. For example, Webster’s is “a largely inheritable and unalterable tendency of an organism to make a complex and specific response to environmental stimuli without involving reason”. — Bob Ross

Yes, that's fine. I'm trying to note the parts of apriori that work. What works is when you note apriori as 'innate being'. This includes instincts and physical potential. These are the only things which are independent of empirical experience. You could think independent of ever having any sense, but what would you think about? You wouldn't even know what space is let alone have a memory of anything but some dark and wordless nothingness. You wouldn't even know what 'dark' is, it would just be a senseless existence. Everything else that we reason about in our head has its root in empirical experience. We create identities, memories, and then have the innate ability to part and parcel those memories into ideas, imagination, dreams, and other thoughts. But to say they are 'true'? What exactly about them is true Bob?

The point that I was making with “applicable” vs. “distinctive” knowledge, is that it doesn’t preclude a priori knowledge; and it would be applicable knowledge in your theory (assuming I grant our theory in its entirety). — Bob Ross

Distinctive knowledge is the closest to the loose concept of 'apriori knowledge'. Its an evolution of the concept without the problematic definitive issues of what apriori is. Never do I say distinctive knowledge is 'true'. Never do I separate the empirical from the mental with distinctive knowledge. The separation is when you try to take those memories and experiences, and apply it to a world that is independent of your wishes, desires, and interpretations. The idea of apriori does not do this.

Space data is not empirical—you are using the terms to loosely. There are aspects of your experience which your brain produces as a matter of how it is pre-structured to represent vs. the actual empirical data it is representing. — Bob Ross

How does a person who has no senses understand space? And if it was inborn, how come it takes several months to learn?

(Development of spatial development in babies)
4 to 6 months:
Begins to grasp objects and explores them with hands and mouth.
Starts to show depth perception (judging distances between objects).
https://www.visionlearncenter.com/post/milestones-for-visual-spatial-development

I was noting that not all aspects of experience are empirical; and I can’t tell if you agree with that or not — Bob Ross

I agree with this. What I'm noting is that apriori meaning "thoughts(?) that are independent of empirical experience" needs special care. If you are to claim an understanding of space is apriori, how can that understanding of space be completely independent of empirical experience with the assertion that is it true?

What helps with productivity is not, "I should be productive". Silence that. What you should be asking yourself is, "What do I want to accomplish in life?" Then make sure you actively work towards that. If what you want to accomplish in life is look at youtube videos all day and talk with chat bots, do so. You'll find once you have a goal that you truly wish to pursue, procrastination will turn into, "I like doing these other things too, but they're at a lower priority for now."

And if its basic maitainence and work that you would rather not be doing...you're screwed. :D

I was wondering how to tackle this post as the entirety of apriori, posteriori, analytic, and synthetic distinctions can get messy. Further, apriori knowledge is often the means of justifying said knowledge, and Kant's justification model is still based off of JTB if I recall correctly. Since we're discussing specifically what Kant is saying, I think its important that we accurately assess what Kant is saying, and not our interpretation of it.

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/apriori/#ExamIlluDiffBetwPrioPostEmpiJust

Honestly, the above is a greater and more accurate source of the definition of apriori, and some of the issues. Specifically, I' m going to refer to section 4 " What is the nature of a priori justification?" Take a read and see what you think. Feel free to ask me to revisit any of the above notes when you're done. But as it is now, I think the terms need better clarification to continue.

I would say it is also independent of the imagination, thoughts, memories, etc. being that it is the necessary preconditions for that as well. — Bob Ross

I don't think we're in disagreement with the idea of apriori, just apriori knowledge. You're using math, but as I'll note, I still don't see that as knowledge independent of experience. Can you give some other examples of apriori knowledge?

Not quite: an instinct is a way one is predisposed to reacting to experience; — Bob Ross

I believe instinct includes this, but also the impetus to act at all. Apriori essentially includes the package of being prior to experience. The apriori of a fish would be very different from a human. One could also posit its the being and potential prior to experience.

whereas the a priori means of cognizing objects is a way we are pre-structured to experience. To your point, we could very well say that there are a priori instincts we have vs. ones we learn. My point here is just that you are invalidly forming a dichotomy between ‘instincts’ and ‘experience’ which turns out to be a false one. — Bob Ross

I'm with you all the way until the last sentence. It may be due to the way you're defining instincts. I'm talking about instincts as the being of a person prior to any experience. So its not a false dichotomy, its a true one.

You aren’t thinking about it properly, and this is what is the root of the confusion. Not everything that is a priori is instinctual (like I noted before); and a priori knowledge is any knowledge which has its truth-maker in the way we experience as opposed to what we experience. — Bob Ross

In the way we experience... So let me note again the point about 'distinctive experience'. In the paper I comment that "I don't know why I distinctively experience, but I do." That isn't knowledge. Actions and instincts prior to experience are not themselves experience. The first time I discretely experience, I now have that experience. But there was no experience before that allowed me to discretely experience. Its an innate capability. Innate capabilities are not knowledge. Knowledge can only be gleaned from experience. So while apriori can work on its own, apriori knowledge is a contradiction.

This is why Kant noted that math is a priori; because no matter what you are experiencing, the propositions in math are true in virtue of the way we cognize objects in space and time which is true for anything a human will experience. — Bob Ross

I noted that math is the logic of discrete experience. But it still needs to be learned through experience. One cannot begin to understand the logic of discrete experience without first discretely experiencing. And that IS an experience. Every thought, feelilng, and 'mental' existence, is an experience. We forget sometimes that even when I touch something, that experience is 'mental'. The carpet doesn't feel soft outside of our touch. Its our touch interpreting the carpet into some type of sensation in our brains. Whether I have a though by touching carpet, or a thought while sitting on a couch imagining a blue sky, those are still experiences.

“1 + 1 = 2” is true as grounded by the way our brains cognize, the mathematical axioms which it has, and not because of something we learned about something which we experienced (in terms of its purely empirical content). — Bob Ross

He almost had it. Since we innately discretely experience, we all share that same aspect of viewing the world. And because we can be logical beings, we can figure out that there is a logic to discretely experiencing. Thus if you reason through it, you can conclude some type of expression of 'math'. But these are things we must learn though experiencing. Just like the fact that physics exists in our world, we don't know about it unless we experience it. Apriori means 'independent of experience'. Knowledge is "What can be logically concluded by experience that best fits reality". Apriori knowledge is therefore a contradiction. You cannot have knowledge, which is dependent on experience, that is also independent of experience.

This is why Kant famously said that all knowledge begins with experience but that does not mean all knowledge arises out of experience. — Bob Ross

A fun and poetic saying, but it does not make logical sense. Knowledge by experience is an either or situation. If you must have experience for knowledge, you cannot have apriori knowledge, or "Knowledge by experience that is independent of experience". Something isn't being reasoned through correctly.

The space which objects are presented to you in is purely synthetic: it is something your brain added into the mix—not empirical data. — Bob Ross

All empirical data is from your brain Bob. All experience is in your brain. We are fortunately able to interpret that there is a world outside of our brain that we try to master. The only difference is, 'Thoughts through nerves that hit the brain" vs "thoughts in the brain without nerves".

What we are discussing is not if knowledge begins with experience, but if there aspects of our experience which are not experiential. — Bob Ross

This needs to be more clearly defined then. How can one have experience and also not have experience? I think its a confusion as to believing that the senses are a different kind of experience then thoughts without the senses. This is a fine distinction, but they are both experiences. That's the difference between my point of 'discrete experiences' vs 'applicable experiences'. Both are experiences, and both can gain knowledge. Apriori knowledge is "Knowledge without experience, but it still starts with experience", which breaks down the more you think on it.

Bases are just different ways to represent numbers: I am talking about numbers themselves — Bob Ross

Again, numbers are signs, which are learned through experience. The sign '1' never had to arise in human society. The sign for one could have just as easily ben 'ua'. What we can learn by discretely experiencing is that we can focus on a 'discrete', or one that is separate from everything around it. We then have the capability to hold a '1' and a '1' discrete experience, and group that into a new discrete experience that we label as '2'. While I believe most people have the innate capacity to do this process, it does not result in 'math' or 'numbers'. If one is able to function with a basic logic of discrete experience, then one can do this. But to know one can do this, one has to experience it first.

The point is that there is no knowledge apart from experience. All knowledge is gained from experience. Our innate capacities determine what types of experiences we can have, and if we can reason through them in a particular way. But knowledge of that only comes after doing so. "Discrete experience" and "distinctive knowledge" solve the problem, "apriori knowledge" doesn't quite work.

If you understood the essential properties and context of what grue and bleen is, then yes

You can tell when things were created down to the year just by looking at them? When you drive through a neighborhood you know the year each house was built just as readily as the the color it is painted? — Count Timothy von Icarus

I misunderstood the question then. To tell the age that a house was built, you need verifiable records and trust in their accuracy.

This seems like "because difference is not a logical contradiction it is arbitrary." — Count Timothy von Icarus

No, I'm not saying that. It is arbitrary in terms of 'accuracy'. It is not arbitrary in terms of individuals or cultures. As I noted, language can be a matter of preference and power in addition to accuracy. Preference and power are arbitrary in relation to accuracy, if the only thing one cares about is accuracy. But people often care more about things other than accuracy. Would I elevate these differences to the same level as 'intelligent decisions"? No.

Human languages distinguish between shape and color — Count Timothy von Icarus

This would be about accuracy. Saying, "That feels like the color red" is something only a person with synthesia would experience. So we people without synthesia don't view the above sentence as having any accuracy.

If someone argued that chemistry should be split into chemistry done by people with blue eyes and chemistry done by people with other colored eyes, or argued that we should divide chemistry into pre and post 1990 chemistries, or a chemistry of federally recognized holidays, they would be rebuffed for non-arbitrary reasons. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes, like the idea that 'slaves shouldn't read'. Such a division is about cultural power over others, not anything accurate to the nature of being a slave.

This might be filtered through "personal preference," but personal preference doesn't spring from the aether uncaused and neither do our concepts and languages. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I never implied that it did. I'm just noting that personal preference can override why one would use a term over another if you had two terms that accurately described the same situation under consideration. And in some cases, personal preference can override accuracy. Of course, the accurate term will be much more likely to accurately reflect the world, but if one is not interested in that, then it is dismissed.

A theorem (as opposed to an equation that's given a real-world interpretation) isn't described as effective, it's described as true, or at least provable in L. — J

It depends on your definition of 'true'. If you mean 'true and false' as logically valid, that's not the same as 'true means what is real'. 'Real' being, "What exists despite our knowledge".

Do you want to abandon that way of talking? If a correspondence theory of truth demands that we do so, I'd argue that it represents a reductio ad absurdum and should be rejected on that ground. — J

In the case of 'truth as reality', there is no correspondence theory of truth. The end result is, "Knowledge is the best logical process we have to understand reality, but it cannot prove that it is a 100% accurate comprehension of truth. That is beyond human limits"

And it all comes down to the fact that 'reality' does not care what we think. Tomorrow we could discover physics is wrong. Does that mean we didn't know physics? Of course not. Today with all we can reason, physics is what is known. So we go with that until shown otherwise. Maybe physics is a 100% accurate representation of truth. Maybe one day we'll discover that its not. But logically, its the best thing we have right now.

Suppose bleen is "green and "first observed" during or before 2004," or "blue and 'first observed' after 2004." Could you go walk around where you live and determine what was grue or bleen? — Count Timothy von Icarus

If you understood the essential properties and context of what grue and bleen is, then yes. Notice I say context, because the context of what grue is to a scientist who studies light waves and a local and colloquial understanding of grue can be different. The important part is to first establish what the definition is in context. Only then can you go about applying that definition to confirm or deny its match.

Suppose there is a famous green landmark in your town and it got flattened by a tornado in 2006. It was rebuilt with largely with materials salvaged from the original, but has a substantial amount of new material. Is it bleen or grue? — Count Timothy von Icarus

Same response.

What if only small parts of it were replaced each year since 2004? — Count Timothy von Icarus

Seems a bit Theseus here, so why don't we go to the source?

Really the same situation applies. What does the culture think is Theseus ship? There might be a society that believes ownership only happens for five years, and after five years the original thing has changed so much that it is something completely knew and it needs to be registered with the state again.

We can have another culture that believes ownership is tied with purchase and then use. So as long as he uses the ship, its his no matter the part replacements. But if he abandons it for a year, its no longer his.

Its all about "What are the definitions in the context?" Once you have that, then you do applied knowledge. The problems often come in thinking that applied knowledge happens, then we wonder what the definitions are. That's an improper use of knowledge. That's when we're discovering what the definitions should be.

In the case of grue and blue, we're not asking what the definitions should be, we already know what they mean. Our decision is then, "should we use grue or blue"? And I mentioned earlier, as long as both are accurate to the point they are not contradicted by reality, its really a personal choice. It may be as simple as, "I like one word more than another" or as complicated as, "Those dirty grueians are a stupid people that I find inferior. Blue is obviously superior and the 'right' way to identify a color."

↪Philosophim What a cromulent response! :smile:

This just pushes the question back a level -- why is it effective? — J

Ha ha, glad you got the reference! It is accurate because it is not contradicted by reality, and that's it. If I can hold a word, phrase, or set of built up claims that are not contradicted by reality, then I have 'accuracy'. Meaning that accuracy is not about capturing 'what really is'. Its about creating a representation of the world that isn't contradicted by 'what really is'. If we use deduction, and the steps that lead to knowledge I noted in the paper, its the most reasonable way to think about the world, and the closest we can ever get to capturing 'what really is'.

But we can have multiple terms and viewpoints of the world that are effective. For example, we can use math in base 2,3,4 or any really. They're all 'accurate'. This is where the other two points I made come into play. The most likely reason we use base ten is because we have ten fingers, which are great tools to start counting with. And that's really it. We use base two in logic gates, because there are only two states for a gate "on or off". We use hexadecimal for memory, as it turns out to make more sense when you combine several binary gates together for functionality.

Wouldn't it make more sense for you (if I've understood your thinking here) to abandon any talk of accuracy or truth? — J

No, accuracy is still extremely important, and should be the ideal goal of knowledge. Accuracy doesn't mean necessarily that you've discovered what is true, but it does mean that you're not in contradiction with what is true. Truth of course being, 'What is'.

Religion is a good example of holding a set of terms that may be both accurate and useful depending on culture and a lack of other terminology. Lets say you don't have an objective morality, but common people who till fields all day need a guide. You know that government isn't well liked by people, after all, they take your money with taxes. People like to have a greater purpose then just living. We need people to treat each other right to build a society. The idea of a "God" that can answer complicated questions that these types of people do not have the education, or real need to consider, can be incredibly useful.

Why should I not steal from my neighbor? Because God, your creator who loves you/will kill you has deemed it so. Its part of a greater plan then yourself. When you die, you'll go to heaven/hell based on your performance here. So be happy that tilling the fields is fulfilling Gods plan, don't lust after your neighbors hot body when you're already married, raise your kids well, and treat people right.

"God" in this case is not necessarily contradicted by reality. "Why can't I see God?" "God is all around us, but you can't see or hear him." "How do I know there's an afterlife." "Have faith, don't you feel it inside of you?"

Of course, increased education like neuroscience and epistemology start to reveal that "God" is simply a plausible invention of the mind, not a real applicable reality. But for a common person tilling fields, "God" may actually give them greater purpose, and answers the basic life and moral questions that one might think of while plowing a field at 2 in the afternoon. Satisfaction with their lot in life generates good work, and a life that feels fulfilled. It can create a common ideology the village can gather around that isn't government. It can give a sense of freedom and personal worth.

Welcome to the forums! For beginners I don't recommend going to school, use the internet to do that!

Here's a 30 minute summary of philosophy.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G5i2y5w8Dzc

Here's a friendly digest which gives a more fun overview that dives a little deeper
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R2zElslG_tE&list=PLybg94GvOJ9FIZxEevSANiCk5O9l_rYWK

Want something more serious? Here's an online history of philosophy series of lectures for free from Arthur Holmes at Wheton College
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Yat0ZKduW18&list=PL9GwT4_YRZdBf9nIUHs0zjrnUVl-KBNSM

Want to just browse topics like 'Aristotle, moralty, or epistemology?' Use the Stanford Encyclopedia of philosophy. https://plato.stanford.edu/contents.html

And of course, feel free to browse the forums and start topic like, "Can I taste the color green?" :) Have fun learning!

Well, perhaps, but how can "accuracy" be a factor at all? What would make something an "accurate representation," to use your phrase, and of what is it a representation? None of the three factors talk about how such an idea could arise.

To put it in simple terms (borrowed from Sider), are we really not in a position to say that the Bleen people have gotten something wrong? — J

Accuracy is point 1.

1. Real life effectiveness

As long as an identity and its application are effective, or not contradicted by reality, people will hold it. Physics is held because it works. When it doesn't work, we look for an amendment or something wrong. Have you ever heard of phlogiston theory? https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Phlogiston_theory

At one time, it was considered a serious contender for why things would catch on fire. In short, the theory that was things which could burn had a substance called phlogiston in them that would burn when you exposed it to air. It has a few problems however, such as that some substances when burnt grew heavier, which couldn't happen if phlogiston was burning away. It was eventually replaced with Oxygen theory because it was more accurate and effective at describing the world.

If the Bleen people accurately describe a color that is useful, then who are we to care if they use the term? Maybe we don't like it, or we want our word to be dominate for some status reason, but if its a perfectly cromulent word, why not? :)

By referring to "accurate representation," you've introduced an epistemologically normative factor that is nowhere implied in the first three factors. — J

No, that's not what I imply in my work.

There are two types of knowledges, distinctive, and applicable. Distinctive knowledge is the knowledge of identity. What we experience, and what we we distinctively experience, is known to us as is. So if I have a definition of blue or grue, I distinctively know what those terms are. The reason why we use one term over the other are what the three points cover.

At the point I try to apply those terms to reality, I have applicable knowledge. That's when I attempt to map the definition or distinctive memory that I have to reality. If I can do so deductively, and reality does not contradict me, then I applicably know that color as grue or blue.

The three points are about the question, "Which distinctive identities would a society use and deem 'the proper one'?" So if you had a group of one people who used grue, and another group that used blue, the three points I iterated above would influence which would most likely be used if the cultures were to discover each other.

OK. So no one of your factors would be something like "This set of concepts more accurately reflects the ontological structure of the world"? — J

More, "This set of concepts most accurately represents what can be known about the world."

Heck, we even disagree on which of us is more focused on 'what we want' and 'what is most likely'. Hehe. It's that kind of topic, eh? — Patterner

Ha ha! True, it is!

Not sure it's possible for the two of us to not talk about it, though. If you say something I disagree with, I'll often want the other person to know there is another pov. — Patterner

And I greatly appreciate it! I've enjoyed my conversation with you Patterner, you write clearly, intelligently, and I always respect your viewpoint. We'll chat again, I'm sure.

Sider uses the "grue and bleen world" example (which you can read about here, p. 16) to refer to a situation that he believes needs explaining: If we encountered a people who used grue and bleen as their concepts, we'd be unable to fault them on any logical grounds. — J

Correct. We would not be able to fault them. Name creation is simply that, name creation. If you read my paper, I actually cover this with a sheep and a goat a bit. There can be a person, and thus a society, that calls both a sheep and a goat, a goat. This is because in their eyes, the essential properties of the sheep and goat, "Fur and hooves" are all that matter. The fact one has weird horns or eyes is a non-essential proper for them. Its irrelevant.

But such broad definitions may run into problems if one were to start raising 'goats'. You would find that one type of goat has medical issues that the other doesn't. They behave differently when managing them around your pens. These differences start to elevate in importance, so they become more essential. One could decide "These two are so different, I'm going to start calling one a sheep," or "(Referring to sheep) I'm going to start calling these 'fluffy goats'".

So with color, it would be the same. To a color blind person, there is no 'red' for example. In most cases, its irrelevant. However, when someone creates a bit of art with color, or you have a need to identify things based on red coloration, this becomes a problem with accurately making decisions about reality.

In my opinion, there are a few factors that determine a cultural set of words and identities.

1. Real life effectiveness

This is actually the most impactful reason. Identifying things incorrectly often leads to mistakes, stumbling blocks, and inconveniences. This gets a person and/or society to change if there is a better alternative.

2. Fulfills emotional desires

Maybe there is a viable reason to use 'grue', but since it doesn't personally impact my life, and I simply 'don't like it', I'm not going to use it. The phrase "Gay marriage" has nothing logically wrong with it, but for some people it made them uncomfortable, so they avoided it. Its the same reason I don't use "Oh snap!" when I make a mistake. It just feels dirty. :D

3. Fulfills a power structure

Sometimes words and phrases contain a cultural power over people and societies. The term "God" might not be clear or particularly useful other than a means of getting a people to unite as a nation "Under God". "Don't use the term transsexual, that's offensive, use transgender", is another example of using perfectly descriptive words to control a narrative.

My apologies on the long delay on my reply! I had intended to reply to this another time as I had some other conversations in play, and only remembered this recently.

Firstly, “a priori” refers, within the context of transcendental investigations, as “that which is independent of any possible experience—viz., independent of empirical data”. — Bob Ross

If we say 'experience' here is 'empirical data', then I'm fine with this. Our thoughts, memories, etc are all 'experience', but I suppose not define here. What we should be careful with is defining thoughts that are based on experience, vs thoughts that have no basis on experience. For example, if I remember a tree, my memory is now based on the experience and identify of a tree. True 'non-empirical' based experiences are what we would call 'instincts'. When a newborn is born for example it cries, and it can breath even though it hasn't breathed yet. The moment after it breathes, any thought on breathing is based on empirical experience.

“Knowledge” is just a justified, true belief (with truth being a version of correspondence theory) or, more generically, ~”having information which is accurate”. — Bob Ross

A JTB theory of knowledge has long been countered by "The Gettier Problem". But lets go with the idea that knowledge is something obtained through reason that is the best stab available at understanding reality. What is apriori knowledge if apriori is simply instinct? The moment a baby kicks, it knows what its like to kick through its empirical sensations. The moment a child learns about ''the number 1' its now empirical knowledge. 'Apriori knowledge' is a misnomer. It doesn't make any sense.

The proposition “all bodies are extended” is universally true for human experience and a priori because the way we experience is in space (necessarily); and so this is a priori known. — Bob Ross

Notice that even in this sentence you justified a claim of apriori by saying 'we experience'. All bodies are extended is something we empirically learn by experience, not anything we are born with.

This immediately incites the question: “if A is knowledge and B is knowledge, then aren’t they inheriting the same type of knowledge and, if so, thereby the question of ‘what is knowledge?’

Of course, you probably have an answer to this that I don’t remember….it has been a while (; — Bob Ross

Yes, I did, and it has been a while. :) You may want to re-read it again now that you're much more versed in philosophy and discussions, or at least the summary that was posted right after it on the revision I posted a while back. So we don't get into that too deeply right now and can remain focused on the point here, I'll simply answer, "Yes, its consistent at its base between the two types".

Briefly, I will also say, that your schema doesn’t negate the possibility of a priori “knowledge” (in your sense of knowledge): it would be applicable knowledge, as the whole metaphysical endeavor of transcendental investigation would be applicable knowledge. — Bob Ross

Its similar, but not exactly the same. The most like apriori is distinctive knowledge. Thus if I kick, I have an experience of that kick, and identify it distinctively in some way from the rest of my experience. I know that experience distinctively. It doesn't mean that if I kick, a burst of air will erupt and shatter a wall in front of me. For that, I need to apply my kick to the air to see if that result happens.

The question becomes: “why don’t you think that we can apply a priori knowledge without contradiction and reasonably to the forms of experience (viz., the necessary preconditions for the possibility of experience) given that we both agree that our experience is representational?”. — Bob Ross

My disagreement purely rests on the fact that 'apriori knowledge' does not make sense as I noted above. The thing that is aprior is instinct or innate capability, not knowledge.

The fact that we can do math in different bases does not negate that the same mathematical operations are occurring, and that they are synthetical, a priori propositions. — Bob Ross

There is no instinct to do math in any base. It takes time for this to develop in humans.

"Quantity recognition: around 6 months
Quantity recognition is often the first mathematical skill children learn. Well before counting, babies as young as 6 months can demonstrate a basic understanding of quantities just by observing objects. Research suggests that babies can distinguish between different quantities, especially when the difference is significant—for example, six apples versus 12 apples.

By 10 to 12 months, babies may apply this skill when making choices."
https://blog.lovevery.com/skills-stages/numbers-counting/#:~:text=Quantity%20recognition%3A%20around%206%20months&text=Research%20suggests%20that%20babies%20can,this%20skill%20when%20making%20choices.

It is purely an abstract thing that cannot be applicably known.

Ehhhh, then you cannot claim to know that there must be a thing-in-itself at all; or otherwise concede that you can know applicably, through experience, that if our experience is representational then there must be a thing-in-itself. — Bob Ross

I cannot applicably claim to know there is 'a thing in itself'. Its a logical induction. Its plausible that a thing in itself exists, and implausible that it does not. Therefore its the smart money bet. But it is not applicably known, and because it is such a broad and unspecified definition, nothing else besides that fact that we say, "There must be something that exists in itself apart for what we observe" can ever be said about it.

"The thing in itself" is a space alien

Then a thing-in-itself is not a concept which is purely logical—that was my only point on this note. It is referencing something concrete. — Bob Ross

You misunderstood, I was creating a hypothetical in the example. My point was to give a concrete to the abstract. To demonstrate a possible 'thing in itself' and demonstrate that no amount of observation could discover it, as everything we observe from it leads us to view it as something completely different then what it really is as itself.

↪Philosophim I did read the summary. Is this the passage you're referring to (concerning "privileged structure" or the like)?: — J

This is part of it, yes. "Privileged" knowledge is really just simple knowledge that has been tested and confirmed so tightly as to be assumed to be 'true'. 'True' in this case being beyond all doubt or viable questioning at this point in time. The creation of our identities has been refined to match reality in ways that are currently impossible to contradict, and are so fundamental and basic as to not rely on much else for their foundation.

It is from these that we generally build other 'less stable' knowledge. If you got to the part about induction, you'll realize that the deduction required for knowledge is highly expensive in time, effort, and perception. Sometimes we reach a point in trying to acquire knowledge that we reach limits that must be filled in with induction. The hierarchy of whether an induction is more cogent than another is probability, possibility, plausibility, and irrational. When comparing inductions, if there is an induction that is at a higher tier, it is more rational to choose that over the lower tier.

For example, the probability of winning a lottery is 1 in 10 million. It is possible to win the lottery. What induction is more rational to consider if you are deciding to spend money on a ticket? The first one. Its possible to win the lottery, but highly unlikely. Now imagine a lottery that costs a dollar per ticket that has a 1 in 2 chance of winning millions of dollars. Same thing. Its highly likely we will win it versus the cost to entering. Compared to this, the idea that 'Its possible to win the lottery" is an inferior induction to reason with.

If you think of knowledge as often complex structures that are built upon other knowledge, more complex structures of knowledge often rely on induction of some kind here and there. The more 'solid' the knowledge, the less it relies both on inductions, but lower tiers of induction. Fundamental bits of knowledge like math are relatively uncomplex, built on the basic structure of 'the logic of distinctive experiences'. Because there is little to no induction involved, or the induction that we do rely on is the best option that we have, we consider these 'privileged'.

I think we're going to have to agree to disagree here. I think you're coming at this as a question of 'what we want', then 'what is most likely'. You want there to be something special about consciousness, I get that. Its likely part of our human desire to want to continue to live, even in the face of incredibly adversity. Once you get past that, you realize there's nothing there. But if you can't get past that, you'll likely grab onto anything that supports a continuation. I've been in your shoes, I understand.

Not saying I'm right and you're wrong, just noting where I'm coming from, and that I think we've each said our piece, and nothing more can be said. :) Genuinely, I hope I'm wrong and you're right. I've had a nice conversation with you, and hope to have many more in the future.

I just think this needs further explanation; logic and noncontradiction alone won't get us to why some matches seem more natural or reality-mirroring than others ("privileged structure"). — J

You may be interested in reading this then. https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/14044/knowledge-and-induction-within-your-self-context/p1

There's a fantastic summary the next post after mine. If you're serious about this, I would read it.

But we don't have any idea how the micro physical properties give rise to subjective experience. We can't figure it out. And, as I've quoted a few times, Brian Greene, who Has a BA in physics from Harvard, and DPhil (PhD) in theoretical physics at Magdalen College, says the micro properties don't seem to have any connection to consciousness. — Patterner

That still doesn't mean conscious isn't physical. That's like saying, "We don't understand how rain works, so obviously its not of this world and God must cause it." Everything points to consciousness being physical by every measure of behavior we know. Just because we can't figure out the subjective portion of it in no way entails that its suddenly made of some new non-physical material.

Consciousness is 'something'. The best explanation from what we know is that it is the first person experience of matter and energy when it is organized in a particular way. So far, we understand human consciousness is the brain. You alter the brain, you get reports of people saying their first person experience is altered. Don't get so wrapped up in theory that you forget the decades of medicine and neuroscience behind this.

The point of 'using other language' is just to put the discussion in another contextual model that doesn't require the physical to describe it. That's it. It doesn't mean its physical or not physical, it just means 'we don't talk about it'. People misunderstand this and think, "Oh, that means consciousness isn't the brain!". No, all of our knowledge points that being the only thing which currently makes sense.

Just like back in the day people may not have understood that water turned into gas, and thought that was evidence that water was from another world.

Person: "Water must be magic. It vanishes into nothing in a few days! It must go to God's realm."

Scientist: "Well according to our studies, and our understanding of the conservation of mass and
energy, it turns into something else. All of our studies so far seem to imply it rises up in the air. We're calling it a 'gas'."

Person: "But isn't water a liquid? How can you call a liquid a gas?"

Scientist: "Well technically its still 'water'. Its just that when enough heat happens, it changes enough that its better that we don't call it a liquid anymore. Its invisible, so using a 'gas' model is better. But its still of this Earth."

Person: "So it still could be magic or God right? I mean, water comes from clouds which are clearly visible so they can't be a gas. And how does this 'gas' go from the ground to way up in the sky?"

Scientist: "Yes, its true, we can't study clouds as they're too high in the air. But its probably just water as a gas turning back into a liquid."

Person: "I heard you said its not water anymore, so it could be anything. And since its impossible to study clouds and you can't explain it, its still probably from another world."

This 'conversation' has taken some form or the other throughout centuries of human history. Here we are at consciousness, and the same thing is happening again. The money is on the brain at this point. You can be the 'person' if you want, but I think we should all try to be the 'scientist'.

I see what you mean, but we can construct an infinite number of worlds with different abstract entities highlighted (see "grue and bleen", Sider, p. 16) and most of them won't "work" at all, if by "work" you mean "give us a useful conceptual basis for navigating the world." — J

Correct.

Yet there is nothing wrong, logically, with the way these abstractions are being matched to reality. — J

If reality is not contradicting those identities, then they hold. Meaning we can identify reality in multiple ways as long as reality does not contradict our claim. The moment reality does contradict our claim however, its over. For example, if I view that every time I touch a statue, it rains, the time when I touch a statue and it doesn't rain, my abstraction is contradicted and needs to be amended or discarded to continue to be a logical match with reality.

Interesting point. But if the images in dreams are from the memories, why some folks see images that they have never come across in their lives, or meet people they cannot recognise and never met, or go to the places they have never been in their whole lives before? — Corvus

Because the human mind has the capability for creativity. Creativity often comes about by taking bits and pieces that belong to one thing, and then applying them to another. Think of a unicorn for example. Its a horse with a horn on its head. Now make a duocorn. That's a horse with two horns on its head. Keep going. That's why you can dream of things you've never seen before.

Saith him wanting to be logical. I'm looking for a discussion with clarity on a serious problem. You just want to play. It's too bad you do not know how to do either. — tim wood

You know, if you can't treat the people in front of you nicely who are trying to politely disengage from a conversation, maybe you aren't the person we should be listening to in regards to moral choices. As a long term member, you should be behaving better. Get ahold of those emotions in you that want to attack or belittle me for whatever reason, and we'll have a nice conversation another time.

The images come from similar parts of your brain that process light. Think about this. Your eyes are simply a lens in which light floods through. Your brain interprets that light, adds intention, dimensionality, and a sense of reality to it. Then 'you' see it. Dreams are a memory of past visual events being sorted through. A person born blind doesn't visually dream, because they have no memory of anything visual.
And by blind, I mean completely blind, not merely legally blind.

Of course, its a memory, not a 'live stream'. So it can be experienced in a hazy or unrealistic matter. And we have the gift to take experiences in our memory and shift them around into 'potentials'. So I can imagine a horse with a horn on its head. This is the source of creativity and problem solving. To fix a problem you don't know the answer to, you often need to piece things together in ways that you haven't observed before.

All people have the ability to discretely experience. That's to take the sea of existence and form identities or 'existences'. So you can look at 1 field, or 1 blade of grass, or 1 piece of grass. The ability to form a discrete identity, is what '1' is. When you are able to say you have 1 identity, another identity, and you want to lump them into another identity that counts how many individual identities there are, that's 2.

Math is simply the logical result of the combination and separation of discrete identities. That's why I can have 1 banana, add another one, and I have 2. Each banana isn't the same mass or size. Its about adding the concepts of what we discretely identify together. That's why it 'works'. If our discrete identities about the world "That is a banana" are true, then it is also true that there are two bananas in our grouped identity.

But because math is about identities, we can create identities in our head that don't work in the real world. For example, each family in America has 1.5 children. The abstraction of the average is mechanically correct, but if it is trying to match reality, it fails as no one has 1 and a half kids.

Math, like language, is a tool of logic with rules. If we use it with the idea that our abstraction is trying to match reality, and we are correct in matching our abstractions to reality, it works because that's how we perceive identities, and our identities are not being contradicted by reality. Thus we can have two bananas, because they are actually bananas. We can add two unicorns, but we cannot have two unicorns, because unicorns don't exist.

I don't agree with it. I just don't have a problem with it
— Philosophim

You're taking issue with it, saying he's mistaken, so don't be too polite about it. :wink: — Wayfarer

Ha ha! No, I genuinely respect Chalmers. How do I explain this...human beings form knowledge and outlooks on life from their perspective. This perspective includes their background, use of language, culture, and their own particular view point on reality. As such, we are all going to have our unique approach to figuring out the world around us. I respect a person's view point that is internally consistent with this background.

As you noted, we are all representing the world the best we can. Hearing of another perspective of how to view that world has always fascinated me. There are people who cannot visualize for example. How different would one's perspective be with that? Someone very short or very tall. Someone incredibly wealthy and another incredibly poor. And of course, 'the average person' (which is more a concept then reality). The fact we're able to come together and have a communicable discussion about reality at all is sometimes a feat in itself. :)

From my own perspective, which of course is just as circumspect as any other perspective, I am a fan of knowledge and communication that is both accurate in assessing reality, and open to the greatest number of people despite our different perspectives. But I'm also aware that there will always be the need for sub-perspectives and different ways of viewing and stating things about the same underlying reality we're all looking at. And sometimes, those sub-perspectives have invaluable points or additions that can and should be brought into the larger perspective.

My disagreement with Chalmer's conclusions is not as a sub-perspective. I don't believe he's in any way noting that it is a fact that subjective consciousness is at its core, necessarily separate from matter and energy. Matter and energy as the building blocks of reality are of course incredibly broad representations of existence around us. To be specific, 'energy' is really just the momentum of matter. And if we wanted to be even more general, its just 'existence'. How we part and parcel that undefinable but all encompassing concept into 'existences' is part of that unique and individual group experience of humanity. His conclusions and word choices within his sub-perspective, can be easily misinterpreted using the language of the general culture. Few people have the learning and background of Chalmer's to truly understand what he is intending, and instead think he means that subjective consciousness is necessarily apart from the brain, and therefore there is a soul, afterlife, etc. That conclusion helps no one.

If you read more of Chalmers, you will see he in no way discounts the neurological perspective. — Wayfarer

Yes, and this is the point I was trying to get at as well. We don't disagree on this aspect. Like Chalmers I am not asserting that it is the truth that subjective consciousness is necessarily neurological, but he is also not asserting that he truly knows what it is otherwise. What I am stating is out of the available theories that I am aware of, the one which fits in with what science has demonstrated to us over decades about the brain so far, is that consciousness is the experience of being. Every being we know of is 'physical' in the fact that it is made up of matter and energy.

There has never been a discovery to my mind, of some 'thing' which is not matter and energy at its core. While speculation, creative thinking, different perspectives, and experimentation are all to be encouraged, the existence of such possibilities does not mean that at this moment, their existence should override what we know currently works to help us navigate the world and make life preserving and enhancing decisions. It doesn't mean that these exploratory measures won't result in a change to the general understanding of the world in the future, but they must prove themselves as offering some real and tangible value to the general perspective that our current understanding and knowledge does not.

Andrei Linde has given a deep reason for why observers enter into quantum cosmology in a fundamental way. It has to do with the nature of time. The passage of time is not absolute; it always involves a change of one physical system relative to another, for example, how many times the hands of the clock go around relative to the rotation of the Earth. When it comes to the Universe as a whole, time looses its meaning, for there is nothing else relative to which the universe may be said to change. — Paul Davies, The Goldilocks Enigma: Why is the Universe Just Right for Life, p 271

This is a category error. One mistake our brains do over and over again, and I am not immune from this, is elevating concepts that that we have reasoned completely through language as if they are actual representations of reality outside of that language.

Getting stuck in the language and perspective can lead us to think, "Yes, we measure time by observing change. The observation of change requires memory. Memory requires an observer. Therefore time only happens with observers!" Of course, we have to be careful what we mean by time here. "Observed time" would be a more accurate representation of reality. If we're not here, wouldn't the Earth still rotate around the Sun? Of course. Meaning that relations between objects would still persist with the momentum that they have at any X time. If there is no observer to label it as 'time', then that label and concept doesn't exist. But the fact that there wouldn't be a label based off of an observer is what wouldn't exist, not the relation of the matter and energy. Useful labels are descriptors of reality for us to understand, but our 'logical' conclusions involving labels must not be confused with reality itself.

The 'observer' needed for quantum mechanics is also a misunderstanding of descriptions within the context of the math, and mixing them with our common English understanding of the word. Taken from each context, or perspective, they are not the same meaning. Our observations, or our passive existence taking in light, does not change quantum mechanics. Otherwise the rest of space would not exist. Quantum mechanics is a mathematical understanding of particles so small, that our scientific attempts at observation; bouncing a beam of light off of them to measure them for example, affects the particle itself. I've often described it as using a bowling ball to measure the velocity and location of a ping pong ball. The experiment affects the outcome itself, and this leads to mathematically logical limits in outcomes.

I don't think that its another category of thinking. It's the first- and third-person perspectives. — Wayfarer

I have not problem in viewing consciousness from both a first and third person perspective. I just think its the most reasonable case that consciousness is the brain's first person perspective.

If you are interested into a deeper explanation of what I've noted here, I have a post on these forums in which I tackle knowledge. Feel free to give it a read or not. https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/14044/knowledge-and-induction-within-your-self-context/p1

It's great you're digging into this, but you will need to understand that you can't both agree with Chalmer's argument, and also hold that consciousness is physical. — Wayfarer

Oh, I don't agree with it. I just don't have a problem with it. When he defined what it was that was separate from 'physical', I understood what he meant. Chalmers is not asserting that subjective consciousness is necessarily separate from the brain. What he's saying is we can't at this moment measure it as a physical entity, and that I have agreed with the entire time. Just like we can't measure space as a physical entity, nor can we measure time as a physical entity. And in this, subjective consciousness is not 'physical'. But it doesn't mean its apart from the physical, or that its even its own entity.

He's using physical in the sense of 'the physical and mental'. It doesn't mean the mental is existent in some reality, just like being mentally unconscious doesn't mean your physical brain is in a state of unconsciousness. He's not claiming mental as 'some other thing existence'. Its a classification of a state of being. And we know as beings, that we are physical. As long as none of his claims outright deny the idea that consciousness does not have a physical origin, I'm fine with it.

David Chalmers: "It's not physical"

Yes, this is his opinion to the solution of the hard problem, but not the hard problem itself. I still believe what I have said does not contradict what the underlying issue of the hard problem is. I disagree with his solution to the problem, because he also currently has no evidence to deny that subjective consciousness could be an aspect of matter and energy. The only thing he can truly conclude is that we cannot be other matter that has the subjective experience, therefore we cannot measure it. If you listened to the rest of the video, he notes that scientists right now are working to correlate their own subjective experiences with their brain states, something I've noted before. His, "Not physical" at best is using a category that does not require us to know whether it is physical or not. Which here, I have no disagreement again.

he says it might be an additional property that is associated with matter (a position which is called 'panpsychism'). But it's crucial to recognize that he doesn't say it can be explained in terms of known physical properties. He says that science has to admit consciousness as a fundamental property. By that he means it is irreducible, it can't be explained in terms of something else. — Wayfarer

No, he does not mean that it can't be explained in terms of something else if he is intending it to be like space or time. Space is a concept we use in relation to matter. We measure it with matter, yet space itself is not matter, but the absence of it. Time is not an existent 'material' concept, but it is is determined by watching and recording the differences in materials. Subjective consciousness as well, if it can only be known by being a material, is still known and defined in terms of the material that it is. Chalmers cannot deny this by his own reasoning. Just that we can't directly measure what it is like to be some other thing.

So if he wants to claim subjective consciousness as an existence that cannot be directly measured like space or time, I'm fine with this. He's not claiming that space and time exist apart from matter and energy, and he has no legs to claim with any evidence that consciousness is not in the same boat. This fits fine into the behavior version of consciousness, and simply gives another linguistic approach to the discussion. I certainly don't see it as a paradigm shift. It gives no argument that the brain does not or cannot cause consciousness, or that consciousness could exist without matter and energy. At most, its an option we can explore, of which I have always been open to.

Right. There's your 'thinking stuff' again. — Wayfarer

Just like Chalmers came up with his ideas using 'thinking stuff' too. He's just a man like you or me. Its fine if you don't agree with my conclusions, but don't discount thinking and questioning ideas, because you will subtly be against it in yourself as well. People move forward and discover by using the proposals, thoughts, and ideas of others as a springboard for new and better ideas. The alternative is dogma, and the elevation of an idea to a pedestal where most do not belong. It is great that you like the idea of subjective consciousness as another category of thinking, but I think the idea that the existence of the hard problem leads to the necessary conclusion that it is some other form of existence unrelated to matter and energy, does not follow.

Tim, all I'm feeling over here is hostility and not a discussion. Lets just shelve this one and I'll catch you on another thread.

Last things first: philosophy is not logic — tim wood

I highly disagree Tim. Without logic, philosophy is simply imagination and emotional exploration. These are elements of philosophy, but the tie that binds them together to be philosophy is logic.

Your views (near as I can tell) are reductionist, legalistic, amoral, and inhuman. — tim wood

You have not asked me why I have those views or have come to my conclusions. You are assuming things that I don't think are true here. Perhaps they are, but neither you nor I will be able to confirm that if you aren't interested as to why I've made my conclusions.

And partner with that is the expectation that the guest and the stranger will themselves meet certain standards of behavior. I would like to see something like that employed at the US Southern border: respect, courtesy, concern and care, and the possibility of entry on meeting certain conditions. — tim wood

We have that today. If you enter through legal means you are treated just like that. Its those crossing the border without permission that generate much of the anger in America. I'm feeling this is more of a political and personal issue to you then a philosophical discussion. I don't care about politics, and I like to think of the subjects from a stable base that builds a compelling argument. If you're interested in that, I'm interested. But if this is a political or venue to assume I'm evil because I conclude something you dislike without exploring more, I'm not.

That is not what Chalmer's says at all. So stop saying that you're 'interpreting' or 'supporting' Chalmer's argument, when you're actually disagreeing with it. If you were honest, what you would say is 'there is no hard problem as Chalmers describes it'. — Wayfarer

I decided to get Chalmer's words himself.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?app=desktop&v=yHTiQrrUhUA

Check out around 6:40. His notes are:

"The hard problem is concerned with phenomenal consciousness: what its like to be a subject.

At 8:26 he goes into the Easy problem. Again, this is about consciousness as behavior.

We have to be careful when we speak of consciousness to understand the implicit aspect that we're talking about. When I say, "Consciousness is your brain" I'm talking about the behavioral aspect of consciousness, which has not been refuted as of today.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Bejm1mYsr5s

In this video at about 5:40 to the end, he covers what he means by 'consciousness as a subjective experience is immaterial'. He notes its like space, time, etc. Of this, I have no problem. This is a question I've been asking for some time now from you Wayfarer, "What is it for consciousness to not be physical?" Here Chalmers gives a clear reply. And this definition of 'not physical', I have no problem with. Its a classification of category, not a claim that, "It is not matter and energy". Just like we cannot have space without matter, and time without matter, it is not a claim that we can have consciousness without matter. This definition of 'immaterial' is perfectly fine for me. This is because it is the creation of a concept within reality that does not care as to the specifics of its makeup. As long as one does not conclude from this that consciousness exists as some essence apart from the physical reality we live in, its fine.

Information itself is not a medium. If I transmit information electronically, the medium is copper or electromagnetic waves, or through speech as sound waves in the air. They are physical media. But the interpretation of information is not a physical process, and information is not physical — Wayfarer

If it is not a physical process, then what is it Wayfarer? I've already described a radio. I've already noted the brain processes information through the senses, and I don't think you deny those are physical. Its fine to claim its not physical, but if you can not demonstrate it as something else, then I don't see it being viable.

Humans build radios to do that and then interpret the sounds as meaningful. There is nothing in the 'physical world', if you mean the world outside human affairs, that will do that. — Wayfarer

Ok, but you're not countering the point that information can be interpreted by physical things. If humans are physical, then there is nothing odd with them interpreting information either. I think the only way this works for you is if its assumed that humans aren't physical. Since this is not the general viewpoint, we need to provide evidence that they aren't physical. Otherwise my point that information can exist a physical medium and physical interpretation holds.

For decades, radio telescopes have been scanning the universe looking for signals from intelligent life. Overall, they've found none (with one possible exception.) All the signals so far have a physical or natural origin. If they found a signal originated by an alien intelligence, it would be something other than physical or natural. — Wayfarer

I was with you until you said it had to be something other than physical. We don't even know if something other than the physical exists.

As noted, psychosomatic medicine, the placebo effect, etc, undercut physicalist accounts of mind. — Wayfarer

This does not if one assumes that consciousness is an aspect of physical reality like 'wetness'. In which case consciousness is also a part of physical reality, and conscious thoughts could affect the brain and body.

I am not understanding what you aren't understanding. Why risk the fate of a country on an issue so complex on average citizens and not experts in that field that have access to information that the general public may not. like I said in my previous post, it should be down experts chosen by elected officials. — Samlw

Democratically elected right? We're talking about the same thing. Ultimately this is the people choosing, through representatives usually.

If someone broke into your house for a warm nights sleep when its cold outside, when you did not want to invite them in yourself, that's a violation of your sovereignty of your home.
— Philosophim

Again, the comparison doesn't meet the severity of the topic. I understand the logic you are trying to use however you simply cannot use a blanket answer from the situation you just described as the answer for a topic that is so complex as immigration. — Samlw

Then I don't understand your topic. This seemed to be to be a sovereignty vs justifications for breaking sovereignty question. What is your point? You use illegal immigration combined with the question of who to let in and not. Are these meant to be part of the same topic, or different questions?

My answer was that a country should decide who to let in, and not. Period. The morality is sovereignty, and the idea that a country is best equipped to handle its own immigration based on a complex number of factors that only a society can handle itself. As such, there is no justification that I can see for illegally entering into a country and living there against its citizens wishes.

What do you think about this?

And I think THIS is definitely debatable. It is the moral question of whether the person in control of the land/property should or should not let a person in.
— Philosophim

This is literally the question from the start. — Samlw

Yes, and I've put my answer forth. Now why do you disagree? To be clear, my answer is: Nations can manage their own immigration issues. If a nation freely decides to limit or let in more immigrants, that's their decision." There is no, "A nation should let immigrants in when X, Y, and Z happens" if people don't want to. Immigration is a willingness of its citizens to accept foreign change and influx, it is not a moral responsibility.

They could instead fight for their own country, or move to a place in their country that is not affected by war.
— Philosophim

Both of those options are terrible, either potentially die and kill people for your country, or move to a poor place due to your country being war-torn and have a terrible quality of life. — Samlw

These are less ideal choices yes, but not choices that compel others morally to provide them the more optimal choice. Life is often unfair, cruel, and less than ideal. It is not a moral responsibility of anybody to make life fair for everyone else across the board, because that takes time, resources, and effort that people are generally using on themselves to make their own life acceptable first. And by 'moral responsibility' that if they don't do this, someone else has the right to take from them, or coerce them to assist others.

Can I ask what happens if a majority of a nation voted for open borders and the country gets ruined because of it? — Samlw

Then they made a mistake obviously. Why it got ruined would be the question here. Was it because they didn't understand the culture they were letting in? They were too altruistic for their limited resources? The issue is not whether legal immigration vs illegal immigration is moral in this case, but whether they made a misjudgement. If you're looking for a benefit vs cost analysis on a countries capacity for immigration, that's fine. If you're looking for a moral justification for illegal immigration, I still have yet to see it.

You are comparing someone who has potentially escaped a war zone, their family killed, scared and not knowing where to go. To someone stealing a car... — Samlw

No, I was comparing to Tim's scenario. My point was that he was already assuming that if a person commits a crime, they have moral justification for doing so. They do not. A crime committed alone does not determine whether that crime was morally justified. If you believe a crime is morally justified, then you need to explain why, not just assume the crime is morally justified.

If you're claiming illegal immigration is morally justified because the other illegally entering person does not get the benefits they want, I don't agree. If someone broke into your house for a warm nights sleep when its cold outside, when you did not want to invite them in yourself, that's a violation of your sovereignty of your home. Now, we could argue that you denying the person a place to sleep, despite not knowing what quality of character they are, is immoral. And I think THIS is definitely debatable. It is the moral question of whether the person in control of the land/property should or should not let a person in.

I believe that the sovereignty of one's property is in the decision of the person. We can judge their decisions as who to let in or not let in as immoral, but defying that decision because someone else wants the benefit of being on that property needs a good reason. I can't see any viable reason except in matters of immediate life or death, and In the case of a nations decision, I see even less of a good reason why someone should force themselves in to live there against the wishes of its people.

In the case of a refugee for example, it is not a life or death situation that they travel to a country that does not want them. They could instead fight for their own country, or move to a place in their country that is not affected by war. It is not an immediate life or death situation in most war torn situations for people to immigrate to a new country. Its more convenient, higher quality of life, and much more beneficial. But it is a want, not a need. Therefore I see no justification in illegally going to one.

No moral issue? Another categorical statement? Well, maybe not for you. — tim wood

Then please explain how it can be moral.

Assuming they have a good reason for being here, likely necessity, there is nothing immoral about it - the necessity being instead grounds for a moral claim. — tim wood

This is a lot of assuming. That would be like me saying, "Assuming people have a good reason for stealing your car, there is nothing immoral about it - the necessity being instead grounds for a moral claim." Can you note when you think it is moral to illegally immigrate somewhere, and why it is moral for a country to allow that illegal immigrant to be there? This is not an emotional issue for me or a "Its obvious" question. Lets engage in philosophy, the logic of it all.