I should preface this by saying I don't think gender should exist at all, as it places unnecessary limitations on people for acting outside of what we as a society consider normal or expected for a certain sex. — MrLiminal

I think gender as a concept is fine. What I don't think is fine is elevating it in importance beyond what it is, which is a subjective societal prejudice at best, sexism at worst. And any idea that it should be elevated in importance or priority over a person's sex itself is simply irrational.

Currently the question "Are trans men/women men/women" feels like it falls into the same trap as "Is water wet?" The question itself is inherently vague in a way that invites misinterpretation and arguments. — MrLiminal

Agreed. The point of the OP is to point this out and note that the phrase is poor English and should not be used as a meaningful phrase. Instead, if people want to communicate the issue they are trying to convey clearly, they should alter the phrase to be less ambiguous in its intents.

All perfectly normal. When we are born we are not precious moral agents. We are selfish, self-centered little animals that have to learn about the world. It is not evil to be young and make mistakes in the process of growing. Yes, you acted terrible for a time, but you learned and grew from that.

A 'bad' person is someone who refuses to grow or refuses to acknowledge they might need to improve. Perhaps you were bad yesterday, that does not mean you have to be a bad person today or in the future. Look back at your past actions with a motive to not be that in the future. What is past is past, and if you are not learning from that past but using it as a means to punish yourself, you are not growing and improving. So don't beat yourself up over your past actions, just move forward and be the better person we all want to be.

I think this largely boils down to semantics and modern discourse not having the words to talk about this in a way that makes sense. — MrLiminal

I agree. I also believe it is the job of philosophers to step forward when current language fails us.

To my mind, this discussion makes more sense if you equate "sex" with biological sex and consider "gender" as a type of social class that is different from but heavily informed by society's interpretation of the roles a person should fill based on biological sex. — MrLiminal

Fortunately that's the actual definitions used. I am referencing gender theory and the formal understanding of these terms according to that context.

The gender/sex split has, in my opinion, greatly confused modern discourse on this as people constantly conflate the two. — MrLiminal

And that is part of the purpose of this question. How do we use terms correctly in a formal sentence? How do we avoid ambiguity and conflation? I think I've pointed out answers to these, but do you agree with the reasoning behind them?

If gender is entirely and exclusively a social construct, as many feminists and even trans people like to say, then trans women are just men who want access to women's spaces. — flannel jesus

Correct.

On the other hand if gender has a real biological/psychological basis, then it seems at least imaginable that there could be people born with a penis but who are nevertheless psychologically or neurologically "female". — flannel jesus

Gender has a real psychological basis. It is a culture's prejudgments or expectations of public behavior that it either believes or imposes on each sex that are apart from the biology of the sex itself.

For example, there is no biological basis behind only men wearing top hats. But we can imagine an individual who thinks, "Women should not wear top hats." That's gender. Of course, we can also imagine a person who thinks, "Men should not wear top hats." That's also gender. This is because gender is not objective, but subjective. You can of course get a group of people to hold the same subjective outlook. This is seen multiple times on culture such as, "God is real" or "Step on a crack and you break your mother's back". We often have group beliefs and rituals that have no objective basis behind them. Gender is a belief system behind the behaviors and actions of a member of one sex in public.

Thus in terms of gender, one cannot be psychologically female objectively, only subjectively. That is because one's view of gendered behavior could very well contradict the definition of another's. A woman might say, "Only men wear top hats, but I'm going to anyway," and in their mind they are trans gender. However in the mind of another who believes, "Only women wear top hats," she's not trans gender.

In terms of neurology, that is not trans gender, that would be 'trans sexual'. Sex is the biological reality of a being, gender is the sociological cultural expectations it is under depending on who it is surrounded by. To demonstrate that someone has neurology associated with the other sex, there must be an objective study to find what areas of the brain are exclusive to one sex and not the other in almost all cases.

The jury is still largely out on this. Our understanding of the brain isn't in the stone age anymore, but its not exactly going to the moon yet either. My readings on the issue have generally concluded that there are neurological differences that more resemble what is female in the brains of homosexual men. We of course do not say homosexuals are 'women in men's bodies'. When heterosexual men who have gender dysphoria have their brains examined, there is no statistically significant difference between heterosexual men who have gender dysphoria. Same with homosexual men in comparison to other homosexual men. After men are put on estrogen, the brain does actually begin to change its structure in limited ways to brain structures that are more often associated with females. But again, brain science involving sex differences is still natal.

As for what we know now, there is no indicator that someone having trans gender issues has a brain difference, but a psychological difference. Just like you can I can have the same brain type but process the color 'orange' in our head differently. I may like the color orange, you may not. You may be very enamored with the social expectations of the other sex, I don't care. It seems that a trans gender individual has a combination of being enamored with the social expectations of the other sex vs disliking the cultural expectations of their own sex that they attempt to reject the gender of their own sex and take on the gender of the other.

I think this is a topic where philosophy (if we can call it that) is employed for an agenda and begins to look absurd. — Mikie

Philosophy is employed here for thinking about a topic that confuses many people. The goal of philosophy has always been to get to a clear and logical understanding of matters about the world. This is ontology in the philosophy of language. Calling it 'an agenda' would be true if it was inflexible preaching, a lack of rational discussion and responses, or a means to simply demean, insult, or threaten people into submission.

This is just a topic to think about. You are free to disagree, point out flaws, ask questions, etc. That is the goal of philosophy. To take the issues of the day within language and being and ask, "What does this really mean?"

What is being presupposed by the word “trans” anyway? From what to what? One sex to another, or one gender to another, presumably. I hold that the latter is absolutely possible — the former isn’t. — Mikie

It is the later. The OP essentially notes that 'woman' without adjectives or modifiers normatively means "Adult human female". "Trans" adjusts woman to mean, "A person who takes on the non-biological gendered behaviors that society expects an adult human female to exhibit".

We can define things any way we like. There is not one “true” definition of anything, except maybe in mathematics. — Mikie

Not even in math. Math and language are both symbols that represent concepts. When I say the word "One", what do you imagine in your head? Its not the same as what I'm imagining. When I say the word "tree" its the same. However, this is not a discussion about the implicit meaning behind words within a person's personal context. This is about explicit meaning within an established language. Just like 'one' can have a personal meaning to you, when taken in the explicit language of mathematics, it has a clear explicit definition that must be agreed upon by all parties for the term to have any useful meaning. As long as when one is using the explicit meaning of the language, their implicit term does not contradict or violate that explicit meaning of the term, implicit meanings are highly flexible in an explicit conversation.

I’ll call anyone what they wish to be called. I’ll call you Janus the Great if you prefer— but before I actually believe it, I’d need to see some evidence or a convincing argument. — Mikie

True. You're essentially saying, "You have an implicit meaning behind that phrase, and as long as that phrase does not actually counter the explicit meaning it would imply in an objective language, I'm fine with that." You would of course have issue if this person rear ended you and gave you "Janus the Great" as his legal name when it is objectively not. When you are both in the explicit context where both parties need to have a common understanding, the phrase matters greatly. Asking your insurance company to find "Janus the Great" is going to give you problems collecting the claim.

If someone wants to implicitly say, "Trans women are women", they can of course mean whatever they choose. But the moment they start demanding that it is explicitly true within the language, "I am Janus the Great, and as such you will kneel before me or die", people have full logical recourse to say, "No, you're Percival Smithers with no title or power to demand what you want of others." Implicitly, Percival might be offended and angry, but his implicit claims of reality can always rightly be overruled by explicit claims to reality.

I think it a pretty good OP, of a sort. But a part of the issue is the very idea of starting with "explicit meaning in the phrasing of the term". — Banno

I think it a pretty good OP, of a sort. But a part of the issue is the very idea of starting with "explicit meaning in the phrasing of the term". — Banno

I think I see your point. It is true that terms hold personal meaning to us. My point with being explicit is taking that context into standard English. Languages have rules and intents that allow an explicit standard of communication and vocabulary to start from. I am not denying that there are not implicit definitions to words people use, but I'm also not denying there are explicit uses either.

In a language one can use an implicit personalized version of a term as long as it does not counter the explicit use of the term in the language. Thus if I'm speaking English, I cannot state, "The sun is the moon." If I have some personal meaning behind that, I need to either add new meanings of the terms, demonstrate its a metaphor, or add more context to explain my meaning. In standard English without these things, "The sun is the moon" is an illogical statement.

The phrase, "Trans women are women" is an explicit claim within the language that demands other people who speak the language accept the phrase. Whenever you involve other people into accepted terminology, it must be the case that an explicit standard is formed between all speakers of that language. Yes, there can, and will be implicit wiggle room, but if there is not an explicit agreement between people in at least some core of the term, then communication simply cannot occur. If I hold "the moon means the sun" and you hold "the sun means the moon" we aren't using the same concepts while talking to each other and will each think the other is spouting nonsense.

So the point of the OP is to establish two definitions of women, and explain when using English properly, "Trans woman are women" is most logically interpreted as "Trans women are adult human females". This is of course wrong. So the phrase needs to adjust to be more accurate among English speakers. "Trans women are men who take on the gendered role of women" is a proper sentence that clearly explains the honest explicit meaning of the phrase.

The thread might best be understood as a negotiation between the players here, looking for agreement on a way to use the words women, man, gender, male, female, and so on. But folk talk as if there are correct and incorrect ways to use the term, to which each has some private access, their use being the right one, the other uses being wrong for various reasons. — Banno

I hope you see this is not an argument for personal implicit use, but an argument about proper explicit meaning within an established language.

The presumption that there is one correct meaning for "woman" is only one small part of the problem, as is the very notion that for each word there is such a thing as its meaning, given by a statable definition, and the task of the philosopher consists at least in part in making this meaning explicit. — Banno

Have you read the OP? I did think I made a decent argument at giving explicit meaning in the phrasing of the term. I also note that woman can take on a gendered meaning, just when it makes sense linguistically to import that in the phrase. Since it is such a focus of yours, I would be glad to hear your take as to the problem in the OP. Part of me writing this is to also be challenged Banno. I have enough of my own ideas after all.

But as you will see, these fora are the natural home for fallacies of definition. — Banno

Would you like to point out any fallacies I've made Banno? Or do you think I've done a good job?

Let's do some entry level metaphysics: first, not every concept can be defined, for that would generate an infinite regress in which it turns out nothing can be defined.

Thus, if there are true definitions, then there are concepts that cannot be defined. — Clarendon

Good point, but you'll need to demonstrate that woman cannot be defined.

Most people don't realize this and believe - fallaciously - that unless one can provide a definition for a concept, one doesn't understand it or have it. That's demonstrably false. — Clarendon

I agree. First there's the experience of something, then we go about using words to better communicate that concept to another person. Words that cannot be defined rely on a shared understanding. For example, "Sight". To understand the word, you must be able to see. I cannot define your subjective experience of sight more than mine, but we both have a shared experience that allows us to definitively separate 'sight' from 'sound'. Thus an example of a word that cannot be defined, but also isn't nonsense and useful in language. After all, a nonsense word is a nonsense thought and can be dismissed as such.

And so they offer a different definition: that a woman is someone with immobile gametes, because when biologists look in detail at women's bodies, they find they all have that feature. And biologists - who are not metaphysicians and are just as capable of fallacious reasoning as the next person - reason that as all women they've examined have immobile gamates, then that must be what makes a woman a woman. That's fallacious. — Clarendon

How is that fallacious? If there is a shared objective experience that people can point to independent of one's subjective experience, then that's a viable word. Language is at its heart a series of signs and symbols to represent concepts which can be shared with other people. There is a physical aspect that is common to an adult human female which is clearly different from an adult human male, so we point out that difference as a means to separate the sexes. If we didn't use definitions, women are the only one's who can naturally birth babies and men are the only ones who can impregnate women. While we can understand that without a definition, a definition can help clarify and add to our understanding of the physical separation of men and women.

A fallacious term would be something that was contradictory in its statement. "A bungle is a mime bigger than itself" is an example of the fallacious term 'bungle'. You can't be bigger than yourself, so its dismissive nonsense.

Plus we can easily imagine someone who answers to the concept of a woman, yet does not have immobile gamates or any at all. — Clarendon

Yet if we have a proper definition and understanding of a woman in our shared language, and someone incorrectly identifies as that definition, wouldn't they simply be wrong? Surely if I claimed you were Mr. Rogers I would be wrong? Surely if you identified as Mr. Rogers, who is long dead now, you would be wrong as well.

Definitions often have flexibility in their terminology which I know has always fascinated me. When does a molehill become a mountain? Except we don't have the question, "When does a canyon become a mountain?" Why? Because a canyon is a direct opposite or contradiction to the fundamental of a mountain. Mountains go up, canyons go down.

And thus why a man is not a woman. They are opposite and contradictory in matters of sex, which is the entire point of pointing out that an individual is a male or female. Defining a man as a woman would be fallacious if they were intended to be different concepts, as different concepts cannot be synonyms. You don't need a definition for that either. I think you have provided the means to counter the oft stated, "But what really makes up a woman anyway?" Simple, it is counter in sex functions to a man. No words or definitions needed.

Is there currently a huge debate over the correct definition of a woman? Yes, that's obvious. — Clarendon

No, I don't think there is. There's no debate that the term woman in the normative context means "Adult human female". There is a faction of people who want to create a context in which 'woman' should mean 'someone who acts in the sociologically (non-biologically) expected way some people think an adult human female should act in public' Or bizarrely, "A woman is a a person who acts like society expects a woman to act irrelevant to their biology". This is of course unclear language, which is a larger point of the OP.

"Trans woman are women" is simply unclear language. I'm also not debating that with modified adjectives to the word 'woman', we can get the context of woman as 'gendered woman'. That's what "Trans woman" does. If the normative and traditional definition of woman is "Adult human female", there should be a good reason why we replace that as the normative term with the gendered one. As there is not, and most people see 'woman' when unmodified by adjectives as "adult human female", a trans woman is not an adult human female.

Further, the language supports this separation. We have cis and trans to denote the context of woman as "sociological' expectation of adult human female cultural behavior, whereas woman unmodified means adult human female. So the proper sentence should be "Trans women are adult human males who take on the cultural behaviors associated with women" "Or if we wanted to shorten it, "Tran women are gendered women". This clearly denotes that the sentence does not imply trans women are women by sex.

That's fair - but i also think it misses that, assuming 'trans' is a "true identity" in the way claimed by the more committed TRAs, then it is imperative that we accept that reality and adjust our priors so as to make room for its truth. — AmadeusD

As this is a philosophy board nothing is assumed to be true. If someone wants to argue what a true identity is, and why trans is one, they are more than welcome to make their case.

↪Philosophim not gonna lie, I stopped reading at around group rights and said ... "man, that message 'trans rights = human rights,' really went over dude's head, probably just like BLM." That's when I realized there's probably some other prejudice at play. — DifferentiatingEgg

If you didn't read the entire OP, then you really can't say if I missed anything or not. If you feel there's prejudice at play after reading the OP, please point out where. Otherwise wouldn't it be that you ironically had prejudice and judged the post before you gave it a chance?

I agree that we seem to have gotten off topic. I was hoping to make some headway on the other points and then reel it back to the topic of transgender rights; but I think we are now doing circles unfortunately without any headway. With that being said, if there's anything about your topic of transgender rights that you would like to discuss further, then I am all ears. — Bob Ross

Not a worry Bob! Still good points to think about. I think I've made my points, but feel free to say anything you still need to.

↪AmadeusD You're, of course, correct especially among lay persons, but here we should be interested in accurate communication. The operative word being: "should"... — LuckyR

And that is why this topic exists. I wanted to chat about it with other people with a philosophical viewpoint. If you want the outcomes in life that you think 'should' be, you must 'do' instead of relying on others to do it.

To be fair, I think you are just using ‘real’ to refer to ‘existence’; so I understand where you are coming from. However, this over-simplifies the conceptual landscape here; as we cannot say things like ‘money exist but is not real’ but instead ‘money is real and a chair is real’. It reduces everything to having the same status of existence in virtue of existing. — Bob Ross

I feel we're getting off topic. I'm not saying that everything we claim to be real is real. I'm just noting that thoughts and subjective experiences are real in themselves. Money and chair are both the same type of general mental concept. 10$ on a table and a mahogany chair model #235 from Ikea are specific real things. I'm not saying that imagining 10$ on a table mean that the 10$ and table are real independent of the thought of it, but that the thought of it is real.

Lets bring this back to trans gender issues. A person who has gender dysphoria has the real feeling of discomfort with their own gender. Does it mean that they're really 'the other gender'? No. Someone can really think they're the opposite sex, but it doesn't mean they really are the opposite sex.

I think you use ‘objectivity’ to refer to that which the subject experiences; and ‘subjectivity’ is anything pertaining to the subjective experience. If this is true, then even in your own terms money is not objectively real since it only exists insofar as two or more subjects value something at a particular amount. — Bob Ross

This is close. I'm noting that what a person experiences is objective in itself. "I feel sad" is an objective reality a person has. If through that feeling alone they say, "I feel sad because I was born in the wrong body." that's not objective. One can feel sad for many different reasons. It could very well be that the reason the person feels sad is because they have a poor diet and are depressed. Fix their diet and depression and suddenly they aren't sad anymore. Subjectively they feel sad because they were born in the wrong body, objectively they feel sad because they had a poor diet and were depressed. "The wrong body" had nothing to do with it.

Would you at least agree, semantics aside, that money does not have the same kind of ‘existence status’ as a chair? — Bob Ross

No, they're actually the same type of word. Money and chair alone are real concepts. Specific denotations of money and chairs are real things.

It might be better to collapse gender and sex for the sake of the masses; but technically I would say that using the Thomistic concepts of virtuality and reality can really help sublate the two mainstream positions (one being that sex and gender are divorced and the other that they are the exact same). — Bob Ross

One can argue that we only use one context for gender, but the reality is that if a person wants to use a particular context, there's nothing to stop them from doing so. What we can do in such an instance is ask if the definitions within the context are reasonable, and if the conclusions that follow from that context are also reasonable. If we are to talk about trans gender, it must be understood that the term 'gender' in this context refers only to social expectations and not biological expectations.

With all due respect, this is just an assertion that begs the question. I outlined why objectifying the face is ontologically grounded in female nature (as the object of sex); and this does entail, if this is true, that men wearing makeup like women do is feminine and immoral. — Bob Ross

You gave an assertion that has no truth bearing Bob. Both men and women objectify the other sex's face. They may not necessarily find the same features attractive, but a woman can swoon over a handsome face as much as a man can swoon over a beautiful female face. If make up enhances the ability of a person to appear attractive in the eyes of the opposite sex, it cannot be said that its only moral if a woman does it but not if a man does it.

True, but freedom is not the kind of capacity for action where one just chooses from options; it is the kind of capacity to will in accord with reason, and this entails that we are more free the more virtuous and biased we are towards what is good. — Bob Ross

People choose to freely smoke cigarettes all the time. It is completely irrational to smoke cigarettes. Yet people we would generally call rational, do so all the time. Freedom is not only about the capacity to make reasonable decisions, but emotional one's as well. Sometimes the two are not aligned with each other. Again, you can say, "That's an irresponsible choice," but the other person was free to make it. No one is arresting a person for smoking a cigarette in their own home.

Think of it this way, to use your example, walking itself is a capacity to move the legs to move around. When properly understood, to be maintain this capacity you have to do things to keep the legs in shape and healthy. There are ‘oughts’ which arise out of the maintenance of that capacity. — Bob Ross

No disagreement here! But you have the freedom to maintain, or not maintain your legs. Should we maintain them? Yes. Are you free not to? Yes. If we were not free to, then someone could legally come over and force us to maintain our legs against our will.

My main point was that your view entails necessarily that we are less free when we do these things; and this is counter-intuitive. — Bob Ross

Its only counter-intuitive because you are adding consequences to the idea of freedom. Freedom, as a word alone, does not consider the consequences. Freedom is simply the capacity to choose either A or B. The next step is to consider the consequences of a choice, or how to use our freedom for our own benefit opposed to our own destruction. You're blending two separate concepts together, and I'm noting that if we separate freedom into its most fundamental definition, this allows us clearer thinking and reasonable use of the term.

To be clear, freedom for excellence defines freedom as ‘the capacity to will in accord one’s nature’ which is the same as ‘to be in a state most conducive so one’s flourishing’. — Bob Ross

I have no disagreement with the phrase 'freedom for excellence'. I'm simply noting what 'freedom' is as a concept apart from 'for excellence'.

I thought you were saying that freedom is about the capacity to choose: do you believe that, in principle, someone can become more free while simultaneously having less options to choose from? — Bob Ross

Again, this is about the consequences of a person's free choice. I am not using freedom to describe consequences, only that one has a choice. We can absolutely talk about whether someone uses their freedom in a way that helps or harms them, but I'm not going to use the term 'freedom' alone as if it address the consequences of its use.

Not everything that has being is a member of reality. For example, the color red that I see exists as a construction of my consciousness but has no membership in reality: if you were to omit my consciousness of the, e.g., red block there would be no redness in the block. — Bob Ross

See your consciousness is part of reality however. Everything you personally experience is objectively real. It is when we claim things about that experience beyond the experience itself that we can assert things that aren't real. For example, if I said, "This color I see is the exact same experience everyone else has when they look at it," that's a claim to what is real without any evidence. In the exact same way a man can have their own subjective experience and they may feel that 'This is what its like to be a man, if they only refernece themselves in 'man'." The moment they say, "Every man experiences what I do, and if they don't they aren't a man" they make claims about reality without evidence.

Money is not real: it is inter-subjective—not objective. Money exists, of course! However, it is not a member of reality. E.g., the $100 price of the diamond does not have being like the diamond does. — Bob Ross

Ha ha! You and I have had different views of subjective and objective in the past, so it might be irreconcilable here. I'll still propose that money is objectively real. But that is because thoughts are objectively real. "The mental" is real. Objective is a claim that taking all the evidence into account, leads to one or more outcomes every time. Subjective is a claim about reality apart from your personal experience, using only your personal experience. So it is objective that my favorite color is blue. It would be subjective for me to claim, "Its the best color in the world." based on this information alone.

To your example, the price of the diamond is whatever is decided between two parties when an exchange of money occurs. If I sell a diamond to one individual for 20$ and claim that all diamonds are worth 20$, that's subjective. If I sell a diamond to one individual for 20$ and claim, "I sold that particular diamond to him for 20$, that's objective".

Technically, no: I am leaning more towards sex and gender being virtually but not really distinct. — Bob Ross

In my opinion it is this very muddying of unclear terms that promotes confusion and unclear thinking on the subject. People are mostly confused when it comes to gender terminology, and I believe at this point it is encouraged to stay that way by design. The best way to think is to have clear and unambiguous terms. Perhaps you are describing sex expectation. Or perhaps you are describing a blend of sex expectation and gender as gender theory defines it. Perhaps its better to create a new word to describe the concept at this point while keeping with the definitions that have been established and are used within the trans gender community and policies.

Kpop stars that are male are engaging in something immoral, under my view, which goes back to my claim about gender realism: in your view, there simply is no right or wrong answer here—it is just people’s tastes—whereas in mine there are facts about this. — Bob Ross

This is a subjective view of yours Bob. I cannot see how you can objectively demonstrate that a Kpop singer wearing make up is immoral. But that might be a better subject for another thread.

With all due respect, this is an unintentional red herring. My point was that if we hold your view that freedom is about making choices and virtues limit choices, then virtues make you less free—irregardless if you freely cultivated them or not. — Bob Ross

I think you're joining the consequences of a free choice to 'free choice'. Freedom does not involve the analysis of the consequences of what a person does. I'm just using freedom like "walking". Walking is a mobility of the feet at a casual pace. Its not a descriptor of why, how, where, when, or should one walk. Same with freedom. Freedom is just a basic descriptor of actionability. It is not a judgement of when, how, what, or should we use that freedom for. I'm not saying we can't apply those to freedom, but before we apply them to freedom we should be able to define what it is as a fundamental and basic definition.

The classical way of thinking about freedom is that it is the ‘capacity to act with virtue and achieve the human good’ — Bob Ross

Yes, that is both outdated and you have to remember that it was written in an era in which 'free speech' was not a thing. Write about freedom as, "The ability to do what you want independent of the state," and you might find yourself in jail and your works banned. Remember that Aristotle was paid by and worked for a king. Its extremely important that we do not simply accept the words and concepts of an era without carefully considering them over the accepted words of this era.

Good philosophical practices rely on clear, unambiguous, and fundamental definitions. If you can take a word, find two distinct concepts within that word, and break them apart, that allows clearer communication and thought about the concepts involved. As I've presented 'freedom' above, it is clear, unambiguous, and fundamental. Aristotle's is not, and his thinking was possibly compromised by the politics of his day. So I see no rational argument for taking 'the classic' view of freedom in virtue of mine being concurrent with good philosophical practice and which easily fits into the modern day use and understanding of the term.

This is doesn’t mean your view is wrong, but that’s why I also gave my counter-examples to show hopefully how your view can be counter-intuitive, such as in the case of having to admit that virtues cause a person to be less free (which is a consequence of your view). — Bob Ross

No. My statement of freedom has nothing to do with consequences. If you wish to argue that choosing virtues makes you less free, that is your claim, not mine. I would simply say the consequences of choosing a virtue may or may not lead to more or less choices in the future. If I freely choose to maintain my health, I have greater choice in activities in life over the restrictions that poor health brings. Of course, if I choose to not steal 1 million dollars, I have far less options in regards to monetary decisions than I do if I steal it. A free choice is about now, not the future consequences. Discussing the future consequences of a free choice is again, separate from the fundamental concept of freedom itself.

You remind me of my teachers from earlier phases of my education. They, too, would talk about the importance of questioning. But the further in education I went, the less we were encouraged to ask questions. — baker

I was a high school teacher for a few years. It is true that the older you get it seems the less comfortable people are with asking questions. If I had to guess its because questions from children are often simple to answer while questions from adults are not.

And who decides that those answers "need to be spread", if not one's ego? — baker

Ego is one motivation for sure. But there are others. Sometimes an idea is put into practice and the outcomes are positive. So the desire is to repeat those positive outcomes. Sometimes its based on a rational conclusion a person has made. Sometimes the spreading is not an insistence, but ensuring the ideas are exposed for others to think and question on.

Modern gender theory, by associated gender with sociology, has collapsed gender into something that is not real: it is inter-subjective, which is not real. — Bob Ross

Lets define real. Normally 'real' means 'what is'. I don't think you're claiming that the concept doesn't exist, but you are claiming the bases for the gender expectations have nothing substantial to point to beyond subjective opinion as to why they exist. I might start another thread analyzing the 'whys' of gender, but for now we can agree in this thread that gender as a social construct is a purely subjective opinion based purely on emotions, nothing rationally substantive.

In my view, as a realist about gender, your examples highlight the real disputes between cultures about what the gender facts are where one can be truly wrong or right, more correct or less — Bob Ross

You and I might hold identical views, the key here is you are using gender in my mind as a synonym for sex. And if that is the case, I think we agree. But as language evolves words sometimes take on different meanings in different contexts. In the context of 'trans gender' and gender theory, gender is not a synonym for sex or sex expectations, but the subjective cultural expectations tied to a sex. "Warriors vs Scholars".

And to your point, as of our current analysis there is nothing substantial behind gender beyond opinion, prejudice, and sexism. As such it most definitely has nothing behind it to compel the idea that cross gender should mean a person can cross sex spaces. The fact that gender has been enshrined in law at all is rationally circumspect and morally questionable.

n my view, there is real, rational disagreement we can have about what gender is and how gender roles work; and so I can admit that cultures have gotten it wrong, some have gotten it sort of right, and some have gotten it sort of wrong. — Bob Ross

Again, if we replace your term gender with 'sex', then we have an objective place to reason from. If we use 'gender' as subjective cultural expectations, then I agree: there is nothing objective to base any reason on. It is one of the many reasons I see gender ideology as a secular religion. It wants to create precepts and ways of living based entirely on a subjective notion of reality.

I would say it is a gender fact that women are the one’s that have the role of wearing makeup, although it is morally permissible for them and not obligatory, and as such any culture that said otherwise got the facts wrong, and this is because women a procreative role that makes them the object of sex. — Bob Ross

Is that backed by fact or opinion Bob? Ever see a woman fall in love with a kpop star? They're men who wear make up, and are intended to appeal to female sexual fantasies. Women can be enamored with men just as much as men with women, and properly applied make up can make a man more attractive in many women's eyes. Perhaps what you mean is the intend of make up application. Obviously men who wore make up in Egypt wore it to enhance the beauty of male features, not feminine ones. We know that 'blush' and lipstick for example are used because women's lips and cheeks take on higher blood volume when they are aroused. So a man in Egypt would use make up for their physical features that women would be interested, or to convey health in their position. The specific intent of using make up in this case is a sex expectation based on biological reality, not cultural expectation. Whereas the idea of "Men cannot use make up even if its applied to accentuate male features" is a gendered expectation.

With all due respect, I think you missed my point. I agree that you are freely choosing, in these examples, to cultivate the virtues: my point is that you are freely choosing to make yourself less free. — Bob Ross

No, I get that. My point is that is a choice we are free to make. A choice that is responsible or recommended by others to make? No. But a free choice nonetheless.

The reason I don’t find this compelling is because the vast majority of human history has used freedom for excellence—not your nor our society’s modern understanding of it. — Bob Ross

I don't think this claim is necessarily true. I agree with you that freedom can be used with the contextual bent of 'responsible freedom', but if we are going to accurately discuss the terms, its our job to break words apart where we can into as simple and agreed upon terms as possible. I see a very simple and unambiguous use of freedom as "The ability to make a choice within one's capabilities", and then adjectives can come in to modify it so that we both clearly know what each is referring to.

So again, I don't object to your notion of 'Freely choosing virtues", I just object that this is the base term of freedom that is least ambiguous and accurate to all the concepts invovled.

Agreed; and, moreover, they are trying to get rights that the other sex has—not the rights they have relative to their own sex: that’s what is so controversial about it. — Bob Ross

Yes, I have mulled it over repeatedly over the years and I just don't see any logical reason why a trans gendered individual deserves cross sex rights and privileges. If people want to volunteer them personally, I have nothing against this. But a right or obligation seems out of the question.

A ‘form’ is not a ‘concept’ in the sense I am using it: a concept is an idea in a mind, whereas a form is an actualizing principle in a being. A ‘principle’ here is being used to denoted something objective: something which is not stand-dependent nor an aspect of a mind’s ‘subjective experience’. The actualizing principle of a being is its act(uality); and the matter which receives it is its potency (potential). — Bob Ross

Ok, so a form in your definition is essentially the maximum potential a person can be. This is a moral principle I'm not against, but do we also have a term for "what a person is"? Few people fully actualize into the potential they could be, so what do we say about a person's present or 'actually actualized' state?

A real essence is a ‘whatness’ which is inscribed in the being itself objectively: it is not an abstraction of a mind. In the case of a mere concept of what it is to be something, that is, by itself, insufficient to provide intelligibility innate to a being; for it is an idea conjured up by a mind for its own understanding and, consequently, is not something real in the being that it is contemplating. — Bob Ross

To follow up with the above, this seems to be 'real essence'. But the 'whatness' of a person in relation to a form seems to contrast with the full potential of the form itself. Is this a correct assessment of what you're saying?

Who I am is unique: there cannot be someone that is me in the sense of ‘me’ as a specific subject; but what I am is common to all male humans. — Bob Ross

This is where I lose you and think we need another term, or I need to understand your concepts better. I see this as

form- full potential
actualization - the whatness of a being's form (Can be less than full potential)

I have a hard time seeing a male as a form, as there can be many types of males. You did mention there is a sort of 'genus' earlier, but that seemed to apply to actualization. For example, and not intending to be crude but there are men who have their testicles inside of them and appear to be female at birth. Technically they're still male, but that's not common to all males.

I think this is a problem any form type capturing of words has to contend with. There are almost always exceptions and sub categories. I'm not saying it can't be handled, but how does your particular approach handle this problem?

If you remove enough of my personality, maybe who I am changes; but only by changing my biology do you change what I am. Likewise, you can change certain things about me without changing fundamentally what I am; such as swapping out my hair color. — Bob Ross

Where is the line for this? This is essentially what I'm asking.

A cripple cannot have any rights that are grounded in their crippleness, because that is a deprivation of their nature—not a part of their nature. Their nature is such that they should have legs; and, again, I would say they have that nature fully in virtue of their ‘form’ (soul). — Bob Ross

It seems here to you that rights should be based on the form of an individual, not the actualization of an individual. At a birds eye view, I agree. When we get into the specifics of what an actual form is, I feel that's where we run into the problem of 'exceptions'.

They may have certain rights grounded in their nature that grant them special needs; because their right to things pertaining to walking are still a right they have because their nature dictates it—it just wouldn’t be in virtue, intrinsically, of them being crippled that would warrant such rights. Same with losing a pinky. — Bob Ross

So if I understand correctly, a handicapped parking spot is provided to a cripple who cannot walk, because the nature of their form as a human is that they should be able to walk. So your exceptions to forms are in essence to acknowledge them, not not give them any credence in themselves. This is why a handicapped person would not have a right to a handicapped spot, and this would best be considered a privilege?

A social aspect of human life is any that pertains to inter-subjectivity. When people expect the penis, to take a sex-specific example, to behave, to be purposefully vague, in such-and-such ways is a social expectation grounded in biological sex. There is no such thing as an expectation held by multiple people that is not social; because a group holding an expectation is them inter-subjectively agreeing upon the belief that such-and-such should work this-and-that kind of way. — Bob Ross

That is not what gender means by social expectation however. It means "Social expectation divorced from the biological reality". Taken in your context, biological sex and its expectations are a form. Gender is an expectation that society places upon the form that have nothing to do with the biological form itself. We have evidence of this because different cultures often have different expectations of dress and behavior from males and females that often contrast. At one time in France, pink was associated with men, while blue was associated with women. So if you were a man and you liked the color blue, society would view you as "girly".

Another way to see gender is if we took the same biological form of a man in both cultures, but one culture believed that all men should be warriors while another culture believed all men should be scholars. Its not a biological expectation, but a cultural one. This is what I mean by 'subjective'. There is no underlying objective grounding for this expectation, it really is just a societal opinion or pressure. Why society puts out these pressures can vary from control, sexual dynamics of power, or just good ol' bias and tradition.

If this is true, then all I am noting is that social expectations can be grounded in objectivity—including biological sex; — Bob Ross

Nothing wrong with this, the point that is being made is this is not a gendered expectation, but a sex expectation. Whereas your make up example is not a sex expectation, but a gendered one. In ancient Egypt men used to wear make up just as frequently as women. There is no biological aspect that necessitates men or women wear makeup, its a cultural strategy and/or outlook about biological differences that has nothing to do with the 'form' of the biological being itself.

This presupposes the idea, again, that freedom fundamentally is about being able to choose from options; and this is not compatible with freedom being fundamentally about a state of being most conducive to flourishing. — Bob Ross

True, but I'm going to stick with that for the following reason. We have better vocabulary that accurately describes situations.

Freedom - The ability to choose your own outcome in life based on your own limitations.
Responsible decisions - Free choices that maximize your potential
Irresponsible decisions - Free choices that inhibit your potential

Tying 'freedom' as being equal to 'responsible decisions' muddies the vocabulary for me and makes it harder to think clearer about these particular distinctions within the English language.

If I cultivate, for example, the virtues; then I am biased towards what is good; so I am less apt to choose ‘freely’ in the sense of purely choosing from contraries; so it follows, under your view, that I am less free the more virtues (or vices) I cultivate. — Bob Ross

No, you're not less free. You are choosing to cultivate virtues. A person who chooses to lie often is cultivating a personality that leads them to ruin their potential, but it is a free choice. A person who chooses to tell the truth despite the personal risk chooses to cultivate good character. There is also nothing from stopping a virtuous individual from ceasing to cultivate truth and start lying. Yes, the decision to cultivate habits to make good or bad choices makes it easier to continue making those choices, but a person freely chose to cultivate those habits.

On the contrary, in my view, I don’t need the ability to choose otherwise or to choose from options to be truly free: if I am most able to will in accord with what is good, whatever that state of being might be (which is going to be a state where I, as a human, are most prejudiced towards doing what is right), then I am the most ‘free’ in my view. — Bob Ross

I think this contrasts too much with the common understanding of freedom, and can just as easily be described by "Making responsible decisions means you will have better and healthier outcomes that lead you to be able to make more free choices". If you take care of your health, then you have more options to choose from in life than if you don't. I get that. But the choice between options is freedom, not "Choosing good".

if freedom is about being able to will in accord with what is good, which is to be in a state of being more conducive than less to your flourishing, then one can, in fact, become more free even in such an environment. — Bob Ross

If freedom is just about the ability to choose your outcome in a particular situation, then we can argue that some choices are better than others. Again what I feel you are arguing for is "Responsible use of freedom" which is a fine thing. But if you eliminate freedom as a concept independent of morality, the concept doesn't go away and we still need a word to describe that situation. It just seems more reasonable to keep freedom in its base simple form and add adjectives to it then tie freedom necessarily into the question of what should be done with it.

However, in freedom for excellence, as the name ‘excellence’ suggests, freedom and goodness are interrelated. — Bob Ross

Again, I have no issue with adding an adjective to freedom to describe responsibilities or moral precepts to what people should do with freedom. I just don't think its reasonable to lose freedom as the simple description of "The ability to make choices within your limitations".

To build self-discipline is inherently to limit one's options to get their body to obey their mind. This would, under your view, limit freedom; but I would argue that it actually makes me more free by limiting my options to cultivate and maintain self-discipline because it makes me more capable of willing in accord with my beliefs — Bob Ross

Its not a limit of freedom, its a free choice to build self-discipline. And I would argue self-discipline is about the mind controlling the body, not the other way around. If I work out every day as a choice to build muscle and make physical work easier, that's a free choice of mine. Yes, it makes being able to handle physical work easier, and my habits make it more likely that I will work out in the future, but its still always a mental choice to continue to stick with those habits. Freedom has nothing to do with "the likelihood of what I will choose". Its just a descriptor that indicates, "I can choose".

Give some examples of gendered actions that would allow one into cross sex spaces? Specifically, female gendered actions that allow males into female exclusive spaces. — Malcolm Parry

Great question. First, a major misunderstanding that I know I had in the beginning of the movement was I thought trans means 'trans sexual' with all the bits cut off. No, it doesn't mean that. It literally means, "I feel like the other sex and might dress or act like them in some way." The issue is of course mostly with trans women, but you have men who have everything intact and might, or might not be on hormones saying, "Because I think I'm a woman, I can go into a woman's locker room". "I can enter an all female race". "I can go into a woman's bathroom." "I deserve to be put in female prisons." Go read up on that if you want an example of "Every reason you can think that's a bad idea played out".

The trans gender movement is partially the trans sexual movement. But it mostly is the, "I feel or act in ways that I feel the other sex should feel and act like, so I should get to be in cross sex spaces" movement. This is the issue that I do not feel is a proper demand for rights, much less an argument rooted in logic or fairness. This just seems to be discrimination and sexism wrapped up in a male desire to get things they want. But feel free to point out if you disagree.

Did you leave teaching due to the turning tides? — Jeremy Murray

I left because I worked more than 40 hours a week in a thankless job. I taught math and constantly told kids to get a good math based degree to make good money. Took my own advice eventually. :)

BTW, where are you writing from where the inquisition has passed? — Jeremy Murray

I live in Texas where there wasn't much of one. But online was a different story.

What pains me about this is that philosophy could perhaps best resist dogma. Certainly, my areas of study are nearly completely ideologically captured. — Jeremy Murray

Correct. I feel philosophy is uniquely fitted to take this on and yet it has no brave pioneers pushing it to address current events. A large part of this is the field I feel, is set up to stop pioneers and original thinkers. It is ironically a very conservative and traditional field.

The issue is can a male (sex) become a woman (gender) and the have the same rights as a female (sex) — Malcolm Parry

This is what the majorly active part of the trans community is asking as a right. They believe that gendered actions allow one into cross sex spaces or confer the right to be treated as that cross sex. The rest of the rights I mentioned fit human rights and I believe are already serviced in Western countries.

No rush Bob! We all have lives outside of here.

Again, why should be believe that two beings of different natures should have the same exact rights—and not just a subset of shared rights—in virtue of their personhood? Perhaps you are open to the possibility of different rights that persons of different natures could have such that they don’t share all the same rights with other persons of different natures — Bob Ross

This is what I proposed earlier considering someone who is crippled or has a different hair color. It is nothing I'm settled on for or against, though I admit to being careful before accepting it.

So you know where I am coming from, I am an essentialist: I think there is a whatness—viz., what it is to be this particular thing contrary to another thing—that real objects (e.g., cars, roads, humans, cockroaches, trees, iron, etc.) have intrinsically. In my case, I account for it with form realism: I think there is a unification, actualization principle of things in matter which provide its innate intelligibility (of what kind of thing it is). — Bob Ross

I agree in a certain context. There is a whatness to you being Bob Ross. There is you, and only you as you. When we talk about rights between people, we have to talk about shared 'whatness'.

so ‘human nature’ is an abstraction of what the two forms have in common. — Bob Ross

I think we're in agreement!

My main point would be: why should we believe that the part of ‘female’ and ‘male’ nature that is shared between them is all that we look at to determine their rights if rights are natural? — Bob Ross

I viable question.

In my view, your form provides you with being the kind of being that will, under the right circumstances, develop into a being that has experience; but for ‘set theoriests’, for lack of a better term, the being doesn’t have that nature until it exhibits the set of essential properties; so if one thinks that ‘having consciousness’ is essential to being human, then anyone who isn’t currently conscious is not human. — Bob Ross

I think we're adding extra steps that aren't needed. You don't actualize into a form. You are. Your existence is what you are, and that may or may not fit into an abstract that we apply. For example, I might have a form that "Humans walk on two legs". Then a human is born with one leg. They don't actualize into a human being. They are a human being, just with one leg. The essence of what one is is independent of our labels of that essence.

The main point would be that the nature one has is not dependent on the subjective stance you take on it; and that’s all I mean here by ‘objectivity’. — Bob Ross

Agreed.

For example, to counter your example, imagine I could drug someone so they won’t feel the pain in your scenario: does that mean I have sidestepped the moral consideration that they are sensibility that are being violated? — Bob Ross

To be very clear, I was talking about cruel and unusual punishment that inflicted no long term damage, but simply mental anguish. If you gave them a drug that also had no long term damage or side effects I would view that as unusual punishment.

Thought experiments can quickly get out of hand however. The point is that a person's subjective state can also be a consideration in their being and nature.

If I expect you to behave some way out of pure subjective feelings or thoughts I have, with no underlying basis in reality, then I am being irrational and immoral because I am viewing you as having an obligation towards submitting to my own feelings are baseless thoughts. — Bob Ross

I believe this is the crux to why many of the rights requested by trans gender individuals such as mandated pronouns and opposite sex entitlements, are not rights but personal desires.

Are you saying here that the only aspects of male and female biology that matter for consideration of rights is their rational will or intellect? I am not following how the biological and functional differences of women and men wouldn’t be, in principle, taken into account when discussing rights. — Bob Ross

That's what I was proposing. I do think physical differences to a point can be rights based. Where the line is drawn is something I do not know. Does a person with a missing index finger have different rights than someone with five? What If I'm missing my pinky toe?

Another major difference, I suspect between us, is that I would say that social expectations and obligations can be, if done right, grounded in the real natures of humans; so the ‘biology and function’ of a male or female does legitimately lead to different social roles between them that are grounded in ‘biology and function’. Whereas, in the OP, if I am understanding correctly, the social roles would just always be purely inter-subjective. — Bob Ross

To be clearer: Expectations about biological sex are not sociological. They a fact based. Expecting most men to be taller than women on average is a fact based expectation. Expecting women to wear earrings and men not to is cultural. It is not that one or the other exist, they both do. Gender is simply always a cultural expectation and never a biological expectation.

In my view I say yes to all three.

I see now you are very libertarian (: — Bob Ross

Ha! I'm really not. Libertarians often take for granted the things they have. A society based completely on absolute freedom, or the freedom to cross other people's freedoms, is no society at all. I believe in a balance of many things, but one thing I am fully on board with is the personal freedom to do what you want as long as it does not unduly affect other people's freedoms.

I don’t think freedom fundamentally consists in being about to choose between options; but, rather, consists in a state of being that is most conducive to flourishing. — Bob Ross

I would call that, "Responsible living". But you are free to live irresponsibly as long as it does not affect other people's freedoms. Freedom has no other purpose than the ability of an individual to live as they truly wish. It doesn't mean this can't be irresponsible or cut one's life short. And it doesn't mean we can't talk to each other and try to persuade each other that our innate desires do not always lead to the best outcomes. But I should be able to go into my own home and eat a pint of ice cream without the law coming and throwing me in jail for living irresponsibly.

If freedom is about being able to choose from options (especially contraries), then God is the kind of being that is the most unfree being that could possibly exist because He cannot do evil (and in some views, like mine, He cannot do anything contrary to what is the best option); — Bob Ross

I have no objection about conversing about a God, but we should be careful of assumptions in the argument. It may be better to abstract what you mean instead of ascribing that abstraction as a necessary identity of a God. Maybe another thread on logically what must a God be like? :)

If freedom is about being able to choose from options (especially contraries), then God is the kind of being that is the most unfree being that could possibly exist because He cannot do evil (and in some views, like mine, He cannot do anything contrary to what is the best option); — Bob Ross

Why can't a God? What if its that God could choose to, but chooses not to? To compare with human beings, I am free to beat a puppy to death, but I choose not to.

if freedom is about being in the best state of being to realize and act in accord with your nature, — Bob Ross

If we define freedom as, "The ability to act based on what you are", that fits. A cripple cannot walk, but their reality denies them the ability to choose to do so. I could easily strangle a puppy to death, but I choose not to. There are of course consequences to one's choices, and some choices will likely give you a better outcome to you and those around you than others. But freedom in itself does not deal with morality. Freedom is simply "the capability to do, or do not do X".

In my view, because I take a different view of freedom, it makes someone less free to give them even the mere option to take hard drugs; — Bob Ross

It may deny them other opportunities, but if they choose to lose those opportunities that is active freedom, not being less free. In other words someone is free to choose to be less free. Again, I wouldn't encourage this and would consider this an improper way to live. But morality has nothing to do with 'freedom' in itself.

The thing is. In this discussion people often become less fair. They make assumptions about such an OP..and as a result they suddenly stop being philosophers. Deeply unfair offcourse. To be unfair and then not engage in proper discussion and project unfairness. — Jack2848

True, but I understand that. There's a lot of emotion that can be wrapped up in this, and I try to have patience and guide it back to 'just thinking about things'.

Because in the end the premises and logic used to derive one is a woman (sex) in a male (sex body) is likely to be very very problematic. — Jack2848

I agree. For me, terms are for conveying accuracy of intent, not to cater to someone's emotional reaction over those words. So if someone told me, "I'm a doctor" but it was just that they really desired to be a doctor, me replying, "You're not a doctor", is not intended to insult, demean, or make them feel bad. Its just a correction to align with reality. If a person gets upset over an observation of reality that is not intended to demean, insult, or diminish an individual, but is truly intended to describe reality, I don't think anyone is under an obligation to change their terms.

But what people tend to do is either believe that somehow it's possible or that possibly something is going on that goes beyond bad logic and actually touches on something about the brain that is yet unknown. And that we should have empathy for whatever this something is. Because if we are wrong and deny their claims, that's a moral horror. Whereas if we are right and their claims about being x in a not x body are wrong. Then it also feels bad for them. — Jack2848

I suppose this is an issue for me. Someone feeling bad about other people's perception of reality just doesn't seem to be a viable argument of obligation. I want to be clear, I don't mean bullying abuse, or intentional disrespect. Its about feeling bad about reality. That's just life. Reality has its ups and downs, and there are many realities that are uncomfortable that we have to learn to deal with.

To show this is not an armchair claim, I have bad facial scars from years of acne. I have rolling scars not only over my cheeks, but my forehead. I take people's breath away. My initial reactions with most people are wide eyes, a bit of panic, or the inability to look at me at all during the conversation. My face is literally something you would see in a horror movie, maybe worse.

When I was young and immature, I became despondent because I realized how shallow people are and that I would forever be cut off from humanity at a fundamental level. Anyone who tells you looks don't matter is a naive idiot. Fortunately, I might be ugly on the outside, but I've fostered not being ugly on the inside. Not that anyone cares, I do it for myself. I thought about it a while. Do other people owe me special treatment because my face is messed up? No. Do I have the right to be angry at them for it? No.

You see that's MY problem. And that means I have to deal with it. Not others. The guy who's uncomfortable looking at me doesn't have to look at me. The person who has panic is blameless. The person who is uncomfortable is ok. No one has to call me handsome or good looking. No one has to pretend I'm attractive. People can believe they are superior to me. Its all ok. Because its my problem, and I have to deal with it.

Has it been painful over the years? Of course. "Hell" is an apt moniker as I'm shy on top of it. I hate to be noticed by people in general, and it is impossible to blend in. I do not question that there would have been other people in my shoes who would have ended it. So when I hear of the anguish of a trans gender person and talks of suicide, I know. Not in theory, but in life experience.

It does not excuse me to demand other people treat me differently. The solution is not to 'pretend everything is ok and I really don't look that bad'. The solution is to recognize the reality of the situation, and learn to emotionally and rationally come to terms with it. That makes you strong. I could wear a mask, make up, or even visualize myself as having a clear face when I was younger. All of that is delusion that will eventually break down and leave you in a far worse state than if you just accepted it.

I however don't think that an entire society should lie. It's best we make a a clear difference between my mom who's born with a vagina and can have children and someone born with a penis who can't ever have children , who has to take hormones to bodily become more like a woman (sex). — Jack2848

Agreed. I think a nice compromise has been 'trans woman'. Its an indicator that a male is trying to live their life as a woman. It might be painful for a trans person to acknowledge that they can't ever truly be the other sex, but that's just delusion otherwise. To become strong in character one must face the challenges of their life head on, honestly admit what they are, and deal with them understanding what they are doing. Anything else is shameful and makes you a burden to others. Asking others to call you something that you and they know isn't real is you making yourself a burden onto another person. I feel bad for the person taking that burden, but I also feel bad for the person who is so weak in character that they think being a burden is an entitlement on others and not a big deal. It is a big deal for many people.

I want to be clear, I understand both the pain and the desire that many trans people go through. But it doesn't make them special. It doesn't mean society has to treat them with anything more than the legal respect everyone else is entitled to in society. So 'trans woman' works. They aren't women. Trans men aren't men. They and society should acknowledge the reality of the situation, and learn to accept each other best we can despite our differences. That's what wins respect in society.

If puberty blockers go on too long, yes you can miss windows of growth that cannot be recovered. Long term use of puberty blockers also are suspected of inhibiting brain development and lowering IQ.

The current argument that makes the most sense to me personally is that you need to go through puberty to really understand what its like to be male or female. Because being male and female is primarily about sex, and puberty is coming to terms with sex.

I don't know RogueAI. The current approach is to study past data more in depth and put puberty blocker use on hold until more information can be gleaned. I believe there is another study that is being set up in England that will put kids on puberty blockers again to do another live test as well. There's a bit of pushback on that one though as there's still much to study under old data and its arguable that there's not enough need to do another live test with the risks known now.

Transitioning children seems... dubious at best. — AmadeusD

Modern day research demonstrates it seems to be medical malpractice on children. First, the research that showed kids with gender dysphoria were more likely to kill themselves was shown to be false. When comorbidities such as depression and other mental health issues were isolated, it turned out the suicidality rate was equal to the expected rate of those comorbidities. Gender dysphoria itself has no significant suicidality rate.

We've also know for decades, with the last paper published in 2021, that if kids are not actively transitioned from 12 to 18, 50-80% of them do not transition as adults. Other research shows that around 80% of those who do not transition turn out to be gay.

Finally puberty blockers are an off label use of the drug to block puberty for kids with gender dysphoria. The theory was that if their puberty was blocked for a year or two, that it would give the child time to figure out if they really should transition or not. A deep study found out that 99% of kids put on puberty blockers transitioned, basically making it a pathway to transition whereas 50-89% of them would never have transitioned at all.

There is still a powerful faction of transgender activists that are still pushing for puberty blockers and medical transition for minors despite the above research. Reasons I've seen: "If I could have stopped my puberty prior to transition, I would look more like the opposite sex today". "Its just transphobic research. (No counter research, only an opinion)" "Trans is a natural state of being that you have when you are born and can't be changed"

Its very much a "We have to save the children" mentality that seems to stem more about 'saving the ideology' than a fact based approach. I've commented that trans ideology in the activist community is very much a secular religion, and going after kids to secure ideas and 'make trans normal' also seems to be a part of it. I also want to be clear that trans individuals who transitioned purely due to gender dysphoria generally do not seem to be pushing transition for kids. It is those who seem to enjoy transition, 'gender euphorics' who want to push this on kids as a reflection of their own desires. Finally, in case anyone thinks I'm 'transphobic', I supported puberty blockers initially and believed that in rare cases transition for kids might be the best medical practice. As more research has come out and I got to see the community personally, I have naturally changed my position.

In your definition of ‘human rights’, you seem to, and correct me if I am misunderstanding, be acknowledging that rights are innate, inalienable, and grounded in the human as a human being; and this implies that rights are inherent to the nature of a human. — Bob Ross

I confess, I should have defined this better. It only took until page 5 for someone to read the OP in seriousness and point that out. :) What I really defined was natural rights, and assumed human rights were an off shoot of them. Turns out human rights are specific to international law, which I'm not sure is the intent of the slogan, "Trans rights are human rights". So lets do a little combo if that's fair. Human rights are rationally agreed upon rights that should be conferred to all people. The key provisions of human rights are:

Universal, non-discriminatory, equal, and ideas that we would like to respect, protect, and fill. And yes, they are human rights, not monkey rights. :)

If this is true, then what rights we have are tied and anchored in our nature as a human; and so we look at that nature to expose which rights we have and which rights we think we have but don’t. — Bob Ross

No objection. We may have to define human nature, but I think we both have a general sense of what that is for now.

A right is, by your ‘human rights’ definition, grounded in the nature of being a human; and the nature of a human is never subjective; so it follows from this, I think plainly by my lights, that ‘transgender rights’ and ‘cisgender rights’ are internally incoherent phraseology in your schema. — Bob Ross

Are you saying that the definition of human nature can never be subjective, or that a human being's nature can never be subjective? I agree with the first part, but not the second part. Our subjective nature of thinking, feeling, and being is a living part of human experience. The subjective viewpoint of a cockroach is very different form the subjective experience of a human being.

For gender is subjective (by way of social expectations, expressions, etc.) and rights are grounded objectively (in the nature of the being); so a, e.g., ‘transgender right’ would be a ‘<subjective category of thought tied to sex by a society> <that grounds a right any member of that subjective category has>’. — Bob Ross

Lets replace your argument with other examples and see if it still works. Freedom from cruel and unusual punishment is often a right. But if we disregard a person's subjective experience, then we would be able to inflict immense pain on a person without a care or doubt.

But, on looking at it again, I think what you're saying is, "Can there be a human right about cultural subjective expectations?" So you're not saying anything about the personal experience of an individual, but a subjective expectation about an individual based on their sex.

To be more thorough, its also best to differentiate between biological expectation and social expectation. For example, we know by fact that men on average are taller than women. This isn't a subjective expectation, this is a statistical expectation based on biology.

So back to what I think you're saying. Lets plug it into another example. Is there a right that society should have certain subjective expectations of someone with a red hair color? It doesn't seem so. For one, everyone could technically have a different expectation of someone with red hair color. But then a right is a reasoned conclusion, and we must ask, is there a way to reason that someone should ever be showed a subjective expected viewpoint in society?

If we look at what is common to many rights, "The right for women to vote and the right to equal treatment under the law", what we see is a consistent pattern of people being free from the subjective expectations of others. Despite there being people who think women can't vote or that we should treat certain people differently under the law, rights expect us to treat each other equally in opportunity, not in expected actions or outcomes.

So then if we say, "trans gender rights" the only way for this to make sense is if there are certain human rights being denied to trans gender people simply because they are trans gendered. I think that's the only way this makes sense.

This is critical to the conversation, I would say, because if this is true then we can’t speak of ‘cisgender’ nor ‘transgender’ rights; instead, it is just ‘human rights’ and every human has such rights indiscriminately of gender. This means that the idea that, e.g., I have the right to use a certain pronoun to identify myself because I am of such-and-such gender is incoherent with your view on ‘human rights’. Instead, I would, e.g., have to argue that something innate to my nature grants me the right to use a certain pronoun (although I understand you were arguing against anyone having such a right). — Bob Ross

Yes, with what's been brought up so far, I mostly agree. With the caveat that I think we can talk about valid trans gender rights that are attempting to remedy rights that are owed them as human beings that they are not currently receiving because they are trans gender. Asking for things separate from human rights would not be a human right, nor a valid 'trans gender right'.

However, if we are acknowledging that rights are grounded in the nature of a being and this is central to what rights a transgender has; then the question arises: “do all humans have the same rights as humans but not necessarily as male and female?”. That is, are we merely discussing what rights both sexes of our human species share in common; or does the other aspects of their nature not get weighed in for other rights that may not be grounded in their mere human nature but rather their specific nature as a male or female? — Bob Ross

In common, but in common based on biology and function. Do we consider that a person who cannot walk has a particular right that a human who walks does not? Of course we would say its "All humans who cannot walk". In such a way we can say, "All humans who are men". The key here is this cannot be due to a social expectation, it must be based on the objective realities and consequences of biology. I say this as a proposal, not an assertion. I'm curious what you think here.

You touched on this a bit in the OP; but it is important to note that bodily autonomy does not cover the right to do anything you want with your body. For example, does a suicidal person have the right to kill themselves? Does a masochist have the right to continually cut themselves to the point of risking bleeding out everyday? Does a person have the right to, in modern terms, “rationally and freely” decide to become a drug addict? — Bob Ross

In my view I say yes to all three. Does a person have the right to kill themselves by throwing themselves into traffic and causing a mess? No. These are all things you have the right to do in your own home. The moment your actions start to unduly impact other people's freedoms, then its no longer a right. So if I use drugs at home and bother no one, its fine. If I use drugs, get in my car and drive into another vehicle, that's not a right. But to your point, I have a subjective expectation that a person should not do that. My subjective expectation that someone shouldn't do something is not a right that should be enforced.

The point being, the critical thing that the OP skipped passed is: “what are rights for?”. I humbly submit, they are for allowing ourselves to have the proper ability to realize our natures—to flourish—unimpeded by others. — Bob Ross

I would argue rights are not for personal flourishing. We would have a very different society if that were the case. I feel that rights are about the freedom from other people's subjective expectation of what we should do with our own life. It is to live and die as we wish and will, be that for good, or be that for ill.

The question then becomes: “is it sufficiently bad for a person’s well-being to try to transition to another sex when it is currently medically impossible to do?”. I would say emphatically “yes”; as it is, I honestly think it is mutilation granted that it doesn’t actually change the body from one sex into the other—we simply don’t have the technology to do that. On these grounds, I would see it like giving someone the option to do meth: that’s not a right one has because it is too dangerous for them—not even in terms of the right to bodily autonomy. — Bob Ross

You and I may differ here. If an adult wants to use meth, I say they have the right to do so. Now I want to be clear, I would not encourage or condone anyone I know to start taking meth. But they have the right to make that choice. My expectation of how they should behave does not trump their ability to decide themselves how they want to live in their own body. What I think of transitioning personally is irrelevant to whether someone should have the right to do so.

Nice to see an actual breakdown of the OP Bob!

↪Philosophim You’ve correctly pointed out that “no being can be unlimited.” But that admission doesn’t solve the problem - it changes the subject. The argument was never about a limited superbeing, but about the logical incoherence of the traditional theistic claim that God is simultaneously omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent. — Truth Seeker

Correct, but any good thinker and philosopher is not going to take the low hanging fruit. They're going to be charitable to ideas they don't like themselves. This is a problem that is easily solved by high schoolers (I know, I was in high school when I first encountered it), and so we have to ask why its stuck around so persistently.

One thing to realize is that if you hold impossible terms, its also impossible to counter someone who believes in them. "Can God create a rock so big even he can't lift it?" Sure, he made himself a man, now he can't lift it. The realm of impossibility is the realm of imagination and child play. It is literally child's play to take your contradiction and simply ignore it because 'unlimited' means I can ignore your contradiction.

If you're accepting that impossible terms can exist and be considered, you're going to end up not winning. Because you haven't proven that impossible terms are impossible, you've only proved a contradiction through some word play to someone who believes in impossibility. Notice how you can point out a contradiction that can be realized in high school and yet there are hundreds of millions of people who still believe in a God? Crowing over a simple contradiction while it changes no one is foolish. You have to think deeper than that. And part of that is being kind to your opponents viewpoint.

If instead you can get the other person to think, "The way to solve the contradiction reasonably instead of simply brushing it off, is to revise the terms to be reasonable," now you have something. You're being charitable. "Couldn't it be," you say, "that people thousands of years ago were simply defining the terms as exaggerations, but really when we examine the word carefully it makes more sense to think in them this way?" NOW you've got the other person thinking. Most people will think, "Yeah, that makes sense." You haven't disproved God, but you were never going to do that anyway. You're doing one better. You've gotten them away from thinking in impossible terms, and now thinking in possible terms.

This is the difference between a person who has a goal of convincing someone of a particular assertion, and instead gets a person to think in a more rational way. That's the goal. Get a person to start thinking rationally and then you can have a reasonable discussion. Meet the person you're talking with half way. Try to see what they want, find what is irrational, then try to shape it in the most rational way from what they want. Then you can take the next step and demonstrate how the next steps of rationality do not lead to a particular conclusion.

That’s not a solution to the problem of evil - it’s the abandonment of classical theism. You’re left with a finite, naturalistic being operating within the limits of reality - powerful perhaps, but not divine in any ultimate sense. — Truth Seeker

Incorrect. You're simply setting "The divine" in terms of "The real" instead of the imaginary. Again, if your goal is to invalidate theism with "The problem of Evil", an ancient and basic argument, hundreds of millions of people will show you its a fools errand. You cannot convince someone of something rational if they aren't already thinking in rational terms. You aren't going to invalidate their faith, so do one better. Get them to think in rational terms. You're not invalidating theism, you're reshaping it to be in the realm of reasonability first. Then you might have a chance.

it’s admitting that the being isn’t truly all-knowing or all-powerful. It turns the classical God into a very capable but ultimately limited entity. — Truth Seeker

Correct. Thus, the problem is solved. No being can be unlimited. The lesson is to ensure that one's definitions do not cross into impossible territory. Whenever listening to anyone's proposed terms, one should first evaluate whether the terms are logical in themselves before accepting them as true.

Likewise, “as powerful as a being can possibly be” is circular. Possible given what? — Truth Seeker

Given the limits of reality. We don't know those limits, so putting them forth is futile.

If a world without suffering is logically possible — Truth Seeker

We do not know this. It may not be possible.

If it’s not possible, then reality itself imposes limits on this being, meaning omnipotence was never real to begin with. — Truth Seeker

Even if it were possible, omnipotence defined as "All powerful" is impossible. The term itself results in the ability to not contradict when a contradiction occurs. There are limits to everything.

And morally, the issue doesn’t go away. Even if this being is “as good as possible,” if it foresaw preventable suffering and chose to allow it, then by any coherent moral standard, it’s not maximally good. — Truth Seeker

If it foresaw unnecessary suffering, had the power to do something about it, and suffering was truthfully evil in this instance, then we can imagine a better being existing because there are humans who would do something about that. Meaning you haven't made a contradiction, you've simply yet to describe the the most benevolent being that has the power to prevent 'evil'.

So, redefining the terms doesn’t eliminate the contradiction - it just concedes that the traditional “all-knowing, all-powerful, all-good” God can’t exist without being reinterpreted as a finite or morally compromised one. — Truth Seeker

It doesn't have to be that a God is morally compromised. It simply means if you are going to describe a God with impossible terms, you're going to get an impossible conclusion. The only realistic way to describe a God is with realistic terms.

A nice start, but lets find the real lesson here.

You've defined 3 impossible terms. Lets tweak them a bit.

Omniscient - A being which knows what can possibly be known.
Omnipotent - A being which is as powerful as a being can possibly be.
Omnibenevolent - A being which is as good as a being can possibly be.

Now the contradiction goes away. Define impossible terms and you get impossible results.

Dude (or dudette, idfk) i appreciate your kindness, but this isn't very true...Bob has revealed that i am not a kind poster. — ProtagoranSocratist

Be a little kind to yourself too. You're learning your way around these forums, and this post got a lot spicier than normal. Most of the posts here are low key discussions about different philosophical approaches. Its perfectly human to get emotional at times here. Trust me, we've had real trolls who would put your post to shame.

I think everyone has gotten to say what they feel in this thread, and I also ask a little forgiveness for Bob too. He felt pretty attacked on this thread, and he's human as well. I've spoken with Bob many times over the years and he's honestly one of the best people here, constantly coming up with new ideas and approaches to subjects and willing to talk to anyone politely. To be clear, I am not saying anyone is right or wrong in their feelings here. If you feel Bob was overly defensive or didn't get a good first impression, I simply ask you to give another of his threads a read and let this encounter be an exception to move on from.

I favor a kind of virtue ethics, together with consideration of what conduct is appropriate to achieve eudamonia. It's based on ancient views concerning what is right conduct on our part rather than demands we be treated in certain ways by others. Hope that suffices for now. — Ciceronianus

I much appreciate your polite contribution to the thread! Thank you for your viewpoints.

Since Leontiskos and Hypericin have finished discussing, it seems like this post has devolved into personal accusations and infighting instead of focusing on the OP. Bob, do you feel this has run its course? Is there anything of value for this post to add at this point? No one is banned, and people can make their own judgements about comments in this thread. You have a lot of other ideas to offer Bob, I don't want to see you gummed up on a thread that has seemingly run its course feeling like you have to defend yourself. You don't.

Also please be kind to ProtagoranSocratist. He's new and feels a bit bothered by his own perceived personal attacks that have happened on these forums. He generally seems like a nice poster and we want him to feel welcome. I think we can all agree it got heated in here and let bygones be bygones for another thread.

Yes. https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/14044/knowledge-and-induction-within-your-self-context/p1

Here is an example of how to understand knowledge, and a reasonable approach to inductive thinking. It is not only a theory, it is something I put into practice with great success in my life.

This seems too crude a term to be analytically useful if the goal is to understand what's going on within the wide area on gender-non-conformism. — Dawnstorm

If we mean 'gender is purely a social construct' then its not crude. If we intend to tie 'gender is sex', then it is crude because then gender as a definition is ambiguous and crude itself. The way to 'uncrude it' as it were is to use sex for sex based realities and expectations vs gender for gender based realities and expectations. Conflating the two in any way muddies thinking and is the wrong way to approach it.

I know you make that distinction, but it's a difficult one to make, because the terms aren't clear. There are people who are trans who use the terms like you do here, for sure. — Dawnstorm

What's important in a philosophical analysis is to pull the terms that people may use indiscriminately and carefully define them in a way that makes rational discussion possible. "Slang" is not anything we can think rationally about. To have rational thought we must first use clear and unambiguous definitions. We can clearly note that if someone uses the term in a different way, that's a different concept. So we use the term in one clear context and concept, which is gender as a social construct. In this way using gender to mean anything related to biological sex expectation is poor vocabulary, unclear thinking, and emotional subjectivity. Nothing can be reasoned with poor and unclear vocabulary. Anyone who desires something at the expense of a person's rational thinking understands this and pushes it. In philosophy we have a responsibility to clarify and pull out the emotional and ill thought out uses of terms into something clear, rational, and unambiguous. What I've noted as the definition for gender is the basis of gender theory.

There are people who are trans who reject that they can ever be tanssexual, no matter how much they'd like to be; the latest reasoning (read by doing research while reading this thread, but I didn't keep a link) was that "they can only tinker with their phenotype; their genotype they have no control over"). — Dawnstorm

If 'trans sexual' means 'fully the other sex', then no one can be trans sexual. But 'trans gender' doesn't mean, 'fully the opposite gender' either. If we are to keep the terms in similar use, trans gender is crossing gender boundaries, trans sexual is crossing sex boundaries. Anyone who alters their biology in an attempt to cross a sex boundary is a trans sexual under this definition.

This is important, because there are many trans gendered individuals who do not attempt to alter their body. They are satisfied crossing the gender divide, but not the biological sexual divide. As such the two terms create a clear distinction that covers two separate modes of thought and process without leaving anyone behind.

A cis woman who wears a dress, is the default expectation. It's unexceptional. Women these days don't stand out (at least not where I live) for wearing jeans and t-shirt instead. That's very common, too, so these days it's a "can-norm". — Dawnstorm

Correct. This is because gender can change from person to person, group to group, and culture to culture over time. It is a purely subjective notion of behavior for a person's sex. As such it holds no objective weight.

Every other constellation is aware that what they're doing shirks gender expectations. The model above would suggest you lump them all in the same category: people who are not biologically female yet still like to wear a dress are all trans. — Dawnstorm

To be more accurate, they are exhibiting 'trans gender behavior'. "Trans" is a slang term. If we intend this slang term to mean, "A person who holds a trans gender identity", this would be a person who consciously chooses where possible to embody the culturally expected behaviors of the other sex while shunning the culturally expected behaviors of their own sex.

cis women who like to wear trousers find themselves more aligned with cis men who wear dresses than with trans men who wear dresses: it's "I'm a man, and I can wear a dress if I want to," vs. "look at me, I'm wearing a dress, I'm a woman." — Dawnstorm

This is 'trans gendered behavior" in the eyes of the social group, while in the subjective mind of the individual, it is a rejection of the social group's idea of gender. Lets say I was raised in a family that discouraged men from being dancers because "Real men don't dance." I grow up and really like to dance. Further, I think its completely stupid that they think men can't dance. I reject the idea of gender entirely and dance. To them, its trans gender behavior. For me, its not because in my definition of 'male gender', 'not dancing' isn't part of that definition.

This is the problem with making gender into a means of law or enforcement. What one believes gender should be for each sex can be different for every single person, group, or country. It is culturally enforced prejudice or sexism. Nothing more.

It's far, far easier for me to navigate this messy situation if it's not only behaviour but also bodies that are gendered. — Dawnstorm

No, its far, FAR messier. Keeping a clear distinction allows clear thought. Once you realize the difference between trans gender and trans sexual, you can correctly identify people's motivations. Some people truly only want trans gender situation. Other only want trans sexual situations. There are men who want to grow boobs, but behave like gendered men. There can also be blends. There are people who want to be both trans gendered, and trans sexual. Identifying which aspects are trans gender and trans sexual allow clear distinctions and greater accuracy in identifying people's situations.

That, too. But what I'm drawn to here is that I think most people only perceive the gender and never topicalise sex to begin with. — Dawnstorm

I disagree with this. I think you're still blending in expected sex behavior with cultural behavior. Imagine that you see a six foot tall man who walks with a physically straight gait, has a large nose, and is wearing a dress and a bow in their hair. The dress and the bow are gender, the gait and large nose are sex features. Perhaps I am wrong, but most people will look at the sex features over the gender features every time. To be clear, a female can have a large nose and a straight gait instead of a hip sway, but biologically it is more common for men to have large noses and a straight gait. Do you see the difference between gender expectations and sex expectations?

Where I do agree, I think, with T Clark is that I do think treating the "mental condition" of being trans in the sense of "making them realise what they really are" is akin to conversion therapy for gays. — Dawnstorm

Conversion therapy refers to sexual orientation. We know conversation therapy doesn't work because you can't change your sexual orientation. The attempt to claim "conversion therapy" is to claim the negative connotation from the word so that trans gender and trans sexual people can justify what they desire without having to do the work that went into demonstrating why changing a person's sexual orientation is doomed to fail.

Now, as I've noted above, many straight men have a sexual impetus to transition. Phil Illy's "Autosexual" book makes a great argument that this is a sexual orientation as it is lifelong and does not break. Just like a gay person has the wrong triggers for sexual attraction, a trans sexual person (all people who transition are tran sexuals by definition) are able to take the normal outside attraction they have for a woman and place it upon themselves. This is not farfetched, as there is another orientation called 'Autosexual". This is a person who is sexually and/or romantically aroused by themself. A person with this condition looks at themselves in the mirror and is physically turned on by themselves, and can fall romantically in love with themselves. A trans sexual with this orientation is essentially an auto sexual who gets the attraction trigger that they see in other women when they present themselves as a woman.

After examining all kinds of different motivations to transition, this is the only motivation I can actually see as being viable. It is something that cannot be removed from the individual as it seems to exhibit all the hallmarks of a sexual orientation. (I cannot say for sure, I am not a sexologist) If this is the case, then 'conversion therapy' would actually apply here. In the other cases in which it is non-sexually motivated, it seems to all boil down to confusion, trauma, or fear which cause transition. These all seem to me to be treatable as it wouldn't be treating a person's desire to transition, but treating the underlying issues that lead people to view transition as a coping mechanism.

I appreciate your long post! Its been a nice conversation.

Ah, but I do believe in a rational moral structure apart from the law. I don't make the all too common mistake of equating one with the other, though. — Ciceronianus

Yes, a few had implied this equation, but you never did. Human and natural rights are rational moral structures apart from the law. Is yours something similar or is it a unique system? If similar we could address it, but if its unique that might be too much to tackle in this thread.

I think they have a human right to some traditional women-only spaces and sports. — RogueAI

What is this human right?

Suppose you have a biological woman who has transitioned to a man and looks like a man. Do we want him to have to use the ladies bathroom/changing room? — RogueAI

I personally don't mind. I had an encounter with a trans gender woman years ago in the male bathroom and it was fine. I think the case here is whether a person can identify the trans person as their natal sex. A person could disguise themselves as an employee and go 'behind the counter', behave like an employee, then leave without anyone knowing. But is that right? If someone can disguise themselves (trans gender, not trans sexual) as the opposite sex, does it make it ok for them to use opposite sex spaces?

This got me thinking about changing rooms in various gyms I've been in. None of them have been mixed, and women have complained about the presence of biological men, as in this story:
https://www.newsweek.com/gym-chain-center-tish-hyman-dispute-flooded-negative-reviews-10989692
This is also an issue in high school locker rooms. Girls, understandably, are not always comfortable with biological boys/men being around them while they're changing. — RogueAI

Hello RogueAI! To bring it to the OP, do you believe that it is a human right that a person's gender allow someone to enter cross sex spaces? That if a woman is uncomfortable with this, she is against a human right?

Well, here's where differ: I do not think bathrooms are "divided by sex." I believe this is surface rhetoric. Bathrooms themselves are social constructs. And bathrooms being "divided by sex," means that bathrooms are gendered: there are bathrooms for girls and bathrooms for boys and unisex bathrooms. Gendering bathrooms is, first and foremost, something we're doing. Something we're used to doing. Something ingrained in our daily praxis. Gendering bathrooms is social behaviour. — Dawnstorm

That's interesting. It may be due to a difference of gender definition. For most of the life of the term gender it was a synonym for 'sex'. Probably about 60 years ago there was an introduction to create a new meaning from gender. This meaning of gender is 'Non biological social expectation from a particular sex."

So what does this mean? We know from biology that on average, men are taller than women. Can an individual man be shorter than a woman? Sure. This is biological expectation, not gender expectation. Gender is when society places cultural actions on a biological sex that have nothing to do with their biological sex. So for example, "Women wear dresses". Is there anything innately biological in a woman wearing a dress? No. Its purely a cultural construct of subjective expectation.

A trans gendered individual is not a trans sexual individual. It is an individual of one sex that does not like the cultural expectation of their sex. So they might be a man who likes to wear dresses, or a woman who likes to wear top hats. Or perhaps a man believes that only women stay at home and take care of the house while men have to work. So he lets his wife work and stays at home.

Bathrooms are not gendered. They are divided by sex. Urinals are designed for the biology of males, not females. The privacy is afforded each sex because there is also more than urination and excrement, but menstruation from women. Not to mention that there is nudity and clothing removal to take care of biological needs. One does not go into the bathroom to affirm that one is male or female, they use the bathroom because they are male or female.

The trans gendered community wants to argue that enacting the cultural expectation of the other sex gives them the right to be in spaces divided by sex. So if a man wears a dress, feels like a woman, and acts in a cultural way that he believes women aught to act, that he should be allowed in the women's bathroom, lockers, sexual abuse centers, and jails. This male can be fully intact and not on hormones.

To make my position clear: sexual facts applied in social contexts is always gendered. That includes biology: the way we organise the facts to make sense of them could be different. But biological facts do set boundries of what is likely to be successful. So empirical research is going to be far more strict than socially structured excretion. — Dawnstorm

So this is an incorrect view of gender within gender theory. Gender and sex are completely different meanings. Meaning you can have division based on sex differences, and based on gender differences. Anything based on biological differences is a sex differentiated situation that is not cultural. For example, getting a prostate exam. Since only men have prostates, the exclusion from females getting the exam is not a cultural difference, but a reasonable one based purely on biological ones.

The issue with many trans gendered individuals is they are likely unintentionally applying sexual differences as cultural expectations. Either that, are they are really trans sexuals and desire to have the cross sex access without the need to take hormones or have surgery. And of course there are always bad actors who want to cross these spaces for duplicitous, malicious, or perverted reasons. I want to be clear I do not think this is the majority, but it must be recognized they exist.

Smart people are good at building elaborate justifications that work out logically. But these elaborate legitimisations, too, are constructs, and not ones likely to be shared with trans people - or me, for that matter. — Dawnstorm

True and well said. I hope my point is based on rational argumentation and not merely bias or lazy thinking. The key is when we start saying things about rights and laws, we have to be very specific and accurate with definitions.

Now I'm a cis male and use bathrooms for boys without a second thought. I neither know or care if I ever shared a bathroom with a trans man. As a result, this is not an issue that intimately impacts me. Which also means that I'm talking from an easy place. I can question the status quo with little problem, because a change won't impact me personally at all. — Dawnstorm

Same, I really appreciate your humbleness and self-awareness in this.

Does Ms Pacman have a female biology? My personal take (in worldbuilding terms; I know Ms Pacman is just pixels... or scan lines... depending on the technology) is that Pacmen reproduce by mitosis (when you've eaten enough you get an extra life, no?). This is only partly a joke. — Dawnstorm

Its light hearted, but your point is well stated. Its interesting to think about what people feel. Some people might view Ms. Pacman as 'biologicaly female' as in 'female pac-creature'. Some people may feel that there is no separated sex intent between the two creatures, and that the only difference is that one wears a bow while the other doesn't. In the same way, it may be possible that humans view 'man and woman' in similar fashion sometimes. I personally cannot view a person in any other way than biology. If you pointed at the blue sky and told me it wasn't blue, I could no more unsee the blue sky than view a man or woman as a biologically distinct person. But, it may be that there are people who do not see biology, and generally only see cultural actions as their primary view of 'man or woman' and legitimately could swap them out in their mind without any compunction.

I think though that my viewpoint is the norm. When Mulan was found to be female, no one said, "Oh, well you were a man, but now you're only a woman because we made you wear a dress." Its an odd way of thinking that doesn't seem quite right.

You seem to want me to declare whether I believe rights I don't think exist ("human rights") include certain rights which, if they are "human rights," I would likewise believe don't exist. That's an odd request. I'm not sure how to respond. — Ciceronianus

Sure, just a logic check on the claims I made in the OP. Fully ok to say, "I don't believe in X, but I see that this meets or does not meet the terms of X."

Unless a legal right right applies, I don't think anyone has such rights. I don't care whether they're called "human rights" or anything else. — Ciceronianus

Fair enough. Seems you don't believe in any particular rational moral structure independent of law, so this is a logically consistent answer.