It’s so glaringly untrue that one can only wonder why one is really saying it. — NOS4A2

I'm trying to discuss this from a logical standpoint of vocabulary, not asking for a person's motivation for wanting one or the other. I'm sure that's another philosophical discussion that could be had, but I want to focus here on the logic of the terminology and use itself. Appreciate the contribution regardless NOS.

Plenty can be lobbed your way. It's just not worth it. I have my sanity and peace of mind to preserve. — Jamal

I suppose discussions on a philosophy board can be tiring and not worth it. And when one isn't able to argue one's points effectively, and realizes they are at risk to be proven wrong, it can affect one's sanity and peace of mind. Go watch a few shows of Friends on Netflix or something today and don't worry your silly little head over matters like this.

That is a really stupid post. — Jamal

Ha ha! You do realize that the person who first insults the other person in a normal discussion is the one who has no real answer right? Thank you for confirming that you cannot counter my point and only an insult of dislike can be lobbed my way.

I'm simply assuming that if the definitions are true, can it be logically claims that a transman is a man? No.
— Philosophim

If he has XY chromosomes, yes. — Copernicus

Yes, in modern day separation of sex and gender, chromosomes indicate a person's sex. I don't think we're in overall disagreement Copernicus, but I think we're talking about two different definitions in regards to gender theory. You may want to check out gender theory before continuing so we're on the same page. I appreciate the discussion regardless!

Obviously if "man" is only about sex, trans men are not men. But this "if" is what is being debated, so you're just begging the question. — Jamal

I'm not begging the question at all. Clearly defining terms then thinking if claims using those terms lead to logical outcomes is a normal discussion. You are very free to define 'man' in another way, you'll just need to argue why it is and if that definition makes sense in normal language use. If you want to argue a specific counter to the point I've made, feel free.

The debate has been going on for years, and you have made no attempt to research it or address the arguments that defend the notion that trans women are women etc — Jamal

Now this is a proper logical fallacy called Ad Hominem. You're attacking assumptions and qualifications about my character instead of addressing the points.

See for example the idea that "man" and "woman" are cluster concepts:

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/feminism-gender/ — Jamal

Fantastic, but I am not here to debate with an entire wiki on sex and gender. Is there a specific argument you want to make that would counter what I've noted in the OP? Just because there are discussions about alternative definitions to man and woman does not mean that you can make the existential fallacy that they are correct in reference to the discussion I've started here.

Must be a pretty stupid theory coined by confused people. — Copernicus

Your opinion is your own, I'm not here to argue for or against the validity of it. I'm simply assuming that if the definitions are true, can it be logically claims that a transman is a man? No.

It doesn’t just have one meaning. It can refer to sex or it can refer to gender. This isn’t to say that it is equally likely to refer to gender as sex. — Michael

Neither does sheep. You are still avoiding the question. Please give me a clear definition of man. If it has multiple meanings, explain what context is required for it to change meaning.

No offense, but that's horsheshit. And as a radical individualist, I don't believe in community or culture. — Copernicus

You don't believe in 'following' community or culture. Obviously you believe community and culture exist. Gender according to gender theory is the cultural expectation of non-biological behavior of a sex within that culture or community. You do not have to follow or recognize the gender of that community or culture, but you should be able to recognize that communities and cultures have expectations of behavior of people within them. Expectations of behavior in regards to a person's sex are gender.

Transgender is having both male and female sexual parts in a single body (naturally or surgically). — Copernicus

There is no definition of transgender that I am aware of that uses that definition. That's normally called intersex or hermaphrodism.

SEX. Gender means Sex. — Copernicus

This is an older meaning of the term prior to gender theory. When talking about trans individuals, gender is defined as I've noted above. Transgendered individuals are not transsexual individuals. A transgendered individual acts and behaves as is expected of the opposite sex within that culture. If you have not been exposed to these definitions before, I can see how they can be confusing. If you wish to use sex and gender interchangeably to refer to sex, that's fine on a personal note. If you are communicating within the context of a transgendered individual, just understand gender is not the same as sex anymore.

And what does the word 'man' mean without those modifiers?
— Philosophim

It's an umbrella term that includes cis men and trans men. — Michael

That is not an answer. If I asked, "What is a sheep?" and you replied, "Its an umbrella term that includes black and white sheep." you would think I wasn't thinking very logically or actively avoiding the question. Define the word man without reference to modifiers please.

If a male wears a skirt, they are acting in a transgendered way.
— Philosophim

I don't agree with this view. I have individual freedom to wear what I want, unless I'm breaking laws or protocols. My gender is solely tied to my sex. — Copernicus

Gender is cultural. Meaning that if you understand the culture of a place, agree with that gendered culture, and purposefully act in a way that is against the gender of that that culture for your sex, and intentionally take the gender of the opposite sex, you are acting transgendered.

Obviously a person can believe that a man and a woman can wear a dress and it has nothing to do with their sex. However, the culture will. If you insist to the culture that wearing a dress has nothing to do with being a woman, then you are having a subjective conflict about gender. That is not transgender. Transgender is agreeing with a particular viewpoint about what non-biological behavior should be done in public by men and women, then purposefully doing behavior that is expected of the opposite sex, not yours.

Culture is a social construct. Sex/gender is not. — Copernicus

According to gender theory gender is a social construct. What definition would you like to propose for gender instead? Why is that a better definition to use than the one's I've put above?

Yes, you logically said that.
— Philosophim

No, I didn't. I said that the word "man" is used to refer to cis men and used to refer to trans men. — Michael

And what does the word 'man' mean without those modifiers? What do those modifiers mean when they're added to the base word 'man'?

No, it is not an empirical fact that when people generally use the word man, that they are thinking it is equally as likely that it is an adult human female behaving like a man.
— Philosophim

I didn't say that. — Michael

Yes, you logically said that. If 'man' was seen by the majority of people as purely a gendered term, not a reference to a person's sex, then logically a 'man' could be equally likely to be male or female. The fact that you imply that you don't do this, tells me that when you hear the term 'man', you normally think its a male. If you truly thought man was only gendered, you would not have protested my point.

How is cultural expression "gender"? I think you coined the definition yourself. — Copernicus

Good question for clarification. There is a difference between being male and female, and how one acts culturally in regards to one's sex. One simple aspect is clothing.

For example, wearing a skirt in America is expected to be worn by females, not males. If a male wears a skirt, they are acting in a transgendered way. They understand the culture views this as clothing that is expected to be worn only by females, and as a man they actively choose to wear a skirt despite knowing this.

Contrast this with Scottland where men are expected to wear kilts, which is basically a skirt. Wearing one fits the cultural expectation of a man, and if a woman actively wore a kilt prior to the 1800's where it was only men, this would be seen as transgendered within Scottland.

There is nothing inherent in being male or female that would drive a man not to wear a skirt and a woman to wear one. Why the culture went that way is not the question here, but that it can. Things that are not in reference to one's sex are public actions and things that a person can do without it being a reference to their sex. For example, "Supermarket cashier". It is non-biological actions, roles, clothing and any other non-biological action that a society judges in regards to one's sex that is gender.

A related post from 2019 ...
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/336888 — 180 Proof

Much appreciated!

Yes. To me,men and women are sex.

And what you designated as gender could be termed as hormonal traits. — Copernicus

Yes, they are sex differentials. I amended gender to be more clear:

Gender - A cultural expectation of non-biological behavior in regards to an individual's sex

In other words, physical and biological aspects of one's sex are not cultural expectations of behavior. They are biological realities. There is no 'hormonal trait' which leads a woman to wear a dress and a man not to. Those are cultural expectations of non-biological behavior in reference to one's sex.

Oh boy... we're differentiating sex from gender. I see. — Copernicus

That is the modern day terminology in regards to transgender issues, yes. I note the definitions in the OP, do you disagree with them?

I am simply explaining the empirical fact that your definition is inconsistent with how English speakers actually use the words. — Michael

No, it is not an empirical fact that when people generally use the word man, that they are thinking it is equally as likely that it is an adult human female behaving like a man. When you read about a man in the paper, do you think they are male, or do you think they could be male or female? You have also not given me your definition of what a man is and what a trans man is. Nor have you answered what word we would use to replace 'man' for 'adult human male'. You are not discussing, you are insisting. Meaning, you are wrong.

You can argue that one word or another shouldn't mean something, but that's not the same s arguing that it doesn't mean that thing. — Michael

I have argued both for why it is, and why it should be. All you have done is insist that it is without any reason. Maybe you do have one, but you have to bring it forward.

Because those questions have subjective answers and argumentative grounds. Biological issues are subject to experimental and empirical truths. — Copernicus

In regards to sex, yes. In regards to gender, no.

What is this question doing on a philosophy platform? It warrants a biological truth, not argumentative conclusions. — Copernicus

I disagree. Philosophy is often about unraveling statements and terms to get better clarity of definitions and what we can draw from them. "What is mind?" "What is good?" "What is knowledge?" "What is a man?" I do not see any reason why this is not a philosophical topic.

Correct, but good vocabulary should be clear, unambiguous, and logical.
— Philosophim

No natural language is clear, unambiguous, and logical. Certainly not English. Maybe check out Loglan. — Michael

I said 'good' language. Of course we can have poor and confusing language. Are you advocating that's a good thing? Might as well throw away the field of philosophy then, as one of its primary purposes is to reason through clear and logical terms and ideas.

There's nothing about language that we should do; there's just what we actually do. — Michael

We should have clear language if we want clear communication between people. If I say, "Hops congaro wit nonk tugor", that is what I spoke. But can you understand me? Did it convey the idea accurately? That's the point of language. If you cannot convey a clear idea to another person that they can logically see, your language is poor.

And what we actually[/i] do is use the word "man" to refer also to transmen. — Michael

This is a nonsense statement. This ignores the definitions I've given above and does not try to give a reason why your use of terms is logical or unambiguous. What does 'trans' refer to then? What does 'man' without the modifier refer to? A statement of insistence is not a statement of argument.

No problem. I really wasn't sure what you were after. Sorry about that — Patterner

Not a problem,

A word's meaning is determined by how its users use it. If a sufficient number of English speakers use the word "man" to refer to both trans men and cis men, fully recognising biological differences between the two, then the word "man" refers to both sex and gender. — Michael

Correct. But does it make sense to do so? First, we would still need a term that denotes that a person is male and adult. It makes more sense to create a new word to indicate a gendered adult male then repurpose a term that is used without issue.

The modifiers for cis and trans take the familiar term that refers to sex, but modify it to refer to gender. And I don't think anyone has a problem with that. We have clear vocabulary that everyone understands, and we have terms that are useful.

My question to you then is, "Why should we change the term man to mean gender instead of sex by default?"

There's no divine dictionary that dictates what words mean. — Michael

Correct, but good vocabulary should be clear, unambiguous, and logical. It seems to me that changing the term man from a sex and age reference into a gender and age reference is not necessary as we have clear vocabulary that denotes gender and sex references already, and we would then need to come up with another word to reference the age and sex of a male.

But you defined gender as a cultural expectation. This means that for gender to change, the cultural expectation needs to change, not a person's personal feelings. — Harry Hindu

Correct, gender is a culturally subjective expectation of the behavior that a person should do in regards to their sex. This differentiates from objective behavior in regards to one sex such as bodily functions. The subjective notion may be within an individual, a small group, a city, a country, or world context if possible.

For example, wearing a skirt in America is expected to be worn by females, not males. If a male wears a skirt, they are acting in a transgendered way. They understand the culture views this as clothing that is expected to be worn only by females, and as a man they actively choose to wear a skirt despite knowing this.

Contrast this with Scottland where men are expected to wear kilts, which is basically a skirt. Wearing one fits the cultural expectation of a man, and if a woman actively wore a kilt prior to the 1800's where it was only men, this would be seen as trasngendered within Scottland.

Words can mean more than one thing. — Michael

Of course, and this depends on context. I am noting that in the general context in regards to sex and gender, 'man' refers to a person's age and sex, not gender.

Sex as a species expressed reproductive role means that terms like "man" and "woman" are sexes, not genders. — Harry Hindu

Correct.

So then what would be the labels we place on different genders? — Harry Hindu

We use the modifiers trans and cis to denote gender. You can be a man, and also be a cisman or transman. "Man" denotes your sex, the modifiers denote you are talking about male gender.

I really appreciate you as a poster Patterner, but if you don't mind, I don't want to make this political or judgmental. This is about taking the terms as they are and seeing if the conclusion above is logical or illogical.

My moral value seems to be supervening on the fact I am a bearer of conscious states. — Clarendon

So I do believe that everything has inherent moral value, but some hold more value than others based on the context of the situation. A germ or bacteria can be very helpful if it cleans up toxic waste, allowing more life to live overall.

In general, its a hierarchy. Non-life, life, conscious life. This is because there is a higher amount of actual and potential existence within more life and intelligent life. Rocks simply sit there. Chemical reactions eventually burn out. But life actively attempts to extend itself beyond a base chemical interaction. Intelligent life is able to alter the world in unique and amazing ways. This is what is good.

Thus I can conclude that I am essentially a bearer of conscious states - something no physical thing seems to be. — Clarendon

This is the mistake of hubris. You are a physical being. You are one aspect of a moral universe. The most moral in most contexts, but moral within the universe as part of the universe, not as something without.

↪Philosophim Although we are essentially objects, I don't think that fact about us can be what our intrinsic moral value supervenes on, for that would then mean that every object is intrinsically morally valuable (yet our reason does not represent this to be the case). — Clarendon

Every object has inherent value in comparison to there being nothing. Meaning the core of morality is that existence is better than nothing. I argue from here that more existence is better than less existence. Existence is not only action, but potential.

Imagine that only sheep and grass existed. Eventually the sheep would breed to eat all the grass. All the sheep and grass would die. Introduce some wolves however, and the existence of sheep, grass, and wolves will go on forever.

Morality in human is about creating the most existence from our actions. Do we commit actions that build up the world, or tear it down? Do we create an environment of safety, free thought, creativity, and joy? Or do we create an environment of danger, restriction, mundanity, and fear?

Objectively, we are objects so that can't be the reason. Have you ever considered that we are inherently valuable because we are objects instead of nothing?

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/15203/in-any-objective-morality-existence-is-inherently-good/p1

No, I don't see this either.
— Philosophim

Well, you could just move forward and say why you don't see this. — Constance

My point is I don't understand how you conclude this if you read the whole thing. Again, your comment doesn't point to what I argued in the paper, so I'm not sure how you concluded what you did.

I don't read the entirety of the pages of this other thread. I never do that. I just say what I think and be done with it. — Constance

Sure, I'm not asking you to read all the other replies in that thread, just the full argument. You can understand why making a conclusion about the argument based on the intro alone would be shallow right?

Sorry, I'm not going to read all of that. I read through some, and it occurred to me that it was excessive. — Constance

Then I'm going to take your disagreements with a bit less value. If you didn't read it, you probably don't understand it.

But existence qua existence syas nothing about this. OTOH, there IS no existence qua existence; this is just an abstraction from what there, in the givenness of the world. — Constance

Correct. But it is a reasonable foundation based on the logic of the argument. If you wish to point out why the argument doesn't work, I would be happy to discuss.

one has to move toward inclusiveness, that is, including everything that IS, and this means all of what is usually excluded, human subjectivity. — Constance

Then you do not understand the argument. Existence is everything that is, including subjectivity.

constitutes a view of existence which has no place for your thesis. — Constance

I'm not sure it does. If existence is everything, including subjective thought, how does my argument not work specifically? If you're not addressing the terms and argument used, then this is a 'straw man' fallacy. In other words you've built up and assumed I am claiming one thing that I am not, then saying its wrong.

You thesis amounts to a world where divinity subsumes existence. — Constance

No, I don't see this either.

One final point, if you can't take the time to read and understand the whole argument, but instead make a snap judgement based on the intro, why would I think you have the capability to be a proper critic of it? Something to consider with other posters going forward.

In this thread, I argue that mental to mental causation is not possible if mental events are related* — MoK

I'm sure you'll get plenty of pushback on limiting causality, I'm going to take another approach for you to consider.

Lets say you're right. Where does the thought come from? Does something cause that thought?

Now, someone like Mackie (see his Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong) will call this "queer"--for what kind of ontology IS this to rule over all existence? — Constance

It is the ontology of consequence. Essentially I'm noting that an essential property of existence is that it 'should be'. This is a fundamental. Fundamentals should be proven as necessary, for what exists to be, but themselves need no prior proof or explanation for their being. It is not, "This is what I propose, just trust me," but "The only logical conclusion that can be reached with what we know of existence."

If you're truly interested in the discussion, please check out the argument in addition to the definitions to see why this ends up being a fundamental. As well, it would probably be better if you post there to not distract from this person's post, as well as have easy quoting access to the argument and responses.

I don't think we disagree on the fundamentals here:

"an Is that entails what one Ought Not to do." is what you noted, which of course logically leaves us with 'what should be' vs 'what should not be'.

I agree that unnecessary suffering 'should not be', my point is that this can only be objectively true if good is objectively what 'should be'. The moral fundamental that 'existence is better than non-existence' is required for us to at any point claim 'X should exist". Because all questions of morality chain down to this fundamental question.

Why should suffering not exist? Because it overall lowers the quality of a living being's life. But why should there be a living being at all? Because its an increased concentration and complexity of existence that produces far outcomes than the material alone. Why should there exist anything at all? Because existence is better than non-existence.

The point of a fundamental is you can get to a point upon which you can build from. It also acts as a floor when working backwards. There comes a point where we have an answer, and there are no more questions. The answer is the reason, the fundamental that logically must be.

I've argued that my usage is objectively true. — 180 Proof

Oh, fantastic! I'll have to read it and reply later.

Existence is good? — Constance

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/15203/in-any-objective-morality-existence-is-inherently-good/p1

The above is the full argument so you can understand where I'm coming from.

... so it would never be good to eliminate good, and thus have complete non-existence.
Well, I think "complete non-existence" (i.e. nothing-ness) is impossible ... and who said anything about "eliminating" existence? Non-existence is an ideal state of maximal non-suffering in contrast to existence (of sufferers) itself. — 180 Proof

The only way to reason to come necessary baseline of an objective good (if it exists) is take the ultimate question of "should there be any existence at all vs nothing" and find what must be the answer. If an objective good exists, logically the answer must be yes. That was the original paper if you want to dive into it again.

Good by definition is what should exist ...
I don't see any reason to accept this "definition". "Should exist" implies a contradiction from the negation of a state of affairs, yet I cannot think of such an actual/non-abstract negation. — 180 Proof

When faced with a competing possible state of existence, what is good is the one that 'should be'. Without any means to quantify good this of course becomes an impossible comparison in many situations, and it may very well be that several competing states of existence would be just as good as another with this definition and evaluation. The original paper attempt was to see if a base good that could be established and built on from there. In such a way I could actually quantify that some states of existence were better than others, and build that up to see how that also applies to human morality.

A more apt, concrete use for "good" is to indicate that which prevents, reduces or eliminates harm (i.e. suffering or injustice). — 180 Proof

So what you're saying is the definition of good 'should be' something different? :)

I agree that what 'should be' is a state of existence where the least unnecessary harm and suffering occurs. The difference is the paper I wrote tried to prove it as objectively true, not a subjective assertion. To do that, it requires a base proof of good to build off of, and I believe using the definition of good as 'should be' fits within our general cultural understanding of good, and can be 'proven' by abducto ad absurdum (IF there is an objective morality). As I see no better competing proposal of good which can be defined as necessary within any objective moral system, I don't see a better alternative at this time.

[T]he one thing we can consider is that existence vs non-existence is good.
— Philosophim
Well I agree, more or less, with Thomas Ligotti (Cioran, Buddha et al): "nonexistence never hurt anyone and existence hurts everyone." — 180 Proof

And yet non-existence means that if good exists, that would mean the destruction of good. Good by definition is what should exist, so it would never be good to eliminate good, and thus have complete non-existence.

Certainly. Existence is good, and it can be measured by actual and potential over time. Morality in human terms is simply an expression of morality that that exists though all existence. At a very basic level, imagine if there were sheep and no wolves. Eventually the sheep would multiply, eat all the grass, then die out. But if there are wolves and sheep, the wolves make sure the sheep don't get out of hand. So instead of sheep alone living 100 years then dying out, you create a cycle that allows sheep and wolves to live for hundreds of years.

How can you know whether morality is objective or subjective? We know things from subjective sensory perceptions, e.g. I see these words on my computer screen. — Truth Seeker

A subjective morality devolves into opinion, which means there is no morality that anyone should reasonably listen to. When you state morality is subjective, its the equivalent to me saying, "Blue is the best color". If that is the case then we cannot reasonably make any enforcement of prevention or allowance of morality. A society which said murder is wrong would be just as reasonably justified as a society which actively encouraged murder and celebrated it. Subjective morality simply does not work as a rational system, and the only reason why anyone holds onto it is because they want to justify doing the things they like, or because there has been no proven objective morality thus far and people just want to hold onto something like "God makes it rain."

The proof does not prove that there is an objective morality, but it does show that IF morality is objective, the tenant of existence is good vs non-existence must be held as a foundational premise.

I believe that if one is to believe that there is an objective morality, the one thing we can consider is that existence vs non-existence is good. Proof here. https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/15203/in-any-objective-morality-existence-is-inherently-good/p1

Although I can't prove anything beyond that, and the discussion is purely philosophical beyond that point, I think that any assertion of morality should not violate this core tenant.