Do you agree that causation is the natural form of shape-shifting within the our phenomenal world of material things? — ucarr

I believe causation is the factual reality of some entity X which explains why some entity Y exists. Thus a first cause would be a Y with no other X entity as its cause for existence.

I was just telling you where the information can be found. There's much reading and too much for me to present to you here. Your argument is refuted by the possibility of other types of causes, along with the fact that the "first cause" which you conclude is a different type, as I've shown. — Metaphysician Undercover

I know where the information can be found. You have not demonstrated any specific type of other cause, only vague, "maybes". So far the main point is that a "first cause" means there can be no prior cause by definition. Since you cannot give me a concrete example that gets past this, I see no evidence of any refutation.

OK, I'll stick right to the point. The issue is how you switch from "cause" to "reason" in your argument, without proper definition. You demonstrate the necessity of a "first cause", then you conclude:

""4. Alpha logic: An alpha cannot have any prior reasoning that explains why it came into existence. An Alpha's reason for its existence can never be defined by the Z's that follow it. If an Alpha exists, its own justification for existence, is itself."

You continued to insist that there cannot be any prior reason for the first cause, despite the fact that I pointed out that this is not a valid conclusion. And above, you even denied your own statements with the following:

"Oh, I never claimed that there was no reason for a first cause. The reason for a first cause is that, "It exists without prior cause." Meaning that there is no other reason for why it exists. If there is no other reason for its existence, there cannot be any rule which made it come into being. Meaning the only logical conclusion is that its existence is truly random as I've defined above."

Simply put, your conclusion of "first cause" provides you with no premise for making any statements about the reason for the first cause, without further premises to define what "reason" means. Your conclusions about "the reason" for the first cause are invalid. You cannot conclude that there cannot be a prior reason for the first cause, or that the first cause is its own reason, because you have no premises about "reasons". Any such statements are not conclusions but personal opinions not supported by the argument. — Metaphysician Undercover

Ok, this is a much better point! What you're missing is the phrase 'prior reason'. If you noted I'm not saying that there isn't a reason for a first cause, I'm saying there is not a prior reason. The reason for a first cause's existence, is simply its own existence at that point.

I just replied to Ludwig because he noticed I was using reason which he thought I was using synonymously with cause. I think he missed the "prior" part as well. Just like I told him, there is overlap because if there is no prior cause, there is no prior reason. Of course this does not mean all reasons are causes.

I did not think I would have to define the term 'reason' but I'll do so here if that's a problem. From Oxford Languages the pertinent noun definition is "a cause, explanation, or justification for an action or event." So as you can tell, its easy to have some overlap as sometimes a reason is a cause. When I and you have been referring to 'reason' as different from 'cause', I have been trying to use it as 'explanation'. Does this help?

You show that there is necessarily a "first cause", which means a first event. You then proceed to assert that there could be no "reason" for the first event, as prior to, and being the reason why the first cause occurs. — Metaphysician Undercover

So to be clear here, I'm noting there can be no prior reason. Which includes not only a cause, but explanation or justification.

And since "cause" is defined by "event", and "prior" "a reason" might be something other than an event, yet still prior, as demonstrated by free will and intention. Your argument does not exclude the possibility that the reason why a first cause occurs could be something other than an event. — Metaphysician Undercover

The reason why there can be no prior reason for a first cause, is that there is no prior causal event. There can be a reason as an explanation for why a first cause exists, "That is it simply exists." But there cannot be a prior reason, as there is nothing prior which causes it. Does this clear up the issue?

An "event" as we know it has a cause and an effect, a prior and posterior. This is because it occurs in a duration of time. But the argument produces the conclusion of a "first cause", and this is not consistent with "event" as we know it. Therefore your argument's definition of "cause", restricting it to an "event" is inadequate, false, because the meaning of "event" which is necessitated by the argument is inconsistent with empirical evidence of events. The argument produces the conclusion of an event (first cause) which only has a posterior part, without the prior part, and this is inconsistent with observation. This demonstrates that your definition of "cause" is false causing the argument to be self-refuting. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is not an empirical argument. This is a logical argument. When Einstein constructed his theory of relativity in regards to large bodies, logically, it was sound. It was only after they observed and measured an eclipse that they could empirically confirm it to be true. I make no empirical arguments here. I simply note that logically, if we continue to examine any chain of causality, whether that be finite or infinitely regressive, we will eventually run into a first cause. So no, there is no empirical observation as of yet that refutes this claim, nor any empirical observation that confirms this claim. This discussion is not an attempt at empirical proof, but a logical proof. As such, unless you can logically refute it, it stands.

And this, so far, is the only weakness I've seen in the argument. It is only a logical argument. A logical argument does not mean empirical truth. By the way, Bob Ross is the only other poster to my mind who understood and communicated this right off the bat. Well done, I consider him one of the best philosophers on these boards. :) So, if you wish to say, "I don't care about what logic says, I only care about empirical proof" then I will simply nod my head and state, "That's fine." But that in itself does not show it is a false logical argument.

I don't think I'm asserting anything as a first cause that would later be found to have a prior cause.
— Philosophim
"Later" is a long time. How long would you wait?
For me, it will always seem more likely, and always possible, that any putative first cause will turn out to have a prior cause (or, in my language, that we will develop a prior cause) than the alternative. — Ludwig V

Almost certainly. As I've noted before its incredibly difficult to prove something is a first cause. And it would need to be proven. Not believed, not assumed, not based off of a lack of being able to examine or measure, but proven.

I notice that here, as elsewhere, you use the word "reason" at this point, instead of cause. "Reason" and "cause" are not synonyms, are they? At least, not in philosophy. So what is the significance of this change in language? — Ludwig V

Mostly because I've been ingrained to use different words instead of the same one repeatedly in a sentence. :) In this case there was overlap, as if there is no prior cause, there is no prior reason. But not all reasons are causes just like not all cats are tigers.

In the first paragraph it talks of "existence" being caused - I take that as meaning "existents", things that exist - then slips sideways to constituents - "neutrons, electrons...", but constituents are different to causes; — Banno

This is a good point. I appreciate the specific point out to where cause is ambiguous. I have always considered constituents as causes depending on how the question is asked. For example, "What causes an atom to stay together?" At that point we include its constituents.

To really simplify, to me a cause is what is the historical fact for why something exists. A description of existence can have many attributes such as constituents and time. Thus the general question of cause can be asked and answered in different ways. So if someone said, "What causes an atom?" we can answer with its constituents. This can then be drilled into. We can then ask, "What causes X constituent?" Eventually we will reach a limit of fundamentals, and will be forced to ask the remaining attributes like time. "Why does that exist in its expressed way now instead of one second ago?" And so on until there is nothing prior. Once we reach the point where there is no other causality to drill into besides the existence itself, we have reached a first cause.

Consider a different sequence, that of mothers: A was born from B; B was born from C, C was born from D. For any person, it is legitimate to ask from whom they were born. It is not legitimate to ask that of the sequence of births - it is not a person and so does not have a mother. — Banno

So to take your example, A caused B, which caused C. We may ask that of the sequence of births as well. "What caused the sequence of births?" And we can explain that A had to exist prior to have B, who had to exist prior to C. For B could not have A, nor C have B. Does this answer your question Banno? I understand if you wish to bow out after making a point, so silence does not mean acceptance. It is at least an answer to think about.

Sorry Philosophim, but I am interesting in this issue of alternative interpretations of "change". I might start a new thread if it turns out to be necessary, though. — javra

No apology necessary Javra! :)

Always nice to see an attempt at epistemology. I would say in general your world 1 and world 2 viewpoints seem sound as an introduction. I don't know if you've proposed anything new enough to be a type of epistemology. An epistemology must not just be enough for its times, it must answer questions about knowledge that our current understanding cannot.

For example: How do you solve the idea of belief vs knowledge? If world 2 is a mirror of world 1, how do we know if we're accurate to world 1? A description of how we assess the world at a high level does not inform us how we should properly assess the world to obtain knowledge. So while it is a nice start, I would keep going with it to see if you can properly tackle some of those issues that other epistemological theories have difficulty doing.

If you are interested in reading other takes on epistemology, I have one here. https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/14044/knowledge-and-induction-within-your-self-context/p1 There's a nice summary from the next poster that covers the topic nicely if you don't want to read the details.

That is not correct. You stated the first cause in a "chain of events". This does not imply "first" absolutely, it only implies first in that chain. That is what allows you to say there might be a multitude of first causes. If you accept this, then you know that "first" does not mean "the first cause period". — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, we agree on this again. To give a less abstract example, imagine that a photon appeared without prior cause somewhere in the universe, while a small bang happens somewhere else five years later. Both are not caused by anything else or each other, they just are.

So, I suggest to you, that if you better understood the concept of "cause", and the multitude of different types of "cause" which have been described over the years, you would see that some types of "cause" do not occur in chains. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is not an argument. If you have in mind a particular idea, please demonstrate it. If not, my point stands.

I recommend that you read some philosophy concerning the concept of causation. Aristotle's outline of the four principal ways that "cause" is used is a good place to start. — Metaphysician Undercover

This again is not an argument and presumptive. You do not know the extent of what I've read on causation. If you find Aristotle's four causes worthwhile to the argument, please refer to my previous request for you to introduce them in a critical way to the discussion.

Are you saying that in front of the first cause of a chain, there's another chain that causes the first cause in the first chain?
— Philosophim

No, I am proposing that there is a type of cause which does not operate through a chain. — Metaphysician Undercover

The chain is just a visual metaphor. How does your proposal work? How do I have a first cause, then have another cause that causes the first cause without there being a causal link between the two? You have to understand by this point, what you're proposing without a concrete example is coming across as a clear contradiction to me.

Look up Aristotle's "formal cause" for an outline of a type of cause which is free from the constraints of a chain. Then you might start to understand how "final cause" as the defining feature of intention and free will is a type of cause which is independent from any chain. — Metaphysician Undercover

If you think it does, please point out exactly how. I may not draw the same conclusions you do, so if you want to communicate what you see, you'll have to do it. At a quick glance, I do not see how the idea of 'final cause' at all applies to what I'm noting here, nor the idea that free will is a first cause.

Philosophim, do you read what I write? I clearly stated that there are "significant days" which are prior to your first birthday, not that there are "prior birthdays to the first birthday" as you straw man. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, I am not straw manning, you are. I've clearly laid out that this is an abstract to clear up the issue, and you are in bad faith claiming otherwise. The abstract was clearly indicated to communicate the idea that a "First X" means we cannot have "A prior X". You are saying "But we can have a prior Y" as if "Y = X". It does not. I am not talking about days. I am talking about a specific thing, a first birthday. You pulling a "Y" of "significant days" out of the example when I've clarified the intention for you is the definition of a straw man.

Again, remove replace the birth day example with a "First day" example if that helps you. You claim that there can be prior cause to my first cause. This is the same as claiming "You can have prior days to your first day".

I'll admit when I'm wrong no problem, I do it all the time.
— Philosophim

Then get on with it. Why do I have to repeat the same thing over and over again, while you keep insisting that your mistakes are not mistakes? — Metaphysician Undercover

Yeah...see this was an attempt to get you to behave like a stable thinker and adult. Personal attacks on me are unnecessary and meaningless. Its arguments and proof. I understand having an emotional slip up, but now you're not correcting yourself. Let me be frank. The fact you think something can come before the 'first' of something is inane. I could easily dismiss your argument and no one would begrudge me this. But, I've withheld my judgement to see if you would go into more depth to reveal something I've missed. Don't fall into the trap of dismissing another's points outright because of our first emotional reaction to them. Sometimes an argument dismissed at first glance might have been great if dug into.

Now, maybe I'm wrong. But all I see in your argument so far is that you are stating, "There might be a prior X to the first X", when I've declared that the "First X" is absolute and not merely an origin or expression of speech. I see that you comprehend a lot of the rest of the argument, so I'm scratching my head as to why you would do this. I'm starting to gather it has something to do with Aristotle's points, which I'll need explained and pointed out to me. Can you demonstrate how Aristotle's points are valid, apply to the argument, and have a situation in which there is a prior cause to an absolute first cause? Even if you can't demonstrate the first cause part as you initially wanted, I still would like to see what it is you're thinking of.

You accept that there could be a multitude of "first causes" as the beginnings of a multitude of causal chains. Since there is nothing to ensure that the various beginnings are all at precisely the same time, then please confess to your mistake. The following statement or so-called "definition" is incorrect, or inconsistent: "A first cause means there can be no prior cause by definition". — Metaphysician Undercover

Maybe you misunderstand the claim then. A first cause cannot cause another first cause. If an atom appears without prior cause, and a big bang appears a ridiculously long way away five minutes later, and is in no way caused by the atom, they are both first causes. You seem to be implying that the atom could cause the big bang. If the atom did cause the big bang, the atom would be the first cause and the big bang would, necessarily, not be a first cause and instead caused by the atom.

Now, if the atom is a first cause, and the big bang is a first cause, years later the atom could arrive into the resulting universe of the big bang and collide with another atom. At this point, this is where the chains intersect. But the big bang did not cause the atom, and the atom did not cause the big bang. If one caused the other, then only the one which caused the other would be the first cause.

This does not at all help me to understand what you meant by "set of existence". — Metaphysician Undercover

A set of existence is "the universe" for example. The universe is composed of many other existences. A fundamental set would be a set of 1, or an existence that is not composed of other existences. So the answer to, "What caused the universe" would imply that it also includes all the existences within that universe.

Thus, "What caused a finite universe?" and "What caused an infinite universe?" Would include the set of each existence. I am very open to saying this a better way if you can think of one, I'm not married to the phrase, just the concept. Maybe "Set of an existence?" I'm unsure.

Now you propose to define "prior" in a way which renders "prior in time" as unintelligible. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, time is simply one property of causation. So for example I can ask, "What causes an atom to exist?" and the answer is the combination of protons, neutrons, electrons, and force. I can then ask, "What caused the atom to be at the particular state it is right now opposed to one second ago," and now we include time in the equation.

I think what you're trying to say, and correct me if I'm wrong, is that you believe I'm stating nothing can exist prior to a first cause. That's not what I'm saying. I'm saying nothing prior can cause a first cause. Meaning that a first cause could appear in this universe right now, it would just have no prior cause from anything that that exists. If you want to add, "Maybe its caused by something from another universe", that is included in what 'exists'. A first cause cannot be caused by anything prior, period. It does not mean other things cannot exist before that specific first cause, though those things which exist prior to that first cause must necessarily have a first cause in its causality chain.

If you would like, you can introduce why you think Aristotle's four causes is pertinent to this discussion.
— Philosophim

That's very straight forward. In your argument you restrict "cause" by definition, to mean an event which occurs within the context of a chain of events. But the way that we understand reality involves using "cause" in ways which are other than the context of a chain of events. This was very well explained by Aristotle. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm not discussing with Aristotle. I'm discussing with you. You obviously see something in Aristotle that counters the argument that I don't. If you want me to see this, you have to point this out. You have not done so. Saying, "But Aristotle so the argument is wrong," is not a valid counter. =)

In our understanding of reality we use "cause" in the way of "final cause", intention and free will, and this is a type of "cause" which is independent of any chain of events. Therefore your definition, which restricts "cause" to an occurrence within a chain of events is not representative of the way that we understand reality, and is thus a false premise. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, mine is not a false premise. This is the premise proposed by the argument and the logical conclusions that result from this premise. You may disagree with the premise, but if you want to indicate the premise is false you need to clearly prove why the premise is false. Pointing out, "Another philosopher defines it differently," does not prove that his premise is true. Demonstrate why Aristotle's premise is true, and why my premise by necessity must be false because his is true.

Everyone here knows the right thing is to say you would if those people were equal in worth to the world as yourself. It would be another matter if it were not an abstract. Armchair ethics is easy, having to be 'in the game', is not.

The issue is the limits to what "cause" means, not the limits to what "first" means — Metaphysician Undercover

If I stated, "The first cause by energy", then of course that leads it open to there being another specific cause like "The first cause by matter". But that's not what I'm stating. I'm stating the first cause period. This is not a specific type of cause, so there can be no other invented type of cause that is separate from what I'm defining.

Yes you've defined it as the first in a chain of causes. However, there are other types of causes which do not occur in a chain like that, specifically the one I mentioned, "final cause". Therefore a "first cause", as defined by you, could still have a cause prior to it, so long as it is a type of cause which does not occur in chains, as per your definition. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm a bit at a loss here on what you're trying to say. Its very simple. Either something is caused by something else, or it isn't. Its not complicated. I'm not sure a final cause makes sense unless this cause ended all of reality. Otherwise causality continues.

You are wrongly interpreting your own argument. The difference between the first cause and the other causes in the chain, is that no part of the chain is prior to the first cause, whereas parts of the chain are prior to all the other causes in the chain. This in no way implies that the first cause "cannot have something prior which explains its existence". — Metaphysician Undercover

I do not understand how you do not see this as a contradiction. Maybe this is what you're saying, correct me if this isn't the case. Are you saying that in front of the first cause of a chain, there's another chain that causes the first cause in the first chain? Because then the first chain's 'first cause' is not a first cause. That's just an extension of the prior chain. A first caused is not demarcated by observation or definition. It is the reality of there being nothing prior. Nothing. No prior cause. You cannot say it is the first cause, but perhaps there's a prior cause. That's a clear contradiction.

The first cause is not an origin set by us. For example, if I say, "The first cause of me dropping this ball is me letting go of my hand," that is not a first cause. A first cause is not 'the starting point from which I choose to reference causality". A first cause is THE first cause in a chain of causality. There is no prior chain, no prior connection, nada. What caused me to release my hand? What caused me to be born? What caused my parents to be born? The chain continues. It only ends when there is absolute no prior cause.

By definition, I cannot be wrong.
— Philosophim

"By definition, I cannot be wrong"? Are you saying that the definition of "Philosophim" is "the person who cannot be wrong"? — Metaphysician Undercover

No, I'm clearly noting the definition of "First cause" is that there is no prior cause. You can't state there is possibly a prior cause to a first cause. That runs counter to the definition. The place where I could possibly be wrong is that a first cause, as defined here, is not logically necessary. But you are not arguing against the idea that a first cause is logically necessary. You are saying there can be a prior cause to a first cause when the definition of a first cause is, "There can be no prior cause of this".

When "my first birthday" occurs, or when it is referred to, it means the first in a chain of significant days. But this does not imply that there are no other significant days in your life prior to your first birthday. So prior to your first birthday, there are many other significant days in your own life. — Metaphysician Undercover

Incorrect. When I say "my first birthday" I mean, "My first birthday" No other days. First birthday. First cause. No other causes. You are saying, "There could be prior cause to the first cause" is the same as "There could be prior birthdays to the first birthday". This is clearly wrong. If the other days in the analogy are making it difficult, eliminate them and just say, "First day". You cannot have a prior X to the "first X" by definition.

The first cause, by your definition, is very explicitly the beginning of the chain. This implies that the reason for the first cause, the cause of the first cause is something which cannot be said to be a part of the chain. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, I've already stated the reason it is a first cause is that it has no prior cause that explains its existence. Its part of the definition which I feel I've been pretty consistent and clear on.

The fact that you keep on insisting that your conclusion is valid, after scrutiny shows you that it is not, inclines me to think that your are improperly attached to your conclusion, and would resort to trickery to persuade people of it. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yeah, I'm going to grow real tired of accusations about my character instead of focusing on the argument. Please be better than this. I'll admit when I'm wrong no problem, I do it all the time.

I'm insisting my conclusion is valid because you have not presented a valid counter to it so far. I'm claiming, "A first cause means there can be no prior cause by definition." You're proposing "A first cause could have some prior cause". You are stating, there could possibly be a prior X to a first X. If this is the case, isn't this a contradiction?

Sorry Philosophim, but "set of existence" seems to be incoherent. Do you mean "set of existents" or "set of existing things"? Maybe you could make another try. — Metaphysician Undercover

I meant exactly what I said. The word "existent' in English is an adjective, not a noun. It means specifically, "having existence or being; existing" https://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/existent#:~:text=adjective-,1.,existing%20now%3B%20present%3B%20immediate

An existing thing describes a thing with a verb. Except that people might say that thoughts are not things. So I don't want to describe things, I want to describe what exists.

We largely agree on most of what's being said here, so lets not nitpick over petty grammar though. I really want to figure out this difference between us.

That's not what the argument shows. The argument shows that the first cause is the first in a chain. It does not show that there cannot be a prior cause, it shows that the prior cause cannot be a part of the chain. "First" is in reference to the chain, it designates the beginning of the chain. It does not designate "the first cause" absolutely. This is evidenced by your insistence that there could be many first causes. — Metaphysician Undercover

A prior cause means its part of the chain of causality. I'm more commenting on this comment so you understand what I meant by first causes. A few chains intersecting somewhere is an intersection of causality, and a continuation. The intersection is not a first cause. Multiple first causes would be the start of each chain. When we get to multiple first causes, its probably better thought of as a web, with the first causes being the beginning of each strand.

Anyway, by Aristotelian metaphysics, each and every existent has two distinct requirements needed for it to be. One is matter, the other is form. In this way there is always at least two distinct types of cause needed for a thing to be. If one of these types of cause forms a causal chain with a first cause, there is still the other type of cause, which may well be prior to the first cause of the causal chain. — Metaphysician Undercover

Wait, are you bringing Aristotle's four causes in here? I am in no way talking about causality in regards to Aristotle. If you would like, you can introduce why you think Aristotle's four causes is pertinent to this discussion. But bringing it in here as a quick aside and acting as if it should simply be accepted as a clear counter to the argument does not work.

If you wish to, please demonstrate exactly how Aristotle's four causes fit within the discussion of causality I've introduced here so far. As well, please indicate to me a specific instance in Aristotle's four causes where one cause causes the other cause. Lets not claim, 'may well be prior', lets show it.

jgill is quite right that the topic is complex. In particular, what it is to be a cause has remained fraught throughout this thread, and the logic of necessity in use has never been made clear. — Banno

I don't see it being particularly fraught myself, but I'll define it if need be. Take any set of existence. What caused that set of existence is anything outside of that set of existence which is needed for that set to be. A set which does not need anything outside of itself to exist, is a first cause.

So, what causes an atom to exist? A combination of proton, neutrons, electrons, and various forces. What causes a proton to exist? A combination of quarks. What causes quarks to exist?...and so on. Time is just another dimension of detail. A first cause would have no other cause for its existence besides its own existence.

A chain of causality is when you look at any one point and look at the linked causality to that point. A causes B, causes C, etc. Multiple chains can join and interlink. The initial question asked is whether there is an end to this chain, or do the chains infinitely extend, regress, loop, etc.

In the first case, we have a first cause. But what I noted is that when you examine the entire set, even if it is regressive, there is still the question of what caused the entire regressive set to be. There is no outside cause. Therefore it is a first cause, or a thing that cannot be explained by anything outside of itself. If the universe is finitely regressive in causality, why? Because it is. If the universe is infinitely regressive in causality, why? Because it is. In either case we come necessarily to a first cause.

Hi Chet! Awesome that you decided to post! Its always a vulnerable position to put yourself out there, but glad you did. :)

I have a few starter questions for you.

If creating happiness is moral, then I want you to consider the following situation. Lets say it would make me supremely happy to be superior to other people. I invent a way to dumb down everyone to an extremely low level of intelligence against their will, but they forget afterward and are supremely dumb but happy. Is this moral?

The claim that morality is objective is fine, but can you prove it? Objectivity relies on facts or reason that must necessarily exist. Otherwise, isn't it just a subjective opinion that an objective morality exists?

If maturity is what causes genuine happiness, isn't the real moral thing to chase maturity?

Instead, the position of any cause in the order might be determined on-the-fly, and only when it is necessary to preserve causal consistency.

For why should the universe decide before our measurements and observations, what is and is not an initial cause? That question might look contradictory, but only if it is assumed that the universe consists of an absolute order of events whose existence transcends our observations and measurements of it. — sime

Yes, my description of a first cause has nothing to do with our observations or measurements. It is the reality of whether there was something prior which caused a particular outcome to be, whether we know it or not. In other words, if a tree falls in a forest and no one is there to hear it, it still vibrates the air.

Then what appears, is that if there is a "first cause", there could be absolutely nothing prior to the first cause because "cause" is meant to be all-inclusive. But that's deception, because there must be criteria as to what constitutes a "cause" so there could always be something else outside that category. And that's the deception which Philosophim argues, that prior to the first cause, there could be absolutely nothing, therefore no reason for the first cause's occurrence. That's why I proposed switching for the word "thing", to expose this sort of sophistry. If there is no thing prior to the first thing, it appears like there is absolutely nothing, but that's a mistaken conclusion. — Metaphysician Undercover

I wouldn't call it deception. I'm not trying to trick anyone, I'm trying to have a conversation to see if what I'm claiming holds upon scrutiny. The word thing does not work because a first cause does not mean a prior 'thing' exists. An atom can exist eons away and another atom can appear as a first cause without that atom having anything to do with our new atoms existence.

I claim a first cause is logically necessary. Not that there can be only one first cause. Meaning other things can exist in the universe, and something appears uncaused by anything within that universe. Meaning that the replacement of 'cause' with 'things' doesn't work.

I expected clear logic: Either all things have a prior cause for their existence, or there is at least one thing that does not.

This convoluted language stops me at the very beginning. — jgill

I gather it's intended to be something like

∀x∃yCyx ∨ ∃x¬∃yCyx

'For all x there is some y such that y caused x, or there is an x such that there is no y that caused x'.

it is valid. — Banno

Much appreciated Banno. He is correct.

I've done some searching and find that causality and causal chains is enormously complex, far more than I anticipated. — jgill

Which is fine, but how does that apply to the argument? I cover both finite and infinite chains. We don't have to have any specification as to what the finite or infinite chain looks like correct? So how does putting a chain into an equation challenge the point I've made?

This is what I dispute. You do not have the principles required to say "there is no other reason why it exists. You have your own reason for assuming a first cause, the logic you demonstrated and this produces your conclusion, that the reason for it is "It exists without prior cause", but you cannot be certain that this is the correct reason for it. — Metaphysician Undercover

You are misunderstanding my claim here. I'm defining what a first cause must be. Its just like defining what the term "first" means. I can give examples of what a "first" would be. Like "My first birthday", or "My first bike". There are limits to what "first" means, namely that its a situation which cannot have occurred prior. What I'm hearing you say is, "Yes, you claim its your first birthday at 1 years old, but how do you know you didn't have a birthday prior?" You're claiming that a "first cause" might have a prior cause. This doesn't make any sense.

Therefore unless you know that your logic (the logic which concludes the reason for the first cause is solely to be the first cause) is absolutely certain, without any flaws, then you are not justified in claiming this reason. — Metaphysician Undercover

I believe this is so. I've clearly defined what a first cause would be correct? Its the "first" cause. Not a second. Not a follow up. There is no prior thing which causes itself to exist. As such, logically, there can be no influence that determines why it should or should not exist prior to its existence.

And, I've already shown you that your treatment of infinite regress and the eternal circle is flawed, so I think you ought to also accept that your reason for the first cause is also flawed. — Metaphysician Undercover

You may not understand what I was doing then. I was noting, "If infinite regression exists." If you rule out infinite regression entirely (which I don't mind, I don't think it can exist either) then the point I'm making stands without question.

This cause, the "first cause", has an essential difference, it is not known directly by inductive reasoning, but by deductive logic, which makes it necessary. Therefore what you call "the only difference" is a very significant difference, which makes the two types of causes categorically distinct, one type contingent, the other necessary. — Metaphysician Undercover

Agreed.

You've lost me here. How is it different?
— Philosophim

It is different because causation in the causal chain is defined by empirical observations, and inductive principles. Being an inductive generalization, the causes must be all of the same type, by the defining principles, to be placed in the same category. That there is a prior cause to any contingent cause is a defining feature. If it was not a defining feature we would not have the appearance of infinite regress. The "first cause" does not have this defining feature, therefore it cannot be placed in that category, it must be a distinct type of cause. However, it is still a "cause" in some sense because it has a similar type of effect, which allows you to make it part of, the base for, the causal chain. Therefore we need to allow for the reality of at least two distinct types of "cause". — Metaphysician Undercover

I also agree here. What I don't agree on is how this difference is anything but the fact that a first cause cannot be explained by a prior cause.

The reason for the first cause is its own existence simply being.
— Philosophim

That's your reason for the first cause, but you may be wrong. — Metaphysician Undercover

By definition, I cannot be wrong. I cannot claim I had a first birthday one year after my birth then say, "I might be wrong."

When you say " A first cause can have no other cause besides itself", this is not a sound conclusion. What the logic shows is that the first cause cannot have a "cause" in the same sense of "cause" as in the causal chain. — Metaphysician Undercover

The only difference between a first cause and a normal cause is that a first cause cannot have something prior which explains its existence. That's it. Meaning by definition, there can be no other cause which explains its existence.

You are simply not accepting the reality that the first cause could have a "cause" in another sense of the word "cause", a different type of cause. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, I'm rejecting the contradiction of what you are claiming. A first cause cannot have another cause that explains it by definition. If you want to explain to me why there isn't a contradiction, please demonstrate how its not a contradiction for someone to claim that having a first birthday one year after giving birth, doesn't necessarily mean they didn't have a prior birthday.

Great points Bob, this is where we can get into the discussion in earnest.

The hypothetical here, to carve it out even more precisely (to avoid confusion), is that working in my garage making model airplanes has more moral worth than me working on a cure for cancer, under your view, IF my productivity in the former is greater than the latter. No? — Bob Ross

Yes, an excellent question. One thing to remember is that the human being themself is not removed from morality, they are part of it. Meaning we have to consider the long term self-sustainment of the person as well. Not everyone is able or willing to work on curing cancer. Further its questionable how much such a person could do in their garage at this point. Modeling planes may be the happiness and relaxation they need to perform well at their job at work.

A hydrogen atom is a hydrogen atom. A helium atom is a helium atom. Let them each be what they are. That is what creates more existence. Yes, its better to have the potential for the two to join together at times, but we still need free hydrogen and helium atoms as well for optimal existence. They are valuable on their own as well as together. The point is a person should consider what they are, and be the best version of that self they can be which does not destroy themselves in the process.

Now, if you're asking a hypothetical in which there exists a person who both loves model air planes and doing cancer research equally, the answer is different. Perhaps doing either refreshes them and sustains them equally. Further, the person has the capability to actually contribute to the cure. It does seem on the surface then that doing the cancer research would be better. It all depends on the context.

Considering such contexts are difficult to assess, we can go by the guidance that we should allow people the easiest way forward to contribute the most they can to society in a way that is also self-fulfilling. I think few would disagree with that.

Same to you, my friend! I always enjoy our conversations, and I commend your creative thinking. It truly is a rare skill and gift in this world (: — Bob Ross

I appreciate it! To my earlier point, I had the option of playing a video game or answering your point. I chose this instead. Both give me happiness and I think doing this is a little better. :)

Not that semantics matters, but ‘act-consequentialism’ is not the view that one should maximize human good (as that’s a form of utilitarianism) but, rather, the analysis of what is right or wrong in relation to which act has foreseeable consequences which maximizes the desired goal. — Bob Ross

I would say this is fair. It is a direct mathematical comparison to demonstrate what set of existence is greater. Since it is math, the difference is that it is not the opinion of an individual as to what must be done, but something that can be questioned and tested. Moral guidelines are estimates and can change based on context, and anyone could demand more than an estimate if they thought this was inadequate.

I think the main issue I see with your view, at its core, is that it is about creating more identifiable entities in reality and not producing better conditions for life — Bob Ross

I think that's because you believe that these things are in competition with one another, when in reality they are not. Creating more identifiable entities in reality while producing better conditions for life is what is optimum. Many traditional views of morality are often very binary and seem to demand sacrifice. As if suffering for something greater is admirable. When this is correct is only in circumstances in which we have no other choice, or a zero sum situation. The most moral case is to ensure we create great things without suffering or personal sacrifice where possible.

To your point on destruction: destruction, like construction, can temporarily bring a heightened set of existence. Sometimes destruction produces something greater over time than if there was never destruction at all. Just like an atom has the potential to become a molecule, a molecule still has the potential to become atoms again. While we may not personally want the molecule to ever break down, the potential for it to do so is a part of overall existence.

The question then becomes, "When is destruction good?" As noted before, its all about preserving the homeostasis of overall existence. The reason why predators are moral is because they limit the overall destruction of herbivores multiplying too much and destroying all plant life. Sometimes old dead wood must be burned away in a forest to ensure a massive fire doesn't start and burn the whole thing down. Cancer in the body must be destroyed for the body to live. When we destroy something lesser to ensure the continuation of something greater, we have moral destruction. I view the continuation of existence like a sin wave on a graph more than a straight line. It ebbs and flows but hopefully continues to trend upward over time.

So what exactly counts here? You say material and expressive existences, but the more I think about it the more hazy those conceptions really are (to me). If by material existence you mean fundamental entities, then we don’t know of any. Atoms aren’t fundamental, and neither are quarks; and, even if they were, counting those should be roughly equal in a destroyed society vs. one in perfect health. — Bob Ross

Material existence is fundamental existence. So for example, lets say that it was possible that an 'atom' could be erased from existence and never reformed again. This would be evil, as all further expressions and potential would be eliminated permanently. Fortunately for us, we have not yet discovered the fundamental building blocks of the universe, nor are we able to destroy said blocks. Even then, if some destruction of fundamental existence were needed prolong the rest of fundamental existence, it would be a necessary sacrifice.

So for our purposes, it is not material existence that we are concerned about, but expressions of, and potential expressions of existence. The patterns for lower expressions existence apply to us as well. Create as many stable and long term expressions of existence over time as possible.

Now you mention a scenario in which it may be possible that destroying a society would be the right thing to do. The key here is we have to realize that claims of what should be done are contextual to the situation. Yes, we have an overall stable set of mathematical conclusions that work, but that must be applied to the specific situation. So if you imagine a good and stable society being destroyed as moral, you must show that something far greater will appear in its place, making up for all the destruction and lives lost.

One example we can probably give is the destruction of Nazi Germany. If a society strongly violates its moral obligation to individuals, and itself seeks to destroy other societies for short term gain, then it is an evil society. Societies which seek to empower its citizens potential, as well as empower other countries who do not seek to destroy each other creates a much better long term set of existence then something like Nazi Germany.

That being said, it doesn't mean that a good society should naturally intend to destroy an evil society either. A much better alternative would be reformation, or change from within. Destruction of a society does not necessitate that something positive will be built in its place. Only when a destructive society threatens to destroy others without intent, and actual reality of improving the world should it be taken down.

This segues into another worry I have, which is that it is not clear what kinds of identifiable entities you are wanting to consider morally worthy of obtaining: is it any? — Bob Ross

No, because it is contextual to the situation. We follow particular guidelines, and then would ask someone to clearly demonstrate through math why they believe an action meets or violates the guidelines when there is resistance or questions. For example, the death penalty. In general ending a life is a tall order. The existence which must be made up for it needs to equal the remaining potential of that person's remaining life. Is there a way to restrict the evil they can do instead? Sometimes yes, sometimes no.

The more resources and power a society has, the more it can expend on restrictions and reformation instead of elimination. Societies with low power and resources often cannot afford prisons or lengthy amounts of time on such endeavors, and may need to simply eliminate threats for their survival. Thus we can see how the death penalty makes more sense 500 years ago in a small village where famine is a real threat, whereas in a wealthy and powerful society like America it seems less reasonable.

If, on the other hand, we extend our definitions to be more colloquial, by just claiming material is whatever is the most fundamental within the context (the most primitive building block in the context) and expressive as the interactions between those materials, then I am not seeing how a healthy society has more expressions of existence than a destroyed one. — Bob Ross

People expressing a society are like atoms expressing as molecules. Its the same pattern repeated again and again. Its not that there couldn't be a situation in which a destroyed society is somehow better than it existing (like Nazi Germany), but in general its better for there to be molecules that exist than just atoms as our calculations showed. Taken without any consideration of the quality of the society, as long as the society is not actively reducing overall existence, it allows for more interactions than not having any at all.

As a clear example of what I mean, imagine an organism which had superior neural networks, and consequently processing power, than a human but wasn’t capable of having a mind—i.e.., a super-computer made out of organic material like what we are comprised of, but no mind. It very well may be the case that this super-computer non-subject is capable of much more expressive existence than a human being—e.g., perhaps for every 10 years of a human’s activities (of expressions), the super-computer non-subject organism produces 10x that in sheer neural network power of computations. According to you, this super-computer is morally worth more, all else being equal, to a human being. — Bob Ross

This is correct. Sorry, we as individuals are not the end all be all in the universe. We are a part. An extremely moral part! We don't even need to consider a super computer as we have societies. Plenty of people die to ensure that societies are preserved. Or sometimes your limb gets gangrene and it must be sacrificed to preserve the rest of the body. Again, the ideal is for both of us to exist together. You're still thinking only in terms of zero sum situations. The reality is, a zero sum decision is not the situation we're often in, and we do not often need to be in. The ideal is the existence of both co-existing together.

Same thing with non-life. Is an adult human more complex, full of more expressive existences, than a hurricane? I am not sure, and I don’t even see, in principle, how you could make that calculation. — Bob Ross

It would be a difficult calculation for sure. I don't have all of the answers Bob, just a beginning set of rules and calculations. If my theory were true, or at least found merit in consideration, I'm quite sure it would become a field of study which we would be researching for centuries. Following the general rules, its difficult to know. Are hurricanes a form of destruction that creates more existence overall than if they never existed? Will that existence be more than whatever existence the individual would create over the remainder of their life? I don't know the answer. I can say that since we cannot calculate the overall resulting existence of a hurricane, nor can we currently stop one if we wanted, its a moot point. I think what is most helpful is discussing things we can calculate, and situations we have control over.

Alright! This has been fun. Continue to critique where you see it. Feel free at this point to bring in other moral considerations, theories, etc. Perhaps I should introduce the morality of art as it may help to understand how overall existence does not simply apply to humanity alone. Let me know!

secondly that it must fit into your definition of random - i.e. the atom can decay into a refrigerator. — EricH

That still does not explain a first cause. An atom decaying into a refrigerator would have a prior cause of the atom's existence. Its really just the case of nothing, then something.

While the decay of an atom is not random per your definition, if is completely and totally random with respect to the time at which it decays. It could decay 10 seconds from now or 10 billion years from now - but there is no prior event which determines when this happens. — EricH

The first part is true. The second part has no evidence that it is true. The second must be proven to be true, not believed or assumed because we cannot currently see the exact moment before decay occurs.

This is not a matter of lack of knowledge or our inability to measure something. — EricH

No, it is. Look, the quantum mechanics scale is so difficult to measure that our very measurements affect the outcome. Its a ton of estimation and probability combined with limited measurements. In no way would any quantum physicist ever state that our calculations are based on absolute precision measurements and a full understanding of the exact location of electrons and quarks.

In the interest of completeness it should be noted that there are still a small number of folks in the scientific community who are trying to keep some notion of causality alive - but at best causality is on life support. — EricH

I have had this notion told to me only by people on these boards. I have not heard of any scientists who are peddling this notion. Causality is alive and well in science. I would require of examples that show causality is not useful or used instead of broad and unbacked accusations like this.

Good conversation EricH, the last word does not mean I'm correct, it just means we've reached the end of where we can go. :)

This notion of first cause being the existence of the chain is no more than interesting speculation. When I speak of a chain receding to infinity that doesn't leave much to grasp at philosophically, so one resorts to the "being" of the chain , like yanking on an emergency cord. — jgill

I really wish you would stop demeaning the post without anything but a deriding opinion. I have answered your questions and critiques, so I would like a little more respect for what I've written here. Either demonstrate the argument is false, or not.

What I find in metaphysics is logical demonstrations as to why this idea of "a chain receding to infinity" is unrealistic. — Metaphysician Undercover

I also agree, but I decided to take an approach of, "What if it was real?" Turns out it still results in a first cause so the idea of infinite prior causality is moot.

That a first cause is necessary may be proven logically, but it does not follow that there can be no reason for the first cause. — Metaphysician Undercover

Oh, I never claimed that there was no reason for a first cause. The reason for a first cause is that, "It exists without prior cause." Meaning that there is no other reason for why it exists. If there is no other reason for its existence, there cannot be any rule which made it come into being. Meaning the only logical conclusion is that its existence is truly random as I've defined above.

Because of this difference we must class it as categorically different from all the other causes in that causal chain, and the same for all the other causal chains. In other words, the "first cause" does not abide by the inductive (general) principles by which we describe all the other causes of causal chains, it cannot be observed to have a cause, therefore we must categorize it separately. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, its category is merely the first right? Categorizing it or naming it differently doesn't make it any different from what I've noted. The only difference is that it does not have a prior cause. Trying to overcomplicate it doesn't change what it is.

You say that the first cause is not explained by anything other than itself, but this claim is not justified. What is justified is that there is no cause for the first cause, "cause" being as described in the sense of the causal chain. But now we've determined a different type of "cause". — Metaphysician Undercover

You've lost me here. How is it different? If something is not caused by something else, how is my claim not justified? I hear the claim, but I'm not seeing the evidence or reasoning. The first cause is something which is not explained by something else, but is a cause when it interacts with other existences forming the normal chain of causality we understand. Its not different besides the fact that it is an uncaused existence.

Since we have now determined the reality of a different type of cause, there is nothing to indicate that there cannot be any reason for the first cause, the first cause being a completely different type of cause itself. Therefore there could be a reason for the first cause, that reason being a type of cause which is other than a "cause" as described in the causal chain. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, there is no reason that this follows. The reason for the first cause is its own existence simply being. If you have another cause 'cause' a first cause, its not a first cause. This is a clear contradiction Metaphysical.

What this means is that it is not predictable in the same way that other causes are predictable. But this does not imply that it is not predictable in an absolute way. — Metaphysician Undercover

Can you explain why? I've presented a clear argument why it is absolutely not predictable which I'll post again. The reason why patterns, rules, and laws happen is because there is a solid reason besides itself. A reason that does not involve itself, is a cause that is separate from itself. A first cause can have no other cause besides itself. There can be no outside constraint that forces it to be. There can be no outside constraint that forces it not to be. It simply is. Thus it is completely unpredictable and not constrained by any outside cause.

If you say its not absolutely random, how? What is causing it to not be absolutely random? That's the question that you'll have to answer without introducing another cause.

Once we start to identify the real existence of first causes, we may start to understand that they have patterns of occurrence, and that they are, through some mathematical principles, predictable. That there is not a cause for their occurrence, in the sense that "cause" is used to describe the causal chain, does not imply that their occurrence is absolutely unreasonable. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is almost true. First, first causes will never be predictable no matter how much we study them. Study assumes that what is consistent today will be consistent tomorrow. The appearance of a first cause can never be consistent, because some other cause was making it consistent. It would be consistent if it just happened to appear consistent.

Now what I have done in other posts is compared the likelihood of a first cause appearing based on the limitations of space and time. I do not promise that my math is perfect at all and I was hoping for someone to give their own take on it, but it seems that we can use cardinality to demonstrate that first causes would most likely be small. If anything can happen in a cube of space, there is a much higher degree of cardinality that something would appear within in a slice of that cube than the cube itself. I can go into more detail next time if you wish, but we need to settle the point of absolute randomness first.

Back to the point, no amount of study will ever show a first cause to be consistent, because the definition of a first cause prevents there from being any other cause which would constraint it to consistency.

Therefore you do not have the premises required to conclude that the first cause is not caused by anything. It may just be caused by a different type of cause. — Metaphysician Undercover

This right here is the crux. No, this is a contradiction. A first cause cannot, by definition, be caused by another cause.

Taking this example, "the big bang", we trace the causal chain to that event, and as you say, we determine it to be a "first cause". This does not imply that there is "nothing prior to the big bang. — Metaphysician Undercover

No. If it is proven and determined to be a first cause, and it is a first cause, there is nothing prior to the big bang. That's the definition. Anything which has a prior cause does not meet the criterion of a first cause.

Knowledge isn't truth; it is applied when someone has discovered the truth. — Ludwig V

I've written my own viewpoints on knowledge that I've developed over years here if you're interested. https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/14044/knowledge-and-induction-within-your-self-context/p1 There's a summary by the immediate next poster that nails the paper 100%, so feel free to check it out if you're curious.

And further questions will develop. And people will call all of these things causes. You can insist they are not, but that won't affect the process. — Ludwig V

I don't think I'm asserting anything as a first cause that would later be found to have a prior cause. Claiming something is a first cause is not a trivial task. It must be proven, and proving such a thing is rather difficult. I think my points greatly reduce the need to label something as a first cause, and I am for sure not asserting that anything in our universe that we know of should be labeled as a first cause. I do not believe the Big Bang is an actual first cause, I was simply using it as a hypothetical in examples to remove a bit of abstraction from the overall points.

It seems like you are saying that the best action to take is the one that maximizes material and expressive existences in the longest foreseeable future, is that right? — Bob Ross

Correct.

Spikes of existence that don't negatively impact steady and constant sets of existence. Explained above with the murderer. But if I want to go have a party with friends, the existence spikes up and is a good thing.

I don’t understand this one. So if I go in my garage and do a whole bunch of useless nonsense but technically it produces expressive existences and I don’t harm anyone doing it, then that is better than if I had done one productive thing that produced less expressive existences? — Bob Ross

Ah, you've made an unknowing contradiction here. That which is productive is something that is useful and good. If you go into the garage and produce something with overall less existence, then it is not as good as if you could have produced something with overall more existence. That which produces more positive existence is more productive than that which does not.

Assuming my responses here are accurate (to what you are conveying), then, yes, I think I understand and still think this is going to lead to all sorts of counter-intuitive conclusions; but I am waiting until we get to your analysis of a reality with life in it first (; — Bob Ross

Thank you Bob, you truly are a great thinker and once again I am delighted to have someone of your caliber to speak with! I know its a lot to ask and yet you patiently have awaited these points.

It sounds like you are holding straight up act-consequentialism, but I could be wrong. — Bob Ross

I don't believe it is. For one, act-consequentialism is about maximizing human good, whereas this is about maximizing existence. Lets call it existentialism. :) If we can evaluate two different outcomes and note that outcome B is more moral than outcome A, and with equal effort we could choose either A or B, it would be more more to choose B. But what is we calculate B is more moral, but we simply didn't have all of the information that A was more moral. In such a case it was still more moral to choose B with the information we had. But on to building up to humanity now.

So why is humanity special. Its not. Humanity is part of the entire totality of existence in the universe. There are two things though that make humanity special and more of a condensed higher existence than the rest of the universe.

1. Expansive Intelligent
2. They are a social species.

Intelligence can be defined in many ways. At its most basic, intelligence is the speed at which neurons process to obtain conclusions. The 'expanse' of an intelligent being is that which it is able to process. We could have an intelligent ant that processes responses much faster than other ants, but its expanse is limited to chemical processing for signals and basic survival. Most life has a much more limited expanse than humanity. Many creatures simply react to outside stimulus with the goal of preserving their existence, and nothing more. No long term planning, or contemplation beyond self-existence.

What's interesting about an expanse is that there is something which to our knowledge, does not form in normal chemical reactions or flat matter, consciousness. Consciousness is like its own world, an ability not only to exist, but to recognize to some extent its own existence. As consciousness expands, it can envision a world ahead of its actions, and attempt to make the world its own actions. As we have noted in the prior patterns, anytime a brand new identity of existence is formed, it factorially explodes in its ability to potentially interact with other existences. Consciousness is essentially a simulation of material reality, and at a bare minimum, doubles the potential existence of the reality it will interact with in its lifetime.

Humanity is special in that it has the most expansive intelligence of all creatures that we know of. It can consider and enact its interactions with the universe far beyond any other living thing. It can access chemical and physical structures of the universe that other living things can only dream of. It can potentially comprehend its moral place in the universe, and act on it. It can finally get away from pure reactions and random chance, and shape the universe into a much more existent place that what a less expansive being can do.

But it doesn't stop there. Even an absolute genius is limited in what they can do as a singular person. This is where the social aspect of humanity explodes even further. Just like the pattern of a multi-celled vs single celled creature, the potential and expressed existence compounds once again. This should be self-evident at this point, so unless this needs to be proved, I will leave this for now to move onto how we can construct morality to optimize humanity within the totality of existence.

As we can see, humanity as a species can be extremely moral as long as it follows some basic patterns.

1. It must be indefinitely self-sustaining. So no using up all the resources so everything dies or bombing everything to destruction for some short term gains.

2. It must not unnecessarily destroy other self-sustaining things, or lives. Unnecessary destruction would be destruction that does not involve reasoned self-preservation. Killing a bug because its in your house spreading disease and its impossible to catch is not the same as being outside and killing a benign bug for the delight of hearing it pop.

The moral precepts of humanity must balance the two points that make humanity special. The individuals potential and expressed existence vs societies potential and expressed existence.

Per the individual, they should follow the same basic pattern that is repeated in moral existence. Self-sustain, do no unnecessary decreasing of existence, and work to expand one's own expression and potential existence where possible.

Notice that expanding one's potential and expressed existence should not come at the expense of self-sustainment. If someone were to take a drug that could heighten their emotions and senses for a few hours, but took years off of their overall life, this would be immoral. If one sacrificed their overall health and well being to accomplish something for themselves alone, this would also be immoral (assuming no affect on society here)

This is a moral guidance for the individual. This can come into conflict with the moral guidance for a society, which is where some of the debate over moral laws comes into play. A society as well must follow the same guidance as everything else. Self-sustainment, and not unnecessarily destroying other lives. Thus a good society should seek to preserve and assist the individuals within it with their moral guides as well. Prolonging a healthy life that encourages individuals to reach their highest expressed and potential existence as possible.

With this general approach and our understanding of an existential morality, we can now examine moral laws in society and understand the reasoning behind them, as well as more carefully evaluate if they are optimal.

First, lets examine vices, or the seven deadly sins that are largely agreed as immoral across cultures.

Gluttony - An excessive consumption of food or resources. This one is self-explanatory. Gluttony in the individual results in a destruction of one's health, impacting both self-sustainment and potential expression. In a society gluttony can burn through limited resources leaving other individuals to be mal-nourished or die.

Prostitution or fornication - With our knowledge of sexual diseases, as well as a history of humanity that had limited resources and little to no birth control, this makes sense. Creating a child without a stable family is less optimal than creating a child with one. Children take immense effort and resources to raise to their potential, and having a child out of wedlock can result in either the mother or the child suffering excessively and ultimately dying.

As humanity has advanced in birth control and has the ability to handle such cases, fornication and prostitution are less of a moral challenge. If one can have sexual intercourse without risk of disease or accidental birth, and it does not impact one's ability to one day have a stable family and children, little wrong can be seen in this. Again though, if such actions produced abuse, neglect, unstable families, and unwanted children, this would still be considered a sin.

Greed - Not much different from gluttony. I'll add that wanting excessive resources for yourself costs time and energy that does not result in more production and use of those resources, just hoarding. If you have spare resources that are completely unneeded, it would be better to give those to other people who need them.

Envy - Envy is sadness at another person's moral success. It is self-evident why this is a sin.

Wrath - Excessive anger and the destruction of things for one's own pleasure. This is different from anger, which is a natural emotion that can be channeled for a productive outcome. Wrath is about destruction for destruction's sake. It does not care about the end result beyond its own satisfaction. This destroys community in society, and violates the core precepts of existential morality.

Sloth - When a person does nothing with their existence beyond basic self-sustaining. Self-evident.

Vanity - An excessive value of one's self-worth over others. As there is a moral instinct that higher existence is more valuable than lower existence if there comes a time where only one can exist, vanity is a lie to oneself that one is more valuable than they are. This ignores the reality of one's moral decisions and will result in an overall loss of existence.

Pride or Hubris - An excessive value of one's own self-worth. I believe the difference between this and vanity is vanity is specifically comparing oneself to others, while pride only involves the self.

Alright, this is enough to cover for now! Let me know what you think Bob.

Hey Metaphysician, I'll address your second post as well. I see it bleeds into my other response to you, so I'll try to address anything that was left out of my reply.

There are no constraints prior to it coming into being, there are constraints after it comes into being.
— Philosophim

This is incorrect, as demonstrated by my argument, there necessarily is constraints prior to its coming into being. "Constraints after it comes into being" doesn't even make sense. If the constraints only exist after the cause, then they have no capacity to act as constraints on the cause. — Metaphysician Undercover

Let me give an example so I can clarify. Imagine our photon again. Now a photon is a photon because of what it is and how it reacts to other existences. In other words, a photon doesn't suddenly produce a million dollar bills at its location. It also doesn't start talking or turn into an eggplant. It has rules, restrictions, and laws based on what it is.

So there is no rule as to what should appear as a first cause without referring backwards from any chain. Meaning if I'm staring at a blank area of the universe, there's no prediction as to what could appear as a first cause. But once that first cause appears, it is what it is. And what a thing is, is defined by rules based on its makeup and the way it consistently interacts with other things in the universe. The status of 'first cause' lasts for only one time tick in the universe. Once a second tick happens the cause of the existence of the thing at the second time tick is the existence of the thing at the first time tick.

Or, taken together as a set of infinite regressive causality, the first cause is the entire set itself. There is nothing prior. But if the first set made a second set, the second set is not a first cause, it is actually subsumed under the first set, as its a continuation of causality. A first cause is extremely literal and simple. "That which is not caused by anything else besides the fact of it existing."

In other words, your idea of an absolutely unconstrained "cause" is self-contradicting, because the concept of "cause" has constraints inherent within it. if you want to talk about a completely, or absolutely, unconstrained act, this act cannot be known as a "cause" in the common sense which relates "cause" to "effect", because that completely unconstrained act could not be said to have an "effect", effect being described in terms of "change". — Metaphysician Undercover

So to clarify, it is not self-contradicting. A first cause is defined as something which has no prior cause. If you are setting up a situation in which there must necessarily be a prior cause, then you aren't talking about a first cause. If a photon comes into the universe unbidden by anything, it is uncaused. From that moment on while it exists, it is then part of the chain of causality formed by that first initial formation.

Your proposal of things to imagine as examples of first cause are all constrained by what is described in the terms of the examples, therefore those proposed "first causes" are actually constrained. In reality, if you can imagine it, then what you are imagining is the effects of the supposed "first cause" on the preexisting constraints, therefore constraint is implied by the image. So your requirement of no constraints is nonsense. This is what makes "first cause" as you propose, completely unimaginable, incomprehensible, unintelligible, and self-refuting nonsense. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm not seeing this. These are all examples of potential first causes, not assertions that they are first causes. What I'm noting is that because a first cause has no prior causation for its existence, there can be no constraints on its initial existence. Now this is only if we have no causal chain to examine. If we have a causal chain, we can work its way back up and see specifically what the first cause of that chain is. Once a first cause appears, it is constrained by its causal influence on reality. So while I'm noting that there is nothing that constrains what a first cause could potentially be, I'm not stating that any specific first cause that does exist, could potentially be something it is not.

For example, if the big bang is the actual first cause of existence in the universe, then we can trace physics back to it, and attempt to demonstrate conclusively that there is nothing prior to the big bang. It doesn't mean that we can trace physics back to the big bang and then randomly claim, "It was actually a little bang".

But, lets say suddenly another universe appears out of nowhere and we have no causal chain to work up to. The first cause of that universe could potentially be anything. The actuality of what it is can in theory be discovered. But there was no rule that necessitated that universe appear at all, or that the first cause had show up right there. Does that clear up the issue?

Careful, now. If you say the Big Bang is the known starting-point of universal creation, you are saying, not only that it is the starting-point of universal creation, but that we know that it is. — Ludwig V

Oh, let me clarify the way I define of knowledge. Knowledge is not truth to me. It is a tool we use to best assess what is most likely to be true with the observations and reason we have at the time. Meaning what is known can change without issue to me depending on context and tools. So I am in agreement with you. :)

There is an issue with your theory. You sweep everything up into one classification, and brush aside the variety and difference in the concepts of causation under one term.
But it is no more significant that the conclusion that something exists, which neglects the differences between rainbows and trees, numbers and lines, arguments and theories, myths and fables, and all the rest of the many different kinds of object - and hence different kinds of existence (and of logic) that also exist. We have Aristotelian causes, Newtonian causes, Einsteinian causes, Quantum causes, not mention reasons for action, premises and conclusions in mathematical arguments. — Ludwig V

The subdivision and different interpretations of general causality into specifics is done for different purposes. I'm using general causality because I want to end a debate that's been going on far too long. Is there a first cause. Yes. Done. Does this note that there must be a specific first cause? No, it can be anything we could imagine, but once in reality it is part of the chain of causality and can be found with evidence and proof. Done.

That's the problem that's trying to be solved. And I believe it is. It doesn't need a subdivision or a reexamination of causality beyond the simple and basic understanding all of us know. If causality exists, logically there must be a first cause. Its not about creating something interesting, its about solving a problem I see in philosophy, and giving a strong base for other ideas to be built on.

I appreciate your contribution Ludwig, its nice to see intelligent and friendly replies and critiques that understand what's being stated here.

to be giving Philosophim some difficulty, the relationship between the first cause, and the resulting causal chain. In the descriptions, or definitions which Philosophim provides, there appears to be some ambiguity as to whether the first cause is part of the chain, or something separate from the chain. — Metaphysician Undercover

Then this I need to be clearer. The idea is that a first cause is not separate from the chain but is part of the chain, or the chain itself. A first cause is not explained by anything outside of itself, therefore must be explained by itself, and is the start of its impact on causality.

These are the principles laid out by Aristotle in the cosmological argument. A "cause" (in the modern sense which corresponds with Aristotelian efficient cause) is a contingent event. This means that it consists of two parts, the temporally prior potential for the event, and the posterior actuality, after the event. The "contingency" is due to the fact that the prior potential is always a potential for a multitude of possible events, and the resulting actuality is the one particular event which actually occurs. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't use this definition because I do not believe, except in cases of first cause, that there is a potential difference in outcomes. There is a difference between our inability to measure and predict, and real randomness as I've noted.

Now, if we ignore the "contingency" aspect and represent the causal chain as a simple cause precedes effect model, in a determinist way, then we effectively remove the "potential" from the model. One actual state precedes another actual state, and this determinist representation provides no real principle whereby we could say that the potential for an event precedes its actual occurrence, all there is is another actual event as cause. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, this is the way it is. Of course, if you disagree with this, that is of course your choice. I have never seen real randomness proved in science, only an inability to measure properly. The conclusion that a first cause logically exists only works with the idea that that everything is deterministic except first causes. By the way, I like your previous idea that first causes can influence the brain. If it is the case that we had very tiny things popping into existence all over the place constantly, it could very well apply a real randomness to outcomes as they bounce against the chemistry of the brain. But this is the only way randomness, according to the definitions I've provided, could ever come into the universe.

Yes, I agree. But that means whenever we think we have found a first cause, we must ask ourselves whether that is due to the limitations of our tools and evidence or to it really being a first cause. I would always bet on the former. Under what circumstances could I confidently bet on the latter? Given the ingenuity and determination human beings have displayed over the last 400 or 500 years, I can't imagine any. — Ludwig V

I largely agree. The logic points out that there must be a first cause, but it does not make any claim as to what that first cause might be. There are SEVERAL difficulties in proving a first cause. I'll list just one.

To keep it simple, imagine a photon appeared as a first cause right now. The thing is, it could also appear with momentum considering that there are no constraints on what a first cause could be. As such, if we were to find that photon we would assume because it has velocity, that something else caused that velocity. The more reasonable conclusion based off of our previous knowledge, is that we simply didn't find exactly what started the velocity of the photon.

In fact, it is possible that all of creation only happened five minutes ago, but we have all of our memories and observations that lead us to think its billions of years old. So even if we stumbled upon a situation in which there was a first cause, if the first cause appeared in such a way that would lead us to believe something else caused it, we would have no logical choice but to assume something else caused it.

This means there must be a VERY specific situation to prove something is a first cause. To my mind, the only thing I can think of is a perfect and absolute vaccum, which I'm not sure is possible to make. As in, absolutely nothing must exist, then suddenly something would form into existence. Even then, we would be scouring to see if it was our own measurement tools that were the issue, as we should.

The point of the idea is to simply note what logically must be true, then think about what it would take to prove such a thing true. As we can tell, proving anything is a first cause is a nigh impossible undertaking. It doesn't mean we shouldn't keep the knowledge around in the back of our minds however. Maybe one day, we'll find something that fits the bill.

My point was that every time something like a first cause or brute fact has been found, we have redefined (or perhaps better "re-invented") the concept of "cause" and carried on. — Ludwig V

This time there is no re-invention needed. We have a clear definition of what it is, and what it would take to prove it exists. The Big Bang for example would be changed to, "The known starting point of universal creation" instead of "The first cause of creation".

I will reply more later today, I'm out of time for now.

So it is not that the soul is a first cause, nor strictly speaking, is free will itself the first cause, but there are first causes, and the soul is able to utilize them for its purposes toward effecting change in the world. The reality of the free will is what provides us evidence that there are first causes, and the evidence is that the soul is using first causes toward its goals. The soul itself is not a first cause, but the soul has free will, and the free will requires first causes for its existence. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is an interesting idea, but interesting ideas are not proof. With the idea of first causes, anyone can propose an equally competitive idea. For example, I could just say that a God created souls, and souls create free will. Or I could say there are no souls and free will is deterministic. All these claims require proof now. You must prove without a doubt that something is a first cause.

Your description of a soul using first causes needs specifics. How can a soul channel something which the soul would not know would exist? After all, first causes are 100% unpredictable, and could be anything. So what you're really stating is that there are very specific first causes that follow very specific rules that pop into reality every time we make a choice. That doesn't make any sense or line up to the complete randomness of a first cause. So its an interesting idea, but logically doesn't make sense, let alone without proof.

So the issue of constraints is not relevant, as I said above. The soul has free will, and it is free because of the reality of uncaused causes which are happening within the living body, but the soul is still constrained by the physical reality of that body at the same time. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, it is entirely relevant. A constraint, by definition, is caused by something. You cannot have a restrained first cause. Its a contradiction.

I've read similar articles already. The point I made about reflex was to demonstrate your illogical use of that article. That some human actions are reflex, does not mean that all human actions are reflex. That is my analogous example. Likewise, that some decisions occur in the way indicated in the article, does not imply that all decision occur in this way. So the article doesn't provide any point to argue, it's like someone arguing that since some human actions are by reflex, therefore free will is not real. — Metaphysician Undercover

Let me clarify my point then. My point is that we have evidence that some decisions of the brain are caused prior to conscious awareness. Meaning something caused you to make a decision. Does that mean all causes are? Not necessarily. But there must be evidence that this is so, not merely a claim that it is so. Since we have evidence that some choices are clearly causal, we cannot easily claim that some other choices are not.

I don't see any relevance here. We are talking about the free will act which rolls the die, and how this act utilizes first causes, we are not talking about the action of the die rolling after being thrown. — Metaphysician Undercover

Sure, the relevance is that 'randomness' is not random. It has clear causal constraints. The only truly thing that would be random is the existence of a first cause. There can be no restraints on what is possible or what should or should not happen.

I don't agree with this. I do not think that you understand the relationship between first causes and constraints.

The first cause comes into being without any reason for its existence, as you say, but it comes into being into an already existing environment. It is not caused by that environment, nevertheless it comes into being in that environment. Therefore there are constraints which are prior to it, which necessarily limit (constrain) its coming into being as it does so, specifically the effect it will have. There are no constraints as to why it exists, but there are constraints as to what effect it will have. — Metaphysician Undercover

We're really close on agreement here. I've bolded the sentence, your conclusion, which does not follow from the rest of the premises that are correct.

There are no constraints prior to it coming into being, there are constraints after it comes into being. But what those constraints are cannot be predicted. Meaning it could be a photon, an explosion, or anything else you can imagine. What you're doing with free will is constraining what comes into existence as a first cause. Something that the soul can turn into free will, and that appears without prior cause that can somehow be molded by the soul without issue.

Just one of several problems here to think about is that free will is consistent. True randomness could be consistent for a time, but is unlikely to. Meaning that it most often should come and go if it were a first cause. You can't just claim a first cause anymore knowing what it is. You have to give evidence and prove it. Free will is a predictable constrained behavior within intelligent beings and brains. This is a far cry from being a first cause.

I think the existence of free will provides very good evidence of the reality of first causes. Look at all the causal chains which must come to an end within us, much of the energy we eat gets stored, so it turns passive. And all the causal chains of all information we absorb through sensation must come to an end if they do not cause a reflex. — Metaphysician Undercover

Causal chains do not end unless existence itself disappears. A causal chain is not a creation of measurement by people, it is the reality of X influences Y's outcome. Even the disappearance of an existence may cause an outcome elsewhere.

Again, you are misrepresenting the role of constraints. The uncaused cause comes into being without a cause, in the middle of preexisting constraints. The limitations, are not causal, they are only restrictions to the cause. So it is incorrect to say that the uncaused cause has no restraint on it. — Metaphysician Undercover

To be clear once again, there is no restriction on what can occur. Once it occurs, it of course has its own restrictions on what it is. The problem I'm seeing is that you're putting a restriction on what can occur in a very specific situation and place. That is not a first cause. Free will is very specific to intelligent beings and is consistent. This is evidence of prior causality, not it being a first cause.

To clarify with another example. Lets say a God did exist. Its appearance would be a first cause. But what makes up that God, and what that God does are all causal at that point. If that God found something that was uncaused in existence and used it, this would also be causal. The appearance of the first cause would of course not be caused, but anything done with that first cause would be causal.

It's simple logic. The uncaused caused cannot have an effect (therefore it cannot be "a cause") unless there is something already existing which it will have an effect on. Therefore it necessarily comes into an existing environment. And the already existing thing which the uncaused cause has an effect on, will be a constraint to the uncaused cause. Therefore the uncaused cause will necessarily be constrained. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, I am confirming that you understood this perfectly! I'm just pointing out that you're drawing incorrect conclusions from this that necessitate free will is a first cause.

A hypothetical chain going back to infinity doesn't have to have a first cause. — jgill

No, it is the first cause. Its entire existence is uncaused by anything prior.

I would prefer more emphasis on the chain itself and its origin than on what comes before its origin. — jgill

That's exactly what this is. If the universe is infinitely regressive, why? Logically there is no causal explanation besides the fact it simply is. Meaning all the rest of the logic flows.

The first cause must have an effect on the causal chain it initiates. Therefore, by definition, it is an element of that chain and not something prior and abstract. — jgill

Exactly.

Although you are not being theological here, your assertion is equivalent to the existence of God. — jgill

Its really not. Its the assertion that eventually we necessarily reach a point in causality where there is something which is not explained by something prior. This is something that is identifiable and testable. A far cry from a God.

I only wish this thread wasn't ultimately so existential and debatable. — jgill

Isn't that part of the fun though? Didn't you get to think about something new and different? Did you stretch your mind? Perhaps similar lines of thinking may do you well in your applications of theoretical math moving forward. I really do hope you enjoyed thinking about it.

From the free will perspective, such a relationship cannot be established, because there is another active force involved, that of the soul, and this active force actually ends and begins causal chains. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm not intending at all to debate the soul, so lets assume one exists. If free will comes from the soul, then free will is not a first cause. Is the soul a first cause then? For it to fit within a first cause it would need to be to be randomly created. There should be no reason a soul should or should not exist. Meaning that a God could not have created them. For if God created souls, then souls are not first causes. I just want you to be aware of this.

Even then, souls would be causing free will. So there's no real free will then either. If a soul is causing something, then it is constrained by rules and limitations. There is no limitation or rule as to what can be a first cause, but once its formed, it then causes other things. For example, lets say a photon appeared with no prior causality. It still acts like a photon once formed. It can be influenced, influence, etc. The only part that is a first cause is its appearance.

OK then, by your definition, "a first cause" is "truly random", not even omniscience could predict it. So, what I am arguing is that this is consistent with "free will" as a first cause, not even omniscience could predict it. — Metaphysician Undercover

To think about the issue, lets say then that a soul is not behind free will but free will is its own thing uncaused by anything else. To prove this, we would have to show that free will is limitless and unconstrained. Except there are a few things we find.

1. Free will is constrained to living things. Free will does not exist on its own in the universe.
2. Free will is constrained to certain biological functions like the brain and nerves. Unless you think your toes or rocks can have free will.
3. Free will shouldn't be contained or limited by intelligence, and yet it is. A roach does not have the same will as a human being.

All of these things refute the idea that free will is a first cause. There are clearly only certain areas where free will can form and is constrained by that biology.

Its actually been determined that people can make unconscious decisions up to 11 second prior to them being aware of it. https://qz.com/1569158/neuroscientists-read-unconscious-brain-activity-to-predict-decisions
— Philosophim

I don't see how this is relevant. If a type of decision can be made in this way, it does not imply that all decisions are made in this way. Many human acts for example, are shown to be simply reflexive, but this does not mean that all human acts are reflexive. — Metaphysician Undercover

You should read the article, its pretty interesting. Here's the second paragraph:

"Using the fMRI to monitor brain activity and machine learning to analyze the neuroimages, the researchers were able to predict which pattern participants would choose up to 11 seconds before they consciously made the decision. And they were able to predict how vividly the participants would be able to envisage it."

That's not a reflex, that's a choice.

Constraints do not necessarily lead to "a particular outcome", constraints limit the possibilities. Therefore your appeal to constraints in this context does nothing to imply that a free will act does not produce a first cause. — Metaphysician Undercover

Let me explain. Take a die roll. Can you roll a die and have a pink elephant appear? No. There are plenty of causes that explain the die roll. A '1' is a result because someone created the die to have a 1. It rolled because of the force of a human putting it into a cup, shaking it, and dropping it. It rattled because of gravity and reactions to force. It stopped moving because of friction. The die result is not a first cause. It is caused by many other forces and constraints.

A first cause has zero reason for its existence besides the fact that it exists. This means there can be no constraints as to what or why it exists. Of course, once it forms, its part of causality and may be limited. Once a thing lasts longer than a measure of time, it is no longer a first cause. At that second tick of time, it is caused by the previous tick in time. It is only at that first tick of time where nothing prior has formed, restricted, or influenced its appearance that it is a first cause.

As mentioned above, in my reply to Ludwig, I think this idea of "a sense of timing" is from a naive form of scientism, based in determinism. In reality there is probably thousands, or millions, of causally chains occurring in the brain at the same time, extremely rapidly, far beyond the brain's capacity to understand its own mechanics. — Metaphysician Undercover

I agree 100%. As we come to understand the basics of what I wrote, we realize that tons of chains interlink all over the place. A first cause is not an interlink though. It is the end of prior causality somewhere in that mess. While there logically must be at least one, there could be several. And each would be exceedingly difficult to prove. How to you prove that prior to a certain point, a "X" (variable) has no reason for its existence? There's always the question that we simply missed something with our instruments or understanding. Proving that there is no instrument or understanding that could show some prior cause is very difficult. While a first cause is logically necessary, proving that "X" is one is a very high bar.

We don't get to create the chain.
— Philosophim

As explained above, this is an unsound premise. You insist that the idea of a free will act being an uncaused cause cannot be accepted without prove, but the inverse principle holds just as well. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, this is not the case. A first cause necessitates that it be uncaused by something prior. If there is evidence at all that some other type of causality is in place, then a claim of a first cause fails. Here's one last nail in the coffin. Free will must respond to a stimulous, or choice. Do I go left, or right? What caused me to go left or right? One part of the prior cause is that I had an option to go left or right. Choices are necessarily caused by the limitations in front of us. Something which has no prior cause has no restraint as to what it must be.

And the vast multitude of causal chains which are active within the brain, in an extremely rapid way, make it very difficult to understand with any degree of certainty, whether some are actually beginning and ending there. If the causal chains are beginning within the brain, then we cannot say "we don't get to create the chain". — Metaphysician Undercover

An inability to understand something completely is not evidence of a first cause. Evidence of a first cause requires that there be no possible explanation for why "X" occurs. Our comprehension of it is irrelevant. Free will has too much evidence that it is constrained and influenced by other factors. Therefore it is not possible that free will is a first cause.

Few folk have ever held justified true belief to be both sufficient and necessary conditions for knowledge. Not even Socrates thought it adequate, and he is the fellow who developed it - describing it as a "wind-egg". Gettier just presented examples that undergraduates could understand. — Banno

I appreciate the history lesson. I was taking a stab in the dark. I probably shouldn't have. :)

Of course not. Suppose instead we observe such a chain in nature, imbedding it in our minds. It now exists in two realms. — jgill

I don't see any separation between realms, or a loss of causal connectivity. You observe, your mind stores the observation and definition as memory in your neurons. We can trace the causal chain from your first observation on. We are not separated in another realm.

Does an act of "measurement" affect FC? — jgill

No.

Suppose I create the chain. Am I the FC? Or are electro-chemical processes in the brain FCs? — jgill

We don't get to create the chain. We are not first causes. We can extend the chain into different branches. but we are not existences that formed without some prior causality. As you noted we are caused by other things such as a brain and body. Further, humans were caused by other things such as evolution. We aren't even close to the beginning of the chain.

Edit in case you reply before I finish:

Perhaps what you're asking is, "What would the necessary requirements be for a human to be a first cause?" Very simply you would not need to exist, then through no cause from anything else, appear whole as you are. From then on, you would be within causality, limited by what you are with the rest of the world around you.

In another case, its possible that you exist, and a photon appears in your body without any prior causality. That would be a first cause that then enters into the rest of the causal system within you. But you yourself would not be a first cause.

Suppose it is possible to describe each link in the chain. Is this description a first cause of the chain? It coincides with existence. Precedes it, actually. — jgill

No. What causes the description? The interaction between a human and the link. The chain exists despite our ability or inability to define it. If a tree falls in a forest and no one hears it, it still vibrates the air. :)

If a well-defined causal chain extending back in time has no beginning or has arbitrary beginnings, does it have a first cause? — jgill

Yes, the first cause is its existence. What is the reason why this infinitely regressive chain of causality exists? There is no prior cause for it, it simply is. One way I've tried communicating it is you can view it as the set of all causality. What caused the set of all causality? Nothing else caused the set of all causality.

Would you say the definitions constitute a first cause? — jgill

I don't quite understand the question. Lets say there's a rock that exists which we haven't defined yet. Does our ability to define it mean it doesn't exist? No. It exists despite our definitions. The interaction of our minds and identities is the cause of definitions, so we can conclusively say definitions are not first causes.

I must have missed something. I thought you were saying that while first causes must exist, there were no existing examples. — Ludwig V

I meant that there are no existing proven discoveries of anything that is a first cause. No one to my mind, has ever conclusively proven that any "x" exists without something prior causing it to be. A belief or limitation in current capabilities is not evidence of a first cause. We must have the tools and evidence to conclusively demonstrate something is a first cause.

I accept that there are first causes in pragmatic applications of an existing causal framework. Call them pragmatic. — Ludwig V

I am not talking about pragmatism, origin creation, or a 'starting point' that we pick. I'm talking about a factual, inalienable, provable first cause that exists regardless of our current capabilities or awareness. A first cause does not depend on our observation, it simply is.

But the concept of a cause outside a framework of definition and explanation, is meaningless. — Ludwig V

See my above reply for what a first cause entails. I'll be happy to dive in further if required.

there is too much internal energy within an atom due to a proton, electron imbalance, there is not enough force to keep the atom together.
— Philosophim

This describes the necessary conditions for decay to occur, but what is the specific event/cause X that causes the specific Y at that specific time? — EricH

Oh, I see what you're asking for now. Let me give you your answer and then a bit more. First, I'm not a physicist which is why I linked you the material to read. But I think what you're looking for is that we either do not know the exact mechanisms or we are unable to know after the fact. Our lack of knowledge or inability is of course not enough to declare it as a first cause however. That's because we've clearly defined what a first cause is so can easily identify it.

First, a first cause has no prior causality for its existence. This means that there is nothing which directs it, shapes it, or limits it outside of itself. To claim something is a first cause, this must be proven. We cannot say, "We don't understand or can currently measure something, therefore its a first cause." It must be demonstrated without a doubt that there is nothing prior which made that existence.

Second, a first cause does not entail that it is separate from causality once formed. For example, a photon could form without prior cause, but once it is formed, if it enters into direct play with anything else, it is now part of a causal chain. Meaning the first cause for the photon in this instance would be its formation. Its interaction with another atom would not be a first cause, but a next step in causality.

Could a quark simply appear somewhere in the universe than vanish out five seconds later, all without a prior cause?
— Philosophim
What's your answer? Yes or no? — EricH

So, if a first cause has no prior explanation for its existence, then it has no reason why it should be. This also entails that there is not a reason that anything could not simply be either. Why? If there is a lean or limitation towards a particular first cause, there is a reason behind this limitation. Meaning our purported 'first cause' is in fact, not a first cause. The first cause would be the lean or limitation. Meaning that a first cause has no limitations, reasons, or necessary things it must be or do besides the fact that nothing prior to it caused it to be.

So, is it plausible? Sure. If we consider that first causes are necessary in any causal chain, and think about what that entails, it means a first cause could appear as anything at any time. Again however, if we are to claim "This X is a first cause," it must be shown with proof. Thus any causal chain must be followed to its first cause. We cannot invent a first cause that is imaginary or separate from the causal chain. Meaning that in your atom example, we work backwards from physics until we get to the point where we can predict a stable probability of atomic decay. This consistency is evidence of something stable and limited. For example, atomic decay does not random spawn an elephant or cookies, but radiation without fail. What is causing this? That question must be answered with proof.

I asked you this before and never got a response, so I'll try again. Using your terminology from the OP, let Y be an atom radioactively decaying into another atom. Is there an X that caused this Y? — EricH

My apologies if I missed an earlier reply! Here's a quick summary of how radioactivity works. https://www.arpansa.gov.au/understanding-radiation/what-is-radiation/ionising-radiation/radioactivity#:~:text=What%20causes%20atoms%20to%20be,an%20excess%20of%20internal%20energy.

In layman's terms, when there is too much internal energy within an atom due to a proton, electron imbalance, there is not enough force to keep the atom together. Over time, the internal structure sends out parts of the atom which when separated, are referred to as energy or photons. So yes.

One paradigm shift is likely The Gettier Problem. Knowledge was generally understood to be justified true belief. Then Gettier came in and scuttled all of that. I believe today knowledge is understood as a tool to grasp truth and reality, but does not necessarily grasp truth itself.

There's a puzzle. I don't think that idea of a cause that is self-explanatory makes much sense. It doesn't seem to fit with your idea of causality. Is that meant to be an example of a first cause? — Ludwig V

Yes, a first cause is that which is not caused by something else. It may be difficult to comprehend, but it is logically necessary.

So finding a first cause is just a reason for developing new ideas. It has happened before and no doubt it will happen again Whether one calls them causal or not really seems much less important. — Ludwig V

No, its just a logical consequence. You're looking for a reason beyond trying to solve the puzzle first. Its a consequence, not why I tried to solve the puzzle! The reason I tried to solve the puzzle was because I thought the back and forth between God and no God was missing a glaring point. Is there a first cause somewhere in causality? Its not an opinion, its a logical conclusion that there must be.

Yes, I take the point that there is a difference between the Big Bang and an arbitrarily chosen starting-point. The Big Bang is implicit in the framework of explanation. But then, there are these pesky people who ask questions which do not go away. And so we start developing new ideas, based on what we already know, but also going beyond them. Whether you call them causal or not is not really very interesting. — Ludwig V

With the understanding that there must be at least one first cause (there is no limitation of course) we have a very clear definition of what a first cause entails. This lets us do something great: require proof. While its logically necessary that first causes exist, saying, "X is a first cause" is a high bar of proof that is falsifiable. Thus we can propose ideas or have faith, but none of it has teeth without evidence.

Appreciate the contribution Ludwig.

I don't quite understand this. An event which cannot be predicted is not necessarily purely random. I understand a freely willed event to be like this, it cannot be predicted yet it is not random. — Metaphysician Undercover

A random event is not about our current ability to measure to predict, it is about a hard logical limitation to predict. A first cause is something self-explained, there is nothing prior that causes it. Such a thing cannot be predicted to arise as there is absolutely nothing causing it.

The point I'm trying to make is that randomness due to lack of knowledge is not the same as randomness with even perfect omniscience could not predict.

The drop cannot be predicted, not even by the person dropping it or else that person does not adhere to the principles of the experiment. — Metaphysician Undercover

Its actually been determined that people can make unconscious decisions up to 11 second prior to them being aware of it. https://qz.com/1569158/neuroscientists-read-unconscious-brain-activity-to-predict-decisions

That an event occurs within constraints does not necessitate the conclusion that it is a caused event. — Metaphysician Undercover

A constraint is part of what causes an outcome. A first cause cannot have constraints or anything that would lead a particular outcome. Because that would 'cause' the first 'first cause' to be. Meaning its not really a first cause. A first cause is as simple as "No quark is there, not a quark is there." There is nothing that caused the quark. It exists purely because it does.

There could be uncaused events occurring all the time, at a small level, and as they occur they are constrained by surrounding caused events. The point, is that there clearly is prior causality to the brain, as you say, but this does not rule out uncaused events within the brain, which make us feel like we have free will. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, this is possible. But it is something which would need to be proven. So, cool idea!

This freely willed decision is the cause of that chain of events in the brain and nervous system which causes the ball to drop, but there is no cause of that decision of "now", at that point in time. — Metaphysician Undercover

This again would need to be proven. I don't think science points that way. I think its pretty clear the brain has a sense of timing and it can be traced through causality. But, as I noted earlier, you have an interesting idea that could be tested.

Hi Metaphysician, good to see you again. :)

Doesn't my example of dropping the ball serve as proof. The act is either random or caused by free will. You showed how it is not truly random, so we can conclude free will. — Metaphysician Undercover

I think there was a misunderstanding. A first cause is uncaused. Meaning its existence is a purely random event that cannot be predicted. Free will is not purely random but has constraints and influences. As I noted earlier the brain is where human thought resides, and there is prior causality to the brain. A first cause has no prior causality, so free will cannot be a first cause either.

What you may be confusing is the idea of a first cause vs a measurement where we state, "OK, this is the starting, or origin of a causal system. Meaning we start with the hand releasing the ball as a measurement, but we're not denying that there is prior causality to why the hand is there, gravity, etc. A first cause is not a measurement by us. It is a fundamental reality that has no prior cause for its existence.