When I speak of a chain receding to infinity that doesn't leave much to grasp at philosophically, so one resorts to the "being" of the chain , like yanking on an emergency cord. — jgill

What I find in metaphysics is logical demonstrations as to why this idea of "a chain receding to infinity" is unrealistic. That type of chain is shown to be logically consistent and therefore logically possible, and even attractive to some people, as seductive in a a sort of aesthetic or emotional way. . . . . Of course there is an issue with inductive principles as shown by Hume, so those who enjoy thinking about, and conceiving, chains receding to infinity, often feel justified in presenting these as if they could be real physical existents — Metaphysician Undercover

I really wish you would stop demeaning the post without anything but a deriding opinion. I have answered your questions and critiques, so I would like a little more respect for what I've written here. Either demonstrate the argument is false, or not. — Philosophim

"1. Either all things have a prior cause for their existence, or there is at least one first cause of existence from which a chain of events follows"

I expected clear logic: Either all things have a prior cause for their existence, or there is at least one thing that does not.

This convoluted language stops me at the very beginning.

I've done some searching and find that causality and causal chains is enormously complex, far more than I anticipated. I like to bring concepts and ideas into focus as clearly as I can, and for me this is to create a mathematical example that incorporates some of these. I admit, my examples are far from the gigantic webs of cause/effect in nature. Nevertheless they do exist in their contexts.

The "chain"
${{F}_{n}}(z)={{f}_{1}}\circ {{f}_{2}}\circ \cdots \circ {{f}_{n}}(z)$, $F(z)=\underset{n\to \infty }{\mathop{\lim }}\,{{F}_{n}}(z)$

recedes to infinity, but represents the convergents of analytic continued fractions, a step up from infinite series. And even series can be written this way. But, you won't find any in a field of flowers. This is not nature, rather math. No apologies, and I will not interfere in the thread again (unless someone says something completely bizarre!).

I expected clear logic: Either all things have a prior cause for their existence, or there is at least one thing that does not. — jgill

I gather it's intended to be something like

∀x∃yCyx ∨ ∃x¬∃yCyx

'For all x there is some y such that y caused x, or there is an x such that there is no y that caused x'.

it is valid.

"1. Either all things have a prior cause for their existence, or there is at least one first cause of existence from which a chain of events follows"

I expected clear logic: Either all things have a prior cause for their existence, or there is at least one thing that does not. — jgill

Philosophim's statement is rather meaningless. We could just as well replace "cause" with "thing" here, and say either all things have a prior thing or they do not. What we do in this case is assume a temporal separation between the thing and the prior thing, such that they are distinct "things". That's what "cause" does here, it implies a temporal separation between the thing known as the effect, and the thing known as the cause.

Now we have a series of "causes", or "things". The series may or may not proceed infinitely. The issue which arises when we apply this to the real world of empirical evidence, is that each of the separate, distinct things, or causes, must differ from each of the others, as this is what the nature of time and change indicate to us. However, we use the same word for all of them, to signify that they are all of the same type, or category, a "cause" or a "thing". In statements like Philosophim's the word used "cause", is meant to be all-inclusive, most universal, so as to create the appearance that there could be nothing outside that category. Then what appears, is that if there is a "first cause", there could be absolutely nothing prior to the first cause because "cause" is meant to be all-inclusive. But that's deception, because there must be criteria as to what constitutes a "cause" so there could always be something else outside that category. And that's the deception which Philosophim argues, that prior to the first cause, there could be absolutely nothing, therefore no reason for the first cause's occurrence. That's why I proposed switching for the word "thing", to expose this sort of sophistry. If there is no thing prior to the first thing, it appears like there is absolutely nothing, but that's a mistaken conclusion. What "thing" actually represents is a category, or type, and there might be something prior to the first thing which is outside that category.

That's why I'm trying to get Philosophim to recognize the need to assume different types of "cause". The proposed causal chain really only represents one type of cause. So if we accept that "cause" in this usage represents only one specific type of cause, then we can allow that prior to the first cause there is a distinctly different type of cause. This is completely consistent with what the empirical evidence demonstrates to us about the temporal succession of the coming into being of a multitude of things of the same type. We can see the need to posit a first of that type, but this does not imply "first" absolutely, just a division or boundary, a temporal limit to that type, and prior to that type is a different type. So for instance we could say either there is a human being prior to each human being, or there is a first human being. Evidence indicates that human beings must have a beginning, so we are inclined toward a "first" human being. Positing a first human being does not exclude the possibility of prior beings of a different type.

...but represents the convergents of analytic continued fractions... — jgill

The key word here is "represents". The problem with representations is that they do not qualify as being the thing which they represent. That's why the word "represents" is used, to signify that it stands for something, but it is not itself the thing which it stands for. And to complicate this problem we can create representations which are completely fictional, having no real thing which they correspond with. They represent something imaginary. So in a discussion of whether or not infinite chains are real, a representation of an infinite chain serves no purpose.

If the past is assumed to be potentially infinite as opposed to either finite or actually infinite, then it isn't necessarily the case that every cause must either be initial or a successor. Instead, the position of any cause in the order might be determined on-the-fly, and only when it is necessary to preserve causal consistency.

For why should the universe decide before our measurements and observations, what is and is not an initial cause? That question might look contradictory, but only if it is assumed that the universe consists of an absolute order of events whose existence transcends our observations and measurements of it.

But if that assumption is dropped, whereby observations and measurements are deemed to be constitutive factors of the thing being observed and measured (as for example as in subjective idealism and in interpretations of QM that fall under anti-realism), then the question as to the ordering and positions of unobserved events denoted by hidden variables, doesn't have to have an absolute and definite ontological answer one way or the other.

This is what I dispute. You do not have the principles required to say "there is no other reason why it exists. You have your own reason for assuming a first cause, the logic you demonstrated and this produces your conclusion, that the reason for it is "It exists without prior cause", but you cannot be certain that this is the correct reason for it. — Metaphysician Undercover

You are misunderstanding my claim here. I'm defining what a first cause must be. Its just like defining what the term "first" means. I can give examples of what a "first" would be. Like "My first birthday", or "My first bike". There are limits to what "first" means, namely that its a situation which cannot have occurred prior. What I'm hearing you say is, "Yes, you claim its your first birthday at 1 years old, but how do you know you didn't have a birthday prior?" You're claiming that a "first cause" might have a prior cause. This doesn't make any sense.

Therefore unless you know that your logic (the logic which concludes the reason for the first cause is solely to be the first cause) is absolutely certain, without any flaws, then you are not justified in claiming this reason. — Metaphysician Undercover

I believe this is so. I've clearly defined what a first cause would be correct? Its the "first" cause. Not a second. Not a follow up. There is no prior thing which causes itself to exist. As such, logically, there can be no influence that determines why it should or should not exist prior to its existence.

And, I've already shown you that your treatment of infinite regress and the eternal circle is flawed, so I think you ought to also accept that your reason for the first cause is also flawed. — Metaphysician Undercover

You may not understand what I was doing then. I was noting, "If infinite regression exists." If you rule out infinite regression entirely (which I don't mind, I don't think it can exist either) then the point I'm making stands without question.

This cause, the "first cause", has an essential difference, it is not known directly by inductive reasoning, but by deductive logic, which makes it necessary. Therefore what you call "the only difference" is a very significant difference, which makes the two types of causes categorically distinct, one type contingent, the other necessary. — Metaphysician Undercover

Agreed.

You've lost me here. How is it different?
— Philosophim

It is different because causation in the causal chain is defined by empirical observations, and inductive principles. Being an inductive generalization, the causes must be all of the same type, by the defining principles, to be placed in the same category. That there is a prior cause to any contingent cause is a defining feature. If it was not a defining feature we would not have the appearance of infinite regress. The "first cause" does not have this defining feature, therefore it cannot be placed in that category, it must be a distinct type of cause. However, it is still a "cause" in some sense because it has a similar type of effect, which allows you to make it part of, the base for, the causal chain. Therefore we need to allow for the reality of at least two distinct types of "cause". — Metaphysician Undercover

I also agree here. What I don't agree on is how this difference is anything but the fact that a first cause cannot be explained by a prior cause.

The reason for the first cause is its own existence simply being.
— Philosophim

That's your reason for the first cause, but you may be wrong. — Metaphysician Undercover

By definition, I cannot be wrong. I cannot claim I had a first birthday one year after my birth then say, "I might be wrong."

When you say " A first cause can have no other cause besides itself", this is not a sound conclusion. What the logic shows is that the first cause cannot have a "cause" in the same sense of "cause" as in the causal chain. — Metaphysician Undercover

The only difference between a first cause and a normal cause is that a first cause cannot have something prior which explains its existence. That's it. Meaning by definition, there can be no other cause which explains its existence.

You are simply not accepting the reality that the first cause could have a "cause" in another sense of the word "cause", a different type of cause. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, I'm rejecting the contradiction of what you are claiming. A first cause cannot have another cause that explains it by definition. If you want to explain to me why there isn't a contradiction, please demonstrate how its not a contradiction for someone to claim that having a first birthday one year after giving birth, doesn't necessarily mean they didn't have a prior birthday.

I expected clear logic: Either all things have a prior cause for their existence, or there is at least one thing that does not.

This convoluted language stops me at the very beginning. — jgill

I gather it's intended to be something like

∀x∃yCyx ∨ ∃x¬∃yCyx

'For all x there is some y such that y caused x, or there is an x such that there is no y that caused x'.

it is valid. — Banno

Much appreciated Banno. He is correct.

I've done some searching and find that causality and causal chains is enormously complex, far more than I anticipated. — jgill

Which is fine, but how does that apply to the argument? I cover both finite and infinite chains. We don't have to have any specification as to what the finite or infinite chain looks like correct? So how does putting a chain into an equation challenge the point I've made?

Then what appears, is that if there is a "first cause", there could be absolutely nothing prior to the first cause because "cause" is meant to be all-inclusive. But that's deception, because there must be criteria as to what constitutes a "cause" so there could always be something else outside that category. And that's the deception which Philosophim argues, that prior to the first cause, there could be absolutely nothing, therefore no reason for the first cause's occurrence. That's why I proposed switching for the word "thing", to expose this sort of sophistry. If there is no thing prior to the first thing, it appears like there is absolutely nothing, but that's a mistaken conclusion. — Metaphysician Undercover

I wouldn't call it deception. I'm not trying to trick anyone, I'm trying to have a conversation to see if what I'm claiming holds upon scrutiny. The word thing does not work because a first cause does not mean a prior 'thing' exists. An atom can exist eons away and another atom can appear as a first cause without that atom having anything to do with our new atoms existence.

I claim a first cause is logically necessary. Not that there can be only one first cause. Meaning other things can exist in the universe, and something appears uncaused by anything within that universe. Meaning that the replacement of 'cause' with 'things' doesn't work.

Instead, the position of any cause in the order might be determined on-the-fly, and only when it is necessary to preserve causal consistency.

For why should the universe decide before our measurements and observations, what is and is not an initial cause? That question might look contradictory, but only if it is assumed that the universe consists of an absolute order of events whose existence transcends our observations and measurements of it. — sime

Yes, my description of a first cause has nothing to do with our observations or measurements. It is the reality of whether there was something prior which caused a particular outcome to be, whether we know it or not. In other words, if a tree falls in a forest and no one is there to hear it, it still vibrates the air.

Which is fine, but how does that apply to the argument? — Philosophim

@jgill is quite right that the topic is complex. In particular, what it is to be a cause has remained fraught throughout this thread, and the logic of necessity in use has never been made clear.

So rather than jumping directly to this argument, much background work on the nature of causation and of necessity is needed.

...but represents the convergents of analytic continued fractions... — jgill

The key word here is "represents". The problem with representations is that they do not qualify as being the thing which they represent. That's why the word "represents" is used, to signify that it stands for something, but it is not itself the thing which it stands for. And to complicate this problem we can create representations which are completely fictional, having no real thing which they correspond with. They represent something imaginary. So in a discussion of whether or not infinite chains are real, a representation of an infinite chain serves no purpose. — Metaphysician Undercover

Good point. What I described is a form which yields specific values depending upon the choices of the
${{f}_{n}}'s$. For certain linear fractional transformations the values of ${{F}_{n}}$ are the convergents of a continued fraction. Is this "real"? It is as a mathematical "fact", but it might not appear in nature.

jgill is quite right that the topic is complex. In particular, what it is to be a cause has remained fraught throughout this thread, and the logic of necessity in use has never been made clear. — Banno

I don't see it being particularly fraught myself, but I'll define it if need be. Take any set of existence. What caused that set of existence is anything outside of that set of existence which is needed for that set to be. A set which does not need anything outside of itself to exist, is a first cause.

So, what causes an atom to exist? A combination of proton, neutrons, electrons, and various forces. What causes a proton to exist? A combination of quarks. What causes quarks to exist?...and so on. Time is just another dimension of detail. A first cause would have no other cause for its existence besides its own existence.

A chain of causality is when you look at any one point and look at the linked causality to that point. A causes B, causes C, etc. Multiple chains can join and interlink. The initial question asked is whether there is an end to this chain, or do the chains infinitely extend, regress, loop, etc.

In the first case, we have a first cause. But what I noted is that when you examine the entire set, even if it is regressive, there is still the question of what caused the entire regressive set to be. There is no outside cause. Therefore it is a first cause, or a thing that cannot be explained by anything outside of itself. If the universe is finitely regressive in causality, why? Because it is. If the universe is infinitely regressive in causality, why? Because it is. In either case we come necessarily to a first cause.

There are limits to what "first" means — Philosophim

The issue is the limits to what "cause" means, not the limits to what "first" means. Reference to "chain of events" implies a specific meaning for "cause", that of "efficient cause". However, the category of "efficient cause", the type of causation implied by "chain of events" does not include all the possible types of cause. Therefore the first cause in a chain of events could have another type of cause as its cause.

I've clearly defined what a first cause would be correct? — Philosophim

Yes you've defined it as the first in a chain of causes. However, there are other types of causes which do not occur in a chain like that, specifically the one I mentioned, "final cause". Therefore a "first cause", as defined by you, could still have a cause prior to it, so long as it is a type of cause which does not occur in chains, as per your definition.

There is no prior thing which causes itself to exist. — Philosophim

This is where your logic is wrong. The valid conclusion is that there is no earlier part of the chain. But this does not exclude the possibility of a different reason for the first cause. The first cause could have been caused by a type of cause which does not partake in the chain, like final cause. The first cause, by your definition, is very explicitly the beginning of the chain. This implies that the reason for the first cause, the cause of the first cause is something which cannot be said to be a part of the chain. You wrongly conclude that there can be no cause whatsoever, prior to the first cause, by wrongly assuming that there cannot be a type of cause which is free from the chain.

What I don't agree on is how this difference is anything but the fact that a first cause cannot be explained by a prior cause. — Philosophim

That's not what the argument shows. The argument shows that the first cause is the first in a chain. It does not show that there cannot be a prior cause, it shows that the prior cause cannot be a part of the chain. "First" is in reference to the chain, it designates the beginning of the chain. It does not designate "the first cause" absolutely. This is evidenced by your insistence that there could be many first causes. Which of them would be the first first cause? And since the occurrence of something from nothing (first cause coming from absolutely nothing) is completely incomprehensible, and unintelligible, we ought to conclude that what is implied is that there is a cause prior to the first cause which cannot be understood to be a part of the chain. That is the most reasonable assumption.

By definition, I cannot be wrong. — Philosophim

"By definition, I cannot be wrong"? Are you saying that the definition of "Philosophim" is "the person who cannot be wrong"?

The only difference between a first cause and a normal cause is that a first cause cannot have something prior which explains its existence. That's it. Meaning by definition, there can be no other cause which explains its existence. — Philosophim

You are wrongly interpreting your own argument. The difference between the first cause and the other causes in the chain, is that no part of the chain is prior to the first cause, whereas parts of the chain are prior to all the other causes in the chain. This in no way implies that the first cause "cannot have something prior which explains its existence". That conclusion requires a further premise, that the only thing which can explain something's existence is the extension of a causal chain prior to the thing's existence. But this premise is simple determinism, and is disputed by anyone who believes in free will, so it is not acceptable as a sound premise.

If you want to explain to me why there isn't a contradiction, please demonstrate how its not a contradiction for someone to claim that having a first birthday one year after giving birth, doesn't necessarily mean they didn't have a prior birthday. — Philosophim

I've been explaining, but you are not listening. Here, I'll refer to your example, "my first birthday", if that might help. When "my first birthday" occurs, or when it is referred to, it means the first in a chain of significant days. But this does not imply that there are no other significant days in your life prior to your first birthday. So prior to your first birthday, there are many other significant days in your own life. Likewise "the first cause" in your example refers to the first cause in a particular chain of significant events, but prior to the first cause there may still be many other events which have significance relative to the first cause.

I'm trying to have a conversation to see if what I'm claiming holds upon scrutiny. — Philosophim

The fact that you keep on insisting that your conclusion is valid, after scrutiny shows you that it is not, inclines me to think that your are improperly attached to your conclusion, and would resort to trickery to persuade people of it.

I claim a first cause is logically necessary. Not that there can be only one first cause. Meaning other things can exist in the universe, and something appears uncaused by anything within that universe. Meaning that the replacement of 'cause' with 'things' doesn't work. — Philosophim

You did not understand the analogy, or else you are in denial. Hopefully you'll understand with the birthday example. But if you do not, I'll be more convinced that you are arguing to deceive, not to understand.

I don't see it being particularly fraught myself, but I'll define it if need be. Take any set of existence. What caused that set of existence is anything outside of that set of existence which is needed for that set to be. A set which does not need anything outside of itself to exist, is a first cause. — Philosophim

Sorry Philosophim, but "set of existence" seems to be incoherent. Do you mean "set of existents" or "set of existing things"? Maybe you could make another try.

Anyway, by Aristotelian metaphysics, each and every existent has two distinct requirements needed for it to be. One is matter, the other is form. In this way there is always at least two distinct types of cause needed for a thing to be. If one of these types of cause forms a causal chain with a first cause, there is still the other type of cause, which may well be prior to the first cause of the causal chain.

It is as a mathematical "fact", but it might not appear in nature. — jgill

The important issue, which you might have seen me argue at numerous places and times on this forum, is to go further than to say "it might not appear in nature" but to question whether it is possible for such a thing to occur in nature.

The point being that mathematics consists of ideals, and the ideals can be very useful in application. However, it's debatable whether it's even possible that any of these ideals could actually exist in nature. So the irrational nature of pi for example provides for a strong argument that the ideal circle simply cannot exist in nature. Then we can replace the question of what is it about mathematics which makes it so useful, with the question of what is it about the natural reality which makes it so that it does not perfectly correspond with the ideals of mathematics. It is this part of reality, the part which makes it so that it does not correspond with the mathematical ideals, which makes reality difficult to understand.

The issue is the limits to what "cause" means, not the limits to what "first" means — Metaphysician Undercover

If I stated, "The first cause by energy", then of course that leads it open to there being another specific cause like "The first cause by matter". But that's not what I'm stating. I'm stating the first cause period. This is not a specific type of cause, so there can be no other invented type of cause that is separate from what I'm defining.

Yes you've defined it as the first in a chain of causes. However, there are other types of causes which do not occur in a chain like that, specifically the one I mentioned, "final cause". Therefore a "first cause", as defined by you, could still have a cause prior to it, so long as it is a type of cause which does not occur in chains, as per your definition. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm a bit at a loss here on what you're trying to say. Its very simple. Either something is caused by something else, or it isn't. Its not complicated. I'm not sure a final cause makes sense unless this cause ended all of reality. Otherwise causality continues.

You are wrongly interpreting your own argument. The difference between the first cause and the other causes in the chain, is that no part of the chain is prior to the first cause, whereas parts of the chain are prior to all the other causes in the chain. This in no way implies that the first cause "cannot have something prior which explains its existence". — Metaphysician Undercover

I do not understand how you do not see this as a contradiction. Maybe this is what you're saying, correct me if this isn't the case. Are you saying that in front of the first cause of a chain, there's another chain that causes the first cause in the first chain? Because then the first chain's 'first cause' is not a first cause. That's just an extension of the prior chain. A first caused is not demarcated by observation or definition. It is the reality of there being nothing prior. Nothing. No prior cause. You cannot say it is the first cause, but perhaps there's a prior cause. That's a clear contradiction.

The first cause is not an origin set by us. For example, if I say, "The first cause of me dropping this ball is me letting go of my hand," that is not a first cause. A first cause is not 'the starting point from which I choose to reference causality". A first cause is THE first cause in a chain of causality. There is no prior chain, no prior connection, nada. What caused me to release my hand? What caused me to be born? What caused my parents to be born? The chain continues. It only ends when there is absolute no prior cause.

By definition, I cannot be wrong.
— Philosophim

"By definition, I cannot be wrong"? Are you saying that the definition of "Philosophim" is "the person who cannot be wrong"? — Metaphysician Undercover

No, I'm clearly noting the definition of "First cause" is that there is no prior cause. You can't state there is possibly a prior cause to a first cause. That runs counter to the definition. The place where I could possibly be wrong is that a first cause, as defined here, is not logically necessary. But you are not arguing against the idea that a first cause is logically necessary. You are saying there can be a prior cause to a first cause when the definition of a first cause is, "There can be no prior cause of this".

When "my first birthday" occurs, or when it is referred to, it means the first in a chain of significant days. But this does not imply that there are no other significant days in your life prior to your first birthday. So prior to your first birthday, there are many other significant days in your own life. — Metaphysician Undercover

Incorrect. When I say "my first birthday" I mean, "My first birthday" No other days. First birthday. First cause. No other causes. You are saying, "There could be prior cause to the first cause" is the same as "There could be prior birthdays to the first birthday". This is clearly wrong. If the other days in the analogy are making it difficult, eliminate them and just say, "First day". You cannot have a prior X to the "first X" by definition.

The first cause, by your definition, is very explicitly the beginning of the chain. This implies that the reason for the first cause, the cause of the first cause is something which cannot be said to be a part of the chain. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, I've already stated the reason it is a first cause is that it has no prior cause that explains its existence. Its part of the definition which I feel I've been pretty consistent and clear on.

The fact that you keep on insisting that your conclusion is valid, after scrutiny shows you that it is not, inclines me to think that your are improperly attached to your conclusion, and would resort to trickery to persuade people of it. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yeah, I'm going to grow real tired of accusations about my character instead of focusing on the argument. Please be better than this. I'll admit when I'm wrong no problem, I do it all the time.

I'm insisting my conclusion is valid because you have not presented a valid counter to it so far. I'm claiming, "A first cause means there can be no prior cause by definition." You're proposing "A first cause could have some prior cause". You are stating, there could possibly be a prior X to a first X. If this is the case, isn't this a contradiction?

Sorry Philosophim, but "set of existence" seems to be incoherent. Do you mean "set of existents" or "set of existing things"? Maybe you could make another try. — Metaphysician Undercover

I meant exactly what I said. The word "existent' in English is an adjective, not a noun. It means specifically, "having existence or being; existing" https://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/existent#:~:text=adjective-,1.,existing%20now%3B%20present%3B%20immediate

An existing thing describes a thing with a verb. Except that people might say that thoughts are not things. So I don't want to describe things, I want to describe what exists.

We largely agree on most of what's being said here, so lets not nitpick over petty grammar though. I really want to figure out this difference between us.

That's not what the argument shows. The argument shows that the first cause is the first in a chain. It does not show that there cannot be a prior cause, it shows that the prior cause cannot be a part of the chain. "First" is in reference to the chain, it designates the beginning of the chain. It does not designate "the first cause" absolutely. This is evidenced by your insistence that there could be many first causes. — Metaphysician Undercover

A prior cause means its part of the chain of causality. I'm more commenting on this comment so you understand what I meant by first causes. A few chains intersecting somewhere is an intersection of causality, and a continuation. The intersection is not a first cause. Multiple first causes would be the start of each chain. When we get to multiple first causes, its probably better thought of as a web, with the first causes being the beginning of each strand.

Anyway, by Aristotelian metaphysics, each and every existent has two distinct requirements needed for it to be. One is matter, the other is form. In this way there is always at least two distinct types of cause needed for a thing to be. If one of these types of cause forms a causal chain with a first cause, there is still the other type of cause, which may well be prior to the first cause of the causal chain. — Metaphysician Undercover

Wait, are you bringing Aristotle's four causes in here? I am in no way talking about causality in regards to Aristotle. If you would like, you can introduce why you think Aristotle's four causes is pertinent to this discussion. But bringing it in here as a quick aside and acting as if it should simply be accepted as a clear counter to the argument does not work.

If you wish to, please demonstrate exactly how Aristotle's four causes fit within the discussion of causality I've introduced here so far. As well, please indicate to me a specific instance in Aristotle's four causes where one cause causes the other cause. Lets not claim, 'may well be prior', lets show it.

But that's not what I'm stating. I'm stating the first cause period. This is not a specific type of cause, so there can be no other invented type of cause that is separate from what I'm defining. — Philosophim

That is not correct. You stated the first cause in a "chain of events". This does not imply "first" absolutely, it only implies first in that chain. That is what allows you to say there might be a multitude of first causes. If you accept this, then you know that "first" does not mean "the first cause period".

So, I suggest to you, that if you better understood the concept of "cause", and the multitude of different types of "cause" which have been described over the years, you would see that some types of "cause" do not occur in chains. And, just like the first cause of one chain might be prior in time to the first cause of another chain, a cause which is of a different type might be prior in time to all the first causes of all the chains.

I'm a bit at a loss here on what you're trying to say. Its very simple. Either something is caused by something else, or it isn't. Its not complicated. I'm not sure a final cause makes sense unless this cause ended all of reality. Otherwise causality continues. — Philosophim

Sure, either something is caused by something else, or it is not, that's self-evident. However, you wrongly conclude that the first cause in a chain of causes could not have been caused by a different type of cause, a type of cause which does not operate in a chain.

I recommend that you read some philosophy concerning the concept of causation. Aristotle's outline of the four principal ways that "cause" is used is a good place to start.

Are you saying that in front of the first cause of a chain, there's another chain that causes the first cause in the first chain? — Philosophim

No, I am proposing that there is a type of cause which does not operate through a chain. You seem to be stuck on the idea that all causes must be described as a part of a chain. Look up Aristotle's "formal cause" for an outline of a type of cause which is free from the constraints of a chain. Then you might start to understand how "final cause" as the defining feature of intention and free will is a type of cause which is independent from any chain.

No, I'm clearly noting the definition of "First cause" is that there is no prior cause. — Philosophim

This is incorrect. You are saying that the "first cause" is the first in a chain. The fact that you allow for a multitude of first causes, being the beginnings of a multitude of chains, each one possibly starting at a different time, indicates without a doubt, that you do not mean "that there is no prior cause".

Incorrect. When I say "my first birthday" I mean, "My first birthday" No other days. First birthday. First cause. No other causes. You are saying, "There could be prior cause to the first cause" is the same as "There could be prior birthdays to the first birthday". This is clearly wrong. If the other days in the analogy are making it difficult, eliminate them and just say, "First day". You cannot have a prior X to the "first X" by definition. — Philosophim

Philosophim, do you read what I write? I clearly stated that there are "significant days" which are prior to your first birthday, not that there are "prior birthdays to the first birthday" as you straw man.

Your statement, "I mean, 'My first birthday' No other days" is demonstrably impossible. There is 365 days in a common year. All those "other days" are implied by "my first birthday". Your first birthday comes a year after your birth. That means that it is impossible that there are "no other days" of significance prior to your first birthday.

No, I've already stated the reason it is a first cause is that it has no prior cause that explains its existence. Its part of the definition which I feel I've been pretty consistent and clear on. — Philosophim

That is not your definition, it is your conclusion, which I'll mention again is an invalid conclusion. Your definition of "first cause" is as stated in 1) of the op the beginning of a "chain of events": "there is at least one first cause of existence from which a chain of events follows."

You then wrongly conclude that there can be no prior cause which explains its existence. And if your intent is to combine the two into one definition, then there is inconsistency within that definition, which warrant it being rejected as unsound. It is commonly accepted that causes (free will) may act independently of the chain of events.

I'll admit when I'm wrong no problem, I do it all the time. — Philosophim

Then get on with it. Why do I have to repeat the same thing over and over again, while you keep insisting that your mistakes are not mistakes?

I'm insisting my conclusion is valid because you have not presented a valid counter to it so far. I'm claiming, "A first cause means there can be no prior cause by definition." You're proposing "A first cause could have some prior cause". You are stating, there could possibly be a prior X to a first X. If this is the case, isn't this a contradiction? — Philosophim

You accept that there could be a multitude of "first causes" as the beginnings of a multitude of causal chains. Since there is nothing to ensure that the various beginnings are all at precisely the same time, then please confess to your mistake. The following statement or so-called "definition" is incorrect, or inconsistent: "A first cause means there can be no prior cause by definition".

Since your two so-called definitions of "first cause" are demonstrably inconsistent with each other, you need to choose one or the other. Is a "first cause" the beginning of a causal chain, or is it "first" in an absolute sense, meaning that there could be no cause of any sort, prior to it in time?

I meant exactly what I said. The word "existent' in English is an adjective, not a noun. It means specifically, "having existence or being; existing" https://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/existent#:~:text=adjective-,1.,existing%20now%3B%20present%3B%20immediate

An existing thing describes a thing with a verb. Except that people might say that thoughts are not things. So I don't want to describe things, I want to describe what exists.

We largely agree on most of what's being said here, so lets not nitpick over petty grammar though. I really want to figure out this difference between us. — Philosophim

This does not at all help me to understand what you meant by "set of existence".

A prior cause means its part of the chain of causality. I'm more commenting on this comment so you understand what I meant by first causes. A few chains intersecting somewhere is an intersection of causality, and a continuation. The intersection is not a first cause. Multiple first causes would be the start of each chain. When we get to multiple first causes, its probably better thought of as a web, with the first causes being the beginning of each strand. — Philosophim

Now you propose to define "prior" in a way which renders "prior in time" as unintelligible. If each chain has a "prior" which is specific to that chain, then you have no way to produce a temporal relation between one chain and another. Each chain would have a "first cause", but we would have no way of saying which first cause is "prior" to another first cause because you have defined "prior" as being relative to the chain itself, rather than an independent measurement of time. It would be much more intelligible if we maintain a distinct flow of time, and judge "prior" relative to the time of occurrence rather than the position in a chain.

If you would like, you can introduce why you think Aristotle's four causes is pertinent to this discussion. — Philosophim

That's very straight forward. In your argument you restrict "cause" by definition, to mean an event which occurs within the context of a chain of events. But the way that we understand reality involves using "cause" in ways which are other than the context of a chain of events. This was very well explained by Aristotle. In our understanding of reality we use "cause" in the way of "final cause", intention and free will, and this is a type of "cause" which is independent of any chain of events. Therefore your definition, which restricts "cause" to an occurrence within a chain of events is not representative of the way that we understand reality, and is thus a false premise.

That is not correct. You stated the first cause in a "chain of events". This does not imply "first" absolutely, it only implies first in that chain. That is what allows you to say there might be a multitude of first causes. If you accept this, then you know that "first" does not mean "the first cause period". — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, we agree on this again. To give a less abstract example, imagine that a photon appeared without prior cause somewhere in the universe, while a small bang happens somewhere else five years later. Both are not caused by anything else or each other, they just are.

So, I suggest to you, that if you better understood the concept of "cause", and the multitude of different types of "cause" which have been described over the years, you would see that some types of "cause" do not occur in chains. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is not an argument. If you have in mind a particular idea, please demonstrate it. If not, my point stands.

I recommend that you read some philosophy concerning the concept of causation. Aristotle's outline of the four principal ways that "cause" is used is a good place to start. — Metaphysician Undercover

This again is not an argument and presumptive. You do not know the extent of what I've read on causation. If you find Aristotle's four causes worthwhile to the argument, please refer to my previous request for you to introduce them in a critical way to the discussion.

Are you saying that in front of the first cause of a chain, there's another chain that causes the first cause in the first chain?
— Philosophim

No, I am proposing that there is a type of cause which does not operate through a chain. — Metaphysician Undercover

The chain is just a visual metaphor. How does your proposal work? How do I have a first cause, then have another cause that causes the first cause without there being a causal link between the two? You have to understand by this point, what you're proposing without a concrete example is coming across as a clear contradiction to me.

Look up Aristotle's "formal cause" for an outline of a type of cause which is free from the constraints of a chain. Then you might start to understand how "final cause" as the defining feature of intention and free will is a type of cause which is independent from any chain. — Metaphysician Undercover

If you think it does, please point out exactly how. I may not draw the same conclusions you do, so if you want to communicate what you see, you'll have to do it. At a quick glance, I do not see how the idea of 'final cause' at all applies to what I'm noting here, nor the idea that free will is a first cause.

Philosophim, do you read what I write? I clearly stated that there are "significant days" which are prior to your first birthday, not that there are "prior birthdays to the first birthday" as you straw man. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, I am not straw manning, you are. I've clearly laid out that this is an abstract to clear up the issue, and you are in bad faith claiming otherwise. The abstract was clearly indicated to communicate the idea that a "First X" means we cannot have "A prior X". You are saying "But we can have a prior Y" as if "Y = X". It does not. I am not talking about days. I am talking about a specific thing, a first birthday. You pulling a "Y" of "significant days" out of the example when I've clarified the intention for you is the definition of a straw man.

Again, remove replace the birth day example with a "First day" example if that helps you. You claim that there can be prior cause to my first cause. This is the same as claiming "You can have prior days to your first day".

I'll admit when I'm wrong no problem, I do it all the time.
— Philosophim

Then get on with it. Why do I have to repeat the same thing over and over again, while you keep insisting that your mistakes are not mistakes? — Metaphysician Undercover

Yeah...see this was an attempt to get you to behave like a stable thinker and adult. Personal attacks on me are unnecessary and meaningless. Its arguments and proof. I understand having an emotional slip up, but now you're not correcting yourself. Let me be frank. The fact you think something can come before the 'first' of something is inane. I could easily dismiss your argument and no one would begrudge me this. But, I've withheld my judgement to see if you would go into more depth to reveal something I've missed. Don't fall into the trap of dismissing another's points outright because of our first emotional reaction to them. Sometimes an argument dismissed at first glance might have been great if dug into.

Now, maybe I'm wrong. But all I see in your argument so far is that you are stating, "There might be a prior X to the first X", when I've declared that the "First X" is absolute and not merely an origin or expression of speech. I see that you comprehend a lot of the rest of the argument, so I'm scratching my head as to why you would do this. I'm starting to gather it has something to do with Aristotle's points, which I'll need explained and pointed out to me. Can you demonstrate how Aristotle's points are valid, apply to the argument, and have a situation in which there is a prior cause to an absolute first cause? Even if you can't demonstrate the first cause part as you initially wanted, I still would like to see what it is you're thinking of.

You accept that there could be a multitude of "first causes" as the beginnings of a multitude of causal chains. Since there is nothing to ensure that the various beginnings are all at precisely the same time, then please confess to your mistake. The following statement or so-called "definition" is incorrect, or inconsistent: "A first cause means there can be no prior cause by definition". — Metaphysician Undercover

Maybe you misunderstand the claim then. A first cause cannot cause another first cause. If an atom appears without prior cause, and a big bang appears a ridiculously long way away five minutes later, and is in no way caused by the atom, they are both first causes. You seem to be implying that the atom could cause the big bang. If the atom did cause the big bang, the atom would be the first cause and the big bang would, necessarily, not be a first cause and instead caused by the atom.

Now, if the atom is a first cause, and the big bang is a first cause, years later the atom could arrive into the resulting universe of the big bang and collide with another atom. At this point, this is where the chains intersect. But the big bang did not cause the atom, and the atom did not cause the big bang. If one caused the other, then only the one which caused the other would be the first cause.

This does not at all help me to understand what you meant by "set of existence". — Metaphysician Undercover

A set of existence is "the universe" for example. The universe is composed of many other existences. A fundamental set would be a set of 1, or an existence that is not composed of other existences. So the answer to, "What caused the universe" would imply that it also includes all the existences within that universe.

Thus, "What caused a finite universe?" and "What caused an infinite universe?" Would include the set of each existence. I am very open to saying this a better way if you can think of one, I'm not married to the phrase, just the concept. Maybe "Set of an existence?" I'm unsure.

Now you propose to define "prior" in a way which renders "prior in time" as unintelligible. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, time is simply one property of causation. So for example I can ask, "What causes an atom to exist?" and the answer is the combination of protons, neutrons, electrons, and force. I can then ask, "What caused the atom to be at the particular state it is right now opposed to one second ago," and now we include time in the equation.

I think what you're trying to say, and correct me if I'm wrong, is that you believe I'm stating nothing can exist prior to a first cause. That's not what I'm saying. I'm saying nothing prior can cause a first cause. Meaning that a first cause could appear in this universe right now, it would just have no prior cause from anything that that exists. If you want to add, "Maybe its caused by something from another universe", that is included in what 'exists'. A first cause cannot be caused by anything prior, period. It does not mean other things cannot exist before that specific first cause, though those things which exist prior to that first cause must necessarily have a first cause in its causality chain.

If you would like, you can introduce why you think Aristotle's four causes is pertinent to this discussion.
— Philosophim

That's very straight forward. In your argument you restrict "cause" by definition, to mean an event which occurs within the context of a chain of events. But the way that we understand reality involves using "cause" in ways which are other than the context of a chain of events. This was very well explained by Aristotle. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm not discussing with Aristotle. I'm discussing with you. You obviously see something in Aristotle that counters the argument that I don't. If you want me to see this, you have to point this out. You have not done so. Saying, "But Aristotle so the argument is wrong," is not a valid counter. =)

In our understanding of reality we use "cause" in the way of "final cause", intention and free will, and this is a type of "cause" which is independent of any chain of events. Therefore your definition, which restricts "cause" to an occurrence within a chain of events is not representative of the way that we understand reality, and is thus a false premise. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, mine is not a false premise. This is the premise proposed by the argument and the logical conclusions that result from this premise. You may disagree with the premise, but if you want to indicate the premise is false you need to clearly prove why the premise is false. Pointing out, "Another philosopher defines it differently," does not prove that his premise is true. Demonstrate why Aristotle's premise is true, and why my premise by necessity must be false because his is true.

↪javra
Nice icon. — Banno

:grin: Just saw this. A sincere thanks!

Btw, if you're still interested, can you offer any references in philosophical literature to the notion of change occurring sans time, i.e. in the absence of before and after?

I so far still can't wrap my mind around "change that occurs in the absence of any 'before the stated change' and 'after the stated change'" ... but I know enough to know that I should never say never when it comes to philosophical proposals.

--------

Sorry @Philosophim, but I am interesting in this issue of alternative interpretations of "change". I might start a new thread if it turns out to be necessary, though.

Sorry Philosophim, but I am interesting in this issue of alternative interpretations of "change". I might start a new thread if it turns out to be necessary, though. — javra

No apology necessary Javra! :)

Thanks for attempting an account. I don't see it as anywhere near adequate. Indeed, it looks muddled. In the first paragraph it talks of "existence" being caused - I take that as meaning "existents", things that exist - then slips sideways to constituents - "neutrons, electrons...", but constituents are different to causes; It talks of time as a dimension but enigmatically adds "...of detail"; then it slides to causes being relations between points. Quite unclear.

But to your main point. You have a sequence, A is caused by B, B is caused by C, C is caused by D, and so on, and you supose it to be valid to ask what causes the entire sequence.

It is not clear that this is a fair question. Further, supposing it to be a fair question assumes your conclusion.

Consider a different sequence, that of mothers: A was born from B; B was born from C, C was born from D. For any person, it is legitimate to ask from whom they were born. It is not legitimate to ask that of the sequence of births - it is not a person and so does not have a mother.

Because you have left the notion of cause unclear, it is as legitimate simple to deny that the sequence has a cause as it is to demand the cause be presented.

That is more or less what @jgill and others have been pointing out: that your conclusion does not follow without a leap in your logic.

Pedagogically, what is needed is to step outside of the argument you have presented here and to consider the broader situation in which it takes place - the nature of cause and of necessity, for starters.

But I doubt that this will happen in the context of this thread.

I'll probably leave you to it.

Consider a different sequence — Banno

Why? Why not deal with the one he presented, and either help him work out the defects, or understand what he's trying to say (you can't be sure, regardless of your hubris)?

It's called a counter-example. If you don't understand that, I don't think I can help you, . Cheers.

Ah Banno - level with me - do you have a really hard time making friends?

:roll:

Since we cannot refute this possibility on the basis of the nature of the concepts of existence and cause (as distinguished from the empirical fact that these things always seem to go together), we therefore cannot make the case that it is impossible for anything to come into existence without a cause – after all, anything is possible unless it is logically impossible. — expos4ever

It is fine to say that anything that is not logically contradictory is possible provided the provenance of that "possible" is understood to be confined to the epistemological. That is to say that as far as we can tell anything that is logically possible might be physically or actually possible. On the other hand, there may be things which are logically possible which are not physically or actually possible, even though we cannot determine what those things could be.

I don't think I'm asserting anything as a first cause that would later be found to have a prior cause. — Philosophim

"Later" is a long time. How long would you wait?
For me, it will always seem more likely, and always possible, that any putative first cause will turn out to have a prior cause (or, in my language, that we will develop a prior cause) than the alternative.

The fundamental argument, if I'm not wrong, is this:-

If we don't know whether our universe has finite or infinite chains of causality A -> B -> C etc...
Lets say there's a finite chain of causality. What caused a finite causal chain to exist instead of something else? There is no prior reason, it simply is.
Lets say there's an infinite chain of causality. What caused an infinite causal chain to exist instead of something else? There is no prior reason, it simply is. — Philosophim

I notice that here, as elsewhere, you use the word "reason" at this point, instead of cause. "Reason" and "cause" are not synonyms, are they? At least, not in philosophy. So what is the significance of this change in language?

Why? Why not deal with the one he (@philosophim) presented, and either help him work out the defects, or understand what he's trying to say... — AmadeusD

Because considering a variety of cases in terms of similarities to and differences from the central case helps one to understand it.

But to your main point. You have a sequence, A is caused by B, B is caused by C, C is caused by D, and so on, and you suppose it to be valid to ask what causes the entire sequence. — Banno

We focus on the "A caused B" kind of cause. If the spark caused the explosion, we can ask what caused the spark and what effects the explosion caused (and sometimes it can cause another explosion, as in an atomic bomb). That's our paradigm of causation.
But we can also ask why the spark caused an explosion (or why sparks cause explosions) and we'll get an answer in terms of the reactions between molecules at certain temperatures. This doesn't fit the "A caused B" model, if only because it doesn't provide a "prior" cause, so it is probably clearer to call this an analysis. This kind of question is also recursive. When we reach the limits of our understanding, we are left with brute facts. The possibility of developing another layer can't be ruled out (and we have), but I think the argument applies.

For any person, it is legitimate to ask from whom they were born. It is not legitimate to ask that of the sequence of births - it is not a person and so does not have a mother. — Banno

That's true, so far as it goes. But we can ask, and answer, the question why people are born and then those people bear children. But not in the same terms. We need an analysis of the sequence, not an addition to it. That's what happens in the case of the explosion.

But the analysis is still in terms of cause/effect relationships, which are the presupposed framework of the sequence. It isn't at all clear to me what kind of answer can be provided to the question why causal relationships (regularities?) exist. It seems to me a brute fact - possibly necessary in some sense. I am clear that "It simply is" is not a cause and not even an explanation. On the contrary, it is a rejection of the question.

There was a moment when one of my children realized the power of the question "Why", which, as good liberal parents, we always tried to answer. But every answer can generate another "why?". When one runs out of explanations - or time - one has to say, "because it is." This is not answer. It is a refusal to answer or a confession of inability to answer.

This is not an argument. If you have in mind a particular idea, please demonstrate it. If not, my point stands. — Philosophim

I was just telling you where the information can be found. There's much reading and too much for me to present to you here. Your argument is refuted by the possibility of other types of causes, along with the fact that the "first cause" which you conclude is a different type, as I've shown. I've already described how "final cause" is a different type. If you do not want to further your study then so be it.

The chain is just a visual metaphor. How does your proposal work? How do I have a first cause, then have another cause that causes the first cause without there being a causal link between the two? You have to understand by this point, what you're proposing without a concrete example is coming across as a clear contradiction to me. — Philosophim

OK, I'll stick right to the point. The issue is how you switch from "cause" to "reason" in your argument, without proper definition. You demonstrate the necessity of a "first cause", then you conclude:

""4. Alpha logic: An alpha cannot have any prior reasoning that explains why it came into existence. An Alpha's reason for its existence can never be defined by the Z's that follow it. If an Alpha exists, its own justification for existence, is itself."

You continued to insist that there cannot be any prior reason for the first cause, despite the fact that I pointed out that this is not a valid conclusion. And above, you even denied your own statements with the following:

"Oh, I never claimed that there was no reason for a first cause. The reason for a first cause is that, "It exists without prior cause." Meaning that there is no other reason for why it exists. If there is no other reason for its existence, there cannot be any rule which made it come into being. Meaning the only logical conclusion is that its existence is truly random as I've defined above."

Simply put, your conclusion of "first cause" provides you with no premise for making any statements about the reason for the first cause, without further premises to define what "reason" means. Your conclusions about "the reason" for the first cause are invalid. You cannot conclude that there cannot be a prior reason for the first cause, or that the first cause is its own reason, because you have no premises about "reasons". Any such statements are not conclusions but personal opinions not supported by the argument.

So, I'll explain another time, in a slightly different way, why your argument is self-refuting.

In your argument, "cause" requires a definition to be meaningful. It is defined by "prior" and it is defined by "chain of events". "Chain of events" is not metaphorical, it is part of what defines "cause", and what necessitates a "first". If you don't like "chain", you could call it a procession of events or something like that. but each cause is "an event". The existences referred to are "events", and each event is a cause.

You show that there is necessarily a "first cause", which means a first event. You then proceed to assert that there could be no "reason" for the first event, as prior to, and being the reason why the first cause occurs. However, "reason" has a different meaning from "cause". And since "cause" is defined by "event", and "prior" "a reason" might be something other than an event, yet still prior, as demonstrated by free will and intention. Your argument does not exclude the possibility that the reason why a first cause occurs could be something other than an event.

Further, the argument ends up being self-refuting because it demonstrates its own definitions to be inadequate, false. That's what I've been trying to explain to you. An "event" as we know it has a cause and an effect, a prior and posterior. This is because it occurs in a duration of time. But the argument produces the conclusion of a "first cause", and this is not consistent with "event" as we know it. Therefore your argument's definition of "cause", restricting it to an "event" is inadequate, false, because the meaning of "event" which is necessitated by the argument is inconsistent with empirical evidence of events. The argument produces the conclusion of an event (first cause) which only has a posterior part, without the prior part, and this is inconsistent with observation. This demonstrates that your definition of "cause" is false causing the argument to be self-refuting.

You might move to replace "cause" in your argument with "reason", but this creates a number of other problems for the argument because the reason why an event occurs might be intention, which is other than "cause" by the definitions required for your argument.

I notice that here, as elsewhere, you use the word "reason" at this point, instead of cause. "Reason" and "cause" are not synonyms, are they? At least, not in philosophy. So what is the significance of this change in language? — Ludwig V

This is exactly the problem, addressed above. The issue is that the reason for an event may be the cause of the event. This occurs in the case of intentional acts. But the two "reason" and "cause" are in no absolute way, equivalent or interchangeable. And, as I explained to Philosophim already, if we move to allow that "cause" of an event includes also the "reason" for the event, as a type of cause, then we must remove the defining feature of a chain, series, or sequence, because this type of cause does not occur in a chain. But Philosophim is disinterested in other types of cause, and wants to adhere to a definition which involves the sequence, or series. However, adhering to that definition invalidates the switch to "reason". Furthermore, it renders Philosophim's argument as self-refuting because the argument itself demonstrates that the "first cause" requires a distinct definition inconsistent with the description of the rest of the causes in the series or sequence. In other words the argument demonstrates that it's premises are inconsistent with empirical description.

In the first paragraph it talks of "existence" being caused - I take that as meaning "existents", things that exist - then slips sideways to constituents - "neutrons, electrons...", but constituents are different to causes; — Banno

This is a good point. I appreciate the specific point out to where cause is ambiguous. I have always considered constituents as causes depending on how the question is asked. For example, "What causes an atom to stay together?" At that point we include its constituents.

To really simplify, to me a cause is what is the historical fact for why something exists. A description of existence can have many attributes such as constituents and time. Thus the general question of cause can be asked and answered in different ways. So if someone said, "What causes an atom?" we can answer with its constituents. This can then be drilled into. We can then ask, "What causes X constituent?" Eventually we will reach a limit of fundamentals, and will be forced to ask the remaining attributes like time. "Why does that exist in its expressed way now instead of one second ago?" And so on until there is nothing prior. Once we reach the point where there is no other causality to drill into besides the existence itself, we have reached a first cause.

Consider a different sequence, that of mothers: A was born from B; B was born from C, C was born from D. For any person, it is legitimate to ask from whom they were born. It is not legitimate to ask that of the sequence of births - it is not a person and so does not have a mother. — Banno

So to take your example, A caused B, which caused C. We may ask that of the sequence of births as well. "What caused the sequence of births?" And we can explain that A had to exist prior to have B, who had to exist prior to C. For B could not have A, nor C have B. Does this answer your question Banno? I understand if you wish to bow out after making a point, so silence does not mean acceptance. It is at least an answer to think about.

I don't think I'm asserting anything as a first cause that would later be found to have a prior cause.
— Philosophim
"Later" is a long time. How long would you wait?
For me, it will always seem more likely, and always possible, that any putative first cause will turn out to have a prior cause (or, in my language, that we will develop a prior cause) than the alternative. — Ludwig V

Almost certainly. As I've noted before its incredibly difficult to prove something is a first cause. And it would need to be proven. Not believed, not assumed, not based off of a lack of being able to examine or measure, but proven.

I notice that here, as elsewhere, you use the word "reason" at this point, instead of cause. "Reason" and "cause" are not synonyms, are they? At least, not in philosophy. So what is the significance of this change in language? — Ludwig V

Mostly because I've been ingrained to use different words instead of the same one repeatedly in a sentence. :) In this case there was overlap, as if there is no prior cause, there is no prior reason. But not all reasons are causes just like not all cats are tigers.

Do you agree that causation is the natural form of shape-shifting within the our phenomenal world of material things?

I was just telling you where the information can be found. There's much reading and too much for me to present to you here. Your argument is refuted by the possibility of other types of causes, along with the fact that the "first cause" which you conclude is a different type, as I've shown. — Metaphysician Undercover

I know where the information can be found. You have not demonstrated any specific type of other cause, only vague, "maybes". So far the main point is that a "first cause" means there can be no prior cause by definition. Since you cannot give me a concrete example that gets past this, I see no evidence of any refutation.

OK, I'll stick right to the point. The issue is how you switch from "cause" to "reason" in your argument, without proper definition. You demonstrate the necessity of a "first cause", then you conclude:

""4. Alpha logic: An alpha cannot have any prior reasoning that explains why it came into existence. An Alpha's reason for its existence can never be defined by the Z's that follow it. If an Alpha exists, its own justification for existence, is itself."

You continued to insist that there cannot be any prior reason for the first cause, despite the fact that I pointed out that this is not a valid conclusion. And above, you even denied your own statements with the following:

"Oh, I never claimed that there was no reason for a first cause. The reason for a first cause is that, "It exists without prior cause." Meaning that there is no other reason for why it exists. If there is no other reason for its existence, there cannot be any rule which made it come into being. Meaning the only logical conclusion is that its existence is truly random as I've defined above."

Simply put, your conclusion of "first cause" provides you with no premise for making any statements about the reason for the first cause, without further premises to define what "reason" means. Your conclusions about "the reason" for the first cause are invalid. You cannot conclude that there cannot be a prior reason for the first cause, or that the first cause is its own reason, because you have no premises about "reasons". Any such statements are not conclusions but personal opinions not supported by the argument. — Metaphysician Undercover

Ok, this is a much better point! What you're missing is the phrase 'prior reason'. If you noted I'm not saying that there isn't a reason for a first cause, I'm saying there is not a prior reason. The reason for a first cause's existence, is simply its own existence at that point.

I just replied to Ludwig because he noticed I was using reason which he thought I was using synonymously with cause. I think he missed the "prior" part as well. Just like I told him, there is overlap because if there is no prior cause, there is no prior reason. Of course this does not mean all reasons are causes.

I did not think I would have to define the term 'reason' but I'll do so here if that's a problem. From Oxford Languages the pertinent noun definition is "a cause, explanation, or justification for an action or event." So as you can tell, its easy to have some overlap as sometimes a reason is a cause. When I and you have been referring to 'reason' as different from 'cause', I have been trying to use it as 'explanation'. Does this help?

You show that there is necessarily a "first cause", which means a first event. You then proceed to assert that there could be no "reason" for the first event, as prior to, and being the reason why the first cause occurs. — Metaphysician Undercover

So to be clear here, I'm noting there can be no prior reason. Which includes not only a cause, but explanation or justification.

And since "cause" is defined by "event", and "prior" "a reason" might be something other than an event, yet still prior, as demonstrated by free will and intention. Your argument does not exclude the possibility that the reason why a first cause occurs could be something other than an event. — Metaphysician Undercover

The reason why there can be no prior reason for a first cause, is that there is no prior causal event. There can be a reason as an explanation for why a first cause exists, "That is it simply exists." But there cannot be a prior reason, as there is nothing prior which causes it. Does this clear up the issue?

An "event" as we know it has a cause and an effect, a prior and posterior. This is because it occurs in a duration of time. But the argument produces the conclusion of a "first cause", and this is not consistent with "event" as we know it. Therefore your argument's definition of "cause", restricting it to an "event" is inadequate, false, because the meaning of "event" which is necessitated by the argument is inconsistent with empirical evidence of events. The argument produces the conclusion of an event (first cause) which only has a posterior part, without the prior part, and this is inconsistent with observation. This demonstrates that your definition of "cause" is false causing the argument to be self-refuting. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is not an empirical argument. This is a logical argument. When Einstein constructed his theory of relativity in regards to large bodies, logically, it was sound. It was only after they observed and measured an eclipse that they could empirically confirm it to be true. I make no empirical arguments here. I simply note that logically, if we continue to examine any chain of causality, whether that be finite or infinitely regressive, we will eventually run into a first cause. So no, there is no empirical observation as of yet that refutes this claim, nor any empirical observation that confirms this claim. This discussion is not an attempt at empirical proof, but a logical proof. As such, unless you can logically refute it, it stands.

And this, so far, is the only weakness I've seen in the argument. It is only a logical argument. A logical argument does not mean empirical truth. By the way, Bob Ross is the only other poster to my mind who understood and communicated this right off the bat. Well done, I consider him one of the best philosophers on these boards. :) So, if you wish to say, "I don't care about what logic says, I only care about empirical proof" then I will simply nod my head and state, "That's fine." But that in itself does not show it is a false logical argument.