While I can’t know what the subjective experience of a given something is, it seems probable that most things don’t have any. I assume you agree with this. So we’re just trying to draw the most likely line as to consciousness. You say with some assurance that AI programs already have limited consciousness. Is there any evidence for this beyond their behaviors? A purely functionalist argument can’t resolve this, since it begs the question. — J

It all boils down to understanding how we know about consciousness today. Its not through the subjective experience of something. Its through its behavior. There is a thought experiment called a philosophical zombie that has the behavior of consciousness, yet lacks the subjective experience that we would associate with consciousness. The hard problem shows that its irrelevant. Since we cannot know the subjective experience of anything, we can only go by behavior. The subjective experience of something that behaves consciously is currently outside of our reach.

Not quite sure why the hard problem rules out denying consciousness to computers at some future date, or why you describe the hard problem as “true.” — J

Mostly because I don't give weight to what 'may' happen. Ask someone 30 years ago what they thought 2024 would be like and they wouldn't even be close. So all we have to go on is today. Today, we do not have the scientific means to experience another consciously behaving entities' subjective experience. Meaning that if we have an AI that ticks all the behaviors of consciousness, we cannot claim that it does, or does not have a subjective experience. Its impossible for us to know. Since we cannot objectively evaluate a subjective experience, all we can do to measure consciousness is through another being's behavior.

Do I think that any non-living thing can be conscious? No, I’m strongly inclined, on the evidence, to believe that consciousness is exclusively a biological property. — J

How about we reword this a bit? Can a non-biological entity have the subjective experience of a biological entity? No. They are two different physical mediums. I can play a song on a harp or a keyboard, and the fundamental experience will have an inseparable difference in physical expression. So if an AI is conscious, its subjective experience is that of a non-biological being, not a biological being.

Unicorns are fictional animals that are {horses} with {horns}. — PL Olcott

Sure. Replace all I said with actual encounters in the world with people's drawings. Is there a degree of bending we can do with a fictional creature and still keep its identity? When is a unicorn not a unicorn, especially if its a made up creature?

Life/biology is the measure and meaning of all things. — boagie

That's nice, but how does that tie into the OP?

I am merely trying to define the term {analytic truthmaker} on the basis of the conventional meaning of those two terms. I can perfectly specify exactly what is and what is not {analytic} for all those people that have made up their minds that they don't believe in the analytic / synthetic distinction. — PL Olcott

Alright, I warned you. :)

Is this statement analytic or synthetic?

"Unicorns are horses with horns on their head"

Lets say you say yes. Now imagine that I go to a ranch where a man has glued a curled goat horn on a horse and is calling it a unicorn. Of course, none of us call it a unicorn. Which means are analytic statement wasn't actually true. But maybe we can go back and fix it.

"Unicorns are horses with straight horns on their head that have grown from their body."

Later we find a horse in the wild that has the Shope papilloma virus and it has caused a straight horn to grow out of the back of its head. Since this fits our true analytic definition, its a unicorn right? Well, no. So lets go back again.

"Unicorns are horses with straight horns coming out of their center of their forehead (Does the the angle of the horn matter? What material is the horn made out of?) which is a non-cancerous growth out of their body."

As you can see, for our analytic statement to be 'true', it needs to be based off of actual sense experience. But aren't things that require us to have sense experience to confirm that they are true make it a synthetic statement?

Lets go even simpler with math. 1+1=2. That's analytic right?

Well what is a 1? How do I tell from that sentence alone what one is? Same with two? Don't I have to actually experience what a '1' is first? But if I have to experience what a '1' is, isn't that synthetic?

Its really a question about knowledge. If you're interested, I have a paper I've worked on for years here. https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/14044/knowledge-and-induction-within-your-self-context/p1 There's a summary from the first person besides me who posted that breaks it down perfectly. If you're interested in exploring the details from that summary, feel free to read the rest.

She was a neuroscientist involved in brain-mapping who suffered a major stroke, which resulted in her attaining an insight into what she descibed as 'Nirvāṇa' (her 'stroke of insight') due to the left hemisphere of the brain shutting down. But note that this was a first-person experience - there would have been no way for her to tell, as a neuroscientist, what that experience might be in another subject, without having undergone it. — Wayfarer

And I agree with this. We can objectively map physical processes to behavior, and even map physical processes to someone's claimed subjective experience, but we will never know what its like to be the subject experiencing. Its very similar to the thought experiment where someone reads all about an apple, but has never seen one. We can describe the apple in excruciating detail, but you won't know the experience of seeing, feeling, or tasting an apple until you actually see, feel, and taste it.

That being said, she had a physical stroke and a physical reaction to it. The inability to know what it is like to be a physical entity having an experience does not negate the fact that certain physical entities can have experiences.

Rationality is a capturing and understanding of the world that allows planning and use of that reality accurately.
— Philosophim

No, that is described in critical philosophy as the instrumentalisation of reason, although I'm guessing that won't of interest to those here. — Wayfarer

Yeah, sounds like we're getting off topic here. Maybe something to explore in another thread.

I'm questioning what you regard as obvious. What imparts that order? If you zero out the HD it is physically the same matter, it weighs the same, has all the same physical constituents, but it contains no information. The information is conveyed by the arrangement of matter. What arranges it? I mean, computers don't emerge spontaneously from the sky, they're the product of human intelligence. — Wayfarer

True. And modern day computers were built up over over a century of work at this point. Basic computers start out as a switch board, which is just a bunch of electrical gates that you turn off and on to set up results based on the combination of those on and off gates. Who would have guessed from such a simple premise we would build the modern world of information, movies, and games?

Now of course a computer did not spontaneously create itself. But we've created computers to the point that when you hook electricity to them and turn them on, they run themselves. In fact, there are whole computers that take very little, if any human input and run whole systems. In general when you send a message to the computer, you're not sending it to the hardware, but the software. That software converts and organizes your input to interface with the hardware, manipulating the gates to open and close as needed. These signals are then converted back into instructions that are passed up to display a result that is understandable to people. Its really quite magical and awe inspiring when you realize what is produced from the machine.

However, the question of who created the computer and its software does not deny that it is purely physical. AI has learning models now that garner new information and come up with new results based purely on its own failures. Here's a summary of AI and machine learning if you're interested. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4RixMPF4xis

And that is the key difference between a computer and a human. For a computer, there's nothing more the file could be. It isn't "like anything" to be a computer. But we have a different experience, which gives rise to all of the problems discussed on this thread. — J

Are you sure? That's a VERY important part of the hard problem. You can't claim to know what the subjective experience is of something. We can claim that something does not have consciousness only by its behavior. We cannot make any claims to its subjective experience. With AI we already have programs that have limited types of consciousness. We have autonomous drones that automate reactions based on information. Yes, it is not human consciousness, but it is at the very least beyond the consciousness of a bug like a roach.

You have to understand, if you accept the hard problem as true, you can NEVER state, "Computers do not have a subjective experience." You don't know. Can you be a computer processing AI algorithms? Nope. So if we create a machine and program that exhibits all the basic behaviors of consciousness, you have no idea if it has a subjective experience or not.

Incidentally, what would constitute evidence of this claim? What would you be looking for? — Wayfarer

Outstanding question. I did a summary of three points for someone else who asked the same question earlier in this thread. Of course, its not limited to that. Let me find and repaste them here.

1. Consciousness is able to exist despite a lack of physical capability to do so.

For example, move your consciousness apart from your head where it sits into the next room that you cannot currently see.

2. Demonstrate a conscious entity that has no physical or energetic correlation.

For example, prove that a completely brain dead body is conscious. Or Inebriate someone to a high blood alcohol level and demonstrate that their consciousness is completely unaffected.

3. If consciousness is not matter and/or energy, please demonstrate evidence of its existence without using a God of the Gaps approach.

An inability to pinpoint the exact physical workings of consciousness does not negate that it is physical. We understand that a car needs an engine to run like a body needs a brain to be conscious. I don't have to understand electromagnetism to understand that a car needs an engine to run, and I don't need to understand the full mechanics of how the brain works to understand you need a brain to be conscious (in humans at least).

It is because he considers only rational agents to have the sufficient freedom to obey their own representational laws as opposed to the laws of nature.

I say all minds have sufficient freedom to do it, we just don’t have the same amount each. — Bob Ross

That's fair. The only potential problem I see is how to justify eating or using animals for materials or labor. Beyond animals, there's now also the question of insects. Do they have minds? Where does a mind begin and end? If we can't treat them as solely means, then do we have a right to eat them?

Of course, this has been answered in other cultures. Jainism preaches that we should never kill animals. I suppose the FIS can note its a necessary evil, but that still leads to points of comparison. Why are animals and insects ends in themselves but clearly have less value compared to people? Its an assumption we all agree upon, but I don't know if there's a clear explanation from the FET and FIS alone.

#1 is proven by the argument for FET: if one is rational, then they cannot treat a mind as solely a means towards an end without conceding a contradiction. — Bob Ross

The only issue is that P2: Person's are ends in themselves isn't proven, its more of a given assumption. Which is fine when you're trying to prove a point. If minds are ends in themselves, then we can say x,y,z. But it all hinges on the reader accepting that a mind is an end in itself and that ends in themselves matter. For a person who already agrees or does not want to question this, it can work. This is more of an apologetics philosophy for morality then a paper of proof.

Apologetics in Christianity is an approach of the religion to the common moral person. Its target audience is a person who wants to believe in God, or has a few upper level hang ups about God. Generally apologetics make a lot of assumptions and don't worry about proving a lot of their premises, only drawing conclusions from these assumptions. I think apologetics serve a very good purpose. They get a person who doesn't need or want to think too deeply about the topic to more easily make better decisions in their lives. Same with the paper you've put here. For someone who already believes in morality and wants to be moral, its a rationale to continue to do so. Not all of us are crazy people who want to dive headlong into writing and questioning the nature of "what is" for days on end. :D

Do you agree, Philosophim, with FET and FIS? Or are you just granting them as internally coherent? — Bob Ross

I'm granting them as acceptably internally coherent. For me, its not enough to state that FET and FIS are 'the' moral theory. Its not that I don't think minds are the greatest things that can be, its the 'end in themselves' argument that isn't enough for me. Why is it important to be a end in itself? What does that even mean? (I know you've answered this, just showing my thought process) Why is it that we have value and morality at all? I'm the type of person that can accept a set of assumptions that lead to a conclusion, but then I have to question the assumptions after. I have to know Bob. And its not that I can't be moral in the meantime or hold a set of values until I find out more. It just has to go deeper.

We've been discussing the objective morality proposal in another thread, so you can see how deep this goes for me. That being said, I want to emphasize again that I find value in these topics. We have all levels of different people in life, and a theory like this could fit someone's personality to give a little justification and happiness in being moral. If it is this or being thrown into moral nihilism, its better to have this any day!

I take a much more naturalistic approach: I say nature, especially evolution, makes no leaps. It is clear to me that the vast majority of animals (although I don’t know about literally all of them) have sufficient freedom to set out a means towards their end, even if they lack the highly rational capacities we humans have. My dog clearly is not rational, but she has her moments: if the matt is wet outside, then she will wait farther back for me to let her in so that her feet don’t get wet. That’s a deliberate action sparked by her making a free choice to not get her feet wet and trying to actualize that prevention by setting out waiting farther back as a means towards that end. Anyways, I am a compatiblist when it comes to free will and don’t believe in souls. — Bob Ross

These are my thoughts as well. Kant came from an era where it was still too easy to dismiss animals as having any worth, and I believe he's a victim of that culture. I often wonder how the culture I've been raised to think in affects my own outlook, and if in a few generations from now they will look back on my thoughts as barbaric or hopelessly naive. :) Anyway, good discussion Bob! I hope Mww comes along and gives it a good read.

It's physical in some respects, but the salient point, our understanding of what is being said, the expression of intentional meaning - that is not a physical process. — Wayfarer

But where is the evidence that its not? I don't mind the declaration, but there has to be evidence. If my brain bleeds do I not have a stroke? If I'm the part of my brain that processes sight is damage, my eyes work, but I cannot see anymore. If I drink alcohol, won't my words start slurring and I start thinking that the jerk to my left is really "A schtand up guy?"

The interpretation of meaning. The constant, underlying, subliminal processes of 'this means that', 'this is that', 'this word has that meaning' - otherwise known as judgement. That is not a physical process. — Wayfarer

But we can take things that impair our judgement, and this is because these substances affect the brain. If judgement was not a physical process, then nothing physical should be able to affect the process correct? Now I could grant that perhaps there is a third non-physical component that could act with the physical brain. I can get behind the idea. But do we have any evidence of this third non-physical component? If it interacts with the physical, then we can get evidence of it.

That is why Thomist philosophy (and Christianity generally) sees the human as a compound of body and soul (or psyche). Not that the soul exists objectively, but as the animating intelligence which makes the grasp of meaning possible. — Wayfarer

Again, this is a wonderful idea. But it has no evidence. I don't mind someone stating, "Its possible this idea is true, and we may find evidence for it in the future." But until evidence is found, it can make no factual declarations of its own, only suppositions.

I can have no justification for trusting a reasoning capacity I have as a consequence of natural selection, unless I am justified in trusting it simply in itself -- that is, believing what it tells me, in virtue of the content of the arguments it delivers. — Thomas Nagel, op cit

Then Nagel misunderstands natural selection. Natural selection is merely a note that species which survive in the world to the point of procreation continue on their genes. Rationality is a capturing and understanding of the world that allows planning and use of that reality accurately. Those that are not rational do not accurately capture reality, and if this inaccuracy is too high they would not be able to handle the dangers reality throws at them.

But the recognition of logical arguments as independently valid is a precondition of the acceptability of an evolutionary story about the source of that recognition. This means that the evolutionary hypothesis is acceptable only if reason does not need its support. At most it may show why the existence of reason need not be biologically mysterious. — Thomas Nagel, op cit

Again, he's missing the point. If we evolved to survive in reality, then logic necessarily reflects reality in the most accurate way we know. It all starts with, "Assume A" Can A be not A at the same time? No. And reality matches that. Logic is not an innate thing floating around existence. Its a well proven tool to accurately evaluate our ideas in a way that intends to match reality.

That's fine, but I'm not seeing why that denies the foundational question of all 'should's' "Should there be existence or not?"

(Me) It is because the very nature of objective morality contradicts your position, unless you are contending with my outline of its nature.

(You) I already outlined it, and you dismissed it as “abstract”; but that is not a valid counter. Either objective morality is like I described or I am misunderstanding it and you have a different view of it. — Bob Ross

How does it contradict it Bob? I missed or misunderstood what you were saying then.

Sure, if that is what you mean by “foundation”, but moral judgments are made true by a state-of-affairs which exist mind-independently; and this contradicts your position that the chain of reasoning boils down to the Hamlet question because, like I said, any given moral judgment will be grounded in the morally relevant state-of-affairs that make them true, which would never be existence itself. — Bob Ross

Ok, noting that moral judgements are true, and the definition of truth, doesn't deny the point I'm making. That's just a description of what is true. The contradiction that I point out in the binary demonstrates that within the state of affairs in which we choose between there should, or should not be existence, we are left with the only logical option being, "It should exist".

and this contradicts your position that the chain of reasoning boils down to the Hamlet question because, like I said, any given moral judgment will be grounded in the morally relevant state-of-affairs that make them true, which would never be existence itself. — Bob Ross

Why is it that the state of existence can never be a moral judgement grounded in the relevant state of affairs between existence and nothing existing? I mean, we're here, and we have to make a moral judgement. The objective judgement would be the true decision between whether there should be existence or not right?

Hypotheticals are a disengagement from the discussion that will go nowhere.

This makes no sense to me. If you claim that every moral claim boils down to the Hamlet question and I explain that your assumption of objective morality entails that it boils down to a state-of-affairs (that exists mind-independently) (as per the nature of morality being objective), then I have demonstrated your claim to be false. — Bob Ross

I'm not saying that particular claim is a hypothetical, just when you were noting "If someone did x". The problem is I'm not seeing how the foundation of all true moral judgements negates the ultimate moral question of, "Should there be existence?"

So I would simply ask, "Why is this proven objectively?" Then they would need to give me a foundational reason why

That reason is that it corresponds with a state-of-affairs that exists mind-independently in reality—that’s where the foundation of the justification of the moral claim would come from, which can’t ever be existence itself: a state-of-affairs is an arrangement of existent things. — Bob Ross

And we're talking about the arrangement in which there is at least one existence, or no existence. To first speak about whether existence should be arranged a certain way we must first answer why there should be existence at all. This is the state of affairs. I'm not seeing the issue.

If morality is objective, then it is necessarily the case that “why should babies even exist?” is completely irrelevant to the truth that “one should not torture babies” as a moral fact. — Bob Ross

Why is it necessarily the case? I don't see that at all. I would think that a key building block to demonstrate why one shouldn't torture babies is that they should exist? After all, one could say, "Fine, I'll end the baby without pain then." You didn't torture a baby, but you thought it didn't deserve to exist. We're looking for the objective why behind that. We can't just claim something necessarily is known, it must be proven.

I am not arguing against moral realism, we are presupposing it. That’s what it means for morality to be objective: moral realism is true. If you don’t want to import that term, then just swap out ‘moral realism’ in my responses for ‘objective morality’: I am using them interchangeably. — Bob Ross

There's a very good reason I'm not using the term moral realism. It might not be true. At least, many of the tenants and contexts of it. When speaking about a foundation we should not be concerned where we are going. We're just concerned about noting the foundation first. If that is solid, we build from there. We might end up in moral realism, or not. We're starting super small first, so we assume nothing beyond it.

Your claim is that there is a contradiction with this, and there isn’t. I am using a hypothetical because that’s the game we are currently playing: if I grant moral is objective and reality has an objective moral judgment such that “nothing should exist”, then nothing should exist. This hypothetical invalidates your claim that “nothing should exist” results in a contradiction. I don’t need to go beyond the hypothetical to prove that. — Bob Ross

Lets take it in the reverse case. "if I grant morality is objective and reality has an objective moral judgment such that “something should exist”, then something should exist." That has the same weight and backing as your argument. Basically the hypothetical is equivalent to, "Maybe there's something objective that notes that reality should or shouldn't exist." Your hypothetical is the question Bob. This isn't an answer or counter. Its the same exact question just using different words. "Should there be existence, or shouldn't there?"

So if you believe there is an objective reason why there shouldn't be existence, you can't 'presuppose it exists'. Just like I can't presuppose there's a reason why there 'should be existence'. We're proving it. So far I've presented that its logically impossible for a reason to exist that existence should not exist. If you think this is wrong, then you must prove that there exists a reason that existence should not exist. If you can't, then we go by what we have remaining: logic.

But they're not. A sentence or a proposition is not a physical thing which is not meaningfully explicable in terms of physical laws. Language, for instance, is the subject of semiotics, linguistics, and other disciplines, but nothing within physics addresses any of that. — Wayfarer

There may be a difference in definition between what we're intending. "Physics" is one aspect of the physical world. Language is another. It is the complex interplay using vibrations through the air to communicate an idea within a brain to another brain in such a way as both brains can share a context. This can further be expressed as physical scribbles on a piece of paper, or electronic pixels on a monitor.

When you read these words, you will interpret their meaning and compose a reaction (or not). That reaction has some physical elements - like the keys you depress to type, the appearance of letters on the screen - but the core is negotiating meanings, and that is not a physical process. — Wayfarer

Of course its a physical process. You are physically typing, the physical transfer of binary information across the internet to my TV hooked up to my computer. I will read it with my physical eyes, my physical brain will process the information, and I'll type a physical reply. If I'm wrong, where am I wrong? What is the non-physical part? A sub-space where my consciousness resides? You don't blink at the idea of a computer physically processing ideas, why do you blink at a physical human brain doing that?

Even if we allow that "a physical thought" isn't question-begging (it seems so to me), we still have to explain how an idea that depends on no particular brain for its instantiation can be called physical. — J

First, the default from all the evidence we have is that thoughts are physical. There is zero evidence that they are something different from matter and energy. You only feel that way. Second, are computers not physical then? I can send a file from my computer to another. Does that mean the file isn't a set of physical 1's and zeros on my hard drive? Of course it is. Its obvious.

However, physical studies of the brain invariably fail to capture the subjective dimension of existence. In other words, this claim entirely overlooks the original point of this thread. — Wayfarer

No, I'm not contrasting what I stated earlier. I agree. It is impossible to objectively capture subjective experience.

Likewise, thought-contents, such as the meaning of propositions, can be represented in many different languages, systems, configurations of ideas, all the while retaining their meaning, — Wayfarer

And all of these are physical things. "Hi" and "Olah" both mean a greeting with the physical difference of intonation and spelling. They do not exists as some platonic form out there in a sub-space. I can translate base ten into base 2, and it exists in base 2 with its own set of particular laws. It is equivalent in many ways, but different in the physical implementation of the system.

↪Philosophim To assume that I am both conscious and just a physical thing and then to conclude that consciousness is just a physical thing would surely be begging the question. — NotAristotle

In classical rhetoric and logic, begging the question or assuming the conclusion (Latin: petītiō principiī) is an informal fallacy that occurs when an argument's premises assume the truth of the conclusion. -https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Begging_the_question

I have presented clear evidence and asked you to address one of three points that would bring some evidence for your claim that consciousness is not a physical thing. I am not begging the question, you are. If you believe it is true that consciousness is not physical, please demonstrate it.

I too think that consciousness is likely a physical (specifically, biological) phenomenon, but we're being awfully sloppy here, in our talk about what "makes" a physical thing. Consider: Is Sherlock Holmes a physical thing? Everything that could possibly be said to comprise him is physical, but what about SH himself? I find it bizarre and counter-intuitive to say that SH, and any other World 3* phenomenon, must be called physical simply because a physical system produces it. — J

Fantastic point. The definition of "What is physical" is paramount for any discussion, and can lead to disagreements of context instead of intent" I consider the physical universe to be matter and energy. Thoughts are physical, and this is backed by studies of the brain. Remove the neurons and the chemical communication; you can't have thought.

"What is Sherlock Holmes?" is a question loaded with implicit details. So we make it simple and state, "What is Sherlock Holmes as an idea?" Its a physical thought that describes a fictional brilliant detective who has some drug and anti-social issues. We have the capability as intelligent beings to create a imagined scenario within the world. Its very similar to your computer code processing things, then ultimately displaying a process on your monitor. The code can process things that could not be displayed on the TV (reality), but when it wants to display on the TV it has to follow the physical limitations of the monitor. All of it is physical.

I am talking about minds, as ‘persons’ to me is a ‘being with personhood’ which, in turns, just entails that the being ‘has a mind’. I did re-google of the term ‘person’ and it seems to exclusively tend to pertain to humans, so I will rewrite the argument with ‘mind’ instead of ‘person’ to more clearly convey the point. — Bob Ross

Seems fine to me. Since this is based off of Kant, it might help to contrast your reasoning with why Kant chose rational minds. I explored Kant years ago and do not remember much at this point.

So, I got rid of that ‘value’ language in the argument because I don’t think it really matters. If you can’t treat an end as merely a means, then it doesn’t matter if you find it invaluable or not: you will treat it as though it is anyways.

So the argument is just FET, which is just that one cannot use a mind as solely a means towards an end but also must treat it simultaneously as an end in itself; and this is demonstrated in the (new) proof by teasing out a contradiction. — Bob Ross

This is also fine. You're taking Kant's stance with a change in detail about minds. Its well documented enough you don't have to go into the justification of the FET unless someone has a problem with Kant.

Can we justify killing an animal to eat it and survive if they are a means to us and an end to themself? If ends to themselves are invaluable, how do we justify killing and eating cows over killing and eating other humans?

This is also addressed in the OP: my answer is yes if it is for the reason of nourishment, not things like taste. I can go through the argument if you would like for why that would be the case. This is another distinguishing factor between me and Kant. — Bob Ross

I think this fits in fine with the FIS. The FIS nicely follows if the FES holds up. Also, an animal is not a person. So no need to go into any more detail for me. :)

The problem with removing value entirely is that questions of relative sacrifice no longer have any justification.
— Bob Ross

If one is really taking FET seriously, then even in situations where they must violate it they should still be considering FIS which is a pragmatic formula that is centered around sanctity of minds, and it is a simple question: what action can I perform that would progress best towards a world with maximal sovereignty of minds (persons)? — Bob Ross

I think this solves the majority of the issues I mentioned. Any mind which took away sovereignty from other minds would be less valuable in a relative forced moral decision.

Anytime we run into a case that conflicts with what most people would innately feel is a simple moral choice and conclusion, the theory needs to clearly and persuasively explain why we should logically dismiss that conclusion.

I don’t think we should dismiss that conclusion at all. — Bob Ross

Sorry, I should have been more clear. Only if your moral decision contrasts with the general expected outcome, then one should explain why the theory necessitates the dismissal of the general expected outcome. I agree that if the proposed moral theory coincides with the expected outcome, its great to walk through it.

I don’t understand the first question, but my answer to the second is that they would be violating FET if they did all else being equal. If it is a moral antinomy, then they may be right depending on the facts in relation to FIS (in principle); but I would intuit that we would be regressing my removing human beings inalienable rights, so I would say in the case of humans we are best off (for the sake of getting to a maximal sovereignty state) to keep rights inalienable. — Bob Ross

Basically I was asking how do we tell a person who rationally justifies murdering another person that they're wrong? As to your second point, the problem really comes into play with justifying the FET's fundamental point that minds are ends in themselves. Why is this necessarily so? How do you demonstrate that a person who rationally justifies that they don't care about ends to themselves and thus don't care about how minds are treated?

So I think this is in a lot better place, I just noted two questions to consider.

1. Can you prove that any of us should care about people as ends in themselves?
2. Can you make a clear contrast with how Kant determines its rational beings to consider in the FET with your line of reasoning that it should be minds?

Other then that, I think its just Kant stuff, and I'm sure a Kantian will come along and be able to provide more feedback. Nicely done Bob!

I am saying that one could decide that they should do something without any reason to do it. — Bob Ross

The reason they decide they should do something then is because they want to. Which is fine. That would be a subjective morality. 'Should' means there is a consideration between at least two options. When you say, "I should choose A' you implicitly mean, "I should not choose B". If there is no option, there is no should, and there is no morality.

I'm not stating that one has to use the objective morality I'm proposing. I'm just noting that if there is an objective morality, this is what it must logically be. Just because a tool exists, doesn't mean you have to use it.

My point is not that Platonism is true, my point is that moral facts are true in virtue of them corresponding to a state-of-affairs that exist mind-independently — Bob Ross

That's fine, but I'm not seeing why that denies the foundational question of all 'should's' "Should there be existence or not?"

And this I think is the true disagreement: the chain of reasoning ends once sufficient reasons are provided for justifying the claim, not when one gets to a foundation. — Bob Ross

That's the definition of a foundation Bob. When there are no more questions and reasons to be given, you have a foundation. That must be proved.

“one ought not torture babies” is that there is a mind-independently existing state-of-affairs which makes that sentence true. Therefore, if they demonstrate sufficiently that there is such a state-of-affairs, then thereby the statement is true and that is the end of the reasoning and justification for that claim. — Bob Ross

Again, this is all abstract. You keep presenting, "But if they demonstrate sufficiently..." as an argument against what I'm noting. Prove it. Hypotheticals are a disengagement from the discussion that will go nowhere. Give me the justified state of affairs that answers questions all the way to the foundation why one "ought not to torture babies," without demonstrating why we don't need to answer the question of why babies should exist in the first place. You can say, "I can't prove it at this time, so I'll go with what you have for now. It doesn't mean I like it though." That's fine. But if you don't have something concrete, let it go so we can move onto more important parts.

There’s no need to ask “but should I exist?”. As a moral realist would put by denoting sentences in quotes vs. states-of-affairs in non-quotes, if one ought not torture babies, then “one ought not torture babies”. — Bob Ross

But we're talking about objective morality. So I would simply ask, "Why is this proven objectively?" Then they would need to give me a foundational reason why. If I asked, "Why should babies even exist? If they don't exist, they can't be tortured." what would be the answer? You cannot give a subjective answer to a question about objective morality. If we're talking with the assumption that an objective morality exists to find what it would necessarily have to be, you must give me an objective answer. We are not debating at this moment whether there is objective morality. Subjective morality is not in the in the discussion. Within the chain of 'should's' when examining an objective morality, indicate to me why objectively it cannot boil down to the fundamental question I've noted.

Yeah, I see what you mean, but that has nothing to do with any chain of reasoning, from a moral realists’ perspective, for why one ought to do anything. — Bob Ross

We're not talking about moral realism. We're talking about the logical conclusions one has to reach if an objective morality exists.

I get that you are conveying that we can ask further morally loaded questions beyond “should I torture babies?” and if they are more fundamental than “should I torture babies?” and they conflict, then we would presumably go with the more fundamental one. — Bob Ross

Not quite. The fundamental answer to, "Why should humans exist?" Doesn't on its own explain why we should help someone who's sick. But that answer is part of the necessary building blocks to objectively build up to the final question. So lets say someone gave an answer why you shouldn't torture babies, but that answer conflicted with why people should exist. Yes, that particular answer would be contradicted. It doesn't mean that there isn't an answer to why we shouldn't torture babies, its just that answer must not contradict the fundamental answer to why babies should exist.

So if ‘I shouldn’t exist’ is true and ‘I should go stop that person from torturing babies’, then perhaps I would just kill myself instead of stopping them; and you seem to be just trying to ask “what’s the most fundamental question of morality?” and concluding: “it is to be or not to be”. Is that what you are saying? — Bob Ross

No, its more like the question about torturing babies is algebra, but we haven't analyzed the nature of what the number 1 is yet. When talking about morality without the fundamentals, we're students being taught advanced math without understanding the why behind it. The point is to find the fundamental. The fundamental in itself will not lead to the answer in algebra, but it will lead to why we do algebra and give us an understanding of why the question is right, not just because we followed a series of instructions we did not fully understand.

So it seems like you are presupposing that there must exist something, which is implied by morality being objective — Bob Ross

Not quite. I am noting that there if there is an objective morality, there is a fundamental 'should' of what should be. There are two options. Either existence should not be, or it should be. The contradiction comes in when I claim that the should, is that existence should not be. But if I claim, "Existence should not be," then the existence of, "Existence should not be," should not be. Meaning all we are logically left with is, "Existence should be".

If I am even remotely close here to the argument, then I would say that the flaw is that the current reality is what dictates what is objectively wrong, and so if there was a state-of-affairs such that there should be nothing, then “there should be nothing” would be true and there would be no contradiction. — Bob Ross

I don't understand what you mean by 'current reality'. There is either existence, or there is not. The question is should there be existence, or should there not. To say something should, is to have a reason why A is preferable to B.

You note here, "...if there was a state-of-affairs such that..." This is a hypothetical again. No if. Is there, or is there not a state of affairs in which there should be nothing? Remember, we're at the last question. Its do or die! What I show is that if we choose, "There should not be" it leads to a contradiction in which the only remaining option is that there should be existence.

Because, again, consciousness is not a physical thing. I am happy to grant that, physically speaking, there are entire organisms, there are atoms, there are neurons and brains, etc. But where in the physical world is consciousness? Answer: it's not there, it is nowhere to be found in the physical world. — NotAristotle

Of course its a physical thing. You're conscious right? Are you a physical thing? I honestly find it bizarre that people think otherwise, and I don't quite understand it. The water analogy is EXACTLY the same thing. You not wanting to believe it does not deny the three points I wrote. Answer at least one of those and you have a point. Otherwise, its just a wish or desire, not a fact.

I think the hard problem is not answering why consciousness is a physical manifestation, but why a physical manifestation should result in consciousness. — NotAristotle

Written this way, I can accept that as well. For example, why does oxygen and hydrogen make water? Why is there existence at all? These are hard problems that may not have an answer besides, "It just does."

The consciousness cannot be accounted for in physical terms because consciousness is not a physical thing. — NotAristotle

Your former point does not lead to the later. That would be like me saying that water is not a physical thing because I don't understand why the combination of hydrogen and oxygen make it happen. That's ridiculous. Consciousness is clearly a physical thing. Please show me an example of consciousness that can arise without any matter or energy involved. Here are some examples that could work.

1. Consciousness able to exist despite a lack of physical capability to do so.

For example, move your consciousness apart from your head where it sits into the next room that you cannot currently see. I am unable to do so.

2. Demonstrate a conscious entity that has no physical or energetic correlation.

For example, prove that a completely brain dead body is conscious. Or Inebriate someone to a high blood alcohol level and demonstrate that their consciousness is completely unaffected.

3. If consciousness is not matter and/or energy, please demonstrate evidence of its existence without using a God of the Gaps approach.

An inability to pinpoint the exact physical workings of consciousness does not negate that it is physical. We understand that a car needs an engine to run like a body needs a brain to be conscious. I don't have to understand electromagnetism to understand that a car needs an engine to run, and I don't need to understand the full mechanics of how the brain works to understand you need a brain to be conscious (in humans at least).

Our inability to understand how an engine works or how a brain works does not give us justification to claim, "A car or a brain running is not physical".

What I meant is that without defining what a non-simulated world is
— Philosophim

But I just did this? A world is a set of objects in a space. The question is whether it emerges from information processing or not. — Hallucinogen

My apologies then, I misunderstood or misread your intentions. I'll give it another read.

1. Any simulation of a world either operates mechanically in physical space (e.g., in a computer) or is the result of information processing in a mind (e.g., a programmer’s mind). — Hallucinogen

A non-simulated world is a set of objects in space. But if that's the case, then a simulated world is not a set of objects in space. Seems clear. But premise one doesn't address this. It notes that a simulation runs in either a non-simulated world, or a mind. These really aren't separate issues though. A mind is not itself a simulation right? Meaning that it is a non-simulated bit of reality that simulations can run in. Is this what you intended, or did you intend for minds to be simulations themselves?

2. The success of digital physics and the holographic principle imply that physical space is an emergent 3D representation of information processing. — Hallucinogen

It doesn't imply that the world is not a set of objects in space however. The simulations we run result in simulated outcomes. An accurate simulation of a non-simulated world can be applied to a non-simulated world without difficulty. I can simulate what will happen to an apple if I drop it using equations, then actually drop the apple. If the simulation is accurate, the apple will drop within a small margin of error of the simulation. That doesn't mean the world is simulated, it just means that simulation of the actual world is accurate. This same point applies to point 3.

4. From (2) and (3), the information processing from which physical space is emergent is scientifically indistinguishable from the information processing that occurs in a mind. — Hallucinogen

All that we can conclude from this is that our simulations of the world accurately reflect how our minds function. I suppose it really depends on your definition of mind. Are minds part of a non-simulated world, or are minds simulated themselves?

5. Restating (1) in terms of (4), our world is either scientifically indistinguishable from the result of information processing in a mind, or it is the result of information processing in a mind. — Hallucinogen

I'll repeat what I noted earlier. The only way you can validly claim 4 is based on one is to state, "A simulated world is either..." Because that's what you stated in 1. An accurate simulation of a world will accurately portray how the non-simulated world functions. There has to be something non-simulated to simulate right? Otherwise there isn't a non-simulated world, and thus the simulation cannot be accurate or inaccurate, it just is. But if it is an accurate simulation, it is not indistinguishible because it lacks the key property that you defined a non-simulated world as being: A set of objects in space. If a simulated world is a set of objects in space, then it is not a simulated world.

I hope this better reflects what you were trying to state. Please correct me where I've misinterpreted the issue.

My advice is to drop the terminology entirely. Some words and concepts become so overloaded by debate, nitpicks, and lack of consensus that they're impossible to make head roads with and become worthless in discussion. You can convey your ideas that you want in an argument without using the terminology, so that's what I would do.

I am noting that one could, which is what I thought your claim was: are you just saying that the word explodes into triviality if we do? Because I agree with that. — Bob Ross

One can do anything. But should they? Once again though, we're really not talking about what a person can or should do yet. We're talking about the simple question of whether there should be existence or not.

If there is no objective morality, then there is no 'should' for anything. If there is, then there must exist a 'should'. The assumption here is that there is an objective morality, because we're trying to work out what that would entail if there was. After all, we can't argue for or against an objective morality if we don't know what it would actually be first.

But this isn’t relevant to your claim: it was that all chains of reasoning biol down to “to be or not to be?”, which is clearly false if the chain of reasoning about “should I torture babies?” bottoms out at a platonic form. — Bob Ross

Can you prove that it is?

I understand, but your argument claimed in one of its points that all chains of reasoning go back to “to be or not to be?”, but if “one should help the sick” is true then it would follow from that that “one should exist” which means that the former is more foundational in this example than the latter (morally: obviously not ontologically). — Bob Ross

You're making an abstract thought experiment into a concrete proof. Unless you can prove that Platonism is the end all be all foundation of what should be, this is not a valid point. If you believe that all questions of 'should' do not boil down to the question of whether existence should be or not, please put forward a proof, not a "But what if".

Sure, you can then start a new chain of reasoning by questioning why that platonic form should exist, but this example violates your claim, no? — Bob Ross

If I can continue to ask why should Platonic forms exist, and that reason lies beyond Platonic forms, that is the continuation of the chain, not a new chain. A chain only ends when you arrive at a foundation. A foundation has no prior explanation for its being, it simply exists. When you find a foundation in the line of 'should' questioning, there will be no prior reason to its foundation.

I understand, but your argument claimed in one of its points that all chains of reasoning go back to “to be or not to be?”, but if “one should help the sick” is true then it would follow from that that “one should exist” which means that the former is more foundational in this example than the latter (morally: obviously not ontologically). — Bob Ross

This is the intention I'm trying to convey. If "One should help the sick, one should exist." "Well why should the sick be helped?" Because they should live. "Why should a person live?" And to answer that you must answer the question of, "Why should anything live?" And to answer that you must answer the question of "Why should anything exist?" You're looking up higher for the answers to the questions of why a castle should be built a certain way without first asking the question of why a castle should be built at all.

You said that “there should be nothing” entails a contradiction, and you presented that ABC argument for it; and I was noting that your argument did not succeed in demonstrating a logical contradiction in positing “there should be nothing”. — Bob Ross

I did not read that from your initial post as you seemed to agree with the propositions and conclusion I had put forward. I'll go back to it again.

A. There exists a reason that nothing should exist.
B. If that is the case, then the reason that nothing should exist, should not exist.
Therefore, there should not exist a reason that justifies non-existence.

There’s no logical contradiction in that syllogism, and I wholly agree with its form. — Bob Ross

You may have forgotten the assumption that we're currently making. That is that an objective morality exists. This means that there is some foundation for 'should'.

After noting point A as a proposition, we go to B. So if it is the case that nothing should exist, it requires that there be a reason that exists. The reason that exists is, "Nothing should exist". If it is the case that nothing should exist, then the reason, "Nothing should exist" should not exist. Thus the conclusion. It is a contradiction for there exist the reason, "Nothing should exist". For if the reason is to exist, there should must be existence.

Since we are assuming that there is an objective existence and that there is a 'should', this leaves us with the only other option in our binary, that existence should be. I hope that clears it up Bob.

Thanks for the answers Bob! I think you tightened up the argument a bit, I'll point out the remaining issues I see.

That’s fair. It opens up the discussion back to metaethics; but I just wanted to make it clear that this theory was building off of the previous one, so one has to subjectively affirm ‘one ought to be rational’—there is not moral fact which makes it so. — Bob Ross

I understand from your point of view, but for the reader, its not relevant what your argument is here. I've found philosophical arguments can, and must, be treated as 'chunks'. Partly this helps keep focus on what is important to the current argument. The idea, "People ought to be rational" is really the only part we need to know to examine the argument you've presented here. Whether that conclusion is subjective or objective is irrelevant and can distract from the point you want to make.

You've probably seen me do this multiple times in our discussions. You'll be talking about something farther down the line of the argument I'm making, or questioning things that are not yet relevant to the argument at hand. When that happens, I try to bring you back to the chunk we're on first. First let people see the argument you want to discuss, not the one you don't want to discuss yet. If your argument works, then you can go back and address whether "We ought to be rational" is subjective or objective.

This lets us 'chunk' the discussions into manageable bits. When you bring in another pre-chunk, you'll find people will ignore the main point you're trying to make here and drag in, "Well why should we be rational?" That's not the point here. I only say this from the bruises I have from my own experience. =)

Persons are ends in themselves because they have the capacity to set out means towards ultimately themselves as the end; thusly, they are ends in themselves. — Bob Ross

I could agree with you if you stated minds, which would include insects, animals, and potentially plants. From animals at least we have clear evidence that animals such as crows and dogs for example, can have ends in mind that they set out towards. I think this is in line with what you want to say, but correct me if I'm wrong here.

If you don’t believe that persons are ends in themselves, then, of course, the conclusion will not follow. — Bob Ross

Ok, I am more than willing to state that minds are beings that can plan means for ends in themselves and see where this goes. After all, a rock has no plan for its own ends; it simply exists.

Firstly, I would just like to note again that I am not arguing that only rational agents have value, because I don not consider all minds to even have the capacity to be rational (in any meaningful sense); or, if they do, it is a stretch. — Bob Ross

I thought that was what you were going for, I just couldn't see how that fit at the time.

Finally, the term 'invaluable' means that it has so much value, it cannot be quantified into one number. It doesn't mean it has no value at all.

That’s fair. I just mean by “we can’t value it” that we cannot put a price on it. — Bob Ross

If that's your intent, all good. The only problem in the theory is proving why minds are invaluable. I happen to agree that minds are the highest values in existence, but for the theory to hold you'll need to prove why minds, even irrational ones, are priced right out of quantification.

That’s fair, and this is why I revised the argument. Hopefully it is a bit clearer now what it is arguing. — Bob Ross

I think it is now.

I am trying to convey that persons are ends in themselves because their nature is such that they are the creators of values (they set out things as means towards their own ends, making them the end ultimately); and if we treat them solely as a means towards an end then we are implicitly conceding the contradiction that they are and are not an end in themselves. So if we are to be rational, then we cannot solely treat someone as means towards an end, but always simultaneously an end in themselves—hence FET. — Bob Ross

Ok, I think this is more clear to me now. There are a few things to tackle to separate yourself from Kant.

1. Minds vs persons. If you want to apply it to all minds, you'll need to place the emphasis on minds instead of persons. As I mentioned earlier, this at the very least means animals. Can we justify killing an animal to eat it and survive if they are a means to us and an end to themself? If ends to themselves are invaluable, how do we justify killing and eating cows over killing and eating other humans?

2. The problem with removing value entirely is that questions of relative sacrifice no longer have any justification. Beyond the animal question, consider this. We have a room with 3 people. An unapologetic murderer, an unapologetic saint, and a regular person. They all must choose one of them to die for the other 2 to live. Currently, your theory has no means of stating that the murderer should be the one to die. Anytime we run into a case that conflicts with what most people would innately feel is a simple moral choice and conclusion, the theory needs to clearly and persuasively explain why we should logically dismiss that conclusion.

3. How do we treat minds that believe the best end to itself, is to end other ends in themselves? Or believes it is rational that the worth of other minds can be quantified as less than its own mind? What I'm noting is that your claim that minds are invaluable is not proven, only claimed. Anytime we claim something without proof, we must immediately realize that someone can claim the opposite to our claim and be just as justified as we are. That makes the argument an opinion, and not an airtight rationale.

Finally, after fully establishing how it minds and not persons that this theory applies to, I would study the general criticisms that people lobby against Kant and see if an how your theory answers or dodges those criticisms.

The bet you referred to, as I understood it, was about the Easy problem.
— Philosophim

Not so. The byline of the article you cite says 'Christof Koch wagered David Chalmers 25 years ago that researchers would learn how the brain achieves consciousness by now.' The bet was lost. — Wayfarer

As I noted, I was a bit uncertain as to my claim. Thank you for the correction.

the neuroscientist believed they would have a neuronal explanation of what causes consciousness. This is the easy problem.
— Philosophim

No, it's not. That is just the problem that hasn't been solved. Again, look at the reference I provided upthread on the neural binding problen. — Wayfarer

Fantastic article, thank you for the reference! They noted there was nothing in the visual part of the brain that could map to a very specific subjective experience of consciousness, namely why we see things in high resolution. This is not the same as not finding neuronal mapping to all subjective experiences.

"There is now overwhelming biological and behavioral evidence that the brain contains no stable, high-resolution, full field representation of a visual scene, even though that is what we subjectively experience (Martinez-Conde et al. 2008). The structure of the primate visual system has been mapped in detail (Kaas and Collins 2003) and there is no area that could encode this detailed information. "

Reading this carefully, there are a few things to note. First, he can say that there is currently no area in the visual system that has been found to encode this detailed information from a book written in 2003. That is true, but not the hard problem. I also did not find a valid reference to his second claim from Martinez-Conde. I looked at his article and found this in the available abstract (I could not find the full article):

"Because all of our visual experience occurs in conjunction with eye movements, understanding their perceptual and physiological effects is critical to understanding vision in general. Moreover, the neural mechanisms underlying perceptual suppression during eye movements may be very important towards narrowing down the neural bases of visual awareness."

"Recent developments have led to new insights through a combination of behavioral, psychophysical, computational and neurophysiological research carried out under conditions that increasingly approach the complex conditions of the natural retinal environment. Among these, fixational eye movement studies comprise a promising and fast-moving field of research. This special issue of Journal of Vision offers a broad compilation of recent discoveries concerning the perceptual consequences of eye movements in vision, as well as the mechanisms responsible for producing stable perception from unstable oculomotor behavior. "

So I'm having a difficult time finding out how the author of the primary article can validly claim his conclusions. I still see the idea of mapping neuronal states to consciousness as the easy problem while being able to scientifically objectify the subjective state of consciousness as the easy problem.

I don't think that there is as strong a correlation as you're claiming. Certainly all of those influences affect the brain, and the state of the brain then affects the nature of conscious experience. But that doesn't amount to proving that consciousness is physical, as it's still not clear what consciousness actually is, other than it is something that, for organisms such as ourselves, requires a functioning brain in order to interact with the sensory domain. — Wayfarer

You and I have touched on this a bit in the past, and I'll refrain from going over them again. To sum, its a difference in approach towards knowledge that you and I take. I'm actually very open to there being alternative reasons for consciousness besides the brain. The thing is, I need evidence. Currently I have found no evidence that provides any indication of consciousness, in humans, without the brain. What would consciousness be if not matter and energy from a neuronal system? Without something concrete to examine, we have an unfalsifiable God of the Gaps consciousness, which I am not interested in. Do we need people like yourself who keep looking for some other evidence of consciousness besides the brain while science grapples with its problems? Absolutely. But until the day something is found, what we can safely claim knowledge to is that consciousness is caused by the brain.

There are also many hugely anomalous cases of subjects with grossly abnormal brains who seem to be able to function (see Man with tiny brain shocks doctors). — Wayfarer

He functions with an IQ of 84. That's the 'normal range' but hardly normal or Einstein. There are brains besides animals that are much smaller than ours, but still conscious. Show me a man without a brain who is conscious and you'll have something.

There is the case of psycho-somatic medicine and the placebo effect, wherein subjects beliefs and emotional states have physical consequences. They can be regarded as being 'top-down causation', in that the effects of beliefs and mental states operate 'downward' on the physical brain. — Wayfarer

Right, but where do beliefs and emotional states come from? The brain. The brain affecting the brain is a well known event. Show me something entirely outside of the physical realm that affects consciousness, and that will be something.

And finally the claim that 'consciousness is physical' is the very subject of the entire argument, and your claims in this regard still suggest, to me at least, that you're not seeing the point of the argument. — Wayfarer

No, the point of the argument is the hard problem. The hard problem has never claimed that consciousness is not physical, if we are regarding physical as matter and energy. Matter and energy has the capability to be conscious if organized right, just like water and hydrogen has the capability to be water if organized right. That's the point of the easy problem, to show that yes, they understand that consciousness is a physical manifestation of the brain. But will we ever be able to map consciousness objectively to what it is like to subjectively be conscious? That seems impossible.

Ah, here it is Bob! I almost missed it. We've already discussed at length on the meta-ethical considerations, but I will dismiss them here.

I ground the entire (normative and applied) ethical theory in one moral judgment: “one ought to be rational”. — Bob Ross

No disagreement with you there. I'll take it as an assumption going forward. The issue comes from the following statement:

There is no moral fact which dictates that one ought to be rational, but any sane person will agree to this moral judgment (subjectively) — Bob Ross

Let me type in a similar sentence and I think you'll see the problem:

"There is no fact that dictates God exists, but any sane person will agree to this judgement."

Claims like this beg challenges and can cause people to dismiss your claims outright. I'm not going to do that of course. I'm just noting that if you want to get to your point, you don't have to make claims like this. A simple "I'm not here to debate why one should choose the subjective start of, 'one ought to do what is rational.' I'm simply going to start with this and show a morality based on rationality." will work fine. So that's what I'm going to do. I'll assume that we take the prime assumption that we ought to act rationally and go from there.

t is important to explicate what exactly is meant by ‘rationality’. By this term I mean ‘the quality of being based in reason and logic’. — Bob Ross

Sounds good.

P1: If something is solely a means towards an end, then it is not an end in itself.
P2: To value something entails it is solely a means towards an end.
C1: To value something entails it is not an end in itself. — Bob Ross

P1 is fine, but how do we get P2? Can I not value an end itself? If I valued world peace, would that not be the end of my means? Can you explain further what you mean by P2?

But ok, lets assume C1 is true regardless for now.

P3: To value something entails it is not an end in itself.
P4: Minds are something.
C2: To value a mind entails that they are not an end in themselves. — Bob Ross

That is fine, but what if I don't value a mind? I'm assuming with the initial premise of "we ought to be rational" that "minds are rational, therefore they should be valued for they ought to be." The problem is you're trying to separate this from Kant, noting that one can have a mind but it not be rational. This leads into the question "Why should minds, even irrational ones, be valued?" If I recall you've given an answer to this long ago, but I don't remember it and I'm not seeing it here. I think it was something along the lines that you considered rational beings beings that had the capacity for rationality, not that they were necessarily rational. Can you clarify that? Onto the next set.

P5: Persons (i.e., beings with personhood) are ends in themselves.
P6: Minds are persons.
C3: Minds are ends in themselves. — Bob Ross

I'm a little confused by P5. Why are persons ends in themselves? Can't I use persons as means to my goals, even benevolently? If I send soldiers out to stop a terrorist, am I not using those soldiers, those people, as means to an end?

For P6, your intended goal was to separate minds from persons so that it can apply to rational agents, not merely persons. If you want to keep with that intention I would reorder P6 to "Persons are minds" or "Persons have minds". With this C3 follows.

P6: One should not accept contradictions as true.
P7: If one values a mind, then they are contradicting themselves (because it concedes that a mind is and is not an end in itself). [ !(C2 ^ C3) ]
C4: One should not value minds. — Bob Ross

I see you're trying a proof by contradiction but you've left out an equally probable conclusion: That persons, and thus minds are means and not ends in themselves. This is because you haven't proven either of the statements, only asserted them. Still, lets continue and assume you can demonstrate C4 as true.

P7: One should not value minds.
P8: To consider a mind valueless is to value them at 0.
C5: One should not consider minds valueless. — Bob Ross

Again I'm going to assume minds have value because they are rational and therefore have innate value. So since we should not consider minds valueless, they have value. And since minds have value, people have value. But then doesn't this prove that people are not ends in themselves?

P9: If one should not value a mind (including a value of 0), then minds should be considered invaluable.
P10: One should not value a mind (including a value of 0).
C6: Minds should be considered invaluable. — Bob Ross

I'm a bit confused again, but are you saying that your conclusion C5 is now being contradicted though P1? That we should consider that minds have value? Then why are we asserting that minds don't have value? Are you stating that not valuing a mind with the representation of 0, is in fact a value? Because that just doesn't work Bob. The number zero is a representation of there not being a quantity. The number zero is not a quantity in itself. The number zero for value is a representation of there being no value, a numeric assignment of zero for value does not mean there exists a value. It means there is no underlying represented value.

Finally, the term 'invaluable' means that it has so much value, it cannot be quantified into one number. It doesn't mean it has no value at all.

From the sheer impossibility (without conceding a contradiction) to value something which creates value, any rational agent is required treat creators of value (i.e., minds: persons) always as simultaneously ends in themselves: as invaluable. It follows from this the sanctity of persons (i.e., of minds) because they are invaluable — Bob Ross

It seems the overall conclusion you want to make out of this is it is impossible to value something that creates value. Since we cannot value an end in itself, we should treat people as so valuable they cannot be quantified into any comparative value? And because we cannot quantify this value, we cannot 'evaluate a value' of them, thus they are ends in themselves?

I think you're trying to say something here, but its just not coming across correctly. It seems to me that when you speak about valuing something, you're talking about a quantative value. For example, lets say we valued a person's worth at 10,000 dollars. If of course we could value people quantitively, then we could use them as means to an end. For example, I could use a person worth 10,000 dollars to make myself 1 million dollars. However, if human value is so valuable as to be beyond quantification, an infinite value so to speak, then we could never use a human as a means to an end. We don't use infinite money to make infinite money, that's silly. We simply enjoy infinite money.

Is that what you were trying to say? This seems to jive with your idea of your formula of ideal sovereignty. If all people are infinitely valuable, sacrificing one infinity for 99 infinities works in the moment of practical necessity, but one infinity is just as equivalent in value to 99 infinities, thus this sacrifice should be abated where possible.

I'm going to stop here for now and let you answer the questions I've posted.

I agree with you. The primary reason, at least in America, why I can see this not being implemented is the long abstinence policy and sexual shame we heap upon teenagers to control them. The only child rearing lesson is typically an assignment in which a person has to lug around a fake baby for a week or two and find out how much of a pain it is to take care of it to discourage young women or men from having unprotected sex, or to abstain entirely.

Not that I think we shouldn't try to lobby such a thing, but there might be a non-insignificant outcry of "the government shouldn't be teaching us how to raise children", and "Why do teenagers need to know how to raise kids? They shouldn't be having them in the first place."

Still, nice points.

You are not describing the HPoC. It's true that nobody/thing can experiences my subjective experiences. But the HP is not that we can't communicate subjective experience; it is how a clump of matter can have them at all. — Patterner

You may have misunderstood that point within the full context of what I was communicating, or I was unclear. It is not that we cannot communicate our subjective experience. Its that we cannot experience another's subjective experience. Meaning that there is no objective way to measure another's subjective experience.

We can very clearly identify and even medically manipulate consciousness. We use anesthesa to put people unconscious. You can drink alcohol, get drunk, and alter your consciousness. Consciousness is clearly physical. How we define consciousness through behavior, and test to understand it at a mechanistic level is the easy problem. Have we fully solved the easy problem? Not at all. Science will likely take centuries to uncover how the brain works at a complete physical level.

The bet you referred to, as I understood it, was about the Easy problem. You can read it here.
https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-023-02120-8 I'm careful to make a full claim on this because this is one article from a news reporter who may not have understood the full subject. But from my understanding, the neuroscientist believed they would have a neuronal explanation of what causes consciousness. This is the easy problem. Even if this is answered, the hard problem of what it is like to experience consciousness for any particular subject will still exist.

" Explaining why consciousness occurs at all can be contrasted with so-called “easy problems” of consciousness: the problems of explaining the function, dynamics, and structure of consciousness. These features can be explained using the usual methods of science. But that leaves the question of why there is something it is like for the subject when these functions, dynamics, and structures are present. This is the hard problem.

In more detail, the challenge arises because it does not seem that the qualitative and subjective aspects of conscious experience—how consciousness “feels” and the fact that it is directly “for me”—fit into a physicalist ontology, one consisting of just the basic elements of physics plus structural, dynamical, and functional combinations of those basic elements. It appears that even a complete specification of a creature in physical terms leaves unanswered the question of whether or not the creature is conscious. And it seems that we can easily conceive of creatures just like us physically and functionally that nonetheless lack consciousness. This indicates that a physical explanation of consciousness is fundamentally incomplete: it leaves out what it is like to be the subject, for the subject. There seems to be an unbridgeable explanatory gap between the physical world and consciousness. All these factors make the hard problem hard."

https://iep.utm.edu/hard-problem-of-conciousness/#:~:text=The%20hard%20problem%20of%20consciousness%20is%20the%20problem%20of%20explaining,directly%20appear%20to%20the%20subject.

However, the fact of my own consciousness is apodictic (beyond doubt) for each of us, is it not? That is the sense that Descartes' cogito is right on the mark, is it not? — Wayfarer

Yes, definitely. The hard problem does not exist for our own selves. For we are the experiencers of that particular locus of matter called the brain. I would be able to measure my brain waves and find out exactly what brain state made me feel what I feel. The problem is, I could never communicate that exact subjective feeling to others in an objective way. The hard problem is not in objectively measuring our own subjective experience with our brains, its in communicating our own subjective experience to another subjective being with an objective means of verification.

Its really really another variation of, "Is the green I see the green you see?" We both have the wavelength of light enter our eyes and processed by our brain a particular way. We both call it green. We could see the process of the brain and wait for each of us to say when we see green. But do we subjectively experience what we each call green exactly the same way? That's something beyond our capability to objectively know.

I would have thought that the distinction between sentient beings and insentient objects is a fundamental not only in philosophy. — Wayfarer

The point of the hard problem is to demonstrate the limits of what we can know about consciousness and sentience in others besides their behavior. Like you said, there is no brain correlate to what a person subjectively feels as pain, only what a person expresses or is observed to be in pain. Logically, this means we cannot state what a person feels like or does not feel like. Meaning, we cannot know the subjective feeling beyond their behavior. This also means we cannot know the subjective feeling despite their behavior.

This leads to the P-zombie. The creature that acts conscious, but we do not know if it subjectively feels conscious. But a P-zombie can sometimes confuse the issue as well, as people get stuck on the behavior. You know the debates. A rock is a more simple way of getting to the heart of the problem by removing the idea of behavior entirely. A rock does not act conscious, but we do not know if it subjectively feels conscious. For if we did know that it does or does not subjectively feel conscious apart from its behavior, then we would have an objective way of telling if something does or does not subjectively feel conscious. That is something we can never know be it rock, bug, animal, plant, or human.

But what it is it like to BE the rock AS the rock?
— Philosophim

I think this demonstrates a failure to grasp the point at issue. — Wayfarer

I appreciate the citation to get the point home, but I think the rock analogy is also useful as well. We know about consciousness through our own behavior and then others mimicking that behavior. But we cannot know what it is like to actually be that other. A rock does not show any behavior of being conscious, and we do not believe a rock can have the experience of a rock, but we cannot know that either.

without first contrasting what a simulation is vs what a non-simulated world is, its mostly circular.
— Philosophim

A world is a set of objects in a space. The decision of whether something is simulated versus non-simulated would rest on whether something emerges from information processing.
I haven't spotted the circularity, could you point it out to me? — Hallucinogen

Sure. What I meant is that without defining what a non-simulated world is, but only defining a simulated world, its turned out like:

A. Its given that the world is simulated.
B. Therefore the world is simulated.

The hard problem of consciousness is largely misunderstood by many people. Its not that mechanics lead to consciousness. We know that. Its uncontroversial except to soul people.

The truly hard problem of consciousness is that we can never objectively test what it is like to be conscious from the subjects view point. Think of it like this, "What is it like to be a rock?" We understand the atomic make up and composition of the rock. But what it is it like to BE the rock AS the rock?

This is unknowable. Same as it is for anyone else but you to know what it is like to be you. We could reproduce your atomic makeup down to the T, but we could never objectively monitor what it is like for the subject itself to feel what it is feeling. We can measure your brain states and after testing say, "When the subject's brain state is X, we have learned this is when the subject feels happy." But we don't know what its like for that subject to be happy. We could learn the mechanics of your brain and body and predict everything you were going to think and say seconds before you thought or said it. But we can never know what its like to be the person with that brain, thinking or saying those thoughts.

As such, its unsolvable. Its simply a limitation of our ability to know. Only if we could erase our self-consciousness, place our self into another consciousness, then retain the memories of that consciousness when we reverted to our own, could we claim to know what its like to be another consciousness. So far, that's impossible.

The primary goal of any philosophical discussion is to be in agreement on clearly defined concepts, or definitions. A dictionary is a fantastic way to start, because it forces the conversation into something that can apply to the language of the user outside of these forums. I've often stated that defining a word too far from the norm is a logical fallacy. Generally its done by people who want the normal emotion evoked from the word, but don't like the logical consequences of the original meaning, so twist it into something they want. We all do it to a degree, its the reason why that can tell us whether its in the wrong or not.

While a dictionary is a great place to start, sometimes the philosophical discussion is about the word itself. Meaning that the current definition has something lacking. If so, the person who wants to change the definition should give a very clear alternative definition, and also why they think it is necessary and enhances the word. This should be the very first step in any philosophical discussion, and oftentimes discussions boil down to whether a person accepts this new definition or not.

That being said, anyone who gives you flak for daring to use a dictionary should be red flagged in your mind. Anyone who resists clear definitions is likely a charlatan who will continue to twist and retwist the meaning any time you think you get a handle on it and it points to a contradiction. Discussing with people like this can be a waste of time, so be careful.

This is different from discussing from someone who is trying to get a clear definition. Such a person will appreciate the dictionary reference, but point out where it lacks, and propose an alternative. Often times this alternative has not been fully explored either, and can gain solid identification through the act of discussion. Arguably, this is the entire goal and purpose of philosophy. Read the intent of the person to see if the discussion is about discovery or "I want to be right and use this word no matter what the underlying definition is".

This is what I wanted you to say. So, since we can imagine or define whatever we want, does that mean there's an any-to-any relationship between the thing defined and the symbol we attach to it (e.g., the meaning, the concept)? — Hallucinogen

It appears we're veering into a discussion of knowledge opposed to the OP about a logically necessary first cause. I've written an extensive knowledge theory here: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/14044/knowledge-and-induction-within-your-self-context/p1

If you want a summary, Caerulea-Lawrence in the first reply wrote a near perfect grasp of the theory. So you can read that first before to see if it sparks your interest to wade in.

Did you mean that the concept of infinity comes from a mind?
— Philosophim
I mean both -- I don't believe anything has a non-mental origination. — Hallucinogen

Interesting, do you mean how we interpret the world is all mental? I don't think anyone would disagree with that. But the world beyond our interpretation doesn't seem mental. If a tree falls in the forest and no one is there, something still happens as a thing in itself. The mental tries to define and create identity in the sea of existence, but the sea of existence is still there whether we are or not.

As the infinite is unprovable
— Philosophim

Would you say that you can decide whatever it is you mean? — Hallucinogen

Let me clarify. There are two things. Definitions, and their application.

I can define a unicorn, but in applying it, I cannot confirm a unicorn exists beyond an idea. We can invent whatever definitions and concepts we want inside of our head. It is their ability to be applied to reality, or their lack, that determine what I meant by 'provability'. So, I can create whatever definition and meaning for that definition I want. But if I cannot apply it to reality, then it is merely an idea and not anything that is provable within reality.

Its a very good question. What I like to consider is first a floor, or minimum standard for a decent human life. What does that entail within a society?

Second, what is that society capable of? Is it still a hunger gatherer society? Does it have modern infrastructure? What is the basic minimum technology needed to perform at this floor within that society?

Third, what is the minimum expected output of work for a human to obtain these things? Such a minimum should not be taxing to the point where the individual suffers undue calculable harm vs the benefits it brings them. In a hunter gatherer society, hunting poses risks, but is necessary to meet the minimum standards of being able to eat.

Fourth, what is the individual capable of doing within society? Are they disabled? Weak? Smart? Strong? We should expect such people to be able to contribute with their strengths, and not push them to work in ways that constantly expose their weaknesses.

As a starting point, I believe a society should work with these ideas in mind. Of course, as others work past these minimum requirements and further technology and outcomes, the floor will rise and things will need to be readjusted. The invention of a wheel chair allows a person who cannot walk new mobility. Medication for psychiatric disorders and let a person function normally. The invention of the internet allows new social connections and immediately accessible knowledge.

Because of this, a maximum ceiling of benefits should only be considered in the case where this prevents the floor from rising, or pushes the floor down for others. Other than that, we need people who push past the floor because it is the only way we rise as a species.

Of course the Alpha does have prior reasoning why it came into existence: itself. — Hallucinogen

I appreciate the read and hope it was enjoyable. We're stating practically the same thing. In the most technical sense, there is nothing prior to the alpha existence's self, so that is why I do not say "prior reason". But this statement : "Inference to the Alpha allows its interior universe to have logical basis on which to explain its own existence and that of the Alpha." is spot on.

Causality isn't infinite but there has to be reasonable grounds on which we include infinity in a model or not. That means that infinity does have a criteria for being explained within a certain structure. Well, we conceptualize infinity and we have minds, so it seems that the infinite has a mind. — Hallucinogen

Did you mean that the concept of infinity comes from a mind? I can agree with that. There is nothing within the infinite itself that indicates it is a 'thing' with a mind. As the infinite is unprovable, as any actual test for the infinite would always reveal more to test, it is a plausible concept, but not a provable reality.

I asked why do normative “moral” claims need a reason and you said because “if there is no reason, then there is no ‘should’”: why?

This seems to imply that I cannot assert “one should not torture babies” without an underlying reason; but I clearly can, no? — Bob Ross

Because that is the nature of 'should' vs 'an action or statement'. I can claim, "One should not torture babies." If you then ask "Why?" there's a reason why we should do X. If I answer, "No reason," then I can come back with, "Well I think we should torture babies". If you ask "Why?" and I answer "No reason." then we shouldn't do X. Why even use the word 'should' at that point?"

If I can claim X should while in the same breath claiming that X should not, then should and should not have no meaning. If should and should not have no meaning, there is no morality. But of course, we're assuming morality exists for now.

No. Again, I think you missed the point: if platonism were true, then “I should not torture babies” does get reasoned down to “why should anything exist?” or “something should exist”: it is true in virtue of a Platonic Form. — Bob Ross

I noted earlier that what I am talking about is a foundation. To prove a foundation exists, you must prove that the foundation is logically true, and that means there is nothing that exists prior. It is true in virtue of its existence and nothing else. I'm assuming we both agree Platonic forms aren't true and not a foundation. If you do believe it to be a true foundation, then please, show me how.

So for example, "Platonism is True because of A. It should exist because it is necessary that Platonic forms exist, and there is no other possible option." If of course there are other options other than Platonic forms, then the chain continues. If you're not seriously demonstrating Platonic forms are the foundation of 'should', just understand we're using "Platonic forms" as an abstract X for a thought experiment about the foundation of 'should' to help you understand the chain.

I think, and correct me if I am wrong, you are noting that whatever moral claims may be true they are not useful to the subject if the subject doesn’t think they should exist; and then you are applying that to existence itself: “to be or not to be?”. But, crucially, it can go the other way around just as easily: “one should help the sick” implies that “one should continue existing”--in this case, the former is not true in virtue of the latter but actually vice-versa. — Bob Ross

No, this has nothing to do with the usefulness to a subject. Humanity isn't even the picture. There is just the question of "Should at least one point of atomic existence be" or "Should nothing be?" That's the foundational question.

But, crucially, it can go the other way around just as easily: “one should help the sick” implies that “one should continue existing” — Bob Ross

Right. Because if I claim, "One should help the sick." A pre-requisite is that one exist. But we're not talking about what one should do at this point. That's a few steps away. We're just talking about the foundation of good if morality is indeed objective.

I think you may have misread my response there: I disagree with you that there is a contradiction in A B C argument you have. — Bob Ross

I never claimed that there was a contradiction.

Therefore, there should not exist a reason that justifies non-existence. — Bob Ross

If objective morality is true (Remember, this is an assumption!), and 'nothingness' has no reason for it to be, then then the only other option is that existence should be.

I want to, firstly, express my gratitude for your elaborate response: I can tell you read through it all and I know how much effort it is to respond that lengthy and substantively—so thank you! — Bob Ross

Not a problem! I greatly respect your work and try to give it its full due. I have noted in the past that it is something I greatly appreciate you having done with me in the past. It is the least I can do!

But truth isn’t a thing-in-itself in that sense...that just seems super weird to say that the relationship itself exists as an entity, a thing-in-itself, out there that we are grasping. This seems platonistic to me. — Bob Ross

I agree it is a bit weird. I was thinking of a better way to say it earlier today as thoughts on your paper were roaming through my head. The thing in itself is objective. Truth as forever unknown to us is a thing in itself. Truth as known to us is subjective, and is at best an approximation that can never be known in the objective sense. The best way to subjectively know truth is to make a judgement that is not contradicted by reality.

Which would you like to talk about, or would you like to pause and discuss normative ethics? — Bob Ross

Honestly Bob, whatever you want. I'm just another subject giving opinions as I look into your ideas from another viewpoint. At any time you can agree to disagree, simply note things that have been stated or move on. It is respect for the time and effort you've put into this work that I try to seriously read your ideas and give it thought. Where this is useful to you, lets us continue. Where it is not, it is not!

Let me at least answer your summaries, and feel free to select what you find worth discussing.

1. Moral judgments expressing something subjective vs. being subjective themselves. You seem to be focusing on the latter, while I the former. — Bob Ross

To me, I do not see a separation between the two with your definition of subjective. If everything we judge is mind dependent, then all moral judgements are subjective (in the fact we make them) and all moral judgements express something subjective (in the fact we make them). Since what is objective is mind independent, there is nothing we can say, do, or judge that is objective, as it is all subjective.

2. You believe I didn’t provide a positive case for prong-2 of my thesis, but I think the proof of (1) moral judgments being propositional, (2) some moral judgments being true, and (3) that moral judgments do not express something objective entails that moral judgments express something subjective. — Bob Ross

If your claim is simply "Moral judgments express something subjective", by you definition of subjective, this is a given. It is only when you introduce truth where the question of objective comes in. If the thing in itself of a moral judgement correlates with reality, then it is objectively true. To subjectively know this, we simply observe whether our judgement is contradicted by reality.

The point I was trying to get at was not that this was 'wrong'. My point was that the definition of subjective is so broad, that this applies to anything we state, judge, do or say, even outside of morality. It also doesn't negate the fact that there is still objective truth, and how we know that truth subjectively. We might call this subjective truth a non-contradictory belief, or knowledge.

If you are claiming there are subjective moral judgements that are true, then there must be some underlying objective morality that is true. If there is no underlying objective morality in which our subjective judgement correlates with reality, then there is no true subjective moral judgement either. This goes for any statement, intent, action, etc.

3. Truth-aptness for you is not contingent on a statement/sentence, but for me it is.
4. The liar paradox, stated as ‘this statement is false’, for you is truth-apt, for me it is not. — Bob Ross

That's fine, mine is another viewpoint to consider or dismiss.

For you, it seems to be a problem that we cannot acquire 100% certain knowledge of what is objective because we only know it through ourselves as subjects, which I don’t see anything wrong with. I have no problem admitting that we only have conditional knowledge of the things-in-themselves, in the sense that we only every analyze representations of things-in-themselves: this doesn’t mean that we are just analyzing things which are purely subjective. — Bob Ross

I don't have a problem with the first part at all. But by consequence, this means that everything we analyze is purely subjective, as our analysis is mind dependent. As you have defined subjective, if there is even an iota of mind dependency, its 100% subjective. As defined, everything is purely subjective that we discuss. I have no problem thinking along these lines, I just find that it just makes the term 'subjective' fairly pointless when discussing morality, as everything we do is subjective. For me it boils down to the question, "If what is objective is mind-dependent, how can we as minds ever analyze anything objective?" To me, we can't, therefore everything we do is subjective, not just morality.

You seem to think that it is a flaw in my theory that moral judgments cannot never be false relative to the psychology of the person at hand, but this just seems like it is the central idea behind the theory itself. — Bob Ross

I really should have used another word, falsifiable. If you are making a claim that something is true, it must also be falsifiable to be considered seriously in application. So for example, if I claimed "God exists", someone should be able to ask, "So what would be the case in which God does not exist?" Even if that case is not true, I should be able to make a case such as, "If I pray and God does not answer, God does not exist". If the claim of God existing was not falsifiable, someone would always come up with an excuse or reason why that doesn't prove God false.

So in what case is your falsifiable claim that moral decisions are true based on our psychology? You need not reply to me, just something to ponder for yourself.

7. I think that moral permissibility is the allowance to do something, which doesn’t entail that one should or should not do it, and you seem to think it means that one should do it; and this is why I think you think there is a symmetry behind my example of eating a sandwhich = permissible and not eating a sandwich = impermissible; but I would say being permissible is not the same thing as one being obligated to do it. — Bob Ross

My problem with understanding your point was that you seemed to imply that acting in a particular way made it permissible. For something to be permissible, something else must be impermissible. If all is permissible, then there is nothing impermissible. And if there is nothing impermissible, at that point, why even use the term permissibility?

As well, you seemed to imply it was actions itself that made something permissible. But if what is acted upon is permissible, then what is not acted on would be impermissible. Again, if what you did not act on was not impermissible, then it is permissible as well. But then we have everything permissible again, and it just seems simpler to say, "There is nothing one should or should not do, thus no morality."

8. I don’t think moral nihilism is the view that there is no objective morality; but you seem to think we can simplify it down to that claim. — Bob Ross

Moral nihilism (also called ethical nihilism) is the meta-ethical view that nothing is morally right or morally wrong and that morality doesn't exist.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moral_nihilism#:~:text=Moral%20nihilism%20(also%20called%20ethical,a%20particular%20culture%20or%20individual.

If there is no objective morality, then it can never be true nothing should or should not be. If nothing should or should not be, then morality does not exist.

10. At one point, you said I don’t believe there are true moral judgments, but I do. — Bob Ross

I wasn't trying to imply that you didn't believe there are true moral judgements, I was noting what it would entail to have a true moral judgement. A subjectively true moral judgement must at some objective level, correlate with reality. This is best known when reality does not actively contradict us.

1. If there is not an objective morality, it means all possible claims of what should or should not happen,
even contradictory claims, correlate with reality.

This is not at all what objective morality means [in metaethics]. — Bob Ross

I claimed what it entails for there not to be an objective morality with your definitions. An objective morality in your definitions, would be a moral judgement that objectively correlates with reality. Our understanding of it would be subjective, most likely in our judgement not being contradicted by reality. If there is no objective morality, then all subjective judgements, even contradictory ones, correlate with reality. There is no truth in what one should or should not do, only actions.

Again, feel free to reply what you want to, or move on Bob. Take what is useful and discard the rest. :)

But why think that all normative claims need a reason? Why can’t “existing should be” just have no reason? — Bob Ross

First, as I requested, please stop using the term normative so that this stays simple and clear. We're not talking about any claim, but "moral claims". A moral claim involves 'should'. 'Should' requires a reason. If there is no reason, then there is no 'should'. If there is no 'should' there is no objective morality. Remember, we're assuming there is an objective morality, not proving that there is. If there is an objective morality, then there must be a should, and must be a reason.

What if someone just says “well, if you can have no reason for why it is, then I don’t need a reason for why it should be”: what’s the symmetry breaker here? — Bob Ross

There is none. We can substitute this sentence with, "There is no objective morality". The symmetry comes in with the assumption "there is an objective morality".

I think this missed my point, although I see what you are saying. You claimed all chains of reasoning boils down to “should existence be, or not?”...but my example clearly, if platonism were granted as true, that this is not true. The point was not that platonism is true, it is that if there are moral facts, then the chain of reasoning for a normative statements ends at the fact that makes it true, and not necessarily “should existence be, or not?”. — Bob Ross

Platonism's truth has nothing to do with whether it should be. For example, someone kills a baby. I can claim they should not have killed a baby. But its still true they killed a baby. When we say something 'should' exist, we say it that it is preferable that it be versus not be. So we can ask, "Why should Platonism exist?" To answer why Platonism or anything else should exist, we really have to answer the question, "Why should anything exist?" first.

This doesn’t explain how this is a calculus of the universe: your answer seems to be that we just assume it. I guess this just boils down to me granting it for the sake of the conversation, so let’s just move past that point. — Bob Ross

Exactly! I am not claiming at this moment that there is an objective morality, I'm simply noting what an objective morality must necessarily be. After seeing the calculus in the rest of the OP and seeing if it works or not, we can definitely address that point.

A. There exists a reason that nothing should exist.
B. If that is the case, then the reason that nothing should exist, should not exist.
Therefore, there should not exist a reason that justifies non-existence.

There’s no logical contradiction in that syllogism, and I wholly agree with its form. In fact, I am glad you wrote this because that is way more precisely what I was trying to convey then what I was saying! (: — Bob Ross

We are in agreement then! We can then agree the only logical conclusion is that nothing should not be. Assuming an objective morality, the only thing we can start with then is that something is what should be. With that, we can move onto the next points.

It all depends on how you define freedom. Freedom can simply mean, "To be free to follow one's intentions without hinderance". Of course what creates those intentions is biological and thus you're not free from them. But such a definition works with many phrases.

Financial freedom - The freedom to buy what you want without risk of harm.
Freedom of speech - The freedom to say what you want without being stopped.
Freedom of choice - The freedom to choose an action despite others opinions that you shouldn't.

So basically there's an idea that ideas don't exist? I think that answers its own question. :)

I reviewed this and MAN is this long. A lot of these points address several details that honestly lead up to the summary at the end. I think the issues are summarized as follows:

1. Making sure I understand your definitions of objective, subjective, and truth and their logical conclusions.
2. Noting that the claim that all of our moral judgements are subjective, as is anything we do. Defining what it means to have a true moral judgement.
3. Noting that you have no underlying claim as to why all true moral judgements are based on psychology through the definitions you use, and why such a claim leads to contradictions.

I may repeat myself in points, so feel free to make the next focus about those three points so you don't have to spend too long on individual issues. For me, its the 3 points that matter, and all the details are an attempt to get to those points.

Judgments are not necessarily statements. A moral non-cognitivist would say that moral judgments are emotional dispositions (i.e., they are conative not cognitive) that are along the lines of ‘boo to torturing babies!!!!!!!’, where they are not saying the moral judgment is the statement ‘boo to torturing babies!!!!!!’ but, rather, the underlying emotional attitude which can be expressed without a statement (e.g., someone looks very angry and astonished when witnessing someone torturing a baby, etc.). So when you say statements are truth-apt, even if it is true, it doesn’t get you moral cognitivism. You would have to demonstrate moral judgments are truth-apt; and you seem to just blow this off and ignore the entire literature on moral non-cognitivism. — Bob Ross

Ah, you didn't mention that specific definition of judgement. I would note that, or reference that there are some definitions like judgement which are being used in accordance with certain moral theories. But let me show you that what I noted still stands. Everything you do is truth apt. I'll explain below.

Likewise, a ‘fact’ is a ‘statement which is true’ or, more precisely, ‘a statement which is truth-apt (i.e., a proposition) which corresponds appropriately with reality’. — Bob Ross

Meaning that anything a subject does either corresponds with reality, or does not. Including our feelings. I might feel angry at the idea of killing a baby and judge that I shouldn't. We can imagine an animal for example. Should it though? Its either true or false. Language is not needed. Morality is about the intent to act and the question on whether it should be acted upon or not. Its either true or false that you should. But the fact that its false that you should doesn't necessitate that its true that you shouldn't.

In other words, if there is no true morality. there is no should, then it is false that you should. But this still makes moral judgements truth apt, as when something is false, it enters into the binary of the possibility of true. Truth-apt simply means what is stated could be true or false conceptually. It makes no claims as to the actual outcome.

Meaning, if I take your definition of truth, subjectivity, and objectivity, everything is truth-apt. Either a belief, statement, emotion, etc. corresponds to reality, or it does not.

2. Statements are not always truth-apt. For example, I would say that the statement “this statement is false” is not truth-apt because it cannot be evaluated as true or false...it lacks that capacity. — Bob Ross

But it is true that the statement is false. Many statements require implicit context for meaning. If we remove those implicit contexts, then It says nothing meaningful. Sentences which lack meaning are not truth apt, because they mean nothing but noise. Don't get caught up in the classic word game. :) We simply break the statement from nonsense into something that makes sense.

A. This is a sentence - True
B. A is false - False

The above word game is just a classic mistaken case of combining two propositions and their assertions into one sentence. Regardless, you are talking about moral judgements, which are evaluations of what one should do. Anytime you introduce the word should, there is the result of its true that you should, or false that you should.

If ‘1+1=2’ can be true, then you have already conceded it is truth-apt, but we are questioning why. Why think it is truth-apt? — Bob Ross

Because it is either true that 1+1=2, or it is false. I can write 1+2=2. This is also truth-apt. It is either true or false that 1+2=2. If something is true, it is truth-apt. If something is false, it is truth-apt.

"A sentence is truth apt if there is some context in which it could be uttered (with its present meaning) and express a true or false proposition."
https://www.oxfordreference.com/display/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803105953845

Yes, there are specific cases when there is no question of truth or falsity, but we're not talking about exceptions into here when we're speaking about morality and simple statements. The question isn't whether judgements and statements are truth-apt. The question is, "What is true?" And you've already answered that. So when we say true in your paper we mean, a subjective statement which is in concurrence with reality. The concurrence with reality is objective, and outside of the ability of the subject to know.

Of course not! That’s what a normative ethical theory is for! The point of moral subjectivism is to note that whatever a person judges morally, it is made true by being a fact about their psychology and not some moral fact out there in the world. I think you have missed the point if you are demanding actual normative claims out of the theory. — Bob Ross

I definitely did miss the point! =D I suppose from my end, once you defined truth, its a given that judgements and statements are truth apt. However, something being truth-apt does not mean it is true. Which leaves me scratching my head when you make the leap to "Whatever a person judges morally, is true by their psychology." This is a claim that needs proof.

A. Morality is about what I should do. It is truth-apt, meaning what should be done could be true, or
false.
B. A true moral judgement is a moral decision of 'should' that corresponds with reality. A
false moral judgement is a moral decision of 'should' that does not correspond with
reality.
C. There is the possibility that I make an incorrect moral judgement, or one that does not correspond to
reality. This would be a false moral judgement.
D. I have a psychology. I make a moral judgement that I should do X because of my psychology.
E. It is true that I should do X because of my psychology.
F. But I have not shown why my psychology concurs with what should be in objective reality.
G. Because of that, I can state, "It is false that I should do X because of my psychology." with equal
weight.
Therefore: G contradicts E.
(I go over this again as a summary at the end)

In other words Bob, for something to be truth apt, it must have the possibility of being assigned a true and a false condition. An example of something that is not truth-apt is something like the amateur understanding of God. There is no condition in which it is possible for God to be false, therefore God is not truth-apt, God is simply true.

To demonstrate that a moral judgement is truth apt, there must be a condition for a moral judgement in which it could be false. Can you give me an example of a moral judgement based on one's psychology that would be false? And what I mean is, the condition. For example, "God is a physical being." It doesn't matter whether this is true or false, it simply means that if its true, God is physical, and if its false, God is not. What is the truth-apt condition of making moral decisions based on our judgements?

4. Because we are subjects, morality is subjective.

I’ve never argued this. This is clearly false. — Bob Ross

Let me clarify. We cannot know things in themselves. You've eliminated the term "objectivity" from any meaningful understanding besides "That which exists which we cannot know." So there could be an objective morality, but it would be beyond our knowledge. For if we could know it, that knowledge would be mind dependent. Known and discussed morality, by your definition, is subjective. As is everything we speak, judge, etc. So technically I should be saying, "Morality as we know it is subjective." But if we state that there is a true moral judgement, this means that our subjective moral judgement is concurrent with objective reality. This concurrence is itself objective, as it does not require our subject to realize this is happening. Truth as well is "a thing in itself" (More details on this later!) Since everything we discuss is from a subject Bob, everything as we know it is subjective.

Likewise with moral cognitivism and moral non-nihilism. You just flatly assert or implicitly assume that they are true without providing an argument. — Bob Ross

First, I haven't been thinking at all in these terms. I'm just using the terms of your OP and showing where I see them logically leading. If I am oversimplifying, please correct me when you see it.

There is nothing implicit about it though. For something to be permissible, there is an implication that something is not permissible. Does that mean that not eating a sandwich implicitly concedes it is impermissible?

No, because not eating the sandwich could have implied one finds it morally permissible not to eat it. Whereas, eating it immediately implies that it is permissible to do so—it wouldn’t make sense if it implied they thought it was impermissible.

Also, I don’t why it would be the case that “for something to be permissible, there is an implication that something is not permissible”, unless you mean that X being morally permissible entails that it is morally impermissible for X to not be morally permissible? But, then, I don’t see your point. — Bob Ross

Ok, I've been wracking my brain trying to understand how you're arriving at this conclusion, and this is the best I can come up with. So are you stating that because you think morality is based on our own psychology, whatever we do we must view as permissible? Because the logical equivalent is that whatever we do not do, is not permissible. Which means if at a future date, we decide not to eat a sandwich, not eating is permissible, while eating it is impermissible. The only way this binary does not exist is if there are actions that are not permissible nor impermissible. In which case, we cannot say that everything we do or do not do is permissible or impermissible. In which case, your claim that whatever we do is permissible doesn't work.

If permissible is synonymous with 'our actions', then why not just say, 'our actions'? We have to be very careful when we redefine words in philosophy, a thing I struggle with as well. The reality is, we all want a particular outcome. Sometimes we like the emotional intention of the original words, but want to change the underlying meaning. This is because the original meaning contradicts with the outcome we want with words. But when we change the original meaning of the words and try to use the original emotional intention, that can result in flawed philosophy. Its as logical a fallacy as any other.

The original intention of 'permissible' is what should or should not be done, but also assumes that someone can make an action that is impermissible, or not take an action on what is permissible. The emotional intention is a strong law that should be enforced. But all you're doing is taking the first portion of the word and throwing away the second part. But without the second part, what separate 'permissible' from moral? In which case, why not just use the word 'moral'?

I feel like your overall point is simple, but its bogged down at points by redefinitions and unnecessary labor. I get it. When I first wrote my knowledge paper years ago it was just like this. It was an over 200 page monster saddled with ideas, definitions, redefinitions, and thoughts that ultimately were unnecessary for the overall point. Its the nature of creating something unique and interesting. Few people understand the amount of thinking, labor, rewriting, etc. that lead to a succinct and solid idea. It is a compliment to your creativity and thinking, please don't take my attempts to simplify the points as trying to overcome your intent. I'm simply trying to cut what I see as fat to get to the meat. Where I oversimplify, please add why and how I can fix it.

That’s not the point of moral non-nihilism: it is the position that there are true moral judgments—i.e., they are not all false. Error theorists, i.e., moral nihilists, claim that moral judgments are truth-apt and express something objective but they are all false. — Bob Ross

Which is fine. Once again, we can more simply state, "Moral non-nihilism claims there is an objective morality." "Moral nihilists claim there is no objective morality". The excessive truth-apt true, false is just unnecessary wording that hinders the point. And yes, we understand that the morality as they know it is subjective in your terms, because anything we say, do, feel, etc is subjective.

If truth is objective, then yes, true moral judgements are not subjective.

No and yes. Truth being objective just means that the correspondence exists mind-independently, but to say that moral judgments express something objective does not follow from that. — Bob Ross

Yes. If you were making sure I understood this distinction, I do. So yes, if truth is objective, and there is a moral truth, then if a person's subjective claim to morality corresponds to this objectivity, it is a true moral judgement. This is as I've been intending. Because as I noted earlier Bob, everything we say, do, think, feel, etc. is subjective under your theory. So if I say, "true moral judgements are not subjective", this is of course a subjective statement. I am noting the thing in itself of the subjective judgement correlating with reality. Meaning the judgement as intended by the person is subjective, as everything is, but it so happens to correlate with the objective morality. This as well does not not that an objective morality exists.

2. True moral judgments express something subjective [moral non-objectivism]
I would tweak this once again to, "We can make subjective moral judgements that are true."

You cannot do that validly: they are two different claims. The moral judgment is subjective and it expresses something subjective—i.e., judgments are always subjective because they are themselves an issuance by a subject and these particular judgments (moral ones) are true in virtue of projections of one’s pyschology and not some non-pyschological fact about reality. — Bob Ross

Once again, everything we ever do, say, judge, act, etc. is subjective. Which means that if my judgement corresponds with reality, then it is a true moral judgement. Which means we can make moral judgements which are true. Of course, since truth is objective, we can never know if our moral judgements are true, because what is objective can never be known as the thing in itself. Again, this is not me saying we have proven that an objective morality exists, only what must be entailed by a true moral judgement.

You statement “we can make subjective moral judgments that are true” could be compatible with a moral realist’s claim that “moral judgments express something objective” just as much as a moral anti-realist’s claim that “moral judgments express something subjective”. — Bob Ross

Yes, this is the logical result of your vocabulary. If it is the case that a judgement (remember, no need to add subjective to this, everything we do is subjective) is concurrent with reality, this concurrence is objective and true. It doesn't mean we as subjects realize it is true. Objective truth is the reality of the situation as it is in itself. If a person has a judgement that is not concurrent with reality then there is no objective concurrence. There is only the subjects claim to what is moral while reality does not concur. So both sentences are right depending on the context and intent.

Ah, I see with point one. To more accurately reflect this I would change
1. Moral judgments are propositional [moral cognitivism]
into
1. True moral judgments are propositional [moral cognitivism]

You cannot do that, because something being propositional does not entail that it is true, it entails that it has the capacity to be true or false. — Bob Ross

No Bob, I can. Just as I can logically say "False moral judgements are propositional". If something is true, then of course it has the capacity to be true or false. The capacity has nothing to do with whether it is true or false, only that by being true or false, there is the binary option of it being the other. If I use a proposition and state, "This proposition is true", it still has the capacity to be false in a logic set up. Typically this is done to set up logical fallacies or proof by contradiction.

I am quite literally arguing that there are no moral states-of-affairs that exist mind-independently: “there are no moral phenomena, just moral interpretations of phenomena” as nietzsche put it. — Bob Ross

Ok, so you don't believe there's an objective morality, nor any true moral judgements. If morality does not exist mind independently, then any judgement to should or should will correlate with this lack of objectivity. Thus it would be true that there is no objective morality. Now all you have to do is prove it.

Problem is, you can't with your current evidence.

1. If there is not an objective morality, it means all possible claims of what should or should not happen,
even contradictory claims, correlate with reality.
2. Point 1 can be proven in two ways.
a. Explore all possible moral judgements and conclude they correlate with reality, including
contradictory psychological judgements.
b. Demonstrate why a moral judgement can never be contradicted by reality (Contradiction is an
opposition of opposite of correlation)
2. You claim our psychology is the basis for morality through your psychology.
3. I claim our psychology is not the basis for morality through my psychology.
4. This is a contradiction in reality.
5. Therefore neither of us can state morality is not objective until this contradiction is solved.
6. To solve this requires evidence to be presented to ascertain that either point 2 or point 3 is correct.
7. But, if point 2 is correct, then point 3 also stands, as my psychology can claim point 2 is wrong, and
you'll have to agree with me if point 2 is right.
Therefore if point 3 stands while point 2 stands, there is a contradiction. Therefore by point 6, point 2 is false.

But even knowledge cannot know truth, as truth is an objective thing in itself.

I would say that truth is not a thing-in-itself, because things-in-themselves are objects. This is why I find it hard to say truth is objective but also that truth isn’t. There isn’t a object, abstract or not, that exists which is the correspondence of thought with reality. The mere relationship between thought and reality such that they correspond is what truth is, and this can be acquired from a subjective viewpoint so long as that subject agrees that there are objects. They don’t come to know truth itself like an object that they observe, it is the abstract relationship between thinking and being: between mind and not mind. — Bob Ross

Yes, I understand but disagree with one statement. The "thing in itself" does not refer to an object. An object is a subjective attempt at understanding what a 'thing in itself is'. Our thoughts are 'things in themselves'. Their intentions, judgements, etc. about other things in themselves. When our intentions about other things are expressed and they correlate with reality, then they are true. Of course, this does not mean we know they are true. How we would know they are true would be subjective. But the subject does not need to have the knowledge or idea of objects, thoughts, etc, only an existence, judgement, etc that is correlating with reality.

Thus, if I claimed, "I believe I should do this," the fact that you believed that you should do this correlates with reality and is true. Everything is self-referential, therefore true. But if you claim, "I believe you should do this," it is uncertain whether this correlates with reality and is a true moral judgement."

Ok, that's a big chunk for you Bob! I know its busy because its Christmas season, so happy holidays if I don't hear from you before then!

Great! I've really wanted to bounce this idea off of someone else for some time. Whether it works or not, this will be fun.

2. If something 'should' be, there is a reason for it.

Three things:

1. If someone claims that ‘there should be <...>’ and that it is just an upshot of their emotions, then they have no reason for it. What is incoherent with that under your view? — Bob Ross

I would say that's a reason. "I should help the world because I feel like it" is a reason. The point is I could then ask, "Why should your feelings matter?" In other words, asking the reason behind the reason.

2. The chain of reasons has to stop somewhere, so the very foundational reason will have no reason; and that foundational reason may very well be a claim like ‘because there should be <...>’. In fact, this gets your point 12 in a lot of trouble: — Bob Ross

Yes, it does have to stop somewhere. But a reason does not have to have a prior reason. I'm saying the ultimate reason is, "It is". This is by necessity as there is nothing prior, nor nothing to negate 'what is'.

3. This seems incoherent with point 12. You say, on one hand, that every claim of ‘something should be’ has a reason underpinning and then claim in 12 that ‘existing should be’ is valid yet has not reason underpinning it: “Existence is, and has no prior reason for being besides the fact that it is. As such, it is the foundational good. It is the prime reason behind all questions of what should be.”--but ‘existing should be’ is the foundational claim of your theory, and it has no reason for it because allegedly existence doesn’t have a prior reason for it. — Bob Ross

You would be absolutely correct if all reasons had an underlying reason. I'm noting that we reach a point in which there is no underlying reason, but a foundation. Recall we are assuming morality exists. So if this is the case, and we've reached a foundation, that is what we build upon.

4. All chain of reasoning reduces down to the final question, "Should existence be, or not"?

I don’t see why this is the case. Moral realists can just have to ground the normative claim in a moral fact. For example, I could say that ‘I should not eat children’ is true because there is a Platonic Form that dictates such and that would be the end of the chain of reasoning. I don’t need to further ask “why exist?” to ground why “I should not eat children” if it is made true by a moral fact. This is unnecessary. — Bob Ross

I could just as easily say, "I should eat children because God tells me to." A claim does not make it so. But you make a good point in the fact I have not explicitly stated a "true reason". If morality is true, then the reasoning behind morality must also be true. Meaning we can make claims of reason, but we must demonstrate why they must be.

So in your example of Plato's forms, I could say, "What's the proof behind Plato's forms?" But lets say that it is true. Plato's forms DO exist. I then would ask, "Why should Plato's forms exist?" Do you see the chain now?

We're asking why it should be beyond our own opinions. We're looking for the calculus of the universe.

This is exactly the problem with assuming moral realism without explaining it: what calculus of the universe determines what is morally right or wrong? You seem to think it is “to be or not to be, that is the question”...but what makes this a calculus of the universe and not just a human existential question? The way gravity behaves is clearly rules or laws in the universe, but asking “to be or not to be?” does not seem (by my lights) to have an analogous correlate. — Bob Ross

Because we're doing a test. We're saying, "If morality, or what 'should' be is apart from humanity, what logically would that be? We must first define it, only then can we apply it. To say that morality exists apart from human opinion but leave it without what that would entail means we don't know what we're talking about.

8. There can be no reason to explain why nothing should be, as there is 'no reason' if there is nothing.

This is a non-sequitur: the reason can exist and be true that nothing should exist. The fact that the reason must exist has nothing to do with whether or not that reason is valid such that nothing should exist. — Bob Ross

No, this is not a non-sequitur at all. Your statement "The reason can exist and be true that nothing should exist" leads to a contradiction Bob. Think about it carefully.

A. There exists a reason that nothing should exist.
B. If that is the case, then the reason that nothing should exist, should not exist.
Therefore, there should not exist a reason that justifies non-existence.

Logically, that means that there should exist a reason that something should exist.

Alright! This is what I wanted to discuss. Poke at it to your hearts content!