The judgements we make in science and some of the judgements we make in life are empirically based. In life many other kinds of judgements are made on the basis of intuition or emotion, and in philosophy, which goes beyond the criteria exercised in the empirical domain, the conceptions of wisdom are far more subjective than they are in science and the practical dimensions of everyday life.

No guarantee if one is one the Quest for Certainty, I suppose. But in this unhappy, imperfect universe we must make judgments without the benefit of absolute knowledge, on the best evidence available at the time we make them. And we do, in real life, if we're wise. — Ciceronianus

Sure, we make judgements, inferences to what we think are the best explanations. But in philosophy, where consensus seems impossible, as opposed to science where it is operative, who decides what is the best evidence or the best basis for judgment, or what wisdom consists in?

A subtle distinction? Say I want to be an artist and I see my goal is to be the best artist I can be. Or my desire to go on a journey of artistic discovery is seen instead as a gateway. A worthwhile goal or a worthwhile desire? Mere semantics?

It is a question of semantics. It is useful to talk about existence in some circumstances and not in others.

I do not see any importance in speculating how we can point at something we cannot point at. — I like sushi

Useful for whom? The fact that you do not see any importance in what you think of as speculating about how we can point at something we cannot point at and that you frame the question that way says more about you than anything else. I don't see the question as being concerned with pointing at anything at all.

If they exist absent humans then their existence is "in itself", rather than 'for us" and we don't know that existence and can only imagine it in 'for us' terms, but it doesn't follow that that existence is of the same nature as what we can imagine, and that also applies to spatiotemporality.

The term 'existence' does not have to be restricted to 'exists for us'. You can stipulate that the term is restricted in that way as you are using it, but it is merely a stipulation not a fact. It is uncontroversial that galaxies, stars, planets, dinosaurs and many other things existed prior to humans. Don't imagine that I haven't thought plenty about this.

No no no. You misunderstand, I promise! — I like sushi

I don't believe I misunderstood what you were saying, I simply disagree.

You cannot imagine something you cannot imagine - by definition. — I like sushi

It seems rather it is you that misunderstood what I was saying; It should be obvious that I was not claiming that we can imagine the unimaginable, but we can certainly imagine that something unimaginable may exist, or that things might have their own existence independently of our perceptions and understandings of them, and that an unimaginable form of existence may be very different than our perceptions and understandings lead us to believe about the form of existence the things we perceive appear to have.

This is an assumption. I am unaware of our ability to think in an atemporal way and with complete disregard to space. — I like sushi

Again, it is not a matter of being able to imagine a non-spatiotemporal existence, but of being able to imagine that there may be such, despite our inability to conceptualize it.

Which is necessarily nothing to us. Hence it is non-existent.

We talking about something existing based on human experience because, frankly, that is all we have and therefore all there ever is for us. It is a subtle obviousness easily missed.

It is not that we do not know what we cannot know - which is contrary! We cannot even refer to what we cannot know in any meaningful way. — I like sushi

It doesn't follow that because something is "nothing to us" that it is non-existent. In any case the in itself is not nothing to us except sensorially; we do generally tend to think that things have their own existences independently of us. The fact that we (obviously) cannot determine the total or absolute nature of that existence does not entail that it is "nothing".

You say we cannot refer to such things in a meaningful way, but that is just your opinion; it seems obvious to me that we can refer to such things apophatically as indeterminate existences or indeterminate aspects of things the aspects of the natures of which we can determine only via being sensorially affected by them.

When we say we can't know what the world really or actually, I think we make certain assumptions, the primary of which is the assumption that there is something that is real behind what we experience which can't be determined. Something hidden from us because of our nature. It's a kind of religious view, perhaps. — Ciceronianus

We know how things appear to us. There is no guarantee that these appearances give us exhaustive knowledge of how things are or that the nature of things is not (at least partially) hidden from us. It seems to me that to admit this is merely to exercise a modicum of intellectual humility which would make it, if anything, far from being an affectation. Closer to being an affectation would be to claim that what we can experience and understand of the world as it appears to is, or even must be, exhaustive of its nature.

The ‘thing-in-itself’ is an illusionary term just like talk of ‘square circles’ or ‘upside down trouser memories — I like sushi

I understand the term to signify the sheer existence of a thing as distinct from its existence for us. We cannot know what that existence is because anything all we can know is what a thing's existence is for us.

So, what we perceive are things as they exist for us, but we can say that it is reasonable to believe that we are precognitively affected by things in themselves (including what we are in ourselves) such as to give rise to the perceptions of things as appearances. In terms of our scientific understanding, we can investigate and analyze how things affect us such as to give rise to perceptions, but this investigation and analysis is still possible only in terms of how things appear to us, and the sheer existence of things, of ourselves and how it all interacts need not be the same as how it all appears to us.

‘The world’ is just shorthand for ‘everything that is’. Although I think the question ‘does the world exist?’ is a nonsense question. — Wayfarer

If 'world' and 'everything' are synonymous, and things exist, then why would we say the world does not exist? If you narrowly define existence as pertaining only to things which can be objects of the senses, and since everything cannot be an object of the senses then, in that sense, it might make sense to say the world does not exist; but then all we would be saying is that the world does not exist for us as an object of the senses.

Just what the world needs—more magnates as political leaders. :roll:

So I repeat, there is nothing about goals that make them worthwhile. Once get that into your head and you can begin to live a life in freedom. — unenlightened

So, according to you no goal is worthwhile even if pursuing it leads to interesting, enlivening or inspiring experiences or enlightening insights?

1. All As are Bs, all Bs are Cs, therefore all As are Cs
2. "All As are Bs, all Bs are Cs, therefore all As are Cs" is a valid argument

I'm not saying that (1) is objectively true; I'm saying that (2) is objectively true.

It is objectively true that (1) is valid, and this does not depend on the existence of an external world; it certainly does not depend on the existence of spacetime or any material object, and I would even say that it does not depend on the existence of any abstract object (à la Platonism).

Objective truths do not depend on the existence of anything (except in the obvious case of something like "X exists"). — Michael

""All As are Bs, all Bs are Cs, therefore all As are Cs" is a valid argument" is true, just as "all bachelors are unmarried" is true; that is, it would seem to be a tautology. I'm not sure what the word "objectively" is doing there, but it does suggest that there must be some state of affairs that acts as a truth maker. What makes tautologies true if not some fact or facts about language use, and is not language use an external world phenomenon?

To be sure facts about language use are not material objects, but language use itself is dependent on the existence of spacetime just as material objects are. You might object that facts about language use are not necessarily dependent on spacetime, but then facts about material objects are not necessarily dependent on spacetime either.

"All As are Bs, all Bs are Cs, therefore all As are Cs" is a valid argument.

The above statement is objectively true and does not depend on the existence of an external world. — Michael

I don't think this is right: the statement is valid, but in that abstract generic form is not truth apt. It needs to be given content in order to be true or false.

There are no worthwhile goals. — unenlightened

Interesting goals perhaps, or at least goals that enable interesting journeys?

If that is what you want...

They are the same question; if the existence of the world depended on your perception of it, it would not be at all external to perception.

If we have no reason to believe in an external unperceived world then we have no reason to believe in an external perceived world.

And you haven't told me what you think Hume says about it. If you are unable to present his arguments in your own words you could try quoting him directly.

You introduced the idea of constant joy and happiness as a goal, whereas as I have not addressed that question, or the OP's question, at all except in response to you. You are merely repeating what I already said, which was that the goal of attaining constant joy and happiness would be self-defeating, so what exactly is your point?

Your post sounds like as if you have not read anything on Hume and any messages in this thread with attention.  What does Hume say about  the way our beliefs arise for the continuous existence of the external world? — Corvus

Our belief in the external world and causation are habitual based on the experienced reliable presence of objects and invariance of objects and the observed constant conjunction of events.

What do you think he says?

Rather that they are grounded in the human mind, so, if you like, a kind of 'universal subject' rather than an individual ego. — Wayfarer

Do you believe in the existence of a universal subject?

He goes on proving Philosopher's belief in the existence of the external world, and concludes that the belief cannot be based on reason, but imagination.  There are extensive arguments and proofs why this is the case. — Corvus

Arguments do not prove anything; they are merely consistent (if valid) with their presupposed premises.
This means that belief in the existence or non-existence of the external world is based on reason, but the premises that reasoning, whether for or against, is based on cannot be certain and are themselves based on abductive speculation (imagination). None of which disagrees with Hume, so it looks to me like it is you who misunderstand Hume.

You seem to be a master of missing the point. The argument is simply that the existence of the world independently of its being perceived is an inference to the best explanation for our experience. It isn't a proof and doesn't purport to be.

As I read Hume all he was doing was pointing out that inductive and abductive reasoning are not deductively/ logically certain; a move against rationalism.

What makes you think I would have such a goal? Such a goal would make itself unattainable.

:up: Probably not.

I don't think constant joy and happiness would necessarily be boring either.

There seems to be no logical imperative that continuous happiness and joy be static and dead.

So it should...unless you can convince yourself that you, being up and the night...all do not exist.

:rofl: Maybe your head doesn't exist...I knew a guy once who could put his head between his legs and disappear up his arse.

But Hume would say, no mate, when you close your eyes, you don't see the world.
Do you still believe that the world exists? If yes, what is the reason that you believe in it when you are not perceiving it? — Corvus

Because no matter how many times I do the experiment things are always there when I open my eyes again just as I left them when I closed my eyes. If I have something in front of me, I can close my eyes, yet still feel it when I touch it.

I don't know what you are looking for: there is no logical or any other kind of proof that the world exists. In fact, there are no proofs other than logical or mathematical proofs, there are only inferences to the most plausible explanations. It seems to me that the most plausible explanation for the invariances we see everywhere in nature is that they have their own existence independently of perception.

What more are you looking for? What is the point of this wild goose chase?

Should there be a licence to have children? Short answer: yes. Will such a legislation ever be established in a nontotalitarian regime? No.

The point is that we are talking about a logical ground to believe in the world when not perceiving the world.  Please ask yourself, what is your logical ground for believing in the world when not perceiving the world.  Please don't say the world exists even when you are not perceiving it, because it is not what we are talking about here. We are talking about the basis for scepticim regarding the external world. — Corvus

As Hume showed in relation to inductive reasoning, there is no purely logical justification for believing that any of the observed natural regularities will continue to hold. That is because it is not logically contradictory that they may not hold.

However, we have good inductive (not deductive, mind) reason to believe they will hold, since they have never reliably been observed to fail. Hume might say this is merely thinking based on habit, but nonetheless we have good pragmatic reasons to believe that the plethora of observed natural invariances will not suddenly cease to exist. This belief is consistent with the whole coherent and consistent body of scientific knowledge and everyday experience and observations.

The same goes for the belief that things persist when unperceived: that they do persist is merely the inference to the best explanation for why things generally will be found where they were last seen, absent them having been moved in the interim.

Of course, it is not logically contradictory that things should cease to exist and then come back into existence again, but considered against the whole body of science and everyday observations it is highly implausible.

It is obvious that we cannot cut a tree with just words, but we can't cut it if we don't understand the act of 'cutting' either. — javi2541997

This is true, but it is also true that we don't need language in order to understand the act of cutting. Think beavers, for example, or leaf-cutter ants.

“We should not pretend to doubt in philosophy what we do not doubt in our hearts”. -C S Peirce

The point, way back, is that we do things with our utterances. — Banno

In the sense that we may act on other people (and some animals) with our utterances, such as to cause, or at least influence, them to do things, I agree.

I cut the tree down by giving an order. — Banno

That seems nonsensical to me; words do not cut downs trees, people do. You influenced someone by words to cut down the tree, you did not cut down the tree, even though, by convention, you may be held responsible for the other's act of cutting down the tree.

Can you change the tree with words? Ordering it cut down will certainly change it. — Banno

You can't cut down a tree, or influence it in any way, with words. You can of course influence other language users with words, you can induce them to cut down the tree. So, it is of course true that we are influenced by our own words and the words of others, that is we are influenced by our understandings of the meanings of those words, and not by the words themselves as mere physical phemomena, whether they come in the form of visual symbols or sounds.

The conversation above with Corvus has me wondering how much this topic depends on an understanding that language is not purely descriptive. — Banno

Who doesn't understand that words are not merely descriptive? Someone who has not given the matter any thought would likely not even explicitly think of words as descriptive, let alone as merely descriptive. This seems like a simplistic strawman to me.

Well, for a start, the word "real" in "nothing is really as it seems" should bring on some hesitancy. What's it doing there? We might take it out, and see what happens. Consider "nothing is as it seems". Well, that doesn't seem right. It seems I am writing this, and you are now reading it, to the extent that one could not make sense of "It seems I am not writing this, and you are not reading it". — Banno

The way I see it the word "real" is just for emphasis. If QM is taken to show us something about the fundamental nature of things, then from that perspective things are not as they seem; that is not solid and static with well-defined boundaries.

The aspects of the body are the body, at least when I look. What distinguishes them beyond the words used to describe it? — NOS4A2

Even without words I see the aspects, movements or activities of the body not as the whole body. I suppose you could say that the totality of all the aspects, movements and activities of the body just is the body, but I never see any totality of aspects, whereas I do see bodies.

That said it is also true that I don't see the totality of any body. but when I look at a body from the front, back or side I still think I am looking at the body. and not necessarily focusing on any specific aspects of it.

I’m not so sure. I cannot see the difference between the body and a bodily process. When I point to either, or both, I am pointing at the same thing. I don’t know how to distinguish between the thing that moves and the movements it makes, as if I was distinguishing between the morning and the evening star. — NOS4A2

The way I understand it, the movements of the body are not separate from the body, but are just aspects of it; so, I don't know how not to distinguish between the two.

That doesn't mean that there is no way of determining which theory is more right, or less wrong. — Ludwig V

I know how to determine which philosophical theories seem more or less right and wrong to me, but not how they seem to other. I can't but think that we all have our own methods and criteria for determining that, and that those methods and criteria are based on our most fundamental presuppositions..

You have put your finger on the way to determine which theory is more right or less wrong. Now, how does one establish whether a theory has any intellectual appeal? By argument, perhaps? — Ludwig V

I know which theories have intellectual appeal to me, and I have to go on what others tell me about what seems to be most appealing to them. By argument or discussion, I might find out what others are convinced by, and i may or may not agree with them. There is a possibility that I or others may change their mind if a convincing counterargument is presented, but my experience on these forums leads me to think that that is relatively rare.