Then where is this relation? — RussellA

The relation just is the amount of actual space between them. That is, if you allow that space exists mind-independently, which I find it most plausible to think.

I find 'indirect/critical realism' (e.g. perspectivism, fallibilism, cognitivism/enactivism) to be much more self-consistent and parsimonious – begs fewer questions (i.e. leaves less room for woo-woo :sparkle:) – than any flavor of 'idealism' (... Berkeley, Kant/Schopenhauer, Hegel ... Lawson, Hoffman, Kastrup :eyes:) which underwrites my commitment to p-naturalism. — 180 Proof

:100:

When someone says that they perceive the colour red, science may discover that they are looking at an electromagnetic wavelength of 700nm.

Where in an electromagnetic wavelength of 700nm can the colour red be discovered? — RussellA

I think this way of speaking is misdirecting. We don't look at wavelengthts of light, wavelengths of light affect our eyes producing the perception of colours. So, red is not discovered in an electromagnetic wavelength of 700nm, as though we are somehow looking into light, light enters our bodies causing the discovery of colours.

It strikes me that, in a sense, Kant is a kind of dualist with his phenomena/noumena distinction. — Tom Storm

That would be one interpretation. As far as I recall form when I was reading Kant and reading about Kant quite intensively (although it was quite a few years ago now, so I could be getting it not quite right) Kant scholars are divided between a 'dual worlds' interpretation where there is the phenomenal (empirical) world and the noumenal world and a 'dual aspect' interpretation where there is one world with both a phenomenal and a noumenal aspect.

Sorry my remark about metaphysics was prompted by many of the comments made here about it, but you're right, it is a field that has made a comeback in current philosophy. — Wayfarer

And it is now a field very different from "traditional" metaphysics.

Russell makes a simple but important point about universals: things like the relation “north of” or the quality “whiteness” are real, but they’re not located in space or time, and they’re not just mental events.
Here’s the gist of his argument in four steps: — Wayfarer

To me this makes no sense. The relation "north of" exists in space and time between objects. If you move the objects the relation may change. When you think about it everything is either north or south of everything else. To my way of thinking "north of" only exists in its instantiations. If The Problems of Philosophy was written after his rejection of idealism then it seems Russell didn't completely escape it's hold on him.

And the question is, in what direction does the justification go? Do we discover a knowledge or nous of a certain sort of thing, and say, "This is real", based on what "real" means? Or do we have a term, "real", which we then attempt to match with certain sorts of things in order to discover what it does or could mean? — J

At first I thought you were suggesting that we might have a noetic intuition as to what's real and then define 'real' according to that intuition. then I wondered whether you were using nous in the modern sense of know-how.

Then I noticed that you were not suggesting defining "real' in terms of the nousy intution, but saying the nousy intuition might be thought to be real or not based on the meaning of 'real'.

Your second idea seems to make more sense, anyway. We can cite examples and say whether they qualify as real or not. It would really just be using examples to illustrate how the term is commonly used in various contexts. We might discover that some examples qualify as real in one context and not in another.

I think the takeaway is that we cannot hope to get a "one-size-fits-all" definition of 'real', or 'existent'. It seems the best we can do is hone in on a somewhat fuzzy sense of the term and hopefully sharpen that sense up a bit.

And BTW, I think (most) universals are every bit as mind-independent as you do. But there we are: "mind-independent" is a property or characteristic we can get our teeth into. Adding ". . . and real" seems unnecessary. — J

And in turn that begs the question as to what we might mean by "mind-independent'―a term that seems to be much more slippery than 'real'.

My own view is that a naturalistic account of the strong emergence of mental properties, (that incorporates concepts from ethology and anthropology), including consciousness, can be consistent with a form of non-reductive physicalism or Aristotelian monism (i.e. hylomorphism) that excludes the conceivability of p-zombies and hence does away with the hard problem. Form in addition to matter is ineliminable in the description of our mental lives, but form isn't something standing over and above matter as something separate or immaterial. — Pierre-Normand

Yes, no matter without form and no form without matter―that makes good sense to me.

:ok:

:up: Too subtle for me, it seems. Can you explain why Davidson is being inconsistent in dismissing the view that Clark Kent cannot fly?

I think they are used in both ways, but the answer to "What is red" is never a frequency. Largely because that's an unsupportable answer... — AmadeusD

I am out of time, but I just want to address this; the frequencies are in the science of optics referred to as being of different colours―the colours of refracted light we can see plus colours we cannot see, but some other animals can, and certain instruments can detect―ultraviolet and infrared.

Who here thinks honour killings are... honourable? — Banno

I certainly don't―there can be no reasonable justification for them―they are despicable, as are genital mutilation and foot-binding.

He is inconsistent with his views at this juncture -- if he is dismissing the view that Clark Kent cannot Fly so readily. — I like sushi

If Superman and Clark Kent are the same entity, and Superman can fly, then so can Clark Kent. Do you think that Superman needs his suit in order to be able to fly?

I have to say, I'm not so sure. Billions in communities outside the West see, for instance. Honour killings as a requirement, morally. All but the victim will agree. Just an example, but its these things I'm speaking out (while trying not to target religious thinking). This may ultimately not be all that important, though. — AmadeusD

Ok, you're right that "honour lkillings" are an exception. I guess if people are understood to have seriously transgressed in a context of very strict dogma, then they may become "othered" so that killing them then is seen as a duty.

But in such cases it would not be seen as murder, but as execution. It is also interesting to note that honour killing sometimes happens to women who have been raped―as though it must have been their fault and they are now forever defiled.

But even within communities who see each other as 'kin', horrifically violent actions take place with support of the law, and one's family, all the time. — AmadeusD

Yes such things of course do occur, but they are generally motivated by dogmatic religious views which effectively dehumanize the victim.

Unfortunately, I think a quote from Sam Harris bears repeating: There are good, and there are bad people. Good people do good things. Bad people do bad things. But to get a good person to do bad things, you need religion. Ah fuck, now I'm just bashing religion. Perhaps I shouldn't be so reticent. It is poison. — AmadeusD

I see no harm in individuals holding religious views of all kinds, provided they admit to themselves that they do not conflate faith with knowledge, that they understand that their faith is for themselves and should never be inflicted on others. So, it is institutionalized religion that is the problem, not the religious impulse perse, as I see it.

We see it among that which can be, though. I'm unsure its particularly reasonable to presume everyone accepts "empirical evidence" as actual evidence. Those of us who understand what you're saying will do, but plenty (perhaps most) do not. They are skeptical of 'evidence' unless it agrees with their feelings. You and I would want to jettison this, and assess it against the claim, rather htan our feelings. I suggest this is far more common, and far more obvious than you are allowing here. — AmadeusD

Yeah, I agree that many, I don't know about most, people are motivated by confirmation bias rather than the attempt to establish what is true or most reasonable to think. Some people just cannot accpet the idea that life may not be as they wish it to be.

Nothing to quibble with here. I guess I just don't understand why the response I get isn't satisfactory. I don't know that anyone claims numbers exist outside examples of number. Or that colours exist outside examples of color (though, perhaps Banno would). — AmadeusD

I think there are those who think numbers and universals are real independently of the particulars that instantiate them, well certainly if you can take them at their word they do. I cannot speak for @Banno but I suspect he would say that it depends on how you define colour. If you define it as a subjective experience then it would only exist as such. But if you allow that different wavelengths of light reflected from things are colours then they would be thought to exist independently of percipients.

Do you recognize that this may indicate that you are in some way mentally handicapped? — Metaphysician Undercover

No, because I know my command of the English language is such that I would be able to understand any coherent explanation. It doesn't follow though that I would necessarily agree with it. Are you one of those who think that you are so right that if anyone disagrees with what you write, they must therefore not understand it?

He thinks that to eliminate the concept of matter is to remove an important cause of atheism, scepticism and even socianism – and who could not think that those are important issues? — Ludwig V

I can understand why Berkeley would have thought getting rid of matter would "remove and important cause of atheism" (although the belief in a mind-independent world is not strictly logically inconsistent with belief in the Christian God) and I can see that the idea of a mind-independent physical world coupled with the dualistic problem of "interaction" could be thought in Berkeley's time to lead to the possibility of skepticism, but I'm not seeing just how socianism would be debunked by the elimination of matter. They according to this source believed that the soul dies with the body, but that the souls of the faithful will be resurrected.

Empirical objects do have the appearance of being mind-independent — they confront us in space and time as separate objects — but that appearance is conditioned by (dependent on) the structures of perception and cognition. — Wayfarer

That is uncontroversial―of course appearances are mind-dependent, or body-dependent―however you want to frame it. It simply doesn't follow that what appears to us as objects in space and time are themselves mind-dependent ―you just don't seem to be able to understand that. They might be mind-dependent in themselves or they might not, and that is the question we cannot answer with any certainty.

They are never given except as appearances to a subject. That is the main point of the mind-created world argument, as it pertains to 'the world' as the sum of sense-able particulars. — Wayfarer

Again that is completely uncontroversial― if objects appear of course they appear to subjects (subjects being defined as percipients). Do the things which appear to us have their own existence independently of appearing to us? For me the answer would be "most likely they do". Of course I don't know for sure, but that seems to be the most plausible answer given everything we know about the world as it appears to be. If you don't think that is the most plausible answer, that's fine―you are entitled to that view, but don't pretend that there is a provable truth of the matter.

Mathematical truths are of a different order: they are independent of any individual mind in the sense that they’re the same for all who can reason — but they are only accessible to mind, not to the sensory perception (hence the subject of dianoia in Platonist terms, so of a 'higher' order than sensory perception.) — Wayfarer

Mathematical truths can be understood as possible logical entailments of the basic rules of number, and number can be understood to exist everywhere in the empirical world. It is a bit like chess―once the very simple rules of chess are established the possible series of combinations of the pieces are virtually infinite. We could say that there are a far greater number of those possible sequences of moves that have never occurred than those which have occurred. Do they exist out there somewhere? Or think of the simple iterative function which generates the Mandelbrot Set.

You've lost me once you start speaking of "higher order" because there can be no explanation of what it might be. We can have a feeling or sense of a higher order, but that is a different matter―it cannot be coherently subjected to analysis and discourse.

As for time and space, they’re not mind-independent containers but, as Kant said, “forms of intuition” — the necessary preconditions of any experience. They are objectively real for the subject, in the sense that all appearances to us must be ordered in temporal sequence and spatial perspective. But that’s not the same as saying they exist as things-in-themselves apart from all possible subjects.

You still seem to think I believe that the world is 'all in the mind', but I'm not arguing that. — Wayfarer

That time and space exist only for minds is itself not demonstrable, just as is the case with "things". That Kant said it is so does not make it true. I'm sorry but Kant is not my guru, I prefer to think for myself. That said I have read him and about him quite extensively so I'm well familiar with all the arguments. I know just where and why I part company with Kant.

I agree with Schopenhauer's critique― that there cannot be things in themselves if space and time exist only in relation to perception. Of course I don't accept that space and time exist only in relation to perception, because I find the idea that a completely unstructured undifferentiated "world in itself" could give rise to an unimaginably complex perceived world completely implausible― implausible as do I also find Schopenhauer's "solution" of a blind will. (And yes, I have fairly comprehensively read, and read about, Schopenhauer's philosophy― certainly enough to be well familiar with its central ideas. So I do understand his ideas, but I just don't agree with them).

I think you believe the world is an idea in some mind, not your mind or my mind, but some universal mind, probably not the mind of the Abrahamic God. If that is not what you believe then I confess I don't know what you are arguing.

Radical changes like that are bound to cost a lot in the short term. Which is not to say I think the DOGE was a good idea.

It's not a matter of 'locating' them. That depiction is only because of the inability to conceive of anything not located in time and space. The unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics in the natural sciences and the abilities that it provides to discover facts which otherwise could never be known, indicate that numbers are more than just 'products of thought'. They provide a kind of leverage (that also being something discovered by a mathematician, namely, Archimedes). Which lead to many amazing inventions such as computers, and the like, which all would have been inconceivable a generation or two ago (as previously discussed.) — Wayfarer

If we cannot coherently conceive of something being real without it existing somewhere at some time or everywhere at all times then that tells against your position.

If you want to say that the effectiveness of mathematics in science tells us anything about more than just how the world appears to us, then you are supporting the idea of a mind-independent reality. It seems obvious that number is immanent in the nature of things―once you have difference, diversity, structure then you have number. Time and space are quantifiable. But if you don't believe that difference, diversity, structure are mind-independently real or that time and space are mind-independently real―are you then
going to say that number is?

This is where I think the problem lies. They will say "I have direct knowledge of this, as do other Christians" (or whatever sect). You and I would largely reject this, but we also do not know their phenomenal experiences. Maybe they have... (this is unserious, but hopefully illustrates). — AmadeusD

Right, but religious experiences (which I of course would not deny that people do have) are not shareable, because they are "inner" experiences, not experiences of an "outer" "external" shared world. People may also experience hallucinations, and they are not considered to be empirically verifiable―if they were they would not be classed as hallucinations.

There are, on many reliable accounts, billions who do not find rape, murder, child abuse etc.. objectionable, when posited by a religious doctrine (or, rather, required by it). I suggest this is probably more prevalent than most in the West want to accept (and here we also need take into account the types within the West who perhaps feel these ways. We have enough abusers around for whom the Law is not a deterrent it seems). — AmadeusD

I think most people are against rape, murder, child abuse etc., when it comes to their own communities, to those they consider to be of their own kind. The word 'kindness' holds this implicit notion of kinship. People find it possible to accept violence against others if the others are understood to be enemies. But even then, look at the general disapproval of "war crimes'. The ideal would be if all people considered all others to be of their kind―humankind unbounded by religious bigotry and cultural antipathies. I don't deny that there are sociopaths, those lacking in normal human empathy, who don't have a problem with violent crimes.

If this is just a claim to an average, I think it's empirically true. I do not think your next claim follows. Among the 'smartest' people, you're likely to get more disagreement as each can bring more nuance and see different things in the same sets of data (or, different relations). I don't think this has much to do with feeling, though I am not suggesting we can avoid feelings when deciding on theories, for instance. — AmadeusD

I agree with you that it doesn't always predominately involve feeling (in the sense of wishing that things are some particular way) but I think in may cases it does, especially among the religious-minded. And remember I also said it can involve the hold that upbringing may have (although I guess that too might be counted as a kind of feeling―of for example attachment). Beyond that of course there will still be disagreement based on what different people find plausible when it comes to those matters the truth of which cannot be empirically determined (notably metaphysics and ontology).

Huh. I've had several give me what I think is a satisfactory answer. Something like:

"real" in relation to Universals obtains in their examples. The same as "red" which is obviously real, "three" can exist in the same way: In three things. Red exists in red things. I don't see a problem? — AmadeusD

Yes, but as I have said in this thread and many times elsewhere, I think number is found everywhere, which would mean it exists in the empirical world. Those who advocate for the reality of universals and number in some transcendental sense are the ones I had in mind―they are the ones who cannot say in what sense number could be real and yet not exist. (of course numbers considered as discrete entities, as opposed to number, are not encountered in the empirical world (except as numerals and of course they don't count because they are not themselves numbers, but are symbols of numbers).

We can agree, and do, agree on what's real in most contexts of ordinary usage. When it comes to metaphysics it's a different matter.
— Janus

This is important. "Real" is perfectly clear and useful in most contexts, because we know how to use it. — J

:up: Yes, and the interesting point seems to be that to agree on the meaning of 'real' would be to agree on what is real. The difficulty I have with those who posit the reality of transcendent things is that they are unable to say what "real" could mean in that connection.

:up:

Sounds dangerous―flipping tractors is not a good idea, but much easier to do than many people realize! Where the lantana is up here it is so vigorous it usually chokes out just about everything else. You get the odd rainforest pioneer tree coming up through it, and they are usually fairly easy to avoid. I acquired a little excavator a few months ago, and I intend to use that for the more precise work after the tractor has done most of the clearing, but since I bought it the ground's been too soggy to use it.

I think we might be straying off topic, but I don't think God will mind. Apparently he's very interested in everything we do.

There are a lot of old hippies up here to be sure. I have never really identified as a hippy, although I do have some sympathy for their values. I just like it up here, and it was time ( about six years ago) to get out of Sydney, since I was able to retire from my landscaping design and construction business.

Lantana is a bit of a bugger―though it's much easier to get rid of than devils fig. I just drive into it with the bucket of the tractor up and the blade of the bucket pointed down, lower the leading edge of the bucket to the ground and then reverse the tractor dragging the lantana out as it is so shallow rooted. Then I run over it with the slasher―it breaks down really fast―problem solved. The only bummer is that it serves as habitat for quite a few species of small birds, so I'm a little conflicted about getting rid of it.

I haven't been to Lake Cathie or Comboyne, but I stay at Flynn's Beach sometimes when I'm on my way down to and back from Sydney. I guess Lake Cathie would have been pretty conservative back in the day.

When I've asked, they mean what you go on to posit: it is an empirically real place one's soul ascends to after death (or, God, similar pseudo-physical terms get used). Not all, but that's the most common response I get. — AmadeusD

I've also struck theists who think that way. But it's not really defesnible since 'emprical' refers to the shared world of phenomena.

I presume the following was to indicate you want to ask about abstract, esoteric matters rather than "is gasoline running my car". I can. I can imagine a society in which there are less variant views generally. This is simply a temporal issue. in 2000 B.C it was probably quite easy, without force, to instantiate certain abstract beliefs in others, if you had a streak to do so. By that, I mean you are energized, articulate and willing to engage, no that you want to force yourself on others. — AmadeusD

Yes, esoteric matters. I did say I think there is general agreement about the nature of the perceived world. I even think there is general agreement when it comes to the "serious" moral issues like murder, rape, theft, assault, exploitation and so on. Admittedly some of the "agreement" may be lip service only.

That there would have been a greater degree of agreement in authoritarian and theocratic societies is no surprise I would say.

You've hit the nail here. I think the problem is that there are dumber, and smarter people. Those dumber people who might actually be precluded from employing the mental techniques required for this type of refinement are going to argue that they aren't dumber, and it's you (whoever, whatever) who has prevented their achieving success. This is patent nonsense, but goes to the issues i'm speaking about I guess: If they think "real" means what they interpret their Lot as, then we can't argue with them. There's no refinement to be had. — AmadeusD

I can't agree with you here. Of course there are smarter and dumber people, but if we allow that philosophers in general are among the smartest people, the great degree of disagreement among them when it comes to metaphysics at least shows that what people believe is more driven by emotion and upbringing than by intelligence.

Expertise is far easier to determine in science, technological pursuits, trades and crafts, and even in the arts technical expertise, if not aesthetic quality, is relatively easy to determine.

As to agreement about the meaning of 'real' I haven't seen a good definition emerge from the context of idealist and anti-realist metaphysics. For example when Platonists say universals and numbers are real, they cannot explain what they mean, because the usual understanding of what is real involves physical existence somewhere and/or the ability to act on other things. So when asked as to where the numbers and universals are to be found if somewhere other than in human thought, no answer is forthcoming.

There is plenty of herb available up here. I don't grow it myself. So much rain up here for the last few years―makes it difficult to get anything done. The weeds grow up here when it's warm and wet like you wouldn't beleiuve, and we are afflicted by the most horrible thorny weed called Giant Devil's Fig, apparently brought into Australia by some idiot to use as rootstock for growing aubergines (it's also in the Nightshade family). There are forests of the stuff everywhere up here―it's a massive problem.

Added: Not sure we should count Camus as an existentialist... — Banno

I have also read a bit of Camus―The Outsider, The First Man and The Myth of Sysyphus. If I recall correctly he disavowed being an existentialist and was opposed to any and all philosophical systems. I also seem to recall he and Sartre fell out over the latter's adherence to Marxism. I think his fiction is much better than Sartre's (although that said I've read only his Nausea).

That's excellent! I live on fifteen acres and recently had a dam put in, but there are so many other land maintenance issues that I am yet to get to starting a vegetable garden. It's definitely on the list. Luckily here in Nimbin we have excellent local farmer markets and a great organic food co-op.

We can agree, and do, agree on what's real in most contexts of ordinary usage. When it comes to metaphysics it's a different matter.

So, what do the theists mean when they say that God or Heaven is real? Mostly when we say something is real, we mean empirically real, that is that it is part of the shared environment of things, processes and events.

When it comes to metaphysics, if one wants to occupy a position, "my truth" is all that can be had. I've said elsewhere that the only criterion for veracity of metaphysical claims is plausibility. Good luck trying to get everyone to agree on what's plausible.

Wayfarer specifically has metaphysics in mind (although he might also have in mind the different ethics that might be thought to accompany different metaphysics), and if we all agreed on what "is real" meant in that context, then I can't see how we would not all be agreeing not merely on the meaning of the term but also as to what is real.

In the past in the West let's say for argument's sake everyone believed in God (or at least paid lip service to the belief out of fear). Can you imagine any context other than an authoritarian one, where everyone would agree (about abstruse as opposed to merely everyday matters?

Yes, thanks. Looks interesting...I will read it later...now I have some work to do outside.

The fact that 'real' and 'reality' don't have 'agreed upon definitions' is actually symptomatic of the cultural problem which the OP is attempting, in its own way, to address. — Wayfarer

You mean the "problem" that we don't all think the same, that we can have different viewpoints?

You would have us all return to living "under the aegis of tutelage"?

How conservative, how dogmatic, of you.

...criteria for the identification of things
— Janus
How do these differ from just plain properties - that is, we can identify the kettle form others if we specify that it is the one on the stove; but being on the stove is not, I suppose, a part of the essence of being that kettle. — Banno

I was thinking in terms of identification of things as kinds of thing, not identification of things as particular things. For the purposes of the latter we could bring relations into consideration. Although all indivduals have unique identifying qualities too.

For example we could say that there are essential characteristics that all tigers share, while there are also unique individual variations of those characteristics. A question I've wondered about is, in the context of modal logic, how far we can go in considering all those properties to be contingent, that is not logically necessary.

Perhaps the subjective experience of information processing systems of sufficient number and/or complexity is awareness. And when sufficient feedback loops are also present, the experience is self-awareness. — Patterner

Whitehead pointed out that any object is "subject" to effects from its environment. So cliffs are weathered, are subject to sunlight, wind and water erosion for example. But we don't usually think of inanimate objects as possessing internally maintained structural integrity. We might think that way about cells and even microphysical particles, though.

So, along with the idea of internally maintained structural integrity comes the biological phenomenon of homeostasis, and this requires the ability to respond to the external and internal environments appropriately, something that a rock responding to the sunlight, wind and rain by being eroded could hardly be said to be doing.

Of course even the most complex organisms, even we humans, are " weathered", "eroded" by the internal and external environments, so we are "subjects" in that sense as well.

I see no problem with the idea of essential qualities or attributes. But should we think of them as logically necessary or merely as criteria for the identification of things?

However, it seems to me that if the 'reality beyond/before phenomena' was structureless, it would not possible for us to give it a 'form'. — boundless

I made the same point myself earlier in the thread but it received no response―which is probably understandable.

Not sufficient to explain the commonality of experience. That's why Kant says there are things in themselves which appear to us as phenomena. Schopenhauer disagreed and claimed there cannot be things in themselves if there is no space and time (both of which are necessary for differentiation) except in individual minds. To posit an undifferentiated, unstructured thing in itself that gives rise to an unimaginably complex world of things on a vast range of scales is, to say the least, illogical. — Janus

Kant may have "gone too far" as you say―it depends on how you read him. There are realist interpretations of Kant―that is there are scholars who interpret him as thinking that things in themselves are mind-independently real, but unknowable as they are in themselves (and that by mere definition) and knowable only as they appear to us.

Anti-realists, anti-materialists, anti-physicalists have a vested interest in denying the reality of things in themselves, because to allow them would be to admit that consciousness is not fundamental, and, very often it seems, for religious or spiritual reasons they want to believe that consciousness is fundamental, especially if they don't want to accept the Abrahamic god. One can, without inconsistency, accept the Abrahamic god and be a realist about mind-independent existents.

Nominalism was clearly part of what was going on, but something as complex as the Renaissance/Reformation must have involved many interacting factors. — Ludwig V

That's right, it is just one thread within the whole tapestry. The attempt to characterize nominalism as 'where we went wrong' is a tendentious, "just-so" story. There are many points in history, right back to the advent of agriculture and land ownership where it could be said we "went the wrong way". The polemic between nominalism and realism of universals is a minor philosophical issue which is of concern only to (some) of the intellectual elites. There are also more nuanced views which avoid this very polemic.

I would go further and suggest that there are no "slam-dunk" arguments anywhere in philosophy. If there were, they would demolish ideas without understand them properly, and in metaphysics all ideas deserve a proper understanding — Ludwig V

Right, I'm obviously not going to disagree (except that you are "going further") since I said as much myself in the very passage you are responding to.

However, your argument proves too much. It is always the case that conclusions depend on what assumptions are made at the start. But that applies to good arguments as much as to bad ones.
I do agree that there is no fact of the matter that will determine the truth or falsity of any metaphysical view. But that doesn't necessarily mean that all views are equal. — Ludwig V

It is strange that you seem to think you are disagreeing with me somehow, when I have already said pretty much what you are saying here. Recall that earlier I said it comes down to what seems most plausible. Of course I agree that there are good arguments and bad arguments, and assuming that we are referring to consistent (with their premises) arguments, then evaluation must comes down to plausibility. It is a little like aesthetics―we all know there are good and bad artworks, but a precise and determinable measure of aesthetic value , just as a precise and determinable measure of plausibility, is not possible.

"Supervenience already implies a function from micro-configurations to macro-properties: if two systems are identical in all micro respects, they must be identical in their macro-properties. But this function need not be definable in purely micro-level terms. The criteria that fix the mapping may depend on high-level structures or capacities that cannot themselves be specified without invoking macro-level concepts." — Pierre-Normand

If you are trying to describe macro-level functions in micro-level terms, then the macro-level description is also indispensable. Otherwise what would it be that you are trying to describe in micro-level terms?

This just seems obvious. But the complaint that seems to be commonly made is that the macro-level description is lost in the micro-level description, and that the micro-level description is thus not a true description. But how could it be otherwise?

I think this problem is what constitutes the so-called "hard problem". No micro-level description will be acceptable to those who demand that physicalism should be able to explain subjective experience, if it eliminates the macro-level description. but it must eliminate the macro-level description (Sellars "manifest image" of human experience and judgement) otherwise it would not be a micro-level description.

So does this substance called mind have a molecular structure? — Wayfarer

And here is a fine example of this conflation of paradigms.

You are probably right that I can become a little verbally aggressive when it becomes obvious to me that the person I am supposed to be discussing with refuses to address my arguments by either distorting them, dismissively labeling them as examples of some ism or other, or simply ignores them. I said you were "full of shit" only once when you claimed to have addressed what I said and that claim was patently untrue. I have probably accused you of intellectual dishonesty a few times for the same reason.

These reactions that express annoyance are not ideal...I acknowledge that, but they have been prompted by frustration. You cannot seriously claim that I don't understand your arguments...in fact you know very well that I do understand them. If I didn't understand them I would ask for clarification, and this is usually not necessary in your case because your writing is clear enough. It is intellectually dishonest to tell someone that they don't understand what you have written if they have not asked for further explanation and if you are not prepared to cite what they have said in response and clearly explain how it constitutes a misunderstanding as opposed to a mere disagreement.

I see you often use this tactic of claiming that your interlocutor simply does not understand in your discussions with others. I will continue to critique what you write if I think it is inconsistent or dogmatic. I reserve the right to call out dogmatism when I see it, and I will always give a clear and sufficient explanation as to why I think it is dogmatic, and then the ball is in your court to defend your claims against the charge of dogmatism by offering cogent arguments as to why it should not be considered to be so. Whether you respond or not is up to you.

:up:

But the claim “mind is brain” is itself conceptual. It relies on the conceptual architecture of science. — Wayfarer

It all depends on your perspective. For the physicalist the claim "mind is brain" is physical, as reasoning is a physical process. Concepts themselves (as conceived) are hypostatized physical processes for the physicalist.

The problem for you is that you think there is a "slam dunk" way of debunking physicalism. There is no slam dunk way of debunking physicalism or any other metaphysical view because everything depends on what assumptions you begin with.

With metaphysics the best you can hope for is consistency and plausibility, you are not going to get any proof.

Yes, the redundancy of ipseity. :wink:

So, according to you it is out of bounds for anyone to join in by expressing their opinion unless it is accordance with yours?

You won't dare to engage with my arguments directly because you know you have no answers for them, so I conclude you are not a genuinely open-minded interlocutor, but are an ideologue, a dogmatist, who reacts defensively by casting aspersions on those who present counterarguments and critiques they cannot deal with.

Gobbledygook.

Sure - I entirely agree, it should be trivial. Some people might disagree, as with everything else in philosophy.

Now the only issue is if you are OK with saying some versions of idealism entail mental mediation or if you think idealism must entail something else. — Manuel

I'm not sure what your are asking here Manuel. I think all worldviews must entail mental mediation insofar as they are worldviews. And I think virtually all worldviews must acknowledge that human experience, perception, cognition entail mental mediation.

Perhaps one exception might be a view that the things we perceive are given to our minds fully formed by God, and this would be a kind of direct realism. Perhaps Berkeley has something like this in mind.

By "something else" do you mean 'something independent of the individual mind'? If that is what you mean then I do think any coherent idealism must entail something else, whether that be an entanglement of all minds, all minds being connected to a collective or universal mind like the Buddhiust ālaya-vijñāna (storehouse consciousness) or God.

So, we need some way of connecting or independently informing individual minds in order to explain the undeniable commonality of experience. For physicalism or materialism that "something else" is the world of mind-independently existing things.


The meaning of life is all about proselytization. :wink:

But there are restrained versions of it which argue is that what we access is necessarily mentally mediated - without making ontological commitments about what these objects are (non-mental, immaterial, mechanistic, etc.) — Manuel

It's more that the way we access what we access is mentally mediated, and that is really a truism, even tautologous, If we say that perception is a mental process.

Transcendental idealism does not claim that the world is a mere figment of individual minds, but rather that the structure of experience is provided by our shared and inherent cognitive systems. — Wayfarer

With no input from the structure of the world or a collective originating mind? That just doesn't compute.

Agreement arises because we all operate with fundamentally similar mental structures. This preserves the objectivity of the external world while acknowledging the active role our minds play in organizing experience. — Wayfarer

Not sufficient to explain the commonality of experience. That's why Kant says there are things in themselves which appear to us phenomena. Schopenhauer disagreed and claimed there cannot be things in themselves if there is no space and time (both of which are necessary for differentiation) except in individual minds. To posit an undifferentiated, unstructured thing in itself that gives rise to an unimaginably complex world of things on a vast range of scales is, to say the least, illogical.

At least Berkeley's idea that all that complexity is generated in the mind of God, which we all participate in, makes some logical sense.

The explanation on offer, "god did it", can account for anything, and so accounts for nothing. Not what I look for in an explanation.

I find it hard to make sense of "collective mind". — Banno

I'm with you on that, but can allow that others think it makes sense. I mean it's really the only thinkable alternative to a mind-independently existent world.

Berkeleyan idealism consists in claiming not that the objects of the senses find their genesis in the individual human mind but in the mind of God, so the problems you enumerated don't seem to be relevant.

The way I see it, the fact that we all experience the same world can be explained only by a collective mind we all participate in or an independently existing material world. We cannot know which alternative is true, the best we can do is decide which seems the more plausible.

Not sure which direct quotation you are referring to. If you mean his saying that the equation should describe the world in a deterministic way, I would interpret that as meaning that, given that the predictive success of QT is unparalleled, and given that the usefulness of any scientific theory consists in its predictive power, he concludes it must be incomplete.

The quoted passage just shows that Penrose is not a rigid determinist, and although Penrose is not quoted as explicitly saying it, according to the author of the article his attack is on the determinism and materialism that dominates the scientific environment, which I would have though is well in line with your ideas on the subject.