The problem of other minds cannot be resolved by looking at other humans face to face. This due to Cartesian doubt which Descartes introduced: e.g. if something looks like and acts like a duck, it might be an elaborate automaton. Same with something that looks like and acts like a human. Etc. — javra
You have claimed that you can't imagine it being ergo it can't be. — javra
"If you can't show that it is tout court inferior...," each time refusing to say what the hell it would mean for something to be "tout court inferior." — Leontiskos
The key idea is that "intelligent structure" has to arise so that this entropy can even be "produced". — apokrisis
I cannot logically or empirically demonstrate that you are human (rather than, say, and AI program). Its called the problem of other minds. That mentioned, do you mean to tell me that all you experience are intense emotions and no moments of eureka where something novel clicks with you? I'll believe you if you so say, but most humans are not like that and know it. — javra
It's called philosophy. Same reason you're bothering trying to convince me of your felt convictions. — javra
It's called reasoning. But OK, you don't see how. — javra
You are not the measure of all things (nor I, nor anyone else). Contra Pythagorean mindsets. — javra
Nope. When we get something, when something clicks with us, there may be emotions also experienced, but the thing that clicks--the deep inner (to the transcendental ego) understanding--is not the emotions that accompany. — javra
But this can, or at least could, be remedied via the introduction of new terms into the English language--at least so far as philosophical enquiry is concerned — javra
Never say never. For one thing, it prevents any progress being made in realms such as this. As one parallel example, same can be said of what beauty is--no one has yet satisfactorily explained it despite being investigated for millennia. To say it therefor can never be satisfactorily explained terminates all enguiries into it. I much rather prefer keeping an open mind in fields such as this. — javra
Like I said, you're the one who coined the term, initially in <this post> and then more definitively in <this post>. If "tout court inferior" doesn't mean anything, then why coin the term? — Leontiskos
↪I already did. — Leontiskos
Firstly, even if that was true that some race was IQ inferior, it doesn't make them tout court inferior, just IQ inferior.
— Janus
Again, this is not a principled response if you refuse to tell your interlocutor what would entail tout court inferiority. — Leontiskos
That's an effective tactic in a culture that opposes slavery, but it is not inherently rational, and therefore will be wholly ineffective in a culture that favors slavery. It is a form of begging the question. — Leontiskos
I am demonstrating the way that your opposition to slavery has reached the stage of mere emotivism. You have absolutely no rational account for why slavery is wrong, and you nevertheless hold that it is wrong. It is like a car running on fumes. — Leontiskos
Yes, I agree. Likely, we can't help but to speculate; the starting point of all constructions. And yet, like you suggest: end of the day, they never stop being constructions. — ENOAH
If '7+5' can be said to cause '12' in those common cases where that association occurs, then it could be said to cause any other association that might occur it would seem. — Janus
Could be. But I'll bet it lead to "12" first. I'll bet nobody who read it thought "5 +7" or "7-5" or "7 divided by 5" or "these two prime numbers do not sum to a prime" or anything else before they thought "12". — Patterner
This is a version of the reductive argument I proposed to ignore: It's the neuronal activity doing the causing, not the thoughts or the meanings themselves. On this understanding, do you think we should deny that my thought of "7 + 5" causes (or otherwise influences or leads to) the thought of "12"? Would this be better understood as loose talk, a kind of shorthand for "The neuronal activity that somehow correlates with or gives rise to the thought '7 + 5' causes the neuronal activity that . . . " etc? — J
Although they've been named after Claude Shannon, I'm pretty sure they identify as non-binary. — Pierre-Normand
I tend, shallowly perhaps, to regard it as over-excited exaggeration to gain attention and to carve out a niche presence in the field and in the media landscape, and so on. There are equally expert people on the naysaying side, probably the majority, who just don't get as much attention. — Jamal
We are. And I have a decent idea on how to teach, so one could say that I have an idea about how we learn. One which functions towards other minds growing.
We learn because we're interested in some aspect of the world: we are motivated to do so by our desire. — Moliere
There is a project in New Zealand which tries to do exactly that by tending to an AI and then letting it "make decisions" that are filtered through the human network that tends to it. But all it is is a group of people deciding to see where an LLM will go given some human guidance in the social world. It's predictably chaotic. — Moliere
. "To “understand” truth, in my view, is to see how the *use* of the concept functions — not to discover its essence." — Banno
And after repetition it "learns" the "rewarding" ways and "unlearns" the "disrewarding" ways. — Moliere
I have no problem with that but, like talk of "relationships", are we really saying much when we say that connections between thoughts are associative? What we want to know is the nature(s) of those associations. And my question here is, specifically, can these associations include causal connections? — J
Might it be the case that there is no tractable way to understand non-physical causation (if it exists) until we understand how a brain can be a mind? Could be. (Even phrasing it this way becomes controversial, of course.) — J
Neural nets aren't radically other from other computers, imo. — Moliere
Basically I think the whole computational theory of mind as false. There are good analogies, but we can directly see how LLM's aren't human beings. If they registered an account here I'd guess there's some human being behind it somewhere. — Moliere
But the idea that AI could develop wants and desires from its life (biology, history, society, etc), like we do, is fantasy. Arguably this isn't connected with what LLMs are doing. As far as we know their "wants" and "desires" will always be derivative and programmed, since they are not part of a project to create conscious, desiring agents. — Jamal
This takes us back to the Google chatbot’s confident statement that “causation involves a physical connection between events, while entailment is a relationship between propositions.” — J
Yeah, but on the other hand, it might not be so bad to use an argument suggested by an LLM, so long as you understand it. After all, we do this all the time reading papers and books. Philosophical discourse takes place in a context that the participants in the discourse should have access to, and maybe LLMs just make this easier? — Jamal
I would also feel bad posting as my own AI content that I have merely paraphrased, even if I understand it fully. (And I might even feel a bit ashamed disclosing it!) — Pierre-Normand
Using them to polish your writing could be good (or merely acceptable) or bad depending on the nature and depth of the polishing. Jamal's earlier comparison with using a thesaurus was apt. An AI could point out places where your wording is clumsy or misleading. If the wording that it suggests instead is one that you can make your own, that's very similar to having a human editor make the suggestion to you. — Pierre-Normand
I wonder if their reading will be existentialist or post-modern. No doubt we'll be able to pick. — Tom Storm
But would an AI Wittgenstein be a performative contradiction? — Banno
"There are no authoritative generalists," says Janus. Of course I think that first sentence should read "only when," no? You are presumably saying that appeal to authority is illegitimate wherever the context is not a specialized discipline?
Your implicit argument here is that AI is not an authoritative generalist, and therefore should not be treated as one. I think that implicit argument is even more plausible than the more explicit argument you have given, but it is in no way uncontroversial. LLMs are coming to be seen not only as authoritative generalists, but as the authoritative generalist par excellence. — Leontiskos
Asking AI for information is a far too easy solution. It pops back in a few seconds -- not with a list of links to look at, but a complete answer in text and more. Seems convenient, but it rapidly undermines one's willingness to look for answers one's self -- and to use search engines to find sources. — BC
The other line is this: We do not have a good record of foreseeing adverse consequences of actions a few miles ahead; we do not have a good record of controlling technology (it isn't that it acts on its own -- rather we elect to use it more and more). — BC
I hope most of us are coming around to being more or less on the same page on this now. — Baden
What we face might be not an empirical question but an ethical one - do we extend the notion of intentionality to include AIs? — Banno
I'll go over Austin again, since it provides a set of tools that are quite applicable. A Phatic act is the act of putting words together in a sequence that recognisably part of language - constructing a sentence en English. This is what an LLM does. It uses a statistical engine to generate a set of words that follow on form the words provide din the prompt. An illocutionary act is one performed in making use of such words - making a statement, asking a question, and so on. This, so the claim goes, an LLM cannot do. — Banno
The AI strings words together, only ever performing the phatic act and never producing an illocution.
The uniquely human addition is taking those word-strings and using them in a language game.
So the question arrises, can such an account be consistently maintained; what is it that people bring to the game that an AI cannot? — Banno
Use AI outputs as starting points for further refinement
Cycle through multiple rounds of critique and revision
Refine prompts to avoid confirmation bias and explore diverse readings
Now this looks very much like a recipe for a language game.
On the other hand, the data set used by a human appears to be far, far smaller than that used by an LLM. Our brains simply do not "contain" the number of texts available to ChatGPT. Therefore whatever the brain is doing, it is different to what is happening in ChatGPT. — Banno
A huge aspect of this is the nature of appeals to authority, and given that TPF has an anti-religious bent, many of the members have not thought very deeply on the nature of appeals to authority (despite the fact that they occur quite often when it comes to SEP, IEP, Wittgenstein, etc.).
Whether or not the LLM is a legitimate authority and is trustworthy is at the root of many of these differences. It is the question of whether any given LLM-citation is an organic argument or an argument from authority, and also of whether the latter case is illegitimate. — Leontiskos
And likely written by Baden without AI, because backrground was misspelled. — ssu
No. I didn't. When has philosophy every provided an answer to any of our questions? Philosophy piggy-backs on the discoveries of science. It is only when science and technology progresses that philosophy progresses (with AI being an example of how it brought new life to discussions about mind and body.) — Harry Hindu
