"not self-contradictory", and "could actually come to be", are just different descriptions of the same type of possibilities. — Metaphysician Undercover

You're not getting the distinction between what is logically impossible and what may be, due to the nature of things, physically impossible, even though not logically self-contradictory.

An example that should be simple enough for you to understand: It is not logically impossible that tomorrow you may be able to fly like a bird. Is it physically impossible? We cannot be 100% sure that the law of gravity will not change between now and tomorrow thus allowing you to fly, even though it seems most improbable, so we don't know for sure what is physically impossible and what is not, without adding the stipulation that the law of gravity must not change. With that condition added, we do know that it is physically impossible for you to be able to fly tomorrow.

:up: Yep, we agree on that.

I added to my post as you were replying, making much the same point as your latter paragraph.

I think what you say is right, at least in the sense that we are all unique organisms. If a different sperm had fertilized the ovum that grew to became you then it would not be you but someone else...unless the theory of the soul as self were true. In the latter case it would be you in a different body. So to speculate about possible worlds in which you were born to do different parents and so on, would always be to invoke such a theory of the soul, else the speculations be nonsense.

'there's no solution to hard solipsism, so let's move on to some philosophy ' Always made me laugh. — Tom Storm

:lol: Nice one!

But it would be fair to say that there are differing schools of thought about what is worth pursuing and the temptation to write off the schools we disagree with as ignorant or 'not genuine' philosophy is probably unhelpful. (I'm not saying that you are doing this.) — Tom Storm

You're too generous, Questioning the reality of the world has been sufficiently done to demonstrate that it is not in any conceivable sense good philosophy, and Corvus, who is obviously a philosophical neophyte, is doing it, but I don't think she or he is open to learning, and so will most likely double down and continue ad nauseum.

a sound philosophical discussions. — Corvus

:rofl: Stop it...you're killing me!

Well, whenever you return here, all you ever keep shouting is that whatever you read is fool and dimwit. How could anyone help you? :lol: — Corvus

Well, I believe in calling a spade a spade, and it is not I who is looking for, or in need of, help. In any case, by all means carry on going around in your silly circle, it may be useless, but at least it will most likely provide a few laughs along the way, for others if not for you.

What I explained to you is that I could not make sense of your description of real possibilities as "physically law-abiding". — Metaphysician Undercover

A logical possibility is anything which is not self-contradictory, while a real possibility is something that could actually come to be. For example, it may or may not be a real possibility (epistemically speaking of course) that there are unicorns on some distant planet, whereas as there is no possibility that there may be perfectly round perfectly square rocks on some planet somewhere.

I can assure you that people draw a lot of conclusions about things which they do not understand. — Metaphysician Undercover

I haven't denied that unjustified conclusions are often drawn.

Do you believe in absolute accuracy on everything you experience? — Corvus

What does the "absolute accuracy" in regard to experience even mean? Perhaps you are looking for some absolute certainty? It's a fool's errand, a dimwit's folly. See if you can dig your pointless hole even deeper; should be fun to watch. :rofl:

Too many double negatives in that to make sense of. — Wayfarer

You need to try harder.

And yet — we don’t understand it.
— Sean Carroll

Makes me wonder if it is a form of sorcery :yikes: — Wayfarer

If we don't undertsnd it, how can we draw any conclusions about it? Sounds like the very defintion of "undecidable' to me.

Sorry Janus, I just cannot follow you. — Metaphysician Undercover

Not an auspicious omen for a fruitful conversation.

when one believes in the existence of the world, but says there is no justified belief in the world when not perceiving it — Corvus

Why would you believe something for which you believe you have no justification for believing? Sounds like the definition of stupidity to me.

Everything I experience gives me reason to believe the world does not depend on my perception of it. Perhaps you believe it doesn't give you such reason; if so, I can only conclude that you are a fool.

The opposite of ingenuity...foolishness, self-contradiction.

But when one believes in the existence of the world, but says there is no justified belief in the world when not perceiving it. What would you class the position? — Corvus

Disingenuity.

Notice all of them are about the 'debate over the nature of reality' and 'struggles for the soul of science'. It suggests that there's something important and real at stake. — Wayfarer

I can't see any reason to think the answer is not undecidable. Also, I can't see how it would make any difference to human life whether the collapse of the wave function is 'real' (whatever that could actually mean) as opposed to merely an artefact of our modeling.

I put 'real' in inverted commas and "whatever that could actually mean" in brackets because the only way I can conceive that the collapse of the wave function could be ontologically (as opposed to epistemologically or phenomenologically) real would be if it were independent of us and our models, that is if it were mind-independent.

If a material ultimate can be conceived of in the classical sense of an atom, an indivisible point-particle, I think it's pretty definitively disproved. It is now said that sub-atomic particles are 'excitations in fields' - but what 'fields' are is an open question, as is whether there may be fields other than electromagnetic (which you would never detect with electromagnetic instruments, for example morphic fields.) — Wayfarer

Perhaps fields are material ultimates. Remember the basic idea behind the concepts of materiality and physicality is that they denote that which exists in and of itself independently of human perception and understanding. Now of course we can say that it is logically possible that no such things exist, but it is not demonstrable that they don't, or even decidable whether they do or not.

So, our beliefs either way must be guided by what seems most plausible given the whole of human experience and understanding as far as we are able to comprehend it, or else guided by wishful thinking if the answer seems to matter enough to us to preclude the application of disinterested rational consideration.

So I really cannot understand your way of thinking here. The assumption of "real possibilities" as a primary premise, denies the possibility of determinism, leaving the proposition "nature is fundamentally deterministic" as necessarily false, therefore not relevant in this context. — Metaphysician Undercover

You are ignoring that fact that all possibilities remain such for us (since we cannot know the future). So even if what we think of as real (i.e. physically law-abiding as opposed to merely logical) possibilities are actually necessities (if determinism is true) they still remain just possibilities, epistemologically speaking.

About the ontological we can only speculate, and we cannot even be sure those speculations are coherent or even what it would mean for them to be coherent.

to which the answer is, it is kind of real, up until the time it is registered on plate. at which point it becomes definite. — Wayfarer

It becomes definite for us at that point; we can't say anything definite either way about its existence prior to that, but it does not follow that what we can say reflects what is the actuality of what appears to us as an electron. There must be a good reason why there is no consensus among those who might actually know what they are talking about when it comes to the question about ontological status of the collapse of the wave function.

I don't see why you would say this is unanswerable. If there is real possibilities then many do not ever become actual, otherwise they would not be real possibilities. Possibility means that actualization is not necessary. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't see how it follows that there must be real possibilities which do not become actualized. If nature is fundamentally random there would be, but if it is fundamentally deterministic there would not be, and we have no way of telling whether nature is fundamentally random or deterministic.

No, simply because there is no material ultimate, materialism is like a kind of popular myth. — Wayfarer

We don't know whether there are "material ultimates" or not.

Which is the real field? — Wayfarer

The answer I would give is that in terms of specialist human experience and understanding they are all real aspects, relations or possibilities of the one field.

' Reality ought also be assigned to certain possibilities, or “potential” realities, that have not yet become “actual.” These potential realities do not exist in spacetime, but nevertheless are “ontological” — that is, real components of existence.' (From the article.)

The idea of something existing “outside of space and time” makes empiricists nervous.' — Wayfarer

The interesting {but unfortunately unanswerable) question is as to whether there are real possibilities that never become actual or whether all real possibilities are determined to become actual. Of course, it certainly seems that no possibility exists as anything more than a possibility until (and unless?) it becomes actual.

Does anything exist outside of spacetime (presuming that by "spacetime" we don't mean human phenomenological space and time).? I'd say again that we have no way of determining the truth regarding that question.

The idea of something existing “outside of space and time” makes empiricists nervous.' — Wayfarer

It might make some empiricists nervous...beyond that I think it is an unwarranted generalization. In any case even if it were true, it would be a psychological observation, not a philosophical insight.

I think it harks back to the idea of there being degrees of reality. — Wayfarer

I can't make sense of the idea of degrees of reality, except in terms of degrees of definiteness, which would seem to come down to experiential intensity, and so would be relevant only in regard to human experience. In other words, some things may seem more real (vivid or definite) than others.

As I said, the answer to the question 'does the particle exist' just is the probability equation. You may brush it off but I'm suggesting, this is just what caused Einstein to ask the question 'doesn't the moon continue to exist when we're not looking at it?' — Wayfarer

From the little I know of QM, this is controversial. I don't like to speculate about things of which I have no expert or at least reasonably educated knowledge. What prompted Einstein to ask that question is a matter of psychological speculation. He was probably a realist so it would likely have seemed most plausible to him that the moon does continue to exist when we're not looking.

But again, the answer may vary depending on what we mean by "the moon".; do we mean 'the moon as appearance' or 'the extra-human conditions that give rise to the human perception of what we call 'the moon'. Different ways of thinking about it is what it comes down to as far as I am concerned; there is no final and absolute answer to questions like that.

In the context of the kind of idealism I'm advocating, — Wayfarer

I wonder why you are advocating it—do you think it really matters for human life in general (as opposed to say you or anyone else who cares about it either way) whether idealism or realism is true or at least more accurate?

For example, do you want idealism to be true because you think it would allow for an afterlife?

Putting it in your terms, how science chose to experience the things became the basis of what the things were in themselves. — Joshs

Science as it is has evolved to be practiced today is based on observing and describing things as they appear to us including augmented appearances via, for example, microscope and telescope, and as they are measured, quantified and modeled mathematically. It also involves educated conjectures regarding how things came to be as they appear to be chemically speaking. Modern chemistry is coherent with physics, and the whole system of understanding as it extends into cosmology, geology, biology is vastly more complex, consistent and coherent than any other body of knowledge.

Putting it in your terms, how science chose to experience the things became the basis of what the things were in themselves. — Joshs

Those are not my terms; I think a distinction between things as they appear to us and things as they are in themselves is a valid distinction, even though we cannot (by mere definition) know what things are in themselves. Science deals, and can only deal, with things as they appear to us. But I don't see that appearing as artificial or culturally constructed, it too is a part of nature, and it is as real as anything else could be.

So, I don't see much or even any "choosing ways to experience things", although of course there is choosing ways to test and experiment with the things as they naturally appear to us.

Building an apparatus that channels the behavior of particles is not just a story, it is a material configuration that interacts with and changes phenomena in predictable ways. Our narratives and theories, as products of brains as physiological systems, are also material apparatuses that are not exclusively constructed by us. They are co-constructions that require both our own material constitution and that of our environment. Our theories are not simply in the head, they are engagements between head and world that are composed of turnout of both aspects. New realities are created through this reciprocal relation, not from inside the head. — Joshs

I don't disagree with anything you say here, although I would say the "new realties" you mention are realities of human experience. I don't think our experimenting changes the nature of the cosmos, but merely the nature of our conceptions and experience of the cosmos.

We see based on what and how it is useful for us to see. this is not a fabrication of the mind, but neither does it allow us to assume lawfully fixed contents of a world independent of our dealings with it. — Joshs

I'm not talking about anything "fixed" in the sense of 'static'. We don't know what the contents of a world independent of our dealings with it are, but that does not preclude thinking that such a world, of which our world of experience and understanding is a small part, a manifestation, exists.

The Wizard of Oz gave me a PhD. — Joshs

I am the Wizard of Oz, and I have issued no such qualification.

What does it mean to say that possibilities are realities? Does it just mean that some possibilities are real, as opposed to merely logical? Unless it means something more than that it is certainly not a novel idea. — Janus

Suggest you read the Science News article. They note the idea goes back to Aristotle, but I think it is one of the things that fell out of favour with the abandonment of Aristotelian realism. — Wayfarer

I did read the article. You haven't answered the question as to whether you think the claim that possibilities are realities means something beyond what I believe is commonly accepted: namely that there are real possibilities and merely logical possibilities.

If that idea has not "fallen out of favour" then what exactly is the idea that you think has fallen out of favour?

There seems to be a casual assumption that 'everyone knows' what it means for something to exist. After all you can open your eyes and see it. But again philosophy is exploring that question from a critical - not necessarily outright sceptical - perspective. — Wayfarer

Everyone knows what it means to exist in the most basic sense; it simply means 'to be actual' as opposed to being imaginary or fictional. But now you may ask what being actual, imaginary or fictional themselves mean. When we are called upon to precisely define or explain terms the problems begin as Augustine pointed out with regard to time.

This is because such concepts can only be defined and explained in terms of other concepts, which in turn can only be defined and explained in terms of yet others and so on. This leads to an endless regression.

But we have an intuitive sense of what such terms mean even if we cannot precisely define and explain that meaning. I would say that intuitive sense derives from experiencing the contexts in which such usages occur.

If we don't have an intuitive understanding of these terms, we are not going to get to an understanding via the endless regress of definition and explanation or via etymology which is fraught with its own set of interpretive pitfalls. How else do you think we could arrive at understanding such concepts?

The claim is made that we "create" or "construct" objects or phenomena in the factory or workshop of our minds as if we carry tiny craftsmen or masons in us, building what we experience. — Ciceronianus

:up: Nice image! I think you are right that metaphors often get taken literally, then reified.

I’m not getting the impression you’re grasping what Wayfarer is aiming at here. For phenomenology, it’s not just that the world appears to us as phenomena, it’s that things appear in particular ways, and these particular ways contribute the sense of what appears. — Joshs

I understand what Wayfarer is aiming at, and I understand the project of phenomenology. My point is that it is just one way of looking at things. Phenomenology is concerned with describing and analyzing how things appear to us, but how things appear to us is not exhaustive of reality, even if it is exhaustive of what we can know of reality.

Science deals with things as they appear to us (obviously, since what else could it deal with?} but it is not phenomenology, because it is concerned with studying the things and not with studying how we experience the things.

This sense is neither purely a contribution of the subject nor the object but of a correlation between the two — Joshs

Yes, the world as we experience it is a function of the interaction between the extra-human conditions and the human conditions.

We tend to distinguish between things we construct , and things that
naturally appear to us, but it is better to understand all appearances as constructions. — Joshs

I don't think it is better to understand all appearances as constructions, or at least not as purely human constructions. We do not create ourselves any more than we create the rest of nature; we are created by nature, we are always already pre-cognitively created by nature.

We create human stories, about how we came to be in the world as we experience it, and of course those stories are cultural, historically mediated constructions, but to say they are exclusively constructed by us implies a creative freedom, a pure creative arbitrariness, which is misleading and brings about an anthropocentric illusion that reality is created by us tout court.

Our human stories are constrained by the signs of the past that are discovered in nature, so our stories are constrained by those signs, most of which predate humanity altogether. Our stories are merely the map, and the map can never become the territory. All we can hope for is verisimilitude, not absolute veracity.

Don't fall into the mistake of thinking that those who disagree with you, who have a different perspective, do not understand your way of understanding things. The important thing to understand, in my view, is that there are many ways of understanding things, and that those ways of understanding can only be more or less right, and that whether they are more or less right is not up to us but is determined, as our very beings are, by natural actuality. The challenge is to be able to accept that we must learn to live with uncertainty, since, as the limited beings that we are, we can only know things as they appear to us.

When we throw the frisbee to the dog to catch, do t they see the object we do? Yes and no. For the purposes of playing catch, the dog must see the frisbee as the same object thoughout changes in its movement. They have to be capable of this to track it. But if we cover the frisbee with a blanket will the dog know the same object is still there but occluded? — Joshs

If the dog sees you cover the frisbee with a blanket she will likely stick her nose under the blanket to retrieve the frisbee. If she doesn't see you cover the Frisbee, she may sniff it out nonetheless. Of course, this depends on the dog. When I throw the ball for my dog and the throw is weak resulting in the ball falling into the metre high grasses where it is no longer visible, my dog does not assume it has simply disappeared but hunts relentlessly until he finds it. I presume he does this by scent, since I would be unable to find the ball in that grass.

If we cut up the frisbee into two pieces will the dog associate the pieces with the former object?

If you cannot come up with a clever experiment to test that, then we have no way of knowing. When the dog chews the frisbee to pieces does she know that the pieces are what is left of the frisbee? To my way of thinking your view suffers from excessive anthropocentrism. In a way of course our views are necessarily anthropocentric since we only know things as they appear to us, but that shouldn't stop us from trying to imagine beyond our human-centric understandings, or from realizing that those very understandings should in any case lead us to acknowledging that we are just one tiny part of a vast universe, the actuality of which is not dependent on us.

What does it mean to say that possibilities are realities? Does it just mean that some possibilities are real, as opposed to merely logical? Unless it means something more than that it is certainly not a novel idea.

So, philosophy forums are pointless then? :wink:

There are also a few definitions or conceptions of what doing philosophy consists in.

It seems to me you fail to understand that others do understand your point of view and simply disagree with it.

It is indubitably the case that 'phenomenon' is from the Greek 'phainomenon' meaning 'what appears'. And I claim that a subject to whom it appears is implicit in this definition as a matter of fact (which is also, I believe, a central contention of phenomenology). — Wayfarer

"What appears" could be construed as either the appearance itself or what gives rise to the appearance.
Even assuming your tale is correct, meanings change, and new usages may be more or less in accordance with the origins of terms (assuming that we are able to accurately interpret just what was meant by archaic usages). It is nowhere near as cut and dried as you would like to paint it.

The 'actual existence' you're proposing is that outside any perspective or point of view. But you can't legitimately occupy such a perspective. I know this is very un-intuitive but I'm saying, it is based on a kind of 'reflexive realism' - what Husserl calls 'the natural attitude' which simply assumes the reality of the sensory domain. — Wayfarer

I understand your way of thinking, I used to think that way or at least tried it on for a while, but I think it is misguided, based on conflating what we can clearly think existence is (based on our experience) with being able to clearly think that actual (as opposed to experienced) existence is not, or at least might not, be the same. As I read Kant this is the very point of the noumenal/ phenomenal distinction.

On the other hand, we could just refer to things as phenomena, whether experienced or not and allow that our perceptions of those phenomena give us limited knowledge and understanding of them. It's just different ways of thinking, but both sides of this interminable and pointless debate seem to want to have it that there is a fact of the matter, and that the reality is just one way and not the other. " There really are cups even when no one is looking at them" or "there really are no cups when we are not looking at them". I mean, what the fuck does it matter?

Put another way, it is empirically true that the Universe (or boulder) exists independently of any particular mind. But what we know of its existence is inextricably bound by and to the mind we have, and so, in that sense, reality is not straightforwardly objective. — Wayfarer

You are losing the distinction between what we know of the existence of things and their actual existence: the two are not the same.

:up:

Mustn’t be forgotten that phenomena are what appears to a subject. — Wayfarer

This is one definition. On the other hand, it seems most plausible that there is a whole universe of phenomena, only the tiniest fraction of which ever appears to any "subject".

Wheeler's diagram suggests that nature can be carved up in any number of ways. A good mathematician (which I'm not) would be able to tell you how many different ways the poles could be joined, each giving a different configuration. What do you think the analogy means?

I'm curious as to who and what you're addressing here.

The idea that the way we carve up nature is purely arbitrary seems highly implausible given that we all, even animals, seem to carve it up the same way.

Not "must be wrong" but rather "could be wrong" depending on context. Surely it depends on what is meant by "phenomenal object", as to whether it would be right or wrong to say they enjoy mind-independent existence, no?

I think it's more a case of "philosophy as talking past one another" than "philosophy as affectation", when each side assumes that either the proposition that phenomenal objects enjoy mind-independent existence or the negation of that proposition represents some absolute matter of fact.

As I see it both of those propositions are "not even wrong", just because we have no idea what they could even mean outside of very well-defined contexts. If there is an affectation it is the pretense that we know what we are talking about when we make such claims and counterclaims.

It really is such a pointless, boring and interminable debate that lacks any significance for human life.

This all seems very hand-wavy.

I've been struck by the lack of clarity in several recent discussions revolving around subjectivity, objectivity, truth and belief. — "Banno

You don't say what the purported confusion is. If all you are saying is that it seems to you that there is a lack of clarity, then that may say something about you but nothing about anything else.

Before commencing the main argument, it may be worth pointing out that belief and truth are not the same. One can believe stuff that is not true, as well as disbelieve stuff that is true. Believing something does not imply that it is true, and being true does not imply being believed. I mention this because it is a simple, but ubiquitous error, and may well underpin other problems.

I don't see, and you haven't explained, how you think these obvious truisms refute anything or support your judgement that some beliefs or claims amount to affectation in philosophy.

And so to the argument. The words subjective and objective are such that we are prone to allow them to lead us up and down various garden paths. It is especially important, therefore, to keep an eye on their use in mundane contexts.

I've already dealt with your 'ice cream' example, showing that saying it is an example of a subjective or an objective statement are just different ways of talking about it. I received no response.

That this text is written in English is not dependent on my own taste or feelings. Hence it is an objective truth.

Do you think anyone would challenge that? What is the word "objective" doing there? Is it meant to suggest that the truth of the statement is independent of any context?

That's an end to it; don't allow the notions of subjectivity and objectivity to take on any more significance.

in particular, don't pretend that there are either only subjective facts, or that there are only objective facts.

An end to what? 'Subjective' and 'objective' is just a distinction we are able to make; they are valid in some contexts, and questionable in others.

It seems to me it is just a matter of different ways of thinking/ speaking. For example, I can say that without percipients (subjects) there are no facts, and in that sense all facts are subjective (or more accurately, intersubjective). Depends on what sense of 'fact' is being employed. Shifting sands...talk about bewitchment by means of language!

I'm not defending Pfizer.

Not by reading your post. :roll:

:up: I'm not a believer in astrology, although I have taken an interest in it in the past due to finding its symbolism interesting. I learned how to do natal charts and was surprised to find how often they seem to fit. I retain an open mind. Anyone who firmly believes, though, I would say must posit the kind of magical correspondence I spoke about, given that there is no conceivable science-based explanation for its efficacy.

:rofl: Your egregious confirmation bias is hilarious! This is merely a claim, not established fact.

Texas lawsuit claims Pfizer exaggerated effectiveness of Covid vaccine
State attorney general Ken Paxton files suit despite medical consensus that vaccine prevents severe infection and death.

The attorney general of Texas is suing the pharmaceutical company Pfizer, alleging that it exaggerated the effectiveness of its Covid-19 vaccine and deceived the public.

Ken Paxton announced the lawsuit on Thursday after filing it in Lubbock state district court in north-west Texas, the Texas Tribune reported.

Greg Abbott, who was previously vaccinated and also later tested positive for Covid-19, said in his order that ‘vaccines are strongly encouraged for those eligible to receive one, but must always be voluntary for Texans’.

Paxton’s suit comes as a consensus of health experts and scientists have said that the vaccine prevents severe infection and death from Covid-19.

Paxton accused Pfizer of “[engaging] in false, deceptive, and misleading acts and practices by making unsupported claims regarding the company’s Covid-19 vaccine in violation of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act”, according to a press release shared to X, formerly known as Twitter.

Paxton argued that Pfizer’s claims about effectiveness implied that it would effectively end the Covid-19 pandemic, and that it failed to do so within a year of being introduced.

The lawsuit also added that claims the vaccine was 95% effective were not accurate, and that Covid-19 infection as well as death rates worsened as the vaccine became increasingly available.

Pfizer released results on the effectiveness of Covid in November 2020, finding that the shot was 95% effective in the first 28 days after receiving the vaccine.

The suit also claims that Pfizer “[conspired]” to silence those who were critical of the shot, common arguments made amid other anti-vaccine figures.

Paxton’s suit asks that Pfizer be prohibited from “making representations about the efficacy of its Covid-19 vaccine”, the Hill reported.

The attorney general is also requesting $10,000 for every alleged violation by Pfizer, in addition to other financial restitution. The total civil penalties against Pfizer total up to more than $10m, according to Reuters.

In a statement, Pfizer said the “state’s case has no merit”, adding that the vaccine has been administered to 1.5 billion people “and helped protect against severe Covid-19 outcomes, including hospitalization and death”.

“The representations made by the company about its Covid-19 vaccine have been accurate and science-based,” it read.

The lawsuit is Paxton’s second against Pfizer in November. The attorney general previously sued the pharmaceutical company and an additional supplier for allegedly altering quality-control tests on ADHD medication for children.

From here

I'm uncertain what metaphysical ideas you think underpin feelings of pain or unhappiness and judgments regarding how to avoid it. If they amount to "ideas" such as that there is an "external world" which has things in it which cause us pain or unhappiness, then I think we're speaking of what I've been calling affectation. I don't think this sort of metaphysics was indulged in by the Stoics, at least. — Ciceronianus

I'm saying that the Stoics, the Epicureans and the Neoplatonists, as three examples. had very definite and different metaphysical postulates which formed integral parts of their respective systems and were (at least understood to be) conducive to the kinds of strategies each employed to deal with pain and suffering and/ or spiritual advancement. In other words, the various metaphysical presuppositions were integral to the various practices involved in the teachings.

Certain statements are labeled subjective because they set out an individuals taste or feelings. In contrast, other statements are called objective, as they do not set out an individual's taste, feelings or opinions.

Supose that "I prefer vanilla to chocolate ice-cream" is a subjective fact - or if you prefer, it is a subjective truth. It's truth is dependent on my own taste. — Banno

I'd say there are only objective facts or actualities. If you prefer vanilla to chocolate that would be an objective fact about you, so I'm not seeing much scope for confusion there.

Good question. One way of answering is to consider it's use in ↪Hanover. The truism that perception always involves a perceiver, is associated with "beauty in the eye of the beholder", "nothing either good or bad but thinking makes it so" and the conclusion that all perception is subjective looks plausible. How can I say that forgery or not is not in the eye of the beholder, or that thinking does not make forgery so (or not) without appearing to deny the truism?
I have to admit that my way of putting the issue might be taken to suggest that Hanover's motivation is suspect. So I have to clarify that I don't doubt that Hanover believes what he is saying. — Ludwig V

It seems plausible to me to think that perception is conceptually mediated. At the very least things seen, which are obviously not isolated from the rest of the visual field, as noticed, stand out as gestalts, as figure stands out from ground.

If 'see' is taken to mean something like 'the changing pattern of tones and colours formed on the retina' then we can say we always see the whole visual field. But this would be Jame's "buzzing blooming confusion' until something stands out as significant, with the rest of the visual field remaining 'invisible' or 'transparent'. We might say the rest is seen, but it is not consciously seen.

So, I don't think reality is socially or culturally constructed, but rather is merely socially or culturally mediated. There is always something real there which constrains what can be seen, but how what is there is seen may vary from culture to culture and individual to individual.

Astronomy, as practiced by science, is trying to do science with respect to the stars and planets and such, while astrology is trying to soothe people's fears about the future or their place within the world or what it is they ought to do with their life today: one is descriptive of the universe, and the other is therapeutic. — Moliere

This charaterization of astrology seems insignificant; I'd say astrology imagines a magical relationship- a correspondence between the cosmos and the human psyche, which is captured in the ancient hermetic principle "as above so below".

This statement seems not to be at all clear...much use for who and for what?

What kind of conduct and thought makes us miserable and how to avoid them seems demonstrable enough in most cases. — Ciceronianus

I don't disagree with that, but my point was that these ancient schools had metaphysical ideas which underpinned their ethical practices. It is arguable that different ideas, different metaphysical assumptions, work for different people. It is also arguable that none of them are truth-apt. Thus, their truth or falsity is not the significant issue, but rather their efficacy in producing misery or happiness is.