I agree with what you say about the intersubjective conventional notions of identity, subjectivity and objectivity. I was only pointing out that cell replacement is an internally driven and regulated activity and most of the cells of a biological body contain DNA unique to that particular organism; so this fact can be a criterion for determining unique identities, biologically speaking.

Yes, it's ridiculous to claim that vaccines were any kind of "government plot"; here in Australia, Scott Morrison's government was criticised for not securing the vaccines quickly enough; it was apparent that very many people felt that he was not taking the job of protecting the populace seriously. The third world countries were complaining because they were last in line to receive the vaccines; another example of the wealthier, privileged nations being prioritised.

This is another example that shows we intuitively know we are not our bodies. — RogueAI

It doesn't show me that. I also don't see parsimony in the belief that the physical realm doesn't exist; instead, I see that as contravening Peirce's maxim: "Let us not pretend to doubt in philosophy what we do not doubt in our hearts".

And how is metabolism a metaphysically important process while the wooden planks shifting around is not? What makes it special from all the other processes in nature? — Lionino

Metabolism and homeostasis are internally regulated. Another point is that the ship of Theseus could be considered to be the same ship or a different ship depending on your perspective, on what criteria you accept. Think about two examples of the same model of motor vehicle; are they the same or not?

Also identical twins are not the same person because they do not inhabit the same space or have the same experiences.
— Janus

Right, so then DNA is not the deciding factor then. — Lionino

Identical twins do not have the same DNA according to some sources. Do a search if you don't believe me. In any case I didn't claim that DNA is the only criterion for determining identity. Throughout your life you have a unique set of experiences. Even if identical twins were exactly the same at birth, divergence from that sameness begins immediately simply on account of them inhabiting different regions of space and experiencing different things through time.

I had in mind self-regulation, homeostasis and metabolism, so my point holds. Also identical twins are not the same person because they do not inhabit the same space or have the same experiences.

You're right about DNA; it was careless of me to say "all cells...", although I find it implausible that all the DNA in his body was destroyed: do you have a reference for this claim?

If all the cells in our bodies, in organisms generally, contain a unique DNA sequence that defines them then that is different than the 'ship of Theseus'. It is also a matter of metabolism. Look up 'self-organization' and you will see why it does not apply to ships or to anything other than organisms..

Yes, I agree it does. I guess I was still caught up in the exchange with @unenlightened.

Nice!

Because of that, I summon Theseus' ship. I ask you: is it the same ship? — Lionino

I don't think the same criteria for identity that apply to self-organizing systems such as biological organisms are relevant in the case of ships.

:ok:

I agree that it is tautologously true that we cannot know what we cannot know. My only point was that this says nothing about the existence of whatever it is we cannot know.

This may be true in the "quest" for enlightenment, but in the context of everyday pursuits, and the enrichment of life in terms of interest, it doesn't seem to follow. Goals can be effective motivators in those contexts.

OBS: Even though it may be that I feel as though I am the same person as I were yesterday, that might simply be an illusion created by the neurological conditions of the body, which are the memories I/we hold. — Lionino

We are constantly changing, all the cells that constitute our bodies replaced every seven or so years according to some accounts. On the other hand, are we not distinguishable as the entities that undergo those changes?

Both Stoicism and Epicureanism had their metaphysics which are not empirically testable. It would seem there are as many "practical wisdoms" as there are practical pursuits; beyond demonstrable efficacy in those contexts how would we measure practical wisdom or test for its presence?

Are you asking whether you or I will arrive at more clarity? I find clarity in drawing any distinction that seems valid. I don't find the sweeping judgement that no goals are worthwhile to be clear or convincing.

The judgements we make in science and some of the judgements we make in life are empirically based. In life many other kinds of judgements are made on the basis of intuition or emotion, and in philosophy, which goes beyond the criteria exercised in the empirical domain, the conceptions of wisdom are far more subjective than they are in science and the practical dimensions of everyday life.

No guarantee if one is one the Quest for Certainty, I suppose. But in this unhappy, imperfect universe we must make judgments without the benefit of absolute knowledge, on the best evidence available at the time we make them. And we do, in real life, if we're wise. — Ciceronianus

Sure, we make judgements, inferences to what we think are the best explanations. But in philosophy, where consensus seems impossible, as opposed to science where it is operative, who decides what is the best evidence or the best basis for judgment, or what wisdom consists in?

A subtle distinction? Say I want to be an artist and I see my goal is to be the best artist I can be. Or my desire to go on a journey of artistic discovery is seen instead as a gateway. A worthwhile goal or a worthwhile desire? Mere semantics?

It is a question of semantics. It is useful to talk about existence in some circumstances and not in others.

I do not see any importance in speculating how we can point at something we cannot point at. — I like sushi

Useful for whom? The fact that you do not see any importance in what you think of as speculating about how we can point at something we cannot point at and that you frame the question that way says more about you than anything else. I don't see the question as being concerned with pointing at anything at all.

If they exist absent humans then their existence is "in itself", rather than 'for us" and we don't know that existence and can only imagine it in 'for us' terms, but it doesn't follow that that existence is of the same nature as what we can imagine, and that also applies to spatiotemporality.

The term 'existence' does not have to be restricted to 'exists for us'. You can stipulate that the term is restricted in that way as you are using it, but it is merely a stipulation not a fact. It is uncontroversial that galaxies, stars, planets, dinosaurs and many other things existed prior to humans. Don't imagine that I haven't thought plenty about this.

No no no. You misunderstand, I promise! — I like sushi

I don't believe I misunderstood what you were saying, I simply disagree.

You cannot imagine something you cannot imagine - by definition. — I like sushi

It seems rather it is you that misunderstood what I was saying; It should be obvious that I was not claiming that we can imagine the unimaginable, but we can certainly imagine that something unimaginable may exist, or that things might have their own existence independently of our perceptions and understandings of them, and that an unimaginable form of existence may be very different than our perceptions and understandings lead us to believe about the form of existence the things we perceive appear to have.

This is an assumption. I am unaware of our ability to think in an atemporal way and with complete disregard to space. — I like sushi

Again, it is not a matter of being able to imagine a non-spatiotemporal existence, but of being able to imagine that there may be such, despite our inability to conceptualize it.

Which is necessarily nothing to us. Hence it is non-existent.

We talking about something existing based on human experience because, frankly, that is all we have and therefore all there ever is for us. It is a subtle obviousness easily missed.

It is not that we do not know what we cannot know - which is contrary! We cannot even refer to what we cannot know in any meaningful way. — I like sushi

It doesn't follow that because something is "nothing to us" that it is non-existent. In any case the in itself is not nothing to us except sensorially; we do generally tend to think that things have their own existences independently of us. The fact that we (obviously) cannot determine the total or absolute nature of that existence does not entail that it is "nothing".

You say we cannot refer to such things in a meaningful way, but that is just your opinion; it seems obvious to me that we can refer to such things apophatically as indeterminate existences or indeterminate aspects of things the aspects of the natures of which we can determine only via being sensorially affected by them.

When we say we can't know what the world really or actually, I think we make certain assumptions, the primary of which is the assumption that there is something that is real behind what we experience which can't be determined. Something hidden from us because of our nature. It's a kind of religious view, perhaps. — Ciceronianus

We know how things appear to us. There is no guarantee that these appearances give us exhaustive knowledge of how things are or that the nature of things is not (at least partially) hidden from us. It seems to me that to admit this is merely to exercise a modicum of intellectual humility which would make it, if anything, far from being an affectation. Closer to being an affectation would be to claim that what we can experience and understand of the world as it appears to is, or even must be, exhaustive of its nature.

The ‘thing-in-itself’ is an illusionary term just like talk of ‘square circles’ or ‘upside down trouser memories — I like sushi

I understand the term to signify the sheer existence of a thing as distinct from its existence for us. We cannot know what that existence is because anything all we can know is what a thing's existence is for us.

So, what we perceive are things as they exist for us, but we can say that it is reasonable to believe that we are precognitively affected by things in themselves (including what we are in ourselves) such as to give rise to the perceptions of things as appearances. In terms of our scientific understanding, we can investigate and analyze how things affect us such as to give rise to perceptions, but this investigation and analysis is still possible only in terms of how things appear to us, and the sheer existence of things, of ourselves and how it all interacts need not be the same as how it all appears to us.

‘The world’ is just shorthand for ‘everything that is’. Although I think the question ‘does the world exist?’ is a nonsense question. — Wayfarer

If 'world' and 'everything' are synonymous, and things exist, then why would we say the world does not exist? If you narrowly define existence as pertaining only to things which can be objects of the senses, and since everything cannot be an object of the senses then, in that sense, it might make sense to say the world does not exist; but then all we would be saying is that the world does not exist for us as an object of the senses.

Just what the world needs—more magnates as political leaders. :roll:

So I repeat, there is nothing about goals that make them worthwhile. Once get that into your head and you can begin to live a life in freedom. — unenlightened

So, according to you no goal is worthwhile even if pursuing it leads to interesting, enlivening or inspiring experiences or enlightening insights?

1. All As are Bs, all Bs are Cs, therefore all As are Cs
2. "All As are Bs, all Bs are Cs, therefore all As are Cs" is a valid argument

I'm not saying that (1) is objectively true; I'm saying that (2) is objectively true.

It is objectively true that (1) is valid, and this does not depend on the existence of an external world; it certainly does not depend on the existence of spacetime or any material object, and I would even say that it does not depend on the existence of any abstract object (à la Platonism).

Objective truths do not depend on the existence of anything (except in the obvious case of something like "X exists"). — Michael

""All As are Bs, all Bs are Cs, therefore all As are Cs" is a valid argument" is true, just as "all bachelors are unmarried" is true; that is, it would seem to be a tautology. I'm not sure what the word "objectively" is doing there, but it does suggest that there must be some state of affairs that acts as a truth maker. What makes tautologies true if not some fact or facts about language use, and is not language use an external world phenomenon?

To be sure facts about language use are not material objects, but language use itself is dependent on the existence of spacetime just as material objects are. You might object that facts about language use are not necessarily dependent on spacetime, but then facts about material objects are not necessarily dependent on spacetime either.

"All As are Bs, all Bs are Cs, therefore all As are Cs" is a valid argument.

The above statement is objectively true and does not depend on the existence of an external world. — Michael

I don't think this is right: the statement is valid, but in that abstract generic form is not truth apt. It needs to be given content in order to be true or false.

There are no worthwhile goals. — unenlightened

Interesting goals perhaps, or at least goals that enable interesting journeys?

If that is what you want...

They are the same question; if the existence of the world depended on your perception of it, it would not be at all external to perception.

If we have no reason to believe in an external unperceived world then we have no reason to believe in an external perceived world.

And you haven't told me what you think Hume says about it. If you are unable to present his arguments in your own words you could try quoting him directly.

You introduced the idea of constant joy and happiness as a goal, whereas as I have not addressed that question, or the OP's question, at all except in response to you. You are merely repeating what I already said, which was that the goal of attaining constant joy and happiness would be self-defeating, so what exactly is your point?

Your post sounds like as if you have not read anything on Hume and any messages in this thread with attention.  What does Hume say about  the way our beliefs arise for the continuous existence of the external world? — Corvus

Our belief in the external world and causation are habitual based on the experienced reliable presence of objects and invariance of objects and the observed constant conjunction of events.

What do you think he says?

Rather that they are grounded in the human mind, so, if you like, a kind of 'universal subject' rather than an individual ego. — Wayfarer

Do you believe in the existence of a universal subject?

He goes on proving Philosopher's belief in the existence of the external world, and concludes that the belief cannot be based on reason, but imagination.  There are extensive arguments and proofs why this is the case. — Corvus

Arguments do not prove anything; they are merely consistent (if valid) with their presupposed premises.
This means that belief in the existence or non-existence of the external world is based on reason, but the premises that reasoning, whether for or against, is based on cannot be certain and are themselves based on abductive speculation (imagination). None of which disagrees with Hume, so it looks to me like it is you who misunderstand Hume.

You seem to be a master of missing the point. The argument is simply that the existence of the world independently of its being perceived is an inference to the best explanation for our experience. It isn't a proof and doesn't purport to be.

As I read Hume all he was doing was pointing out that inductive and abductive reasoning are not deductively/ logically certain; a move against rationalism.

What makes you think I would have such a goal? Such a goal would make itself unattainable.

:up: Probably not.