You did not address my objection that if truth and fact mean exactly the same thing, why have two words instead of one?

There are multiple words for other concepts: justice and fairness for example. In any sentence in English of the form "It is true that", "it is a fact that" can be substituted. But in a wider context they don't mean exactly the same things just as justice and fairness don't.

"Truth" would be closer to 'factuality', and 'true' to 'factual'. But 'true' is a broader term; you cannot substitute 'fact' in the sentences 'his aim was true',or 'her love was true' or 'she is a true friend'. But to repeat, in propositional language as shown in 'it is true that' substitution makes sense.

Rather, you agree with my view; get over it. :-) — Olivier5

OK, this is getting too weird. If you want to believe that I agree with you, go ahead, you will be wrong, but it's no skin off my nose.

That doesn’t allow for the possibility of something that is thought by everyone to be a fact which subsequently turns out not to be. You’re appealing to a notion of ‘fact’ that transcends the possibility of being wrong, or saying that established facts are incontrovertible, when they often turn out not to be. — Wayfarer

You have it exactly backwards; it is the position of Olivier5 that carries the burden of not being able to account for being wrong.. I have said that facts are not fallible, but that what we take to be facts is fallible; for Oliver5 there is no distinction between facts and what we take to be facts.. You need to read more closely

I'm not saying that facts are dependent upon being determined. — Janus

You haven't addressed the fact that when the innocent and the guilty persons are both dead no one knows the fact of the matter; which remain facts of the matter nonetheless. And you have addressed the problem with your view of what constitutes a fact as it relates to historical fact. On your view there can be no historical fact because there is no way of observing the events in question in order to determine what actually happened.

You ARE saying what I am saying, you are just too stubborn to realize it. — Olivier5

That's a ridiculous claim given your inability to address the difficulties I have raised with your position. I disagree with your view; get over it. If you agree with what I'm saying then repeat after me

I'm not saying that facts are dependent upon being determined. — Janus

Do you have an idea of pain? Is it an idea of a bodily feeling or an idea of an expression such as "ouch"?

He went all the way to saying that

If I went to his place I could, via the senses, directly confirm whether or not there is a tree in his backyard, but not whether or not there is a pain in his toe. — Janus

but then reneged, choosing only to see this as a difference in perspective and not of kind.

The same floppiness occurs throughout philosophical discussions; it's most noticeable in talk of qualia, but it's also there in talk of truth and belief, and in the foundation of mathematics.

So yes, it is a recurring theme. — Banno

OK, from an intersubjective point of view it's a difference in kind of perspective because there are some "views" you can have which I never can and vice versa, and other "views" of yours which I could have if I were in a suitable position (although I could never have exactly the same view as you which is a further wrinkle in the fabric). I have already acknowledged the difference re the possibility of corroboration.

From a subjective perspective the tree is an external object and pain an internal one, but I don't need any further justification to know I am seeing a tree than I do to know I am feeling a pain in my toe. So it really does all come down to perspective, as I see it.

But if you think I've made a mistake somewhere, then please identify it; I'm open to correction if it is precisely targeted; but I'm not interested in vague assertions of misunderstanding.

And however could they have known? — Tzeentch

It's a long way from knowing there is Antisemitism afoot to knowing that 6,000,000 Jews will be tortured and executed.

Enlightenment does not come from seeing the duck as a rabbit, but from seeing that it can be seen as either a duck or a rabbit. — Banno

Yes, and I see the situation can be understood differently from a subjective or an inter-subjective point of view. Is there anything else of interest to say about it, or is this the Wittgenstein Secret Handshakes Club?

If you think I missed something, you should be able to explain what it was you think I missed.

Or was it something ineffable?

Sure. So what do you think the topic is here? — Banno

The PLA. So, the discussion has veered into the question of private experiences. I already agreed that no private language is possible (because to determine and subsequently know what its words referred to we would need to translate it into a public language).

I agree with this, but note again, that we can imagine a doubting situation with the tree e.g., but not the pain e.g.. — Sam26

That's true, and maybe that's because doubting situations always arise in the contexts of what can be intersubjectively corroborated (sorry Banno).

You don't see a difference between not being able to doubt you're in pain, as opposed to being able to doubt there is a tree over there. Of course the latter depends on context, it would be easy to imagine someone doubting that your seeing a tree. For example, maybe it's foggy and you can't see clearly. However, try doubting the pain you're having. — Sam26

As I said to Banno, I can see the difference in the intersubjective context. But from my point of view it would make no more sense to doubt I was seeing the tree I'm looking at, than it would to doubt that I'm feeling the pain that's throbbing in my toe.

Do you see it now? — Banno

As I say above and have said from the start, I see the difference in the intersubjective context. But I put that down to the contingency of perspective: in some cases there is just no way you can get yourself into a position to experience what the other is experiencing.

Not happy with that sort of language. Wash your mouth out.

What about the pain in Sam26's toe, and the tree in his yard? What do you know of them? — Banno

I know nothing of the pain in Sam's toe or the tree in his yard. If I went to his place I could, via the senses, directly confirm whether or not there is a tree in his backyard, but not whether or not there is a pain in his toe. That all I mean by "Intersubjective corroboration".

Well, yes - and hence drops out of the discussion. Unlike a tree.

That is rather the point. — Banno

I agree that my being in pain cannot be intersubjectively corroborated as my seeing a tree can be. From my own point of view though; I feel the pain, I see the tree; and no further justification is needed.

The only thing that differentiates facts from non-facts is knowledge gained by observation.


The trouble here is of course that what counts as a suitable observation is already theoretical - already an interpretation. Observations thus cannot fulfil this role as a foundation to knowledge. — Banno

I agree, what we take to be facts are always fallible. But the logic behind our understanding of factuality is not such that facts are fallible; it is that facts are facts and once a fact always a fact.

If we all had a pain in your toe, then that pain would be like the tree.

We don't, so it ain't. — Banno

Pain is different only in that it is internal to the body and so irretrievably hidden from the senses of others. As I said before the only different is the contingency of perspective; where pain is the extreme case.

Moreover, it makes sense to claim to know based on sensory experiences, but not, to claim to know that I'm having a pain, which has been the main idea of this thread. There's no knowing one is having a private sensation, I just have them. — Sam26

Are you saying that you just have private sensations, but that you don't know you have them? I don't see the difference between feeling a pain in my foot and seeing a tree in my garden. neither of these experiences require any further justification.

Pain is not an object of one of the five "external" senses, but it is sense nonetheless I would say. It makes sense to me to say I feel pain or I sense pain.

I have attempted to deal with it by pointing out that in this example, you imagine a certain state of affairs and declare it such, as true. — Olivier5

I don't see how the stipulation that in this story no one knows that the convict is innocent, is relevant, since the intention was to mirror actual cases just like that. Are you denying there could be cases like that where convicts are innocent? If a convict is actually innocent of a crime is it not a fact that he didn't commit the crime even if no one knows it?

Or another example; take any supposed historical fact; imagine that it didn't actually happen; would it not then be a fact that it didn't happen, even if we have no way of determining that?

The only thing that differentiates facts from non-facts is knowledge gained by observation. — Janus


Voilà. — Olivier5

I'm not saying what I think you think I'm saying. I'm talking here about how we determine what we consider to be facts. I'm not saying that facts are dependent upon being determined.

So far, you haven't offered any counterexamples or counterarguments, you just keep repeating the same assertions. Well, I genuinely don't agree with your assertions; because I think there is a valid, an indispensable, distinction between what we take to be the facts and what the facts might actually be.

And that is because a fact is a statement known to be true, or accurate enough (ergo based on accurate, replicable or otherwise dependable evidence). It's not just a true statement. It's a well buttressed one. — Olivier5

I know what you're saying but I don't think it's right. I would say what we take to be a fact is a statement we take ourselves to know to be true; that we take to be well-buttressed; it might still turn out to be wrong. That said, there are general descriptive facts that within the context of human life are unquestionably true. For example that Paris is the capital of France and that humans are usually born with two arms and two legs are facts which cannot be coherently questioned. There are countless numbers of these kinds of facts, but they don't tell us anything that is not self-evident; so they are not particularly important.

Whatever else stupid people may or may not have in common, modesty or humility is not frequent. — Manuel

Yea to that!

"I have a pain in your toe", while odd, does not seem to be ill-formed nor contradictory. — Banno

It seems syntactically well-formed but semantically ill-formed; to me at least. Is it contradictory? Perhaps according to the logic of ownership? Like saying "your pain belongs to me".

That would seem to just be an example of the contingency of perspective. I can see the tree in my backyard now, but I can't show it to you. If you ask me how I know it is a tree. I will say that it is the kind of thing I have learned to call 'tree'. If you were here I could show you the tree, but I can never show you the sensation in my toe; so it is just the extreme case of the contingency of perspective; you can never get yourself into a position so as to be able to feel my sensations.

Hi Janus,
I think we have to be careful here. We do use sensory experiences as justification to believe that something is the case. So, it's very appropriate to say, "I know the orange juice is sweet." Someone might reply, "How do you know? (this would be the case even if you just said, "The orange juice is sweet.)" You answer, "Because I tasted it." Sensory experiences are important in observing experiments also. It's true that you can simply say, "I see the tree," but many statements of knowledge are said without the "I know..." Note that the doubt often makes sense in these situations, which demonstrates the appropriateness of the knowledge. — Sam26

Is not feeling pain a kind of sensory experience? I'm finding it difficult to see a cogent difference in kind between "I feel a pain in my toe" and "I see a tree in my backyard"..

"'Only you can know if you had that intention.' Wittgenstein, explains how we might use such a statement, i.e., how it might make sense to use know in this way. The only way it would make sense, is as an expression of doubt, not as an expression of knowing. Only you could know? What does that mean? In other words, as he said earlier, you don't know it, you have it, viz., the intention, in this context. — Sam26

By the same argument when I look at the tree in my backyard, I don't know or believe there is a tree in my backyard, I see the tree in my backyard, I see that there is a tree in my backyard.

I'm glad to hear you are feeling better. I felt like crap only for one day with the Astra Zeneca shot. I was given a two page document outlining symptoms to look out for; the common, the more unusual and the rare and serious. Apparently the symptoms I experienced occur in about two thirds of cases according to the document.

Have a look at the 1932 election results. — Tzeentch

I'd say the electors could have had no idea what was coming at that time.

And you are backtracking on your original implication,which is disingenuous. — Ambrosia

What was my original implication, according to you?

I used to wonder how people could stand idly by while the Nazis rose to power in Germany, but I've come to realize that people did not stand idly by, but happily participated. — Tzeentch

Can you cite some texts or studies that support that conclusion?

Many boxers are fine in retirement. — Ambrosia

You need to read more carefully. Did I say that all boxers, or even most, end up with brain damage? What I suggested was that it is a risk that comes with receiving repeated blows to the head; a risk that would be somewhat mitigated by wearing a head guard.

I can also agree that "a fact is a true statement." And you are right that the term is sometimes used this way in English. — Olivier5

I also have indicated, as has Banno, the other usage equating facts with actual (as opposed to imaginary or fictional) states of affairs or situations or events or whatever you want to call them.

My point is simply that this definition does not help identify what is a fact and what is not. — Olivier5

So I am looking for a definition that would help one differentiate facts from non-facts. — Olivier5

The only thing that differentiates facts from non-facts is knowledge gained by observation. You still haven't attempted to deal with the example I gave of prisoners who are innocent; an example that shows that what is generally held to be fact may not be, even if that fact is never discovered. What kind of definition would be able to distinguish fact from fiction in such a case?

No, you know nothing about me, but I know something about you, assuming you're not a liar; you box without a head guard, and I know that is a very stupid thing to do; brain damage from boxing is well-documented.

Making assumptions are one mark of an uncultivated mind; you know nothing about me or what sports I might participate in.

My attempts at humour might be lame, but yours haven't even learned to crawl.

Yep. Most boxers would blast your ivory tower world. — Ambrosia

They would not be able to find it or enter it, let alone "blast it". But by all means go back to boxing without a headguard and give your brain the only workout it seems likely to get.

Besides I've learned that it's highly non-PC to criticize Nietzsche on internet forums.) — Wayfarer

It's bad form to criticize authors you haven't actually read.

This is said in bad faith. I can understand your definition of 'fact' and I've acknowledged it accords with one of the common usages, but not with the other. You seem to want to dictate that the other, which makes perfect sense to me, and, I have no doubt, many other people, is somehow wrong or incoherent. Well, it might seem incoherent or confused to you, but a decent level of modesty should lead you to allow that others might not see it that way.

"They muddy the water to make it seem deep" Nietzsche

To say of philosophy or poetry that it is deep might suggest work that is difficult to fathom or even fathomless.

Other associations could be 'profound', 'subtle', 'nuanced', 'complex'. 'dense', but these carry no necessary allusion to mystery than cannot be solved, plumbed or penetrated.

So, in this context, does depth suggest to you mystery, impenetrability or ineffability?

So. I've rambled a bit, but basically I'm wondering whether you are thinking of what is hidden or what is complex and/ or nuanced.

I boxed without a headguard. — Ambrosia

That might explain it.

Yes there is no guarantee that the stupid are capable of being anything other than stupid, but likewise there is no guarantee that they are not either.

Of course I acknowledge that not all what passes for a fact deserves the title. Which is precisely why I am interested in a pragmatic definition, that gives a sense of how facts are determined by us human beings in practice. — Olivier5

In that case I have no idea what you are arguing about.

We don't need to evoke 'great artists' - think of the long suffering parents who work hard in menial jobs getting ill health, postponing all their own pleasures, perhaps dying young so that their children can study and become useful transformative members of a culture - doctors, pharmacists, researchers, teachers, whatever. Pretty common. Self sacrifice has traditionally been seen as worth living for. — Tom Storm

:up: You're right of course; the suffering artist is just an extreme example.

The moment they realize that they are not God, they will understand that facts can only be established by us humans via some evidence... — Olivier5

It has nothing to do with being God; it ironically is just the opposite; it has to do with being fallible. If you don't acknowledge that some of what are generally taken to be facts may in fact not be, then I don't know what else to say to you except "keep digging".

If that life affords some pleasure for others. Think of the great artist whose life is constant suffering for example.