So if we have some world within which exists only non-physical things, and if those non-physical things are destroyed (and in being non-physical are not subject to the law of conservation of energy), then what is left? I say that nothing is left.

It seems that either nothingness is metaphysically possible or (complete) destruction is metaphysically impossible.

https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-news/trump-hitler-comparisons-doubles-down-1234932630/

Donald Trump accused immigrants of “destroying the blood of our country” during a campaign rally in Iowa Tuesday, repeating hateful rhetoric echoing white supremacists and genocidal Nazi dictator Adolf Hitler.

“They’re destroying the blood of our country. That’s what they’re doing. They’re destroying our country. They don’t like it when I said that — and I never read Mein Kampf,” said Trump, referencing Hitler’s manifesto. “They could be healthy, they could be very unhealthy, they could bring in disease that’s going to catch on in our country, but they do bring in crime, but they have them coming from all over the world,” the former president continued. “And they’re destroying the blood of our country. They’re destroying the fabric of our country.”

Hitler, who repeatedly compared Jewish people to a blood poison within German society, wrote in Mein Kampf that “all great cultures of the past perished only because the originally creative race died out from blood poisoning,” and blamed Jews and other “undesirable” groups for said contamination.

It is possible that nothing physical to exist metaphysically such as mind, spirit, concepts ...etc. — Corvus

Is it metaphysically possible for something that exists to be destroyed?

But because of the concept "a world" implying the ontological entity, "a world of nothingness" would be contradiction in metaphysics. — Corvus

Is it metaphysically possible for nothing physical to exist?

My problem is that if the word-forms conveyed meaning, we’d know what they meant by reading them. It is precisely because they do not convey meaning that we do not understand them, not unless some Rosetta Stone or human being is able to supply them with meaning. The drift of meaning over time suggests much the same. — NOS4A2

On the other hand, if they didn’t convey meaning then how could I learn something new by reading?

Yes, but a second ruling would be needed for that, although it’s almost certain that they’d rule the same way (unless one or more justice dies or retires and is replaced by then).

It should be noted that this ruling only applies to the Republican primary:

In this appeal from a district court proceeding under the Colorado Election Code, the supreme court considers whether former President Donald J. Trump may appear on the Colorado Republican presidential primary ballot in 2024. A majority of the court holds that President Trump is disqualified from holding the office of President under Section Three of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Because he is disqualified, it would be a wrongful act under the Election Code for the Colorado Secretary of State to list him as a candidate on the presidential primary ballot.

It should also be noted that this case was brought by “both registered Republican and unaffiliated voters”, not by Democrats.

Are you saying that the "Disqualification from office for insurrection or rebellion" section of the 14th Amendment doesn't exist?

Or are you saying that this section doesn't apply to the Presidency?

Or are you saying that this section doesn't apply to Trump because he did not "[engage] in insurrection or rebellion against the [Constitution of the United States], or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof"?

The Colorado Supreme Court ruled that that section of the 14th Amendment does exist, that it applies to the Presidency, and that Trump engaged in insurrection. If each of these is true then it follows that Trump is constitutionally ineligible to run for President.

Here's a really rubbish AI:


It doesn't seem at all appropriate to say that it believes or accepts or considers anything. That would be a very obvious misuse of language.

ChatGPT and p-zombies are just very complicated versions of the above, with p-zombies having a meat suit.

The relevant definition in Webster's is "something that is accepted, considered to be true, or held as an opinion". This to me doesn't entail subjective state. — hypericin

What does it mean to "accept", "consider", or "hold as an opinion"? Again, these aren't terms that it makes sense to attribute to a p-zombie. A p-zombie is just a machine that responds to stimulation. It's an organic clockwork-like body that moves and makes sound.

It's quite ironic that you're anthropomorphising p-zombies.

The democrats refusing to enforce the laws of the country is poisoning the blood of the country. That’s what they’ve done. — NOS4A2

At best you can say that they're allowing the country to be poisoned, but the poison itself, according to Trump, is the illegal immigrants.

He has a problem with the foreign nationals who are coming into the country (illegally).

Are you saying that illegal immigrants have let people into the country? — NOS4A2

I'm saying that Trump said "ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION IS POISONING THE BLOOD OF OUR NATION".

Illegal immigration is "the migration of people into a country in violation of that country's immigration laws".

Therefore, Trump was saying that the migration of people into the U.S. in violation of U.S. immigration laws is poisoning the blood of the U.S.

Illegal immigration is a process, an act, not a group of people. — NOS4A2

It's an act done by a group of people.

He was talking about Biden and his croneys. They are the direct cause of illegal immigration. — NOS4A2

He was talking about illegal immigrants. His Truth Social post makes that clear. You are misinterpreting his words at the rally.

But the article said he was talking about immigrants, not illegal ones. — NOS4A2

And you said he was talking about Biden.

At least the article was closer to the mark.

And his Truth Social post reaffirmed what he was saying earlier at the rally; that illegal immigrants are "poisoning the blood of our nation"

But wouldn't "belief", for a p-zombie, be precisely this "belief-analog"? — hypericin

"Belief" is a word in the English language that has a well-established meaning. If p-zombies are speaking English then the word "belief" means what it means in English.

Wouldn't it be preferable to say intentional attitude? That's the usual term used by philosophers, with a quite substantial backing in the literature. It avoids the problematic notion of the subjective. — Banno

Sure, I just grabbed that definition from Wikipedia.

The "they" he was speaking of were his political opponents, for instance "Biden and the lunatic left" and "the radical left democrats". He was saying they were poisoning the blood of the country — NOS4A2

https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/111593149429973351

ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION IS POISONING THE BLOOD OF OUR NATION. THEY’RE COMING FROM PRISONS, FROM MENTAL INSTITUTIONS — FROM ALL OVER THE WORLD.

Trump supporters don't seem ... cognizant — GRWelsh

:up:

along with the informational p-zombie belief-analog that they are p-zombies. — hypericin

Whatever "belief-analog" they have isn't belief.

If the p-zombies are speaking English then the words they use mean what they mean in English, and "belief" in English means something like "the subjective attitude that a proposition is true."

But the fact remains that they might be a p-zombie

Yes, which is why I said this.

Something inside their heads causes them to say things, just as it does for us. The only difference is the lights are out. — hypericin

Which is precisely why their claims, when made by them, are false.

"I am conscious" is false when said by a p-zombie.
"I believe that I am a p-zombie" is false when said by a p-zombie.

The words they use mean what they mean in ordinary English. They certainly don't have the intention to mean anything else.

"p-consider", "p-belief" is all the informational operations of "consider", "belief" without the conscious part. Like how a computer-vision program might "believe" it is looking at a table, without any conscious awareness of it. — hypericin

Something like "the computer algorithm inside my head has caused me to speak the phrase 'I am not a p-zombie'"?

Certainly that's possibly true, but anything that speaks like that isn't a very good facsimile of a real person, and so isn't a p-zombie.

If they're a convincing doppelganger, as p-zombies are, then they speak ordinary English, in which case the word "belief" that they use means what the word "belief" means in ordinary English. And so any self-proclaimed belief, as expressed by a p-zombie, is false. P-zombies, by definition, don't believe anything.

That is, when he says "I consider myself to be a p-zombie", what he really means (to you) is "I p-consider myself to be a p-zombie". — hypericin

What does “p-consider” mean?

P-zombies have no consciousness. They just have an outward appearance (including observable behaviour). You’ll need to explain it in these terms.

(By outward appearances I don’t mean to exclude muscles and bones and internal organs)

If you equate them, then you really need to pony up a generic word that applies to cars and such which consider some judgement to be 'true'. — noAxioms

You could just say “I am a p-zombie”.

The term “morning star” was used to refer to an object in space that appeared in the morning. The term “evening star” was used to refer to an object in space that appeared in the evening. Given that the object in space that appeared in the morning is the same object in space that appeared in the evening, and given that an object is necessarily itself, it then follows that the morning star is necessarily the evening star, even though this cannot be known a priori. Hence it being an a posteriori necessity.

But as I said, I think this is only the case if we consider the meaning of “morning star” and “evening star” in terms of their referent(s). I don’t think this is the case if we consider the meaning of “morning star” and “evening star” in terms of their senses.

I think p-zombies may believe things. They have the capacity to record and analyze information the same way we do. There is just no concomitant phenomenal experience of believing. — hypericin

I’m not sure that counts as belief. Belief seems to me to be a conscious activity. Machines can record and analyze information but they don’t believe anything.

Can you clarify the attempted distinction. Venus references love as well as a planet X. Lucifer references lucidity as well as the same planet X. The sense of each term is then obtained from the totality of what each term references - or so it so far seems to me. — javra

In the context of this discussion the terms refer to an object in the solar system.

I consider myself to be a p-zombie. — noAxioms

One of these must be true:

1. “I consider myself to be a p-zombie” is false because you are a p-zombie and so don’t believe anything.

2. “I consider myself to be a p-zombie” is false because you are not a p-zombie and believe that you are not a p-zombie.

3. “I consider myself to be a p-zombie” is true because you are not a p-zombie and believe that you are a p-zombie.

The statement “I consider myself to be a p-zombie” is only true if you are not a p-zombie and so no rational person can believe themselves to be a p-zombie.

The leading example I've seen of a posteriori necessity is that of "Venus = Lucifer". I so far find this fishy. Any bloke on the street will tell you that "Venus" does not equal "Lucifer". That they both in part reference the same physical planet is not the whole of the story. — javra

The sense/reference distinction. By sense it’s metaphysically possible that they’re different but by reference it’s metaphysically necessary that they’re the same.

I came across Kripke and a posteriori necessity in my brief reading on the topic before making this thread. While I find his ideas very interesting and convincing even, I think the thesis is a bit too recent to make any definitive claims on it as a layman. — Lionino

Naming and Necessity is 43 years old now. Certainly "recent" when compared to Plato, but it's not like we're talking about last year.

Isn't it a little far-fetched to imagine a p-zombie getting in a drunken argument and murdering someone? Doesn't something like that require a lot of anger, which they don't have? For that matter, why would they drink alcohol or do any kind of drugs? There's no mind for them to alter. — RogueAI

Drugs, Brains, and Behavior: The Science of Addiction

Drugs interfere with the way neurons send, receive, and process signals via neurotransmitters. Some drugs, such as marijuana and heroin, can activate neurons because their chemical structure mimics that of a natural neurotransmitter in the body. This allows the drugs to attach onto and activate the neurons. Although these drugs mimic the brain’s own chemicals, they don’t activate neurons in the same way as a natural neurotransmitter, and they lead to abnormal messages being sent through the network.

The brain controls the body. Drugs (and other normal stimuli like light and sound) affect the functioning of the brain.

How could a zombie commit a crime of passion??? By definition they have no passions. — RogueAI

Them killing someone after an argument after drinking alcohol wouldn't be a crime of passion then.

Would a p-zombie ever murder someone after having a bunch of drinks and getting in an argument, and then a fight at a bar? Or is that uniquely a human thing? — RogueAI

A p-zombie, by definition, will look and behave exactly like us. Anything we can do they can do. They're just not conscious.

True, but if feelings are sufficient for action (and I think it's obvious feelings are), and x has feelings and y doesn't, x may behave differently than y. — RogueAI

They may also behave the same. Or it may be that both x and y have feelings but still behave differently.

Do feelings cause action? It certainly seems like they do. — bert1

They happen to cause action in our case, but it is possible that in some other world those same actions are caused by something other than feelings.

Would a materialist grant that a p-zombie might act completely different than a human because it can't have desires or feelings? — RogueAI

They wouldn't be p-zombies if they acted differently. A p-zombie is defined as an entity that looks and behaves human but that does not have conscious experience.

P-zombies that procreate are self-replicating machines that look and behave human.

Normativity in Metaethics

Our decision to focus initially on metaphysical issues doesn’t get us any closer to what normativity is; it only tells us where to locate the initial important questions about normativity. But what would make a fact be a normative one? We started with some hand-wavy platitudes about normative claims being “action-guiding”, and “attitude-guiding”, and about their giving us reasons for action, or reasons for attitudes. We could also give lots of examples of normative claims, adding that, if they are true, they are true in virtue of the normative facts:

...

But while platitudes and examples can give one a general sense of the extension of the normative, they don’t tell us what normativity is.

...

This worry becomes deeper when we consider the possibility of reasons that are not “robustly” normative in the philosophically most interesting and important sense. In chess, there is a reason to castle early. In etiquette, there is a reason, when in Rome, to do what the Romans do. But it might seem that these reasons have no genuine claim on our attention in the way that the moral reason to be loyal to friends does. So it would seem that the normatively fundamental facts about reasons, if reasons fundamentalism is indeed on the right track, would be facts about robustly normative reasons. Perhaps, then, only some reasons are normatively fundamental – the robustly normative ones. If so, presumably the reasons fundamentalist would want to amend their view: what makes a fact normative is that it is, or depends on, a fact or facts about robustly normative reasons. But then it seems important for them to be able to say what makes a reason robustly normative – and it would be unsatisfying for them to answer that a robustly normative reason is one that makes its dependents robustly normative!

There is more to the issue than you and some others seem willing to admit. Robust moral realists, non-realist cognitivists, and moral non-objectivists all believe that we have moral obligations, but they disagree on what this means and how such obligations can be verified or falsified.

However, what would something metaphysically impossible but logically possible be? — Lionino

If Kripke is to be believed then any a posteriori necessity is metaphysically necessary even if not logically necessary, and so their inverse is metaphysically impossible even if logically possible.

The problem with Michael’s approach is that it disregards one’s responsibility to argue for a coherent moral theory and not contradict oneself. — Leontiskos

I don’t need to argue for any theory. You’re shifting the burden of proof. You made much the same comment to another poster earlier in the discussion from what I recall.

Michael has admitted that his own holdings are self-contradictory, but he ignores this fact and instead just argues with everyone. That is, he argues with noncognitivists, error theorists, subjectivists, and moral realists alike. Since his own position is self-contradictory he feels himself at his rights to argue against all possible positions simultaneously. It turns into argument for the sake of argument — Leontiskos

I’m interested in testing the strengths of each theory whether I agree with their conclusions or not. If these arguments cannot stand up to scrutiny then they fail in their task.

I don’t know why you think my personal beliefs matter at all.