I would say that the part "at the same time" in Wikipedia's definition of the law of non-contradiction is superfluous. "In the same sense" is enough, because it also includes whatever is meant by "at the same time" (in the context of theory of relativity it means "at the same time from the perspective/reference frame of the same observer").

Because there is no slices in the block, it is a block. The slicing and ordering is done by something outside the universe. — Metaphysician Undercover

The time slices are parts of the spacetime block. When there is an order somewhere it doesn't have to mean that the order is created by some external force.

The second law is not a structural feature of the eternalist block universe, that's the inconsistency I'm talking about. Either the eternalist block provides an incomplete representation of the universe, or the second law refers to something outside the universe. — Metaphysician Undercover

The second law is just the way the time slices are ordered. Why would it be something outside the universe?

The second law of thermodynamics, necessitates that time is passing in one direction, so it represents that outside force. — Metaphysician Undercover

The second law of thermodynamics is just a rule for ordering the time slices of the block. It doesn't make time pass any more than any other rule for ordering time slices. But it does seem important for the feeling or quality of time passing.

The second law of thermodynamics describes a force external to the universe, which is imposed on it. — Metaphysician Undercover

The second law of thermodynamics is a structural feature of the universe.

Right, so the point at issue is the second law of thermodynamics. It indicates that the structure of patterns within the eternalist block are such that we must proceed in our experience of time passing, in one direction only. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, time is a special kind of order and increase of the world's entropy is one of the characteristics of this order.

But the eternalist block allows that we could experience time in both directions. — Metaphysician Undercover

Why do you think so? As far as I know, the eternalist block just says that there is no passage of time because spacetime is a static, timeless object.

So "increasing entropy" is a concept derived from observations of the physical world, and these observations directly contradict the block universe theory because they indicate that time can only flow in one direction, while the block universe allows that time could flow in either direction. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, presentations of block universe typically assume a single direction of time, which is usually identified with the direction of increasing entropy along the otherwise bi-directional time dimension. As an example, imagine a gas tank with gas concentrated in one of the corners of the tank. According to the second law of thermodynamics the entropy of the gas tank increases with time, so at the subsequent moments of time the state of the tank will have more and more dispersed gas particles. So there is a series of states of the gas tank, each state having more entropy (more dispersed gas) than the previous state, and this series constitutes an eternalist block. There is no obvious "passage" of time in this block; it's just a series of arrangements of gas particles.

But causality is highly questionable in eternalism. — Metaphysician Undercover

Causal relations are part of the structure of block spacetime. I think causal relations are a special kind of mathematical/logical relations in the context of the entropic arrow of time where consequences logically follow from causes, if we use a broad definition of "causes" as initial conditions and structural features of spacetime that we call laws of physics. So, if you can logically derive a pattern at some moment of time from a pattern at a prior moment of time and laws of physics, then there is a causal relation between the two patterns.

That is how we experience time, as order. — Metaphysician Undercover

Time is a special kind of order. At least in our world this order is defined as the time dimension of spacetime according to the theory of relativity and the direction of this order (the arrow of time) is defined by the increasing entropy (second law of thermodynamics). All of this is already included in the structure of block spacetime. The remaining problem is why this order appears to be "passing" or "flowing", and I am saying that this appearance of "passing" or "flowing" is a feeling, a quality of consciousness, a qualitative aspect of neuronal firings. This is the subjective (experiential) passage of time. I am also saying that this quality of neuronal firings is a representation of a quality of the world, and I am suggesting that this quality of the world can be regarded as an objective passage of time.

The "patterns" you refer to are a temporal succession, one neuron firing is experienced as prior to another etc. In the block universe, how does one thing get experienced as prior to another? — Metaphysician Undercover

Because of causal relations between one thing and another. There is a causal imprint of the earlier thing in the later thing, so the experience of the later thing enables us to identify it as being after the earlier thing.

I don't see how a passage of time is a qualitative aspect of a static eternalist pattern. — Metaphysician Undercover

The experienced passage of time is a feeling, a quality of consciousness (quale). It is a fundamental problem in the philosophy of consciousness how a certain pattern of neuronal firings, whether viewed as static or dynamic, can give rise to a quality of consciousness, for example to the experience of red color. David Chalmers dubbed it the "hard problem of consciousness". So your inability to see how the experience of a passage of time can be a qualitative aspect of a static eternalist pattern is a special case of a wider problem - the inability to see how any experience can be a qualitative aspect of some pattern.

As I said, the qualitative aspect of the pattern can be understood as the intrinsic identity of the pattern (as opposed to its structural or compositional identity) but there seems to be an unbridgable explanatory gap between the structure of the pattern and its quality. This seems to be due to the fact that the quality cannot be logically derived from the structure (and the structure cannot be logically derived from the quality) because you can only derive a structure from a structure - logical derivation is about relations, not about qualities. So we can understand why there is some qualitative aspect of a pattern but we cannot explain why the qualitative aspect is the way it is - why the experience feels the way it feels. Moreover, we cannot even describe how the experience feels because a description of a thing always refers to other things, not to the intrinsic identity of the thing. Try to explain the experience of red color to a person who never saw it; referring to tomatoes won't help, it will only tell him about the relation of red color to tomatoes but not about the quality of red color.

Still, since the intrinsic and the structural identity of a thing are bound up like two sides of a coin (they are identities of the same thing), we can expect that structurally similar patterns will also have similar qualities. We can also expect that the quality will somehow reflect the structure, so it can make some sense that the causal structure of brain processes, which enables the identification of prior and later moments, will be reflected in the experience of a passage of time.

Exactly. We conclude that there is an objective timeline from the fact that there is consistency in our experience, so from the consistency in this aspect of our experience, time passing, we can conclude that there is an objective aspect of reality which corresponds to this experience the passage of time. So the question is, how do we reconcile this with the eternalist block time. I don't think it is possible, and that's why I don't think that the block time is an acceptable representation of reality. — Metaphysician Undercover

I would reconcile an objective passage of time with the eternalist block time in the following way. While the subjective passage of time is a qualitative aspect of a pattern of neuronal firings (an experience), the objective passage of time is a qualitative aspect of the pattern of the external world (which is represented in our mind by the pattern of neuronal firings). Both the external world pattern and the pattern of neuronal firings are patterns in an eternalist block spacetime, but every pattern has a qualitative aspect (in addition to its structural aspect); in the case of the neuronal firings it is a conscious quality (quale/experience) while in the case of the external world it is, presumably, an unconscious quality. These two qualities are similar because the two patterns are similar, but one quality is conscious and the other is probably unconscious. It seems impossible to imagine the unconscious quality because only conscious qualities can constitute the content of our consciousness, but we know that there is some kind of similarity of the unconscious quality to the conscious quality, and so in the external world there is some kind of counterpart of the consciously experienced passage of time. But as I said, both kinds of the passage of time are qualitative aspects of a static, eternalist pattern.

The "qualitative aspect" of a pattern may seem like a convenient concoction but I think there is a plausible metaphysical idea behind it. The idea is that every thing has an intrinsic identity, which is something that the thing is in itself, and this intrinsic identity is unstructured/monadic and therefore "qualitative" - it is the qualitative aspect of the thing. This same thing also has a structural identity, which may be a structure constituted by the relations of the thing to its parts (or generally by the relations of the thing to any other things), but since the thing (the whole) is not identical to any of its parts, the intrinsic identity of the thing is not constituted by its parts. The intrinsic identity is something indescribable because when we describe something we always present the thing in its relations to other things (by referring to its parts, properties or other things). And so it ultimately defies description what the "passage of time" is in itself. We may label it by a name or a phrase like the "passage of time", or describe it by reference to other aspects of reality like "past", "present" and "future", which however have something qualitative and therefore indescribable about them too.

The metaphysical view known as Russellian monism proposes that intrinsic identities, or at least some subset of them, are qualities of consciousness. The panpsychist version of Russellian monism regards all intrinsic identities as qualities of consciousness while other versions only some - that's why I differentiated between the conscious qualities of neuronal firing patterns and the probably unconscious qualities of the external world patterns. (in the end we might say that all qualities are conscious but differentiate the "level" or "intensity" of consciousness)

If it is, then we have two "times", one in the eternalist block, the other to account for the ordered relations, the passing of time. — Metaphysician Undercover

This idea just occurred to me a while ago but it seems that the second timeline, which would be a series of my passing "now" experiences of the eternalist block, would constitute another eternalist block. It would be a series of my brain states or mind states, each state being an experience. And since my subjective experiential timeline is bound up with the objective world timeline we might fuse these two timelines into one timeline of a world that includes both the objective world and our brain or mind states.

Funnily, it also occurred to me that the "passage" of time may be a phenomenon that is not only our subjective experience but in some weird sense also a property of the objective world. Let me explain. What we experience is, strictly speaking, not the external world but the representations of the external world in our minds. But since these representations are particular mappings, via causal relations involving the senses, of the external world onto our minds, there is some significant similarity between the external world and our representations of it. For example, when we see a triangular traffic sign in the street, the triangle of the traffic sign in the external world is similar to the triangle experienced in our mind. Also presumably, when we experience the red color of a tomato, there is some similarity between our experience of red color and a property of the tomato that is represented by our experience of red color. And so, when we experience the passage of time of the external world there seems to be a property of the external world that is somehow similar to its representation, that is, to our experience of the passage of time. That property would be an objective "passage" of time. It would be like an "experience" of the eternalist external world block itself, associated with structural properties of the world (the relativistic structure of spacetime, the laws of physics, the second law of thermodynamics...).

It could be that we do not either exist as complete 4D entities extended throughout our entire lives, nor instantaneous entities in the block universe, but are actually somewhere in between, mini 4D entities who exist for only a mere few milliseconds, but certainly more than an instant. — Alec

But there must also be a kind of connectedness between these mini 4D entities that enables accumulation and integration of memories that enable our experience of personal identity that evolves in time.

Our brains seemingly just process information in discrete chunks of 50 milliseconds, but our experiences are constantly flowing in and out (presumably staying within our brain for that particular interval of time), so which parts of our lives these our mini 4D entities do occupy and experience is unclear which raises the question of why our lives were "cut" up in a particular manner. — Alec

These chunks of experiences may actually overlap, but since we cannot experience time intervals under the scale of tens of milliseconds the transitions between experiences may feel fuzzy and continuous.

Personally, I think that the fact that our brains process information at a certain time scale has no ontological implications. It just means that at every moment we are aware of events occurring within a period of time but that does not mean that our conscious mind need be extended. — Alec

Our experiences are obviously associated with spatiotemporally extended objects like brains but the experiences themselves seem to be indivisible and unanalyzable. They seem to have an intrinsic, unstructured, monadic identity as well as a relational identity that is constituted by the relations of the intrinsic identity to other intrinsic identities. This metaphysical view is also known as Russellian monism.

My current experience is of only this one moment, and that cannot be reconciled with the view that I am currently experiencing my entire life. — Alec

Right. It appears that one's identity is a series of experiences along the time dimension that are connected in an intimate way by laws of nature but each experience excludes the others. Earlier experiences may affect later experiences as memories built in the structure of your brain but at each moment there is an experience that excludes both earlier and later experiences. This exclusion seems to be due to the fact that consciousness exists only on certain time scales, which is about tens of milliseconds. There is no experience on shorter or longer time intervals. And so you cannot have an experience that spans an hour or your whole life. At this moment you have an experience that spans say 50 milliseconds. Over the next 50 milliseconds you have a different experience and not the one that you have over the previous 50 milliseconds. And you have no experience that spans 100 milliseconds.

Why consciousness is constituted this way is an open question. There are many questions about why consciousness is the way it is, for example why a particular pattern of firing neurons feels like experience of red color or why another pattern feels like experience of sweet taste.

Schopenhauer would say that becoming a hermit-ascetic would be the ultimate goal in purging the Will for good. It is the only road that leads to full denial of the Will. — schopenhauer1

Hermit-ascetic life seems to require a lot of will power.

In any case, I have no idea what the Laws of Nature might be. It is far more mysterious than consciousness, mind, or quantum potential. — Rich

Laws of nature are simply certain regularities in nature. Nature contains various stuff, and just as there are differences in nature, there are also regularities (commonalities, symmetries or repeated features). For example, the law of gravity is the regularity with which massive bodies attract each other in a specific way. These regularities may be difficult or impossible to visualize but they can be expressed mathematically.

Seems far so far, but what then is the role of consciousness? Couldn't all of this be done without conciousness? Or would it be impossible? — Daniel Sjöstedt

I actually have a general metaphysical theory in which consciousness has a natural place:
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/1455/an-outline-of-reality/p1

The contradiction in a lot of modern thinking is that it presumes that this rational ability is the product of the very thing that it is setting out to explain. — Wayfarer

I don't think this is a contradiction. It's more like circular reasoning - we assume that reality is rational, in the sense that it is built on the principle of non-contradiction: every thing is identical to itself and different from other things. But we don't have any other option than to acknowledge that reality is indeed rational in this sense (that is, non-contradictory). Any other option would automatically refute itself.

My view is that all our actions, including our cognition and planning, are indeed ultimately completely determined by factors over which we have no control, whether this determination is causal or non-causal. It may be disconcerting but in a sense our illusion of ultimate control is similar to our illusion that the sun moves around the earth. We still refer to the sun as if it rises in the east and sets in the west even though we know that this is an impression we get from the earth's rotation.

Our illusion of having ultimate control over our actions seems to stem from our not being conscious of all the factors that completely determine our actions. This illusion is probably more pronounced in the Western culture because this culture places more emphasis on the autonomy of the individual and is generally more analytic than holistic.

Cognition and planning are simply an internal mechanism that enables the organism to perform complex external behaviors. This internal mechanism and the resultant external behaviors evolve via random mutations and non-random natural selection.

There is an interesting similarity between the concept of the soul that can be found in mystical/esoteric literature and quantum field theory. In mysticism there is the idea of a universal soul or an all-encompassing "sea of spirit" that can be identified with God, from which the individual souls emerge, like waves or ripples in the sea. In quantum field theory, matter is a vibrating quantum energy field that is spread out in all space and particles are localized energy excitations of this field.

The behavior of the souls may or may not include incarnation in a physical/material form. When they are in a discarnate state they are said to exist only in the spiritual world, while in an incarnate state they are said to exist in the physical world (but simultaneously also in the spiritual world because they remain projections of the "sea of spirit" in the spiritual world, although they may not be conscious of it).

This gives rise to the questions about the nature of the spiritual world and its relation to the physical world. If the spiritual "stuff" could be included in an expanded quantum field theory it seems it would be a new type (or types) of energy field and related particle. Maybe dark matter could fit the bill. It is generally assumed that dark matter, which does not interact via electromagnetic force, is a new type of fundamental field and particle. If dark matter is spiritual "stuff" then the spiritual world spatio-temporally interpenetrates the physical world (ordinary matter) but its interaction with the physical world is very limited (perhaps only to the gravitational force).

Dark energy is probably not a good candidate for spiritual "stuff" because it just seems to be repulsive gravity that accelerates rather than slows down the expansion of the universe and so it doesn't seem to have the capacity for intelligence or consciousness that are attributed to souls.

Another candidate for spiritual world might emerge in the form of additional dimensions of space that are required in string/M-theory, a candidate for the unification of quantum field theory and general relativity.

We experience the world through our conscious mental representations of it and these representations reflect the world in some way, which means there is some similarity or correspondence between the world and the representations. This similarity is not surprising, since the representations are created through our interaction with the world and thus by the mapping of parts or properties of the world via causal relations onto the structure of our minds. We can then continue to build these representations further by reason, that is, by the rules of logic and mathematics which govern the world as well as our minds/brains. Finally, evolution (natural selection) helps to arrange that these representations correspond to reality in a way that is beneficial to survival and reproduction, which often means that there is a high degree of similarity/correspondence between the world and the representations.

To the extent our minds are similar, the qualia of our minds are similar too, since the qualia are the stuff our minds are made of.

Consequently this theory regards any attempt to investigate the possible validity of Free Will by means of a type of causal analysis – ex by considering issues related to the complex and perhaps inseparable interplay occurring between individual neural idiosyncrasy and environment – to be appropriate only to the question of free will as this is related to amoral choice and to be a methodology irrelevant to an investigation of the possibility of moral autonomy, the latter problem being viewed as a subset of the problem of moral knowledge. — Robert Lockhart

How so? The experience causes moral knowledge and the moral knowledge causes moral behavior.

1) Is the idea of objective morality in terms of there existing a set of objective moral values meaningful? - The theory considers the principle of moral relativity to be irreconcilable with the concept of moral free will. — Robert Lockhart

Assuming that human minds or brains are similar in a significant way - enabling a high level of consciousness characterized by sensitivity to suffering and joy and by compassion and intelligence - we can generalize moral values as universal human values.

2) Given the validity of the concept of moral objectivity, in terms of what then would such objective moral knowledge consist? — Robert Lockhart

It would consist in sensitivity to suffering and joy, in compassion and intelligence.

3) How in principle could such knowledge be acquired and then permit a capacity of irreducible personal moral autonomy? — Robert Lockhart

The human mind in general provides capacity for moral knowledge but this capacity might need to be complemented by reason and experience.

Well, by acquiring knowledge our understanding and abilities expand and that may help us in living a more fulfilled life, in finding more effective ways of satisfying our desires and needs, or in being more compassionate and moral. That would be an expansion in compatibilist freedom.

But on the basis of such reported experience there does exist a theory that the idea of a moral autonomy ultimately capable of transcending neural determinants may be valid and therefore that the free will problem regarding moral choice is really one related to the nature of moral knowledge rather than causality. — Robert Lockhart

I don't understand why Dostoyevsky's aversion to death penalty would need a non-neural or non-causal explanation. Isn't it obvious that it was caused by his terrifying experience?

This is in part why our sensitivity to norms of sound practical reasoning don't account for our behaviors being in accord with them (or failing to be in accord with them) in the same way laws of nature account for material effects following material causes in accordance with them. — Pierre-Normand

Human behavior can be very complex because it is influenced by many factors. The norms that are incorporated in our minds exert causal influence on our behavior just like gravity exerts causal influence on objects in its field. Just because we may not behave according to the influence of the norms doesn't mean that the norms don't exert causal influence on our behavior. Just because a helium balloon rises and thus goes against the influence of gravity doesn't mean that gravity doesn't exert causal influence on it. It just means, in both cases, that also other causal factors are involved in the situation and the resultant behavior is the result of the joint influence of all factors involved.

What I am saying is that *all* of those influences and "causal factors" are utterly irrelevant to the question of the validity and soundness of the mathematical demonstration that you are purporting to evaluate. — Pierre-Normand

But we are able to perform such an evaluation thanks to those causal factors. We cannot do it without them.

Your only guidance for doing this is your knowledge of sound principles of mathematical reasoning. — Pierre-Normand

And this knowledge is encoded in neural states that exert causal influence on other neural states.

So, the sense in which the intention to Y "causes" the intention to X, in the case where you are intending to do X in order to do Y doesn't refer to the same sort of causal relation that holds between throwing a rock at a window and the window breaking. — Pierre-Normand

I see no reason to postulate a different sort of causation. The causation between mental events happens in our heads but it boils down to electromagnetic forces that also work outside our heads. Even if the causation in our heads or minds was based on a different kind of forces it still wouldn't affect my argument in OP.

So, saying that intending to Y causes your intending to X is rather like saying that your believing that 102 is an even number causes your belief that 102 isn't a prime number. — Pierre-Normand

I see no problem with it. One thought (mental state) causes another through neural forces. Computers can perform such mathematical and logical operations too.

This is only a negative characterization of "compatibilist free will". — Pierre-Normand

"Without obstruction" is the negative part. "According to one's motives" is the positive part.

But if your own account of "compatibilist free will" happily dispenses with the necessary connection with responsibility, then that would seem to make it indistinguishable from some crude libertarian accounts. — Pierre-Normand

Moral responsibility is the ability to behave compassionately. Since it requires a high level of consciousness (including compassion and intelligence) it is primarily expected of humans rather than animals. It becomes a value when evolution reaches human level.

You can't cast the content of moral thought solely in evolutionary terms. If you are going to grant that evolutionary pressures account for both moral and immoral tendencies, then you have thereby failed to account for our ability to distinguish between those two sorts of tendencies. And yet, we are able to do so. — Pierre-Normand

If evolution produces desire for sex and desire for sugar does that mean we can't distinguish between these two desires? Of course not. Evolution produces different values and we can distinguish them. Compassion and morality are just one of them.

The only ultimate aim that they have is reproductive fitness, and this is something distinct from the aim of morality. — Pierre-Normand

Morality is related to that. As I said, compassion facilitates bonds between people and is part of our ability of mental integration. These are abilities that also facilitate survival and reproduction.

Appeals to rational or functional norms are irreducible to causal explanations. And that's because things that flout norms (buggy computers or irrational agents) still obey the laws of nature perfectly (or rather, their material constituents do). — Pierre-Normand

But norms are just another factor that causally influences us. They are simply values or habits that influence our mental and physical actions.

And this is the fact that knowledge of actual physical laws, or of past historical facts, isn't required for one to assess the soundness of a mathematical demonstration. — Pierre-Normand

So what? Even when we don't know physical laws or the past state of the universe they still influence us and everything we do we do within their context.

If you intend to walk to the corner store in order to buy a dozen of eggs, then what might the content of your "act of will" be such that it would "stimulate" the intention? — Pierre-Normand

It would be an intention that stimulates an intention. For example, you have the intention to eat eggs. This intention, along with other factors, may stimulate your intention to go to the corner store to buy some eggs.

The intention and the act of will just are two names for the very same thing. Can you imagine an act of will that would somehow fail to constitute the corresponding intention? — Pierre-Normand

If the intention to do an action and the intended action itself are one thing then I don't see how we can have control of our actions. It seems we would have no time to plan the action or think about it in advance because when we intend to do it it is already happening.

I had asked you if you knew a contemporary compatibilist philosopher who endorses such a simplistic conception of an act of free will. — Pierre-Normand

The Wikipedia article gave the essense of compatibilist free will: it is the freedom to act according to one's motives without obstruction. You can analyze and differentiate what the "motives" or "obstruction" are but compatibilist free will remains compatible with the fact that everything we do is ultimately determined by factors over which we have no control, while libertarian free will is not.

Some inherited agressive tendencies, which may contribute to explaining why some people commit murder or rape, may have had evolutionary advantages in the past and have been selected for that reason. That doesn't make rape or murder moral. Just because a form of behavior has a tendency to promote survival and reproduction doesn't make such behaviors moral. — Pierre-Normand

Evolution promotes values that are beneficial to survival, health and reproduction. Not all of those values can be regarded as moral. Morality is based primarily on one of the values that evolution promotes: compassion. It is an important value that facilitates emotional and cooperative bonds between people and seems to be part of the integrative processes in our minds.

No, this is too simplistic; intention is the decision, whether conscious or not, to act on one desire rather than another. — John

Any mental state is a decision, because the state is what it is rather than another state.

Evolution has its own agenda. Human beings have a different agenda. For sure, contingent features of our evolutionary history can account for some tendencies and general abilities that we have. The naturalistic fallacy is the fallacy of inferring what it is that one ought to do on the basis of what it is natural that one would be inclined to do. — Pierre-Normand

Evolution also allows random mutations - so we can have any values that can possibly happen to us. But natural selection will tend to remove those that are detrimental to survival, health or reproduction.

If you have a suitably abstract view of "the universe" such that numbers and other abstracta make up an integral part of it, then, maybe, you could argue that principles of theoretical and practical rationality are "parts" of the early universe. But they are not parts of physical laws or of the initial conditions of the universe — Pierre-Normand

Why not? Physical laws and initial conditions of the universe have mathematical and logical features; they can be accurately described with the mathematical and logical apparatus of science.

It would mean, for instance, that if a friend of yours purports to have proven Goldbach's conjecture, and ask you if her demonstration is sound, then it would make sense to say that you can't know for sure until such a time when physicists have discovered the fundamental laws of nature or what the past state of the universe precisely was. — Pierre-Normand

I have no idea what you meant here. Computers - causal machines - can perform logical and mathematical operations, so why would humans need something non-causal to perform such operations?

Likewise if someone would seek you advice over some moral dilemma that she is facing: She promised to return a gun that she borrowed from a friend who she suspects might make use of it to commit a crime, say. It wouldn't make any sense, in that case either, to claim that you can't know what is advisable to do until such a time when physicists have gained a more precise knowledge of the laws of nature or of the past state of the universe. — Pierre-Normand

We act based on the limited information we have. That doesn't mean that our thought processes are non-causal.

I don't know any contemporary compatibilist philosopher who endorses such a simplistic conception of compatibilist free will. Can you point me to one? — Pierre-Normand

This is from Wikipedia's entry on compatibilism:

Compatibilists often define an instance of "free will" as one in which the agent had freedom to act according to their own motivation. That is, the agent was not coerced or restrained.

Rather, you have straddled all libertarians with a dilemma regarding the source of "intentions", but you have in the process misconstrued what it is for one to have an intention as if it were caused by an antecedent act of the will rather than its being itself an act of the will. — Pierre-Normand

Intention is a mental state, a desire that stimulates and directs action. If the intention was not caused by an antecedent act of will then it was not intended - it formed in our minds without our intending to do so and thus without our control.

The case where humans are being influenced by principles of rationality or morality is quite different. The principles of rationality are not part of the initial state of the universe or the laws of physics. — Pierre-Normand

If by principles of rationality you mean logic and mathematics then principles of rationality are pretty much features of the universe - that's why science is so successful in predicting the behavior of nature and in harnessing the behavior of nature in technology. The behavior of nature reaches its most complex manifestation in human consciousness and thought. Morality stems from this consciousness and thought, from the feelings of joy and pain, compassion and intelligence.

In the specific case of morality, looking for its source in our evolutionary past, for instance, leads one straight to the commission of the naturalistic fallacy. What makes something worthy of being valued can not be reduced to any sort of causal explanation as to why you actually came to value it. — Pierre-Normand

We value joy and hate pain; it actually seems to be true by definition: joy is that which is valued (accepted and sought) and pain is that which is hated (resisted and avoided). Evolution tends to arrange that that which is valued is useful for survival, health and reproduction, while that which is hated is the opposite. Thus our values are formed.

Yes, I think most compatibilists, because of the metaphysical picture that comes bundled up with the uncritically accepted doctrine of universal determinism, generally have a hard time distinguishing what it is in the aetiology of human action that constitutes external constraint to our freedom from what it is that is a constitutive part of (internal to) our power of free agency. — Pierre-Normand

I don't think compatibilists have a problem with distinguishing the constitutive part of free agency - they think that free agency consists in the ability to satisfy desires, carry out intentions. But libertarians surely have this problem because of their insistence on the incoherent concept of ultimate control. And by the way, compatibilists don't require that reality should be completely deterministic; they claim that free will is compatible with determinism and that a certain degree of determinism is necessary for the exercise of free will, simply so that we can determine our actions and cause what we want to cause.

What you say here leads me to highlight something about litewave's determinism. According to it, there is no source of action that is not an "external coercion" or "external impediment"; whether it is "felt" or not is really a matter of indifference. The idea of a self that originates intention is simply seen as an illusion on that view. The whole notion of moral responsibility is logically inconsistent with such a view, which is what I have been, apparently unsuccessfully, trying to point out. On such a view all circumstances are extenuating circumstances. — John

I pointed out that humans have a higher level of consciousness than animals, with greater capacity for compassion and greater intelligence - and this constitutes grounds for their moral responsibility.

The classical example concerns the nicotine addict who wishes that she would not desire to smoke but can't help but acting on this desire. If we imagine that she indeed is powerless in getting rid of her addiction (and may be blameless for her having acquired it, let us suppose) then, in a clear sense, her addiction constitutes a restriction on her freedom. — Pierre-Normand

When we talk about coercion we typically mean external coercion but there can also be internal coercion such as addictions, diseases or handicaps that force us to do something or prevent us from doing something, against some of our wishes, and thus constitute impediments to compatibilist free will.

On such a simple account, mature human beings wouldn't be anymore or any less free than dogs and cows are. However, we don't hold dogs and cows morally responsible for what they do (although we may reward or punish then when this is effective). So, there ought to be something more to our own freedom on account of which we can hold ourselves responsible for what we do than merely being uncoerced by external agents or circumstances. — Pierre-Normand

Sure, as I mentioned, humans have a higher level of consciousness than animals. This entails more capacity for compassion and more sophisticated intelligence, so we regard humans as more morally responsible than animals. Humans are also more free than animals in the sense that human intelligence enables them to find more ways or more effective ways to satisfy their desires and needs.