The key characteristic of Austin's approach is the seeking of wisdom within our everyday language. — Banno

I put Austin in the analytic tradition squarely against positivism/representationalism--showing the variety of ways in which statements can have rational value without being true/false. If this is wisdom, it is not "everyday" wisdom.

Wittgenstein, in contrast, disdained how language misleads us into philosophical knots that are to be undone by careful and more formal analysis. — Banno

Disdain is a strong word; I would say he unravels the picture which language allows, only to show the desire (for certainty, universality, etc.) which leads us to picture language that way (singularly). Now Witt takes skepticism (the cause of the desire) seriously, i.e., he does not try to 'solve" it, while Austin (and Moore) either skip over it as nonsense or insignificant.

That they have different conclusions, goals, whatever, does not make the method different. They are not creating theories, just showing us ourselves.

but it's not style that counts here; it's method — Banno

Cavell makes an argument that the "style" of the Investigations (confession, the Interlocutor, the obfuscation) is as much a part of the method. Not to drag Nietzsche into it, but I would argue that he too could not make his point (get you to see what he sees) without saying it in the way he does.

Nietzsche renders the list too irregular — Banno

I concede, begrudgingly, just to stop talking about him (and let's not take up Socrates, etc. when we are still stuck on OLP being merely normal language use).

I will not budge, however, from the claim that Wittgenstein is fundamental to OLP.

...an ordinary langauge treatment of ethics; but too much Kant for him to be central or OLP — Banno

Not sure "him" is, but I will just throw out that Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations is ultimately an examination of ethics through (the epistemology of) OLP. And that Kant's "categories" are comparable to Witt's Concepts, just that each has it's own category, possibilities, conditions, etc.

I re-read Signature-Event-Context today, and my take on it is this. Derrida zeros in on the concept(s) of context, which is central to the argument of olp. He claims that Austin believes one can exhaustively determine a context of word uses such that no remainder is left over. — Joshs

Again, Derrida is jumping to conclusions maybe for his own reasons (if context is closed than the only option is difference?). A context only needs to be fleshed out to clarify any distinctions which are necessary for you and I to have no more concerns. If a concept is used generally, than the need for criteria and any context are simple to resolve. To quote myself from Emotions Matter: "The sky is blue." "Do you mean: we should go surfing? It's not going to rain? or are you just remarking on the brilliant color?" All these concerns of course may not need a much larger, more-detailed drawing out of a context to resolve (either to the Other or myself), but the context is endless if the need for distinctions remain. Context is not a means of (all) communication, it is a means of investigating our criteria of our concepts. One question would be: what context gives us an idea of the criteria a philosopher is relying on when saying "Surely I must know what I feel!" (Witt)

So what is ordinary then? — Pantagruel

Creating a context that shows us the ordinary criteria for a concept, not (regular, common) words

So does ordinary usage mean resolving more expansive universes of discourse down to less expansive, but therefore more universal, ones? — Pantagruel

We're not talking about ordinary "usage" (see above). We are not resolving, nor reducing--when we ask what we say when..., we are explicating and opening and expanding our ordinary criteria (though, yes, the claim is that these are universal, though not in there application to all contexts, but to every one of us).

From Derrida: “Austin was obliged to free the analysis of the performative from the author­ity of the truth value, from the true/false opposition, at least in its classical form, and to substitute for it at times the value of force, of difference of force (illocutio­nary or perlocutionary force). In this line of thought, which is nothing less than Nietzschean, this in particular strikes me as moving in the direction of Nietzsche himself, who often acknowledged a certain affinity for a vein of English thought.” — Joshs

I just read this last night. I would say taking Nietzsche as substituting truth for force (presumably, the will to power), is to miss his desire to insert the human (emphatically, which may be his downfall) back into the moral realm--in the history of, and after the limitations of, the moral; to give us that "power" (a place, as it were, "over"). @Ciceronianus the White

Also, my understanding is that Derrida misconstrues Austin's peripheral reference to "force" in one particular category (perlocutionary) to apply it as Austin's entire goal, and overlooks that Austin more generally is still claiming truth value (adequation to the world), but calls it "felicity" (aptness) to the criteria of a concept--if an apology is done correctly, it is not true, but felicitous (apt), rather than infelicitous (botched, I think is Austin's way of putting it once). This is not a "force" more than a rationality.

I look on OLP and analytic and linguistic philosophy (largely) as being a kind of tonic, serving to restore rigor to philosophical thought by disposing of faux problems arising from misuse of language... serving to purge philosophy of its extravagance. — Ciceronianus the White

Again, it's not that philosophy is "misusing" language, and OLP is arguing that it is using it correctly. The "rigor" of OLP is its attention to its examples and fleshing out of the context, but the point is not right/wrong but to shed light on what philosophy means by what it is saying, not in contrast to normal words, but in light of ordinary criteria (and their context)--not cure, but diagnose maybe. This is not to dispose of problems like skepticism, identity, justice, etc. but to expose what we actually (still) want from philosophy's questions. Sometimes finding the criteria for philosophical claims involves creating wildly fantastic scenarios; you want extravagance, you can't go further than Wittgenstein or Cavell, or Nietzsche. Austin, of course, is British, so he scaled it down a bit.

Nietzsche with his hyperbolic claims, often ending in exclamation points, mixed with rhetorical questions, and brimming with certainty, is more a philosophical rabble-rouser than physician. — Ciceronianus the White

If you read Philosophical Investigations, it is full of open-ended questions, and confusing statements to make you turn upon yourself to verify. This is due to OLP's call to have you answer for yourself whether the criteria is described clearly, fully enough. Cavell is so aggravating in this regard it's almost as if I'm supposed to write the other half of the book (he means for us to follow our own voice, our further interest). Emerson appropriates analytical philosophy into other contexts, and is on his tiptoes encouraging us to find what (criteria) matters to us in the sea of unexamined, universalized (conformed) concepts.

And again, the claim of OLP is hyperbolic, it is voiced to include everyone (though impossible), as if to move past resorting only to the individual and approaching a sense of the universal without erasing the context of the particular--Nietzsche will appear righteous and unabashedly anarchistic; Austin, contemptuous or condescending; and Wittgenstein, enigmatic, curt, presumptuous (as I've said elsewhere, the lion quote is used as an uncontested fact). These OLP claims can be strident (See what I see!!) because there is a moral urgency to bringing the human "voice", in a sense, back to our criteria, rather than lost to the inhuman, sterile theories that attempt to leapfrog our responsibility to our words.

I thought OLP was all about what words actually mean in everyday use. As opposed to artificially constructed types of contexts which create the problems which they then try to solve. — Pantagruel

Trying to unpack this a little, OLP is not trying to solve (all) the "problems" philosophy has (skepticism, moral disagreement, etc.), but, yes, one point is to show the constructed criteria (striped of context). Philosophy is not, however, being "opposed" to "what words actually mean" (my emphasis)--this idea of "meaning" as an independent thing (that could be "actual") is even one target of OLP. As part of their Grammar concepts have multiple (public) senses in which they can be meant; imagining a context clarifies which sense is being used (which criteria come into play--or even how concepts are extended), but the idea is not that words used in ordinary circumstances have a meaning which is a solution for (or normalizes) philosophy.

Habermas says that our communicative actions derive from a massively shared lifeworld (lebenswelt). This is a background set of assumptions so fundamental that they resist analysis. His observations on specialized languages are that the value of special theoretical domains can only be measured to the extent that they manage to re-integrate themselves into the universal community. Therefore, they must eventually find a way to communicate in everyday language. In fact, Habermas says that everyday language is the best meta-language. I'd agree. — Pantagruel

One point of OLP is that we are able to individually examine our concepts because they each have their own ways of being meaningful, so that one over-arching theory need not explain meaning universally, such as a representational theory or a pragmatic explanation of how language is used.

I think it is important to point out again that OLP is not investigating norms, nor arguing for what is normal (language). The goal is not to re-integrate philosophical language (they are, as @Banno points out, the same words) so much as see it in relief to ordinary criteria and the context in which they work, to provide a larger picture and reflect the context and criteria philosophy has perhaps created or abandoned; not that normal language is better or necessary for communicating philosophy--it is the criteria which are ordinary, given voice in a context to differentiate them.

[A.J Ayer's book] was a book I loved to hate — Wayfarer

Well you'll be happy to read Sense and Sensibilia. Austin basically just punches him in the face repeatedly. Logical positivism and the principal that only emperically-verifiable statements have the value of truth bear the brunt of Austin's wrath and they serve as the Interloctor in the later Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations, so basically he is talking to himself--the earlier author of the Tractatus--who set up the path to positivism.

I had taken one of the starting-points for this approach to be Moore's 'Refutation of Idealism', and the subsequent tendency to reduce philosophy to what can always be rendered in crisp propositions. — Wayfarer

All of us at OLP deeply apologize for Moore's over-enthusiasm. Austin also did not take skepticism seriously enough, among other fallouts he just brushed over--"What's the point of all these examples again?"--though he is the best at stunning you with criterial distinctions: why do we ordinarily ask "how" you know something, but not usually "why" you know it?

one consequence often seems to me to try and cast every idea in philosophy in terms of what can easily be spoken or written, leaving aside the larger issue that philosophy often has to plumb difficult questions about the limits of language or of reason and the nature of truth. — Wayfarer

Again, as discussed above, easy is not the point. At times it will almost seems Austin or Wittgenstein are belaboring something instead of just telling us--this comes from OLP trying to get us to see the same thing from a different angle, the point being to reflect how you got to the old viewpoint in the first place (whew! Did I say not easy?) And OLP isn't avoiding the difficult questions, just trying to make it clearer what we are actually asking ourselves (and why).

And thank you for the encouragement. If you ever venture another try, may I suggest any of the essays by J.L. Austin, especially Sense and Sensibilia (along with reading Ayer's Truth, Language, and Logic), or any essay from Stanley Cavell's first set, Must We Mean What We Say (though maybe start with the one about later Wittgenstein).

I'm puzzled by your inclusion of the Great Moustache, — Banno

Nietzsche brought a historical (in that sense, a contextual) view to morality. He was investigating the metaphysical version of morals (deontology) and finding the place for the human voice. His aphorisms are not statements of fact or opinion (where people run into trouble believing they understand him), but claims to, or examples of, the actual workings of our moral concepts, to reflect against the single "ought" of moralism. It's also funny that OLP provides relief from Hegel, as I count Hegel as important to its development. He, like Nietzsche, brought historicity and context to philosophy, in tearing apart manufactured dichotomies with a method of investigating our concepts. He of course had the answers all worked out ahead of time rather than only seeking clarity from the evidence, but you take the good with the bad with most philosophers.

I think it is critical though to say (via-a-vis Hegel) that it is not important for OLP to be written in simple ("ordinary") language without terms (Cavell is fill-in-the-blank cryptic, Nietzsche openly defies understanding, and Wittgenstein has so many special terms it's all anyone believes he meant--only Austin is readable, but few remember what the point was because he hardly ever says it).

I also should say this is hardcore analytical philosophy, not meant for "ordinary" readers (like continental philosophy can be). It is strictly written in contrast to, or at least with a good understanding of, traditional analytic philosophy. Not that studying philosophy can't be useful to anyone, but just that this isn't a dumbed-down version to be understood with a quick glance, nor does getting the point stand apart from seeing its relation to the tradition.

The general theme was that ordinary language was both a blessing and a curse; on one side it brought clarity and perspective (Austin); on the other, many if not all philosophical problems derive from ordinary language's ambiguous structure (Wittgenstein). — Banno

The first trip-up I think is skepticism's desire (for certainty)--the seeming gap between us and the world--then (yes) language gives us the sense of an intellectual lack, then we (philosophers) try to fix language by removing its context and stripping its ordinary criteria (replaced with certainty, universalism, etc), and then we have to put those back to see the mess we got into. Unfortunately this is a desire created by our human condition so it happens over and over (eternally recurring as it were).

whatever your philosophical inclination, you will eventually have to make a place for ordinary language. — Banno

Just to be clear, this isn't to say: "you must listen to what OLP says is ordinary usage!" Wittgenstein says "Look at the use!" to get people to see how ordinary use reflects on philosophical issues. Nor is it to say that traditional philosophical concerns are nonsense or not important or not valid (well, some).

Neat Austin references in the OP, by the way - I wonder who saw them. — Banno

No one. No one saw them.

The only thing I would quibble with here is your characterization of Derrida as a relativist and/or a skeptic. — Joshs

Ah, the dangers of categorization (I suppose Hume is more of a skeptic). And my knowledge of Derrida is not even being able to get through his attempt to read Austin (in Signature Event Context); though I have read an account of it. My only grounds then for calling him relativistic/skeptical is his contrasting metaphysics with difference, as if we couldn't have a separate (ordinary) voice, but only a related one. As if we could tear down the old forms of philosophy, yet have the same satisfactions (maybe not seeing our part). Again, I don't say this out of an experience with reading Derrida so much as maybe holding a grudge from the effort of fending him off in literary theory class trying to hang on to structuralism (perhaps a more rigid equivalent of how Wittgenstein sees the ordinary criteria of our concepts). OLP has the sense of bringing the human voice back to philosophy without all the gymnastics, but I know Derrida is pretty spikey so I concede all ground.

I appreciate your resolve, but I believe I have addressed these concerns already. My point in all this was to shed light on the possibility of discussing art in a rational way. I have (Kant has) shown that there is more "objectivity" in aesthetics than most people would grant. Whatever you believe is excluded or constrained, I would only suggest that there is nothing left of that concept except the desire for the type of conclusions which created it.

Well, I could only make the case for the broader analytical implications because that's what I'm trained in. And, though Stanley Cavell is both a philosopher and an art critic, notably film and Shakespeare, he is not an artist. I don't know if reading art critiques at that level "enhance artistic creation"' however.

It is (human) reason itself that serves as the limitation. And it is our capacity to recognise and own this subjectivity that enables us to develop and refine rational y structures of relation to more closely approximate reality. * * * This is not, as I think Antony Nickles suggests, wanting to keep one’s own opinion (a passionate plea for individuality), but rather recognising that we only arbitrarily isolate both the artwork and aesthetic judgement from our subjective relation to it. In my view, it is awareness of the variability in our qualitative relation to knowledge such as criteria of the Form that orients it in the possibility of a rational ontological structure which could make claims to objectivity, and from which we can restructure and refine a more accurate epistemology. — Possibility

As this is not directed at me, it feels odd to cast in, but I believe focusing on my (Witt's) conjecture/speculation as to the motivation to hang on to any rational "subjective relation" to art and our aesthetic judgement, detracts from my greater point. Basically, I think maybe the disagreement comes down to a confusion in terms. I suggest that "human reason itself" is different than the rationality inherent in the forms of art. Cavell would call the Forms the structure of support of aesthetic claims--their rationality is not "arbitrarily isolate[d]" by us; they are categorically independent from us, wrapped up in the means of art; free, if not from our opinion, from our control (our "meaning"), from our arbitrariness, and our falling into taste or mere experience. Whatever the reason you want/need to maintain a "subjective relation" (not captured in the Pleasant and the Sublime) we do not have a "variable" "relation" to knowledge of the forms of art. When I speak of possibilities of the forms, it is not a possibility to be rational, it is the open-ended possibilities of their rationality. The possibility is for you to see for yourself the rationality I shine a light on, or not. And, again, this is not an "ontological" structure; there is no "object" in relation to the Beautiful (Witt's analogous "concepts" are not of a metaphysical or "objective" world). We do not make claims to "objectivity", we can make claims about art because of the rationality in their forms, claims that would speak for all of us, not just my reasons/relation--you seeing it on your own. A main point of mine is that there is rationality without the idea of "objectivity". In concert, our epistemology does not have to be more "accurate" (of/to something) so much as realize that knowledge in aesthetics does not ensure agreement, certainty, universality, etc. (what we philosophically have wanted from knowledge). This does not eat away at its sense of rationality as much as leave those things in our hands, up to our skills to evoke that rationality for all to see. Again, maybe this comes down to a misunderstanding that the rationality of the forms of art should not be confused with the critic giving us "reasons"--evidence, perspective, connections, etc.--to see the rationality inherent in the forms of art in the example of a work. We do not vary the structure, we vary in our capability or desire to discuss art in relation to its rational, formal structure.

p.s. @Jack Cummins obviously does not understand/value the desire for the aesthetic discussion, which is fine--everyone has their interests (philosophy is also powerless to prove its relevance); only to say, Cavell picks a point with Hume that if you presume taste you should have the discipline to account for it. I would, in trying to tempt anyone--controversially!--point out that the Forms of art are similar to Wittgenstein's Concepts, with their categorical identity and possibilities, the rationality of their criteria--their Grammar. And these concepts include ones that affect our moral moments; thus the "irrational", "emotional", "subjective" presumed about aesthetics is related to our dismissal of the rationality of our moral relation to each Other and our actions, etc. Also, the methodology of making a claim about the rationality of a form of art is structurely similar to the kind of claim used in Ordinary Langauge Philosophy in investigating what is said when..., or what we ordinarily say and do, as philosophical data.

The meaning of life simply exists: it is just a matter of finding it. — Rafaella Leon

I loved that book in school, and I enjoyed reading this; it made me think of the ways in which I understand these same (similar) things now. The approach reminds me of Emerson in that it is not synonymous with typical analytic philosophy, but it is relevant. If we say that a person exists if they find the meaning of their life, then others have not yet, in a sense, come to "exist". Without interest in, or attraction to, the world--if nothing is meaningful to them--there is nothing that would endure. When the means of the production of ourselves is forced upon us, we are alienated from our ability to find ourselves, Marx would say.

No man invents the meaning of his life: each one is, so to speak, surrounded and cornered by the meaning of his own life. — Rafaella Leon

Here I am reminded of Stanley Cavell's observation that the "will" is not active, but actually passive; not, say, that I am in perfect control of my body, but that I am in the perfect control of my body, even, as it were, the god within me. The world draws me if I would let it, Heiddeger would say, but in grasping for certainty/knowledge, I loose sight of what is meaningful to me.

But if the individual acts solely on the basis of an end, he is acting precisely on the inexistence of a world around him. With or without the world, he would act the same way. Acts then acquire a supra-temporal, supra-historical meaning, that is, eternally man should do so before the world exists or when it ceases to exist. Here action is taken as the direct expression of a divine quality that acts without the existence of the world. — Rafaella Leon

To say there is no world is maybe a way to say we should not be acting towards a goal or end--the Hindu idea of detachment from the fruits of our actions. Our actions being the expression of something higher in us is another way of saying our actions create us, complete us.

the meaning of the individual’s life, of the individual before his ultimate moral responsibility, something that is above the character, something that Humanity itself does not know. — Rafaella Leon

I have tried to explain (not as eloquently)--in my contributions to the post Freedom and Duty, and in my post on Wittgenstein's lion-quote--that responsibility, answerability, and duty, are beyond knowledge and above our "selves" (our ego, as it were). In that moral realm we are defined by our acts; we are responsible for the existence and composition of who we are either reflecting our interests and what is meaningful to us, or living in, as Emerson would say, conformity.

Well said.

the first being that I don’t mean to negate your contention regarding objectivity, but to challenge the limitations of your perspective, and work towards a synthesis. It seems natural in moments of disagreement to consolidate perspectives, but I’ve never been very good at debates. — Possibility

Well, I am not making a claim to "objectivity"--only rationality--as Kant's term is an out-dated concept (as is "subjectivity"--instead of the personal); and, again, I believe there is everything here that is desired in the idea of "objectivity" except the "object" and that there is no "approximation" of our personal opinions to the unknowable yet certain "thing-in-itself". And I will admit to "limitations", namely, that this is not to encapsulate the Sublime experience (immediately), or is not subject to degradation into mere opinion (taste) and personal experience (the Pleasant), and most importantly, that it is open and vulnerable to the discussion coming to an end. Though this is not a "synthesis" of, say, (beginning) perspectives--points-of-"view" (viewpoints); it is the rational distinction of one claim from another; that a claim is incorrect or wrong, subject to evidence and rational resolution or disagreement. Again, we are not "consolidating perspectives" because we are discussing something public based on the overt and explicit ways (criteria of the form) in which art makes its point, what methods are inherent in it, etc. You attribute this as well to our philosophical discussion, but, apart from getting clear about terms, realizing we simply have difference interests, or are talking about different (not-overlapping) points, etc. one of us can be wrong--that is rationality in the sense I am discussing; one of us must learn something correct from the other--we are not just swapping opinions. This, again, is not to say the conversation can not be cut short, frustrated, relinquished, not conceded, etc. As Cavell says, we are separate, but nothing separates us, so we are answerable for everything that comes between us.

sometimes we are just going to disagree: perhaps I feel you are wrong in your reading of the disowning of love in the opening scene of King Lear. You feel you have tried all you'd like to point to the text, tie it to other occurances in the play that echo it, etc. — Antony Nickles

This disagreement you’ve offered as an example is not a rational relation: it is a perception of difference from a centralised position, and a challenge to that position from a dissenting perspective. Each participant believes themselves wholly rational, and yet both judge this as a dead-end based on feeling. They are faced with the limitations of their own rationality, an event horizon beyond which all is deemed irrational, illogical, emotional. — Possibility

The use of the word "feeling" is misleading here. You skip over the rational claims that they have asserted; there I am only making the point that, at some point, I "feel" I have done all I can; though this endpoint/giving up is always my call, the reasons I have claimed are not my call (subject to my "feelings"). Witt's teacher hits bedrock with the student, but most people miss that the teacher is only "inclined" to shut the door on more discussion--this does not change our obligation to be answerable to the Other and ourselves, nor does it change the nature of the discussion. The two people in a sense meet on the same ground of the concept of the form of art; they don't "believe themselves wholly rational"; the Form is the rationality--we can, as I have said, make arguments not on that field (option, taste). The "event horizon" is a construction of Kant's to try to separate what is certain, universal, etc. from that which he believes can not be. Positivists (think Witt's first book) and others took this to the extreme to throw out everything else, including the aesthetic, and call it "irrational", "emotional". There are human reasons for this that I go over in my post on Wittgenstein's lion-quote.

Now, let’s say that one of them recognises this limitation, and humbly entertains the possibility that they might be disconnected from, or even ignorant of, certain qualitative aspects of the text which may be apparent to the other, perhaps owing to their personal experiences of love. Now we’re exploring an aspect of existence beyond what either would consider ‘rational’ from their limited perspective. There’s no rational criteria with which to navigate this relational ‘space’, and yet the difference is undeniable. — Possibility

The "distance" is manufactured by one's desire to have an "internal" experience that could also be "explored". Now, if someone wants to have a feeling or experience of love, of course that is fine; this is the experience of the Pleasant (or Sublime) in terms of the aesthetic. Why do we keep confusing the other categories and imagining that they somehow affect the rational discussion of the form of the Beautiful? Maybe it helps to point out that the expression of an inner experience is different than the desire for "knowledge" of it, and that the "space" between us is fundamentally (unless manufactured) between our separate bodies, so the difference is a moral moment defining one to the other--bridgeable in our reaction to the Other (again, I take this up in that other post).

As in my discussion with Joshs, this can lead us to a rational idea that we inaccurately perceive our own viewpoint as central to a normative understanding. — Possibility

Well, here, I will leave it to you and @Joshs; I take this mostly as a separate discussion. In relation to my point, we do not create the rational (our "ideas" are not--"perceived" to be: rational or just feelings); what is rational is the external criteria of the Form (from the method of the art). Also, the idea of "normative" is muddled and based on this misunderstanding of our own place and power (lack thereof) in and over language. The misconception of "reality" (say, Plato's forms, the "objective") leads to a sense of "qualitative relativity" when, if we remove ourselves from rationality and "meaning" (as if we create that, or that "words" are tied to "meanings"), how things relate to each other is much less swirled together (as if there was one problem of relativity, instead of each concept having its on world of criteria, which in each context, involves an ordinary rational discussion). Again, this is to confuse a discussion of coming to terms in each form of art, with imagining some abstract overarching rift and thus believing that everybody has their own starting point (them)--which I simply take as one wanting to keep their own opinion (making it unassailable, or unique), when that is simply a refusal to participate in the forms of rationality. As I have said, you MAY do this, but that refusal is your call, not a comment on the possibility of the rational discussion of our claims about the aesthetic.

...consider an alternative perspective... perceiving the relational structure in which an ‘event’ (itself consisting of relational structure) is open to variability. — Possibility

I am doing my best here to understand what you are saying (perhaps not well) but also, I'm not sure how you think this needs to negate my contention about the actual OP about "objectivity"--our how aesthetics holds any sense of "rationality" for Kant at all. In the end, I believe it appears we are talking about two different things, and then I would not deny that the Sublime has a separate relation to aesthetics (nature, awe, bigness, respect, etc.) and that it, along with the Beautiful, has a relation without an object—I would even grant it is a “faculty” though I don’t know what the implications of that are other than an ability to have that experience. However, "categorically" Kant says (Gramatically Witt would say) that relation is not a rational relation—it is without a concept/form (there is no “structure” in that sense) as similarly, with Taste and the Pleasant. And, as much as Witt's term "Concept" is similar to the idea of Kant's "Form", those two are both, "open to variability" (though I'm not sure of this as a term), even rationally (if only eventually). I brought up the continuation of the series to focus on the conceptual jump that can be made between teacher and student--outside of numbers--they are not "consolidating the concept"--it can be moved to a new context, broadened.

I feel I have connected the Beautiful to the Sublime in its role to creativity and inspiration but this is not a rational connection. The judgment of the Beautiful and the Form of art work together extend it into further possibilities (from itself) and, I believe, covers all the ground you need to have everything you want of the Sublime. Though I may not have pegged your claims correctly, I feel as if you are not allowing my claim all the consequences of its open-ended relation to art. So I feel an impasse that I believe is unnecessary—what is the fear that I am denying anything? Why must there be a separate rational relationship to aesthetics? Why and how is “variability” different/necessary? (I believe this would be a different post but I wonder if we aren’t floating into Derrida’s creation of “Metaphysical Presence” instead of addressing Logocentrism head on and in denying a concept's actual flexibility—“variability” being an excuse to open a separate door, or a justification to politically attack the whole idea of tradition, concepts, form, and language itself.)

[“Possibility;486311"]...this consolidated ‘touchstone’ is arbitrary - it is the viewer/critic who determines the ‘launching point’, not the art or artist.[/quote]

The clarification in your second paragraph is also well taken, thank you. I only point out that Forms (concepts) are not arbitrary, although, as you say, this is no constraint on the art or artist (when is painting not painting is also an open question for art—though still intelligible in contrast to the structure of the Form). To say that the possibility of misunderstanding is cause to assume individual “perspective” is to misunderstand that the forms of art are public. No one is reasoning from outside (completely apart) of the forms and context (without debasing the discussion to taste or personal experience). It feels like a desire for individuality; art can be a private language, however, until we find a way to discuss it in relation to how art works, it is simply the expression of the pleasant or sublime experience, or is valuable or not. Thus why art is close to madness sometimes.

I agree with the brief third, and the fourth, paragraphs. I think just after that when you discuss "misunderstanding"... "at the level of meaning", here I would say is an example of trying to step out of the rationality by imagining something individual. If you misunderstand what I meant, then you ask, "Did you mean the trope, or its analogous nature?" In other words, there are rational ways of clarifiying disagreement: collecting more evidence, clearing up terms, and sure I guess "increasing awareness, connection, and collaboration", but in none of this is a "broader relational structure" necessary (if even possible)--sometimes we are just going to disagree: perhaps I feel you are wrong in your reading of the disowning of love in the opening scene of King Lear. You feel you have tried all you'd like to point to the text, tie it to other occurances in the play that echo it, etc. This is not a "variability in... rational relation"--this a conversation coming to a dead-end. These aren't different "perspectives", they are different rational claims about the art; the "possibility of agreement" is not in "perspectives"; that is not rational, as is a reading connected to the Form, which can be "wrong", say, being simply conjecture, personal opinon (taste), lacking evidence, not accounting for history at all, etc. These things don't have anything to do with one's "perspective". And I would agree that we can have a non-judgemental relation to art; but would we call it rational (would Kant?). You can have your opinion and hold your words to yourself as a perspective, say, an observation, but no one can disagree with you in the way possible through the Form (concept). There is no "language" to use together, and we are left "talking at cross purposes", because your "purpose"--your perspective--is more important than being answerable to me and responsive (responsible) to the text (art).

I am notifying the following participants (and others that may have an interest), in the hope of rounding out @darthbarracuda 's PO with any other concerns: I would bring up again that my contention (in a nutshell but stated more accurately and clarified over this whole thread) is that all the qualities of "objectivity", including right and wrong, are possible in aesthetics apart from an "object", except agreement on a claim of judgement. @Moliere @Hanover @Thorongil @Tom1352 @Banno @Number2018

Here and above, @Possibility and I are having a discussion I would characterize as: the play between art (and our relation to it) and the judgement (rationality) of aesthetics; the possibility and totality of rationality without something other than (say, an idea), or beyond (say, a place), Kant's "forms" of aesthetics.

You say that 'modern art expands and re-examines its own rational criteria in the making of art' - how do you think it does this, without pointing to an aspect that exists in a relational "space" beyond the criteria of the form? — Possibility

The evolution of art is an appropriate topic and this is well taken; in pushing too hard on the fact of rational judgement at all, I only peripherally addressed the way art changes, and thus changes its rationale. Wittgenstein would, roughly, refer to this as projecting a concept into a wider or new context (perhaps akin to your "space", without an aspect), and with the process of "continuing a series", there, with a student (see PI Index "Series - of numbers).

I would first point out that extenuation or expansion presupposes the actuality of the workings of art (reflected in the criteria of its form). The criteria of the form express (Witt's term) the means of art, are the launching point or touchstone; there is no "beyond" or "aspect" that they are pointing "to"; the form moves itself ahead drawing out, and on, the means of the work, without an end. "Purposefulness" is not to a purpose, but only to say that art has rational but open-ended ways of being meaningful. This is not capturing, or transcending to, an "aesthetic idea"; it is, as it were, on a path (cubism comes from portraiture) but without destination. Emerson says (roughly) we must live fuzzy in front (Wittgenstein talks of concepts with "blurred edges" #71). The context here is the painter, say, with their canvas blank and the means at their disposal; but are we denying history (even in revolutionizing)? And of course this is acknowledging that, if anywhere, art may break or defy or abandon any of its methods of meaning; ahead of its time, waiting to be explicated--yet to find its words, or voice, or audience.

This is how the work draws us in - through transcendence. A discussion which acknowledges this transcendence also acknowledges the nature of its approximation within the criteria of the form.... Those who do not allow for broader systems and structures of rationality (such as aesthetics) limit their ability to engage with the work, in the same way that “a discussion of the form of art does not require or allow for... different rationality than: criteria of a form.” — Possibility

I would, again, argue there is no "other" rationality in the judgement of aesthetics, no "broader systems and structures of rationality"; again, the discussion is not an "approximation", not (as that is defined by Webster's) "nearly" correct, as if the Sublime (or transcendent) were an eventual or separate correct destination to which we have a different rational relation.

For the rest of us, art actively draws us in (through transcendence) to a ‘space’ that challenges our capacity to rationally discuss what we perceive. — Possibility

And here I absolutely agree. I believe this is Kant's experience of the Sublime (though I believe in the value of trying to, and the ability to, meet that "challenge"). Though I am left with the impression you feel the need to defend that there is something more, greater, that you feel I am taking away, or denying. Maybe it helps to say, the rationality of the judgement of art does not take away from the transcendent experience or creation of art. This fear of denial reminds me of Wittgenstein's consolation to the metaphysical skeptic (my italics):

PI #305. But you surely cannot deny that, for example, in remembering, an inner process takes place." -- What gives the impression that we want to deny anything?... The impression that we wanted to deny something arises from our setting our faces against the picture of the 'inner process'. What we deny is that the picture of the inner process gives us the correct idea of....

And here I want to end this quote instead with: the extension of the form (instead of "the use of the word remembering"). Witt talks of this picture (there, an inner process; here, an "aesthetic idea") getting in the way of seeing the use of the word "remembering" as it is (here, the rationality and progression of art's forms with the workings of the art, and their change). All this is to say, the desire to have a special access to aesthetics (say, to some idea of it) gets in the way of beginning a conversation. The fear that it might constrain, say, a desire to have some connection with art that is special, ineffable, is not to say discussion is not possible (however threatening, subject to philistines). Another way to look at it, again, is the fact we might end without agreement is not proof that we have no way to try (that art is unintelligible), or that there is some better way, or that the attempt is structurally flawed.

Would creative genius be content with inspiring critical assent? — Possibility

The work of criticism is separate but rooted in ("dependent" on), and in the service of, art (not parasitic to it, or indistinguishable thus irrational, as Derrida suggests); the artist, with hope, works for the art, and its creation--in and for its possibilities. Is art only that which criticism says it is? Of course not. But are we not discussing the rational judgment of aesthetics? The agreement (assent) is not between the artist and critic, but the critic and anyone who wishes to see more in art than their own feelings and their valuation/opinion, though the critic can be as degenerate as the viewer. Nevertheless, without the critic (or them within us), we (the viewers) are ignorant in a sense, blind, or at least without depth perception; unable to access the richness and fullness of the awe and wonder of art. Here I would suggest Stanley Cavell's essay Aesthetic Problems in Modern Philosophy. In truth most of this is in that work, including the Kant. He starts by justifying the ability to paraphrase poetry, so you'll have something to chew on.

I thank you for your diligence and consideration.

If I reveal that my position in this discussion is as an artist, not a critic, would that change how you perceive my argument? — "Possibility

I can only say for sure that although the artist may understand the workings of the form as well or better than the critic, I would say the critic understands the explicit criteria, the history of the art form, and is more deliberate, thoughtful, and comprehensive in his investigation into a work (though of course the artist could do this too, but then: is he an artist? or a critic?). That's not to say there aren't sensationalist, or populist, or just bad critics, or that the good ones aren't sometimes wrong. But I don't put any stock necessarily in the artist's position--his goal or intention, etc.

When I argue that a logical, rational discussion of art is not ‘objective’, [I'm only saying] its claim to objectivity is limited. ...my view of Kant’s aesthetics abandons no ‘standards of objectivity’ to begin with, but rather strives towards the possibility of a more complete objectivity. — Possibility

Well "objective" gets used a lot without it being clear why. The "claim" of the discussion of art is not "limited" (it is, say, unguarded to the Other's rejection); it is not making a claim "to objectivity". Also not sure what a "standard of objectivity" is--certain, predictable, enforceable? Here Kant is saying we have a universal claim (acceptable by anyone) and impersonal criteria (though not certainty of agreement). How can we approach? Towards what? What would make this "more complete"? I would point out that the "more complete" a critique of art (the more evidence used, the more implications followed through, the more questions/objections addressed, etc.) its possible the more people may see it the same way, agree that all those determinations, the critique, are right/correct. Now, could we also deepen/broaden our criteria of a form? sure. Stanley Cavell's observations in "The World Viewed" about the nature of film bring to light criteria I don't think film critics even considered before; and Northrup Frye's "Anatomy of Criticism" is such a fundamental framework of the structure of literature, people call it the bible. (I will note that both of these works investigate the "forms" of these arts.)

This approximation...is a call...to engage in a shared relational ‘space’, in which differing systems and structures of rationality, logic or end-place can be understood and restructured in relation to others without consolidation or conflict based on significance. Without this approximation, which expresses an awareness of its incompleteness through aesthetics (whether intentional or not), how do we acknowledge and respond to the call in the first place? — Possibility

I like the idea of a call: the work draws us in, it speaks to us through the criteria of its form, and our critique beckons the Other for their assent. Are these all not "space" enough? A discussion of the form of art does not require or allow for "differing systems and structures of rationality", as in, different rationality than: criteria of a form. But we also don't create the criteria nor change them (arbitrarily; say, without the art form changing). Where is the need for an "end-place"? Modern art expands and re-examines its own rational criteria in the making of the art--it's become its own critic. The criteria are not "incomplete", or unfinished, or, as of yet, only of a lower order (only an approximation?). A discussion of them need not end or be resolved or bettered for the rational conversation of art to begin--the one is the means to the other. We will have no other, better ("objective"?) means, to, say, have a particular, better ("objective"?) end. The frailty of the possibility of agreement in a discussion of art is its triumph, not its lack.

[claiming objectivity is limited] is due in part to Thomas Nagel, and in part to my examining Kant in the ‘wrong’ order. — Possibility

Yes, we'll need a full accounting of this.

You or I might consider something beautiful, but it's not true beauty, according to the conceptions of Kant. — Mijin

I get what you're saying; Kant can be esoteric. I usually work from ordinary language (its ordinary criteria), but, if you let go of the personal use of the words as terms, the categories of judgement themselves regarding aesthetics are part of our world, just the names don't line up. In other words, don't throw the baby out with the bathwater. The criteria aren't Kant's opinions or "conceptions", these are categories he is observing; he isn't making this stuff up (except, of course, that is, the names).

That is to say, you can consider something whatever you want ("beautiful"), but it's just your feeling or opinion until we have some external criteria to agree or disagree about it over. And we are not discussing whether something is actually beautiful, but discussing the categories of judging (say, how it is determined to be beautiful). And true and false do not come into an aesthetic discussion, i.e., "true" beauty (the claims aren't propositional statements).

Well, I have no reason to suppose these conceptions are the correct framing; it's just a proposition that I either accept or reject. It can't be used as an argument to convince anyone of anything. — Mijin

I just gave a ton of reasons! Throughout this thread! And yes, just as with most claims to our shared criteria, you can, of course, reject my (Kant's) claim (again, not a proposition). You are, however, answerable for that rejection, the lack of depth of it**, the refusal to address the distinctions, the impatience with any standard/terms but your own, etc. Maybe you no longer care, maybe you're attacking the method because you don't want to accept the conclusions, I don't know (maybe I'm not sure I care anymore.) And here is where we may be at the end of the rope with any claim about our shared criteria (as Wittgenstein says), which is the same failure that can happen with an aesthetic claim of the judgement of the beautiful. But this end is our failure more than just the possibility for it in the nature of the judgement of the aesthetic (or the philosophical).

**I'm not sure it makes sense to say I "can't" use whatever it is you're saying; maybe you mean that Kant's argument is not going to convince "anyone" (no one? harsh) of "anything" (wow, none of it?); or maybe you mean necessarily convince, say, everyone--and when is that possible? / if ever a requirement? Ooooohhhh, wait! are we doing science?!

I'm still not sure I entirely follow, as you still have not provided a concrete example.... Is it your view that true beauty has to be based on rationality? — Mijin

Yes, Kant's judgement of the Beautiful is rational, and universal, in a sense. And I wanted to make clear that, according to Kant, any "object" can be an example for the judgement of the Pleasant (a pleasing feeling) or the Good (popular), so we could pick literally any thing. You've chosen a face. As an object it is categorically not a subject for Kant's judgement of the Beautiful--he uses ordinary words as terms, I know, it's annoying; let's call it pretty or attractive to make it easier. You say everyone is hard-wired to "like" symmetric faces, sure, fine. We could say it's the pleasing feeling of it ("oh, pretty!" the brain says), and we could try to call the feeling the "reason" we find it pretty, but, just as one point, is there any space for that reason/feeling to be mine? other than it is my body, or is the "reason" in the face?

Now we can judge a face (or faces) to be attractive ("I like that!"), but my valuing that face over another is my choice, i.e., any rationale would be "my" reasons, not universal, external (objective?) rationale. Even if we all value that face, does popularity lead to rationality? We could all have different reasons, or the exact same (say, the same feeling).

Now Kant's idea of the Beautiful is judged by the criteria of the form not the object, for example, an art form, say, literature. Above I explain and quote Kant's process and basis for the rationality of the Beautiful, but, roughly, I make a universal claim for all of us based on the external criteria of the form, though your assent to that claim is uncertain. Here, imagine literary criticism that rises above what is pleasant or popular to use the criteria of written story to try to get you to accept what I see is correct based on the textual evidence and ways in which stories work.

Again, above I argue against the popular but outdated objective/subjective distinction: is the feeling of the pleasant more, or less "objective" than the use of public criteria to reach agreement that I am right in what I see and say about the aesthetic? But if we will only accept certain, determined, necessary solutions beyond the human voice, then we could call the feeling of pleasure an "objective" judgment of the aesthetic--Oh, pretty! Yay!

Unless you knew people of my grandmother's generation, I don't really care what you think. — Athena

Well, I deeply apologize; I got an email that I thought was you replying to my post, but it was, instead, you replying to someone else's (a little new to this). I thought it was strange, but I made some poor assumptions, and I'm sorry that I offended you. If it helps, my mother lived through the war in England, and my grandmother the century before last.

I have no idea why some people appear to worship Nietzsche. — Athena

As I don't take this as a real desire to learn, I would only say that people who take Nietzsche as proposing "ideas" or social opinions, miss the point (which is to say everyone who has only read snippets of him, or think the "will to power" is a moral theory.) His mission was to show the historical and contextual quality missing from Kantian and deontological morals, along with the additional point I am making about our human condition (I think it important to say, though, that he did not believe we are always living beyond morals; only that they have a life and a limit).

This is not quick judgment... — Athena

Again, my sincere apologies. As a token of peace, I offer that you might (if you can forgive him for basically being a Nazi) find Heidegger's essay “The Question Concerning Technology” interesting. He has a very dark view of the influence of technology, roughly, "enframing" (narrowing) our view of humanity and nature as only a means (echoing Marx).

["[Antony's argument] that we can bypass ['the distinction between the rational and emotional, or (Hume's) moral sense/innate moral judgment'] and still have a personal moral decision bound to reasonable action"] would be highly dependent on our culture, associations, and the books we read. Social animals have what some call a pre-morality. They are wired for group behavior.... we are not born with [cultural/thinking] language, nor are we born knowing the concepts essential to moral thinking and we aren't born knowing the high order thinking skills. Any "personal moral decision bound to reasonable action" is dependant on what we learn and because our circumstances are different, our sense of morality can be different.

This is where the higher-order thinking skills come in. That is the learned ability to reason through our choices and make decisions. ...Morality based on how we feel instead of how we think, leads to power struggles not a high standard of morality. — Athena

I agree that "higher-order thinking skills" embetters us and our society, not only with knowledge of the criteria of our morals, but also our understanding of our obligation to ourselves (and others) to the ethical consideration of a moral moment. I would only say that the idea of "dependent" and "different" does not affect the human condition between (any) morals and when they leave us turned upon ourselves without further guidance. Our "culture" and our "circumstances" and even our "morals" can be different, but the responsibility (among other things) that we have is universal, as you say, "to reason through our choices and make decisions", though I wouldn't call this a "learned ability" so much as a human obligation (categorically, as it were), say, our moral duty.

I would only else say that we are not born with moral/cultural/language, we are born into them. They are there before us and apart from us. We do not (always) "learn" these (as rules, laws), as much as we pick them up in going along and becoming a part of society (an unconscious social contract by osmosis as it were); they are wrapped up in what our society cares about and the way things count in the world (this is Wittgenstein's Grammar and Criteria)--they are not "knowledge" and we don't "agree" on them. But, yes, we can renounce them, be ignorant of them, contradict them, but also, become conscious of them, reform them, extend them (into new contexts), etc. We do not need nor have a "higher standard". It is not a dichotomy between feeling and knowledge--we/the world already have ordinary criteria for morals, etc. The criteria may be forgotten, or unexamined, but that does not mean we don't live by them (are left to our "feelings") or can't explain them if asked (by Socrates, Austin, etc.).

Whoops, responded to a response that was not to my post.

I quibble on the word "epistemology." If you mean methods by which we know, I agree, — tim wood

Method is basically what I am talking about, though I would say that we do gain something. "Knowledge" is a loaded word in ethics, but we do gain insight (even, of ourselves), a larger perspective, and, say, an understanding of the criteria of our concepts and the context we find ourselves in, etc.

I suggest we are always lost and never not lost, anything else is mere illusion propped up by a seeming regularity: we think we know, and for a while win some of our bets, but our knowledge is spurious. — tim wood

Although we might not always know the criteria for something (what is indicative of "walking" is one example Wittgenstein gives"), it might be a little cynical to say we are "always lost". This is only to say though that not everything is a moral moment, the same as to say not every motion is an action, or every action is "intended". We normally go along saying things and doing things, and only when something is fishy (Austin/Cavell say) do we ask "What did you mean?" or "Did you intend to do that?" The things we do and say being, not illusion, but merely not usually conceptually investigated (looking at their criteria and use). And I would claim knowledge is not so much false, as limited--it comes to an end, say, with respect to the separate Other (which I take up in my examination of Wittgenstein's lion quote).

Our duty then to be informed and self-informed as best we can be, reason being our best and only true navigational aid. And it seems to me Kant finds morality in reason, at least as much as with reason. — tim wood

I agree that what I am suggesting is both an examination of the world, and learning about ourself. And also agree that Kant is trying to find morality in and with reason, but my argument here is that his is still an effort to solve the moral problem beforehand. It is also to deny the human contribution (thrown out with the desire to remove emotion, inclination, etc. (the "subjective") from moral decision-making); seeing the partial role of rational rules and criteria is to acknowledge the human standing up for what matters to them (or not), subject to the consequences to their identity, character, answerability, etc.--completing the circle Emerson would say.

And this is precisely what the mariner does, not just in storm but always. He reads his moment, the vibration of the wind in his lines, the colour of the sky, and what experience tells him. His decision then at that moment being always and forever correct, notwithstanding what comes over the horizon at him. — tim wood

You may enjoy Stanley Cavell's essay in "The Quest for the Ordinary", in which he uses The Rime of the Ancient Mariner to investigate the loss caused by the line Kant draws between us and the thing-in-itself.

I do agree that aesthetic rationale applies an internal logic to the form, terms, means and structure in talking about art. But this logic serves to constrain the aesthetic in art, as it does in nature - there remains an aspect that transcends and even dissolves these categories of sculpture, dance, visual art, language or music. I think Kant refers to this as ‘the aesthetic idea’ - in relation to which all concepts, all thoughts and indeed all art, is but a rational approximation. — Possibility

I agree if this is to say not everything about the aesthetic can by captured in critique (or even words), i.e., the Sublime, but I think it's a scapegoat to throw the baby out with the bathwater to say that we are only "approximating" an idea (as it were, that taking the same unknowable place of the "object"--except if you only want to accept a certain type of rationality, logic, or end-place). Also, I'm not sure what "constrain" accomplishes other than to also say it does not meet a particular standard--one which changes nothing about our ability to discuss the aesthetic for everyone to see the public criteria of the form we have pointed out in a universal voice. It is not up to us to assent to the criteria, or an ultimate "idea", only to the critique--only that is subject to agreement.

I agree with all of this - but a rational discussion of art is still not objective. However, it is not ‘rational discussion of art’ that this thread refers to, but aesthetics in general - and it’s about this subtle distinction that I’m continuing to quibble with you. I think that aesthetics could be objective - but any discussion of it can only approach this possibility through uncertainty and a self-conscious capacity to transcend the laws of logic. — Possibility

Well if we have to discuss the hangup with "objectivity"/("subjectivity") we must--I believe Kant starts the death-nell (started by the idea of the metaphysical "object" with Plato) for "objectivity" by shriveling its application to only certain standards (self-contained, impersonal, certain, universal, pre-determined, having moral force, etc.) I get his desire to distinguish out the "subjective", as feeling, inclination, and all the other failings of the particular human; but, in doing so, he entirely removed the human voice and the natural human condition dictated by the limits of knowledge, our separateness from each other (which I discuss in my post about Wittgenstein's lion quote), and the powerlessness of rules/logic/rationality. Modern philosophy (Wittgenstein, Emerson, Heidegger, Nietzsche) puts a nail in the coffin by making the "object", "reality", etc. obsolete, and dialectically filling the object/subject distinction in with our ordinary criteria.

With the judgement of the Beautiful to aesthetics, however, Kant claims the standard of "objectivity" is not even used--we are not discussing the "object" (or the "idea"), we are not applying criteria for its identity or its certainty, universality, its "existence" apart from us. My whole point is that we give up "objectivity" but still have a logical rational discussion--we have everything else except the certainty that we will agree (or force to make us). Who needs the approximation other than to ignore the possibility of the voice of the other to speak for all of us, and to make us responsible for a cogent, rational response--we are answerable to each other; what are we missing?

...one example of what you mean by "sensations of the Pleasant, or the value of the Good".... — Mijin

It's not that there needed to be a reason; just some specificity--which you have now provided. I did suggest reviewing Kant's description of the Pleasant: "As regards the Pleasant every one is content that his judgement, which he bases upon private feeling, and by which he says of an object that it pleases him, should be limited merely to his own person” Sec. 7. As I noted above, this would be that you have a sensation, say, feeling sad or pleased by an object of art, that you may feel without anyone disagreeing.

The Good (taste) is “that which is ESTEEMED [or approved] by him, i.e. that to which he accords an objective worth, is good." Sec. 7. It is the value of the art or of its purpose, assigned by the individual based on their approval of an object, say, one with an exemplar, which others can agree regarding its worth, or interest.

They are both similar categorically, only to say your experience of art (it's pleasantness) may lead to the judgment that it has value (or good). The Pleasant would be the sensation, and the Good would be its popularity. Both are in consideration of the artwork (as an object), and both are attributable in their same manner to any object (a flower, a horse, a painting, etc.).

Of course, my point in beginning my remarks only concerned these concepts in contrast to the disinterested, impersonal, intelligible rationality that the judgement of the Beautiful has.

The ability to discuss anything rationally is not necessarily objective. When we render aesthetics in discussion, reduced to a particular language structure, objectivity often defers to certainty. Still, rational is not always logical. I don’t believe the possibility of failure makes discussion hopeless, only uncertain. — Possibility

I concede that aesthetic rationality is not "objective" (another post I think to argue that standard is based on Kant's desire to empower some judgment to be, say, irrefutable, but not based on a "real" "universal" object; however, I don't need agreement on either of those contentions to make my point here.

And I do allow for uncertainty, but only in the sense that it is uncertain that you will see what I see. I do claim that aesthetic rationale has a logic to it, though not a logic that ensures agreement or certainty in conclusions (not the logic you may want). This is an internal logic to the form of the art, the terms and means and structure--what makes a difference in sculpture compared to dance. Wittgenstein and Emerson inherit Kant but make every concept (here every form of art) categorical; each with its own class and criteria.

When we allow for this uncertainty - acknowledging purposiveness without agreeing on a stated end or purpose, or exemplary beauty/sublimity without agreeing on what is correct about its relation to form - the discussion itself allows for a relation between perspectives to approach objectivity in meaning beyond inter-subjective significance. This aspect of the discussion is irreducible, however. — Possibility

And I allow that we might not agree (on the end of purposiveness--though I'd want to re-read my Kant--or exemplariness of the art form) but the "uncertainty" of agreement here is not corrosive to the possibility of agreement (or even just "approaching" agreement), it does not make the discussion of art irrational or illogical. We do not "agree" on the terms and forms of art (though we may disagree about one criteria's "significance" over another in a certain work). Our "perspective" is not something personal (the art's "significance" to us) so much as seeing the art, for example, thoroughly, within the history of its form, taking in all available evidence, etc. It's not what matters to me, it's what matters in, say, making that art--what is meaningful to the art form. I'm not sure this reduces anything so much as broadens our stifled philosophical terms and conditions.

I don't understand any of that.
Can you give an example of the distinction(s)? — Mijin

I'm not quite sure it's unfair (or even rude) to say you're going to have to try harder. First, you say that you "don't understand any of that", which is grammatically referred to as a "naked this". What is the referent? Everything? The Pleasant and the Good? And so I'm not sure as well the distinction(s) to which you are referring? Also, do you mean you would like a scenario which better explains the distinction(s)? Or examples of (maybe?) judgments of each type? It might help to read my last threeposts, the first with quotes from Kant.

Following Kant (and subject to correction on the details), the argument here is that freedom is exactly freedom to do one's duty, and nothing else. * * * Duty, for the moment, is just what reason tells us ought to done.... But the purpose here is to draw attention to people who claim as a matter of right under freedom to do what they want... And I think the logic of the thing compels agreement. Yes? — tim wood

A very important discussion currently, so thank you for the post. What sparked my curiosity was the idea of duty and whether there is any compulsion. First, there is the distinction between the rational and emotional, or (Hume's) moral sense/innate moral judgment. I would argue that we can bypass this and still have a personal moral decision bound to reasonable action.

Starting with the idea that duty is "what reason tells us ought to [be] done", I would point out that this frames our moral decisions as occurring beforehand; rationally coming to a morality--a defined moral standard (in Kant's case), or theory, or the setting of what is a moral/immoral act (through authority, agreement, or other process, etc.--"regularity" Kant says). Morality and the "ought" have their place, but, like much of the moral, they have no force (apart from moralism, punishment, shame, etc.). I can make a case for what you ought to do (like Kant), and even have reasons that make sense (including internal coherency, categories or levels or rationality, etc.), but that does not ensure anyone will do what they ought to (see, e.g., Dostoyevsky). The same applies to the Good, though I believe teleology makes sense in relation to an object, say, in bettering our institutions.

Instead, imagine a case after our morality (beyond Good and Evil, as Nietzsche says)--a moral moment. As Cavell would say, when we do not know what to do; we are at a loss despite our deontological rules. Part of the picture here is that we are standing in the present, with a current context. And by this I do not mean a pre-determined context as in some thought-puzzle; a context that is as full and deep as the entire world, and that includes not only physical circumstances, but also our morality, all the distinctions we make and could make, and, most importantly, us as an unfinished work. One of Emerson, Wittgenstein, and Nietzsche's important contributions is that our action defines us; we are not here good/bad, right/wrong, but lazy, selfish, courageous, etc. Wittgenstein talks about "continuing a series" and taking an "attitude". Our action reflects on us; so consequences matter, but when we come to the end of a rule, who we are is at stake. Sometimes even, as Nietzsche and Thoreau point out, the "immoral" act is the necessary act.

So whatever moral "force" there is, it is not (only) immorality, punishment, or wrong/bad, but our responsibility (to ourselves, our words, our actions), our integrity--not so much our reputation, as our character--our moral identity, in a sense. People, obviously, sometimes don't care about these things (nor do they have to), but they are nevertheless subject to this human condition in the moral realm. As I have said in my post on Witt's lion quote--when we come to the end of knowledge of the Other's pain, we either accept or reject them (their moral claim on us). He says, "My attitude towards [them] is an attitude towards a soul. I am not of the 'opinion' that [they have] a soul." p. 178. We don't have knowledge that they have a soul, we treat them as if they do (or not), but the point being that we are in the mix here, our human frailty and possibility.

Now if our course of action is not defined (by, say, rules) ahead of time, nor by others (entirely); if we are lost and our character is on the line, what is our duty? If we can not rely on rationality to tell us what to do (should do)--say, definitively, certainly, "objectively", as it were, without our "person" being involved (though not emotionally/"subjectively")--are there criteria for determining our duty in that moment? Now here, all the moral philosophers I have read spend most of their effort pushing against simple morality/moralism (Wittgenstein, Nietzsche, Cavell, Emerson) so, what came to me first, actually, was the Bhagavad-Gita. Not that I agree with the answers themselves, nor feel that ours is a theological argument, but the situation and the type of discussion is an example of the type of grounds/criteria for a "reasonable" determination of our duty.

The case is that Arunja is going to war against his own family, and he is filled with doubt, pity, grief, etc., and turns to his "charioteer" Krishna for advice (imagine he is talking to himself). Krishna does not make a case for war (say, a "just" war), nor does he rely on how one should treat others--it is not a discussion of ends nor means. As part of the discussion, Arjuna keeps asking how he will know what to do, and Krishna is left with only being able to show Arjuna "his totality"--here again imagine Krishna is Arjuna's own voice to himself--to which Aruna says "You [I, as it were] alone fill the space" (20). It is similar to how Job's questioning is finally left only with the vision of the Leviathan--turning him back on himself to provide the answer.

Arjuna asks what defines a person whose insight is sure (54). They discuss discipline, detachment from emotions and goals, necessity, what differentiates an act from a motion, the need to ask questions, reflection, and the partial nature of our world's concepts and outcomes (only made whole by our action). Krishna advises "knowing the field", which is a way of saying the lay-of-the-land, which I take as making explicit the criteria of the (then-present) situation as well as of our concepts of action, courage, selfishness, flippancy, thoughtfulness, being reasonable, etc. These are criteria for defining a person in light of their actions. I submit that our duty is found in this space and the context and the ways our character/"humanity" is judged, not as right or wrong or good and bad, but nevertheless as rational (reasonable), rigorous, careful, detailed--as if our approach to a moral moment required an ethical epistemology.

Are we bound to our duty? In this sense we are; we are bound to our act. In these ways we are more responsible than just to rules/laws; we are, in a sense, created by our actions and finished as well (to a particular conception of ourselves). (The fact that here there are excuses and mitigation--such as lack of freedom to do what we decide is our duty--aides the point.) I believe these are not traditional philosophical rationale, but ordinary, everyday criteria. The "logic of the thing [that] compels agreement" is that we are disappointed by people, we no longer trust them, we believe they are fools, braggarts, cowards, etc.; that they made their choice in a moral moment thoughtlessly, hastily, self-servingly, recklessly, on a whim, etc. Do they care? Maybe not. Nonetheless, it can be true.

Well, I understand the part about the sublime delight in art's transcendence, but the Sublime does not negate the Beautiful. The Beautiful is still a rational discussion of claims to (for) everyone about what is correct/felicitous ("right") about an art's relation to its art form.

Universal validity/communicability is not objectivity. — Possibility

So if we agree on the first part, how is it "not objective"? I (and Kant) have already granted that it does not have an "object"--which I take in Kantian terms to mean there is no absolute, certain, pre-determined "right"--but does not having a final fixed point obviscate our ability to rationally discuss art? Maybe if we let go of the "objective"/"subjective" dichotomy, we can allow ourselves the grey areas (Witt. post-Tractatus). In other words, does the possibility of failure make discussion impossible/hopeless?

An objective object can clearly invoke subjective experiences however it is difficult to see how there could be anything beyond this to make a subject experience 'right or 'wrong' with reference to an objective value. I don't think it is possible to make an argument for why something is beautiful other than merely describing the object, feeling beauty needs first hand experience. — Tom1352

Yes, an art "object" can invoke "subjective [first-hand] experiences." Categorically, this is what Kant calls, the Pleasant--an experience that it is nice (say when you look at it), or whatever personal "feelings" you have . And Kant also allows that an art "object" can have good/bad "value" for us (@Tom1352)(although, again, "object-ive" is not a possibility there either). These two categories of the possibility of art do not wipe out the third means of addressing art, which is called the Beautiful (don't get caught up in the ordinary words--focus on the distinctions). It is not the "experience" of right or wrong, it is the rational discussion that is right/wrong (this is a rational category; not the kind of fixed Right!/Wrong! you may be thinking of); this is not in reference to the object, or its "objective" or "subjective" value. The thing to focus on is the form of the art--the way in which a story is told (think Northrup Frye's Modes and Genres); or the possibilities of the camera, the method, processes, framing, etc. in photography. These are the tools that a critic rationally uses to get us to try to see his insight into a work of art. For example, Cavell claims that the "modern" is now the discussion of the form through the work of art. The rest follows from my arguments above.

Speaking from a more neuroscientific point of view, there are of course aesthetic qualities to things for the vast majority of people. * * * And while it's fashionable to try to define standards of human beauty as arbitrary cultural creations... The more specific we get, the more subjective it gets though. — Mijin

We are bumping up against the limits of neuroscience (and sociology) here; and there is a categorical confusion here. What we can say about art through science refers either to the sensations of the Pleasant, or the value of the Good (popularity--@TheMadFool @Bitter Crank). What I am discussing is not a standard to judge the object, it is the ways a type of art has as its means. This is not a standard or "cultural creation" (as opposed to some "thing" created outside of culture?). And the more "specific" the claim gets, usually the better its argument--the more evidence it incorporates, the deeper the insight, etc. The Weltanschauung Wittgenstein would say, the comprehensive view. Of course, you may mean the more specific as the more personal (merely pleasant or good), and I would agree, but let's not mash everything together.

I think you might be thinking of the pleasant, not the beautiful. The "concept" of beauty is not determined (not an "object" in Kant's terms), and it is disinterested: not related to any individual "experience".

“Consequently the judgement [of the beautiful]... must claim validity for every one, without this universality depending on Objects. That is, there must be bound up with it a title to subjective universality” Sec. 6.

Compared to the pleasant: “As regards the Pleasant every one is content that his judgement, which he bases upon private feeling, and by which he says of an object that it pleases him, should be limited merely to his own person” Sec. 7.

I hope my (Kant's) point is clear about the nature of the claim here. “[ B ]ut if he gives out anything as beautiful, he supposes in others the same satisfaction—he judges not merely for himself, but for every one... which can make a rightful claim upon every one’s assent. ...the beautiful undertakes or lays claim to [the universal].” Id.

As to the criteria of our art forms: “It is not what gratifies in sensation but what pleases by means of its form... [that] is... the only [element] of these representations which admits with certainty of universal communicability” Sec. 10.

I would agree with @Thorongil that Kant's description of our judgment of what he terms the Beautiful allows for rational discussion (apart from just personal feelings or value judgments, etc.). Although we are not assured of aesthetic agreement (not just agreement in taste or value), we do have internal criteria (to the art) for what constitutes a beautiful painting or a movie that is well-made, etc.

But the value of this aesthetic, the identity of the aesthetic, depends upon the individual. — darthbarracuda

There is judgment just based on personal taste, but its existence does not negate the possibility of a different category of aesthetic discussion and agreement (you are entitled to "your" "opinion", but there is also the possibility of "informed judgment").

Part of the structure of an aesthetic claim to Beauty according to Kant (and drawn out by Cavell in "Aesthetic Problems in Modern Philosophy") is that I am making such a claim in a universal voice. I am making a claim (with rationale) on behalf of everyone for others to accept or discuss even though the outcome is not predetermined to be an absolute, certain conclusion (this is not an "objective" object, to the extent there are any). The art critic does not have better knowledge of the art, so much as a deeper perspective--their goal is to get you to see what they see (as @Moliere points out).

And I would tweak @Bitter Crank and @TheMadFool's emphasis on popular criteria (or "agreement"), to aspire to judgment based on the terms of that art (photography, modern dance, etc.--each having its own). A disagreement that regresses to simply unsubstantiated agreement (or personal taste) ignores the rational structure and evidence in art (as @Hanover points out).

It invokes a feeling of sadness to me, and a feeling of hope to you, which are subjective experiences that cannot be right or wrong. — darthbarracuda

We are also not making a judgment of value (as it were, that the critic has better taste; simply the authority to label a work "good" or "bad"). If there is an insightful critique, would we say it was "good" or "bad" (see @Moliere above) or are we more likely to say the critic is, in a sense, "right" or "wrong"? (Of course, these are different senses of the terms than someone solving a math equation.) In other words, if we say they are wrong, we can, for instance, discuss in what way they are not justified based on the entire context of the evidence in the work within the forms and terms and methods for that art, i.e., rationally.

This is the kind of claim that Wittgenstein is making when he describes the Grammar (criteria) for our ordinary use of concepts (each one, their own). He is postulating something which may be disputed based on the contextual evidence or a misunderstanding of the importance of, and what counts for, a concept (its criteria). The open-ended nature of aesthetic discussion leave some to dismiss it as "subjective" or irrational or emotional, but this may only be the desire for a standard of universal, absolute rationality (or to deny any rationality to art, actions, morality, etc.).

We see more and more that science, mainly physics, has strayed into the realm of philosophy and thought experiments. Seeing this what is your opinion on the subject? Do you believe science has become no longer the study of the world as it is, but as it may be? or do you see science as simply the persuit of knowledge no matter the form? — CallMeDirac

Straying a little from this OP, and given we do have philosophy of science (Kuhn, etc.), there has been a slow chipping away of the subjects of philosophy by science, though I don't begrudge science taking its place, nor believe that philosophy does not benefit from the lessons of science and that philosohy must be accountable to scientific advances.

However, the feeling of satisfaction with the method of science to provide certainty, predictability, universality, necessity, etc. has lead to an expectation that everything should meet that standard. Beginning with the Renaissance with Descartes and Kant dividing us from the "world", we've tried to sew that seeming distance back together with true knowledge, even logically necessary rationality. It reached a peak with the positivism of Comte, Carnap, Popper, and recently, even Stephen Hawking--the idea that only true/false empirically or logically-verifiable statements offer real knowledge of the world (the descriptive fallacy). This leads this scientific outlook (or its corrupted philosophical cousins) the feeling it can (and has more authority to) speak to the original and remaining purview of philosophy--aesthetics, morality, how to lead a better life, the investigation of our unreflected concepts, etc.

Even after Nietzsche, Emerson, Wittgenstein, Austin, Cavell, we still believe that science is the standard, and knowledge/theory the solution for the answer we demand. Despite its inability to teach us what we want to know about our moral realm, the problem of the Other, our skeptical doubt, etc., we still desire an answer of its certain form, thus its criteria for a valid solution are set in our cultural unconscious before even beginning to look. We want DNA and have forgotten how to (or fear to) assess the credibility of a witness and convict on circumstantial evidence. We follow the same desire to remove our responsibility in the face of the limitations of knowledge and the need for judgment, or assertion of ourselves, our acceptance of the other. This is science's belief its success allows its knowledge and standard to address our problems, "no matter the form".

There's a story of how Raven released the People from a cockle shell, stole the light, and brought it out to light up the world (the trickster?); another story of the beginning of our frailty, tied to our knowledge of the world; another story of a cave with a light that creates a new world, if only we could turn from our shadow.

These are origin stories. Theology? The genesis of everything? or (and?) Philosophy? (conducted through literature?** ) our (re-)birth, our birth to ourselves, the beginning of a journey, where everything is clearer, say, seen in a different light?

**Other stories: Hobbes' state of nature; Rousseau's first land fenced from that nature; Hume's creation story of creation stories (causality)...

real - not imaginary
real - not painted
real - not virtual
real - not made-up
real - not a hallucination
real - not a semblance — unenlightened

Is it a real painting, or a reproduction? Is it a real coin, or a counterfeit? Is it a real lake, or a mirage? Is it real magic, or prestidigitation? — Banno

how did we even come up with the concept of "real?" — TiredThinker

I see that @unenlightened and@Banno have already made the observations I would have based on Ordinary Language Philosophy (Austin, Wiggenstein, etc.) of the ordinary uses we have for the concept of "real", but the question remains of why did we come up with the philosophical (abstract) idea of "real"?

Now my history of philosophy is patchwork, but I offer that the common thread is the same desire that is behind "existence" or "consciousness": philosophy "came up" with its own picture of the world and its criteria for deciding what was real (thanks Plato) because of the problems created by our disappointments with our ordinary ways of judgment and certainty (such as in each case above). "We can't tell if they are lying to us? but we must know their pain? they could be a robot!" "I see tons of chairs; what is the 'meaning' of 'chair'? I don't see all of it! maybe what I see is not the 'true' chair?!" So, yes, our (philosophy's) imagination ran away with us to create, as one example, a quality opposed to the "appearance" of the world, and then that open question became an independent desire for a world/quality to be a foundation to our world --"reality".

I would only say that the skeptic's concerns about the world do reveal some truths about us: we are not ultimately in a position of knowledge toward each other. Our ideas of the structure of our world can not ensure, nor account for the failures of, communication. Philosophy's fear of the world, and desire for a solution to doubt, are not limited to philosophers alone: it is the human condition to want to reach past our partial, failing, contingent role in the world to something "real" that does not rely on us.

The self ‘is’ an expression, which is why [Heidegger] puts discourse as equiprimoridal [existing together as equally fundamental] with attunement and understanding. — Joshs

I agree here (though still not sure where this Heidegger is from--I assume Being and Time), though I don't see why our ordinary means aren't sufficient here. Our identity, as it were, our character, our individuality, our aversion to conformity Emerson would say, is not given, but claimed, by our voicing, our expression (including actions). Emerson removes the "therefore" and simply says " 'I think', 'I am' " as emphatic assertions, as it were: standing up for what matters to us, being responsible for the public language we say. To use your Heidegger--the self is an expression; it does not exist, it is expressed. As it is, we may not exist; we carve ourselves out, or not (aligning with others, along party lines, against our mother, etc.). Being and thinking are not ever-present states of the human condition--only possibilities.

And I agree with the post-metaphysical position you assume is necessary to any modern philosophy. I would only hope that you might see that the desire to have the relationship to the Other as constant, ensured, and/or pre-existent, and thus not subject to rejection/termination, is born of the same desire for the private, hidden self or subject--that these theoretical machinations are born of the same fear of our fragile, ephemeral (or lack of any) connection to the Other and of our personal burden to our voice and to answer the claim on us of the Other. This is not subject-object; it is two individual people left with the failure of knowledge to connect them.

Or perhaps you are thinking of something as easy as the context that precedes and allows for the possibilities of our concepts, communication.

...what makes things 'matter'[?] ...desire or need to do anything other than 'live'.... the ability to want things is what now drives our lives and allows us to want to do more than just survive. It means we have our own goals and desires to fulfill in life.... Without them, none of this would matter. — existentialcrisis

To return to the topic at hand, although I balked at the phrasing of "emotions" or "feelings" initially, I do agree that what makes us human is our interest, our attraction, our desires, our needs--as you say, what matters to us. Without that, not only would we just be surviving (which I would argue some only do), but those interests are the framework of all the criteria which shape our concepts. Unfortunately, philosophy has been neurotic about allowing our human expressions of these interests (or disinterest) to be what comprises us, without its theoretical nets.

The self is already a sequentially sel-transforming community. There is never a self-identical’I’ to return back to from moment to moment , because the very sense of this ‘I’ has been subtly changed by its being in the world. As Heidegger says, the self is a ‘between’ , not a private space. — Joshs

Your summation of Wittgenstein reverses his objective: he is trying to do away with the "private", the "self" (not to say, the personal). Yes, we are "sealed off from... the other" except through language/action (we could say we are even sealed off from ourselves (our subconcious) in the same way); this is not solipsism (there is nothing kept in reserve--our makeup is, as it were, entirely public), but rather a fact of our human condition. The Other just is separate--it is our responsibility to bridge that gap through expression and understanding (where does Heidegger conflict with this?); there is no more certain, theoretical explanation or solution for our situation--no "more intimate site", and, more importantly why do we feel the need for there to be?